An Ambiguity in Aristotle,

EE VII 2 1236a23-4
Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.

ι
In the course of his paper 'Does Primacy Confer Universality? Logic
and Theology in Aristotle', Professor John Thorp (21-40) draws atten-
tion to an interesting passage in Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics. Thorp's
framing of his subtitle in terms of logic and theology may seem a bit
unusual for the contrast between ontology and the Aristotelian theo-
logical science, a contrast worded in the latter way from Natorp on
in the debate about the subject of Aristotle's primary philosophy. But
one of the senses given ontology has been 'the largest logical system'
(Feibleman). So from that angle there need not be any strenuous ob-
jection to the phrasing. Nor in regard to the text signalized from the
Eudemian Ethics does any special difficulty arise for the discussion of
the problem under that subtitle. The importance of the short text for
the controversy on the subject of the Aristotelian Metaphysics is in con-
sequence not affected by Thorp's formulation of the question. His con-
clusion in regard to it, at the end of his 'second objection' (21), is
strongly worded: 'If Aristotle is claiming that the study of substance
is necessarily the study of the common properties of beings, of what
makes beings beings, then he is refuted out of his own mouth and in
the most unequivocal language' (24).
Thorp's intervention in the controversy thereby highlights 'this little-
noticed but very rich passage' (21) from the Eudemian Ethics. The pas-
sage is indeed exceptionally enlightening in regard to the debated point.
But its wording conjures up a deep background in Aristotle's distinc-

APEIRON a journal for ancient philosophyBrought to you by | ULB Bonn

and science
Authenticated
0003-6390/89/2202 127-138 $3.00 E Academic Printing | 131.220.250.11
& Publishing
Download Date | 9/22/13 9:25 AM
128 Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.

tive vocabulary and highly original technique in the use of philosophical

terms. A close study of the passage, accordingly, can hardly fail to be
rewarding.
The passage is dealing with friendship. In explaining why some per-
sons deny that associations based on utUity or pleasure are friendships
in the sense of the Greek φιλία, it makes this rather puzzling asser-
tion: δια δε καθόλου εϊναι το πρώτον, λαμβάνουσι και πρώτον καθόλου·
τούτο δ' εστί ψευδός.1 As it has come down in the traditional unamend-
ed text, the sentence may be translated: 'But because the universal is
the primary instance, they also take a primary instance to be a univer-
sal; and this is false.' Without a second definite article before καθόλου
in the first clause the meaning 'But because the primary instance is
universal' might be grammatically possible, but it would leave little
point to the conclusion drawn in the second clause of the sentence.
If, however, the definite article before πρώτον in the Greek is deleted,
the first two clauses would read: 'But because the universal is primary,
they also take a primary instance to be a universal.' Or, if the definite
article is to appear before πρώτον in both clauses, the translation would
be: 'But because the universal is the primary instance, they also take
the primary instance to be a universal.'
In any of these three readings the sentence might seem at first sight
to imply a fallacious affirmation of the consequent. Aristotle's point
would have been that his adversaries were guilty of the fallacy. But
that interpretation runs counter to the thrust of the entire passage in
which the sentence occurs. In the passage the Stagirite is intent on
showing that the notion of friendship (φιλία) in its Greek sense does
in fact apply truly to associations motivated by profit or pleasure. He
is insisting that 'friendship' includes them under its range. In calling

1 EE, VII 2, 1236a23-24 (Bekker). Susemihl, though with hesitation, excises the
article before the first πρώτον, suggesting that if it be retained another το
should be inserted before the first καθόλου. Against this see Franz Dirlmeier,
Endemische Ethik (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1969), 384. The Oxford translation
(Solomon) is 'But because the universal is primary, they also take the primary
to be universal, and this is an error', unchanged in Barnes' revision. The Loeb
(Rackham) is 'and because the universal is primary they assume that also the
primary is universal; but this is untrue'. Decarie renders it in French 'mais
parce que 1'universel est premier, on croit que le premier est universe!: c'est
une erreur'. In German, Dirlmeier has 'Weil nun aber das Allgemeine ein
'Erstes' ist, fassen sie auch das "Erste" als allgemein' Context infra, nn 7-8

