The evidential and doxastic dimensions of Basque bide*

Kepa Korta and Larraitz Zubeldia

Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language and Information (ILCLI)

University of the Basque Country (UPV-EHU)

[To appear in Belgian Journal of Linguistics]

Abstract

Two kinds of meanings are usually associated to the Basque particle bide.1 On the one

hand, it has been taken to point to the indirect nature of the speaker’s evidence for the

truth of the proposition put forward. According to this view, it would be a sort of

inferential particle. On the other hand, bide has been associated to the expression of a

certain degree of belief or certainty on the truth of the proposition. This double

dimension of bide resembles various aspects of the meaning and use of another

Basque particle —omen. The morpho-syntactic behaviour of these two particles is

practically identical, and their semantics and pragmatics invite a close comparison.

Thus, starting from our conclusions regarding omen, we explore the similarities and

differences between both particles. We find two main differences. First, bide encodes

a doxastic dimension that is absent from the semantic meaning of omen. And, second,

bide can be taken to be an illocutionary force indicator that does not contribute to the

proposition expressed, while omen does contribute to the truth-conditions of the

utterance.

1
Keywords: Basque, particle, evidential, conversational implicature,

(un)certainty/probability

1. Introduction

Two kinds of aspects are usually associated to the meaning of bide in the literature.

Some authors relate it to the indirect nature of the evidence the speaker has for the

truth of the proposition expressed. Others point out its doxastic (high

certainty/probability) aspect, claiming that bide is used when the speaker has high

(but incomplete) certainty on the truth of the proposition. In fact, the very same

aspects are also frequently related to the reportative particle omen. In Korta and

Zubeldia (2014), we have argued that in the case of omen these two aspects have a

different status: the evidential is semantic, while the doxastic is pragmatic. In the

present paper, we examine whether the same division can be drawn in the case of

bide. For that purpose we compare these two particles that are usually classified

together as indirect evidential elements.

To start with, we outline the study carried out on omen, briefly presenting our

main conclusions: (i) Uncertainty often related to omen is not part of its semantics,

but a Generalized Conversational Implicature (henceforth, GCI) generated by an

omen-utterance; omen has just the evidential (reportative) meaning (subsection 2.1).

(ii) Omen contributes to the propositional content of the utterance, and it is not an

illocutionary force indicator (subsection 2.2).

2
 We then proceed to present our analysis of bide. First, we give some of its

morpho-syntactic characteristics, which parallel omen’s (subsection 3.1). After this,

we consider its evidential (inferential) meaning —which would suggest that bide

could be a hyperonym of omen— (subsection 3.2), as well as its doxastic meaning

(subsection 3.3). Omen and bide share various features. A closer inspection, however,

points to two main differences between omen and bide. On the one hand, the doxastic

dimension is of a pragmatic nature in the case of omen, whereas it is semantic in the

case of bide. We also propose that the doxastic dimension each particle covers is

different: omen takes the whole spectrum, while bide’s dimension is restricted

(subsection 4.1). On the other hand, they differ in their possible contribution to the

truth-conditions of the utterance: omen contributes to the propositional content of the

utterance; bide does not. It is rather an illocutionary force indicator (subsection 4.2).

We finish by drawing some conclusions and pointing to further work.

2. Omen

We begin by summarizing our main conclusions on the meaning and content of omen.

2.1. Omen and uncertainty

(1) Euri-a ari omen d-u2

rain-DET.SG.ABS PROG REP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have

‘It is stated that it’s raining.’

3
In Basque linguistics, it is widely assumed that the speaker using an omen-utterance

like (1) expresses uncertainty about whether it is raining or not, in addition to

indicating the source of information (that she got it from another person).3 We argue

that the uncertainty often attached to omen, if present, belongs to the pragmatic

content of the utterance; and, more specifically, that it is a GCI (see Korta and

Zubeldia 2014). We reach these conclusions based on the results of various arguments

concerning (a) data from various corpora; (b) Grice’s cancellability test; (c) Grice’s

non-detachability test; and (d) the similarity with other phenomena typically taken to

be GCIs.

