PRESUMPTIONS

140 Christian Fernandez

HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA vs. G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Respondent.

G.R. No. 170071 March 9, 2011

Principle:

"In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no
need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence."

There exists a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

FACTS:

(Sakyanan nilupad sa fly-over.... pasahero, patay!)

Jose Marcial died on the night of March 10, 1995 while on board an Avis taxicab owned and operated by G & S Transport Corporation (G & S), a
common carrier.

At the Manila Domestic Airport, the late Jose Marcial K. Ochoa boarded and rode a taxicab with Plate No. PKR-534, a passenger vehicle for hire
owned and operated by defendant corporation under the business name "Avis Coupon Taxi" (Avis) and driven by its employee and authorized driver
Bibiano Padilla, Jr. on his way home.

The taxicab was cruising along EDSA, in front of Camp Aguinaldo in Quezon City at high speed. While going up the Boni Serrano (Santolan) fly-
over, it overtook another cab driven by Pablo Clave and tried to pass another vehicle, a ten-wheeler cargo truck. Because of the narrow space
between the left side railing of the fly-over and the ten-wheeler truck, the Avis cab was unable to pass and because of its speed, its driver (Padilla)
was unable to control it. To avoid colliding with the truck, Padilla turned the wheel to the left causing his taxicab to ram the railing throwing itself off
the fly-over and fell on the middle surface of EDSA below.(Nilupad ang sakyanan) The forceful drop of the vehicle on the floor of the road broke and
split it into two parts. Both driver Padilla and passenger Jose Marcial K. Ochoa were injured and rushed to the hospital. At the East Avenue Medical
Center, Ochoa was not as lucky as Padilla who was alive. He was declared dead on arrival from the accident.

Jose Marcial’s wife and his two minor children, sent G & S a letter demanding that the latter indemnify them for Jose Marcial’s death, his loss of
earning capacity, and funeral expenses in the total amount of P15,000,000.00. As G & S failed to heed the same, the heirs filed a Complaint5 for
Damages before the RTC.

The heirs alleged that G & S, as a common carrier, is under legal obligation to observe and exercise extraordinary diligence in transporting its
passengers to their destination safely and securely. However, G & S failed to observe and exercise this extraordinary diligence because its employee
failed to transport Jose Marcial to his destination safely. They averred that G & S is liable to them for having breached the contract of common
carriage. As an alternative cause of action, they asserted that G & S is likewise liable for damages based on quasi-delict pursuant to Article 2180 in
relation to Article 21767 of the Civil Code. The heirs thus prayed for G & S to pay them actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.

G & S claimed that Jose Marcial boarded an Avis taxicab driven by its employee, Bibiano Padilla (Padilla), at the Domestic Airport to bring him to
Teacher’s Village in Quezon City. While passing the Santolan fly-over, however, the Avis taxicab was bumped by an on-rushing delivery van at the
right portion causing the taxicab to veer to the left, ram through the left side of the railings of the fly-over and fall to the center of the island below.
The taxicab was split into two and Jose Marcial was thrown 10 meters away. G & S posited that the proximate cause of Jose Marcial’s death is a
fortuitous event and/or the fault or negligence of the driver of the delivery van that hit the taxicab. It likewise claimed that it exercised the diligence
required of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees including Padilla.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The trial court rendered a Decision9 finding the vehicular mishap not caused by a fortuitous event but by the negligence of Padilla. It likewise found
the evidence adduced by G & S to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees
as insufficient.

Agruments:

Before the CA, G & S continued to insist that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. It averred that it has been carrying out not only seminars for its drivers even before they were made to work, but also periodic evaluations
for their performance. Aside from these, it has also been conducting monthly check-up of its automobiles and has regularly issued rules regarding the

conduct of its drivers. G & S claimed that it was able to establish a good name in the industry and maintain a clientele.

The heirs maintained that Padilla was grossly negligent in driving the Avis taxicab. The heirs also averred that in order for a fortuitous event to
exempt one from liability, it is necessary that he has committed no negligence or conduct that may have occasioned the loss. Thus, to be exempt from
liability for the death of Jose Marcial on this ground, G & S must clearly show that the proximate cause of the casualty was entirely independent of
human will and that it was impossible to avoid.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA ruled in favor of the heirs. The appellate court gave weight to their argument that in order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability,
it is necessary that he committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. In this case, the CA noted that Padilla failed to
employ reasonable foresight, diligence and care needed to exempt G & S from liability for Jose Marcial’s death.

With respect to the award of P6,537,244.96 for Jose Marcial’s loss of earning capacity, the CA declared the same unwarranted. It found the
Certification issued by Jose Marcial’s employer, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through its Chief of Human
Resources Division Jonas Cruz (Cruz), as self-serving, unreliable, and biased. While said certification states that Jose Marcial was earning an annual
salary ofP450,844.49 at the time of his untimely demise, the CA noted that same is unsupported by competent evidence such as income tax returns or
receipts. This is in view of the ruling in People v. Ereño where it was held that "there must be unbiased proof of the deceased’s average income."

ISSUE:

Is there a presumption of negligence on the part of common carriers in case of death of passengers? YES!
Is certification made by the USAID HR officer presumed to be valid? YES!

SC RULING:

There is a contract of carriage between G & S and Jose Marcial

What is clear from the records is that there existed a contract of carriage between G & S, as the owner and operator of the Avis taxicab, and Jose
Marcial, as the passenger of said vehicle. As a common carrier, G & S "is bound to carry [Jose Marcial] safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." However, Jose Marcial was not able to reach
his destination safely as he died during the course of the travel. "In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier is at fault or is
negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. In fact, there is even no need for the court to make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part
of the common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence."
Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed to overcome this presumption. Both the trial court and the CA found that the accident which led to Jose
Marcial’s death was due to the reckless driving and gross negligence of G & S’ driver, Padilla, thereby holding G & S liable to the heirs of Jose
Marcial for breach of contract of carriage.

The acquittal of Padilla in the criminal case is immaterial to the instant case for breach of contract

When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

The denial by the CA of the heirs’ claim for lost earnings is unwarranted

Going now to the petition filed by the heirs, we note at the outset that the issues of whether the CA erred in deleting the award for loss of earning
capacity and in reducing the award for moral damages made by the trial court likewise raise questions of fact as they "involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties". However, we find that the heirs’ case falls under one of the exceptions because the findings
of the CA conflict with the findings of the RTC. Since the heirs properly raised the conflicting findings of the lower courts, it is proper for this Court
to resolve such contradiction.

In Ereño, we denied the claim for loss of income because the handwritten estimate of the deceased’s daily income as a self-employed vendor was not
supported by competent evidence like income tax returns or receipts. This was in view of the rule that compensation for lost income is in the nature
of damages and as such requires due proof of damages suffered. Self-serving, hence, unreliable statement is not enough. In People v. Caraig, we
declared that "documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception,
damages therefor may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence, provided that there is testimony that the victim was either (1) self-
employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the victim’s line of work
no documentary evidence is available; or (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws".
However, we subsequently ruled in Pleyto v. Lomboy that "failure to present documentary evidence to support a claim for loss of earning capacity of
the deceased need not be fatal to its cause. Testimonial evidence suffices to establish a basis for which the court can make a fair and reasonable
estimate of the loss of earning capacity".

In all of the cases mentioned except for Ereño, the sole basis for the claim for loss of earning capacity were the testimonies of the claimants. This is
not the case here. Just like in Ereño where the testimony of the mother of the deceased was accompanied by a handwritten estimate of her daughter’s
alleged income as a fish vendor, the testimony of Jose Marcial’s wife that he was earning around P450,000.00 a year was corroborated by a
Certification issued by the USAID. However in Ereño, we declared as self-serving the handwritten estimate submitted by the mother hence we
denied the claim for such award. Based on said ruling, the CA in this case deleted the award for lost income after it found the USAID Certification to
be self-serving and unreliable.

A research on USAID reveals that it is the "principal [United States] agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to
escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms." It is an "independent federal government agency that receives over-all foreign policy guidance
from the Secretary of the State [of the United States]." Given this background, it is highly improbable that such an agency will issue a certification
containing unreliable information regarding an employee’s income. Besides, there exists a presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed. Absent any showing to the contrary, it is presumed that Cruz, as Chief of Human Resources Division of USAID, has regularly performed
his duty relative to the issuance of said certification and therefore, the correctness of its contents can be relied upon. This presumption remains
especially so where the authenticity, due execution and correctness of said certification have not been put in issue either before the trial court or the
CA. As to its being self-serving, our discussion on "self-serving evidence"

‘Self-serving evidence,’ perhaps owing to its descriptive formulation, is a concept much misunderstood. Not infrequently, the term is employed as a
weapon to devalue and discredit a party's testimony favorable to his cause. That, it seems, is the sense in which petitioners are using it now. This is a
grave error. "Self-serving evidence" is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its proponent's interest. The term, if used with any
legal sense, refers only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court x x x.

Verily, the USAID certification cannot be said to be self-serving because it does not refer to an act or declaration made out of court by the heirs
themselves as parties to this case.1awphi1

The CA erred in deleting the award for lost income on the ground that the USAID Certification supporting such claim is self-serving and unreliable.
On the contrary, we find said certification sufficient basis for the court to make a fair and reasonable estimate of Jose Marcial’s loss of earning
capacity just like in Tamayo v. Señora52where we based the victim’s gross annual income on his pay slip from the Philippine National Police. Hence,
we uphold the trial court’s award for Jose Marcial’s loss of earning capacity.

141 Yvonne Nicole Catacutan Garbanzos

METROBANK VS TOBIAS

PRINCIPLE:

Under the law on evidence, presumptions are divided into two (2) classes: conclusive and rebuttable. Conclusive or absolute presumptions are rules
determining the quantity of evidence requisite for the support of any particular averment which is not permitted to be overcome by any proof that the
fact is otherwise, if the basis facts are established

The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.

FACTS:

Rosella Santiago was the OIC Branch Head of Metrobank Makati. She was introduced to respondent Tobias who opened a savings account in the
bank in the name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Respondent subsequently filed a loan with the bank. The bank then appraised
the property offered by Tobias consisting of 4 parcels of land in Malabon. The loan was approved and the mortgage was annotated in the title. Tobias
initially availed himself of ₱20,000,000, but took out the balance within six months.

He paid the interest on the loan for about a year before defaulting. His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months, he
again defaulted. Thus, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the lone bidder. When the certificate of sale was
presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the registry vault.
Given such findings, METROBANK requested the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to investigate.

In its report dated May 29, 2000,PAOCTF concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations submitted by Tobias were fictitious. The Office
of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa through falsification of public documents which found probable cause.
Tobias appealed to the DOJ which directed the withdrawal of the information since Tobias sufficiently proved good faith when he purchased the
property. Metrobank appealed to the CA which the CA dismissed. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the presumption of authorship is applicable against Tobias based on his having offered the duplicate copy of the spurious title to secure the
loan.

RULING:
NO.

Firstly, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged in the State.

The effect is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to the contrary.
As such, a presumption of law is material during the actual trial of the criminal case where in the establishment thereof the party against whom the
inference is made should adduce evidence to rebut the presumption and demolish theprima facie case.
This is not so in a preliminary investigation, where the investigating prosecutor only determines the existence of a prima facie case that warrants the
prosecution of a criminal case in court.

Secondly, the presumption of authorship, being disputable, may be accepted and acted upon where no evidence upholds the contention for which it
stands.

It is not correct to say, consequently, that the investigating prosecutor will try to determine the existence of the presumption during preliminary
investigation, and then to disregard the evidence offered by the respondent. The fact that the finding of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation is an executive function does not excuse the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice from discharging the duty to weigh the
evidence submitted by the parties. Towards that end, the investigating prosecutor, and, ultimately, the Secretary of Justice have ample discretion to
determine the existence of probable cause,
a discretion that must be used to file only a criminal charge that the evidence and inferences can properly warrant.
The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.

Accordingly, we cannot hold that the Secretary of Justice erred in dismissing the information in the face of the controverting explanation by Tobias
showing how he came to possess the spurious document. Much less can we consider the dismissal as done with abuse of discretion, least of all grave.

142 Lor Belleza

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS

Principle:

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.

Facts:

Syed and Gloria were married on January 9, 1993. However, Syed seek to declare his marriage with Gloria void ab initio on the ground of the
absence of Marriage License. During the trial, Syed presented Bagsic, an employee in the Municipal Civil Registrar. He testified that their office
issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically. He also testified that the a certification was issued and
signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial number, namely
9969967, to any other person. RTC annulled the marriage of Syed and Gloria due to lack of any formal requisite. On appeal, CA reversed and held
that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed
was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value.

Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Registrar’s Certification has probative value although it failed to state that diligent search were done by the office to locate
the same.

Ruling:

Yes. Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty
of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of
Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license
was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage
license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in
securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who
could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony
of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

Short Digest:
In a trial for a Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of lack of Marriage License, a certification from the Municipal Civil Registrar was
presented as evidence which states that no Marriage License was issued to the spouses. Does the certification has probative value although diligent
effort in the performance of duty on the part of the officer issuing the same was not shown?

Yes. Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty
of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of
Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

143 He

G.R. No. 188299 January 23, 2013

HEIRS OF LUNA vs. AFABLE

Facts:

Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. J-7205 (T-54199), with an area of 158.77 hectares,
located in Barangay Guinobatan, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro.100.2856 CARP.
Respondents were identified by the DAR as qualified farmer-beneficiaries; hence, the corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award
(CLOAs) were generated, issued to respondents and duly registered in their names.

Petitioners filed before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) Oriental Mindoro a Petition for "Cancellation of CLOAs”for the land is outside the
purview of RA No. 6657."The petition was anchored mainly on the reclassification of the land in question into a light intensity industrial zone
pursuant to Municipal Ordinance No. 21, series of 1981,

The DARAB found that petitioners’ property is exempt from the CARP as it has been reclassified as non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the DARAB Central Office.

The Central Office of the DARAB held that the local Adjudicator misconstrued DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 and, in the process, overlooked
DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 2, Series of 1994 which provides the grounds upon which CLOAs may be cancelled, among which is that the
land is found to be exempt or excluded from CARP coverage or is to be part of the landowner’s retained area as determined by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform or his authorized representative. Thus, the DARAB concluded, the issue of whether or not petitioners’ land is indeed exempt from
CARP coverage is still an administrative matter to be determined exclusively by the DAR Secretary or his authorized representative. In short, an
exemption clearance from the DAR is still required.

Accordingly, the DARAB set aside the Decision of the DARAB Calapan City for lack of jurisdiction and referred the case to the Regional Office of
DAR Region IV for final determination as to whether the land covered is exempt from CARP coverage.