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.11
Download Date | 9/22/13 9:25 AM
 An Ambiguity in Aristotle, EE VII 2 1236a23-4 129

it 'the universal' in the first clause of the above sentence, he is em-

phasizing the stand that 'friendship' is predicated universally of all the
types enumerated. They are all forms of friendship, in the Greek sense.
If 'the universal' continued to have the same meaning in the second
clause of the sentence as it had in the first, Aristotle would obviously
have to say that the primary instance of friendship is universal in regard
to all three types. It would be universal, not in the univocal
(καθ'εν-12363ΐ6) way in which Socrates and Plato are each 'a man'
nor in the way 'plant' and 'animal' are species of the genus living thing',
nor yet in a manner that would be entirely equivocal. The text (al5-20)
had in this respect just compared 'friendship' and 'medical', which
designates one of its instances primarily and the others in only secon-
dary fashion. This means predication in the way called προς εν in the
Greek, and which in English may with G. E. L. Owen be felicitously
termed 'focal meaning' or 'focal analysis'.2
If this sense of 'universal' were retained in the second clause of the
above sentence, Aristotle would in consequence have to say that the
affirmation in the clause is true, not false. For him the assertion 'a
primary instance is universal' would in the context be correct. He would
be in full agreement with it if it referred to the kind of universality ex-
plicitly called 'universal' in the first clause of the sentence. He could
not brand it as wrong. Yet he declares that the statement is false, and
he shows no interest whatever in pointing out a fallacy in the way it
is alleged to have been inferred by his adversaries.
'Universal', however, has another and better known sense. It is the
meaning regularly met in logic. This sense is incisively explained in
the various meanings of technical philosophical terms given in the
Metaphysics. An object is a universal 'in the sense that it contains many
things by being predicated of each, and by all of them, e.g., man, horse,
god, being severally one single thing, because all are living beings.'3

2 'Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle', in I. During and

G E. L. Owen, eds., Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century (G teborg:
Studia Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia XI 1960) 169-87
3 Metaph V 26, 1023b30-2; Ross trans., 1928. Barnes' revision, following the 1908
edition, has 'and that each and all of them, e.g., man, horse, god, are one,
because all are living things'. Apostle translates it '... is universal in this man-
ner: it contains many in the sense that it is a predicate of each, and they all
are one in the sense that each is one; for example, a man, a horse, and God
are all animals'. The point is that 'each and all of them' must coincide in the

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.11
Download Date | 9/22/13 9:25 AM
130 Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.

In this ordinarily encountered type of universality each of the individu-

als or each of the species is identical one by one with the universal
nature. The instances coincide with it, not together, but only each
in turn. With this change in the meaning of 'universal' in the second
clause Aristotle could consistently claim that the universal by focal
reference is not universal in the sense taken from the fifth book of
the Metaphysics, just as in the seventh book of that work he could
say that ουσία is the primary instance of being and yet that no univer-
sal is an ουσία.
But can so sudden a change from one sense of a term to another,
without at all alerting the reader to what was happening, be tolerated
in the one short sentence? In a book or article written today the am-
biguity would certainly not be admissible. But the Eudemian Ethics has
the format of school λόγοι, a literary genre common to the Aristotelian
treatises. In them thought can be expressed concisely, and left for ex-
planation in the oral discussion after the reading. Would the twofold
sense of 'universal' be obvious enough to Aristotle's hearers to be left
stand as we have it in our present text?
This question would be interesting enough even if its importance
were confined to the one passage in the Eudemian Ethics. But the topic
had moreover been placed in a wider and more controversial context
by Thorp at the 1985 meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Associa-
tion in Montreal. Thorp looks upon the passage as opposed to the in-
terpretation usually given to the texts in the Metaphysics that deal with
the object of the primary philosophy. These texts have been common-
ly understood to mean that the Aristotelian theological science is
universal because its object, the divine, is primary. Thorp maintains
that in our sentence from the Eudemian Ethics Aristotle seems to be
denying in the clearest possible terms that primacy confers universali-
ty. The conclusion thereby suggested is that the Aristotelian theology
cannot be the universal science of being qua being, and that the texts
of the Metaphysics need reinterpretation to bring them into line with
the denial of universality to the primary instance in the case of focal
meaning.
In this way Thorp has brought out a new consideration for the tradi-
tional controversy about the object of the Aristotelian primary philos-
ophy. The problem naturally calls for a close examination of the relevant
passage in the Eudemian Ethics, in order to determine exactly its origi-
nal meaning. If the short sentence is in fact taking the notion 'univer-
sal' in two such different senses, the reason for the ambiguity will
require discussion and the plausibility of Aristotle's using it in so cryptic

