What Disaster Response Management Can Learn From Chaos Theory

Conference Proceedings
May 18-19, 1995

Edited by
Gus A. Koehler, PhD.
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CHAOS THEORY AND DISASTER RESPONSE MANAGEMENT:

LESSONS FOR MANAGING PERIODS OF EXTREME INSTABILITY

L. Douglas Kiel, Ph.D.

University of Texas at Dallas121

Chaos prevents a stable strategy of problem solving. Klaus Mainzer, 1994.

To the uninitiated, chaos theory often lurks as a mathematical and scientific hinterland, of
value only to a small cadre of theorists. Yet, a vast number of applied disciplines are now
exploring chaos theory as a means for understanding and building systems that utilize the
potentialities of this new approach. From neuroscience (Bower, 1988), to cardiology
(Garfinkel, et. al., 1992) to business (Priesmeyer, 1992; Goldstein, 1989) and public
management (Kiel, 1993; 1994) researchers are developing a new intellectual paradigm that
offers the insights of chaos theory as a new vision for understanding various aspects of our
world. In short, a new paradigm of social and human dynamics is emerging.

This new appreciation for chaos has led to an understanding of both the nonlinearity of the
world in which we live and of the functional aspects of instability as a means for adapting to
new situations. Chaos is one possible result of the dynamics of nonlinear systems.
Nonlinearity refers to behavior in which the relationships between variables in a system are
dynamic and disproportionate. In nonlinear systems small changes or small errors can have
big effects. And, in nonlinear systems outcomes are subject to high levels of uncertainty and
unpredictability. In nonlinear systems behavior is erratic and filled with surprises. Our world
is filled with nonlinearity.

Disaster and emergency situations epitomize the nonlinearity of human events. These are
events in which the relationships between relevant variables is churning. Even in our desire to
create order and control the situation, events often seem to churn one step ahead of our best
efforts. Heinz Pagels (1988, p.56) noted that, "life is.. nonlinear. And so is everything else of
interest." Clearly, what makes disaster situations particularly interesting and challenging is the
inherent nonlinearity in such events.

New thinking in response to the recognition of nonlinearity in human and organizational

systems has focused on the functionality of disorder and instability (Kiel, 1994). Management
scholar Ikijiru Nonaka (1988, p.59) offers a view of the functionality of disorder and
instability in organizations "Chaos widens the spectrum of options and forces the organization
to seek new points of view. For an organization to renew itself, it must keep itself in a non-
equilibrium state at all times."
Most importantly, during times of high instability such as disasters and occasions when
emergency services reach peak levels of activity it is essential to recognize that stability can
only be regained by developing strategies that are themselves unstable. In short, we must
match the instability of these environments with management practices and organizational
strategies that are dynamic and fluid. This paper focuses on developing such instability in
administrative systems.

If Disasters Were Simple Events: Linear Versus Nonlinear Behavior

The best way to understand how disaster and emergency events are nonlinear systems is to
compare the behavior of such systems with that of linear or simple systems. In linear systems
the relationships between relevant variables is stable. In linear systems the relationship
between cause and effect is smooth and proportionate. In short, linear systems respond to big
changes in a big and proportionate manner and linear systems respond to small changes in an
equally small and proportionate way.

If disaster and emergency response processes were linear system we could predict the number
of fatalities or the amount of resources and personnel required to bring order to chaos. We
could predict how long reconstitution of the previous environment would take. We could
make statements such as an 8.5 earthquake centered on Ventura avenue would kill exactly X
number of people. We often make these linear estimates because we are limited by linear
tools for prediction and response.

But when we look at real disasters do we see such prediction, such simplicity, or such
linearity? The potential for nonlinearity and erratic behavior to occur in complex human
environments emphasizes the overly simplistic assumptions we often make about system
behavior and real outcomes. In 1992, the city of Chicago suffered a devastating downtown
flood due to a failure in the city's tunnel wall. Only later was it discovered that a private
contractor tried to report the failure but no city authority responded to the report. A crack that
could have been remedied for $10,000 eventually cost taxpayers, the city, and business an
estimated 1.7 billion dollars (Roeser, 1992). The nonlinear and explosive effect of a
seemingly small crack led to real disaster. In disaster and emergency services management the
outcomes of our errors, oversights, and even our best intentions may only, much later, result
in real and unexpected surprises.

Consider how as a nonlinear system evolves over time we cannot predict all of the
consequences of what seem, initially, to be totally reasonable management decisions. An
example of our limited ability to predict all of the interactions in a complex and nonlinear
world were the severe floods along the Mississippi river in the summer of 1993. For several
decades prior to this flooding, the Army Corps of Engineers built a series of levees to protect
many river front communities. These levees were seen as solutions to local flooding
problems. These levees, however, served to change the course of the Mississippi in many
areas. Some analysts now believe that these levees, and the decision decades earlier to build
them, actually exacerbated downstream flooding that adversely affected many riverfront
communities (Burton and Gibson, 1993). The seemingly simple decisions to aid individual
communities with levees led to a tangled web of cause and effect that, over time, had
disastrous results many years later for other communities. Clearly, the world of public
management is a world in which managers cannot predict how future observers will judge the
quality of their decisions.
Nonlinear Change: Equilibrium to Rhythms to Chaos

To fully understand the paradigm of nonlinear dynamics we need to examine the types of
behavior that nonlinear systems generate. For our purposes, behavior refers to how change
occurs in organizations and how organizational data evolve over time. One tenet of nonlinear
dynamics is that complex systems defy simple formulation and thus may preclude the
development of precise mathematical algorithms. As a response, students of nonlinear
dynamics show a preference for graphic representations of data, behavior, and systems. The
following pages of graphs typify this approach. Such graphic representation is consistent with
the trend in public management toward the visual display of information. Graphs and pictures
can tell very important stories for managers.

