2 The Musical Work and Conscious Experiences ‘We are living through the aftermath of prychologism, which stil has many followers, particularly in Poland, ale though elsewhere is grip ha been broken and itis seen 3 thing ofthe past! Expecially to are theorist and musicolo Biss, who themselves taken interest in philosophy yee are Inclined to make general assertions regarding the objects of ther investigations it scems almost obvious that a work of art, and especially 3 musical work, i something “mental” cluster of imaginings or auditory experiences. I can almost hear some of my readers saying: why does he author com- plicate a simple matter? A musical work is above all cer fain cluster of sounds with which one associates feelings, thoughts, and imaginings. And, as we learn from physicists and psychalogists, sounds are nothing but sense-experiences and therefore mental experiences, The same applis to pre= sentations felings, and so-called presentational judgments Tis therefore clear that the musical work i something. mental. And ie follows that no single musical work is the same for several different mental subjects, or for the same ‘subject listening to 2 second performance of "the same” 1, Pech, hati the etment at mena acs(r concons cxperene of ober thin theme ent tena, finde port ‘nos really among people without haope undertuning so, secre, dk tey need roi phono vows mace so Conscious Experiences work, All we have are conscious experiences: on the one hhand, experiences while composing 2 given work and, on the other, experiences of listeners whose nerve-endings a stimulated by sound waves produced by the vibrations ofan instrament being played. Whatever the composer expeti= enced islong pas, and we can conjecture it only ou the bats ‘of our own reactions in the course of listening. Strictly speaking, there is nothing more than a growing chester of experiences resembling each other in thelr sponse to sin lar physical stimuliehe sound waves, When, in common speech, we talk 2 if there existed a single musical work (or example, Szymanowski’s Fourth Symphony) we ate expres- sing ourselves imprecisely, yielding either o certain ings Luc suggestions and fietions or to a usage convenient in daly lif, Bor we must not yield to such imprecision when con dlacting dheoretiesl investigations. Acknowledging the sults of seientifc investigations, we know that physics and psychology have claifed ths issue: a musical work is ob- viously a selection of mental iets conditioned by physical stimuli, The problem of identicy of a musical work arses from the illusions created by the imprecisions of ordinary language. The scientific tak ito describe and explain caus- ally the experiences we undeego while listening t certain ‘musical work ‘Unraveling the assumptions hidden in psychologisic no tions ofare—especially musie~-would take ws 00 far. Lets confine ourselves to an attempt to acquire the experience of objects that we wish to study and eo remain thf to data ofthis experience, accommodating to them the sense of ‘ur assertions and not falsifying these aeertions even in the name of the most "scientific" theorists within certain philor sophical movements —here have chiefly in mind the postv iss and the neopostivists. Let us inguice whether its por- sible to accept the foregoing view of a musical workConscious Experiences Fics ofall, we need to reach an understanding of the ter “mental.” What in fact do psychologistic theorists mean when they claim thata musical werk "mental"? This seems to mean thatthe work isa conscious human experience ora prposeflly selected cluster of such experiences, among which the mostimportantroleisplayed by so-called auditory experiences. When we ask what leads poychologistc theor Jsts to such an assertion, we find cha it isthe acceptance of another concept related to the mental. According 0 this concept, “the mental” covers everything that is neither physical no existing independent of conscious experiences Such matters ate called “subjective,” and the subjective is impercepsbly identified with experience or ite constituent parts. Only che material i regarded as having independent (On one point we can agree at once: a musical product is not existentially independent fits composer's conscious perience. Iemay be that i is noe even fllyexistentalyin- dependent ofits listeners conscious experiences. If we were therefore to agree to the above sense ofthe term “subjec- tive” —without identifying that which s “subjective” in this sense with a conscious experience otis constituent parts — ‘hen we would have co acknowledge that in this sense amu sical work is “subjective” Sill, om thie basis there is no rea son to assert that it is something mental or an element in some conscious experience. Further, f we were to accept the assertion of critical realism, according to which all qualita- tive products famiong ethers, sounde and tral structures we perceive inthe ouside world) ae “ony subjective” (a matter for frteaching doubts eventhough the whole of conrempo- rary physics is written in this spirit), “objective” existence ‘may here be ascribed only to waves from material fields of force. Even then it would not be possible to claim thae a ‘musical work is a conscious experience or its constituent Conscious Experiones a cements. Arguing against this assertion i the very fct that all experiences and their elements are acessible to cognition only