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ond edition of his book, Miracles. Contempo‐ mechanistic materialism are compatible with
rary philosophers who have employed the atheism, mechanistic materialism seems to be
argument against physical determinism in‐ the worldview held by most atheists. So if I can
clude James Jordan and William Hasker,6 and show that the existence of reason makes sense
those who have turned it into an argument for in a theistic universe but not in a mechanistic
theism include Richard Purtill7 and J. P. More‐ materialist universe, I will have given some
land.8 Following John Beversluis,9 one of the good reasons for preferring theism to atheism.
argument’s critics, I will refer to this argument If an atheist wishes to propose a form of athe‐
henceforth as the argument from reason. ism that differs from mechanistic materialism, I
In presenting this argument, it is necessary would be happy to discuss that worldview as
to contrast the atheist’s view of the world with well.
that of the theist. I will present a model of the According to theism, the universe is a ra‐
atheist universe which I will call mechanistic tional place because it is the creation of a ra‐
materialism. Although worldviews other than tional being, namely God. Reason is, so to
speak, on the very ground floor of reality.
6 Given that God creates creatures, it is a least
William Hasker, Metaphysics (Downer’s Grove, IL:
Inter‐Varsity, 1983), 47‐50, and “The Transcendental possible that God might wish to provide those
Refutation of Determinism,” Southern Journal of Philoso‐ creatures with the some measure of the ration‐
phy 11 (1973), pp. 175‐83. ality which God himself possesses. And human
7
Richard Purtill, Reason to Believe (Grand Rapids: beings reflect God’s rational character by hav‐
Eerdmans, 1974), pp. 44‐46. ing the capacity think logically. If we make the
8
J. P Moreland, Scaling the Secular City (Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1987), pp. 77-105. further supposition that God has created hu‐
9
John Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational man beings in such a way that they consist of
Religion (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985) 58‐83. For a both a soul and a body, we might be able to say
response to his criticisms see Reppert, “Lewis‐ that while the body’s activities are determined
Anscombe,” above. by the laws of physics, it is possible for human
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THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON
beings, through their souls, to perceive not selves into complicated systems that work
merely physical activities in the environment, together to further the survival of the organism
but logical and mathematical truths that apply and the species. So, for example, your eye
throughout all that God has created. If some‐ might be said to have the “purpose” of allow‐
one in a theistic universe who had a spiritual as ing you to see. That is, your eye might be struc‐
well as a physical nature were to reason were tured, as a result of centuries of evolution, in
to reason to a conclusion logically, it might such a way that it serves the purpose of your
very well be that the person reached the logical seeing. But the particles that make up your eye
conclusion because the conclusion follows are just as mechanistically determined as the
logically from the premises, and not because particles of a rock falling down a mountain.
the laws of physics mandated that the physical What we call “drawing a rational inference”
particles in the brain move to such and such must be accounted for in the same way. Per‐
places. haps our brains are structured in such a way
Now let us consider the universe from the that the activity we call rational inference will
point of view of mechanistic materialism. The be performed, and that this capacity contrib‐
universe may have begun with a Big Bang, but utes to our survival individually and collec‐
what results from that Big Bang are material tively. But the description of this activity as
substances of various kinds. And material rational inference is not the description of this
substances go where they go, not because it activity on the most basic level of analysis. The
would be a good idea to go there, but because most basic level of analysis is that of physics,
such motion is mandated by the laws of phys‐ which makes no reference to purposes or logic
ics. If rocks fall down a mountain due to an whatsoever.
avalanche, they will not stop because they Daniel Dennett presents the commitment to
don’t want to hit and kill any people. On the mechanistic explanations as follows:
mechanistic view of the world, material parti‐
cles can, through evolution, organize them‐
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THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON
Psychology of course must not be question‐begging. is closed, that is, nothing apart from the physi‐
It must not explain intelligence in terms of intelli‐ cal order can cause anything to happen within
gence, for, instance by assigning responsibility for
the physical order. Third, all states supervene
the existence of intelligence to the munificence of an
intelligent creator, or by putting clever homunculi
on physical states. By this I mean that given the
at the control panels of the nervous system. If that state of the physical, there is only one way that
were the best psychology could do, then psychol‐ anything not physical (biological, psychologi‐
ogy could not do the job assigned to it.10 cal, sociological, moral) can be.