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.11
Download Date | 9/22/13 9:25 AM
 An Ambiguity in Aristotle, EE VII 2 1236a23-4 131

a way will have to be gauged. If the procedure stands up under se-

vere scrutiny, the meaning of the sentence may then be compared with
the relevant doctrines of the Metaphysics.

II

The passage in the Eudemian Ethics (VII 2, 1236al5-33) commences with

the assertion that there are necessarily three forms of friendship. These
are based respectively on virtue, on utility, and on pleasure. They are
understood in focal meaning, with one instance the primary friend-
ship and the others secondary types through reference to it. The rela-
tionship is explained through the example of the notion 'medical'. The
notion is primarily located in medical science or art.4 That primary in-
stance is dominant whenever a mind or something corporeal or an in-
strument or an activity is called medical. It is the instance whose notion
(λόγος-a20) is present in all the other instances.5 For example, it is
found in 'medical practitioner' and 'medical instrument'. Both share
the notion 'medical', though the man does not share the notion 'in-
strument' nor the instrument the notion 'man', and the instrument is
medical because of the use made of it by the practitioner.6 In all the
instances, then, it is the primary instance that is in question.7

same predicated notion, while each remains itself and distinct from the others.
'Each as individual' (ως έκαστον-531) is the object that is predicated univer-
sally. But while being that object it does not thereby coincide with any of the
other individuals. Socrates is 'a man'. Plato is 'a man'. But Socrates does not
become Plato. Ross' 'severally' carries the notion correctly.
4 See Metaph, IV 2, 1003bl, XI 3, 1061a4-5.
5 The text at 1236a20 may be clarified by emending it, as Bonitz suggested, to
read 'in all'. Cf. πανταχού at a22 and at Metaph, IV 2, 1003bl6. On the emen-
dation see Enrico Berti, 'Multiplicite et unite du bien selon EE I 8,' in Paul
Moraux and Dieter Harflinger, eds. Untersuchungen zur Eudermschen Ethik (Ber-
lin: De Gruyter 1971), 174, n 55. Against the emendation, see Dirlmeier, 383-4.
6 Here the reference to the primary instance is graded. The instrument, for in-
stance a bandage or a splint or a salve, or today a stethoscope or thermome-
ter, is medical because of the use made of it by the practitioner, while the
practitioner is medical because of his immediate relation to medical art.
7 ... εν δε τω του ιατρού λόγω ουκ έοτιν ό του οργάνου, ζητείται μεν ούν παν-
ταχού το πρώτον. ΕΕ, VII 2, 1236a22-3 (Susemihl text).

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.11
Download Date | 9/22/13 9:25 AM
132 Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.

Here a few remarks are in order. Medical art is what the practition-
er qua 'medical' possesses. It is what the instrument qua 'medical' is
directed by. But intrinsically the man remains a man, and the instru-
ment remains the kind of thing it is, even though both are 'medical'
through their added reference to the primary instance, medical art.
Neither becomes that art, in the way that Socrates and Plato are each
'a man', severally. In the way 'a man' is predicated universally of hu-
man individuals it expresses the intrinsic nature of each instance. In
the way 'medical' is predicated of all its instances it coincides in na-
ture with only the primary instance, and in the other instances remains
outside their natures though adding the reference to the nature of that
primary instance. The result is that while the nature predicated univo-
cally is intrinsically present in each of the instances, so that Socrates
is a man and Plato is a man, the nature predicated through focal refer-
ence remains in the primary instance only. Practitioner and instrument
do not coincide in one intrinsic nature through being medical, though
Socrates and Plato coincide in the same human nature through being
each 'a man'.
The sentence considered earlier (supra, n 1) now follows in immedi-
ate sequence. The primary instance looked for in all the instances is
expressly referred to as 'the universal'. Because here the universal is
the primary instance, Aristotle's adversaries are reported to be refus-
ing to acknowledge other instances of friendship. They see that the
primary instance of friendship, namely friendship based on virtue, does
not coincide in notion (ου γαρ έφαρμόττοντος ενός λόγου ... οταν ή
πρώτη μη έφαρμόττη) with associations based on utility or pleasure.
If it were universal (for them) through the fact of being primary, its
notion would have to coincide with those of the other associations.
On that ground they deny those associations the status of friendship.8