Sometimes, using omen, the speaker implicates uncertainty, but often she

conveys absolute certainty about the proposition being reported. Hence, uncertainty

cannot be part of the meaning of the omen-sentence. It cannot be part of what is said

explicitly by an omen-utterance either; the application of Grice’s (1967) cancellability

test shows that uncertainty is cancellable. Then, it must be either part of the enriched

what-is-said (or explicature) or an implicature.

We argue that it is a GCI.4 It is inferred from the utterance of an omen-

sentence, in general, without having a particular context in mind, since when using an

omen-sentence the speaker expresses that she is reporting information she got from

someone else. It is inferred assuming that the speaker is observing the Cooperative

Principle and the second maxim of quality: “Do not say that for which you lack

adequate evidence” (Grice 1967a: 46). In particular circumstances, the uncertainty

can be present or not, and certainty can also be implied without any contradiction.

Moreover, the content of uncertainty is non-detachable, since the uncertainty

would remain when saying the same thing by other means (like the use of an utterance

4
with the verb esan ‘to say’). Finally, the parallelism with the Gricean account of the

ignorance associated with ‘believe’ also supports this analysis.5

2.2. The contribution of omen

After excluding uncertainty from the semantic meaning of the omen-sentence, we

claim that the meaning of omen is just the evidential (reportative) element; namely,

that the proposition reported was said by someone other than the speaker. Omen

contributes this evidential meaning to the propositional content of the utterance, so it

is not an illocutionary force indicator. On the one hand, the results of our experiment

based on the assent/dissent test show that, when an omen-utterance is being directly

challenged, participants found it acceptable to reject the evidential content (in

addition to the reported proposition). On the other hand, the scope test says that the

evidential content of the omen-utterance can take narrow scope within certain

operators —more precisely, within sentential (external) negation, communication

predicates (such as esan ‘to say’ or erantzun ‘to answer’), and knowledge predicates

(for instance, kontuan hartu ‘to take into account’).

Furthermore, a contradiction arises when trying to cancel the evidential

content of the omen-utterance. This is a further argument for its contribution to the

truth-conditions of the utterance.

Those are our conclusions regarding omen (see Korta & Zubeldia 2014 for

further details). The main aim of this paper is to compare these conclusions with the

case of the particle bide, and to see whether its semantic and pragmatic behaviour is

similar to omen’s.

5
3. Bide

3.1. Morpho-syntactic characteristics of bide

The syntax of bide perfectly mirrors the syntax of omen.6 It is attached to conjugated

verbs as part of the verbal complex. In affirmative sentences with synthetic verbs it

goes just before the verb (2), and with periphrastic verbs it appears between the main

verb and the auxiliary (3).

(2) Euskara-z bide d-aki.

Basque-INS PART 3SG.ABS.PRS-know

‘(S)he bide knows Basque.’

(3) Ezagut-zen bide d-u Euskal Herria.

know-IPFV PART 3SG.ABS.PRS-have Basque Country

‘(S)he bide knows the Basque Country.’

In negative sentences with synthetic verbs it goes before the verb (4) as well. In

contrast, with periphrastic verbs it is located before the auxiliary verb, with the

auxiliary verb moved ahead of the main verb (5).

(4) Ez bide d-aki euskara-z.

not PART 3SG.ABS.PRS-know Basque-INS

‘(S)he does not bide know Basque.’

6
 (5) Ez bide d-u ezagut-zen Euskal Herria.

not PART 3SG.ABS.PRS-have know-IPFV Basque Country

‘(S)he does not bide know the Basque Country.’

In addition, it appears only in declarative sentences, like omen does, both in main and

subordinate sentences.

3.2. The evidential (indirect) meaning

The semantics of bide and the semantics of omen seem to share various elements.

They often seem to be practically interchangeable, as in the following example:

(6) Asko mugi-tzen omen naiz lo-tan

a.lot move-IPFV REP 1SG.ABS.PRS.be sleep-INS

na-go-ela.