Now, the question that I want to pose is
Similarly, Dennett explains the appeal of whether reason is possible in a mechanistic
Darwinian theory on the grounds that universe. Let’s consider what reasoning
amounts to for a moment. If you are arguing
Darwin explains a world of final causes and teleo‐ with an atheist, it is reasonable to expect that
logical laws with a principle that is entirely inde‐
the atheist will present an argument of the
pendent of “meaning” or “purpose.” It assumes a
world that is absurd in the existentialist’s sense of
following type:
the term: not ludicrous or pointless, and this as‐
sumption is a necessary condition of any non‐ 1. If God exists, then there can be no gratui‐
question‐begging account of purpose.11 tous evil.
2. Probably, there is gratuitous evil.
I think that the materialist’s commitment 3. Therefore, probably, God does not exist.
can be described by three theses. One, causa‐
tion within the physical order is mechanistic, Presumably he hopes that some of you will be
that is, non‐purposive. Two, the physical order persuaded by this argument. But what does
that mean? First of all, the atheist is expecting
10
Daniel Dennett, “Why the Law of Effect Will Not Go us to apprehend the content of the premises
Away,” in Brainstorms (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977), and the conclusion. He expects us to accept the
pp. 46‐47.
11 premises as true and will no doubt provide
Ibid.
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THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON
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THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON
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THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON
So most rebuttals to the argument from ment “a round peg fits in a round hole” is
reason make the claim that explanation of a multiply realizable‐it can be a wooden peg, a
mental act of rational inference in terms of metal peg, or a plastic peg, etc. But any such
particle physics that makes no reference to peg or hole would have to satisfy a certain
reasons, and the explanation of that same act in structural specification to play a role in a trans‐
terms of propositional attitudes, intentionality, action described thus, in particular, it would
truth, and laws of logic, are compatible with have to be round.
one another. Given a proper relationship be‐ Another example would be the webbed feet
tween the explanation given at the physical of a duck. The natural webbed feet of a duck
level, the explanation at the mental level can will permit the duck to move in the water as
obtain also, and one needs no more to choose well as on land, but perhaps veterinary medi‐
between a mental and a physical explanation cine might be able to provide ducks whose
than one needs to choose between a biological webbed feet have been injured or destroyed
and a physical explanation. with artificial webbing that is molecularly very
But let’s take a look at what explanatory different form their natural webbing. Neverthe‐
compatibility amounts to in different cases. Let less even though its microstructure is different
us say we have an explanation, at the level of from natural webbing, its macrostructure is
particle physics, for a round peg going into a similar, and it is the macrostructure that en‐
round hole. In this case, the explanation in ables it to do its job. Putting steel in place of
terms of physics fails to make mention of pegs webbing will result in the duck not being able
or holes, but the physical structure of the peg function in water as effectively as they cur‐
and the hole, (as well as the force putting the rently do. We might call this kind of explana‐
peg into the hole), is what makes the causal tory compatibility structural compatibility.
transaction possible. It could be pointed out That is, even though the upper level explana‐
that one could have a peg and a hole made of tion uses terms which are not found in the
different types of material, and that the state‐ lower‐level explanations, the structure of
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THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON
13 14
Jerry Fodor, “Special Sciences” in his Representations Geoffrey Madell, Mind and Materialism (Edinburgh:
(Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981), pp. 127‐145. Edinburgh University Press, 1988), p. 40.
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THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON
showing that our mental states are or can be good reasons for believing it, then it cannot be
physical states, given that the universe is true that my acceptance of naturalism is a
purely physical. matter of conventional compatibility. What is
Further, it seems clear enough that conven‐ more, conventionally established characteris‐
tionally established characteristic cannot be tics of a person are also irrelevant in evolution‐
causally relevant. Structure, after all, is what ary explanation. After all, it cannot be a matter
counts in causal transactions. If a baseball of convention whether I survive long enough
breaks a window, this window breaking can be to pass on my genes. So any attempt to use
explained both at the level of particle physics evolution to account for the reliability of my
and at the level of macro‐mechanics. Some belief‐producing mechanisms is bound to fail if
properties of the baseball, such as its size and mental states are conventionally established
weight, and its velocity, are relevant to the characteristics.
question of whether it will break the window. Yet many materialist theories of mind seem
But other properties are clearly not relevant. If to provide compatibilist accounts of mecha‐
the ball was used in Sandy Koufax’s fourth nism and purpose which are, in the final analy‐
career no‐hitter, this may explain why the sis, based on conventional compatibility.