... οϊ δ' όταν ή πρώτη μη έφαρμόττη, ως ούσαν καθόλου αν, εϊπερ ην πρώτη,
οΰδ' είναι φιλίας τάς ολλας φασίν εστί δε πολλά είδη φιλίας ΕΕ VII 2,
1236a28-30 (Susemihl text) At 28a the accusative absolute ούσαν marks the
apodosis as a conclusion of the adversaries: 'they say that if it [the primary
friendship] were universal by reason of being primary, the other kinds would
not be friendships'. This brings out even more strongly that the adversaries
are the ones who are introducing into the argument the notion of a universali-
ty that has each instance coincide severally with the nature expressed by the
term, and who are drawing the conclusion that since associations based on
utility and pleasure do not coincide in notion with the association based on
virtue these latter cannot be friendships Aristotle does not give any further

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.11
Download Date | 9/22/13 9:25 AM
 An Ambiguity in Aristotle, EE VII 2 1236a23-4 133

This brings out clearly enough what Aristotle takes his adversaries
to mean by the universality they deny to focal reference. It is a univer-
sality in which the nature of the primary instance would have to be
intrinsic to the natures of the other instances, in the way in which hu-
man nature is intrinsic to both Socrates and Plato, or the generic na-
ture 'animal' is intrinsic to both man and beast. It would be the kind
of universality described in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (see supra,
n 3). Aristotle has no hesitation in denying that a primary instance is
universal when 'universal' is being understood in that way, for friend-
ship through virtue (the primary instance of the notion) does not enter
intrinsically into the natures of friendship for utility or friendship for
pleasure. Taking 'universal' in the sense fixed for it by his adversaries
in the discussion, Aristotle could readily agree that the conclusion 'a
primary instance is universal' (a24-5) is false.
But is it really plausible that Aristotle would proceed in this way?
In one and the same sentence would he be willing to use the term
'universal' in the sense of focal meaning in the first clause, and then
without warning use it in a different sense in the second clause?

explanation in the compact text of the Eudemian Ethics. But even in the more
extensive discussions in the Metaphysics he is content with asserting categori-
cally that no universal is an ουσία while maintaining that ουσία is the primary
instance of being. In this regard W.W. Fortenbaugh, 'Aristotle's Analysis of
Friendship: Function and Analogy, Resemblance, and Focal Meaning/ Phrone-
sis 20 (1975) 51-62, acknowledges the focal reference framework for friendship
in the Eudemian Ethics, while considering it mistaken: "The author of the Eude-
mian Ethics, whether he be a younger Aristotle or a later imitator, may have
thought that he could apply focal analysis ...' (57), but "The Eudemian Ethics is
mistaken in suggesting focal analysis ...' (62). Fortenbaugh insists that 'pleas-
ure is not conceptually dependent upon perfect friendship' (58), and that
friendship directed to utility 'is not formally dependent upon the friendship of
morally good men' (59). But in fact the situation here satisfies adequately the
framework of Metaph II I,993b24-31. Quite as the primary instance of being is
imitated by the lesser instances, so the lower human associations imitate in
lesser ways the human association that is highest. In the focal reference frame-
work the secondary instances can be literally and genuinely friendships, even
though they are essentially different from the primary instance. Here 'secon-
dary' does not mean figurative or improper. The secondary instances are
authentically friendships (in the Greek sense), just as quantities and qualities
and actions are genuinely beings even though they do not coincide in mean-
ing with the primary instance, ουσία.

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.11
Download Date | 9/22/13 9:25 AM
134 Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.