Nonlinear systems exhibit three distinct types of behavior over time. These behaviors are
labeled as (1) convergence to stability or equilibrium; (2) stable oscillation; and (3) chaotic.
Each behavior can appear over the long term behavior of a nonlinear system. Disasters,
emergency response, and changes in quality all occur over time. Thus, in real work processes,
each behavioral type does not reflect permanent commitment only to that behavior, because
the real world generates many different patterns in the data organizations create. Equilibrium
in Time

We can examine the different kinds of time series nonlinear dynamical systems generate by
using a simple nonlinear equation and the help of line graphs. The logistic equation is an oft-
used algorithm for generating nonlinear time series. The logistic map takes the form xt+1 =
(wxt) * (1-xt). The variable w represents a control parameter in the range 0 < w < 4. The
variable xt is the value of x at the current time and xt+1 represents the next time period
following xt.

The most simple type of time-based behavior generated by nonlinear systems is convergence
to a stability or equilibrium. This behavior occurs when we start from an initial point that
quickly reaches and maintains a mathematically stable point (see figure 1). This behavior
represents the ultimate equilibrium, where change does not occur over an extended period. As
one can see, once the mathematical point of stability is reached the system remains stationary,
even if the time series is extended indefinitely.

In a nonlinear world, one must wonder how many work or organizational systems will show
such extremely stable behavior over time? Even the most stable work outputs, such as fire
station equipment inspections, show some variation in output from month to month. Yet, at an
abstract level the reader will see that the equilibrium in figure 1 is the Weberian ideal. In
short, the work output is perfectly stable. In such a case, management could predict output
perfectly because management knows exactly what to expect on a consistent basis. If we view
figure 1 as output from any organizational process we can see it represents the Weberian ideal
of organizational stability represented by a time series! The volatility and dynamism of the
real world is gone and the machine-like bureaucracy marches on. But, can we really expect
such stability in the real world? Can we think of any organizational output that is this stable
over time? Or, as Cavaleri and Obloj (1993, p.57), note, "The behavior of virtually all systems
important to organizations varies over time and does not follow a straight-line pattern". As
Drabek (1994, p. 30) has also noted, "Disasters do not constitute a simple straight line
extension of an auto accident or house fire." Rhythms in Time
A second type of nonlinear time series that can occur in the real world of organizational data
is rhythmic or oscillatory behavior. This type of behavior is generally labeled as stable
oscillation because work output, such as, service responses to citizens calls shift fluidly up
and down in a patterned and stable fashion (see figure 2). This type of smooth change is
incremental change that moves up and down in a predictable manner.

The time series is figure 2 is called a two-period cycle. This is because the cycle repeats itself
every two time periods or every two data points; the cycle stabilizes at about point 20. Such
periodic, or cyclical, time series can have varying periods such as 4, 6, or 8 periods before the
cycle repeats itself. So rhythmic data can have lots of short little cycles or big, longer cycles.

One can imagine many agency and organizational systems relevant to emergency
management that operate in such a cyclical manner. In fact we use this kind of language in
public management. For example, calls for local emergency medical services are generally
cyclical and rhythmic: messy and noisy, but rhythmic and continuous.

Consider the cycle of local emergency calls in any large city. Emergency calls peak during
weekend evenings as the multiplying interactions of alcohol and automobiles collide. During
other hours of the week calls decrease. The up and down cycles of traffic also include another
rhythm, the rhythm of the work week. Weekend traffic has a different pattern than does
workday traffic. Of course these patterns create other patterns. The pattern of police response
activity to traffic accidents is also determined by the cycles of the "rush" hour. Chaos Over
Time

A third type of nonlinear time series data that can be expected in the world of management is
chaotic behavior. Priesmeyer (1992) has shown how chaos appears in organizational systems
ranging from financial management data to data from production processes. Chaos is typified
by behavior that, over time, appears random and disorderly (see figure 3). Chaos does,
however, occur within definable parameters or mathematical boundaries. Thus chaotic
behavior remains within boundaries or within limits. It is not random behavior that can result
in any outcome. Chaotic behavior looks wild and erratic, but does not jump out defined
mathematical limits.

When chaos occurs a nonlinear system does not retrace prior identifiable sequences of
behavior and does not evidence obvious patterns in its behavior. Chaotic behavior thus
appears extremely disorderly since patterns over time, a symbol of orderliness, do not appear
to exist. Chaotic behavior simply skips from one identifiable point to the next, yet never
extends outside clear and distinct boundaries. The reader will note that the data points in
figure 3 do not extend beyond 0 or 1. Chaos thus looks like random behavior but is really
unstable behavior over time that stays within clear boundaries.

Although chaotic time paths may look random they are generated by deterministic and rather
simple mathematics. Thus the kind of chaos we see in figure 3 is referred to as "deterministic
chaos". It appears that such deterministic chaos can be created by organizational systems and
processes that are intended to be very mechanical and simple. Researchers have discovered
both such deterministic chaos in organizational data (Priesmeyer, 1992) and the potential for
this chaos in organizations (Mosekilde, et.al., 1991; Richards, 1990). This has two very
important consequences. First, this means that work systems or processes with few parts and
simple interactions can generate very complex data, that look erratic and chaotic over time.
For managers, the effort to simplify processes may result in unexpected complexity. Second,
if simple systems can generate complex behavior then imagine what may result when
considering the complex organizations and environments that disaster and emergency services
managers attempt to handle.

A word of caution is necessary at this point. To verify the existence of real mathematical
chaos in organizational data requires the use of some very sophisticated statistical methods.
So analysts need to be careful not to call all "messy" looking time series data as chaotic. Time
series data may be nonlinear but not chaotic. So we must be sure to note when we are
discussing real verifiable chaos or chaos as a metaphor. Surely, both approaches can help us
attain the vision of the paradigm of nonlinear dynamics.

