p.

2: He has a distinction between substances, bearers of intrinsic properties, on the one hand;
and relational properties of substances on the other. He says that we have no knowledge of the
intrinsic properties of substances. This, as it stands, is not idealism, but a kind of epistemic
humility. There are inevitable constraints on what we can know, inevitable limits on what we can
become acquainted with.
La influencia del empirismo en Kant se nota con la tesis que sostiene que somos receptivos. O sea,
que tenemos que ser afectados por las cosas para conocerlas.
Para Kant, la humildad viene de la tesis de la receptividad.
p. 2: […] he believes [Kant], as Strawson has remarked, that our ignorance of things as they are in
themselves follows from the fact that we must be affected by things if we are to achieve
knowledge of them. If this is correct, then our ignorance of things as they are in themselves is not
supposed to be a special consequence of the arguments about space, or time, or the categories: it
is supposed to be a general consequence of the fact that human knowledge is receptive.
Leibniz en Kant. Hay una influencia en la distinción entre cosas en sí y fenómenos, esto coincide
con la distinción entre substancias y sus propiedades relacionales.
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