RES GESTAE

108 Christian Fernandez

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO Y ALI, VICTOR y ALI AND JULIAN y OMBRADOR, accused-appellants.
PRINCIPLE:
The testimony of a witness, mentioning the minutiae of an incident that could not easily be concocted, such as the murder, deserves credence for it
indicates sincerity and truthfulness in the narration of events.
FACTS:
Accused-appellants were charged with and convicted of Murder by the RTC for hacking to death a certain Renato.
Prosecution witness Lucresio was in the living room of his house near the crossing of Kisawi and Anlawagan, Bukidnon, when he heard cries for
help. As he went down the stairs, he saw the appellants drag the victim away from the road towards his house. At a distance of approximately three
fathoms from his house, he positively recognized the victim as Renato. He also witnessed the accused-appellant Rogelio and Victor hack the victim
several times with their long bolos while appellant Magbarit held back the victim who was lying on his back. Overcome with fear, he rushed back to
his house. He then assisted his wife who was in near-faint after witnessing the incident.

Prosecution witness Charlito testified that on the night of the incident, he was watching the coronation ceremonies of the fiesta queen at the barrio
hall when he received information from his brother, Raul, about a hacking incident that took place at the crossing of Anlawagan and Kisawi. He
immediately went to the place and there saw Renato, seriously wounded and lying on his back. (Part of his testimony)
Q When you asked him what was your position in relation to Renato Salvar who was lying on the ground?
INTERPRETER:
Witness demonstrating by squatting.
WITNESS:
A I went near him and asked him who was responsible for his condition and he answered.
PROS. RECINA:
Q What was his answer?
A "They betrayed me" (unay).
Q I want you to quote to the Court what actually Renato Salvar said when you asked him what happened to him?
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
A He said, "I was betrayed by Rogelio Espinosa (sic), Victor Espinosa (sic) and Julian Magbaril (guiunay).
Simplicio Salvar, Jr., together with his father and other companions who arrived at the scene, boarded Renato in a truck to seek medical assistance in
Don Carlos. Two hours later, while they were on their way to Don Carlos, Renato expired. Upon noticing that Renato had died, the group did not
proceed to Don Carlos. Instead, they returned to their house.
ISSUE:
Whether RTC and CA was correct in giving credence to the testimony of the lone alleged eye-witness Lucresio
SC RULING:
No.
Eyewitness Lucresio, positively identified Rogelio, Victor and Julian as the assailants of Renato. It is unrebutted that Lucresio's house is located at
least three (3) fathoms away from the scene of the crime. Moreover, during the hacking incident, the place was illuminated by the moon. The defense
failed to impute any improper motive on the part of Lucresio for testifying against the appellants.
In addition, Lucresio testified in detail how the accused-appellants, taking advantage of their superior strength, hacked to death the victim. he
testified as follows: (In case if Atty will ask what was his testimony)
PROS. RECINA:Q When you heard Renato call for help what did you do?
LUCRESIO: A I went downstairs and I met the person who was asking for help.
Q When you went down and you said you went to the person asking for help what did you do?
A I saw Victor Espinos (sic), Julian and Boy Espinosa (sic).
Q When you said Boy Espinosa (sic) you are referring to Rogelio Espinosa (sic)?
A Yes, Sir.
Q When you saw them when you went down from your house how far were they?
A Three fathoms, more or less.
Q What did the three accused do when you saw them?
A They were hacking.
Q Who were they hacking?
A Renato.
Q What did Rogelio Salvar use to hack Renato?
A A long bolo.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What did Victor Espinosa use to hack Renato?
A Also a long bolo.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How about Julian what did he use?
A He was not using any weapon he was just holding.
Q Who was he holding?
A Renato.
Q When Rogelio Espinosa (sic), according to you, hacked Renato, what was the position of Renato?
A Lying on his back.
Q How about when Victor Espinosa (sic) hacked Renato what was the position of Renato?
A I was not able to see his position because he was blocked by the grasses, what I knew is he was already on the ground lying.

The testimony of a witness, mentioning the minutiae of an incident that could not easily be concocted, such as the murder in the case at bar, deserves
credence for it indicates sincerity and truthfulness in the narration of events.
The trial court correctly gave great weight to the testimony of Lucresio. The probability that he committed a mistake as to the identity of the
appellants whom he had known for six (6) years is nil.The credible testimony of a lone witness can provide a rational basis for conviction. The fight
for truth is not necessarily won by the party with more numerous witnesses. It is the quality and not the quantity of witnesses that counts in assessing
their credence.
In an attempt to discredit Lucresio as a witness, accused-appellants assert that he did not volunteer as a witness immediately after the crime was
discovered that same fateful evening. According to Lucresio, after witnessing the incident he rushed back to his house for fear of his life and opted to
attend to his wife who had just given birth.
We take judicial notice of the fact that people usually shy away from any involvement in criminal cases due to its inconvenience, if not the danger it
poses to their lives. The fact, therefore, that it takes them a long time to decide whether or not to testify should not necessarily erode their credibility.
Inn this case, Lucresio had just witnessed a gruesome, hacking incident. There is no standard form of behavior when on is confronted with a shocking
incident. Lucresio's initial hesitation to report the crime to the authorities due to the shocking experience should not be counted against his credibility.
The failure of the prosecution to present the "bolos" which were used in the commission of the crime did not weaken the evidence against accused-
appellants.
It cannot also be doubted that the numerous wounds suffered by the victim were due to hacking by means of sharp bladed instruments.
Appellant's participation in the merciless killing of Renato is further buttressed by the fact that before the victim died, he disclosed to witnesses
CHARLITO AND SIMPLICIO. the name of his assailants. Utterances made immediately after a startling occurrence and before the declarant
had an opportunity to fabricate a false statement can be considered as part of the res gestae pursuant to Section 42 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence.
Accused-appellants would like us to disbelieve the testimonies of Charlito and Simplicio, Jr. on the ground that they are relatives of the victim. This
is a trite argument. We have ruled that relationship of the witnesses to the victim per se does not affect their credibility.
Finally, as between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of the appellants, the former deserve more
credence and weight than the latter. In this case, we give full credit to the factual findings of the trial court considering that it is in the best position to
weigh conflicting declarations of witnesses as it was able to observe their demeanor and conduct while giving their testimonies.

ENTRIES IN THE COURSE OF BUSINESS

109 Rogelle Cueva

G.R. No. 96202 April 13, 1999

ROSELLA D. CANQUE, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
Principle:

The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

"What a man has actually done and committed to writing when under obligation to do the act, it being in the course of the business he has
undertaken, and he being dead, there seems to be no danger in submitting to the consideration of the court."

FACTS:
• Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name RDC Construction. She had contracts with the government for (a) restoration
of Cebu-Toledo wharf road; (b) the asphalting of Lutopan access road and (c) asphalting of Babag road in Lapu-Lapu City.
• In connection to the projects she entered into 2 contracts with Socor Construction.
• On May 28, 1986 Socor Construction sent a bill to RDC Construction for P 299,717.75, plus the interest of 3% a month which represents the
balance of the petitioner’s total account which is P2,098,400.25. However RDC refused to pay the bill for failure of Socor to present
delivery receipts showing actual weight in metric tons of the items delivered and acceptance of the government thereof.
• Hence a case was filed, on June 22, 1988 the trial court decided in favor of the plaintiff asking the RDC to pay P299,717.75 plus 12% interest
per annum.
• However upon appeal by RDC to the CA it affirmed the decision of the trial court based on the reliance on the private respondent’s Book of
Collectible Accounts on the basis of Rule 130 Sec. 37 of the Rule of Court.
ISSUE:
• Whether or not the CA erred in admitting in evidence the entries in the respondent’s book of collectible accounts?

RULING:
• No.
• We agree with the appellate court that the stipulation in the two contracts requiring the submission of delivery receipts does not preclude proof
of delivery of materials by private respondent in some other way. The question is whether the entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts
(Exh. K) constitute competent evidence to show such delivery. Private respondent cites Rule 130, §37 of the Rules of Court and argues that
the entries in question constitute "entries in the course of business" sufficient to prove deliveries made for the government projects. This
provision reads:
• Entries in the course of business. — Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of
the Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
• As petitioner points out, the business entries in question (Exh. K) do not meet the first and third requisites. Dolores Aday, who made the
entries, was presented by private respondent to testify on the account of RDC Construction. It was in the course of her testimony that the
entries were presented and marked in evidence. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as
the person who made them was available to testify in court.
• Necessity is given as a ground for admitting entries, in that they are the best available evidence. Said a learned judge: "What a man has
actually done and committed to writing when under obligation to do the act, it being in the course of the business he has undertaken, and he
being dead, there seems to be no danger in submitting to the consideration of the court." The person who maybe called to court to testify on
these entries being dead, there arises the necessity of their admission without the one who made them being called to court be sworn and
subjected to cross-examination. And this is permissible in order to prevent a failure of justice.
• Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said she made the entries based on the
bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. The deliveries of the materials stated in the
18
bills were supervised by "an engineer for (such) functions." The person, therefore, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated in the
entries, i.e., that such deliveries were made in the amounts and on the dates stated, was the company's project engineer. The entries made by
Aday show only that the billings had been submitted to her by the engineer and that she faithfully recorded the amounts stared therein in
the books of account. Whether or not the bills given to Aday correctly reflected the deliveries made in the amounts and on the dates
indicated was a fact that could be established by the project engineer alone who, however, was not presented during trial. The rule is stated
by former Chief Justice Moran, thus:
• [W]hen the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him, and the person who gave him the information is individually
known and may testify as to the facts stated in the entry which is not part of a system of entries where scores of employees have intervened,
such entry is not admissible without the testimony of the informer.
110 Lor Belleza

G.R. No. 164273 March 28, 2007

EMMANUEL B. AZNAR vs. CITIBANK, N.A.,

Principle:

The following conditions are required for Sec.43 be applicable:

1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;

2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;

3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;

4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and

5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

Facts:

Emmanuel B. Aznar (Aznar), is a holder of a Preferred Master Credit Card (Mastercard) bearing number 5423-3920-0786-7012 issued by Citibank
with a credit limit of P150,000.00. As he and his wife, planned to take their two grandchildren, on an Asian tour, Aznar made a total advance deposit
of P485,000.00 with Citibank with the intention of increasing his credit limit to P635,000.00.

With the use of his Mastercard, Aznar purchased plane tickets to Kuala Lumpur for his group worth P237,000.00.

However, when Aznar presented his Mastercard in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same was not honored. And when
he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it was again dishonored for
the reason that his card was blacklisted by Citibank. Such dishonor forced him to buy the tickets in cash. They were humiliated and accused of being
swindlers.

Thus, Aznar filed a complaint for damages against Citibank and was raffled before RTC20 Cebu City (Judge Ferdinand Marcos). To prove that
Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT
ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh. "G") with the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi) which shows that his card in
question was "DECL OVERLIMIT" or declared over the limit. Citibank denied allegation that they blacklisted Aznar's card. To prove that, Citibank’s
Credit Card Department Head, Dennis Flores, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which contained the list of its canceled cards covering the
period of Aznar’s trip.Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

Aznar filed a motion for reconsideration with motion to re-raffle the case saying that Judge Marcos could not be impartial as he himself is a holder of
a Citibank credit card. The case was re-raffled to RTC10 through Judge Jesus S. De la Peña. Latter issued an Order granting Aznar’s motion for
reconsideration. It ruled that: " Exh. "G" was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or regular course of business in the modern credit card industry and
Nubi was not able to testify as she was in a foreign country and cannot be reached by subpoena; taking judicial notice of the practice of automated
teller machines (ATMs) and credit card facilities which readily print out bank account status, Exh. "G" can be received as prima facie evidence of the
dishonor of Aznar’s Mastercard xx"

CA reversed RTC10's judgment and reinstate RTC20's decision.

Issue:

whether or not Aznar has established his claim against Citibank/ whether or not "exhibit G can be considered as entry in the course of business.

Ruling:

No.

Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased or unable to
testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his
professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

Under this rule, however, the following conditions are required:

1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;

2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;

3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;

4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and

5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

In the case at bar, as correctly pointed out by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, there appears on the computer print-out the name of a certain
"Victrina Elnado Nubi" and a signature purportedly belonging to her, and at the left dorsal side were handwritten the words "Sorry for the delay since
the records had to be retrieved. Regards. Darryl Mario." It is not clear therefore if it was Nubi who encoded the information stated in the print-out and
was the one who printed the same. The handwritten annotation signed by a certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was Mario who printed the
same and only handed the print-out to Nubi. The identity of the entrant, required by the provision above mentioned, was therefore not established.
Neither did petitioner establish in what professional capacity did Mario or Nubi make the entries, or whether the entries were made in the
performance of their duty in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

111 Clea Borja Cabueñas

111. JOSE, JR. vs. MICHAELMAR Phils.

PRINCIPLE: “Under the legal rules of evidence, not all unsigned documents or papers fail the test of admissibility. There are kinds of evidence
known as exceptions to the hearsay rule which need not be invariably signed by the author if it is clear that it issues from him because of necessity
and under circumstances that safeguard the trustworthiness of the paper. A number of evidence of this sort are called entries in the course of
business, which are transactions made by persons in the regular course of their duty or business.”

FACTS:
The MSSI through MPI engaged the services of Jose, Jr. as oiler of M/T Limar. In connection with the employment contract, Jose, Jr. signed the
declaration on the “no alcohol, no drug policy” of the company.

A random sample was conducted on all officers and crew members of M/T Limar at the port of Curacao. Jose, Jr. was found positive for marijuana.
He was informed about the result of his drug test. When the M/T Limar reached the next port after the random drug test, Jose,Jr. was repatriated to
the Philippines. When Jose,Jr. arrived in the Philippines, he asked MPI that a drug test be conducted on him. MPI ignored his request. On his own,
Jose, Jr. procured drug tests and was found negative for marijuana.

Jose, Jr. filed with the NLRC a complaint against MPI and MSSI for illegal dismissal. The LA dismissed the case and found the complainant’s
termination from employment valid and lawful. The NLRC set aside the LA’s decision. It ruled that the random drug test result did not contain any
signature, much less of any of the doctors whose name were printed in the document. Verily, the veracity of the purported drug test result is
questionable, hence cannot be deemed as substantial proof that Complainant violated his employer’s “no alcohol, no drug” policy.