In an apparent response to the above ruling of the DARAB holding that petitioners still need an exemption clearance from the DAR, petitioners filed
an application for exemption from CARP coverage of subject land.
DAR Secretary Roberto M. Pagdanganan granted petitioners’ application for exemption. It held that the subject property has been zoned as light-
industrial prior to the enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as shown by the various certifications issued by the HLURB and
CPDC of Calapan City, Mindoro.

Predictably, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of exemption.

In a Resolution, former DAR Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce granted respondents’ motion for reconsideration stating that the
subject property is still within the ambit of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program since the same were [sic] reclassified only in 1998 through
Resolution No. 151, City Ordinance No. 6, and was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan only in 2001 through Resolution No. 218, Series of
2001 long after the effectivity of RA 6657.
Thus, the Order issued by DAR Secretary Pagdanganan was set aside, revoked and cancelled.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of this Resolution.

DAR, through then OIC Secretary Nasser C. Pangandaman issued an Order denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

The Certification issued on 8 October 1998 by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) proved that the property is still agricultural. It
was re-classified into residential, commercial and institutional uses pursuant to Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution No. 151, Ordinance No. 6 only
on 23 June 1998. The 1981 Ordinance, albeit approved by the HLURB, did not automatically reclassify the land.
The Order granting the motion for reconsideration filed by the farmer-beneficiaries was, therefore, affirmed in toto.

Petitioners, consequently, filed an appeal before the Office of the President. It quoted with approval the findings and conclusions of former DAR
Secretary Pagdanganan in his Order.
According to the Office of the President, contrary to the findings and conclusions of the DAR in its Resolution, the area where subject property is
situated was really intended to be classified, not as agricultural, as in fact it was declared as residential, commercial and institutional in 1998.

The Office of the President further held that from the time portions of subject property were declared to be within the Light Intensity Industrial Zone
in 2003, it was never established that it had been devoted to agricultural purposes. Besides, the confirmation of its falling within the residential,
commercial and industrial zone was ahead of the Notice of Acquisition. It would not be proper to subject a residential, commercial and industrial
property to CARP anymore.

The motion for reconsideration and second motion for reconsideration of respondents were respectively denied by the Office of the President in a
Resolution

Respondents then appealed to the CA.

The CA granted the appeal based on a finding that the ruling of the Office of the President is not supported by substantial evidence.
Hence, this petition for review wherein petitioners seek the reversal of the aforementioned decision on the ground, among others, that the Honorable
Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the Decision of the Office of the President is not supported by substantial evidence.

Issue:
whether or not the land subject of this case had been reclassified as non-agricultural as early as 1981, that is, prior to the effectivity of the CARL and,
therefore, exempt from its coverage.

Ruling

Yes.
In resolving the issue in the affirmative, former DAR Secretary Pagdanganan relied primarily on the respective Certifications issued by the
54
Office of the Deputized Zoning Administrator, Urban Planning and Development Department of Calapan City and by the Housing and
55
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and considered subject property as having "been zoned as light-industrial prior to
the enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program." Secretary Pagdanganan consequently granted petitioners’ application for
56
exemption pursuant to DAR AO No. 6, Series of 1994. This issuance was released by the DAR following DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of
57
1990, wherein the Secretary of the DOJ opined that "with respect to conversions of agricultural lands covered by RA 6657 to non-agricultural uses,
the authority of the DAR to approve such conversions may be exercised from the date of the law’s effectivity on June 15, 1998." Thus, AO No. 6
states that "all lands that were already classified as commercial, industrial or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need any conversion
clearance." Designed "to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based on DOJ Opinion No. 44," the AO laid down the procedure and
58
guidelines for the issuance of exemption clearances for landowners whose lands are covered by DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 and desire to
obtain an exemption clearance from the DAR. Such exemption clearance does not mean that the DAR Secretary is exempting the land from CARL
coverage, with the implication that the land was previously covered; it simply means that the CARL itself has, from the start, excluded the land from
CARL coverage, and the DAR Secretary is only affirming such fact.
The CA, agreeing with the finding of OIC Secretary Pangandaman, and quoting from the OIC Secretary’s order, held that the Certification of the
HUDCC "proved that the property is still agricultural."
A careful scrutiny of the aforementioned certification reveals, however, that contrary to the findings of OIC Secretary Pangandaman and the CA, the
certification, in fact, proves that petitioners’ land falls within the area classified as light intensity industrial zone. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent
portions of the certification:
This is to certify that a parcel of land with a total area of 1,587,713 square meters and situated at Brgy. Guinobatan, Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro,
a portion of which is approximately 1,537,713 square meters is applied for Zoning Certification as shown in the vicinity map submitted by the
applicant appears to be within the LIGHT INDUSTRIAL ZONE (100 meters deep west and 200 meters deep east) of the Provincial Road and the rest
is AGRICULTURAL ZONE based on the Zoning Ordinance approval by HLURB Resolution No. R-39-4 dated 31 July 1980. (Emphasis supplied)
Submitted Transfer Certificate of Title described as:
TCT NO. LOT NO. AREA (sq.m.) REGISTERED OWNER
J-7205 612 1,531,713 (sic) Luis A. Luna, et al.
61
xxxx
Based on the foregoing, 1,537,713 square meters (sq. ms.) out of the 1,587,713 sq. ms. total area of petitioners’ property have been zoned as light
industrial and only 50,000 sq. ms. apparently remain agricultural. Considering, however, the certification of the Deputized Zoning Administrator of
the Urban Planning and Development Department of Calapan City, this Court finds and so holds that the entire landholding has been classified as
light intensity industrial zone pursuant to Ordinance No. 21.
The court is inclined to give more evidentiary weight to the certification of the zoning administrator being the officer having jurisdiction over the area
where the land in question is situated and is, therefore, more familiar with the property in issue. Besides, this certification carried the presumption of
regularity in its issuance and respondents have the burden of overcoming this presumption. Respondents, however, failed to present any evidence to
rebut that presumption.

Accordingly, since specialized agencies, such as the HUDCC and the Office of the Deputized Zoning Administrator tasked to determine the
classification of parcels of land have already certified that the subject land is industrial, the Court must accord such pronouncements great respect, if
not finality, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Respondents insist that petitioners’ landholding is not included in the light intensity industrial zone under Ordinance No. 21, yet, they never
submitted any evidence to support their contention. No maps, such as a zoning map or a land use map, clearly showing that petitioners’ property lies
outside the reclassified area were presented by respondents. Instead, what they presented were: (1) a certification from the Provincial Irrigation
Manager stating that several of the respondents were listed as beneficiaries of the Calapan Dam Irrigators’ Association; (2) a certification from the
Municipal Agriculturist of Calapan declaring that the property is irrigated; (3) photographs of the irrigation system covering the subject landholding;
(4) a letter from the Chief of the Land Management Service of the DENR Region IV stating that the entire 158.77 hectares of the land in question
falls under 18% slope; (5) photographs showing that the property is generally planted with rice; and other documents which, however, do not prove
nor support their claim that the property has not been reclassified into non-agricultural use.

Respondents, however, did submit in the proceedings before then DAR OIC Secretary Ponce an "approved survey plan" commissioned by the DAR
allegedly "showing that only about 20 hectares or so would be covered by" Ordinance No. 21. A copy of this plan was nevertheless not attached to
the records of this case thereby making it impossible for this Court to examine the same and draw its own conclusions therefrom.
At any rate, as already adverted to above, the certification of the deputized zoning administrator carries more weight by reason of his special
knowledge and expertise and the matter under consideration being under his jurisdiction and competence. He is, therefore, in a better position to
attest to the classification of the property in question.
The best evidence respondents could have presented was a map showing the metes and bounds and definite delineations of the subject land. Since
respondents failed to do so, this Court is bound to rely on the certifications of the appropriate government agencies with recognized expertise on the
matter of land classification. Thus, through the certifications issued by the deputized zoning administrator of Calapan City and by the HUDCC,
petitioners were able to positively establish that their property is no longer agricultural at the time the CARL took effect and, therefore, cannot be
subjected to agrarian reform.

A final note: In his Order dated 21 June 2006, then OIC Secretary Pangandaman made mention of a "report" issued by the MARO of Calapan City
claiming that the area covering 100 meters deep west and 200 meters deep east along the provincial road traversing the property which was declared
in the HUDCC certification dated 8 October 1998 as light industrial has already been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27.Thus, Secretary
Pangandaman concluded, there were already vested rights over the property and can no longer be covered by an application for exemption.

The records of this case, however, do not contain a copy of the aforementioned report.Thus, the Court is unable to scrutinize the same and make a
definite ruling thereon.
In any case, an examination of the records of this case show that the earliest document evidencing coverage under the CARP of the land subject of
this dispute is the published Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition dated 20 August 1998. Prior thereto, all documents in connection with the
compulsory acquisition of land for agrarian reform pertain to land covered by TCT No. T-18192 with an area of 161 hectares, purportedly in the
name of Mariquita A. Luna. Clearly, this land is different from the land subject of this case which is covered by TCT No. J-7205 (T-54199). It may,
therefore, be reasonably presumed that the report adverted to refers to the land covered by TCT No. T-18192 and not to the property under
consideration herein.

SHORT DIGEST

1. Petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel CLOA. Exempted because of reclassification

2. Granted by DARAB City office
3. Reversed by DARAB Central Office, stating that mere reclassification thru an ordinance of a local government is not sufficient. The
 petitioner should obtain a clearance/application of exemption from DAR

4. Petitioners requested a clearance from DAR

5. DAR Pagdanganan Secretary granted the request.
6. Respondents filed an MR of the DAR Secretary Ruling.
7. DAR-OIC Secretary granted the respondent’s MR stating that Resolution NO. R-39-4, Series of 1980 of the then Municipality of Calapan did
not categorically place the entire landholding under Light Industrial Zone.

8. Petitioners filed an MR of this resolution of the OIC.

9. DAR denied the petitioner’s MR stating that the resolution R-39-4 did not categorically place the entire land holding under Light Industrial
Zone.

10. That the same land was reclassified into a residential, commercial and institutional uses pursuan to Sangguniang Panlungsod Resolution No.
151, Ordinance No. 6 only on June 23, 1998.

11. Petitioners filed an appeal before the Office of the President.

12. President granted the petition (gubota ani eeeyyyy!)
13. Respondents appealed to CA. CA ruled in favor of the respondents ruling that only 100 hectares of the property were subjected to the
conversion. Since the remaining were converted only in 1998 – after CARL – DAR Secretary’s clearance is required.

14. Petitioner appealed to SC.

144 Roche Torrejos

G.R. No. 199938 January 28, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
CAMALOUING SAMANODING, LARA y BRION, Appellant.
Principle: The presumption of the law is that, if the person carries with him or her more than five grams, that is not for his personal consumption.
37
He is out to traffic the rest of it. (Underscoring supplied) This is based on the deliberation of Congress.
Presumption on the regularity in the performance of official duties of the police officers.
Facts:
On July 18, 2005, at around 10:45 in the morning, appellant arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport in Pasay City to take his flight bound for Davao
4
City. When he approached the initial check-in area, Mark Anthony Villocillo (Villocillo), a non-uniformed personnel (NUP) frisker assigned
5
thereat, physically searched the person of appellant and suspected that the latter’s oversized white rubber shoes, with the identifying mark
6 7 8
"Spicer," seemed to contain what felt like rice. Upon inspection of the rubber shoes, which Villocillo asked appellant to remove, the former
9
discovered three (3) plastic sachets containing shabu– two plastic sachets were inside the left shoe while one was inside the right shoe.
When Villocillo extracted the plastic sachets from appellant’s shoes, the latter told Villocillo, "Baka pwedeng pag-usapan ito" while simultaneously
10 11
handing him a rolled wad of paper bills. Eventually, Villocillo called the attention of his supervisor, SPO2 Nolasco Peji (SPO2 Peji), who
12
apprehended appellant and apprised him of his rights. Subsequently, appellant was brought to their office and investigated by PO2 Edwin
13
Caimoso, who thereafter indorsed appellant, together with the confiscated plastic sachets, to Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) agents
14
who had eventually arrived at the scene.
20
In defense, appellant claimed that on the date and time in question, he was at the Manila Domestic Airport for his flight to Davao City. After
passing through the metal detector and while walking towards the ticketing counter to check-in, a police officer, whom he later identified as SPO2
21 22
Peji, called his attention and asked him to stay for a while because something was allegedly recovered from him. At the same time, appellant
noticed that someone had been arrested, and he heard SPO2 Peji tell that person to settle the case so that they could just "pass" the "thing" to
23
appellant, which turned out to be shabu.
24 25
Thereafter, SPO2 Peji and Villocillo brought appellant to an office where SPO2 Peji forced him toadmit ownership of the shabu. When appellant
26
refused, SPO2 Peji suggested the settlement of the case forP100,000.00, an amount which appellant could not afford. Later, he was brought to a
27
PDEA office where PDEA agents took his statement and once again asked him to admit ownership of the confiscated shabu. Appellant averred that
28
SPO2 Peji confiscated his wallet which contained P1,600.00 in cash, as well as P2,000.00 found in the pocket of his pants. Finally, appellant denied
29
wearing the white rubber shoes with the label "Spicer" at the time he was arrested.
30
On August 29, 2006, after trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant as charged upon a finding that all the elements for transportation of
31
drugs, i.e., actual physical possession and control of the prohibited drugs, coupled with the presentation of the corpus delicti in court, have been
established by the prosecution. It found the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Villocillo and SPO2 Peji to be candid, forthright and reliable.
Moreover, as law enforcers, they were presumed to have regularly performed their official duties.
On the other hand, the RTC refused to give credence to appellant’s bare and unsubstantiated denials, as well as his claim that he was merely framed-
up, and his insistence that the police officers were extorting money from him. The CA affirmed the decision in toto.
Issue :
Whether the CA and the RTC committed any reversible error in convicting appellant as charged.
Held: NO
35
"Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean "to carry or convey from one place to another." The essential element of the
36
charge is the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another.
In this case, appellant was apprehended inside the airport, as he was intending to board his flight bound for Davao City with a substantial amount or
196.63 grams of methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in his possession, concealed in separate plastic bags inside his oversized Spicer rubber
shoes. While it may be argued that appellant was yet to board the aircraft or travel some distance with the illegal drugs in his possession, it cannot be
denied that his presence at the airport at that particular instance was for the purpose of transporting or moving the dangerous drugs from one place to
another.
Moreover, it may be reasonably inferred from the deliberations of the Congress that if a person is found to have more than five (5) grams of shabu in
his possession, then his purpose in carrying them is to dispose, traffic, or sell it, as follows:
REPRESENTATIVE AQUINO (B.). We agree with the premises, Mr. Speaker.1âwphi1 But just for the sake of our education, in terms of volume,
somebody informed this Representation that one gram of shabu would probably be the same size as a single kernel of corn. Would that be correct?
REPRESENTATIVE CUENCO. The technical committee that has been assisting us in carpentering this bill tells us that a habitual user of, let’s say,
shabu, one of the dangerous substances provided for here, a habitual user of shabu, even if we say daily taker of shabu consumes only 1/5 of a gram,
.02 grams a day. So that means, if he has with him one gram of shabu, that is good for five days; if he has five grams, that is good for 25 days. Now if
he is a user, he won’t need more than five grams to carry with him or her. So the presumption of the law is that, if he carries with him or her more
37
than five grams, that is not for his personal consumption. He is out to traffic the rest of it. (Underscoring supplied)
 LAYING THE PREDICATE

145 Clea Borja Cabueñas

PEOPLE vs. MOLO

FACTS:

X was accused of murder for allegedly killing Y. Y and his wife, Z, lived in a typical hut made of bamboo flooring and dilapidated buri walling
surrounded by fruit bearing banana plants. Z, who had not yet fallen asleep, heard an indistinct sound of murmur and gnashing of teeth. She saw
accused X by peeping in a hole. She immediately lighted a kerosene lamp and placed it on top of the trunk nearby. She tried to awaken her husband,
but the latter did not respond. The accused had already climbed up the house. The accused forcibly pushed the sliding door and barged into the house.
He inquired from Z where Y was and she replied that he was asleep. Finding Y sleeping near the door, he immediately grabbed his left wrist and
started hacking at the sleeping old man. Rudely awakened, Y quickly stood up and with his right hand reached for his bolo which was atop the table
nearby; but he was not able to retaliate in as much as X was quick to hack at him again. Fearing for her own life, Z rushed out of the house through
the door of the unfinished kitchen to summon help from her son, A, who was at another house. Upon being informed, A and his friend ran towards
the house of Y. Upon arrival, they saw Y bleeding profusely and in weakened condition. He was sitting in the floor of the kitchen, defecating in his
pants. When A took him in his arms, Y told him that he was boloed by X.