We can begin to see that as the relationships between the parts of nonlinear systems change,
these systems can create choppy, or even erratic behavior over time. Nonlinear systems
bounce around and can be quite messy. Nonlinear systems create graphs with lots of breaks
and changes and with lots of ups and downs. The messiness and ups and downs of nonlinear
systems clearly reminds us of the data public managers examine over days, weeks, and
months. Employee performance goes up and down over time. Budgets go up and down over
time. The erratic time-based data that organizations generate is a result of our nonlinear
world. Sensitivity to Initial Conditions

Systems functioning in chaotic regimes may show a tendency to be highly sensitive to their
initial conditions. This means that small changes or errors can have amplified effects. The
point is reinforced if we consider the concept of the "butterfly effect". The butterfly effect can
be better understood by examining the two different time series in figure 4. These time series
use the same nonlinear equation as that used to generate figures 1-3. The time series in figure
4 start at mathematical points that differ by only one-ten millionth (the last decimal place).
Yet, look at how these lines quickly separate, diverge, and create very different results, that
continue over time. We see that a small difference, a small error, or a small change can have
very novel, unexpected and even explosive effects over time.

Think back to the scenario of the federal alcohol, tobacco, and firearms raid on the Branch
Davidians. We can now see the unexpected "tip-off" of the cultists as the "butterfly" that sent
the government raid off in a totally unexpected direction. Of course, a multitude of possible
results could have occurred. Look to figure 4 and imagine how things may have turned out
differently if the tip-off had not occurred. Without the tip-off another totally different set of
results may have occurred. Attractors - The Order in Chaos

One of the interesting qualities of nonlinear dynamics as a paradigm for emergency

management is that even when the data we examine look erratic and chaotic we can find a
deeper order in the data. By looking at this deeper order in organizational data, managers can
find both a new means for understanding how much change exists in organizational output
and performance, but can also begin to see how much effort will be needed to change and
improve the performance and results of work processes in organizations.

To examine the "order within chaos" in organizational data we can examine the "attractor" of
time series data. An attractor is a graphical method chaos researchers use to determine how
much change is occurring in a set of data overtime. The attractor presents an image of all of
the change in the data that work process data or employee performance data generate. By
viewing this attractor we can begin to see the unusual and unique forms of order that the data
in organizations create.
To look at time-based data managers usually examine line graphs. An attractor is a different
way of viewing time series data. An attractor is a mapping of data that allows us to see how
all the data, be it work group output or individual employee output, relate to each other. These
figures are called attractors because the data seem to be "attracted" to certain regions on the
graph. While line graphs show us how each element of data changes relative to the data point
behind it and in front of it, an attractor mapping shows us how all of the data we are
examining change relative to each other. The attractor can show managers how much
variation and change is occurring in organizational data over time.

The attractor is graphed in a t/t+1 phase plane. In this case, t (time) represents the data at one
point in time, while t+1 represents the same data at the next point in time. The t is plotted on
the vertical axis and t+1 is plotted on the horizontal axis as shown in figure 5. The attractor in
figure 5 is derived from a chaotic time series generated by the logistic equation. For another
method for graphing attractors see Priesmeyer (1992). The Functions of Chaos

Conventional systems thinking has focused to an extreme extent on actions necessary to

stabilize systems. While instability was recognized, previous systems thinkers saw a return to
stability as the only real alternative. This focus on stability thus minimized efforts to examine
the positive aspects of periods of instability or even chaos. Scientific investigation of chaotic
behavior in a variety of natural and human systems over the past two decades now reveals that
chaotic episodes are actually highly functional aspects of system evolution. Chaos serves at
least two evolutionary functions.

First, chaos serves to avoid entrainment or mode lock-in. Entrainment refers to system
behavior that maintains itself even when environmental change or internal demands suggest
new behavioral changes for survival and adaptation. Examples of mode lock-in are seen in
corporations that refuse to alter products or services when markets and customer demands
have changed. Mode lock-in is seen when employees fight and resist potential labor saving
improvements in an effort to maintain existing methods and processes. Chaotic episodes offer
the potential to break entrainment and offer new forms of behavior and functioning. Chaos
helps to break existing molds.

Second, chaos allows relevant systems to explore the entire range of behaviors available to
them. This is because systems in chaotic phases bounce around the phase plane exploring
their every possibility for new and alternative behavior. The range of available options is, of
course, bounded by the parameters of the system. It is this erratic behavior though that creates
the uncertainty and unpredictability typical of chaotic periods. It is however, uncertainty and
unpredictability that are essential aspects in the mechanisms of learning. Learning comes from
the instability of uncertainty and is evidenced by new forms of behavior and response.

This second function of chaos emphasizes that chaos is fundamentally a learning mechanism.
This is a learning mechanism that allows systems to test their evolutionary potential. The
unfortunate reality that emanates from the chaos of a disaster situation is that weal ways learn
much. We learn about the capabilities of existing disaster response system, the capacity of
humans to survive exceedingly traumatic events, and the capacity of renewal in both natural
and human systems. Controlling Chaos

Understanding the functions of chaos reveals that chaos represents both risk and opportunity.
The risk of chaos is that a system may not reach another point of stability and thus be
overwhelmed by constant uncertainty and instability. The opportunity of chaos is that new
ways of behaving and responding to environmental challenges may be developed and become
essential elements of emergent ways of responding to an uncertain world.

Since continuous chaos, particularly during natural disasters, would overwhelm our capacity
to bring any level of even minimal sustainable livability to our populations methods for
controlling chaos and bringing some order to this disorder is necessary. Natural scientists
have for the last several years examined methods for controlling chaos (Ott, Grebogi and
Yorke, 1990). These efforts have resulted in three fundamental methods for controlling chaos.

One method for controlling chaos is to alter the parameters of the system. This means limiting
the degrees of freedom or the extent of the behavior available to a system. In short, by
clamping down on the parameters of behavior, the hope is to alter behavior and create greater
stability and predictability. In a disaster situation these degrees of freedom are often beyond
the control of human actors. As an earthquake travels up the logarithmic Richter scale, the
degrees of freedom in potential damage expand making control an increasingly difficult
endeavor. The parameters of destruction may outstrip response system capacity.