ISSUE: WON the unsigned document or paper failed the test of admissibility.

HELD: No. Under legal rules of evidence, not all unsigned documents or papers fail the test of admissibility. There are kinds of evidence known as
exceptions to the hearsay rule which need not be invariably signed by the author if it is clear that it issues from him because of necessity and under
circumstances that safeguard the trustworthiness of the paper. A number of evidence of this sort are called entries in the course of business, which are
transactions made by persons in the regular course of their duty or business. We agree with the labor arbiter that the drug test result constitutes entries
made in the ordinary or regular course of duty of a responsible officer of the vessel. The tests administered to the crew were routine measures of the
vessel conducted to enforce its stated policy, and it was a matter of course for medical reports to be issued and released by the medical officer. The
ship’s physician at Curacao under whom the tests were conducted was admittedly Dr. Heath. It was under his name and with his handwritten
comments that the report on the respondent came out, and there is no basis to suspect that these results were issued other than in the ordinary course
of his duty. As the labor arbiter points out, the drug test report is evidence in itself and does not require additional supporting evidence except if it
appears that the drug test was conducted not in accordance with drug testing procedures. Nothing of the sort, he says, has even been suggested in this
particular case.

ENTRIES IN OFFICIAL RECORDS

112 Roche Torrejos

REPUBLIC V. MARCOS-MANOTOC

Principle:

Entries in Official Records requires authentication of the custodian or public officer in order to be admissible. As to the copy of the TSN of the
proceedings before the PCGG, while it may be considered as a public document since it was taken in the course of the PCGGs exercise of its
mandate, it was not attested to by the legal custodian to be a correct copy of the original. This omission falls short of the requirement of Rule 132,
Secs. 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.

FACTS:

After the People Power Revolution in 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) that
was primarily tasked to investigate and recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives and associates.

On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion,
Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R.
Marcos; and herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and Gregorio Araneta III.

Four amended Complaints were thereafter filed imputing active participation and collaboration of another persons, viz. Nemesio G. Co and Yeungs
(Kam, Ho and Fan) of Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing Corporation Phils.; and, Imelda Cojuangco for the estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Prime
Holdings, in the alleged illegal activities and undertakings of the Marcoses in relation to the ₱200 Billion Pesos ill-gotten wealth allegation.

Petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents. However, the latter objected on the ground that the documents were
unauthenticated and mere photocopies.

On 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a RESOLUTION ADMITTING all the documentary exhibits formally offered by the prosecution; however, their
evidentiary value was left to the determination of the Court.

Subsequently, Imelda R. Marcos, Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III;Yeung
Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the PEA-PTGWO filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.

On 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, granting all the demurrers to evidence except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos.

Petitioner contention

The documents fall under the Rules third exception, that is, these documents are public records in the custody of a public officer or are
recorded in a public office. It is its theory that since these documents were collected by the PCGG, then, necessarily, the conditions for the exception
to apply had been met. Alternatively, it asserts that the documents were offered to prove not only the truth of the recitals of the documents, but also of
other external or collateral facts

Issue:

Whether the documents presented containing the proceedings before PCGG and other exhibits were admissible

RULING:

NO.
The court held that the evidence, in particular, exhibits P,[8] Q,[9] R,[10] S,[11] and T,[12] were considered hearsay, because their originals were not
presented in court, nor were they authenticated by the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that petitioner failed to provide
any valid reason why it did not present the originals in court. These exhibits were supposed to show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotok in the
media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and RPN-9, all three of which she had allegedly acquired illegally. These exhibits also sought to prove her alleged
participation in dollar salting through De Soleil Apparel.

The fact that these documents were collected by the PCGG in the course of its investigations does not make them per se public records
referred to in the quoted rule.
Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno, who testified that these public and private documents had been
gathered by and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the Commissions investigation of the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.
However, given the purposes for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a credible witness who could testify as to their contents. To
reiterate, [i]f the writings have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses. Witnesses can testify only to those facts which
are of their personal knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception. Thus, Magno could only testify as to how she obtained custody of
these documents, but not as to the contents of the documents themselves.

Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or Memoranda submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while
affidavits may be considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before a notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay
evidence. The reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant, but by another one who uses his or her own language in
writing the affiant's statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.

As to the copy of the TSN of the proceedings before the PCGG, while it may be considered as a public document since it was taken in the
course of the PCGGs exercise of its mandate, it was not attested to by the legal custodian to be a correct copy of the original. This omission falls
short of the requirement of Rule 132, Secs. 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.

113 He

[G.R. No. 140023. August 14, 2003]

RUDY LAO, petitioner, vs. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., respondent.

PRINCIPLE:

Under Section 44, Rule 130, the following are the requisites for admissibility of entries in official records

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law;

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
[19]
personally or through official information.
FACTS:

a. X is the owner of Truck #1 (Fuso) and Truck #2.

b. Truck #1 is insured with the respondent insurance company to cover any damages that might be caused to its truck and the goods therein.
c. During the existence of the policy, an accident occurred. Truck #1, which is driven by Y collided with Truck #2 driven by Z.
d. Petitioner filed a claim with the respondent company for the proceeds from his policy. The claim was denied by respondent on the ground
that when it investigated the matter, it was found that the driver of the Truck #1 (Y), did not possess a proper drivers license at the time of
accident.

e. The restriction on Y’s driver’s license provided that he can only drive four-wheeled vehicles weighing not more than 4,500 kgs. Truck #1
however weighed more than 4,500 kgs.

f. The respondent cited the following excerpts from the police blotter:
“11:30 PM Sgt. A. Bernas informed this office that a collision took place at Brgy. Buhang, Jaro, IC. Investigation conducted by Pat.
Villahermosa, assisted by Lt. P. Baclaron (OD), disclosed that at about 8:00 PM this date at the aforementioned place, a collision took place
between Truck#2 with Plate Nr FB[S] 917 owned by X and driven Z and Truck #1 with Plate Nr. FCG-538 owned by Rudy Lao and driver
(sic) by Y.”

g. Petitioner alleges that at the time of the accident, it was Z who was driving Truck #1 and not Y. As evidence, petitioner presented the Motor
Vehicle Accident Report written by Pat. Villahermosa (the same person who conducted the investigation which resulted to the police blotter
above). The said report was made three days after the accident. Respondent was firm in its denial of the claim.

h. Petitioner filed a civil case before RTC. The latter ruled in favor of respondent. CA affirmed. Hence this pettish.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in relying mainly on SEC. 44, RULE 130 in upholding the entry in the police blotter which stated that the driver of
Truck#1 was Y, who was not an authorized driver.

HELD:
NO! The CA correctly affirmed the decision of RTC.
[18]
The police blotter was admitted under Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court. Under the said rule, the following are the requisites for its
admissibility:

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person, specially enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law;

(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or
[19]
through official information.
[20]
We agree with the trial and appellate courts in finding that the police blotter was properly admitted as they form part of official records. Entries in
police records made by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the fact therein stated,
[21]
and their probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by other competent evidence. Although police blotters are of little probative
value, they are nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.
In this case, the entries in the police blotter reflected the information subject of the controversy. Stated therein was the fact that Leonardo Anit was
[22]
driving the insured truck with plate number FCG-538. This is unlike People v. Mejia, where we said that entries in the police blotters should not be
given undue significance or probative value, since the Court there found that the entries in question are sadly wanting in material particulars.

Furthermore, in this case the police blotter was identified and formally offered as evidence. The person who made the entries was likewise presented
in court; he identified and certified as correct the entries he made on the blotter. The information was supplied to the entrant by the investigating
officer who did not protest about any inaccuracy when the blotter was presented to him. No explanation was likewise given by the investigating
officer for the alleged interchange of names.

114 Colleen Rose Sab Guantero

WALLEM VS NLRC

FACTS:

This is petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution of the NLRC affirming POEA's decision that Wallem Maritime Services Inc.,
and Wallem Shipmanagement Ltd., are jointly and severally liable to herein complainant Joselito Macatunu for illegal dismissal.

Macatunu was hired by Wallem Shipmanagement Ltd., as an able-bodied seaman on board M/T Fortuna vessel of Liberian Registry. Pursuant to the
contract employement, Macatunu was employed for 10 months.

While the vessel was dock in Kawasaki Japan,an altercation took place between Macatunu and Gurimbao versus a cadet officer having the same
nationality with the ship's captain. The master entered the incident in the tanker's logbook.

Another incident happen between the 3 seaman. This incident leads to the repatriation of Macatunu and Gurimbao to the Philippines.

The captain summoned the two and they went to the captain's cabin. The captain told them to pack their things and disembark on the next port.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, Macatunu filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the POEA.

Wallem, defending their position, alleged that the incident was not the first infraction committed by the two. As shown by the logbook, first: on June
19, 1989 while the vessel was docked in Batangas, the two left without permission; second: while the vessel was anchored in Kawasaki Japan, they
assaulted the officer on watch for the day, the cadet officer Sason; third: When the vessel was about to sail that day, the rwo went ashore inspite of the
warning given them, they were arrested by Japanese authorities.

POEA's decision:

The complainant's dismissal is without just and valid cause. we cannot give much weight and credence to the "certified true copy of the official
logbook" because the alleged entries therein were only handpicked and copied from the official logbook of the vessel M/V Fortuna. There is nk way
of verifying the truth to these entries and whether they actually appear in the log entries in the specific dates mentioned. The specific pages in the
official log bookmwhere these entries appear whould have been reproduced to give effect to the same taint of credence. No documentary evidence
was submitted to support the alleged official log book, like the master's report and the police report or any report by the Japanese authoritues by
reason of their arrest. The copy of the alleged official logbook was not properly authenticated.

NLRC: affirmed

ISSUE:

whether or not the "typrewritten collation of excerpts from the logbook without proper authentication" is considered as an official entry of records
and as such admissible as evidence.

HELD:

No. The authentication is necessary specially so since this document is the only piece of evidence submitted by the respondents.

In this case, petitioners, did not submit also as evidence the logbook itself, or even authenticated copies of pertinent pages thereof, which could have
been easily xeroxed or photocopies considering the present technology on reproduction of documents.

115 Albert Cyr Bitangjol

Manalo vs Robles

Principle:

"The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and,
therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of
caution as the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require."

Facts:

On August 9, 1947, a taxicab owned and operated by defendant appellant Company and driven by Edgardo Hernandez its driver, collided with a
passenger truck at Parañaque, Rizal. In the course of and as a result of the accident, the taxicab ran over Armando Manalo, an eleven year old,
causing him physical injuries which resulted in his death several days later. Edgardo Hernandez was prosecuted for homicide through reckless
imprudence and after trial was found guilty of the charge and sentenced to one year prision correccional, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P3,000, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay costs. Edgardo Hernandez served out his sentence but failed to
pay the indemnity. Two writs of execution were issued against him to satisfy the amount of the indemnity, but both writs were returned unsatisfied by
the sheriff who certified that no property, real or personal, in Hernandez' name could be found.
On February 17, 1953, plaintiffs Emilio Manalo and his wife Clara Salvador, father and mother respectively of Armando, filed the present action
against the Company to enforce its subsidiary liability, pursuant to Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The Company filed its
appearance and answer and later an amended answer with special defenses and counterclaim. It also filed a motion to dismiss the complaint unless
and until the convicted driver Hernandez was included as a party defendant, the Company considering him an indispensable party. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss, holding that Hernandez was not an indispensable party defendant. Dissatisfied with this ruling, the Company filed
certiorari proceedings with the Court of Appeals, but said appellate court held that Hernandez was not an indispensable party defendant, and
consequently, the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss acted within the proper limits of its discretion. Eventually, the trial court rendered
judgment sentencing the defendant Company to pay to plaintiffs damages in the amount of P3,000 with interest at 12 per cent per annum from
November 14, 1952, plus P600 for attorney's fees and expenses for litigation, with costs. As aforestated, the Company is appealing from this
decision.
To prove their case against the defendant Company, the plaintiffs introduced a copy of the decision in the criminal case convicting Hernandez of
homicide through reckless imprudence, the writs of execution to enforce the civil liability, and the returns of the sheriff showing that the two writs of
execution were not satisfied because of the insolvency of Hernandez, the sheriff being unable to locate any property in his name. Over the objections
of the Company, the trial court admitted this evidence and based its decision in the present case on the same.
Defendant-appellant now contends that this kind of evidence is inadmissible and cites in support of its contention the cases of City of Manila vs.
Manila Electric Company (52 Phil., 586), and Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Company (15 Phil., 75). This point has already been decided by this
tribunal in the case of Martinez vs. Barredo (81 Phil., 1). After considering the same two cases now cited by appellant, this court held that the
judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and offended party, is binding upon the party subsidiarily liable.
The appellant also claims that in admitting as evidence the sheriff's return of the writs of execution to prove the insolvency of Hernandez, without
requiring said official's appearance in court, it was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine said sheriff. A sheriff's return is an official statement
made by a public official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law and forming part of official records, and is prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein. (Rule 39, section 11 and Rule 123, section 35, Rules of Court.) The sheriff making the return need not testify in court as to the
facts stated in his entry.

Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented by the appellee (the copy of the decision and sheriff’s return) are admissible in evidence.

Ruling:
Yes.
"To the foregoing rules with reference to the method of proving private documents an exception is made with reference to the method of proving
public documents executed before and certified to, under the hand and seal of certain public officials. The courts and the legislature have recognized
the valid reason for such an exception. The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed, the occasions in which the officials
would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work something is
not done in which testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there no exception to official statements, hosts of officials would be found
devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering their depositions before an officer. The work of Administration
of government and the interest of the public having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence."
And this Court added:
"The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and,
therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of
caution as the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require."
Bar Q:
X company operates and owns taxicabs. Y, as a driver of one of the taxicabs of X company, ran over A. Y was charged and convicted of the crime of
homicide through reckless imprudence. Since Y was insolvent, the sheriff’s return was unsatisfied. The parents of A now file a civil case against X
company for subsidiary liability invoking the Revised Penal Code. The former presented as evidence the copy of the judgment against Y and the
sheriff’s return to prove the insolvency of Y so that the X company should be held subsidiarily liable with Y. X company argued that the evidence
presented are inadmissible.
Are the evidence admissible?