ISSUE:

Whether the identity of the appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

Yes.
Appellant contends that inconsistencies exist between Z’s statement given to the police and her foregoing testimony in court, relative to — 1) the
precise moment when Z recognized the accused, and 2) whether there was a conversation between Z and the accused.
The records show, however, that the alleged statement given to the police was neither offered as evidence nor shown to witness in order to enable her
to explain the discrepancies if any in accordance to Section 16, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The proper bast was, therefore, not laid to impeach
Z’s testimony on the basis of alleged inconsistent statements which she allegedly made before the police.
At any rate, We find the alleged inconsistencies inconsequential. Inconsistencies on minor details or on matters that are not of material consequence
as to affect the guilt or the innocence of the accused do not detract from the credibility of the witnesses. The discordance in their testimonies on
collateral matters heightens their credibility and shows that their testimonies were not coached or rehearsed. Far from being evidence of falsehood,
they could justifiably be regarded as a demonstration of good faith.

146 Anna Danessa Valdez

PEOPLE VS. BUDUHAN

Principle:
The rule that requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before introducing evidence of inconsistent statements of a witness is founded upon
common sense and is essential to protect the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by the necessary inquiries, which enable him to explain
the statements referred to and to show that they were made by mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between them and his testimony.

Facts:
On 24 July 1998, Cherry Rose was working as a guest relations officer at the RML Canteen, a beerhouse and a videoke bar. At about 9:00 to 10:00
p.m., there were only two groups of men inside the beerhouse.The group that went there first was that of the appellants, composed of Robert
Buduhan, who was wearing a white T-shirt marked Giordano, Rudy Buduhan, who was wearing a red T-shirt, a man wearing a blue T-shirt,and
another man wearing a blue T-shirt with a black jacket.The second group was composed of Larry Erese and his companions Gilbert Cortez (alias
Abe) and Fernando Pera (alias Nanding).
At 10:40 p.m., while Cherry Rose was entertaining the group of Larry Erese, Robert approached them and poked a gun at Larry. Immediately, the
man wearing a blue T-shirt likewise approached Cherry Roses Manager Romualde Almeron (alias Eddie), who was seated at the counter.The man in
blue poked a gun at Romualde and announced a hold-up.Larry then handed over his wristwatch to Robert. Instantaneously, all four men from Roberts
group fired their guns at Larry and Romualde, which caused them to fall down.Abe and Nanding ran out of the RML Canteen when the shooting
occurred, and Cherry Rose hid below the table.
SPO1 Leo T. Saquing testified that on 24 July 1998, at 11:00 p.m., he and SPO4 Alex M. Gumayagay were detailed as duty investigators at the
Maddela Police Station when Eddie Ancheta, a fireman, reported to them a shooting incident at the RML Canteen in Barangay Poblacion Norte,
Maddela, Quirino. SPO1 Saquing and SPO4 Gumayagay then proceeded to the said place. About 50 meters from the scene of the crime, they
encountered four male individuals who were running away therefrom.The policemen immediately halted the men and asked them where they came
from. When they could not respond properly and gave different answers, the policemen apprehended them and brought them to the Maddela Police
Station for questioning and identification. Afterwards, the policemen went back to the RML Canteen to conduct an investigation therein. Later that
night, the witnesses of the shooting incident went to the police station and they positively pointed to the four persons, later identified as Robert
Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boy Guinhicna and Boyet Ginyang, as the assailants in the said incident.
The RTC found the accused-appellants Robert Buduhan y Bullan and Rudy Buduhan y Bullan guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide with respect to the deceased Larry Erese, and of the crime of homicide with respect to the deceased Romualde Almeron.
The appellants filed a Notice of Appeal raising questions of law and facts. The CA affirmed the RTC's decision but with modifications only as to
damages. From the CA, the case was elevated to the SC for automatic review. Appellants argue that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt in view of the trial court's error in the appreciation of the evidence for and against them. They fault the trial court's over-reliance on the
testimony of the prosecution's main witness and its failure to consider the glaring inconsistencies in Cherry Rose' previous accounts of the shooting
incident.
Appellants insist that Cherry Rose is not a credible witness in view of the conflicting answers she gave in her sworn statement before the police, in
the preliminary investigation of the case and in her testimony in open court.
Appellants called attention to the fact that during the preliminary investigation of the case, Cherry Rose stated that a man wearing a white Giordano
T-shirt shot Larry after Larry handed his wristwatch. Thereafter, when she was asked whom she saw wearing a white Giordano T-shirt, she pointed to
Boy Guinhicna. With respect to appellant Robert Buduhan, she identified him as the one who shot Orlando Pascua.
In her testimony in open court, however, she identified appellant Robert as the man who was wearing a white Giordano T-shirt and who shot Larry
Erese.
Also, in her sworn statement before the police, she narrated that the group of the appellants, consisting of five persons, was already inside the RML
Canteen before the shooting incident occured. However, in her direct examination, she stated that appellant Robert had only three other companions.
Finally, in the preliminary investigation, appellants pointed out that Cherry Rose unhesitatingly admitted that Larry Erese was her intimate boyfriend
and that was why she embraced him after the latter was shot.
In her cross-examination, however, she stated that Larry was only a customer and not her boyfriend. When questioned about her prior statement
about this fact given during the preliminary investigation, she changed her answer and said that Larry was indeed her boyfriend.

Issue:
Whether or not Cherry Rose may be considered a credible witness despite her conflicting statements.

Ruling:

Yes. As between statements made during the preliminary investigation of the case and the testimony of a witness in open court, the latter deserves
more credence. Preliminary investigations are commonly fairly summary or truncated in nature, being designed simply for the determination, not of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but of probable cause prior to the filing of an information in court. It is the statements of a witness in open court
which deserve careful consideration.
In any event, Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, on the matter of inconsistent statements by a witness, is revealing:
Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at
other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places
and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing
they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.

The rule that requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before introducing evidence of inconsistent statements of a witness is founded upon
common sense and is essential to protect the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by the necessary inquiries, which enable him to explain
the statements referred to and to show that they were made by mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between them and his testimony.
In the present case, the statements made by Cherry Rose during the preliminary investigation with respect to the identities of the accused were not
related to her during the trial. Indeed, it is only during the appeal of this case that appellants pointed out the supposed inconsistencies in Cherry Roses
identification of the appellants in order to destroy her credibility as a witness. No opportunity was ever afforded her to provide an explanation.
Without such explanation, whether plausible or not, we are left with no basis to evaluate and assess her credibility, on the rationale that it is only
when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling her conflicting declarations that she should be deemed impeached.
In this regard, what the defense brought to Cherry Roses attention during the trial were her contradictory statements about her romantic relationship
with Larry Erese. As a result of this confrontation, Cherry Rose changed her answer. We rule, however, that this inconsistency relates only to an
insignificant aspect of the case and does not involve a material fact in dispute.
Inasmuch as the above-stated mandatory procedural requirements were not complied with, the credibility of Cherry Rose as a witness stands
unimpeached. As found by the trial court, the testimony of Cherry Rose was straightforward throughout. The appellants were not able to adduce any
reason or motive for her to bear false witness against them. As a matter of fact, Cherry Rose testified during cross-examination that she did not
personally know appellant Robert, and that she had first seen him only during the night when the shooting incident took place.
As the trial judge who penned the assailed decision did not hear the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, the rule granting finality to the
factual findings of trial courts does not find applicability to the instant case.
After a careful review of the entire records of this case, the Court finds no reason to disagree with the factual findings of the trial court that all the
elements of the crime of Robbery with Homicide were present and proved in this case.

REFERENCE TO THE MEMORANDUM

147 Imee Nawanao Hiyas

September 3, 1928

GREGORIO FIGUERAS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. SIMEON SERRANO, as administrator of the Estate of Leandro Serrano, Defendant-
Appellant.

PRINCIPLE:

It is absolutely necessary for the admission of such entries to prove that they were made at or about the time of the transaction to which they
relate. Once this is proven they may be admitted to corroborate the testimony of the person who made them.
Written memoranda made at or about the time of the transaction to which they relate are sometimes admitted in evidence to corroborate the
testimony of the person by whom they were made.
FACTS:

This is an action to collect the balance of professional fees, for medical services amounting to P52,229, with P7,310 interest, plus P5,000 damages,
and the costs of the action.chanroblesvir

Herein plaintiffs Figueras contend that defendants Primitiva Serrano and Leandro Serrano (deceased) promised to pay for plaintiff's trip to the town
of Cabugao (deceased residence) at the rate of P4 per kilometer made in the course of their medical attendance during the years 1919, 1920, and
1921.

The principal evidence adduced to prove this promise is the letter Exhibit C which is alleged to be addressed to the plaintiff and signed by Leandro
Serrano. This was objected to by the deceased’ administrator assailing the authenticity of letter and the signature at the bottom thereof.

Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur ruled in favor of plaintiffs. Appeal was brought. The case finally brought up to the SC.

ISSUE:

1. Rule on the competency of Exh. C (stating the defendant’s [romised to pay)

2. Rule on the competency in Exhs. 6,7,9,10. (no. of medical visits made)

RULING:

1. A careful examination of Exhibit C reveals some details which bear out the presumption that it was written on the same typewriter as
document Exhibit 2. The latter is a letter written by the plaintiff's brother.
Observations:

• There are changes and erasures which have not been satisfactory explained

• The remarkable resemblance almost identical, in point of size and contour, between the signature in Exhibit C and the one in Exhibit J, as may
be clearly seen by placing one upon the other, casts serious doubts on its genuineness. It seems hardly probable that Leandro Serrano
should have been able to write two signatures so exactly alike, not only in the curvature at the base of the letters, and in the form of the
small as well as the capital letters, but also in the distance between them, the space they occupy, and the slant of the strokes of the whole
signature as well as of each letter thereof, and even in the length, contour, and other details of the paraph.c

The burden of proof was on plaintiff to show, at least by a preponderance of evidence, that this document was admissible evidence of record,
and, in this case the preponderance militates against the document.chanrob

Exhibits Q and R (handwriting made by the plaintiffs in connection with the agreed payment of services- P25.00 per visit):

No proof that the notes in these exhibits were written with the knowledge and consent, or even in the presence, of Leandro Serrano. Neither does it
appear that such notes were made at the time of the visits and professional services referred to therein, or that they were written about that time. And
the appearance of the writing in these books (Exhibit Q and R ) does not show that such notes were made therein on different occasions and at
different periods of time, considering the noticeable uniformity of the handwriting and of the color of the ink used (in Exhibit Q), in almost all
the entries, notwithstanding the fact that these entries cover a period of over one year.

It is absolutely necessary for the admission of such entries to prove that they were made at or about the time of the transaction to which they
relate. Once this is proven they may be admitted to corroborate the testimony of the person who made them.
Written memoranda made at or about the time of the transaction to which they relate are sometimes admitted in evidence to corroborate the
testimony of the person by whom they were made.
Exhibits Q and R not only do not meet the requirement as to being contemporaneous, but it appears that the plaintiff who made the memoranda noted
therein did not even testify concerning them.
2. No. of visits in Exh. 6,7,9, 10 are competent evidence:
These were dentified by Pedro Suero and Simeon Serrano, the plaintiff made twenty-six medical visits to Primitiva Serrano in Cabugao, and ninety in
Vigan. Not only are these Exhibits 6, 7, 9 and 10, identified, but it appears from the testimony of Pedro Suero, that he, as former clerk to Leandro
Serrano, was enjoined to note down in Exhibits 6 and 7, which are Bristol Almanacs for the years 1919 and 1920.
It appearing that the plaintiff admitted, and that the trial judge so held without any objection from said plaintiff, that the latter has already been paid
the sum of P1,025 on account of the fees here in question, and as the sum of P830 as above stated to which he is thus entitled is less than that, said
fees have already been amply satisfied.
defendant is absolved from the complaint.
SHORT DIGEST:
Plaintiffs made a medical service to defendants, one of them already died. It was the contention of the plaintiffs that they agreed as to the payment of
the medical service, P4.00 per visit (Exh. Q and R). This was objected to by deceased administrator assailing the genuineness of the document.
Another exhibits were presented (Exh. 6,7,8,10) as to the number of visits made. These were also objected by the defendants.
ISSUE:
Rule on the competency of each exhibits.
RULING:
1. Exh. Q and R are incompetent
No proof that the notes in these exhibits were written with the knowledge and consent, or even in the presence, of Leandro Serrano. Neither does it
appear that such notes were made at the time of the visits and professional services referred to therein, or that they were written about that time. And
the appearance of the writing in these books (Exhibit Q and R ) does not show that such notes were made therein on different occasions and at
different periods of time, considering the noticeable uniformity of the handwriting and of the color of the ink used (in Exhibit Q), in almost all
the entries, notwithstanding the fact that these entries cover a period of over one year.