A second method for controlling chaos uses "perturbations" or disturbances during chaotic
episodes to change behavior back to more predictable and smoother functioning. This refers
to the sensitivity of chaos to small changes. The intent with such interventions is to use small
change that create nonlinear effects, that create phase shifts from erratic behavior to more
fluid behavior.

A third and most recent method for controlling chaos is aimed at altering the "orbit" of a
chaotic to system to a more desirable orbit on its attractor (Ditto and Pecora, 1993). This
approach uses continuous tracking and seeks to identify changes in system behavior that occur
over time. By tracking such changes alteration of the parameters are expedited. This approach
is similar to the first method noted above, but this third approach represents a more adaptive
or cybernetic approach to controlling chaos.

Each of the above methods for controlling chaos reveals analogs for management practice.
Efforts to control system parameters best defines the dominant scientific management and
Newtonian control model advanced by linear Western science. This model argues that placing
strict controls on behavior of systems and people management is most likely to get levels of
certainty and prediction that may result in management goal attainment. The most striking
example of this management style is the paramilitary structure that still dominates many
bureaucracies. The negative externalities of this approach to management are evidenced by
inadequate response to changing circumstances due to mode lock-in, excessive and
debilitating bureaucratic oversight, and demoralized employees.

The second approach to controlling chaos based on identifying pressure points to alter system
behavior is synchronous with emerging views of managing organizations and inter-
organizational response. This new view argues that recognition of the nonlinearity of human
systems demands that we examine methods that use minimal pushes to develop maximum
results. This approach focuses more on open lines of communication (Comfort, 1994) rather
than controlling and dominating hierarchies.

The third approach for controlling chaos is consistent with cybernetic approaches to
management. These approaches rely on constant feedback to ensure that work and
administrative systems are continuously adjusting to environmental and organizational
demands and changes. Again, we see the importance of communication and feedback in all
efforts to control chaos. Comfort's work (1994) reveals the importance of modern information
technologies to expedite this approach. A Dynamical View of Disasters

One of the advantages of viewing the world from the lens of chaos theory or nonlinear
dynamics is that we begin to see that the world is actually filled with flux and change. The
world is, from this perspective, an infinite array of time series of system all marching to their
own unique drummer. While pattern and similarity occur the unique elements of each
system's organization and environment represent that nuance that lead to unique evolutionary
outcomes. Fields of Action

To better understand the relevance of nonlinear dynamics to the challenges of disaster

response and management, and of improving the quality of outcomes, a brief introduction to
the elements of dynamical systems theory is necessary. Dynamical systems are comprised of
two elements. These elements are (a) the area or field on which the "action" or "motion" takes
place (the formal label for this region is the "manifold of states") and (b) the set of rules that
determine the motion or action in the field of action that lead to results. achieved in the field
of action, (these rules are called "vector fields") (Casti, 1990, p. 54-55).

The field of action, or the "workplace", is determined by the nature of the work and the
technology used to perform the work. Consider, for example, how the field of action for a
classroom teacher is quite different than that of the more traditional office environment of an
employee of the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics. What distinguishes emergency and
disaster response professionals from other workers is that their "field of action" is both in the
office (preparedness, waiting and watching) and in an external environment that may be
changing as the disaster continues or as the fallout of the disaster continues over time.
Disasters may also occur in unexpected areas. Thus even the field of action itself may be
highly unpredictable for disaster response. Rules for Guiding Action

Workplace rules are elements such as policies, work processes, work behaviors, and employee
attitudes that result in the actual outputs of the government work unit. Naturally, some
guiding principles are intended to at least define the rules for the manager. Most observers
assume the government manager simply seeks to optimize the use of resources to maximize
the benefit to the taxpayer and the client of the agency.

But the rules can sometimes be vague and even work against each other. For example, in our
efforts to be efficient, in time and resources for example, management may lower the
effectiveness, or the ability, of the organization to reach its goals. By saving money we may
decrease our ability to serve the citizenry. On the other hand, managers may find new ways to
meet desired goals, only to find that such goal attainment will require more money and time to
achieve.

The set of rules available to the emergency services manager is also not a completely open-
ended set of possibilities. Public managers work within an environment of considerable
constraints (Lerner and Wanat, 1992). Budget constraints dictate levels of agency service and
response. Civil service regulations limit managements' ability to hire and fire. Requirements
to save lives first impose certain (and essential) restrictions on how emergency services
should be organized and rendered. And the ordinary limitations imposed by statutorily
mandated policy and the following inevitable red-tape generate considerable administrative
constraints.

We can see that these rules represent policies, processes, and the work behavior and attitudes
of management and staff. It is the interaction of the rules of motion with field of action that
determines the direction and result of the motion in the workplace. The dynamics created by
the interaction of the "rules" and the "field of action" lead to agency response, outputs and
performance.

From the manager's perspective, the task is to move to the desired position on the region of
action. The manager must utilize some set of rules (or heuristics, formal or informal) to drive
the agency. If a new space on the region of action is desired a new set of rules is generally
required. Most importantly, the outputs in terms of performance and the outcomes in terms of
policy results are the measures used to determine a manager's success in melding the "rules"
to the "field of action". The Changing Nature of Workplace Rules

Public management thinkers have tried to identify the rules that drive agency actions. The
classic effort in this area is Downs' (1967) comprehensive listing of laws and propositions
intended to "help analysts forecast bureau behavior" (p. 261). Down's rules set out some
general bureau and management behaviors that appear universal, such as managers will
capture as much financial resources as possible and large bureaus are more resistant to change
than small bureaus. These rules are intuitive and provide guidance as to how people will act in
government agencies.