116 Kevin Santi

VICENTE D. HERCE, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF CABUYAO, LAGUNA and JOSE B. CARPENA, Respondents.
FACTS:
This is a case regarding 2 conflicting titles – one in favor of petitioner and the other in the name of the Municipality of Cabuyao.
The municipality’s claim of ownership is based on the entry in the Ordinary Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that Decree No. 4244
was issued on March 3, 1911 and that Lot I Plan II-2719 was one of the six parcels of land previously applied for registration by the Municipality of
Cabuyao.
Petitioner’s claim is based on the decree of registration issued by the LRA on January 28, 1997 in favor of petitioner, followed by the issuance of
OCT No. O-2099, pertaining to the same parcel of land covered by Decree No. 4244.
In his MR, petitioner principally claimed that the entries in the Ordinary Decree Book of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) did not categorically
state that the property covered by Decree No. N-216115 and OCT No. O-2099 was included in Decree No. 4244. As such, the title issued in his favor
could not be declared void, because it had not been shown by competent proof that the lot covered thereby was included in Decree No. 4244.
ISSUE: WON Decree no. 4244 is valid
HELD:
Yes.
Sec. 44. Entries in official records.
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Ordinary Decree Book, LRC (CLR) Rec. No. 6763, showing that Decree No. 4244 was issued on
March 3, 1911, is presumed to have been regularly issued by the accountable public officers who enjoy the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of their functions. Thus, the proceedings that led to the issuance of Decree No. 4244 in favor of the Municipality of Cabuyao cannot be
overturned without any countervailing proof to the contrary.
It is clear that Decree No. 4244 issued in favor of the respondent municipality in 1911 has become indefeasible; as such, petitioner is now barred
from claiming the subject land.
BAR Q
X, a private person claimed ownership over a parcel of land which was also claimed by Municipality Y. X contends that decree 1234, granting in
favor of Municipality Y the disputed land, is invalid. However, in a proceeding filed by X against the municipality, he did not present any evidence as
to the validity of its procurement. The lower court favored the municipality on the basis of presumption of regularity on the part of the public officers
accountable for such decree. X on appeal stated that such decree did not categorically include the said property. As such, the title issued in his favor
could not be declared void, because it had not been shown by competent proof that the lot covered thereby was included in Decree No. 1234. Is X
correct?
117 Frances May Realino

G.R. NO. L-3898 FEBRUARY 18, 1908

THE CITY OF MANILA VS. TOMAS CABANGIS

SHORT DIGEST:
The City of Manila alleges that the defendant unlawfully obstructed the course of a public navigable river and converted the same into a private
fisheries. Plaintiff presented maps to prove the existence and location of the bed of the River Sunog-Apog and the existence and location of the
fisheries of the defendant.

FACTS:

The plaintiff in this action alleges that the defendant obstructed the course of a public navigable river, estero, or waterway, known as Sunog-Apog,
situated in Gagalangin district of Tondo, Manila; that at that time the said defendant took possession of the said river or estero, and converted it into a
private pesqueria (fishing pond); and that he continued in possession of the said river, estero, or waterway up to the time of the filing of the
complaint. The plaintiff claims the right of possession and control of the said river, estero, or waterway, and prays for judgment of possession.

The defendant alleges that the subject matter of the litigation forms an integral part of the Island of Balot purchased by his forefathers from the
Augustinian Order on December 9, 1871, and that it has been in the continuous and peaceable control of himself and his predecessors in interest since
that time.

Plaintiff presented maps of the section of the city of Manila wherein the fisheries in question are situated. They were offered in evidence to show (1)
the existence and location of the bed of the River Sunog-Apog and (2) the existence and location of the fisheries of the defendant.

The trial court was of opinion that the evidence of record sustains an affirmative finding as to each of these facts, and that the defendant had failed to
sustain his allegations of ownership or of prescriptive rights in the said fishery, and rendered judgment accordingly in favor of the plaintiff.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the maps presented are admissible as evidence of the facts stated therein.

RULING:

YES.

Exhibits B and C purport to be maps of the section of the city of Manila wherein the fisheries in question are situated. Taken together with the
testimony of the city engineer, who testified as to their accuracy, and the admissions of the defendant as to the existence and locations of his fisheries,
we think these maps were properly admitted in evidence to show the location of the subject-matter in litigation by reference to the Bay of Manila, and
the Rivers Maypajo and Vitas, whose existence and identity have never been questioned; they were, however, wholly incompetent as evidence of the
existence or location of the River Sunog-Apog, or as evidence as to the disputed fact that the subject-matter in litigation, is within the jurisdictional
limits of the city of Manila.

The plaintiff failed to establish the authenticity of these maps as maps of territory included within the jurisdiction of the present city of Manila, and
the evidence shows that the former bed of the River Sunog-Apog, which appears on one of these maps, was placed there by one of the engineers of
the city of Manila at a time when, according to the allegations of the complaint, the territory in question was in the possession of the defendant and
used as a fishery, and neither the authority of the engineer so to do nor the source of his information are disclosed in the record. These maps,
therefore, so far as they purport to establish the existence and location of the Sunog-Apog River, are no more than an expression of opinion of the
engineer who prepared them, unsupported by evidence as to the grounds upon which his opinion was based.

It is not quite clear from the record whether these maps were finally admitted as evidence as to the existence and location of the Rio Sunog-Apog, but
granting that they were, we think their admission for the purpose indicated would not constitute reversible error, because the fact that the fisheries in
question are within the jurisdictional limits of the city of Manila and occupy the bed of a former river, estero, or waterway known as the Sunog-Apog,
in proof of which these maps were offered in evidence, is sufficiently established by other evidence of record.

The evidence of record sustains the finding of the court as to the existence within the jurisdictional limits of the city of Manila of an open, public,
navigable river, estero, or waterway, which has been unlawfully obstructed by the defendant, and of which possession and control is granted to the
city of Manila in accordance with the terms of its charter. The judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. So ordered.

118 Melissa Samson Guillemer Cotoner

​
# 118 FERNANDEZ VS. CA G.R. NO. 108366 FEBRUARY 16, 1994

PRINCIPLES:

1. The Local Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person.
[Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958)]
2. The certificate of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said
child. [Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958)]

3. A birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity. (Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128
SCRA 53 (1984))
4. While baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on
the dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.
[Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980)]
 5. A baptismal certificate is no proof of the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of prior and distinct
facts which require separate and concrete evidence. (Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984))

BAR EXAM QUESTION:

X and Y filed a case against Z for Recognition and Support.
X and Y presented the following documentary evidence:

1. Certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Z as their father;

2. The baptismal certificate of X which also states that Z is his father;
3. Photographs of Z taken during the baptism of X; and
4. Pictures of respondent Z and X taken at the home of the mother of X.
X and Y also presented the following testimonial evidence:

5. Three (3) witnesses, who told the trial court that the mother of X and Y had, at different times, introduced Z to them as her "husband".
6. The priest who administered the baptismal rites who testified that Z was the one who presented himself as the father of X during the
latter's baptism.
Are these evidence sufficient proof of filiation or paternity?

RULING:
No.
The evidence is insufficient to prove filiation or paternity.

1. The certificates of live birth of X and Y identifying Z as their father are not competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. The records do
no show that Z had a hand in the preparation of said certificates. In Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958),viz:
“. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines explicity prohibited, not only the naming of
the father or the child born outside wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the recognition, is not filed or made by him, but,
also, the statement of any information or circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar
had no authority to make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate
of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said
child.” (Emphasis supplied)

​
Reiterated in Berciles, op. cit., "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged ​father therein indicated is not competent evidence of
paternity."

2. The baptismal certificates of X naming Z as his father has scant evidentiaryvalue. There is no showing that Z participated in its preparation.
In Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
“As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is that although the baptismal record of a natural child describes her as a
child of the record the decedent had no intervening, the baptismal record cannot be held to be a voluntary recognition of
parentage. . . . The reason for this rule that canonical records do not constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts. 115
and 117 to prove the legitimate filiation of a child is that such canonical record is simply proof of the only act to which the
priest may certify by reason of his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in his presence, like the administration of the
sacrament upon a day stated; it is no proof of the declarations in the record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or
of prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete evidence.”

​In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), the Court also ruled ​that while baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they c​ an only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the ​dates so specified. They are not
necessarily competent evidence of the v​ eracity of entries therein with respect to the child's paternity.

3. X and Y cannot rely on the photographs showing the presence of Z in the baptism of X. These photographs are far from proofs that Z is the
father of X. As explained by Z, he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of X. The latter's testimony was corroborated by another
sponsor.

4. The pictures taken in the house of the mother of X and Y showing Z showering affection to X fall short of the evidence required to prove
paternity. As held in Tan vs. Trocio, 192 SCRA 764:
“. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual closeness between
Respondent and Jewel, like playing with him and giving him paternity. The same must be said of . . . (the) pictures of Jewels
and Respondent showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity and
much less would prove violation of complaint's person and honor.” (Emphasis supplied)

5. Their mother's testimony is highly suspect as it is self-serving and by itself, is

insufficient to prove the paternity of X and Y.

6. X and Y capitalize on the testimony of the priest who solemnized the baptismal ​ceremony of X. However, there is no proof that the

priest is a close friend of X ​and Y's mother, and Z, which should render unquestionable his identification of ​Z during X's baptism. In the
absence of this proof, the Court does not concede t​ hat the said priest who officiates numerous baptismal ceremonies day in and ​day out can
remember the parents of the children he has baptized.
119 Faith Ravens

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN "JHONNY" LOCSIN

Principle:
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry, a copy of which is transmitted to the Civil Registry General
pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. However, if there are material discrepancies
between them, the one entered in the Civil Registry General prevails.

Facts:
Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.[1] died intestate on December 11, 1990,
respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of Administration"
(docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4742) praying that he be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He
alleged, among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased
owned personal properties which include undetermined savings, current and time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the
undivided mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes
Locsin and Ester Locsin; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.

Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992, the heirs of Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester
Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an opposition to respondents petition for letters of administration. They
averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never
affixed "Sr." in his name.

To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of
the intestate estate, respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D")[3] of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in
the bound volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that
respondent's father is Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated therein, as evidenced by his signatures
(Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 from which Exhibit "D" was
machine copied, respondent presented Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced and identified in court the
bound volume of 1957 records of birth where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is included.

In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a certified true
copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit "8",[5] indicating that
the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan
C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on
January 30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used before respondent's birth. This scenario clearly suggests that
Exhibit "D" was falsified. Petitioners presented as witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a handwriting expert. He testified that the signatures of
Juan C. Locsin and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D")
are forgeries. He thus concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious document surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume of birth
records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.

Issue:
which of the two documents - Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is
genuine?

Ruling:
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to
the Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner.
In this regard, we find Vencer's explanation not convincing.

Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958 form
could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded, Vencer answered that "xxx during that time, maybe the forms in 1956 were
already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form."

The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December 1,
1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2) years earlier.

Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No. 102,
revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used several
years thereafter. But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is unlikely.

There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit "D." The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil Registry
of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound volume, not sewn like the other entries.

When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume, Vencer had no answer except to state, "I am not aware of this because
I am not a bookbinder." As to why Exhibit "D" was not sewn or bound into the volume, she explained as follows: It is because
sometimes the leaves are detached so we have to paste them."

At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In
this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of
Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the Civil Registry General.

120 Joji Digyan

121 Roslyn Cortes

BARCELON, ROXAS SECURITIES, INC (NOW KNOWN AS UBP SECURITIES, INC.) VS. CIR G.R. 157064

Principle:

1. There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

2. When a mail matter is sent by registered mail, there exists a presumption, set forth under Section 3(v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that it was
received in the regular course of mail. The facts to be proved in order to raise this presumption are: (a) that the letter was properly addressed with
postage prepaid; and (b) that it was mailed. While a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, this is still
merely a disputable presumption subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the burden upon the party favored by the
presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee.

SHORT DIGEST
FACTS: Petitioner, a corporation engaged in the trading of securities. It filed an Annual Income Tax Return year, 1987 on 14 April 1988. BIR issued
an assessment for deficiency income tax of P826,698.31 covered under Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-87-91-000649. However, petitioner
denies having received an assessment notice from respondent. Respondent presented the BIR record book where the name of the taxpayer, the kind of
tax assessed, the registry receipt number and the date of mailing were noted. The BIR records custodian, Ingrid Versola, also testified that she made
the entries.

ISSUE: WON BIR record book and the testimony of its record custodian, Ingrid Versola, admissible as entries of official records?

RULING: NO
In the case of Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc, Supreme Court held that there are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that
the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other
person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were not based on her personal knowledge as she did not attest to the fact that she personally prepared
and mailed the assessment notice. Nor was it stated in the transcript of stenographic notes how and from whom she obtained the pertinent
information. Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she acquired the reports from persons under a legal duty to submit the same. Hence, Rule
130, Section 44 finds no application in the present case. Thus, the evidence offered by respondent does not qualify as an exception to the rule against
hearsay evidence. Furthermore, independent evidence, such as the registry receipt of the assessment notice, or a certification from the Bureau of
Posts, could have easily been obtained. Yet respondent failed to present such evidence.
** The right of the government to assess and collect the alleged deficiency tax is barred by prescription. The evidence offered by the respondent fails
to convince this Court that Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-87-91-000649 was released, mailed, or sent before 15 April 1991, or before the
lapse of the period of limitation upon assessment and collection prescribed by Section 203 of the NIRC. Such evidence is insufficient to give rise to
the presumption that the assessment notice was received in the regular course of mail.

LONG DIGEST

FACTS: Barcelon, Roxas Securities Inc is a corporation engaged in the trading of securities. It filed an Annual Income Tax Return year, 1987 on 14
April 1988. After an audit conducted by BIR, respondent CIR issued an assessment for deficiency income tax of P826,698.31 arising from the
disallowance of the item on salaries, bonuses and allowances in the amount of P1,219,093,93 as part of the deductible business expense since
petitioner failed to subject the salaries, bonuses and allowances to withholding taxes.