It is absolutely necessary for the admission of such entries to prove that they were made at or about the time of the transaction to which they
relate. Once this is proven they may be admitted to corroborate the testimony of the person who made them.
Written memoranda made at or about the time of the transaction to which they relate are sometimes admitted in evidence to corroborate the
testimony of the person by whom they were made.
2. Exh. 6,7,8,10 are competent
It was testified to by Pedro Suero a former clerk to Leandro Serrano, was enjoined to note down in Exhibits 6 and 7, which are Bristol Almanacs for
the years 1919 and 1920.
HOWEVER, It appearing that the plaintiff admitted, and that the trial judge so held without any objection from said plaintiff, that the latter has
already been paid the sum of P1,025 on account of the fees here in question, and as the sum of P830 as above stated to which he is thus entitled is
less than that, said fees have already been amply satisfied.
Defendant is absolved from the complaint.

148 Kevin Santi

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORENCIO ODENCIO and GUIAMELON MAMA, accused-appellants.

FACTS:

Florencio Odencio and Guiamelon Mama appealed from the decision of CFI Cotabato, finding them guilty of two separate crimes of murder, for the
death of Prowa Talib and Kadir Oranen.
According to the prosecution, Prowa Talib, a 40yr old farmer was in the yard of his house handing a pot of rice to his wife when he was suddenly
felled down by a volley of shots.
The wife went to the aid of his husband and looked at the direction where the gunshots were fired and saw Mama holding a gun near a coconut tree
six brazas away. She also saw Odencio holding a gun near another coconut tree 10 meters away from the yard of their neighbor, Oranen who was also
shot by the assailants. The 2 fled westward thereafter.
Policemen arrived at Talib's house. Setie informed them that Guiamelon was the gunwielder. They brought Talib to a medical clinic where he was
interrogated by Patrolman Joaquin Sañada Talib told Sañada that his assailants were Guiamelon, Florencio Odencio and Florencio's father, Joseph
Odencio. Due to the critical condition of Talib, he was not able to sign his dying declaration. He died on the following day.
In that unsigned antemortem declaration, Talib revealed that the dispute arose from theft of 2 carabaos.
Both accused denied the allegations and contend that they were in their respective houses when the incident occurred.

ISSUE:
WON the “unsigned” dying declaration of the deceased may be used as a memorandum by the wife who took it down
HELD:

Yes.
Section 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or
recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh
in his memory and knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be produced and may be
inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify
from such writing or record, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or record correctly stated the
transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution. (10a)
Appellants' counsel further contends that they were convicted on the basis of the wife's uncorroborated testimony "which is open to suspicion due to
inherent improbabilities'' and "motives to falsify the truth". That contention is not correct. Talib's antemortem statement fortifies the testimony of his
widow, an eyewitness. We have stressed that two other witnesses saw the appellants leaving the scene of the crime.
Moreover, Talib's dying declaration was sufficiently proven. The rule is that a dying declaration may be oral or written If oral, the witness, who heard
it, may testify thereto without the necessity, of course, of reproducing exactly the words of the decedent, if he is able to give the substance thereof. An
unsigned dying declaration may be used as a memorandum by the witness who took it down.
BAR Q
X was killed by multiple gunshots from 2 assailants whom he got into a dispute regarding the theft of carabaos. Prior to his demise, he was
interrogated by the police and made an unsigned dying declaration to his wife identifying the assailants. He died the following day. The lower court
convicted the assailants. Now the counsel for the defense contends that the assailants were convicted on the basis of the wife's uncorroborated
testimony "which is open to suspicion due to inherent improbabilities'' and "motives to falsify the truth". Is the “unsigned” dying declaration of the
deceased may be used as a memorandum under section 16, Rule 130?

149 Michelle Silva

Borromeo vs Ca (supra)

Principles:
➢ Where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony, has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in dispute, such
memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence.
➢ The mere making of written memorandum immediately after the interview does not make the memorandum affirmative intrinsic proof of the
things said or transacted. Knowledge on the part of the person who made the memorandum, at the time it was made, that the statements or
entries therein were correct must be shown.

Facts:
Borromeo was the administrator of the properties of deceased Rallos. Crispina was the daughter of deceased Rallos. Aznar was the alleged “buyer”.
Borromeo wants to claim the land in question. Aznar insists that the contract was a contract of absolute sale. Meanwhile Borromeo claims that it was
only equitable mortgage.

Crispina says that the contract was one of equitable mortgage. She testified that she was present on all occasions when the transactions in dispute
took place between her father and Matias Aznar and that while listening to their conversations she took down notes of the various amounts mentioned
by them and the respective purposes thereof such as interest, attorney's fees, other obligations to be paid out of the money being borrowed by her
father, etc., which notes were Identified at the trial as Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5 (in other words, the pieces of evidence support that the contract
was really in fact a mortgage and not a sale.)

Among other evidence, Exhibit K was presented – which was prepared by an employee of Matias Aznar, ordered by the latter, and allegedly shows
that Matias Aznar charged deceased Rallos with the payment of the taxes due on the contested lots. (this exhibit further supports that it was an
equitable mortgage)

Nonetheless, RTC and later CA ruled that the contracts entered into were absolute sales and not equitable mortgages. CA ruled that the testimony of
Crispina is inadmissible for being a mere memorandum, which was not adequately shown to be true. Also, that exhibit K was a mere memorandum.

But the above ruling was later reversed by CA itself on the ground that such was part of the res gestae considering that Crispina’s testimony appears
to be clearly and sufficiently supported by memoranda which are admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae.

To this ruling, the heirs of Aznar filed this petition.

Issue:
1. WON said memoranda are admissible as part of the res gestae.
2. WON said memoranda (Exhibits A-2, A-3, B-3 and C-5 and Exhibit K) may be admissible to prove that the contracts entered into were
really equitable mortgages and not absolute sales.

Ruling:
1. No. (this has already been discussed under the topic of res gestae)
2. No. The Court upheld the ruling of the CA before the latter reversed itself.
SEC. 16, Rule 132. When witness may refer to memorandum. — A witness may be allowed to refresh his memory
respecting a fact, by anything written by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact occurred, or
immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was
correctly stated in the writing; but in such case the writing must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse
party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness
 may testify from such a writing, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that
the writing correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.

As may be observed, this provision applies only when it is shown that there is need to refresh the memory of the witness, which is not the case here.
Nowhere in the record is there any indication that Crispina needed during her testimony the aid of any memorandum in respect to the matters
contained in the notes in dispute. Where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the
events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any
written statement prepared wholly by him. He cannot be more credible just because he supported his open-court declaration with written statements
of the same facts even if he did prepare them during the occasion in dispute, unless the proper predicate of his failing memory is priorly laid down.

Such evidence must be received with caution because it is not very difficult to fabricate evidence of this nature. This is doubly true when the witness
stands to gain materially or otherwise from the admission of such evidence, which is exactly the case of Crispina Alcantara.

As to Exhibit K, the court ruled: transaction is neither dated nor signed, much less by the party sought to be charged. The alleged writer thereof was
not presented at the trial of the case, and we have only the biased testimony of Crispina as to its authenticity or preparation. The mere making of
written memorandum immediately after the interview does not make the memorandum affirmative intrinsic proof of the things said or transacted.
Knowledge on the part of the person who made the memorandum, at the time it was made, that the statements or entries therein were correct must be
shown and this the plaintiff failed to do. Consequently, we hold that Exhibit K has no evidentiary value, and the lower court was correct in
disregarding it.

With the evidence failing to support that the transactions entered into were of equitable mortgage, the Court considered such to be of absolute sales.

PART OF TRANSACTION

150 Melissa Samson Guillemer Cotoner

PROOF OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT

151 Faith Ravens

AZNAR V CITIBANK

Principle:
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever
any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw
the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Facts:

Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard) issued by Citibank with a
credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, Zoraida, planned to take their two grandchildren, Melissa and Richard Beane, on an Asian tour,
Aznar made a total advance deposit of P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of increasing his credit limit to P635,000.00.

Aznar claims that when he presented his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not honored. And
when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again
dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash. He further claims that his
humiliation caused by the denial of his card was aggravated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use blacklisted cards. Aznar and his
group returned to the Philippines on August 10, 1994.

On August 26, 1994, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-16474 and raffled to RTC Branch 20,
Cebu City, claiming that Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard which forced him, his wife and grandchildren to
abort important tour destinations and prevented them from buying certain items in their tour.

To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN
ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh. "G") with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows
that his card in question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit.

Citibank denied the allegation that it blacklisted Aznar’s card. It also contended that under the terms and conditions governing the issuance and use of
its credit cards, Citibank is exempt from any liability for the dishonor of its cards by any merchant affiliate.

Issue:
whether Aznar has established his claim against Citibank
Ruling:

The dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard is not sufficient to support a conclusion that said credit card was blacklisted by Citibank, especially in view of
Aznar’s own admission that in other merchant establishments in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, his Mastercard was accepted and honored.43

Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to Aznar
by Ingtan Agency, marked as Exh. "G", to prove that his Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted. On said print-out appears the words
"DECL OVERLIMIT" opposite Account No. 5423-3920-0786-7012.

As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were
not sufficiently established by petitioner.

The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever
any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw
the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the document executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence
on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out.

Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case,
the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.

Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the "other evidence showing integrity and reliability of Exh. "G" to the
satisfaction of the judge." The Court is not convinced. Aznar’s testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer print-
out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient to show said print-out’s integrity and reliability. As
correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan Agency as
Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific business address
of the source of the computer print-out because while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not reflected in
the print-out.

Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which pertains to entries in the course of business, to support Exh. "G".

As correctly pointed out by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, there appears on the computer print-out the name of a certain "Victrina Elnado
Nubi" and a signature purportedly belonging to her, and at the left dorsal side were handwritten the words "Sorry for the delay since the records had
to be retrieved. Regards. Darryl Mario." It is not clear therefore if it was Nubi who encoded the information stated in the print-out and was the one
who printed the same. The handwritten annotation signed by a certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was Mario who printed the same and only
handed the print-out to Nubi. The identity of the entrant, required by the provision above mentioned, was therefore not established. Neither did
petitioner establish in what professional capacity did Mario or Nubi make the entries, or whether the entries were made in the performance of their
duty in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

And even if Exh. "G" is admitted as evidence, it only shows that the use of the credit card of petitioner was denied because it was already over the
limit. There is no allegation in the Complaint or evidence to show that there was gross negligence on the part of Citibank in declaring that the credit
card has been used over the limit.

The Court is also perplexed that stated on Exh. "G" is the amount of "6,289,195.10" opposite petitioner's account number, which data, petitioner did
not clarify.48 As plaintiff in this case, it was incumbent on him to prove that he did not actually incur the said amount which is above his credit limit.
As it is, the Court cannot see how Exh. "G" could help petitioner's claim for damages.

152 Albert Cyr Bitangjol

TAN SHUY VS MAULAWIN

Principle:

Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Facts:

​Petitioner Tan Shuy is engaged in the business of buying copra and corn in the Fourth District of Quezon Province. According to Vicente
Tan (Vicente), son of petitioner, whenever they would buy copra or corn from crop sellers, they would prepare and issue apesada in their favor.
A pesada is a document containing details of the transaction, including the date of sale, the weight of the crop delivered, the trucking cost, and the net
price of the crop. He then explained that when a pesada contained the annotation pd on the total amount of the purchase price, it meant that the crop
delivered had already been paid for by petitioner.

​Maulawin obtained a loan from Tan Shuy in the amount of ₱420,000. In consideration thereof, Guillermo obligated himself to pay the loan
and to sell lucad or copra to petitioner.

​As Maulawin failed to pay his loan obligation, Tan Shuy brought the controversy to the Lupon. When no amicable settlement was reached,
petitioner filed the case with the RTC.
 ​Maulawin contended that he already paid his loan obligation through the sale of copra to Tan Shuy. He presented as evidence the pesadas
executed by Elene, the daughter of petitioner. Such pesadas hus no “pd” or paid in it which means that the proceeds thereof are applied as payment to
his loans.

Issue:

​Whether or not, the pesadas as private document, needs to be authenticated to be admissible in evidence.
Ruling:

​No.
Here, a finding of fact is required in the ascertainment of the due execution and authenticity of the pesadas, as well as the determination of
the true intention behind the parties oral agreement on the application of the net proceeds from the copra deliveries as installment payments for the
loan. This function was already exercised by the trial court and affirmed by the CA. Below is a reproduction of the relevant portion of the trial court’s
Decision:

x x x The defendant further averred that if in the receipts or pesadas issued by the plaintiff to those who delivered
copras to them there is a notation pd on the total amount of purchase price of the copras, it means that said amount was actually
paid or given by the plaintiff or his daughter Elena Tan Shuy to the seller of the copras. To prove his averments the defendant
presented as evidence two (2) receipts or pesadas issued by the plaintiff to a certain Cario (Exhibits 1 and 2 defendant) showing
the notation pd on the total amount of the purchase price for the copras. Such claim of the defendant was further bolstered by the
testimony of Apolinario Cario which affirmed that he also sell copras to the plaintiff Tan Shuy. He also added that he incurred
indebtedness to the plaintiff and whenever he delivered copras the amount of the copras sold were applied as payments to his
loan. The witness also pointed out that the plaintiff did not give any official receipts to those who transact business with him
(plaintiff). This Court gave weight and credence to the documents receipts (pesadas) (Exhibits 3 to 64) offered as evidence
by the defendant which does not bear the notation pd or paid on the total amount of the purchase price of copras
appearing therein. Although said pesadas were private instrument their execution and authenticity were established by
the plaintiffs daughter Elena Tan and sometimes by plaintiffs son Vicente Tan. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In affirming the finding of the RTC, the CA reasoned thus:

In his last assigned error, plaintiff-appellant herein impugns the conclusion arrived at by the trial court, particularly with
respect to the giving of evidentiary value to Exhs. 3 to 64 by the latter in order to prove the claim of defendant-
appellee Guillermo that he had fully paid the subject loan already.

The foregoing deserves scant consideration.

Here, plaintiff-appellant could have easily belied the existence of Exhs. 3 to 64, the pesadas or receipts, and the
purposes for which they were offered in evidence by simply presenting his daughter, Elena Tan Shuy, but no effort to do so
[15]
was actually done by the former given that scenario. (Emphasis supplied)

We found no clear showing that the trial court and the CA committed reversible errors of law in giving credence and according weight to
the pesadas presented by respondents. According to Rule 132, Section 20 of the Rules of Court, there are two ways of proving the due execution and
authenticity of a private document, to wit:

SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. (21a)

As reproduced above, the trial court found that the due execution and authenticity of the pesadas were established by the plaintiffs daughter
Elena Tan and sometimes by plaintiffs son Vicente Tan.