Yet, Downs also recognized that change is evident throughout government organizations. He
also was aware of agency policy, in this sense policy for problem handling and decision-
making, as sources of stability and change," a bureau can change its everyday actions without
changing its rules; it can change its rules without shifting its rule-making structure; and it can
alter its rule-making structure without adopting any different fundamental purposes" (1967,
p.168). Yet, Downs does not note that the policy itself can serve as a source of change due to
the dynamic environment in which they exist. In an administrative world in which in which
chance can impede on seemingly fixed administrative and work process "rules", surprises are
inevitable. Even when the "rules" appear clear and simple the nonlinear dynamics of the
administrative and organizational world can generate real complexities and surprises.

It is clear that new rules are emerging in the workplace in public organizations. For example,
the increasing calls for quality improvements in service provision demand new rules for
achieving results and serving citizens. The expanding call for empowering employees
demands new attitudinal and behavioral rules for both managers and employees. Management
rules may require more "letting go" while employees must take more responsibility and
initiative.

Most importantly, we begin to see that fixed policies may serve as inhibitions to positive
change. If these fixed policies serve to entrain disaster and emergency response the necessary
flexibility and instability for adaptive response is lost. Chaos, Variation, Learning, and
Disaster Response

Chaos theory teaches us of the value of variation as a means for learning has obvious
relevance to the management lens of nonlinear dynamics. In nonlinear systems it is the non-
average behavior, the unusual event, the unexpected fluctuation that drives the processes of
change. This suggests then, as with variation beyond the control limits in quality measurement
systems, that variation should not be considered a problem in management systems but rather
an opportunity to learn why the variation occurred. It is the peaks and valleys in quality
measurement data that may provide the best source to improve administrative systems.
Managers must learn to ask why output, problems, or performance peaked at one point and
then reached a valley at another.

The ideal work system produces quality data that remains within the confines of upper and
lower control limits. It is, however, not the normal variation that management should only be
concerned with, but also those instances where "abnormal" variation occurs. Even if such
abnormal variation cannot be controlled, management may learn much about work systems by
investigating those external factors that alter work and outputs. Taking variation as an
opportunity for learning means that managers do not get angry with such variance but instead
see variation as a source of and for learning.

Understanding the value of variation for the public manager also emphasizes the value of
instability in work and organizational systems. We know that unstable systems will generate
more variation than stable systems. Chaos thus does not have to be seen as confusion. The
functional aspect of chaos is learning, as systems and individuals are allowed to test their
parameters of output, service, and quality.

Disaster and emergency service managers recognize the value of variation. This is evidenced
in sessions to capture what was learned from each disaster. But variation can teach new
lessons, not only from the unique nature of events, but also by trying new methods and
techniques. This means that we need to examine new methods to ensure that we practice
variation by perhaps using diverse teams to try diverse methods on essentially the same
disaster or emergency problem. While patterns may exist in disasters, managers need to
discover methods for breaking patterns of response in an effort to embed variation and the
potential for learning. Work Teams, Instability, and Learning

The importance of work teams has long been recognized in management (Likert, 1961). This
emphasis seems to currently be reaching a high pitch in the literature of public and business
management. These expanding emphases are due both to an awareness that teams permit a
larger number of potential inputs into decision-making and problem-solving and to the fact
that teams may energize cohesive behavior that may enhance organizational effectiveness.

A work team with good "dynamics" thus can resolve many organizational issues. One of the
expected lessons from this understanding is that finding a good work team is only slightly less
important than keeping it together. This conventional wisdom asserts that a stable work team
will promote learning as team members work together to develop new methods and adaptive
innovations (Miller, 1993). The Value of Unstable Work Teams

One recent study in public management, however, emphasizes the value of instability in work
teams (Miller, 1993). Gerald Miller (1993) conducted a study designed to determine levels of
learning among work teams. The study simulated bidding on a government bond auction.
Learning was determined by the number of errors the teams made in response to different
incentives and different levels of initial funding. Several different work teams were involved
in the study. Some teams were comprised of the same team members throughout the study.
Other teams were unstable teams in which membership shifted as new members were
installed.
Miller's results showed quite the opposite of the conventional wisdom. In all of Miller's
experiments the stable teams showed either no learning or a rate of learning that was slower
than the unstable groups. Unstable teams started with error rates that were initially higher than
the stable groups, but quickly overtook the stable groups and produced fewer erroneous
decisions. Thus, over time, unstable teams, learned significantly faster than stable teams.
Miller concludes in his study that instability in work teams leads to "... a short-run
performance decline and, yet, long-term effectiveness" (1993, p.57).

While Miller's study requires replication for solid generalization his efforts appear to promote
the value of instability and variation in management systems. Apparently, the major inhibition
to learning in stable teams is an initial acceptance and overly rigid view of a problem that
minimizes possible solution sets. The new members of unstable teams appear to serve as
"devil's advocates" that promote alternative decisions and thus divergent outcomes. This
further suggests that unstable teams represent a more readily adaptive response to changing
situations (Miller, 1993). Thus, instability in work team memberships promotes many
qualities considered valuable in contemporary government organizations.

The value of instability, then, in work teams is that these "messy" teams serve the role of
creating emerging structures consistent with the nonlinear notion of process structures. The
team structure when thus viewed as a shifting and dynamic structure of human interaction
generates an increased number of decision inputs and thus the likelihood of expanded
alternative and solutions. At the same time this approach adds to the complexity of public
management as managers may no longer rely on constancy in teams but rather must devote
attention to shifting groups of teams. Freedom and Instability in Work Teams

Perhaps, most significantly, the notion of unstable teams is also consistent with the challenge
of understanding the nonlinearities of work organizations themselves. Since so much of the
interplay of work dynamics are beyond reasonable efforts at comprehension such shifting
work teams provide management the opportunity to allow self-organizing teams to generate
and explore their own parameters of learning. Such teams would be as chaos researcher Frank
Ford notes, "...liberated to explore their every dynamical possibility" (Gleick, 1987, p.306).
The usual constraints of public law and service will serve to minimize the total set of
solutions available to a group.