The last day for filing by petitioner of its return was on 15 April 1988 giving respondent until 15 April 1991 within which to send an assessment
notice. While respondent avers that it sent the assessment notice dated 1 February 1991 on 6 February 1991, within the three (3)-year period
prescribed by law, petitioner denies having received an assessment notice from respondent. Petitioner alleges that it came to know of the deficiency
tax assessment only on 17 March 1992 when it was served with the Warrant of Distraint and Levy.

This assessment was covered by Formal Assessment Notice No. FAN-1-87-91-000649 dated 1 February 1991, which, respondent alleges, was sent to
petitioner through registered mail on 6 February 1991.

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA ruled on the primary issue of prescription and found it unnecessary to decide the issues
on the validity and propriety of the assessment. Respondent is ORDERED TO DESIST from collecting said deficiency tax. Respondent files MR,
CTA reversed its decision.

The Court of Appeals found the evidence presented by the respondent to be sufficient proof that the tax assessment notice was mailed to
the petitioner, therefore the legal presumption that it was received should apply. Petitioner filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

1. WON BIR record book and the testimony of its record custodian, Ingrid Versola, admissible as entries of official records?

2. Whether or not the right of the bureau of internal revenue to collect the subject alleged deficiency income tax for 1987 has prescribed?
RULING:

1. NO

There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person
specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were not based on her personal knowledge as she did not attest to the fact that she personally prepared
and mailed the assessment notice. Nor was it stated in the transcript of stenographic notes how and from whom she obtained the pertinent
information. Moreover, she did not attest to the fact that she acquired the reports from persons under a legal duty to submit the same. Hence, Rule
130, Section 44 finds no application in the present case. Thus, the evidence offered by respondent does not qualify as an exception to the rule against
hearsay evidence.

Furthermore, independent evidence, such as the registry receipt of the assessment notice, or a certification from the Bureau of Posts, could have
easily been obtained. Yet respondent failed to present such evidence.
 2. YES
In Protectors Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeal, this Court ruled that when a mail matter is sent by registered mail, there exists a presumption, set forth
under Section 3(v), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that it was received in the regular course of mail. The facts to be proved in order to raise this
presumption are: (a) that the letter was properly addressed with postage prepaid; and (b) that it was mailed. While a mailed letter is deemed received
by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, this is still merely a disputable presumption subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt
thereof shifts the burden upon the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee.

In the case of Nava v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, this Court stressed on the importance of proving the release, mailing or sending of the
notice. An assessment is made when sent within the prescribed period, even if received by the taxpayer after its expiration (Coll. of Int. Rev. vs.
Bautista, L-12250 and L-12259, May 27, 1959), this ruling makes it the more imperative that the release, mailing, or sending of the notice be clearly
and satisfactorily proved. Mere notations made without the taxpayers intervention, notice, or control, without adequate supporting evidence, cannot
suffice; otherwise, the taxpayer would be at the mercy of the revenue offices, without adequate protection or defense.

In this case, the respondent was unable to present substantial evidence that such notice was, indeed, mailed or sent by the respondent before
the BIRs right to assess had prescribed and that said notice was received by the petitioner. The respondent presented the BIR record book where the
name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax assessed, the registry receipt number and the date of mailing were noted. The BIR records custodian,
Ingrid Versola, also testified that she made the entries therein. The right of the government to assess and collect the alleged deficiency tax is barred
by prescription.

122 Yvonne Nicole Catacutan Garbanzos

SALMON, DEXTER AND CO VS. WIJANGCO

PRINCIPLE:
certificate issued by the Director of Agriculture is admissible in evidence as an official document issued by a public officer authorized by law.
Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, vol. 3, section 1636, speaking of exceptions to the rule as to the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, among
other things, says:
6. Certificates. — Every officer has an implied duty or authority to prepare and deliver out to an applicant a certificate stating anything
which has been done or observed by him or exists in his office by virtue of some authority or duty, and the certificate is admissible.
FACTS:
On Oct. 8, 1920, a contract was entered into between the parties to this action for the purchase and sale of a tractor and threshing machine upon the
conditions specified in said contract. The price of the machineries sold Is P12,400, payable by installments as follows: P400 at the signing of the
contract sale, to wit, October 8, 1920; P4,000 upon the delivery of said machineries by the defendant to the plaintiff; another P4,000 on June 15,
1921, and, finally, another P4,000 on December 15, 1921. The plaintiff claims payment for the tractor with legal interest. The defendant denies
generally and specifically the facts alleged in the complaint and alleged that
(a) That the tractor and threshing machine, which is the subject-matter of the contract set out in the second paragraph of the first cause of
action and which was sold by the plaintiff company to the defendant, does not meet the conditions specified and guaranteed in the
aforesaid contract of sale (b) That in the month of April, 1921, the defendant has notified the plaintiff of the fact that the threshing
machine sold to him pursuant to the contract above referred to could not thresh 300 cavans per day, as was guaranteed in said contract,
and offered to return the aforesaid tractor and threshing machine, but the plaintiff company, without answering said offer, let the time
elapse until the filing of the herein complaint.(c) That all the amounts claimed in the herein complaint are based on the contract set out
in paragraph 2 of the first cause of action, which as above stated, was violated by the plaintiff.
The lower court ruled in favour of the plaintiff and ordered defendant to pay. Defendant appealed the lower court’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the certificate issued by the Director of Agriculture is admissible in evidence as an official document issued by a public officer authorized by
law.
RULING:
YES.
The statistics prepared by the Bureau of Agriculture is chiefly based on the quarterly reports of the municipal presidents made pursuant to section
2202 of the Administrative Code, which provides:
The president of each municipality shall, upon forms to be supplied by the Director of Agriculture, and in such detail as shall be required
by him, make quarterly reports of the condition of agriculture and live stock in his municipality, and of such other matters as relate to the
development of those interests.
The reports so made shall be submitted to the municipal council, and, if approved, a copy thereof shall be forwarded to the office of the
provincial governor, a second copy to the representative from the district, a third copy to the Director of Agriculture, and a fourth copy
shall be filed in the office of the municipal secretary.
Under such circumstances, we hold that the certificate issued by the Director of Agriculture is admissible in evidence as an official document issued
by a public officer authorized by law. Wigmore, in his treatise on evidence, vol. 3, section 1636, speaking of exceptions to the rule as to the
inadmissibility of hearsay evidence, among other things, says:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Certificates. — Every officer has an implied duty or authority to prepare and deliver out to an applicant a certificate stating anything
which has been done or observed by him or exists in his office by virtue of some authority or duty, and the certificate is admissible.

123 Jun Marlon M. Denila

TARPEN VS. PEOPLE

FACTS: A dump truck driven by Jimmy Pugoy arrived at Zandueta St., Baguio City, to collect garbage. He was accompanied by petitioner and
Edmond Ferrer. Upon reaching the Hilltop Market, the truck turned around. During this time, vendors, including the victim were peddling their wares
along said street. Petitioner alighted from the truck and signaled to the driver to move slowly. Despite guiding the truck, said vehicle ran over the
eggplants. Petitioner picked up the vegetables and threw them towards the place where James was. This angered James because the flowers he was
selling were soiled. An exchange of words ensued between petitioner and James. Petitioner went to the back of the dump truck and got a shovel.
While James was facing downwards, petitioner, coming from behind and holding the shovel with two hands, struck James on the head with the same,
causing him to fall to the ground in a squatting position. As soon as James raised his head, petitioner hit the former’s head again with the shovel.
Petitioner then ran away.
Petitioner was charged before the RTC of Baguio City with Frustrated Homicide for attacking and assaulting James Lacbao Pangoden. The day after,
the victim died from the injuries he sustained. As a consequence, an amended information was filed charging petitioner with Homicide.

Petitioner admits killing James to the policeman but invokes self-defense.

The trial court convicted petitioner of Homicide. The trial court found the prosecution’s version of the incident credible. The trial court gave credence
to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming with modification the decision of the trial court convicting petitioner.

The defense tries to destroy the version of witnesses that the victim was hit from behind by arguing that same is not corroborated by medical
findings. Witnesses’ claim that James was hit on the right side of the head was, according to the defense, negated by the findings of Dr. Mensalvas
that James suffered injuries on the "left frontoparietal and left frontotemporo parietal" areas of his head. The findings of Dr. Mensalvas mean that
James was facing Peter when hit by the shovel contrary to the prosecution’s claim that James was hit by Peter from behind.

ISSUE: Which medical findings should this Court believe?

RULING: The SC gives more weight to the medical certificate of Dr. Cala, because the same was issued by a government doctor. By actual practice,
only government physicians, by virtue of their oaths as civil service officials, are competent to examine persons and issue medical certificates which
will be used by the government. As such, the medical certificate carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his functions and duties.

Moreover, under Section 44, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Dr. Cala’s findings that the victim sustained injuries on the right side of his head are, therefore, conclusive
in the absence of evidence proving the contrary, as in this case. We cannot consider the contents of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Mensalvas
sufficient to controvert the findings of Dr. Cala. As held by this Court, an unverified medical certificate not issued by a government physician is
unreliable.

Even assuming arguendo that we give more weight to the medical certificate issued by Dr. Mensalvas, this does not mean that the testimonies of
witnesses shall be disbelieved. It is noted that Dr. Mensalvas testified that the victim sustained a wound on the right side of his head, possibly caused
by a steel shovel. Such a finding is consistent with the claim of witnesses that the victim was hit on the right side of the head. Though there can be
inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnesses with Dr. Mensalvas’s other findings (i.e., injuries on the left portion of the head) this does not
mean that we should totally doubt and discard the other portions of their testimonies.

124 Joan Risel Baliar Abangan

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE vs. MICHAEL ALFIO PENNISI

G.R. No. 169958 March 5, 2010

FACTS: Michael Alfio Pennisi was in Queensland, Australia to Alfio Pennisi, an Australian national, and Anita T. Quintos, allegedly a Filipino
citizen. In March 1999, respondent filed a petition for recognition as Filipino citizen before the Bureau of Immigration (BI). Respondent submitted
the following documents before the BI:

1. Certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Quintos, and a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Antonio, Nueva
Ecija;

2. Certified true copy of the certificate of marriage of respondents parents

3. Certified true copy of Quintos Australian certificate of registration of alien, indicating her nationality as Filipino;

4. Certified true copy of respondents birth certificate stating that he was born on 13 March 1975 and indicating the Philippines as his
mothers birthplace; and

5. Certified true copy of the letter dated 14 July 1999 of the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, stating that
as of 14 July 1999, Quintos has not been granted Australian citizenship.

nd
BI Associate Commissioner Alan Roullo Yap issued an order granting respondents petition for recognition as Filipino citizen. In a 2 Indorsement,
the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ) disapproved the order. However, upon respondents submission of additional documents, BI
Commissioner Rufus B. Rodriguez granted the order.

Thereafter, respondent was drafted and played for the Red Bull, a professional basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA).

Later on, the Senate Committees jointly submitted Committee Report recommending, among other things, that (1) the BI conduct summary
deportation proceedings against several Filipino-foreign PBA players, including respondent; and (2) the DOJ Secretary conduct an immediate review
of all orders of recognition. Respondent was included in the list on the ground that verification on the authenticity of the above documents reveals
highly suspicious circumstances.

His alleged mother and other relatives, are not known and have never existed in Panabingan, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. According to the affidavits
executed by Barangay Captain Ramon Soliman and Barangay Treasurer Condrado P. Peralta of the abovementioned place, there are no Quintoses or
Tomedas that have lived or have resided in the said barangay.

The BI directed the deportation of several Filipino-foreign PBA players, including respondent. Respondent and Harp withdrew their petition before
the trial court without prejudice. Respondent filed a petition for review, with an application for temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, before the Court of Appeals which was granted.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in finding that respondent is a Filipino citizen.
RULING: The petition has no merit. SC affirmed the decision of CA. In this case, the SC sustain the CA that the evidence presented before the BI
and the DOJ have more probative value and must prevail over the statements of Soliman and Peralta before the Senate Committee.

His mother’s certificate of birth in the civil registrar of Nueva, Ecija was issued on the basis of an application for late registration, which is ten (10)
years after the date of birth.

The SC agree with the CA that while the affidavits of Soliman and Peralta might have cast doubt on the validity of Quintos Certificate of Live Birth,
such certificate remains valid unless declared invalid by competent authority. The Rule stands that documents consisting of entries in public records
made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

125 Kimberly Dy

ROÑO SEGURITAN y JARA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by
substantial evidence on record.

Facts:
• Petitioner was charged with homicide when he inflicted head injuries which caused the death of his neighbor Lucrecio Seguritan
• Prosecution’s version of events: petitioner punched the left and right temple of the victim, causing the latter to fall and hit his head on a
hollow block used as a makeshift stove;
• Petitioner’s version: the victim was about to punch him but fell down due to a heart attack, hit his head on the hollow block; he also
presented the Municipal Health Officer who signed the certificate that the cause of death was cardiac arrest
• Lower courts convicted the petitioner of the crime of homicide based on the eyewitness testimony of Melchor, the petitioner’s uncle,
which is consistent with the autopsy findings
• Petitioner contested such findings, hence this appeal.

Issue:

​
WON the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC convicting him of homicide on the basis of the autopsy findings and eyewitness
testimony?

Ruling: YES

• Factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on appeal, especially when such findings are supported by
substantial evidence on record.
o It is on record that Lucrecio suffered two external injuries and one internal injury in his head. The autopsy report showed that
Lucrecio died of internal hemorrhage caused by injuries located at the upper right portion of the head, left side of the center of his
head, and a "fracture, linear, right middle fossa, hemorrhage, subdural, right and left cerebral hemisphere."

o SC held that there is no reason to doubt the findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court

• Petitioner belatedly quoted the book Legal Medicine by Dr. Pedro Solis, however his reliance there of is misplaced and such was not formally
offered as evidence
o it is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally offered. 18 The allegation that the results of the
autopsy are unworthy of credence was based on a book that was neither marked for identification nor formally offered in
evidence during the hearing of the case. Thus, the trial court as well as the appellate court correctly disregarded them

o A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only — and strictly — upon the
evidence offered by the parties at the trial

• it is settled that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded greatest respect by the appellate court absent any abuse of discretion.