inactsof “relecion, "Le. inner experience. and:hatno fone cognizes musical workin these kinds of at. Also, sure- Ty all will agree that 2 musical work is not an ac of con- sciousness thats, an ac of listening or imagining. Even the paychologizng theorists would reject such an interpretation ‘of their position, Were we to agree on the “subjectivity” of| isi works in the above-mentioned sense, we would st thesame time have to reject the assertion thatthese works are conscious experiences or their constituent pars, since expe riences in this sense are not “subjective” This isso because experiences are nor existentally dependent upon other expe riences for instance, the ats of reflection” directed upon them. Peshaps the paychologizing eheorsts would say that the music work is che content ofthe composer's experiences ds {ng composition or those ofthe listeners during one ofthe performances. Unfortunately, the term “content of experi= ence” is ambiguous when used by psychologists, and in cis generally undetected ambiguity lies the apparent strength of the psychologistc theorist® notion. They ofen avoid crite ieisms by moving impercepubly from one meaning to 21 ther They also understand “content” 0 widely that every= thing which is neither an act of consciousness nota material abject becomes the “content of 4 conscious experience Such a definition precludes response, for in this sense tent" ex definione may’ refer equally to's musical work ot any sensibly perceived object, taken precisely as petcel But this extension of reference forthe concept “content” is ansbuse oflanguage: the concept explains nothing, buc with its aid nothing can be denied, We must, therefore, begin by ‘stablishing a useful meaning of this term. Since, however, {nthe case af « musical work we can only be concerned with28 Conscious Experiences suditory perceptions or experiences that have thee psycho~ logical base in these experiences, we may ask what one ought te understand by the “content” of these experiences. Our atstude toward a musical work may be purely inelleetual— ‘for instance, without listening to any performance we try ovunderstand of pass judgment on a work. While listening to a musical work, we do experience a variety of feings. Bot if we could demonstrate that a musical work, indepen dent of what iis lke, differs fom even these directly given contents of perception or auditory imagining, chen a fortiori this would have had to be tue in relation to all other con= scious experiences here taken into consideration [et as then allims that if “content” is really to be some thing mental in the sense ofan experience of consciousness, perience tnd that part which we apprehend in the experience, yet not form part ofthe experiencing itself. This s because the ex- periencing and all its elements form a conscious act, and we Fave aleeady agreed that the act ie not under consideration The element we seek from an experience cannot at the same time be something to which our experience refers, given us ‘while the experience i taking place, since this constitutes che ‘Object of experience. What then in auditory perception does the effective element of our listening experience? Te is not easy f0 answer this question if our answer is to tive a faithful account of the fies, neither oversimplfying them nor replacing them vith something totally alien. fn four discussion, howeves, the theoreical situation is sim= plifedto the extent thatthe sopporters of psychologism have 2 ready answer aso what constitutes the content of auditory perception. They will reply: iis simple—that which con- Situtes an effective element of auditory perception is none ‘ther than the sensible auditory experience: justas, they will fd, the content of visual perceptions wsual experience, Conscious Experiences » and the content of tactile perception is tactile experience. In this manner everything would he seted and the supporters of psychologism would be convinced that this answer com stiuted the final catfication of the problem, if (a) there ‘were absolutely no doubts about the meaning of auditory, visual, and other “experiences,” and (b) we were certain that what we had in mind was undoubtedly an effective pat of an experience of a perception—be it ator, Vista, or any other kind, afortunatly even though senscexperiences” have been Aiscussed in European philosophy for several hundred years and forthe last ninecy years, begining wich Fechner, they have been stdied by experimental psychologists, neither of these problems has been finally setled. We eannot, for ine stance, use the concept of “element” in Mach’ sens, because thisconcepe as introduced and used in his Analy der Emp lunges arnbigsous. Tes tre that since Mach’ day the d= cussion ofthis matter has progressed (¢hough profesional psychologists working experimentally have made only 2 Small contribution), particularly inthe work of Bergson and thephenomenologists Huser), Schappy Hofmann, and Cot rad-Martius. Bue iff were to refer t0 these views even in passing, my investigation into the musical work would tuen ino an analysis ofthe steuceure and process of ensc-experi- nce Tewill perhaps to say thatthe so-called per= Ceptions are neither objects given usin sense-experience nor their dzcetly given qualitative characteristics, bu rather ce ‘Gin quabtative data that we experience when we are objec- tively piven things or other objects that have Been