1SG.PRS.ABS-be-COMP

‘It is stated that I move a lot while sleeping.’

(7) Asko mugi-tzen bide naiz lo-tan

a.lot move-IPFV PART 1SG.ABS.PRS.be sleep-INS

na-go-ela.

1SG.ABS.PRS-be-COMP

‘I bide move a lot while sleeping.’7

Since, for obvious reasons, the speaker cannot directly observe her behaviour while

sleeping, she points to the indirect evidence she has for the proposition that she moves

7
a lot while sleeping. Intuitively, by uttering (6) the speaker asserts that she has been

told that she moves a lot, while when uttering (7) she would just point to the indirect

nature of her evidence; e.g. she might have inferred the proposition from the state of

her bed every morning or, perhaps, she might have been told about it, as in (6). There

are more examples like this, where bide is used when the speaker has verbal evidence

for her inference.8 See, for instance, the following example:

(8) Gau-ez, ostera bai, ager-tzen bide dira

night-INS on.the.other.hand yes appear-PFV PART 3PL.ERG.PRS.be

itsaspeko-ak azal-era, Gregory-k

submarine-DET.PL.ABS surface-DET.SG.ADL Gregory-ERG

konta-tu-ko d-u-en legez. (Jimenez 2003, 187)

narrate-PTCP-PROSP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP as

‘At night, on the other hand yes, it seems that the submarines appear in

the surface, as Gregory will narrate.’

The interchangeability of bide and omen in these examples suggests that both

particles can be taken as evidentials that point to the indirect nature of the evidence

supporting the speaker’s assertion. More specifically, just as the particle omen in an

utterance (where the sentence uttered consists in sentence S plus the particle omen)

points to the linguistic nature of the speaker’s evidence for the reported proposition p

(which corresponds to the proposition expressed by the utterance of S), the particle

bide indicates the indirect nature of the evidence for that proposition. Or, in other

words, if what the speaker of an omen-utterance asserts is (9), what the speaker of a

bide-utterance asserts is (10):

8
 (9) It is said that p.

(10) I have indirect evidence that p.

This fits with the idea that bide is an inferential (evidential) particle. The

lexicographer Novia de Salcedo (1887, 307), for instance, points towards this.

Bidé. Esta partícula, interpuesta en las voces compuestas, equivale á un supuesto de

hecho realizado, y pospuesta en la contestación á, parece: etorri bide da, debe de

haber venido; uste bidé du, debe de pensar; bai bidé, parece que sí. ‘Bidé. This

particle, placed between composed words, is equivalent to an assumption of a fact,

and placed after a response to, it seems [sic]: etorri bide da, (s)he must have come,

uste bidé du, (s)he must think; bai bidé, it seems so.’ (Novia de Salcedo 1887, 307)9

So does de Rijk (2008, 162) when he says that bide “signals that certain facts known

to the speaker lead him to infer the truth of his statement” or Boye (2012, 82) when he

claims that “… the meaning of bide may be described in terms of inferential

justification” (see also Alcázar 2009 and Jendraschek 2003).Following this thread, if,

in line with the classification of Willett 1988, we distinguish between direct and

indirect evidentiality (or using Boye’s (2012) term, justification), within the latter

category Basque seems to distinguish between linguistically reported evidence and

other kinds of indirect evidentiality. The issue would then be to decide whether bide is

a sort of hyperonym of omen, that can be used for all sorts of indirect evidentiality —

including speech reports (fig. 1)—, or whether there is some other relation between

these two particles. We discuss this issue further in subsection 4.1.

Evidentiality

9
 Direct Indirect

bide

Reportative Others

omen (e.g. inferential, conjectural…)

FIGURE 1. Bide and omen as indirect evidential particles.

We turn now to discuss a second meaning attributed to bide: its epistemic or, perhaps

better, doxastic meaning.