COMMERCIAL LISTS

126 Yason Pagskini

PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION, respondents.

Principles:
Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if:

(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation;

(2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation;

(3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and
(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.

Facts:

• M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private respondent, when navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas, collided with
the vessel Petroparcel.

• After investigation, the Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard found the Petroparcel at fault.

• Based on this finding by the Board and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner,[7] private respondent sued the LSC and
the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo, before the then Court of First Instance of Caloocan City.

• In particular, private respondent prayed for an award of P692,680.00, based on price quotation of the barge’s equipment, produced by its
owner Del Rosario.

• Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC as
it had already acquired ownership of thePetroparcel.[9]

• In its decision, the RTC awarded the amount of P6,438,048.00 in actual damages. The RTC based its award on the price quotation presented
by the private respondent.

(The price quotations are herein produced for your guidance)

(a) Exhibit A certified xerox copy of the certificate of ownership of M/V Maria Efigenia XV;

(b) Exhibit B a document titled Marine Protest executed by Delfin Villarosa, Jr. on September 22, 1977 stating that as a result of the collision,
the M/V Maria Efigenia XV sustained a hole at its left side that caused it to sink with its cargo of 1,050 baeras valued at P170,000.00;

(c) Exhibit C a quotation for the construction of a 95-footer trawler issued by Isidoro A. Magalong of I. A. Magalong Engineering and Construction
on January 26, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that construction of such trawler would cost P2,250,000.00;

(d) Exhibit D pro forma invoice No. PSPI-05/87-NAV issued by E.D. Daclan of Power Systems, Incorporated on January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario
showing that two (2) units of CUMMINS Marine Engine model N855-M, 195 bhp. at 1800 rpm. would cost P1,160,000.00;

(e) Exhibit E quotation of prices issued by Scan Marine Inc. on January 20, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that a unit of Furuno Compact Daylight
Radar, Model FR-604D, would costP100,000.00 while a unit of Furuno Color Video Sounder, Model FCV-501 would costP45,000.00 so that the two
units would cost P145,000.00;

(f) Exhibit F quotation of prices issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. on January 21, 1987 to Del Rosario showing that two (2) rolls of nylon rope (5 cir. X
300fl.) would cost P140,000.00; two (2) rolls of nylon rope (3 cir. X 240fl.), P42,750.00; one (1) binocular (7 x 50), P1,400.00, one (1) compass
(6), P4,000.00 and 50 pcs. of floats, P9,000.00 or a total of P197, 150.00;

(g) Exhibit G retainer agreement between Del Rosario and F. Sumulong Associates Law Offices stipulating an acceptance fee of P5,000.00, per
appearance fee of P400.00, monthly retainer of P500.00, contingent fee of 20% of the total amount recovered and that attorneys fee to be awarded by
the court should be given to Del Rosario; and

(h) Exhibit H price quotation issued by Seafgear Sales, Inc. dated April 10, 1987 to Del Rosario showing the cost of poly nettings as: 50 rolls of
400/18 3kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P70,000.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 5kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P81,500.00; 50 rolls of 400/18 8kts. 100md x
100mtrs., P116,000.00, and 50 rolls of 400/18 10kts. 100md x 100mtrs., P146,500 and banera(tub) at P65.00 per piece or a total of P414,065.00

• The plaintiff assails the award given by the court on the basis that it was only based on price quotation and the witness Del Rosario who is
also the owner of the sunken ship is not competent to testify in support thereof because he did not issue the said price quotation.

Issue:

WoN the price quotation presented as to the amount of damages admissible in evidence.

Ruling:

No.

The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence considering that the persons who issued them were not presented
as witnesses.[35]

Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to
the hearsay evidence rule.[36] On this point, we believe that the exhibits do not fall under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of
Rule 130.[37]

It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to commercial lists and the like under Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.

Under Section 45 of the aforesaid Rule, a document is a commercial list if:

(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation;

(2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation;

(3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and

(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.

Based on the above requisites, it is our considered view that Exhibits B, C, D, E, F and H[39] are not commercial lists for these do not belong to the
category of other published compilations under Section 45 aforequoted. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, (w)here general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but
are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.[40]

The exhibits mentioned are mere price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment similar to the
ones lost at the collision of the two vessels. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject matter.
Neither are these market reports or quotations within the purview of commercial lists as these are not standard handbooks or periodicals, containing
data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation.
 LEARNED TREATISE

127 Anna Danessa Valdez

SEGURITAN VS. PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 172896, APRIL 19, 2010
Facts:
In the afternoon of November 25, 1995, petitioner was having a drinking session with his uncles Lucrecio Seguritan, Melchor Panis and Baltazar
Panis, in the house of Manuel dela Cruz. Petitioner, who was seated beside Lucrecio, claimed that Lucrecio's carabao entered his farm and destroyed
his crops. A heated discussion thereafter ensued, during which petitioner punched Lucrecio twice as the latter was about to stand up. Petitioner's
punches landed on Lucrecio's right and left temple, causing him to fall face-up to the ground and hit a hollow block which was being used as an
improvised stove.
Lucrecio lost consciousness but was revived with the assistance of Baltazar. Thereafter, he rode a tricycle and proceeded to his house. Upon his
arrival, his wife noticed blood on his forehead. He explained that he was stoned, then went directly to his room and slept.
At around 9 oclock in the evening, Lucrecio's wife and daughter noticed that his complexion has darkened and foamy substance was coming out of
his mouth. Attempts were made to revive him but to no avail. He died that same night.
After the burial, the wife learned of petitioner's involvement in her husband's death. She sought the assistance of the NBI. NBI Medico-Legal Officer
Dr. Antonio Vertido exhumed Lucrecio's body and performed the autopsy. He found hematomas in the scalp located in the right parietal and left
occipital areas, a linear fracture in the right middle fossa, and a subdural hemorrhage in the right and left cerebral hemisphere. He concluded that the
cause of death was traumatic head injury.
Melchor executed a sworn statement before the Gonzaga Police Station recounting the events on that fateful day, including the punching of Lucrecio
by petitioner.
Petitioner denied hitting Lucrecio and alleged that the latter died of cardiac arrest. He claimed that he suddenly stood up during their heated argument
with the intent to punch Lucrecio. However, since the latter was seated at the opposite end of the bench, Lucrecio lost his balance and fell before he
could be hit. Lucrecio's head hit the improvised stove as a result of which he lost consciousness.
Petitioner presented Joel Cabebe, the Assistant Registration Officer of Gonzaga, Cagayan, and Dr. Corazon Flor, the Municipal Health Officer of Sta.
Teresita, Cagayan, to prove that Lucrecio died of a heart attack. These witnesses identified the Certificate of Death of Lucrecio and the entry therein
which reads: Antecedent cause: T/C cardiovascular disease.
The trial court rendered a Decision convicting petitioner of homicide. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the Judgment of the RTC.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in disregarding the autopsy report.

Ruling:
NO.
The petitioner belatedly contends that the delay in the autopsy of Lucrecio's body and its embalming compromised the results thereof. To substantiate
his claim, he quotes the book entitled Legal Medicine authored by Dr. Pedro Solis, viz:
a dead body must not be embalmed before the autopsy. The embalming fluid may render the tissue and blood unfit for toxilogical analyses.The
embalming may alter the gross appearance of the tissues or may result to a wide variety of artifacts that tend to destroy or obscure evidence.
the body must be autopsied in the same condition when found at the crime scene. A delay in the performance may fail or modify the possible findings
thereby not serving the interest of justice.

Petitioner's reliance on this citation is misplaced. Petitioner failed to adduce evidence that the one month delay in the autopsy indeed modified the
possible findings. He also failed to substantiate his claim that the embalming fluid rendered the tissue and blood of Lucrecio unfit for toxilogical
analysis.
Further, it is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally offered. The allegation that the results of the autopsy are
unworthy of credence was based on a book that was neither marked for identification nor formally offered in evidence during the hearing of the case.
Thus, the trial court as well as the appellate court correctly disregarded them. The prosecution was not even given the opportunity to object as the
book or a portion thereof was never offered in evidence.
A formal offer is necessary since judges are required to base their findings of fact and judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties at the trial. To rule otherwise would deprive the opposing party of his chance to examine the document and object to its admissibility. The
appellate court will have difficulty reviewing documents not previously scrutinized by the court below. Any evidence which a party desires to submit
to the courts must be offered formally because a judge must base his findings strictly on the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.

OPINION RULE

128 Michelle Silva

CHINABANK VS CA, HEIRS OF AVELINA, AND PIERO | G.R. NO. 155299

Principle: The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert witnesses applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science,
and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts.

Facts:

​
A certain Kipte obtained a loan from China Bank which was alleged to have been secured by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage
signed by Avelina over the latter’s properties. Also, a surety agreement was made where Kipte was the principal and Avelina was alleged to be the
surety. As Kipte failed to pay, Petitioner Bank foreclosed the mortgaged properties.

​
Respondents Avelina and Piero filed a case before the RTC, with Avelina denying having signed the documents. She alleged that years ago,
she was made to sign documents by her daughter-in-law which she did not know the contents of as she is blind. Further, she was told that she had to
sign only as a witness.

​
Petitioner BANK, however, contends that at the time of the execution of the documents, though physically weak, she was mentally sound
and she understood the nature of the transactions; and Avelina personally appeared before the notary public; and that the respondents could have
easily submitted a medical certificate attesting to the supposed blindness of Avelina or made an ophthalmologist take the witness stand, but they did
neither.
RTC rendered its decision in favor of China Bank.
CA ruled in favor of Avelina.

Issue: Whether or not Avelina signed the real estate mortgage and surety agreement knowingly and voluntarily, with full knowledge of its contents.

Ruling:

​No.

​The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert witnesses applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science,
and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Thus, to prove
whether one is blind, it is not necessary to submit a medical certificate attesting to the blindness or to require an expert witness, such as an
ophthalmologist, to testify to such fact, since the fact of blindness can be determined through common knowledge and by anyone with sufficient
familiarity of such fact.

​
In this case, Avelina, categorically testified and attested to her own blindness. Her blindness was further confirmed by testimonies of her
children. Even the notary before whom she supposedly appeared testified to the fact that she was indeed blind and that she was not made to
understand the documents. Thus, Avelina did not know that the Surety Agreement and Real Estate Mortgage she signed were to secure the loan Kipte
contracted from the petitioner; that she was made to understand that she was to sign only as witness; and that Kipte was a total stranger to her, and, by
this reason, it is implausible that she agreed to be his surety. In fact, it was only after Avelina received the notices of foreclosure that she learned that
there was a mortgage document among the papers she signed.

129 Luvernie Narca Cañete

JOEY P. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN 5th DIVISION and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents
G.R. Nos. 187912-14 January 31, 2011

Facts:
In the audit conducted by the Special Audit Team(SAT) of the Commission on Audit (COA), several anomalies were discovered involving Marquez,
then City Mayor and Chairman of the Bids and Awards committee(BAC) of Parañaque City; and Ofelia C. Caunan (Caunan), Head of the General
Services Office of said city.

It was found that, through personal canvass and without public bidding, Marquez and Caunan secured the procurement of several thousand rounds of
bullets of different calibers that were grossly overpriced.
the COA SAT issued Notices of Disallowances for the overpriced ammunitions. Marquez and Caunan sought reconsideration but denied. Elevated the
matter to COA but denied.

th
Charges were filed against them in violation of RA 3019 and were raffled to the 4 Division of the Sandiganbayan.

Before arraignment, on November 24, 2003, alleging discovery of the forged signatures, Marquez sought referral of the disbursement vouchers,
purchase requests and authorization requests to the NBI and the reinvestigation of the cases against him but denied.

Before the SB-4th Division, to prove its case, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely:
1] COA State Auditor IV Fatima Valera Bermudez;

2] Elenita Pracale, Chief, Business Permit and Licensing Office, Parañaque City;

3] Benjamin Cruz;

4] P/Insp. Rolando C. Columna, Legal Officer, PNP Firearms and Explosive Division; and

5] Emerito L. Lejano, President, Guns Empire.

Documentary evidence consisting of disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests were also adduced.

After the prosecution rested, Caunan testified and partly presented evidence for her defense. Marquez, on the other hand, in his Omnibus Motion
dated April 1, 2008, moved, among others, for the inhibition of Associate Justice Gregory Ong (Justice Ong) and Associate Justice Jose Hernandez
(Justice Hernandez) and for the referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization to the NBI. Associate Justice Hernandez
and Associate Justice Ong inhibited themselves but the request of Marquez that the questioned documents be referred to the NBI was not acted upon.

On May 20, 2008, Justice Ong and Justice Hernandez recused themselves from further participating in the cases. The cases were then raffled to the
SB-5th Division.
Marquez insisted that he never admitted that his signatures on the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and authorization requests were his and
that his motion was not intended to delay the proceedings.

The anti-graft court denied the motion of Marquez. Citing Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, it was of the view that while resort to the
expert opinion of handwriting experts would be helpful in the examination of alleged forged documents, the same was neither mandatory nor
indispensable, since the court can determine forgery from its own independent examination.
Thus, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
WON the anti graft court erred in denying the petitioner’s motion to refer prosecution’s evidence for examination by the questioned documents
section of the NBI which denial is in violation of his right to present evidence and his twin constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of
law.

Held:
YES.
It is well settled that due process in criminal proceedings requires that (a) the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power
to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given
an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

While the Constitution does not specify the nature of this opportunity, by necessary implication, it means that the accused should be allowed
reasonable freedom to present his defense if the courts are to give form and substance to this guaranty. Should the trial court fail to accord an accused
reasonable opportunity to submit evidence in his defense, the exercise by the Court of its certiorari jurisdiction is warranted as this amounts to a
denial of due process.

In this case, the defense interposed by the accused Marquez was that his signatures in the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
authorizations were forged. It is hornbook rule that as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing
evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.