Such an approach to team building also strikes at the heart of the quality management
perspective. Quality management urges that employees be liberated to develop new methods
and levels of client service. Such unstable teams provide a means for expanding the range of
possible methods. This suggests that teams should be formed from employees across
functional areas. This would be valuable as employees learn how other functional unites
resolve their problems or provide new means for service delivery.

What work groups really represent is a potential source for generating new dynamics and
creative fluctuations in organizations. Public managers must increasingly show a willingness
to permit creative fluctuations to occur and infiltrate government organizations in hopes of
generating nonlinear and explosive improvements in service quality. Furthermore, this
approach emphasizes a new mode of management control. This mode of control is one of an
evolving control that accepts instability as a necessary state for responding to the breaking of
existing symmetries that hinder government performance and improvement.
On a practical level experiments may be conducted in emergency and disaster response that
engage two activities. First, more cross-teaming preparedness between potential disaster
groups is needed. This approach will allow more knowledge dissemination at both the
organizational and individual level. Second, why not consider the use of unstable teams
during disasters. What is learned by one team may be readily disseminated by simply altering
the configuration of personnel rather than by using some perhaps overly specified
organizational structure. Flattened Hierarchies: Disorder by Liberating Structures

Another prevailing theme among contemporary management thinkers for responding to rapid
change and calls for continuous improvement is to alter the structure of organizations. This
concern over organizational structure generates some rather predictable behavior on the part
of public managers. When problems arise, often, the first culprit is the organization chart.
This phenomenon seems particularly apparent among new senior managers whose first action
often is to re-organize in hopes of improving the performance of an organization in decline or
one that is considered underperforming. These administrative efforts, although sometimes
without adequate cause, do create considerable turmoil and resistance. One can also argue that
such efforts to change the organization chart are really an easy fix for real and deeper
problems, such as inadequate attention to process or a lack of concern for quality, that are not
easily "fixed" by changing organization structure.

At the core of these persistent calls for improving performance by changing traditional
bureaucratic hierarchies, is a focus on decreasing the amount of hierarchy in organizations.
This notion of "flattening" the hierarchy has both two meanings and dual purposes. First,
flattening the hierarchy can mean cutting down on the number of administrative layers in an
organization. By cutting down on the layers of management in an organization, information
should flow more smoothly as there are fewer people involved who may slow down
information flows or who for purposes of self-interest improperly manipulate information.
More fluid and rapid flows of information should improve organizational efficiency and
response.

The second reason for flattening hierarchies concerns who should make decisions in
organizations. This purpose for flattening hierarchies is based on the notion that those
employees closest to the action, or the clientele, are best suited to make decisions. From this
perspective, hierarchy is flattened because employees are not expected to obtain permission
for every action, but instead are empowered to provide quick responses to client needs.

An example of this type of flattening is community-based policing. This popular method of

having police officers get to know, on an individual basis, the people "on their beats" and thus
the real problems these people face. The increase in police "store fronts", small police offices
in high crime areas also serves to get the government service provider closer to the citizen.

It is important to recognize that changing organizational structures does incorporate an

essential aspect of what we know about nonlinear and dynamical systems. This important
feature is that in such dynamical systems, structure creates behavior. In short, the way the
parts fit together dictates much of the behavior generated by employees. Changing structure in
organizations is likely to impact the level and quality of performance and service provision.

Students of disasters have also recently identified the problems of bureaucratic models for
contending with the complexity and instability of disasters. Drabek (1994, p.41) notes in a
recent paper, "...some within the emerging profession (emergency management) will continue
to apply organizational theories that have a high probability of failing them and their
communities". This comment raises further questions about our bureaucratic and paramilitary
approaches to even high instability situations such as disasters. Order Through Disorder

Interestingly, recent investigations, based on nonlinear dynamics, offer a strong argument for
the value of flattening the number of administrative layers in organizations and for placing
decisions closer to the "field of action". Hershey and his colleagues (1990) have examined the
amount of disorder in information flows in four different types of organizational structures.
This study is particularly important for government organizations because government is
primarily an information producer. In government, the efficient and orderly production of
information is essential.

Hershey et al. analyzed the information disorder created by the organizational forms of (1) the
ideal horizontal (flattened) organization; (2) the traditional vertical hierarchy; (3) an
intermediate structure combining both hierarchy and horizontal qualities and; (4) chaos. The
use of the term chaos here refers to total chaos when a system is completely disordered, and
not to the chaos of time-series behavior used throughout this book. In such a chaotic
organization there are no direct linkages for information to flow. While both the horizontal
and the chaos models represented flattened hierarchies, model 1 included "perfect"
communication with a single leader, while in the chaos model organizational units were
completely independent and devoid of any defined leader.

These experiments (Hershey, et al., 1990) showed that the ideal horizontal structure produced
the least disorder in information flow. This horizontal model thus evidenced the highest
degree of organizational efficiency. The reader will probably not be surprised to discover that
the intermediate model ranked second in efficiency, the vertical model third and the chaotic
independent model fourth. This study appears to confirm not only the value of flatter
organizational structures but also the important link between organizational structure and
behavior.

What is essential for managers to remember is that the more disorderly "flattened" hierarchy
creates better information flow and organizational efficiency. This flattened hierarchy is more
disorderly in structure because it is less rigid and less militaristic in the way information is
handled and in the way employees are led. By giving up the traditional management need for
hierarchical order, improved information processing and organizational efficiency can be
enhanced. Police officers in store fronts or in community-based policing programs are given
considerable discretion to gather information, to learn, and to help citizens. This freedom
inevitably creates disorder as employees are provided more freedom to resolve issues and
problems. Structure, Process and Self-Organization

The structure of the emerging views of organization focus on processes. The previous model
of the flattened organization is a good first start for the disaster and emergency services
manager. Our previous review of the "order" created by flatter structures lends credence to the
notion that flatter is better. Yet, what we now know about processes in organization is that
well designed work processes are the key to quality and productivity (Deming, 1986). Work
re-engineering also informs managers that organizational structure becomes less important in
the re-engineered organization. Management must rethink organizational structure and
identify processes that are linked in the organization. This suggests less of a focus on
traditional structuring by functional area and instead consideration of where functional units
converge to create outputs and service (Hammer and Champy, 1993).
The first action on management's part is a complete process mapping throughout the
organization. Process mapping requires a thorough analysis of how work is accomplished and
how information flows within and outside the organization. While these efforts are just
beginning to take hold in government, efforts to reinvent government will increasingly focus
on such practices. Since structure creates behavior, the way processes are structured and
organized will in large part determine whether improved quality and performance are attained.