3.3. Doxastic meaning

Other authors associate the meaning of bide to another aspect also related to the

meaning of omen: the expression of a certain degree of (un)certainty. Euskaltzaindia’s

gloss of bide, for instance, parallels the gloss given for omen:

Esaten dugunari ziurtasun oso-osoa ematen ez badiogu ere, egiantz handia bederen

eskaintzen diogula adierazteko bide partikula dugu. ‘We have the particle bide to

express that, even if we are not totally certain about what we say, we consider it at

least highly plausible’ (Euskaltzaindia 1987, 502. See also van Eys 1873; Orpustan

1993 and Elhuyar-Elkar 1994, among others)

10
These authors point to a quite specific aspect of the doxastic dimension of bide.

Taking p to be the proposition expressed by the sentence S, a speaker using a bide-

sentence (i.e. S plus bide) means that she attributes a high degree of plausibility to p;

that p is highly likely but not absolutely certain.

If we consider example (7) again (repeated here as (11)), it looks like it can be

perfectly glossed, not only as (12), but also as (13).

(11) Asko mugitzen bide naiz lotan nagoela.

‘I bide move a lot while sleeping.’

(12) I have indirect evidence that I move a lot while sleeping.

(13) It is highly likely but not absolutely certain that I move a lot while

sleeping.

And the same goes for the following examples:

(14) Bai, uda bide zen, garai epel-en bat

yes summer PART 3SG.ABS.PST time warm-INDF one

behintzat. (Jimenez 2004, 128)

at.least

‘Yes, it bide was summer, a warm time at least.’

(15) Sakon-a bide zen haren lo-a.

deep-DET.SG PART 3SG.ABS.PST 3SG.GEN sleep-DET.SG

(Mendiguren 2002, 114)

‘His/her sleep bide was deep.’

11
 (16) Jon, ipurdi-a hara eta hona astin-tzen,

Jon bottom-DET.SG there and here shake-IPFV

dantza-n ari bide zen. (Iturriaga 1999, 226)

dance.DET.SG-LOC PROG PART 3SG.ABS.PST

‘Jon, shaking his bottom here and there, was bide dancing.’

In all these examples, bide seems perfectly rendered either as an indirect evidential —

to the effect that the speaker has indirect evidence for the truth of p— or as a doxastic

degree particle —indicating that the speaker attributes to p a high likelihood but not

absolute certainty.

This two-fold meaning of bide may look like an unexpected conclusion.

Reasons of theoretical economy would favour taking one meaning as primary, and the

other as somehow derived. Regarding omen we argued similarly for the reportative

and the uncertainty aspects of its meaning: the semantic meaning of omen is purely

reportative; the uncertainty often associated to omen-utterances is a pragmatic

element, a GCI. As for bide, there are two options in this direction: its indirect

evidential aspect is the semantic meaning of bide and the expression of high but not

absolute probability is a pragmatic element of a bide-utterance, or the other way

around —the doxastic element is semantic, the evidential is pragmatic.

Following the first path, for instance, we may contend that the supposed GCI

of high but not absolute probability would be inferred from an utterance of a bide-

sentence, in general (with no particular context in mind). The speaker, when using a

bide-sentence, can be taken to express that she has indirect evidence and, therefore,

she cannot be taken to be able to confidently assert the truth of the inferred utterance.

Then, in particular circumstances, the degree of certainty will be present or not. The

test of cancellability, however, does not tell one way or the other, in this case. Neither

12
the indirect evidential aspect nor the doxastic aspect seems explicitly cancellable.

Adding anything like “and/but I saw it” or “and/but it is highly improbable” after a

bide-utterance such as (11) above produces a very odd utterance, if not a

straightforward contradiction.

(17) #Asko mugi-tzen bide naiz lo-tan

a.lot move-IPFV PART 1SG.ABS.PRS.be sleep-INS

na-go-ela. Eta ikus-i d-u-t.

1SG.ABS.PRS-be-COMP and see-PTCP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-1SG.ERG

‘I bide move a lot while sleeping. And I saw it.’

(18) #Asko mugi-tzen bide naiz lo-tan

a.lot move-IPFV PART 1SG.ABS.PRS.be sleep-INS

na-go-ela. Baina ez da posible.