Thus, Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact that his signatures were indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his
burden, he must be afforded reasonable opportunity to present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of the
signatures he is questioning by no less than the country’s premier investigative force – the NBI. If he is denied such opportunity, his only evidence on
this matter is negative testimonial evidence which is generally considered as weak. And, he cannot submit any other examination result because the
signatures are on the original documents which are in the control of either the prosecution or the graft court.
At any rate, any finding of the NBI will not be binding on the graft court. It will still be subject to its scrutiny and evaluation in line with Section 22
of Rule 132. Nevertheless, Marquez should not be deprived of his right to present his own defense. How the prosecution, or even the court, perceives
his defense to be is irrelevant. To them, his defense may seem feeble and his strategy frivolous, but he should be allowed to adduce evidence of his
own choice. The court should not control how he will defend himself as long as the steps to be taken will not be in violation of the rules.
The fact that the documentary exhibits were already formally offered and duly admitted by the anti-graft court cannot preclude an examination of the
signatures thereon by the defense. With proper handling by court personnel, this can easily be accomplished by the NBI expert examiners.

SHORT DIGEST
Mayor Marquez and Officer Caunan were found to have procured without public bidding the purchase of ammunition and overpricing thereof by
th
COA Special Audit team and charges were filed against them in violation of RA 3019 and were raffled to the 4 Division of Sandiganbayan.

Before arraignment, alleging discovery of the forged signatures, Marquez sought referral of the disbursement vouchers, purchase requests and
authorization requests to the NBI and the reinvestigation of the cases against him but denied.

th
Judge Ong and Hernandez inhibitied and the case was raffled to SB-5 division. On motion, Marquez insisted that the signatures were forged but
denied citing Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, it was of the view that while resort to the expert opinion of handwriting experts would be
helpful in the examination of alleged forged documents, the same was neither mandatory nor indispensable, since the court can determine forgery
from its own independent examination.
Thus, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
WON the anti graft court erred in denying the petitioner’s motion to refer prosecution’s evidence for examination by the questioned documents
section of the NBI

Held:

Yes.
It is hornbook rule that as a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof
lies on the party alleging forgery.

Thus, Marquez bears the burden of submitting evidence to prove the fact that his signatures were indeed forged. In order to be able to discharge his
burden, he must be afforded reasonable opportunity to present evidence to support his allegation. This opportunity is the actual examination of the
signatures he is questioning by no less than the country’s premier investigative force – the NBI. If he is denied such opportunity, his only evidence on
this matter is negative testimonial evidence which is generally considered as weak. And, he cannot submit any other examination result because the
signatures are on the original documents which are in the control of either the prosecution or the graft court.

130 Owen Lerin

Ma. Socorro Camacho-Reyes vs. Ramon Reyes

Facts:

​Petitioner, who finished a degree in AB Sociology from UP Diliman, met respondent, who was a book keeper for their family business, the
Aristocrat Restaurant. They married each other on December 5, 1976, the year following petitioner’s graduation and father’s death. They lived with
the respondent’s family, where all living expenses were shouldered by respondent’s parents. Thus, the salaries of the couple were spent solely for
their personal needs. A monthly allowance of 1,500 pesos was given to petitioner by respondent. Financial difficulties started when their first child
was born. The monthly allowance was not given to petitioner and when the latter asked, the former told her that he resigned due to slow advancement
within the family business. Respondent planned to venture into seafood trading but he would be away from his family without communication.
Petitioner suggested they move away for their in-laws but it gave them further financial difficulty. Petitioner struggled as the single-income earner of
the family while respondent’s business flunked. His second business with a fishpond in Mindoro also flunked. The couple’s relationship was strained
because of respondent’s indifference towards his family. As of 1985, they have three children.
 After respondent’s fishpond business stopped in 1989, petitioner discovered sometime in 1996 that respondent had an affair. Finally,
petitioner’s operation for the removal of a cyst and respondent’s continued indifference towards his spouse, and after attempts by respondent’s family
to help, petitioner filed a case against respondent due to psychological incapacity.

​
The testimonies of Dr. Dayan and Dr. Magno were presented as evidence. The RTC granted the petitioner and declared the marriage null
and void due to psychological incapacity. On appeal, the decision was reversed.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the opinions of the witnesses presented.

Ruling: Yes.

The court noticed points of convergence and consistency in the testimonies of the witnesses.

The three reports and the respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas show that (1) respondent does have problems; and (2) these
problems include chronic irresponsibility, inability to recognized and work towards providing the needs of his family, several failed business
attempts, substance abuse, and a trail of unpaid money obligations.

The diagnoses of psychologists are not automatically believed by courts.

A clinical psychologists of psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not
beset by one of the parties or both parties psychological incapacity. On more than once occasion, we have rejected an expert’s opinion concerning the
supposed psychological incapacity of a party.

-Santos vs. CA = The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of interview, and unsupported by separate
psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to
the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is founded.

But the factual antecedents alleged and established point that respondent is psychologically incapacitated even without expert conclusions.

In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations
as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money
obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

(Note: What the court says is that expert opinions are not automatically admitted. However, as in the case at bar, aside from the expert opinions of the
doctors, their testimonies were supported by facts. Each doctor performed a thorough study of the history of the respondent. All three findings point
to respondent being psychologically incapacitated. Hence, expert testimony supported by facts are admissible as evidence.)

131 Juan Jigo Remotigue-Monteclar Gaston-Dacua

ROXAS VS ARROYO

PRINCIPLE:

Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because
the former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply leave to
remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.

The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives
that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing
or threats thereof had transpiredthe writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be
criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law.

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational
privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a persons right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an
actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.

FACTS:

Background of events (Petitioner’s version):

Roxas enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with a group called BAYAN-USA. She then joined a group called BAYAN-TARLAC in a
health survey in La Paz, Tarlac. She had with her a passport, wallet and Php 15k in cash, journal, digicam with memory card, laptop, external hard
disk, IPOD, wrist watch, sphygnometer, stethoscope, and medicines (hereafter known as “STUFF”).

May 19, 2009—After doing survey work, petitioner and companions decided to rest in the house of Jesus Paolo (hereafter, Mr. Paolo). At 1:30pm,
they were startled by people banging on the door, demanding for them to open up. 15 armed men, with bonnets to conceal their faces (except
the leader), tied them up and blindfolded them. They were dragged into a van. From here on out remember, she’s blindfolded.
When they got to the destination, she was informed that she had been detained for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-
New People’s Army (CCP-NPA). She was separated from her companions and kept in a room with metal bars. From the sound of gunfire,
planes taking off and construction bustle, she inferred she was in Fort Magsaysay.

She was subjected to 5 days straight of interrogation and torture to convince her to abandon her communist beliefs and return to the fold. She had
blindfolds on even while she was sleeping and only got to take them off to take a bath and to occasionally sneak a peek at her
surroundings. She was able to learn the names of her 3 interrogators during her stay—Dex, James and RC.

May 25, 2009—Petitioner was released to her uncle’s house in QC. Her abductors gave her a cellphone with a SIM card and an email address with a
password, biscuits, books, the handcuffs used on her, a blouse, and a pair of shoes. She was told not to report what she went through to a group
called Karapatan or something untoward will happen to her and her family.

She would receive calls on the phone occasionally. For fear for her and her family’s safety, she threw away the phone.

Start of the case

Seeking sanctuary from all the threats, she filed with the SC a Petitioner for the Writs of Amapro and Habeas Data against her interrogators and also
impleading public officials, police officers, and military men of the highest rank (check out the list of respondents) because she believed that it was
the government that was responsible for her abduction.

She prayed:

1. that respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching her family

2. an order be issued to inspect the detention areas in Fort Magsaysay

3. that respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any reports about her

case, including intelligence reports and operations reports of the Special Operations

Group of the AFP

4. that respondents expunge from the records any documents pertinent to her name or

any name which sounds the same

5. that respondents be ordered to return her STUFF

SC issued the desired writs and referred the case to the CA for hearing and reception of

evidence; SC also directed the respondents to file their answer.

OSG on behalf of respondents:

1. petitioner’s alleged abduction was just “stage-managed” and a scheme to put the government in bad light

a. according to Mr. Paolo’s report: prior to her abduction, she instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house. From this, they
conclude that no one else could have known where petitioner and companions were except the people already in the house. If there was
actually an abduction, she herself consented to it

b. the Medical Certificate showed abrasions in her wrists and knee caps. If she was indeed choked and boxed by her abductors, it would
have showed

2. even assuming that the abduction and torture were genuine

a. PGMA is immune from suit as a sitting president

b. There are no specific allegations against the officials impleaded that they actually participated therein

3. Public respondents were not remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the petitioner

a. Police action—when the police heard of the abduction at 4:30pm, they launched an initial investigation. They sent a Flash
Message to all the police stations around in an effort to locate the van. The Special Investigation Task Group (Task Group CAROJAN) was
formed to conduct an in depth investigation. They contacted Karapatan and Alliance for Advancement of People’s Rights to get help,
but these never heeded. They still have not found out the abductors identities, which they attribute to the lack of help from petitioner,
her companions, and the afformentioned groups.

b. Military action—GIBO (Secretary of Defense) first heard of the abduction when this case was filed. But upon receipt of the resolution
from the Court, he issued a Memorandum Directive to the AFP Chief of Staff to conduct an investigation. AFP Chief of Staff sent a message to the
Commanding General of the Army Lt. Gen.

Bangit to cause the investigation. Bangit then instructed Maj. Gen. Villanueva to set this in motion, who then tasked Office of the
Provost Marshall (OPV) to conduct the investigation. They described petitioner’s allegations as “opinionated” and cleared the military for
any kind of involvement.

CA’s decision:

• Gave great weight to petitioner’s version of the story

• Disregarded the “stage managed” argument of respondents because it was based on unfounded speculation that only Roxas and companions knew
where they were

• Medical Certificate can only affirm that there was indeed an abduction; it cannot be reflective of the actual injuries suffered

• There is an ongoing threat to the security of petitioner and family and so extended the privilege of the writ of amparo and ordered respondents to
use extraordinary diligence to continue the investigations

• There is a transgression of the the petitioner’s right to information privacy because according to photos and videos (supplied by party-list
reps Jovito Palparan and Pastor Alcover), there were “records of investigation” concenrning petitioner’s involvement in the CPP-NPA—CA
granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, mandating respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any records relative to her
alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or her abduction and torture.

• CA not convinced that the military or any of the public officials were involved in the abduction and torture and also absolved PGMA because of
immunity from suit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Roxas sufficiently identified her perpetrators with whom she has adequate knowledge.

Whether or not Roxas will be granted her petitioner for Habeas Data and Writ of Amparo.
No!

RATIO:

• Petitioner invokes doctrine of command responsibility in impleading the public respondents

o Incorrect. Rubrico v. Arroyo: Command responsibility refers to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by their
subordinate members or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict

o Since its application presupposes imputation of individual liability, it is invoked in criminal cases, not amparo proceedings—see
definition of writ of amapro in Sec. of National Defense v. Manalo

• However, they may be impleaded on the basis of responsibility or accountability

o Razon v. Tagitis: Responsibility—extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way in an enforced disappearance; the Court may craft the directive to file an appropriate civil or criminal proceeding against
them. Accountability—measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility or imputed with knowledge relating to the
disappearance or those who carry the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of enforced disappearances

• Totality of evidence does not prove that respondents were her abductors or that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay

o Direct evidence of identity (cartographic sketched of abductors, which Roxas was able to describe) is accorded more weight than
mere circumstantial evidence in amapro proceedings (i.e. past abductions in Fort Magsaysay having similar circumstances as
hers)

o Given that the identities of the men in the cartographic sketches were not identified as belonging to the military or
public officials, they cannot be held liable

o Roxas is just a sojourner in the Philippines and not even a citizen, so the Court can’t rely on her inference that she was taken to
Fort Magsaysay merely because the distance from Mr. Paolo’s house to where they were taken felt like the distance
between the house and Fort Magsaysay

• With regard prayer for the return of her belongings

o The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full
and exhaustive proceeding. Matters of liability are not discusses in amparo cases.

• Prayer for inspection of Fort Magsaysay

o Since it was not proven that Fort Magsaysay was indeed the palce where abductees were taken, an order to inspect it
would be tantamount to a “fishing expedition” for evidence

o It is a rule in amapro that a place inspected must at least be identified with clarity and precision and that allegations be sufficient in
themselves to make a prima facie case

• HABEAS DATA

o Conceptualized as a judicial remedy for enforcing a right to privacy, most especially the right to informational
privacy of individuals. It operates to protect a person’s right to control information regarding himself, particularly, in the instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends

o The indispesable element is a showing, at least substantially, that a violation or threatened violation of the right to privacy
in lifem liberty or security has happened, which the petitioner has failed to do

o There is no evidence that any of the public respondents have violated or threatened a right to privacy of the
petitioner. There wasn’t even evidence that they had access to the photos and videos

o The grant of habeas data by the CA has no legal basis

• Extraordinary diligence was not exercised by the respodnents

o The reports of Task Group CAROJAN contained background checks of the abductees but none about the abductors. They
also blame the failure of their investigation on the petitioner’s lack of participation. They could have used many other means, i.e. a cartographic
sketch of the unmasked abductor could have been obtained from the testimony of Mr. Paolo

RULING:

• Deny prayer for return of belongings

• Deny prayer for inspection of detention areas in Fort Magsaysay

• Reverse grant of privilege of habeas data, without prejudice to changes that might occur

after the investigation is completed

• Modifying directive for further investiation:

o Appointing Commision on Human Rights (CHR) to be the lead agency in the

investigation

o Directing incumbent Chief of PNP or whoever succeeds him and the chief of staff

of the AFP to assist the CHR

o Directing PNP chief to furnish CA with copies of the investigation reports

o Directing CHR to furnish CA with copy of report and recommendations within 90

days from receipt of this decision

• Referring the case back to the CA for monitoring, determination if the abduction was

indeed performed by public respondents, and to submit the report to the SC within 10

days from the receipt of the report from the CHR

• All other findings not contrary to the ones here, affirmed

SHORT DIGEST:

Roxas had an immersion here in the Philippines, enrolled herself in an exposure program. One day, after doing survey work, she was abducted by
armed men. There the abductors told her that she was adbucted by reason of her being member of the CCP-NPA. She was interrogated by them and
was tortured. The armed men introduced themselves as part of the Special Operations Group and with that, Roxas also knew the names of some of
them. After 5 days of being held captive, she was realeased by the armed men.

Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppresion of any existing government files or records linking her to the CCP-NPA,
petitioner filed a Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data while she impleaded public officials to answer for her abduction and torture.

132 Nilgie C. Villaganas

PETER TARAPEN y CHONGOY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with homicide. For the death of James Lacbao Pangoden.

The trial court found the prosecution’s version of the incident credible. The first part of the incident, which was the heated argument between
petitioner and the victim involving the victim’s soiled goods, the second part of the incident when petitioner went to the back portion of the garbage
truck and got a shovel with which he hit the victim from the back, twice on the head, resulting in his death.

Petitioner admits killing James but invokes self-defense. He claims that the victim was the unlawful aggressor and that he (petitioner) did not
provoke the victim.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defense had sufficiently proved the existence of facts proving that indeed the accused was defending himself from James
Pangoden.

RULING:

No.

Having admitted that he killed James, the burden of evidence that one acted in self-defense shifted to petitioner. Like an alibi, self-defense is
inherently weak, for it is easy to fabricate. It is textbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to
show that the killing was justified, and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the
killing. Hence, he must prove the essential requisites of self-defense as aforementioned.

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to clearly and convincingly prove self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.

133 Ramon Mikhail Duyongco

BORJE V SANDIGANBAYAN

PRINCIPLE: We also reject respondent court's reliance on the presumption that as possessor of the document, the accused is presumed to be the
author of the falsification. In the first place, the factual basis which is the Lorenzo testimony which We have reviewed as doubtful and variable,
cannot be credited. Petitioner has denied vigorously the testimony of Lorenzo that he received the payroll and the checks from her. He said that his
participation in the preparation of the payroll ended with his signing thereof after which the payroll goes to the Disbursing Officer for the preparation
and issuance of the checks to the payees at which time the payee affix their signatures on the payroll, which is substantially corroborated by the
original testimony of the witness Lorenzo during the reinvestigation of the case before the Tanodbayan.
In the second place, Exhibit "A" appears to be also signed by ten (10) other production technicians fisted in the payroll, besides complainant Ducusin.
It is initialled by three (3) personnel in the Accounting Services Unit and further signed by the Regional Accountant and for the Regional Director.
All of these persons were at one time or another in possession of the document, all of them had the same opportunity impliedly imputed to the
accused, The payroll must have been carried and passed by messengers and other employees from one office to another, from one desk to another for
purposes of typing, funding, initialling, verification, certification, accounting, recording, drawing of the check and finally, issuing of the check. In
Our view, the respondent court's reliance on the presumption which is only presumptive, is misplaced and unwarranted, there being no sufficient
reason to apply the same.

FACTS

NICASIO BORJE being the Provincial Plant Industry Officer of the Bureau of Plant and Industry in San Fernando, LaUnion was charged with
falsification of a public document. He was accused of falsifying the timebook and payroll of his office for the periods covering January to March
1977, the daily time record of Ducusin and a certification for the amount of P225. According to testimonial evidence, Ducusin was employed as Plant
Pest Officer with BPI San Fernando from February 2, 1975 up to his resignation on April 30,1978. From February 2, 1975 up to December 1976, he
was detailed as production technician in the Gulayan Program of the BPI and the Bureau of Agricultural Extension receiving incentive pay from the
National Food and Agricultural Council during said period. In 1977, however, Ducusin was no longer entitled to the NFAC incentive pay as he was
detailed to the Surveillance and Early Warning Services (SEWS) Team of the Bureau of Plant Industry from January 1977 up to April 30, 1978.
Ducusin was informed by Castro that he was entitled to receive NFAC incentive pay because his name was included in the special order enumerating
those included in the program. Before one can receive the incentive pay, a person must prepare his daily time record and a certification that he was
indeed detailed in the said program. Ducusin went to the BPI’s accounting division where he discovered that the payroll for the periods of January,
February and March1977 all bore his name and signature even if he had never done so. Ducusin referred the matter to accused Borje who confessed
that he (Borje) had taken Ducusin’s incentive pay and repeatedly offered him P225 to cover the incentive pay which Ducusin did not accept. Ducusin
reported the matter to the BPI Regional Director’s attention and later to the BPI president and director. Ducusin later resigned, saying he had lost
faith in the way the matter was being handled. Borje contends that Ducusin was paid his incentive pay and he confirms substantially the official
procedure in the preparation of the payroll and subsequent payment of the incentive pay to the production technicians as described by witness
Lorenzo, disbursing officer and cashier of BPI. He vigorously denies having received the payroll and the corresponding checks from witness Lorenzo
as his participation in the preparation of the said payroll ended with his signing thereof after which the payroll goes to the disbursing officer for the
preparation and issuance of the checks to the payees. Borje claims that he had nothing to do with the falsification charges filed against Ducusin but
alleges that Ducusin’s falsification charges filed against him was the latter’s way of getting back at him. He also alleged that Ducusin performed dual
work – first with the Gulayan program and second with the SEWS team as Plant Pest Control Officer and that his resignation was a way for him to
avoid facing the charges in connection with this dual work performed. Borje pleaded not guilty but the Sandigabayan declared him otherwise.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sandigabyan erred in declaring Borje guilty of falsification of public documents

RULING:

YES, the prosecution was unable to satisfactorily overcome the presumption of innocence accorded to accused Borje.
Ratio
The constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused has not been satisfactorily overcome by the prosecution evidence in this case
where the conviction of Borje for falsification of public documents was based principally on the mere assumption that as possessor of the falsified
documents, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification.

There is no direct proof showing that Borje, who had many subordinate employees and personnel under him engaged in agricultural field work and
assigned in the rural areas, had personally and actually falsified the public documents in question. In the face of the documents presented
(timebook,payroll and daily time record), the liability of Borje as head of the office who had signed the certification and verification must be limited
to the contents of said verification and certification for which he does not necessarily incur criminal responsibility if the entries, data or statements
certified and verified turn out not to be true. In such a scenario, the employee or personnel making the entries, data or statements as to his services
and attendance is solely and separately responsible.

The Sandiganbayan convicted Borje on the basis of the testimony of the cashier Lorenzo who testified that she delivered the payroll and checks to
Borje, relying further on the presumption that as possessor of the document, the accused is presumed to have falsified it. But in reviewing the
testimony of Lorenzo, the Court found that she said that she delivered the payroll and the checks to Ducusin, even identifying the genuine signature
of Ducusin on the payroll. Lorenzo’s claim that she was forced to testify for Borje on pain of being implicated in the case does not hold water.
Lorenzo’s position as cashier is not subordinate to Borje’s position so she cannot be easily said to be intimidated by him.

The Court rejects the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the presumption that as possessor of the document, the accused is presumed to be the author of the
falsification on the following grounds:The Lorenzo testimony is deemed to be questionable. Borje has denied vigorously the testimony of Lorenzo
that he received the payroll and the checks from her. He said that his participation in the preparation of the payroll ended with his act of affixing his
signature.Exhibit A (payroll and timebook) appears to be also signed by 10 other production technicians listed in the payroll, besides Ducusin. It is
initialled by 3 personnel in the Accounting Services Unit and further signed by the Regional Accountant and for the Regional Director. All of these
persons were at one time or another in possession of the document, all of them had the same opportunity to commit the falsification along with the
messengers who presumably delivered the documents. Other employees may have handled the document also or purposes of typing, funding, initial
ling, verification, certification, accounting, recording, drawing of the check and finally, issuing of the check. Only photocopies of the alleged
documents were presented in court and the Sandiganbayan stated that the issue of bringing out the original would have been relevant if he issue
confronting the Court been one of alteration or superimposition of signatures or words or figures.With regard to the defense’s portrayal of the accused
as an exemplary public servant, the court held that an accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and
exemplary conduct if the court believes he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Sandiganbayan convicting the accused is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

134 Mel Jason Augusto

CAPILI VS CARDANA

GR No. 157906

Topic: Presumptions

Principle: As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes thatprima facie negligence
may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.

FACTS: On February 1, 1993, Jasmin Cardaña was walking along the perimeter fence of the San Roque Elementary School when a branch of
a caimito tree located within the school premises fell on her, causing her instantaneous death. Thus, her parents - Dominador and Rosalita Cardaña -
filed a case for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte against petitioner.
The Cardañas alleged in their complaint that even as early as December 15, 1992, a resident of the barangay, Eufronio Lerios, reported on the
possible danger the tree posed to passersby. Lerios even pointed to the petitioner the tree that stood near the principal’s office. The Cardañas averred
that petitioner’s gross negligence and lack of foresight caused the death of their daughter.
Petitioner denied the accusation and said that at that time Lerios had only offered to buy the tree. She also denied knowing that the tree was dead and
rotting. To prove her point, she presented witnesses who attested that she had brought up the offer of Lerios to the other teachers during a meeting on
December 15, 1992 and assigned Remedios Palaña to negotiate the sale.
3
In a Decision dated February 5, 1996, the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents to establish negligence on the part of the
petitioner.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court found the appellee (herein petitioner) liable for Jasmin’s death
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is negligent and liable for the death of Jasmin Cardaña.

RULING: Yes.

The probability that the branches of a dead and rotting tree could fall and harm someone is clearly a danger that is foreseeable. As the school
principal, petitioner was tasked to see to the maintenance of the school grounds and safety of the children within the school and its premises. That she
was unaware of the rotten state of a tree whose falling branch had caused the death of a child speaks ill of her discharge of the responsibility of her
position.

The fact, however, that respondents’ daughter, Jasmin, died as a result of the dead and rotting tree within the school’s premises shows that the tree
was indeed an obvious danger to anyone passing by and calls for application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

The effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere falling of the branch of the dead and
rotting tree which caused the death of respondents’ daughter was a result of petitioner’s negligence, being in charge of the school.
In the case of D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:
…As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes thatprima facie negligence may
be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
The procedural effect of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that petitioner’s negligence is presumed once respondents established the
requisites for the doctrine to apply. Once respondents made out a prima facie case of all requisites, the burden shifts to petitioner to explain.
The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.
135 Faith Chareen D. Rollan

SANTOS VS. NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE

Facts:
nd rd
Petitioner and respondent entered into a contract of lease three times for a period of about five years. The 2 and 3 lease contract were entered for
rd
renewal of the lease contract and covering a bigger area while the 3 contract was entered to cover an additional space. Respondent failed to pay
rentals and refuse to vacate thus prompting petitioner to file an ejectment case against the former. On respondent’s answer it alleges that petitioner
st
never informed them that when they entered into the 1 contract lease the property was collateral for a real estate mortgage. That when they entered
nd rd
the 2 and 3 contract petitioner never informed respondent that the property was already foreclosed and China Banking Corp. is now the owner.
Petitioner misrepresented himself as still the absolute owner of the subject property when he entered into said contracts.

The MTC ruled in favor of petitioner stating that a tenant cannot, in an action involving the possession of leased premises, controvert the title of his
landlord.

The RTC affirmed in toto leaning its decision of the settled rule that the fact of lease and the expiration of its terms are the only elements in an action
for ejectment, which it found to have been established in this case. According to said court, a plaintiff need not prove his ownership and defendant
cannot deny it.

The CA overturned the RTC’s decision stating that the rule on estoppels against tenants does not apply if the landlords title has expired, or has been
conveyed to another; or has been defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the commencement of lessor-lessee relationship. The respondent was
able to prove that title to the subject property has already been effectively consolidated in the name of China Bank. That there was no landlord-tenant
relationship created between the parties because the agreements between them are void.

Issue: WON the rule on estoppels against tenants is applicable in this case.

Ruling: No.

Rule 131, Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:
xxxx

(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them.
The SC explained that the provision above is clear that what hat a tenant is estopped from denying x x x is the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of
that relation, the presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the landlords title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself;

and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount.
nd rd
In this case, respondent was able to prove that petitioner was no longer the owner to the subject property even before they entered the 2 and 3
contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not stopped to deny a claim for rent.

136 Neo Kigz

MARQUEZ VS. FERNADEZ

Upon proof of a submission of a falsified document, also carries the burden of proving that such person did not commit the serious administrative
offense of dishonesty

FACTS:
This case presents administrative complaint dated December 10, 2004 brought by Isabel D. Marquez (Marquez), Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Caba, La Union against Stenographer Jocelyn C. Fernandez (Fernandez) of the same court, for frequent unauthorized absences or tardiness,
and falsification of public document.
Marquez alleged that Fernandezs daily time records (DTRs) from September to November 2004 showed that she had incurred tardiness/undertime
almost everyday. In a memorandum she issued on October 3, 2004, Marquez asked Fernandez to explain her tardiness/undertimes. She answered she
had health problems due to her fractured arm. Marquez sent Fernandez another memorandum dated November 2, 2004,[3] but received no reply; a
second memorandum dated December 1, 2004[4] merited a reply where Fernandez again claimed that she was having health problems.
Marquez found Fernandezs explanation unsatisfactory; he dismissed it as a half-truth that does not justify her frequent tardiness/undertime as
Fernandez looked strong and healthy. She claimed that Fernandez was often seen roaming the courts premises and the municipal hall where their
office is located.In November 2004, Fernandez submitted a medical certificate stating that she was treated at the Ilocos Training and Regional
Medical Center[6], San Fernando City, La Union on November 5, November 22 to 26; and November 30, 2004 and need medical attention for 20
days. Verification with the hospital however, revealed that Fernandez was examined and treated at the hospital only on November 5, 2004.[7] It was
obvious that Fernandez introduced details which were not in the original certification the hospital issued on November 26, 2004.
Fernandez submitted her answer on February 1, 2005.[9] She expressed dismay that Marquez could not understand the reason behind her frequent
tardiness and undertimes, as well as her absences. She explained that it was due to mental anxiety arising from her medical problems, brought about
by the bone fracture in her lower left arm that caused her extreme pain and mental stress. She sought treatment at the Ilocos Training and Regional
Medical Center, but the treatment was not successful as she developed an infection and was cautioned that her arm might require amputation if the
infection spread. She was told it could even be fatal. She claimed that she pleaded with Marquez to excuse her from reporting for work until she had
fully recovered, but Marquez ignored her plea.
On the alleged falsification of her medical certificate, Fernandez admitted that she had herself examined and treated on November 5, 2004, for which
she was given a medical certificate for that day only. She claimed that Marquez insisted that the certificate be changed to indicate the specific days
covering her healing period. For this reason, she returned to the medical center, but her attending physician was not around at the time; the nurse on
duty at the orthopedic department of the center named Rose told her to just type on the certificate the period when she was getting medical attention
and this could be signed later on; she carried out the nurses suggestion, but because of Marquezs pressure on her to submit the certification, she
forgot to have the certificate signed by the nurse before submitting the document to Marquez.
ISSUE:
WON the allegation of fernandez that the nurse commits the falsification of the med. cert. excuses her from administrative liability.?