In any event, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the due execution and authenticity of the pesadas. As found by the CA, Tan Shuy could
have easily belied the existence of x x x the pesadas or receipts, and the purposes for which they were offered in evidence by simply presenting his
daughter, Elena Tan Shuy, but no effort to do so was actually done by the former given that scenario. The pesadas having been admitted in evidence,
with petitioner failing to timely object thereto, these documents are already deemed sufficient proof of the facts contained therein.

153 Roslyn Cortes

ELLERY MARCH TORRES VS. PAGCOR (GR NO. 193531, DECEMBER 14, 2011)
PRINCIPLE: A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the
original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and
his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.
A facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence.
SHORT DIGEST: (FACTS ONLY)
Petitioner was dismissed by PAGCOR for padding the Credit Meter Reading of the slot machines. He filed with the CSC for illegal dismissal and
alleged that he filed letter reconsideration through facsimile transmission addressed to PAGCOR’s Chairman. PAGCOR filed its Comment that
petitioner failed to perfect the appeal. Hence, CSC dismissed the petition for having filed out of time. CA likewise dismissed and held that the letter
recommendation is inadmissible. A review of the CSC assailed resolution revealed that the telephone numbers where petitioner claimed to be the
recipient of the faxed document sent was not that of PAGCOR's Office of Board of Directors.
LONG DIGEST:
FACTS:
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor of respondent PAGCOR. On the basis of an alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit
Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot machines at PAGCOR – Hyatt Manila, respondent PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) discovered the
scheme of CMR padding which was committed by adding zero after the 1st digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a digit before the 1st
digit of the actual CMR e.g., a slot machine with an actual CMR of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the amount of either P50,000.00 or
P35,000.00. Based on CIU’s investigation, it identified petitioner as one of the members responsible for such CMR padding. Petitioner was dismissed
from the service.
Petitioner filed with the CSC a complaint for illegal dismissal and nonpayment of back wages and other benefits against PAGCOR; alleging among
others that he tried to persuade respondent PAGCOR to review and reverse its decision in a letter of reconsideration addressed to the Chairman, the
members of the Board and the Merit Systems Protection Board.
CSC denied the appeal; it did not give credit to petitioner’s claim that he sent a facsimile transmission of his letter reconsideration within the period
prescribed and manner provided by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service Law. It found out that one of the telephone
numbers where petitioner allegedly sent his letter reconsideration did not belong to
PAGCOR’s office of the Board of Directors; and that petitioner should have mentioned about the alleged facsimile transmission at the first instance
where he filed his complaint.
On appeal, CA dismissed the petition for it found insufficient to merit consideration petitioner’s claim that he had sent through a facsimile
transmission a letter reconsideration addressed to PAGCOR chair, members of the Board and the Merit Systems Protection Board, and assuming that
a letter was indeed sent, such facsimile transmission is inadmissible as electronic evidence under the E-Commerce Act of 2000; and that the
telephone number where petitioner claimed the recipient of the faxed document sent was not that of the PAGCOR’s office of the Board of Directors.
ISSUE:
1. WON the letter sent through facsimile transmission is admissible?
2. WON the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce
Act?
RULING:
1. NO
A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is
no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It
may, in fact, be a sham pleading.
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy,
one elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a
signal over regular telephone lines or viamicrowave relay and is used by the receiver to reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper
position and the correct shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a printed record on paper referred to as a
facsimile.
2. NO
SC held in MCC Industrial Sales Corpo vs Ssanyong Corporation that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined
under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as
electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
No reversible error committed by the CA when it affirmed the CSC in dismissing petitioner's appeal. Petitioner filed with the CSC a complaint
against PAGCOR and its Chairman for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other benefits on September 14, 2007. The CSC correctly
found that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since petitioner's dismissal had already attained finality.
Petition is DENIED

PROOF OF PRIVATE DOCUMENT

154 Rogelle Cueva

G.R. No. 163271 January 15, 2010

SPOUSES PATRICIO and MYRNA BERNALES, Petitioners,

vs.

HEIRS OF JULIAN SAMBAAN, namely: EMMA S. FELICILDA, ANITA S. SAMBAAN, VIOLETA S. DADSANAN, ABSALON S.
SAMBAAN, AGUSTINE S. SAMBAAN, EDITHA S. MANGUIRAN, GRACE S. NITCHA, CLODUALDO S. SAMBAAN, GINA S.
SAMBAAN and FE S. YAP, Respondents.

HOLDING:

It is of no moment that the examination of the Deed of Absolute Sale was commissioned by the respondents. In the end, it is the court which has the
discretion and authority on whether to give probative value to the results of the examination.

FACTS:

- Julian Sambaan, who was married to Guillerma-Sambahan owned a parcel of land located at Balua, Cagayan de Oro City.

- The parcel of Land was mortgaged Myrna Bernales his eldest daughter and husband Patricio.

- Julian was ambushed in Bukidnon sometime in 1975 and was hospitalized he gather all his children and he left 2 wishes; one of it was to redeem the
subject land from Myrna.

- Absalom Sambaan one of Jullian's children offered to redeem the property but was refused by Myrna and Patricio.

- The children and wife(respondents) of Julian received information on Junuary 1991 the parcel of land was already transferred to Myrna and
Patricio's (petitioners) name.

- The respondents acquired a copy of the Dead of Absolute Sale which bore the signature of Julian and Guillerma.
- They had it examined by the NBI and were found to be forged.

-They filed a complaint of Apr. 13 1993 for the cancellation of the TCT and preliminary injunction.

-On July 27, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Document to compel respondents to produce and permit them to
inspect and to copy or photograph the Deed of Absolute Sale subject matter of said examination. So, the trial court issued an Order dated August 14,
1992 granting the motion and directing the Regional Office of the NBI to bring the document to court so that the same may be properly examined.

-RTC ruled in favor of the respondents

-Affirmed by the CA

ISSUE:

CA erred when it accepted the opinion of the NBI on the examination of the signatures.

RULING:

No.

Petitioners failed to present any evidence to rebut the findings of the NBI handwriting expert.

Moreover, the findings of the NBI document examiner were corroborated by the trial court’s own observation, as affirmed by the CA, that "even a
cursory examination of Guillerma’s questioned signature from her specimen signatures in the enlarged photographswould show that it needs no
expert witness to notice the wide difference in stroke, as well as the writing style in capital ‘G’." What is more, Emma S. Felicilda, the daughter of
then deceased Guillerma, likewise testified that "in fact my mother was the one who filed the complaint in this instant case because according to her,
she did not sign the said document".

The fact that the examination was commissioned by the respondents did not make said examination null and void.

It is of no moment that the examination of the Deed of Absolute Sale was commissioned by the respondents. In the end, it is the court which has the
discretion and authority on whether to give probative value to the results of the examination. As held in Sali v. Abubakar,30 the fact that the NBI
conducted the examination of certain contested documents upon the request of a private litigant does not necessarily nullify the examination thus
made:

x x x Its purpose is, presumably, to assist the court having jurisdiction over said litigations, in the performance of its duty to settle correctly the issue
relative to said documents. Even a non-expert private individual may examine the same, if there are facts within his knowledge which may help the
courts in the determination of said issue. Such examination, which may properly be undertaken by a non-expert private individual, does not, certainly,
become null and void when the examiner is an expert and/or an officer of the NBI.

155 Jun Marlon M. Denila

NACU VS. CSC

FACTS:
PEZA issued a memorandum prohibiting its employees from charging and collecting overtime fees from PEZA-registered enterprises. Nacu,
Enterprise Service Officer III assigned at the Bataan Economic Zone (BEZ) however, still charged overtime fees. The document processor attested
that the overtime fees went to Nacu’s group, and that, during the time Nacu was confined in the hospital, she pre-signed documents and gave them to

him.
After investigations, the Director General of PEZA filed a complaint for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service. The PEZA requested the NBI to verify the genuineness of Nacu’s signatures appearing on the Statements of Overtime Services (SOS).
The NBI have found the samples to be insufficient to serve as basis for a specific comparative examination. PEZA referred the SOS, together with the
same standard specimen of Nacu’s signatures/initials, to the PNP Crime Lab for determination of the genuineness of Nacu’s signature appearing
therein. After the hearing, Nacu was found guilty. Upon appeal, the CSC affirmed the findings of the PEZA Board of Discipline. The Court of
Appeals likewise upheld the decision of the CSC after appeal. After a failed motion for reconsideration, Nacu appeals to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON the signatures appearing on the SOS are genuine.
RULING:
YES.
The testimonies of the witnesses and the findings of the PNP Crime Lab on its examination of the signatures on the SOS, amounted to substantial
evidence that adequately supported the conclusion that Nacu was guilty of the acts complained of.
For one, petitioners cite the PNP’s findings as unreliable in light of the NBI’s opinion that the samples utilized by the PNP Crime Lab—the same
samples submitted to the NBI—were not sufficient to make a comparative examination.
We do not agree. The PNP and the NBI are separate agencies, and the findings of one are not binding or conclusive upon the other. Moreover, as
pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment, the NBI’s finding referred only to the insufficiency of the samples given; the NBI
did not actually make a determination of the genuineness of the signatures. While the NBI may have found the samples to be insufficient, such
finding should not have any bearing on the PNP Crime Lab’s own findings that the samples were sufficient and that some of the signatures found on
the overtime billings matched the sample signatures. The difference of opinion with respect to the sufficiency of the samples could only mean that the
PNP Crime Lab observes a standard different from that used by the NBI in the examination of handwriting.
Instead of just discrediting the PNP Crime Lab’s findings, Nacu should have channeled her efforts into providing her own proof that the signatures
appearing on the questioned SOS were forgeries. After all, whoever alleges forgery has the burden of proving the same by clear and convincing
evidence. Nacu could not simply depend on the alleged weakness of the complainant’s evidence without offering stronger evidence to contradict the
former.
Nacu cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the said order. As correctly opined by the CA, it is difficult to believe that Nacu, one of the
employees of PEZA affected by the memorandum order, was not in any way informed—by posting or personal notice—of the implementation of the
said order, considering that over a year had lapsed since it had been issued. From the testimonies of the other witnesses, who were employees of
PEZA and PEZA-registered enterprises, it was evident that the prohibition against charging and collecting overtime fees was common knowledge to
them. At any rate, no publication is required for such a regulation to take effect. Memorandum Order No. 99-003 is an internal regulation that clearly
falls within the administrative rules and regulations exempted from the publication requirement, as set forth in the prevailing case of Tañada v. Hon.
Tuvera.

156 Joan Risel Baliar Abangan

HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA vs.G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION

G.R. No. 170071 March 9, 2011
Facts:

Jose Marcial K. Ochoa (Jose Marcial) died on the night of March 10, 1995 while on board an Avis taxicab owned and operated by G & S Transport
Corporation (G & S), a common carrier. The death certificate issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City cited the cause of his death
as vehicular accident.
The heirs, through counsel, sent G & S a letter demanding that the latter indemnify them for Jose Marcial’s death, his loss of earning capacity, and
funeral expenses in the total amount of P15,000,000.00. As G & S failed to heed the same, the heirs filed a Complaint for Damages before the RTC.
The RTC found the defendant guilty of breach of contract of carriage and ordered to pay plaintiffs for civil indemnity and damages. The CA ruled in
favor of the heirs. With respect to the award of P6,537,244.96 for Jose Marcial’s loss of earning capacity, the CA declared the same unwarranted. It
found the Certification issued by Jose Marcial’s employer, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through its Chief of
Human Resources Division Jonas Cruz (Cruz), as self-serving, unreliable, and biased. While said certification states that Jose Marcial was earning an
annual salary of P450,844.49 at the time of his untimely demise, the CA noted that same is unsupported by competent evidence such as income tax
returns or receipts. This is in view of the ruling in People v. Ereño where it was held that "there must be unbiased proof of the deceased’s average
income."
ISSUE:
W o N THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN COMPLETELY DELETING THE TRIAL COURT’S AWARD

FOR THE LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY OF THE DECEASED.

RULING:
The CA sweepingly concluded that the USAID Certification is self-serving and unreliable without elaborating on how it was able to arrive at such a
conclusion. A research on USAID reveals that it is the "principal [United States] agency to extend assistance to countries recovering from disaster,
trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms."It is an "independent federal government agency that receives over-all foreign policy
guidance from the Secretary of the State [of the United States]."Given this background, it is highly improbable that such an agency will issue a
certification containing unreliable information regarding an employee’s income. Besides, there exists a presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed. Absent any showing to the contrary, it is presumed that Cruz, as Chief of Human Resources Division of USAID, has regularly
performed his duty relative to the issuance of said certification and therefore, the correctness of its contents can be relied upon. This presumption
remains especially so where the authenticity, due execution and correctness of said certification have not been put in issue either before the trial court
or the CA. As to its being self-serving, our discussion on "self-serving evidence" in Heirs of Pedro Clemeña y Zurbano v. Heirs of Irene B. Bien is

enlightening, viz:
‘Self-serving evidence,’ perhaps owing to its descriptive formulation, is a concept much misunderstood. Not infrequently, the term is employed as a
weapon to devalue and discredit a party's testimony favorable to his cause. That, it seems, is the sense in which petitioners are using it now. This is a
grave error. "Self-serving evidence" is not to be taken literally to mean any evidence that serves its proponent's interest. The term, if used with any
legal sense, refers only to acts or declarations made by a party in his own interest at some place and time out of court
Verily, the USAID certification cannot be said to be self-serving because it does not refer to an act or declaration made out of court by the heirs
themselves as parties to this case.1awphi1
Clearly, the CA erred in deleting the award for lost income on the ground that the USAID Certification supporting such claim is self-serving and
unreliable. On the contrary, we find said certification sufficient basis for the court to make a fair and reasonable estimate of Jose Marcial’s loss of
earning capacity. Hence, we uphold the trial court’s award for Jose Marcial’s loss of earning capacity.

157 Kimberly Dy

COMPLAINT OF CONCERNED MEMBERS OF CHINESE GROCERS (A.M. OCA IPI NO. 10-177-CA-J)

Facts:

​
CGA alleged that there was gross negligence on the part of the RTC Judge when she granted the petition for issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate since the vendor was already dead during the time of the execution of the deed of sale. To show the death of Ang E. Bio in 2001, they
presented a photocopy of Ang’s certificate of death.