'Universal', as far as can be determined, was a word of his own coin-

age. He had given it an accepted sense in his logical works and in the
lists of meanings in the fifth book of the Metaphysics. He could take
that sense as well known among his hearers. In the present context
he had to explain the focal reference sense in which he was applying
it to the primary instance of friendship. The other sense did not need
any explanation and could be brought in without apology or warning.
The abrupt passage to it in the same sentence seems intolerable for
us today. But in public reading the varying emphasis on the words
can easily forestall error, and today in writing the use of inverted com-
mas can have the same effect. One may say without fear of being mis-
understood that Aristotle's naive realism is not 'naive', conveying by
the tone of voice or by the commas the meaning that his adherence
to the natural trend of human cognition was not by any means uncrit-
ical. Correspondingly, in the circumstances, it does not seem too much
to credit Aristotle with saying that the focal reference universal is not
'a universal'. With Aristotle's intricate and penetrating account of
human cognition before one's mind, the derogatory sense of 'naive'
would at once appear ruled out. For hearers accustomed to associate
'universal' with identity in a nature shared severally, the primary in-
stance in focal meaning would immediately stand in contrast to it, with-
out need of further explanation.

Ill

The comparison with the relevant doctrines of the Metaphysics may be

made briefly. In the Metaphysics (IV 2, 1003a33-b22) being, like friend-
ship in the Eudemian Ethics, is meant neither univocally nor entirely
equivocally, but with focal meaning. The same example, 'medical' is
used as an illustration. The primary instance of being is a nature
(φύσις-a34), namely ουσία. Through reference to ουσία the accidents
are beings. Within the realm of ουσία itself, matter and composite are
beings because of the form (IV 3, 1005a33-bl; VII17, 1041a6-b28), and
ultimately through reference to separate form. Separate form, a na-
ture that is divine, thereby specifies the primary philosophy as a the-
ology (VI1, 1026alO-32). Divine being is the primary instance whose
stability and permanence all other instances of being strive to imitate
and attain as far as is possible for them (IX 8, 1050b28-29; cf. Gael I
9, 279a25-30; de An II 4, 415a26-b7).

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.11
Download Date | 9/22/13 9:25 AM
 An Ambiguity in Aristotle, EE VII 2 1236a23-4 135

Each secondary instance of being, however, retains its own nature,

which is different from the nature of the divine. Each is a man, a color,
a size or some other kind of being. But they are all ranged universally
under the notion of being, through focal reference to the divine being.
They are thereby brought under the one universal science of being qua
being. No matter what they are in their own natures, they are all be-
ings through reference to the primary ουσία. The reference can be grad-
ed (see supra, η 6).
Though the primary instance of being is an ουσία and functions
universally as the object of the science of being qua being, Aristotle
can still maintain in the Metaphysics (VII 13, 1038b8-35; 16, 1041a3-5)
that no universal is an ουσία. The primary instance of ουσία is a par-
ticular kind of being. It is not universal in the sense that would make
each of its secondary instances coincide with it in nature. It is a partic-
ular nature in itself, and not a common aspect intrinsic severally to
a number of individuals.
Accordingly Aristotle's position in the Metaphysics with regard to
being parallels exactly that of the Eudemian Ethics vis- -vis friendship.
The object that is universal for the science of being qua being is the
primary ουσία. But because it is an ουσία, it is something that no univer-
sal in the ordinary sense can be. Just as in the Eudemian Ethics, Aristo-
tle can maintain that the nature predicated universally through focal
meaning is the primary instance and also that here the primary instance
is not a universal.
The adverbial character of the Greek expression το καθόλου renders
the ambiguity of the term somewhat less harsh than in the case of its
English equivalent. In Greek the expression means that which is said
of the whole group.9 It emphasizes first and foremost the nature that

9 In Aristotle a notion can be 'said of or 'predicated of the whole group

through focal meaning as well as univocally. These are certainly two very
different senses of universality. Universal extension by focal meaning keeps
the predicated nature in the primary instance alone, universal extension in
univocal fashion locates it severally in each of the instances. There should be
no objection to referring to that situation by the term 'ambiguity' in English.
No pejorative insinuation is thereby implied. The word is merely standing for
Aristotle's expression 'said in many ways' or 'meant in many ways'
(πολλαχώς) Far from denoting confusion, this 'ambiguity' is Aristotle's stan-
dard technique for clarifying basic philosophical terms. I have discussed that
point at some length in The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3rd