1SG.ABS.PRS-be-COMP but not 3SG.ABS.PRS.be possible

‘I bide move a lot while sleeping. But it is not possible.’

Likewise, we have not found any clear case of contextual cancellability: bide-

utterances appear to carry their indirect evidential/doxastic meaning in all imaginable

circumstances. We should maybe adopt a different stance on the issue.

Perhaps the (in)directness of the evidence for the truth of a proposition p and

the degree of strength of our belief that p are just two sides of the same coin.10

Actually there is quite a systematic correspondence between the kind of evidence we

have for a belief and our degree of certainty (see, for instance, Chafe 1986 and

Matlock 1989). Direct visual perception of a fact typically amounts to complete

13
certainty about the statement of that fact. As they say, “seeing is believing”. Believing

absolutely, we would add.

If this is so, it does not make much sense to attempt to tell the indirect

evidentiality attached to bide and the high but incomplete degree of certainty apart,

since they always come together. If we assign probabilities on a scale of 0 to 1, we

can see that 1 (complete certainty about p) and 0 (complete certainty about the

negation of p) coincide in what is taken to be direct evidence for the truth (or falsity)

of p, and that it is precisely in these cases where the use of bide is infelicitous, as

shown by examples (19) and (20).

(19) #Euri-a egin bide d-u, ikus-i

rain-DET.SG do.PFV PART 3SG.ABS.PRS-have see-PFV

d-u-t nola ari z-u-en.

3SG.ABS.PRS-have-1SG.ERG how PROG 3SG.ERG.PST-have-PST

‘It has bide rained, I’ve seen how it was raining.’

(20) #Euri-a egin bide d-u, baina ez

rain-DET.SG do.PFV PART 3SG.ABS.PRS-have but not

d-u egin.

3SG.ABS.PRS-have do-PFV

‘It has bide rained, but it hasn’t.’

Our initial contention is that the use of bide seems appropriate only when the speaker

assigns to the proposition p a probability n such that 0.5 < n < 1, which fits squarely

with the cases in which the speaker has indirect evidence for the truth of p, as

opposed to indirect evidence for the falsity of p. Bide would encode, then, both an

14
evidential and a doxastic meaning. 11 A closer comparison with omen suggests,

however, that the doxastic element of bide has some priority over the evidential

meaning.

4. Bide versus omen

We said above that, as an evidential, omen can be a hyponym of bide, and, thus,

where omen is used bide could also be used (but not always the other way around). At

a closer look, however, we find that there are various important differences.

4.1. The doxastic dimension

Most importantly, we notice that the doxastic element is completely absent from the

meaning of omen. Stating pomen is absolutely compatible with any doxastic attitude

towards p, from absolute belief (1) to absolute disbelief (0), passing through any

degree of belief in between; omen takes the whole spectrum regarding the speaker’s

probability assignment. The absence of complete certainty associated with omen-

utterances is a GCI, as is shown, among other things, by the fact that it is contextually

and explicitly cancellable (see Korta and Zubeldia 2014, 407-412 for further details).

Things are quite different with bide. For one thing, bide looks incompatible

with the speaker’s complete certainty about the truth (or falsity) of p. That is why

utterances (19) and (20) above and (21) below are infelicitous.

(21) #Euri-a egin bide d-u, eta/baina

15
 rain-DET.SG do.PFV PART 3SG.ABS.PRS-have eta/but

euri-a egin d-u.

rain-DET.SG do.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have

‘It has bide rained, and it has rained.’

The same kind of infelicity arises with the adverb nonbait12 ((22)-(23)) and the “past

future” ((24)-(25)).

(22) #Euri-a egin d-u nonbait, eta/baina

rain-DET.SG do.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have ADV and/but

euri-a egin d-u.

rain-DET.SG do.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have

‘It has rained nonbait, and/but it has rained.’

(23) #Euri-a egin d-u nonbait, baina ez

rain-DET.SG do.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have ADV but not

d-u egin.