​Chinese Grocers Assoc. (CGA) was the owner of a parcel of land in Manila TCT No. 42417.
Sometime in 2008, Romualdo dela Cruz filed a petion filed a petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 42417,
claiming that the old owner's duplicate copy had been misplaced. In the petition, dela Cruz alleged that his interest in the property is in the right of a
vendee thereof as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 2008 by Ang E. Bio. After the procedural requirements were complied, Judge
Inting granted the petition and a new TCT was issued to dela Cruz. The decision became final and executory with no action taken by the CGA.

Thereafter, the CGA filed a letter of complaint against Judge Inting claiming that she acted with gross neglect when she granted dela Cruz's
petition for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate copy. Alleging that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 15, 2008, the basis for dela Cruz's
interest and right to file the petition, should have aroused Justice Inting's suspicion as it was allegedly signed on behalf of CGA by Ang E. Bio, who
died on August 28, 2001. Additionally, the Judge allegedly failed to appreciate the photocopy of the certificate of death of Ang Bio, which would
have proven that dela Cruz derived no right to the property because the sale was fictitious.

Issue:

​WON the photocopy of the certificate of death should be appreciated as evidence?

Ruling:
NO.
While the Certificate of Death is indeed a public document, to prove its contents, there is a need to present a certified copy of this document, issued
by the public officer in custody of the original document. 7 Since the Certificate of Death is not a certified copy, it is inadmissible as proof, and is
considered a mere scrap of paper without any evidentiary value.
The complainants attached a mere photocopy of Ang Bio's Certificate of Death to their letter complaint. A mere photocopy of a public document
without certification that is a certified copy is not admissible in evidence.

The case against Judge Inting was dismissed.

OFFICIAL RECORD

158 Yason Pagskini

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION V. JOSEFINA ECHIN

Facts:

• Her name is Echin, a medical technologist.

• She was hired by the petitioner on behalf of the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry) under a two-year contract, denominated as
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).

• Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board
Employment Contract No. 2.

• However, she was terminated prior to the end of agreed term allegedly because she did not pass the probationary qualifications.

• Upon her return in the Philippines, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner its foreign agent, Ikdal and the Ministry.

• The L.A., NLRC, and CA favored her, applying the Philippine Labor Law on probationary employment.

• Now, the petitioner brought the case before the SC, on the following ground, inter alia:

o That the labor tribunals and the appellate court erred in applying the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment
in deciding the present case because under the respondent’s employment contract, her employment shall be governed by the
Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait.

To prove the Kuwaiti Civil Service Law and Regulations, petitioners submitted the following:

• MOA between respondent and the Ministry which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year; that the host
country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply;

• a translated copy (Arabic to English) of the termination letter

Issue:

WON the petitioner sufficiently proved the pertinent foreign laws as official record.

Ruling:

No.

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept
is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)

Further:
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. (How to prove? Here comes
sec. 24 of Rule 132)

In the case, the documents submitted by petitioner, i.e., the MOA which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year
[11]
and that the host country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy (Arabic to English) of the termination letter both of which
documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs Islamic Certification and
Translation Unit, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws.

Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required
under the Rules, what petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the
termination letter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws,
respondent was validly terminated.

159 Colleen Rose Sab Guantero

 MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN,
Petitioner,
- versus -
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,
Respondent.

FACTS:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor,
he contracted a second marriage with Merope Enriquez, herein petitioner.

In 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

Thereafter in Feb. 2005, petitioner filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando.

On March 2005 while the petition of petitioner was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first
marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC.

The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by respondent on the ground of litis pendentia, considering that her petition covers the same
estate was already pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner
before in the RTC of Pangasinan.

Felicitas Amor first wife, filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married
to one Eusebio Bristol.

In 1998, the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. The trial court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American
citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.

Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor
against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.

Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.

In 2006, RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private
respondent.

Contrary to its findings in the 1998 decision of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, the RTC of Burgos held that the marriage between petitioner and
Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando.

Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner
was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for
Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.

CA dismissed petitioner's petition for lack of merit. The CA's racionation:

"The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been
preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed by the
petitioner. "

Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the
trial court is in place.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.

In 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Hence, this Petition.

SC: "RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in the acquittal of petitioner in the crime of bigamy that petitioner
was never married to Eusebio Bristol.

Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was
valid.

By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that
petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our
jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.

"However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In
this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage. "

the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in

Garcia v. Recioto

"Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.
The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

HELD:

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated
20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial
Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

ANCIENT DOCUMENT RULE

160 Frances May Realino

G.R. Nos. 79597-98 May 20, 1991

HEIRS OF DEMETRIA LACSA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
PRINCIPLE:
Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due execution and authenticity, it is not enough that it
be more than thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled;
1. that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and
2. that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.

SHORT DIGEST:
This petition involves two (2) cases for recovery of possession of a parcel of land and the cancelationn of respondent's title thereof. Petitioners
contend that the CA wrongfully applied the "ancient document rule". That the documents entitled "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de
Particion Extrajudicial" and "Escritura de Venta Absoluta", respectively, can not qualify under the foregoing rule, for the reason that since the "first
pages" of said documents do not bear the signatures of the alleged parties thereto, this constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget unlimited
alterations.

FACTS:
This petition which originated with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga involves two (2) cases.
One is an action for recovery of possession with damages and preliminary injunction filed by herein petitioners, the heirs of Demetria Lacsa, against
Aurelio Songco and John Doe based on the principal allegations that petitioners are heirs of deceased Demetria Lacsa who, during her lifetime, was
the owner of a certain parcel of land consisting partly of a fishpond and partly of uncultivated open space, located in Bancal, Guagua, Pampanga,
evidenced by an OCT;
The other case is an action also by herein petitioners against private respondents before the same lower court for cancellation of title, ownership with
damages and preliminary injunction, based on the allegations that they are the heirs of Demetria Lacsa who was the owner of the land also involved
in the first case; that the herein private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, thru stealth, fraud and other forms of machination, succeeded in
occupying or possessing the fishpond of the said parcel of land, and later abandoned the same but only after the case was filed and after all the fish
were transferred to the adjoining fishpond owned by the private respondents; that on 31 October 1923 and 15 March 1924, by presenting to the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga certain forged and absolutely simulated documents, namely: "TRADUCCION AL CASTELLANO DE LA
ESCRITURA DE PARTICION EXTRAJUDICIAL" and "ESCRITURA DE VENTA ABSOLUTA", respectively, and by means of false pretenses
and misrepresentation, Inocencio Songco, the private respondents' predecessor-in-interest, succeeded in transferring the title to said property in his
name, to the damage and prejudice of the petitioners; and that a preliminary injunction was necessary to prevent the private respondents from
disposing of said property.
Private respondents denied the material allegations of both complaints and alleged as special and affirmative defenses, petitioners' lack of cause of
action, for the reason that the OCT was merely a reconstituted copy issued in April 1983 upon petitioners' expedient claim that the owner's duplicate
copy thereof had been missing when the truth of the matter was that the OCT in the name of Demetria Lacsa, had long been cancelled and superseded
by a TCT in the name of Alberta Guevarra and Juan Limpin by virtue of the document entered into by the heirs of Demetria Lacsa; that the latter
TCT was in turn superseded by another TCT in the name of Inocencio Songco (father of private respondents) by virtue of a document executed by
spouses Juan Limpin and Alberta Guevarra in favor of said Inocencio Songo.
Private respondents, in their answer, pleaded a counterclaim against petitioners based on allegations that the latter headed by Carlito Magpayo, by
force and intimidation, took possession of a portion of the fishpond in the land and occupied a hut therein, that at that time, private respondents had
3,000 bangus fingerlings left in the fishpond which upon petitioners' harvest thereof left private respondents deprived and damaged in the amount of
P50,000.00 more or less; that such illegal occupancy caused private respondents to suffer unrealized income and profits, sleepless nights, wounded
feelings and serious anxiety which entitled them to actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees and P500.00 appearance fee for
every hearing.
The lower court held that: the fishpond in question belongs to the private respondents, having been inherited by them from their deceased father
Inocencio Songco. Petitioners appealed the above-mentioned decision to the respondent Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals wrongfully applied the "ancient document rule" provided in Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 14
The rule states that:
Sec. 22. Evidence of execution not necessary.— Were a private writing is more than thirty years old, is produced from a custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its execution and authenticity
need be given.
It is submitted by petitioners that under this rule, for a document to be classified as an "ancient document", it must not only be at least thirty (30)
years old but it must also be found in the proper custody and is unblemished by alterations and is otherwise free from suspicion. 15 Thus, according
to petitioners, exhibits "3" and "7", entitled "Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" and "Escritura de Venta Absoluta",
respectively, can not qualify under the foregoing rule, for the reason that since the "first pages" of said documents do not bear the signatures of the
alleged parties thereto, this constitutes an indelible blemish that can beget unlimited alterations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the documents in question are ancient documents, so that further proof of their due execution and authenticity be no longer required.

RULING:
YES. Under the "ancient document rule," for a private ancient document to be exempt from proof of due execution and authenticity, it is not enough
that it be more than thirty (30) years old; it is also necessary that the following requirements are fulfilled;
1. that it is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and
2. that it is unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.
The first document, Exhibit "3", entitled 'Traduccion Al Castellano de la Escritura de Particion Extrajudicial" was executed on 7 April 1923 whereas
the second document, exhibit "7", entitled "Escritura de Venta Absoluta" was executed on 20 January 1924. These documents are, therefore, more
than thirty (30) years old. Both copies of the aforementioned documents were certified as exact copies of the original on file with the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga, by the Deputy Register of Deeds. There is a further certification with regard to the Pampango translation of the
document of extrajudicial partition which was issued by the Archives division, Bureau of Records Management of the Department of General
Services.
Documents which affect real property, in order that they may bind third parties, must be recorded with the appropriate Register of Deeds. The
documents in question, being certified as copies of originals on file with the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, can be said to be found in the proper
custody. Clearly, therefore, the first two (2) requirements of the "ancient document rule" were met.
As to the last requirement that the document must on its face appear to be genuine, petitioners did not present any conclusive evidence to support
their allegation of falsification of the said documents. They merely alluded to the fact that the lack of signatures on the first two (2) pages could have
easily led to their substitution. We cannot uphold this surmise absent any proof whatsoever. As held in one case, a contract apparently honest and
lawful on its face must be treated as such and one who assails the genuineness of such contract must present conclusive evidence of falsification.
Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule" that a document must be unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion
refers to the extrinsic quality of the document itself. The lack of signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any alterations or circumstances of
suspicion cannot be held to detract from the fact that the documents in question, which were certified as copied of the originals on file with the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and free from any blemish or circumstances of suspicion.
The documents in question are "ancient documents" as envisioned in Sec. 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Further proof of their due execution
and authenticity is no longer required. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

NOTARIAL DOCUMENTS

161 Luvernie Narca Cañete

AURORA B. GO, vs. MARGARITO A. COSTELO, JR., SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 11, CALUBIAN, LEYTE,
A.M. No. P-08-2450 June 10, 2009
Facts:
Aurora B. Go filed a complaint against Margarito Costela, Sherrif of Branch 11 Calubihan, Leyte for grave misconduct, falsification and abuse of
authority with the Office of the Court Administrator(OCA).
Go alleged that she issued a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of her sister, Anita Conde. While Go was in Taiwan, she was informed by Conde
respondent Sheriff was going to subject said parcel of land to an auction sale on that same day pursuant to Writ of Execution issued by the MTCC in
Cebu City for an ejectment case against the complainant.
Complainant advised Conde to avail herself of legal remedies such as filing a third-party claim to prevent the auction, but despite proof of ownership
shown by Conde to respondent, the latter proceeded with the sale.
Go further alleged that the Sheriff:
1) took advantage of her absence from the Philippines and surreptitiously and hastily proceeded with the auctioning of the real property;
(2) persisted in conducting the auction sale with patent partiality in favor of Doris Sunbanon, the prevailing party in the ejectment case;
(3) made it appear that a person residing in the subject property received the notice of auction by falsifying the signature of the alleged person in the
purportedly received copy of the notice, but such person was unknown to complainant and Conde;
(4) failed to make proper posting of the notice of auction;
(5) did not acknowledge the documents evidencing the transfer of ownership of property from complainant to Conde, and said that the Deed of
Absolute Sale was "gawa-gawa" [simulated]; and
(6) falsified the entries in the Certificate of Sale by stating that it was executed and notarized on November 8, 2001 by a certain Atty. Roberto dela
Peña when in truth a certified photocopy of the notarial book of Atty. Dela Peña shows that no such document was notarized on said date or
immediately thereafter. Also Go was douftful whether an auction sale actually took place because on the scheduled date, a strong typhoon hit Leyte.
Respondent filed his Comment dated September 9, 2003, wherein he denied that he committed irregularities in auctioning the subject property, for a
Levy on Execution had been made based on the certified true copy of the tax declaration issued by the Municipal Assessor of Calubian, Leyte and the
same was duly annotated by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Leyte. He claimed that, before November 12, 2001, he had no knowledge that
the property sold at public auction was owned by a certain Anita Conde, and that the sole basis of the Levy on Execution and the Sheriff’s auction
sale was the mere fact that the declared owner of the property was complainant Go, the losing party in the ejectment case. It was only when Conde
filed her third-party claim that respondent came to know that there was a third-party claimant over the property in question.
The OCA recommended that the complaint be referred to Judge Alejandro Diongzon but Go filed a Motion for Inhibition because it was Judge
Diongzon who signed the Certificate of Sale. The case was transferred to Judge Crisostomo Garrido.
Judge Garrido found Sherrif Costelo guiltyof the offenses charged and declared the public auction null and void.
Issue:
WON Sheriff Costelo is guilty of grave misconduct, falsification and abuse of authority
Held:
Yes.
Among the evidence presented is alleged Cetificate of Sale duly notarized.
The validity, genuineness, authenticity and due execution of the Certificate of Sale issued by Respondent Sheriff Costelo, Jr., dated November 8,
2001, was put in issue when Notary Public Roberto Dela Peña of Calubian, Leyte, who allegedly notarized the Certificate of Sale on November 8,
2001 was put to the witness stand. Roberto Dela Peña denied that he notarized the alluded Certificate of Sale and that his signature appearing on the
acknowledgment portion of the said document is fake, a product of falsification and forgery. The entries denominated as Document 161, Page 37,
Book 3, Series of 2000, appearing on the Certificate of Sale were forged, falsified and fictitious entries.
Document No. 161, Page No. 37, Book 3, Series of 2000 as entered in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Roberto Dela Peña refers to a document
denominated as Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage, executed by and between Spouses Fileo and Angeles Arias, and Baruel Rimandaman,
Leonila B. Pepito and Alfredo Lagora, and not the Certificate of Sale issued by the respondent sheriff.
Court’s observation and examination of the said entries on page 37 of the Notarial Register of Roberto Dela Peña, appears to be genuine and
authentic, without any erasure or alteration, written in freehand writing and in chronological order of events, written in the middle portion of page 37
of the notarial registry, indicative that the document entered thereto is the true act of the notary public in recording his transaction for the day,
pursuant to his oath of office.
There is credence to the testimony of Roberto Dela Peña that the Certificate of Sale issued by the respondent sheriff, was fictitious, falsified and a
product of forgery. Moreover, Roberto Dela Peña, being 70 years old and in the twilight of his life, testified clearly and in a straightforward manner,
relative to the entries on page 37 of his Notarial Register. Other infirmities in the other pages in his Notarial Register could only be attributed to old
age.
Sheriff Margarito Costelo, Jr. having acted without [any] authority to conduct a public auction sale of the real property on execution, the public
auction sale is illegal, invalid and void ab initio. Under the rules, supra, the public auction sale of the real property on execution shall only be
conducted at the office of the Clerk of Court, MTCC, Branch 2, Cebu City, the Court which issued the Writ of Execution.
Judiciary officers must, at all times, be accountable to the people. They serve with utmost degree of integrity, responsibility, loyalty and efficiency in
their duties. In the case at bar, respondent sheriff, Margarito Costelo, Jr. has [been] remiss of his duties and must account to the people who repose
their
trust on him. Such grave misconduct committed by the respondent sheriff, deserves the highest degree of sanctions. The respondent sheriff is a
disgrace to the Judiciary.