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.11
Download Date | 9/22/13 9:25 AM
136 Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R.

is envisaged in the members of the group, and concomitantly the com-

mon status that in ordinary predication would keep the object from
being an ουσία. But when the focal meaning framework is expressly
laid down, as is the case in the relevant passages, Aristotle can center
the attention on the particular nature of the primary instance and show
how it extends to the other instances through reference in a way that
does not make their natures coincide. What is predicated universally
does not then become 'a universal', in the way the hearers would spon-
taneously understand that term.
On all counts, then, the discussion of the predication of 'friendship'
in the Eudemian Ethics follows the same general lines as the treatment
of being that is found in the Metaphysics. The primary instance of friend-
ship is the association that is distinctively human. It is the association
that springs from right reason and virtuous choice. That is the proper-
ly human way of bringing people together. The other human associa-
tions imitate it in lesser ways. In virtue of that focal reference they are
friendships, but only in a secondary degree. This is sufficient to make
the primary instance universal through focal meaning. But friendship
based on utility is never friendship based on virtue, nor is it ever friend-
ship based on pleasure. Each of the secondary instances retains its own
nature, different from the nature of the primary instance. Correspond-
ingly, with being, the secondary instances are beings through refer-
ence to the primary instance whose permanence and stability they
imitate and strive for as best they can. But the secondary instances re-
tain their own natures as substances or accidents. They do not become
divine. They are not gods, even though they are beings through refer-
ence to the divine.
The sentence from the Eudemian Ethics, therefore, far from oppos-
ing the theological interpretation of the Aristotelian primary philoso-
phy, significantly supports it and illuminates it through the application
of the same general principles in another field. The procedure in each
case is the same. Unlike entropy in the physical world, the mentality
remains constant through the treatises in both the Metaphysics and the
Eudemian Ethics. The sentence highlighted by Professor Thorp repays

ed (Toronto· Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 1978), 107-35. In the

present instance the Academic background of Aristotle's hearers would tend
towards locating 'friendship' in a primary instance that would be universal in
the one sense but not in the other. Surely that situation can be described in
English as ambiguity in the use of the term 'universal'.

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.11
Download Date | 9/22/13 9:25 AM
 An Ambiguity in Aristotle, EE VII 2 U36a23-4 137

careful study, for it centers attention upon the crucial contrast between
the two different types of universality involved in the discussion.
Though the umbrella as made to measure covers only the head of the
elephant, its location can be varied in ways that allow the other mem-
bers to come in one fashion or another under its shelter. Because
πολλαχώς, focal meaning adapts its contours on each occasion to the
varying natures of the instances in which it is found. The perfection
signified remains the same. But the secondary instances share it in
different degrees or relationships.
In reply, then, to the question 'Does primacy confer universality?'
Aristotle's answer is clearcut. The primary instance in focal reference
is necessarily universal to all the focal instances. But universality in
the sense that each secondary instance would severally coincide in na-
ture with what is universally predicated in this focal way, is thereby
necessarily excluded. No secondary instance can coincide with what
the primary instance is, in the focal type of universality. The conten-
tion of Aristotle's adversaries was that because here the universal by
focal reference is the primary instance, a primary instance is a univer-
sal. Aristotle categorically brands this conclusion as false. That is the
reverse side of the coin. The obverse side, Aristotle's own tenet, would
be: 'Because what is universal through focal reference is the primary
instance, it is not universal in the sense of being predicable severally
of each of its focal instances'. The ambiguity is fully that sharp, and
has to be respected if one wishes to appreciate the depth of Aristotle's
thought.

Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies

59 Queen's Park Crescent East,
Toronto, ON
M5S 2C4

Brought to you by | ULB Bonn

Authenticated | 131.220.250.11
Download Date | 9/22/13 9:25 AM
 Brought to you by | ULB Bonn
Authenticated | 131.220.250.11
Download Date | 9/22/13 9:25 AM