qualita tively determined. In particular, auditory "perception®” are notsounds, tones, chords, ormelodies, oreven thei qualia tive characteristics such as pitch or coloring, the harmonic ‘quality ofa chord, or the shape of a melody, Tones, coeds, and melodies are given usin simple auditory experience asx» Conscious Esperenes fies fr instance. as constituents ofa indvidal pe formance In percving therm, however we oer hats data that, Being fui, pas into one anothee Thee oar ce thre mpomile deere ec oe out tuening them into objects) But tat. tpee cn Sesoimchow lated in thi generalcaratertonke eed, Jepearing within the confines of audoriy pores weetecn, Tice a special cognitive act, a spechl Kind of suchas even he simplest whosequasne eee Ncsmanit theca sell trough Baul os oho Be experiential dats o auditory pec ce them. A soundoraotethit we har ences bree {Rone seconds givennanone nd tienes ee ound continaui), while the experiential dataancene tee new. changeable in their satin the mee manifestations) inthe way they come by these ofthe qualities, to dominate ing rou hough its inital sound has passed) on enh 2 ts pried. The chord des nay ERREEL as some naively think, ofexperiental data nos rene danjcerstics identical with such data Itmaniése neces sound einen raion othem, Ths, even thesiape Sutin concrete individual performanceataree ea ‘work doesnot constitute any effcive parte mulpicny Conscins Experi a othe auciory experi dt. Even if we wert inlude such dataamong theclements ofthe percep tal experince — apdthisincsioni, sel eemarked, mater of apute~cven then the sound prods fon part ofthe performance ‘would no const any par of tha cxperince ann hat se woul be in transcendent relation to. Ths does not Prevent hee Beng palpably given fo ws ‘Ignoring the question ofowit happens thatin experience ing the fd dts of aitory experiences we ne tral products, fom which the pevrmnce of te musical work Sconwrocte, we car ssert only tha propercormeltons take lace between the multiplies ofexpeicntal das and Sound products forming pa of the perfomance we ate to perceive crn decid sound proc then i he calm of our auditory experiential data there mos appear roulapities of sound proce tht ima determined ay tithe low each othe or appentcontemporenecshy set vice vr fare experience cetain muleplesienafsudiory Experiential dt, sea consequencethere ust appecramony the objects we hea sounds, notes, chord ane melodic) certain filly determined produce with minocly deter mined properties, Desptethe work of. Sep. these cone tations in the resi of sory perepon have not ben Aeveloped in deal Conceming val perception lation. Ships have Been worked out much mote fly Te emai 4 fit that these ae correlations of only tivo mutalycxlae sive realms. Inoter ond if the eta ef-audory peeps ves, then the ou, tones, chores, melo prodts thac we perceive objectively ae no the convert af suite ercevedexpeienss, and therefor,» foto ae not the Even mores, nosound produc of higher order, fr example, eran deteriined melody woe into tae2 Conscious Experiences compan and an in hindi alles os com Sxpernce, When we psc the mod sa ee Berience on theone had, a mulupictyofBaidectereseel dha, and she auitory aspects constuced upon hens Oy the other nd, ou se of perception ontaing s rerrigd incrtion lating otha ody an tention tae dang tat, and nt the immediately present conten sie eof petetion, Ths intention elas coun ee ters Ginenacerainmode ofuniestniing te nal can be concluded Hat the nein mea Ler foc Ss ately om the heard melody, et ns hehe properties possessed by che melody snd ican core to Keown neu item may fom t melody sy can he given ina immanent, elects peng (aoc by any defnitionasnsecxpercses) whe eke Sal mcody now occuring pen objet ieee reflective, outer seaseexpenence: Oat a inne wth akc ie of the conn dts we ar expen in same may be suid owe all elements and Uepeeies me mets ian individual pearance ef any Wk of ee They ae all objects o objective moments to whisk of aitry pereepin ees, bu hey se sor none the content ofthe audtory peep, The same ce kere about these objet or objective moments ia stone experiences, be thy ats of undesunding score oon femanceonsraced on theimmedate auto reve or ac ot elngsenewiing with he sara of ee es given sin pecepion st pevormanecofs parte nee Thisbods tue aso in reson to al etn eth only inet witht heacng meres aparece femanceorisance dsc with rend ences the deta of Chopin's B Minor Sonat Conscious Experiences 33 “Thus one nvdet performanceofa masa work fms no part of eonscous experiences and consequent isnot ny sense mental Only primitive understanding of mental formnes of mune! work, onthe othen could suppor this notion inesence absurd that he performance of 2 msi srork is mental n character A fron hi appli co the Imusial work, to Chopin B Minor Sonat, which, a one ad the same, mani tscfto ws throng vay af pee formanoss, and-vas we have shown is tadially diferent fromits various performancesand forms clement of cin Inedaont ti expences Scendent ancien higher level thn he india porto mance: we hae here something Hike a wanscendeee of + second order (‘rancendhsmany caning Heretencans Simply "stepping beyond conscious experiences and hetrcle- rent). Ths in ial establisis the ct thatthe work oF ‘use fcertain determinate one like Chopin's B Minot Sor tata) nether mental nor subjective hai, belonging the Glemenes or moments of the pereving Subject.