RULING.
No.
The entry, 22 to 26 in 30/04 was inserted in the original certificate after its issuance a falsification for which only Fernandez could have been
responsible. She explained that it was the nurse Rose, in the hospital who made the insertion. It was a lame excuse. It could not have been Rose who
did it. The insertion was typed with a font smaller than the typed entries in the certificate issued by the hospital. Whether it was Fernandez who
falsified the document or somebody else upon her behest is not established in the record. This hanging question, however, is not enough to exculpate
Fernandez. Upon proof of a submitted falsified document, she carried the burden of proving that she did not commit the serious administrative
offense of dishonesty. Although the falsification itself may not be enough basis to sanction Fernandez for lack of definitive proof that she did it, we
cannot ignore the gross dishonesty involved in her submission of a falsified document to cover up several unauthorized absences.
BAR:
Marquez (CoC) filed an admjnistrative complaint against Fernandez(stenogrpher)for frequent unauthorized absences or tardiness, and falsification of
public document. Marquez alleges for frequent tardiness. Fernadez reasoned she has health problems due to her fractured arm.her frequent tardiness
and undertimes, as well as her absences. She explained that it was due to mental anxiety arising from her medical problems, brought about by the
bone fracture in her lower left arm that caused her extreme pain and mental stress. Fernadez also passed sa med. cert. to support her claim.The entry,
22 to 26 in 30/04 was inserted in the original certificate n small fonts. A claer indication that it was falsified. Fernandez alleges that she never made
such falsification and states that the nurse inserts the dates.

137 Kirby Kirby Bragat

CENTURY SAVINGS BANK VS SAMONTE

Facts:
Petitioner initiated before the notary public extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged properties with petitioner as the winning and
highest bidder. Notary Public Magpantay subsequently issued a Certificate of Sale,[12] covering the subject properties, in favor of petitioner.
Sometime in 2001, the parties executed a Contract of Lease[14] whereby petitioner leased one of the foreclosed properties to respondents for a period
of one year, from January 16, 2001 to January 16, 2002.
A few months later, respondents filed a Complaint seeking the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of their real properties. Among
respondents contentions was that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings initiated by petitioner failed to comply with the posting requirements
under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended.
Issues:
WON the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of respondent’s properties is valid.
WON respondents are already estopped from challenging the validity of the foreclosure sale, after entering into a Contract of Lease with petitioner
over one of the foreclosed properties.
Ruling:
1.The Court declares that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of respondents properties is valid, having complied with the legal requirements for the
same.
It is an elementary rule that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law.[23] In Cristobal v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court explicitly ruled that foreclosure proceedings
enjoy the presumption of regularity and that the mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite has the burden of proving such fact, to wit:
Further, as respondent bank asserts, a mortgagor who alleges absence of a requisite has the burden of establishing that fact. Petitioners failed in this
regard. Foreclosure proceedings have in their favor the presumption of regularity and the burden of evidence to rebut the same is on the petitioners.
In this case, it was respondents who instituted Civil Case No. 01-1564 seeking the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure of their mortgaged
properties on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of the law on the posting of the notices of sale. Thus, the burden falls upon
respondents to prove the fact of non-compliance; but respondents miserably failed in this regard. Respondents did not present any evidence at all to
establish that the notices of sale were not posted as required under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended. Instead, respondents merely focused on
how Notary Public Magpantays Certificate of Posting was worded, and emphasized on technicalities and semantics.
Respondents insist that the phrase on the 15th day of November 1999, I have caused the posting of three (3) copies of Notice of Sale in the Certificate
of Posting meant that Notary Public Magpantay posted the notices for only one day, i.e., on November 15, 1999. This is a rather specious
interpretation of the aforequoted phrase. It is more logical and reasonable to understand the same phrase as to mean that the notices were posted
beginning November 15, 1999 until the issuance of the certificate on December 9, 1999.
2.The Court agrees with the RTC that respondents are already estopped from challenging the validity of the foreclosure sale, after entering into a
Contract of Lease with petitioner over one of the foreclosed properties. The title of the landlord is a conclusive presumption as against the tenant or
lessee. According to Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, [t]he tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. The juridical relationship between petitioner as lessor and respondents as lessees
carries with it a recognition of the lessors title. As lessees, then respondents are estopped to deny their landlord's title, or to assert a better title not
only in themselves, but also in some third person while they remain in possession of the leased premises and until they surrender possession to the
landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor had no title at the time the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may be asserted not
only by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed to his title.[30]

138 Imee Nawanao Hiyas

CIR VS METRO STAR

Principle: If the taxpayer denies ever having received an assessment from the BIR, it is incumbent upon the latter to prove by competent evidence
that such notice was indeed received by the addressee. The onus probandi was shifted to respondent to prove by contrary evidence that the Petitioner
received the assessment in the due course of mail.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines

Revenue Officer (BIR) Daisy G. Justiniana to examine petitioners books of accounts and other accounting records for income tax and other internal
revenue taxes for the taxable year 1999. They proceeded with the investigation based on the best evidence obtainable preparatory to the issuance of
assessment notice. On April 11, 2002, petitioner received a Formal Letter of Demand dated April 3, 2002 from Revenue District No. 67, Legazpi
City, assessing petitioner the amount of Two Hundred Ninety Two Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Four Pesos and Sixteen Centavos
(P292,874.16.) for deficiency value-added and withholding taxes for the taxable year 1999.

Revenue District Office No. 67 sent a copy of the Final Notice of Seizure dated May 12, 2003, which petitioner received on May 15, 2003,

petitioner received from Revenue District Office No. 67 a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy No. 67-0029-23 dated May 12, 2003

petitioner filed with the Office of respondent Commissioner a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied

Petitioner’s defense:
Denying that it received a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) and claiming that it was not accorded due process.

The CTA-Second Division found merit in the petition of Metro Star.

While there [is] a disputable presumption that a mailed letter [is] deemed received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, a direct denial of
the receipt of mail shifts the burden upon the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee.
[5]
It also found that there was no clear showing that Metro Star actually received the alleged PAN, dated January 16, 2002. It, accordingly, ruled that
the Formal Letter of Demand dated April 3, 2002, as well as the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy dated May 12, 2003 were void, as Metro Star was
[6]
denied due process.

CTA en banc affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT CIR HAS THE BURDEN OG PROVING THAT THERE IS SERVICE OF NOTICE.

RULING:

YES.

JURISPRUDENCE:

if the taxpayer denies ever having received an assessment from the BIR, it is incumbent upon the latter to prove
by competent evidence that such notice was indeed received by the addressee. The onus probandi was shifted to
respondent to prove by contrary evidence that the Petitioner received the assessment in the due course of mail. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that while a mailed letter is deemed received by the addressee in the course of mail, this is
merely a disputable presumption subject to controversion and a direct denial thereof shifts the burden to the party favored by the
presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the addressee (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA
351). Thus as held by the Supreme Court in Gonzalo P. Nava vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA 104, January 30,
1965:

"The facts to be proved to raise this presumption are (a) that the letter was properly
addressed with postage prepaid, and (b) that it was mailed. Once these facts are proved, the presumption
is that the letter was received by the addressee as soon as it could have been transmitted to him in the
ordinary course of the mail. But if one of the said facts fails to appear, the presumption does not lie.

The Court agrees with the CTA that the CIR failed to discharge its duty and present any evidence to show that Metro Star indeed received the PAN
dated January 16, 2002. It could have simply presented the registry receipt or the certification from the postmaster that it mailed the PAN, but failed.
Neither did it offer any explanation on why it failed to comply with the requirement of service of the PAN. It merely accepted the letter of Metro
Stars chairman dated April 29, 2002, that stated that he had received the FAN dated April 3, 2002, but not the PAN; that he was willing to pay the tax
as computed by the CIR; and that he just wanted to clarify some matters with the hope of lessening its tax liability.

Indeed, Section 228 of the Tax Code clearly requires that the taxpayer must first be informed that he is liable for deficiency taxes through
the sending of a PAN. He must be informed of the facts and the law upon which the assessment is made. The law imposes a substantive, not merely a
formal, requirement. To proceed heedlessly with tax collection without first establishing a valid assessment is evidently violative of the cardinal
[14]
principle in administrative investigations - that taxpayers should be able to present their case and adduce supporting evidence.
[19]
It is an elementary rule enshrined in the 1987 Constitution that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. In balancing the
scales between the power of the State to tax and its inherent right to prosecute perceived transgressors of the law on one side, and the constitutional
rights of a citizen to due process of law and the equal protection of the laws on the other, the scales must tilt in favor of the individual, for a citizens
right is amply protected by the Bill of Rights under the Constitution. Thus, while taxes are the lifeblood of the government, the power to tax has its
limits, in spite of all its plenitude.

WHEREFORE, petition is DENIED.

SHORT DIGEST:

FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines

BIR assessed petitioner the amount of Two Hundred Ninety Two Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Four Pesos and Sixteen Centavos (P292,874.16.)
for deficiency value-added and withholding taxes for the taxable year 1999.

They were sent by the BIR A copy of the Final Notice of Seizure, Warrant of Levy/Attachment.

Petitioner asserts that they were deprived due process for they were not served with the Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) before levy.

CTA and CTA en banc gave credence to petitioner.

ISSUE:

WON CIR has the burden of proving the service of notice.

RULING:

YES.

if the taxpayer denies ever having received an assessment from the BIR, it is incumbent upon the latter to prove by competent evidence that
such notice was indeed received by the addressee. The onus probandi was shifted to respondent to prove by contrary evidence that the
Petitioner received the assessment in the due course of mail.

"The facts to be proved to raise this presumption are (a) that the letter was properly
addressed with postage prepaid, and (b) that it was mailed. Once these facts are proved, the presumption
is that the letter was received by the addressee as soon as it could have been transmitted to him in the
ordinary course of the mail. But if one of the said facts fails to appear, the presumption does not lie.

The Court agrees with the CTA that the CIR failed to discharge its duty and present any evidence to show that Metro Star indeed received the PAN
dated January 16, 2002. It could have simply presented the registry receipt or the certification from the postmaster that it mailed the PAN, but failed.
Neither did it offer any explanation on why it failed to comply with the requirement of service of the PAN. It merely accepted the letter of Metro
Stars chairman dated April 29, 2002, that stated that he had received the FAN dated April 3, 2002, but not the PAN; that he was willing to pay the tax
as computed by the CIR; and that he just wanted to clarify some matters with the hope of lessening its tax liability.
139 Anne Vernadice Areña

ALFEREZ vs PEOPLE
Principle:
PRESUMPTION ON B.P. 22 CASES.
The presumption arises when it is proved that the issuer had received the notice of dishonor, and that within five banking days from its receipt, he
failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. The full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five
banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. Accordingly, procedural due process requires that a notice of dishonor be sent to and
received by the petitioner to afford the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.
x x x. [I]t is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the petitioner. It is also incumbent upon the prosecution to
show that the drawer of the check received the said notice because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice
of dishonor by the drawee of the check.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jaime Alferez purchased construction materials from Cebu ABC Sales Commercial. As payment for the goods, he issued three (3) checks
for the total amount ofP830,998.40. However, the checks were dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account. Petitioner was thus
charged with three (3) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 22. During the trial, the prosecution presented its lone witness,
private complainant Pingping Co.
Instead of presenting evidence, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence on August 8, 2003, or approximately ten (10) months after the prosecution
rested its case. Petitioner averred that the prosecution failed to show that he received the notice of dishonor or demand letter.
MTCC denied the petitioners Demurrer to Evidence and rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged.
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC rendered Judgment affirming in toto the MTCC decision. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but it was denied.
Undaunted, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It sustained petitioners conviction as the
elements of the crime had been sufficiently established. As to the service on petitioner of the notice of dishonor, the appellate court pointed out that
petitioner did not testify, and that he did not object to the prosecutions evidence aimed at proving the fact of receipt of the notice of dishonor.
Consequently, the registry receipt and the return card adequately show the fact of receipt.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
WON the registry receipt and the return card adequately show the fact of receipt of the petitioner of the notice of dishonor, which would make rise to
the presumption of his knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.
RULING
The court ruled in the negative.
In Suarez v. People,
The presumption arises when it is proved that the issuer had received this notice, and that within five banking days from its receipt, he failed to pay
the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. The full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days
from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. Accordingly, procedural due process requires that a notice of dishonor be sent to and received by the
petitioner to afford the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.
x x x. [I]t is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the petitioner. It is also incumbent upon the prosecution to
show that the drawer of the check received the said notice because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice
of dishonor by the drawee of the check.
In this case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter, together with the registry receipt and the return card, allegedly sent to
petitioner. However, there was no attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return card. Receipts for registered letters and return
receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of
dishonor. To be sure, the presentation of the registry card with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required proof beyond reasonable
doubt that petitioner received such notice. It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check.
The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such
notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check. The burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to prove notice. In criminal cases, however, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, for B.P.
Blg. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, for notice by mail, it must appear that the same was served on the addressee or a duly
authorized agent of the addressee. From the registry receipt alone, it is possible that petitioner or his authorized agent did receive the demand letter.
Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubt. The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed strictly against
the State and liberally in favor of the accused. The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives the accused an opportunity to preclude a
criminal prosecution. As there is insufficient proof that petitioner received the notice of dishonor, the presumption that he had knowledge of
insufficiency of funds cannot arise.