Focusing on process also means a different view of operational control. Well defined and
efficient processes themselves become the source of control. Quality experts (Deming, 1986;
Carr and Littman, 1990; Cohen and Brand, 1993) note that if processes are well considered,
individual variation becomes less important, because the process limits individual variation.
In this sense the process creates its own self-organization. Control mechanisms are based on
workers given the opportunities to base their work on outputs and outcomes, not just
individual tasks.

Employees, in the new emergent government agency, will also be trained to measure their
own performance using the techniques of statistical process control (Deming, 1986).
Employees will be allowed to examine their own performance so they may take part in
determining any adjustments necessary to improve their performance. The time-series of
performance provided to employees allows self-adjustment and more personal knowledge of
when and why variation occurs in work processes. This places employee "self-control" at the
heart of quality processes and limits the need for excessive management oversight. The
culture of service serves as the principal source for employee self-adjustment to improve
performance.

Parameters are defined by management but variation within these parameters is accepted as
the inevitable result of the nonlinearity inherent in human organizations. Furthermore
variation is not seen as a threat but instead as an opportunity to learn via an understanding of
the sources of variation. Control mechanisms thus represent features of bounded instability.
The process and the constraints of government work serve as the "bounds" of work. But
workers are genuinely engaged to use their full capacities within the confines of the
constraints of government regulations and public law. When re-engineering plans break-up
previous processes, the manager must find new forms of order and process. Process is More
Important than Structure

The importance of organizational structure is deeply ingrained in the traditional vision of

management. People often have their egos directly tied into their own place in an
organization's structure. A focus on process, rather than on organization charts and structures
is itself a paradigmatic shift for managers. Even getting managers to think of themselves as
part of a process rather than as part of an overarching structure may enhance the level of
participation in organizations so essential for fully utilizing the skills of employees.

Managers and employees often do not take the time to examine all of the linkages between
their functional units and other in the organization. But one need not be an expert in
organizations to understand how much actual work crosses the boundaries of functional units.
There is a clear need to see organizations as multitudes of process. This view provide an
improved way of seeing how organizations either fit or do not fit together. The increasing
emphasis on cross-functional teams in organizations emphasizes this point.
But the notion of process structures from the nonlinear paradigm is important to remember. It
is the internal processes that allow structures to reform after a transforming and qualitative
change, such as a disaster. Only by producing viable and dynamically unstable processes in
organizations can managers hope to develop organizations that can cope with rapid
transformations and increased complexity.

The inevitable resistance to organizational and process change has also been examined by
Goldstein (1989) from the perspective of "a far-from-equilibrium approach". Goldstein (1989,
p. 23) argues that resistance to change in organizations may be mollified by "difference
questioning". This approach focuses on identifying the differences that may be generated by
new modes of work and organization. Change may not represent what may initially be
perceived as a threat, if employees are aware of the nature of the new changes. It is such
"difference questioning" that may generate the instability necessary to liberate employees and
managers from strong commitments to forms of work that inhibit performance and
productivity gains.

The changes presented by work re-engineering may represent the greatest threat to managers
and employees who resist change. The possibility of completely new means for
accomplishing organizational goals, suggests real organizational upheaval. Yet, the process of
work re-engineering also offers some means for contending with these potential changes in
work similar to Goldstein's (1989) notion of "difference questioning". These means involve
the essential questions that drive recognition of both the problems and prospects for change in
work processes. These two questions are Why? and What? Why do we do things this way?
What will happen if we change the present work process? Such questions, combined with
employee involvement may serve to mollify many employee and management fears over
potential changes. The task for the public manager is to fully inform employees of the benefits
of such change. The applied task is to develop work processes that ensure employees that the
nature of work will be both more productive and more rewarding.

Finally, the notion of the attractor may help in pushing work systems to new patterns of
functioning. Think of the most stable and "tightly attracted" activities an agency performs.
These highly attracted processes may be excessive sources of order that inhibit positive
change. By improving quality in these areas it may enhance many of aspects of disaster
response and emergency services. Planning, Strategy and Emergencies

Dallas, Texas resides on the southern edge of a geographic region subject to natural disasters
called "tornado alley". People who reside in this part of north central Texas understand the
destructive and deadly force of tornadoes. The focus on tornadoes in "tornado alley",
however, revealed a recent example of mode lock-in and inflexible planning that has led to
calls for a comprehensive reconsideration of Dallas' disaster management planning (Dallas
Morning News, May 8, 1995).