owner, (presumably a Dodger fan) would prize According to some versions of functionalism,
it over other baseballs he owns. But it is irrele‐ not only is it the case that mental states are
vant to whether the ball will or will not break multiply realizable, but that those mental states
the window upon impact. Whether a com‐ can be realized in just any medium. On this
puter’s activity is interpreted as a chess game view mental states are to be distinguished by
or a word‐processing program will not affect their causal role, and these roles can be played
the actual output of the computer, though it by anything from Swiss cheese to a Cartesian
will no doubt affect the input that its users mind. What this means to me is that nothing
generate. What this means is that if I want to about physical structure is relevant to whether
say that I accept naturalism because there are some particular causal role is played or not
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THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON
Davidson’s anomalous monism fails to do full jus‐ tion. Thus it is impossible to see how, on
tice to psychophysical causation in which the men‐ Davidson’s model, I could possibly believe that
tal qua mental has any real causal role to play.
anomalous monism is true because I accept
Consider Davidson’s account: whether or not a
given event has a mental description (optional read‐
Davidson’s argument that it is true.
ing: whether or not it has a mental characteristic) So it seems clear enough that one cannot
seems entirely irrelevant to what causal relations it accept both a materialist world‐view and the
enters into. Its causal powers are wholly deter‐ claim that someone has reached the conclusion
mined by the physical description or characteristic that materialism is true on the basis of argu‐
that holds for it; for it is under its physical descrip‐
ment only if mental states exist as a matter of
tion that it may be subsumed under a causal law.17
physical structure. The difficulty with this
suggestion is that in reasoning the mental
The problem with Davidson’s position is
states involved are supposed to be connected
that, in order for rational inference to be possi‐
by logical necessity, but one cannot given an
ble, beliefs must cause other beliefs, but also,
account of this logical necessity by describing
beliefs must cause other beliefs in virtue of
contingently connected physical states. There
their propositional contents. And this seems
is, to paraphrase Lessing, a big ugly ditch
impossible on Davidson’s model. In physical
between the necessary truths of reason and the
causation what are relevant are physical prop‐
contingent facts of neurochemistry. It is part of
erties, although this can be conceived of
what it means to have a thought or a belief that
broadly to include properties like “being
we perceive it as part of a network of logical
round,” being square,” “being webbed.” What
connections. If I believe that the cat is on the
clearly cannot play a role in physical causation
mat, I must also be capable of recognizing that
are properties ascribed as a matter of conven‐
I reject the belief that the cat is not on the mat.
17
But how can a physical state be the perception
Jaegwon Kim, “Epiphenomenal and Supervenient
of a logical connection. A physical state is
Causation” ch. 6 of Supervenience and Mind (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 106.
determined, not by the laws of thought, but by
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THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON THE ARGUMENT FROM REASON
the laws of physics. And the laws of physics of how interpreters could arise in a purely
sometimes allow people to form beliefs con‐ physical world.
trary to the laws of thought. What is more, if I conclude, therefore, that the Argument
we are purely physical systems, then whatever from Reason stands untouched by challenges
we know must come to us through causal based on the possibility of compatible explana‐
connection with particular states in the physi‐ tions. It does not follow from the fact that
cal world. Thus, if I see a computer monitor compatible explanations can sometimes be
before me, the monitor affects the rods and given for the same one and the same event that
cones in my eyes in such a way as to produce a brain process in a purely material universe
in me the belief that there is a computer moni‐ can be given both a true physical explanation
tor before me. But principles like the laws of and a true explanation as a rational inference.
non‐contradiction apply universally. Contra‐ Materialist accounts of reasoning typically
dictions cannot be true in Phoenix, in Houston, presuppose the existence of the very thing that
in Antarctica, on Venus, in the Virgo cluster, in they are trying to explain. According to materi‐
the furthest nebulae, or even in Southern Cali‐ alism, the universe begins with no mental
fornia. From what particular experience could states and somehow evolves them into exis‐
our knowledge of this have come? One can tence through the shuffling and reshuffling of
describe physical states to one’s heart’s content, material particles. Suppose, however, that
without being able to infer form the physical rationality were, so to speak, on the ground
system itself what logical laws are being floor of reality. Suppose the universe were the
obeyed in the course of, say, a person perform‐ result of the activities of a rational being. If that
ing a Barbara syllogism. If we come to a physi‐ were the case, then we could understand how
cal system armed with the laws of logic, then such a rational being could bestow beings in
we can, perhaps, interpret some physical ar‐ the universe with a measure of its rationality.
rangement as the representation of a logical In response to Dennett, I would want to say
law. But then one is still left with the problem that explaining reason in terms of reason is no
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18
I would like to thank Bill Hasker and Jim Lippard for
helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions
of this paper.
27