162 Owen Lerin

UNCHUAN VS. LOZADA

Facts:
Sisters Anita Lozada Slaughter and Peregrina Lozada Saribay were the registered co-owners of 2 lots. They were based in the United States; so they
sold the land to their nephew, Antonio Lozada. Peregrina secured an SPA from Anita and she went to Dr. Lozada's clinic. He agreed to advance the
purchase price of the property for the benefit of their nephew. The deed of sale was thereafter notarized before the Philippine Consul Office. The
copies of the title, the deed of sale, and the SPA were forwarded to Antonio, who was in the Philippines. Antonio then recorded the sale with the
registry of deeds and the corresponding titles were issued in his name. Petitioner, Marissa R. Unchuan, annotated an adverse claim over the titles,
alleging that an undivided portion was donated to her under an unregistered deed of donation. Hence, a case for quieting of title was instituted against
the petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not the unregistered deed of donation gives petitioner a right over the subject lands.

Ruling:
No.
The notarization requirement of a deed of donation is not present.
When the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that
requirement is absolute and indispensable. Here, the Deed of Donation does not appear to be duly notarized. In page three of the deed, the stamped
name of Cresencio Tomakin appears above the words Notary Public until December 31, 1983 but below it were the typewritten words Notary Public
until December 31, 1987. A closer examination of the document further reveals that the number 7 in 1987 and Series of 1987 were merely
superimposed. This was confirmed by petitioners nephew Richard Unchuan who testified that he saw petitioners husband write 7 over 1983 to make
it appear that the deed was notarized in 1987. Moreover, a Certification from Clerk of Court Jeoffrey S. Joaquino of the Notarial Records Division
disclosed that the Deed of Donation purportedly identified in Book No. 4, Document No. 48, and Page No. 35 Series of 1987 was not reported and
filed with said office. Pertinent to this, the Rules require a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to have been
altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in dispute, to account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was made by
another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocently made, or that the
alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall, as in this case, not be admissible in
evidence.
The deed of donation is void.
Remarkably, the lands described in the Deed of Donation are covered by TCT Nos. 73645 and 73646, both of which had been previously cancelled
by an Order dated April 8, 1981 in LRC Record No. 5988. We find it equally puzzling that on August 10, 1987, or six months after Anita supposedly
donated her undivided share in the lots to petitioner, the Unchuan Development Corporation, which was represented by petitioners husband, filed suit
to compel the Lozada sisters to surrender their titles by virtue of a sale. The sum of all the circumstances in this case calls for no other conclusion
than that the Deed of Donation allegedly in favor of petitioner is void. Having said that, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the issue of laches as the
execution of the deed created no right from which to reckon delay in making any claim of rights under the instrument.

163 Juan Jigo Remotigue-Monteclar Gaston-Dacua

HEIRS OF THE DECEASED SPOUSES VICENTE S. ARCILLA VS. MA. LOURDES A. TEODORO
G.R. NO. 162886 AUGUST 11, 2008

FACTS:

On December 19, 1995, Ma. Lourdes A. Teodoro (respondent) initially filed with the RTC an application for land registration of two
parcels of land. Respondent alleged that, with the exception of the commercial building constructed thereon, she purchased the subject lots from her
father, Pacifico Arcilla (Pacifico), as shown by a Deed of Sale and that, prior thereto, Pacifico acquired the said lots by virtue of the partition of the
estate of his father, Jose Arcilla evidenced by a document entitled Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. Respondent also presented as evidence an
Affidavit of Quit-Claim in favor of Pacifico, executed by herein petitioners as Heirs of Vicente Arcilla (Vicente), brother of Pacifico.
On February 7, 1996, the case was transferred to the Municipal Trial Court.

In their Opposition, petitioners contended that they are the owners pro-indiviso of the subject lots including the building and other
improvements constructed thereon by virtue of inheritance from their deceased parents, spouses Vicente and Josefa Arcilla; contrary to the claim of
respondent, the lots in question were owned by their father, Vicente, having purchased the same from a certain Manuel Sarmiento; Vicente's
ownership is evidenced by several tax declarations attached to the record; petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
subject lotsPetitioners moved to dismiss the application of respondent and sought their declaration as the true and absolute owners pro-indiviso of the
subject lots and the registration and issuance of the corresponding certificate of title in their names.
Respondent filed a Motion for Admission contending that through oversight and inadvertence she failed to include in her application, the
verification and certificate against forum shopping required by Supreme Court.
 Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Application on the ground that respondent should have filed the certificate against forum shopping
simultaneously with the petition for land registration which is a mandatory requirement of SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and that any
violation of the said Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the application upon motion and after hearing.
Opposing the motion to dismiss, respondents asserted that the petitioners' Motion to Dismiss Application was filed out of time;
respondent's failure to comply with SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 was not willful, deliberate or intentional; and the Motion to Dismiss was
deemed waived for failure of petitioners to file the same during the earlier stages of the proceedings.
On July 19, 1999, the MTC issued an Order denying petitioners' Motion to Dismiss Application. On appeal, RTC affirmed in toto the
decision of the MTC and the CA on review dismissed the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the non-forum shopping subsequently submitted by respondent does not require a certification from an officer of the court of the
foreign service of the Philippines as provided under Section 24. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

No.
Under the attendant circumstances in the present case, the Court cannot uphold petitioners’ contention that respondent's delay of more than
two years and three months in filing the required certificate of non-forum shopping may not be considered substantial compliance with the
requirements of SC Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; that respondent's reasons of oversight and
inadvertence do not constitute a justifiable circumstance that could excuse her non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of the above-
mentioned Circular and Rule; that subsequent compliance with the requirement does not serve as an excuse for a party's failure to comply in the first
instance.

The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not unprecedented. In those cases where the Court
excused non-compliance with the requirements, there were special circumstances or compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule
clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or
"compelling reason" for the reinstatement of the petition.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the lower courts did not commit any error in proceeding to decide the case on the merits, as herein
respondent was able to submit a certification of non-forum shopping. More importantly, the apparent merit of the substantive aspect of the petition
for land registration filed by respondent with the MTC coupled with the showing that she had no intention to violate the Rules with impunity, as she
was the one who invited the attention of the court to the inadvertence committed by her counsel, should be deemed as special circumstances or
compelling reasons to decide the case on the merits.
In addition, considering that a dismissal contemplated under Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is, as a rule, a dismissal without
prejudice, and since there is no showing that respondent is guilty of forum shopping, to dismiss respondent's petition for registration would entail a
tedious process of re-filing the petition, requiring the parties to re-submit the pleadings which they have already filed with the trial court, and
conducting anew hearings which have already been done, not to mention the expenses that will be incurred by the parties in re-filing of pleadings and
in the re-conduct of hearings. These would not be in keeping with the judicial policy of just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.

The certification of non-forum shopping executed in a foreign country is not covered by Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
There is no merit to petitioners’ contentions that the verification and certification subsequently submitted by respondent did not state the
country or city where the notary public exercised her notarial functions; and that the MTC simply concluded, without any basis, that said notary
public was from Maryland, USA; that even granting that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping were notarized in the USA, the
same may not be deemed admissible for any purpose in the Philippines for failure to comply with the requirement of Section 24, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court that the notarized document must be accompanied by a certificate issued by an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines who is
stationed in the country in which a record of the subject document is kept, proving or authenticating that the person who notarized the document is
indeed authorized to do so and has custody of the same.
From the foregoing provision [referring to Section 24, Rule 132, Rules of Court], it can be gathered that it does not include
documents acknowledged before [a] notary public abroad. For foreign public documents to be admissible for any purpose here in our courts, the
same must be certified by any officer of the Philippine legation stationed in the country where the documents could be found or had been executed.
However, after judicious studies of the rule, Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court basically pertains to written official acts, or records of the
official of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. This is so, as
Sec. 24, Rule 132 explicitly refers only to paragraph (a) of Sec. 19. If the rule comprehends to cover notarial documents, the rule could have included
the same. Thus, petitioners-oppositors' contention that the certificate of forum shopping that was submitted was defective, as it did not bear the
certification provided under Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, is devoid of any merit. What is important is the fact that the respondent-
applicant certified before a commissioned officer clothed with powers to administer oath that [s]he has not and will not commit forum shopping.

Section 19(a) of the same Rule provides:

Sec. 19. Classes of documents. - For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private.

It cannot be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service under Section 24 refers only to the
documents enumerated in Section 19(a), to wit: written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies
and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines or of a foreign country. The Court agrees with the CA that had the Court intended to
include notarial documents as one of the public documents contemplated by the provisions of Section 24, it should not have specified only the
documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19.
In Lopez, the requirements of then Section 25, Rule 132 were made applicable to all public or official records without any distinction
because the old rule did not distinguish. However, in the present rule, it is clear under Section 24, Rule 132 that its provisions shall be made
applicable only to the documents referred to under paragraph (a), Section 19, Rule 132.
Settled is the rule that the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding and conclusive upon this
Court. There are recognized exceptions to this rule, among which are: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the
inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of
absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to the findings of the trial court; (9) the
CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of
the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. However, petitioners failed to show
that any of the exceptions is present in the instant case to warrant a review of the findings of fact of the lower courts.
 The only evidence of petitioners to prove their claim that the disputed property was sold by Jose Arcilla to Manuel Sarmiento in
1908 is a single Tax Declaration in the name of the latter, with a notation that the property was acquired by purchase.

The Court agrees with the CA in its finding that petitioners failed to present any substantial evidence, such as a deed of sale, to prove their
claim that their predecessor, Vicente Arcilla, bought the disputed property from Sarmiento. Petitioners were only able to present tax declarations in
Vicente's name to prove their allegation that Vicente became the owner of the subject property. The tax declarations presented in evidence by
petitioners are not supported by any other substantial proofs.

The Court has ruled time and again that tax declarations do not prove ownership but are at best anindicium of claims of
ownership. Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, any more than indicating possession in the concept of an owner. Neither a tax receipt
nor a declaration of ownership for taxation purposes is evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty when not supported by other
effective proofs.
On the other hand, respondent's claim of ownership is not only backed up by tax declarations but also by other pieces of evidence
such as the subject Extrajudicial Settlement, Affidavit of Quitclaim, and Deed of Sale.

Petitioners question the validity of the above-mentioned documents. However, as the CA, RTC and MTC found, these documents are all
notarized. It is settled that a notarized document is executed to lend truth to the statements contained therein and to the authenticity of the
signatures. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity which can be overturned only by clear and convincing evidence.

SHORT DIGEST:
Respondent applied for land registration. Respondent presented as evidence an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, Deed of Sale and Affidavit of
Quitclaim in favor of her father Pacifico where she got basis for her claim. Petitioner on the other hand opposed that they are the owners of the land
subject hereof acquired by them through their deceased father Vicente who is the brother of Pacifico.
Incidentally, petitioner was not able to include in her application the verification and certificate against forum shopping as required because of
inadvertence and oversight.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on that matter.

ISSUE ABOVE:
RULED ABOVE with emphasis.

164 Nilgie C. Villaganas

LAZARO VS AGUSTIN

FACTS:

Herein petitioners filed against herein respondents a Complaint for partition. The MTCC ruled, among others, that no evidentiary value could be
given to the affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein she purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the subject property with her
siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant was not presented on the witness stand, such that all the statements made in her affidavit
were hearsay. Moreover, the MTCC held that two credible witnesses testified in plain, simple and straightforward manner that at the time the affidavit
was supposed to have been signed and sworn to before the notary public, Basilisa was already bedridden and an invalid who could not even raise her
hand to feed herself. In addition, the MTCC also gave credence to the testimony of the notary public, before whom the document was supposedly
signed and sworn to, that the said affidavit was already complete and thumbmarked when the same was presented to him by a person who claimed to
be Basilisa.

Petitioners argue that since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be admitted in court without further proof of its due execution and
authenticity; that the testimonies of Basilisa's nurse and physician cannot qualify as clear and convincing evidence which could overthrow such
notarized document; that the notary public cannot impugn the same document which he notarized for to do so would render notarized documents
worthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the public.

ISSUE:
Whether the subject sworn statement, granting that it refers to the property being disputed in the present case, can be given full faith and credence in

view of the issues raised regarding its genuineness and due execution.

RULING:

NO.

Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and
documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. However, this presumption is not absolute and may
be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

Moreover, not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public
document just because it contains a notarial jurat. The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond

dispute that the notarization was regular.

However, a question involving the regularity of notarization as well as the due execution of the subject sworn statement of Basilisa would require an

inquiry into the appreciation of evidence by the trial court.

Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity accorded by law to notarized documents. While indeed, a notarized document enjoys this
presumption, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. As earlier discussed, the presumption is not absolute
and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The presumption cannot be made to apply to the present case because the
regularity in the execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima facie validity was overthrown by
the highly questionable circumstances under which it was supposedly executed, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who testified on the
improbability of execution of the sworn statement, as well as on the physical condition of the signatory, at the time the questioned document
was supposedly executed.

Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to reverse the rulings of the MTCC, the RTC and the CA. Although the questioned sworn
statement is a public document having in its favor the presumption of regularity, such presumption was adequately refuted by competent
witnesses.