Early on May 5, 1995 weather forecasts predicted heavy, but seasonally typical, spring
thunderstorms for the north central Texas area. These storms often bring tornadoes. The city
of Dallas emergency preparedness organization immediately devoted disaster resources to
prepare for tornado damage and appropriate response. Rather than contending with the reality
of tornado damage, however, torrential rainfall brought unexpected levels of flooding to
Dallas. Emergency preparedness officials were simply unprepared for this level of flooding, at
least in part, due to tornado damage directed resources. Sixteen citizens lost their lives due to
flooding (Dallas Morning News, May 9, 1995).
This misguided planning in Dallas, although understandable, exemplifies the problems of
mode lock-in during disaster planning. By locking into one mode in an early stage the City
created initial conditions which inhibited flexible response to disaster. This emphasizes the
importance of flexible planning and response to disaster. Initial mode lock-in may make
alterations in mid-course quite difficult, particularly if the triggers to alter strategies are not
known. Nonlinear Models for Planning

Scholars are increasingly critical of the types of models used for planning. For example, Jay
Forrester (1987, p.110) has written, "There has been a reluctance to give up the linear
mathematical procedures, with the result that models have been biased to fit the linear
procedures at the expense of faithfulness in representing the real world". These linear models,
moreover, have led traditional policy modelers to seek and identify variables and system
behavior that lead to some clear image of the future (Kiel, 1992). As Anghel Rugina (1989)
notes, such modeling efforts are based on mathematics that avoid the uncertainty inherent in
real social systems. This has led many social scientists to believe that once the model
produces a "stable" outcome to a problem then such a stability must represent the desired
solution. This is obviously problematic since we know that social phenomena are inherently
nonlinear and unstable. Traditional modeling thus seeks to generate stable solutions in an
unstable world.

More recently, modelers have, however, begun to interject notions of instability, nonlinearity
and uncertainty into computer models of social problems and policy options. One example of
this emerging approach is Ann Stanley's (1989) model of the AIDS epidemic in the United
States. The AIDS epidemic is clearly a major concern for public health officials across the
nation.

Stanley (1989) examines the nonlinear nature of HIV infection and the concomitant nonlinear
growth of actual AIDS disease. Her data are quite foreboding in their policy implications and
for the pressures for public officials to respond to this nonlinear trend. Of further interest is
that some of Stanley's models suggest the unexpected result of an eventual increase in AIDS
within groups that were previously consider "low-risk". Interestingly, a recent study by
medical researchers (Selik, Chu, and Buehler, 1993), supports Stanley's model, and, reveals
an increasing rate of growth in AIDS among previously considered "low risk" groups. In
particular, AIDS seems to be exploding among young women in many of America's urban
areas.

While forecasting is perhaps an obvious example of where the information set available to the
disaster response and emergency service manager is limited, recent studies show that actual
processes of strategy making and goal seeking by managers are also subject to fluctuations
that demand altering and adjusting plans and strategies. Strategy development for public
managers clearly must include recognition of the many stakeholders involved in government
(Nutt and Backoff, 1992). Government managers know that any effective strategy must
consider all relevant actors impacted by any strategic plan. This means that successful
strategies must incorporate the mutual interdependencies and mutual expectations of these
actors. It is the dynamic nature of these interactions and expectations that over time can make
the specific outcomes of strategies very erratic and unpredictable (Richards, 1990). At best it
appears managers can only define the boundaries of their plans and strategies, the specifics
may bounce around and change with little attention to the manager's initial intent.
Finally, in a nonlinear and uncertain world we need to think carefully about the language that
some management analysts use. The term optimization is thrown around with abandon in
some management circles. Who really believes that any human effort is optimal? And if we
thought the effort was optimal how would we know? In our efforts to avoid mode lock-in,
while doing our best we should eschew notions of optimal response. What seems more logical
is ensuring that we have available a range of adequate responses across a range of potential
disaster scenarios. This should ensure that we do not waste resources on unlikely events, but
are still prepared for their arrival. Conclusion

Professionals involved in emergency response to disasters are what should be labeled

"maximum uncertainty managers". Disasters reveal a level of uncertainty for public managers
that is likely only equaled during battle in war. But how does one cope with such maximum
uncertainty. The key here is continuous learning. Furthermore we learn, in an uncertain world
where history does not necessarily repeat itself, that the rapid capacity to learn may be more
important than experience.

We also learn that in the kind of uncertain and nonlinear world we live in that the tools
available to managers are not like those available to the natural scientist. For as Jay W.
Forrester (1987, p. 108) noted in reference to contending with our nonlinear world, "results
are less generalizable, but more relevant. Sweeping theories are replaced by bounded classes
of rules of thumb." These heuristics, or rules of thumb, thus are managements intellectual
resources, resources that must be unstable as a means to deal with instability and inherent
variation that exists in disaster situations.

Our understanding of how chaos theory, nonlinearity and instability and the sciences of
complexity can help us better manage organizations is in its initial stages. There is much more
that will be learned over the next several decades about complex systems and nonlinear
dynamics as scholars and managers understand more about this new vision of reality. One of
the more interesting aspects of this new paradigm is the timing of its appearance on the scene
of management. Nonlinear dynamics as an emerging paradigm for emergency and disaster
management in particular, and public management in general, has appeared at a critical
juncture in our thinking about organizations and management. As Cavaleri and Obloj (1993,
p. 387) write, "The discipline of management is itself at a bifurcation point in its evolution.
Managers of today have more incentive than ever to explore new ways of managing and
viewing the world." The goal of this conference is to explore these new ways of thinking
about emergency and disaster response that may save lives and enhance the human condition.

Another goal for the managers at this conference should be the development of preparedness
systems and action plans that do not require excessive management control and oversight. The
notions of self-organization that apply to natural systems can be applied to management. The
best organizational systems are ones that can do without management. These are systems that
have the response capable to solve problems with maximal learning and minimal top down
direction.

For additional copies of this paper or correspondence, contact -

L. Douglas Kiel, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Government and Politics and Political
Economy, School of Social Sciences, University of Texas at Dallas, P.O. Box 830688,
Richardson, TX 75083. Phone - (214) 883-2019; FAX (214) 883-2735; E-MAIL:
DKIEL@UTDALLAS.EDU
FIGURE 1

CONVERGENCE TO AN EQUILIBRIUM

FIGURE 2

STABLE OSCILLATION

FIGURE 3

CHAOS
FIGURE 4

Sensitivity to Initial Conditions

2 points starting to close together - rapidly diverge

FIGURE 5

A CHAOTIC ATTRACTOR
The Order in a Chaotic Time Series
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