In the instant case, the notary public should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true identity of the person executing the said sworn
statement. However, the notary public did not comply with this requirement. He simply relied on the affirmative answers of the person appearing
before him attesting that she was Basilisa Santos; that the contents of the sworn statement are true; and that the thumbmark appearing on the said
document was hers. However, this would not suffice. He could have further asked the person who appeared before him to produce any identification
to prove that she was indeed Basilisa Santos, considering that the said person was not personally known to him, and that the thumbmark appearing on
the document sought to be notarized was not affixed in his presence. But he did not. Thus, the lower courts did not commit any error in not giving
evidentiary weight to the subject sworn statement.

The second and third assigned errors proceed on the presumption that petitioners are co-owners of the disputed property. Since the Court has already
ruled that the lower courts did not err in finding that petitioners failed to prove their claim that they were co-owners of the said property, there is no
longer any need to discuss the other assigned errors.

165 Ramon Mikhail Duyongco

ALCANTARA v NIDO
Facts:

Revelen, who is respondents daughter and of legal age, is the owner of an unregistered land with an area of 1,939 square meters located in Cardona,
Rizal. Sometime in March 1984, respondent accepted the offer of petitioners to purchase a 200-square meter portion of Revelens lot (lot) at P200 per
square meter. Petitioners paid P3,000 as downpayment and the balance was payable on installment. Petitioners constructed their houses in 1985. In
1986, with respondents consent, petitioners occupied an additional 150 square meters of the lot. By 1987, petitioners had already paid P17,500[5]
before petitioners defaulted on their installment payments.
On 11 May 1994, respondent, acting as administrator and attorney-in-fact of Revelen, filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages and
prayer for preliminary injunction against petitioners with the RTC.
The RTCs Ruling
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, by -
1. Declaring the contract to sell orally agreed by the plaintiff Brigida Nido, in her capacity as representative or agent of her daughter Revelen Nido
Srivastava, VOID and UNENFORCEABLE.
The Appellate Courts Ruling
the appellate court reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the civil case.[10]
The appellate court also held that respondent, as Revelens agent, did not have a written authority to enter into such contract of sale; hence, the
contract entered into between petitioners and respondent is void. A void contract creates no rights or obligations or any juridical relations. Therefore,
the void contract cannot be the subject of rescission.[14]
Aggrieved by the appellate courts Decision, petitioners elevated the case before this Court.

Issue:
whether or not the General Power of Attorney constituting respondent as the attorney-in-fact and authorizing her to enter into any and all contracts

and agreements on Revelens behalf is admissible?

RULING:

NO.
On 25 March 1994, Revelen executed a General Power of Attorney constituting respondent as her attorney-in-fact and authorizing her to enter into
any and all contracts and agreements on Revelens behalf. The General Power of Attorney was notarized by Larry A. Reid, Notary Public in
California, U.S.A.
Unfortunately, the General Power of Attorney presented as Exhibit C[22] in the RTC cannot also be the basis of respondents written authority to sell
the lot.
Section 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
In Teoco v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,[23] quoting Lopez v. Court of Appeals,[24] we explained:
From the foregoing provision, when the special power of attorney is executed and acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official in
a foreign country, it cannot be admitted in evidence unless it is certified as such in accordance with the foregoing provision of the rules by a secretary
of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept of said public document and authenticated by the seal of his office. A city judge-notary who notarized
the document, as in this case, cannot issue such certification.[25]

Since the General Power of Attorney was executed and acknowledged in the United States of America, it cannot be admitted in evidence unless it is
certified as such in accordance with the Rules of Court by an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the United States of
America. Hence, this document has no probative value.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78215.

166 Mel Jason Augusto

ONO VS LIM
GR NO. 154270

FACTS:

1.) Lim filed in the RTC in Cebu City a petition for the reconstitution of the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), alleging
that said OCT had been lost during World War II by his mother, Luisa;

2.) that Lot No. 943 of the Balamban Cadastre in Cebu City covered by said OCT had been sold in to Luisa by Spouses Diego Oo and Estefania
Apas (Spouses Oo), the lots registered owners;

3.) that although the deed evidencing the sale had been lost without being registered, Antonio Oo (Antonio), the only legitimate heir of Spouses
[5]
Oo, had executed in favor of Luisa a notarized document denominated as confirmation of sale, which was duly filed in the Provincial
Assessors Office of Cebu.

Zosimo Oo and petitioner Teofisto Oo (Oos) opposed Lims petition, contending that they had the certificate of title in their possession as the
successors-in-interest of Spouses Oo.

On account of the Oos opposition, and upon order of the RTC, Lim converted the petition for reconstitution into a complaint for quieting of
title, averring additionally that he and his predecessor-in-interest had been in actual possession of the property since 1937, cultivating and developing
it, enjoying its fruits, and paying the taxes corresponding to it. He prayed, inter alia, that the Oos be ordered to surrender the reconstituted owners
duplicate copy of OCT No. RO-9969-(O-20449), and that said OCT be cancelled and a new certificate of title be issued in the name of Luisa in lieu
of said OCT.

In their answer, the Oos claimed that their predecessors-in-interest, Spouses Oo, never sold Lot No. 943 to Luisa; and that the confirmation of
sale purportedly executed by Antonio was fabricated, his signature thereon not being authentic.

RTC Ruling: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered quieting plaintiff's title to Lot No. 943 of the Balamban (Cebu)
Cadastre. The RTC found that the Lims had been in peaceful possession of the land since 1937; that their possession had never been disturbed by the
Oos and that that the Lims had since declared the lot in their name for taxation purposes, and had paid the taxes corresponding to the lot.

Frustrated, Oos appealed to the CA.

CA Ruling: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The CA denied the Oos motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant case.

ISSUE:

(1) WON there was a deed of sale executed by Spouses Oo in favor of Luisa and whether or not said deed was lost during World War II
(2) WON the signature purportedly of Antonio in that confirmation of sale was genuine

Supreme Court: The petition IS DEVIOD OF MERIT.

Supreme Court pronounced to the effect:

Forgery, being a question of fact,

could not be dealt with now

The petitioners submit that Lims evidence did not preponderantly show that the ownership of the lot had been transferred to Luisa; and that both the
trial and the appellate courts disregarded their showing that Antonios signature on the confirmation of sale was a forgery.

Clearly, the petitioners hereby seek a review of the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence presented by the parties.

The Court cannot anymore review the evaluation and appreciation of the evidence, because the Court is not a trier of facts. Although this rule
admits of certain exceptions,viz: (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjecture; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case, and the
findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and, (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record, it does not appear now that any of the exceptions is
present herein. We thus apply the rule without hesitation, and reject the appeal for that reason.

It is emphasized, too, that the CA upheld the conclusion arrived at by the RTC that the signature of Antonio had not been simulated or
forged. The CA ruled that the testimony of the notary public who had notarized the confirmation of sale to the effect that Antonio and Luisa had
appeared before him prevailed over that of the petitioners expert witness. The concurrence of their conclusion on the genuineness of Antonios
signature now binds the Court.

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Preponderance of evidence is
the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side, and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the
evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that means, in the last analysis, probability of the truth. It
is evidence that is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

Lim successfully discharged his burden of proof as the plaintiff. He established by preponderant evidence that he had a superior
right and title to the property. In contrast, the petitioners did not present any proof of their better title other than their copy of the reconstituted
certificate of title. Such proof was not enough, because the registration of a piece of land under the Torrens system did not create or vest title, such
registration not being a mode of acquiring ownership. The petitioners need to be reminded that a certificate of title is merely an evidence of
ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.

167 Anne Vernadice Areña

ABADIANO vs. SPOUSES JESUS and LOLITA MARTIR

A notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity.

FACTS:

The case stemmed from an action for quieting of title and/or recovery of possession of a parcel of land filed by herein respondents against Roberto
Abadiano, Faustino Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit. Petitioner Xerxes A. Abadiano intervened in that case.

Lot No. 1318 of the Kabankalan Cadastre covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20461 issued on November 19, 1923 in the name of the
spouses Inocentes Baares and Feliciana Villanueva. Before the issuance of OCT No. 20461, however, Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva
(who had predeceased her husband) executed an Agreement of Partition over Lot No. 1318. The lot was partitioned and distributed. The partition is
embodied in a Deed of Partition executed and notarized the following day by Notary Public Jose Peralta with notarial inscriptions Reg. No. 64, Pag.
69, Libro III. David Abadiano, who was absent during the execution of the Agreement of Partition, executed a Deed of Confirmation acknowledging
and ratifying the document of partition.

Leopoldo Baares filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Occidental an ex-parte petition praying for: first, the confirmation of the
Agreement of Partition, the Conformity executed by David Abadiano, and the Deed of Sale between him and his father; and second, the cancellation
of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and, in lieu thereof, the issuance of a new certificate of title over the property. The court ordered the cancellation of
OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of Dr. Leopoldo Baares, Amando Baares, and Ramon and
David Abadiano. Pursuant thereto, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31862 was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros Occidental.

Respondent spouses alleged that, Ramon Abadiano, for himself and on behalf of David Abadiano, had already sold their rights and interests over Lot
No. 1318-C to Victor Garde. The sale was allegedly evidenced by a document of sale (Compra Y Venta) and acknowledged before Notary Public Jose
Peralta and bearing notarial inscription Doc. No. 64, Pag. No. 60, Book No. III, series of 1922. The sale was allegedly affirmed by David Abadiano.

After acquiring the property, respondent spouses continued to plant sugarcane on the land. Sometime in March 1982, after respondent Jesus Martir
harvested the sugarcane he had planted on Lot No. 1318-C, defendant below Roberto Abadiano (son of Ramon) allegedly entered the property and
cultivated the remaining stalks of sugarcane and refused to vacate despite demands to do so. The following year, defendants Roberto Abadiano,
Faustino Montao, and Quirico Mandaguit again harvested the sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-C. Further, the defendants also entered the property and
harvested the sugarcane on Lot No. 1318-B, which by then had been acquired by Lolita B. Martir from her adoptive father, Amando Baares.

Thus, herein respondent-spouses filed the Action to Quiet Title and/or Recovery of Possession with Damages before the then CFI of Negros
Occidental.

The trial court decided in favor of the spouses.

Defendants appealed to the CA. However, the same was summarily dismissed.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the Compra Y Venta is a notarial document?

RULING:

It is not.

There is no denying that TCT No. 31862 is still the subsisting title over the parcel of land in dispute. It is also a fact that the
purported Compra Y Venta was not annotated on TCT No. 31862 until April 1982, shortly before the complaint was commenced, even though the
deed was allegedly executed in 1922.

Considering that the action is one for quieting of title and respondents anchored their claim to the property on the disputed Compra Y Venta,
we find it necessary to repeat that it was incumbent upon the trial court to have resolved first the issue of the documents due execution and
authenticity, before determining its validity.

Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra Y Venta to their complaint. According to respondent Lolita Martir, the original of
said document was in the office of the Register of Deeds. They allegedly tried to obtain a copy from that office but their request was refused. No
other evidence but these bare assertions, however, was presented to prove that the original is indeed in the custody of the Register of Deeds or that
respondents due and diligent search for the same was unsuccessful.

The Rule states that when the original document is unavailable, has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of
its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the document was made in accordance with any of the
exceptions allowed under the rule, and yet, the trial court accepted the document as genuine and proceeded to determine its validity based on such
assumption.

We stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner therein expressed and has in its favor the
presumption of regularity.

In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would not have invalidated the sale if indeed it took place the
same error would have meant that the document cannot be treated as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to the presumption of
regularity. The document would be taken out of the realm of public documents whose genuineness and due execution need not be proved.

Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution and genuineness of the purported Compra Y Venta, the weight of evidence
preponderates in favor of petitioner.

The petition is GRANTED. The decision of the trial court, REVERSED.

168 Neo Kigz

GABUNAS VS. SCANMAR

FACTS:
Petitioner Gabunas, Sr. was a seafarer registered with the POEA and also with the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA).
On 22 December 2000, Gabunas signed a contract with Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. (Scanmar) to work as 2nd Assistant Engineer for its
principal, IUM Ship Management, on board the ocean vessel M/V Chaiten for nine months. Prior to boarding his assigned vessel, Gabunas was
subjected to a pre-employment medical examination, on the basis of which he was declared by the company-designated physician "fit to work."
During the period of his contract, Gabunas experienced a throbbing pain in his left leg while on board his vessel of assignment which he reported but
subsequently ignored. After the expiration of his contract, Gabunasreported to Scanmar to receive his final wages and to set his next deployment and
further requesting for a medical check-up, but said request was ignored. With the persistent pain to his leg, Gabunas sought medical attention at the
Philippine Heart Center, where he was diagnosed with "Critical Limb Ischemia." Gabunas sought medical assistance from respondent Scanmar, but
he was ignored. Because his condition did not improve, Gabunas underwent a below-knee amputation of his leg.
Due to the amputation of his leg, Gabunas was prevented from engaging in his line of work. Hence, Gabunas demanded sickness allowance and
permanent disability benefits from Scanmar. CA upheld the NLRCs decision denying Gabunas claims.
Hence, this instant Petition for certiorari assailing the appellate courts Decision.

ISSUE:
WON the evidence that was presented by the petitioner is substantial?

RULING:
The NLRC dismissed the complaint after finding that petitioners claims were not supported by substantial evidence. It noted that the records showed
petitioners failure to present credible evidence to prove that his illness was work-related. In fact, the NLRC regarded as mere allegation, his statement
that while busy doing his task, (he) felt a throbbing pain on his left leg, because he failed to support it with credible evidence, such as medical records
and the daily logbook of the vessel.[24] Its finding was sustained by the Court of Appeals.
In affirming the findings of the NLRC, the appellate court found that the clinical abstracts presented by petitioner to support his permanent disability
claims were taken only after his disembarkation from his assigned vessel.[25] The CA also noted that petitioner failed to present evidence that he had
notified the ship captain about his alleged medical complaint while on board the vessel. Further, it found no proof, aside from mere allegations in the
Complaint of petitioner,[26] that he had notified respondent of any medical problem upon disembarkation.
Contrary to petitioners position, we do not find any error on the part of the appellate court, which gave credence to the Affidavit of witness Victorio
Q. Esta, respondent Scanmars Manning Manager. The Affidavit attests to the fact that respondent did not receive any complaint from petitioner,
either while on board the vessel or after disembarkation.[27]
We scoured the records of the proceedings on the level of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC and agree that petitioner could not substantiate his claim
that he had complained of pain in his left leg while on board the vessel or upon his disembarkation. We also note that even the Labor Arbiters
Decision on this matter is wanting in reference to any evidence that would support findings in favor of petitioner. As between petitioners bare
allegation and the Affidavit of a witness to the contrary, we give credence to the latter.

169 Kirby Kirby Bragat

170 Joji Digyan