3SG.ABS.PRS-have do.PFV

‘It has rained nonbait, but it hasn’t.’

(24) #Euri-a egin-go z-u-en, eta/baina

rain-DET.SG do-PROSP 3SG.ERG.PST-have-PST and/but

euri-a egin d-u.

rain-DET.SG do.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have

‘It must have rained, and/but it has rained.’

(25) #Euri-a egin-go z-u-en, baina ez

16
 rain-DET.SG do-PROSP 3SG.ERG.PST-have-PST but not

d-u egin.13

3SG.ABS.PRS-have do.PFV

‘It must have rained, but it hasn’t.’

So the lack of absolute certainty associated with bide is not a GCI of bide-utterances,

but rather an invariant aspect of bide-sentences across contexts; i.e. part of their

meaning. Bide —unlike omen— requires, first, lack of complete certainty (less than 1)

and, second —also unlike omen—, high degree of certainty (over 0.5). Thus, it seems

that, when the speaker neither believes nor disbelieves a certain proposition p —the

case of 0.5 probability assignment—, she would not use a bide-sentence regarding p.

In the case of, say, 0.3 probability, she would not use it either (example (26)); she

would rather use a bide-sentence such as (27) expressing not-p.

(26) #Euri-a egin bide d-u, baina

rain-DET.SG do.PFV PART 3SG.ABS.PRS-have but

ez d-u-t uste.

not 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-1SG.ERG believe.IPFV

‘It has bide rained, but I don’t believe that.’

(27) Ez bide d-u egin euri-rik.

not PART 3SG.ABS.PRS-have do.PFV rain-PRTV

‘It has not bide rained.’

Again, the same seems to happen with the adverb nonbait and the past future.

17
 To sum up, it seems that the relation between omen and bide is not the relation

between hyponym and hyperonym. With the use of omen there is a gain of

information about the sort of evidence about p —speech versus other sorts of indirect

evidence— but a loss of information about the speaker’s doxastic stance on p. With

the use of bide there is a gain of information on the speaker’s incomplete but high

degree of belief on p, but a loss of information on the particular sort of indirect

evidence —speech. In other words, bide can be used in place of omen in cases where

there is a high but incomplete degree of probability, although at the cost of losing the

explicitness of the reportative nature. Figure 2 shows the contrast between bide and

omen regarding their doxastic dimensions concerning the proposition p.

|____________________________________|

0 0.5 1

≥_______________(omen)______________≤

>_____(bide)_______<

FIGURE 2. Certainty on the truth of p.

We have so far assumed that indirect (or inferential) evidence goes hand in hand with

uncertainty. But perhaps this is wrong. We think that, as far as indirectness (or

inferentiality) and incomplete certainty do not come together, the latter has priority

with bide. At least, the role of the doxastic dimension is central for bide in a way that

it is not for omen. We turn now to another point of the comparison between bide and

omen —their contribution (or not) to the proposition expressed by the utterance.

18
4.2. Bide as an illocutionary force indicator

One important issue regarding the meaning and use of evidential and epistemic (or

doxastic) particles is whether their meaning contributes to the propositional content or

truth-conditions of the utterance containing them. Various criteria such as the

assent/dissent test or the scope principle have been proposed to settle this issue (see,

among others, Faller 2006, Matthewson et al. 2007, Murray 2010, and Matthewson

2012 for the former and Faller 2002, Matthewson et al. 2007, McCready & Ogata

2007, Sauerland & Schenner 2007, Schenner 2008, and Waldie et al. 2009 for the

latter).

In the case of omen, as we stated at the beginning, we think that it clearly

contributes to the truth-conditions of the utterance. So, in equal circumstances, a

speaker uttering a sentence S versus Somen would assert different propositions. If John

utters “Euria ari du” [It is raining] in Donostia today, he asserts that it is raining in

Donostia today; a proposition that is true if and only if it is raining in Donostia today.

But, if he utters “Euria ari omen du” [It is omen raining], he asserts that someone

other than himself stated that it is raining in Donostia today, a proposition that is true

if and only if someone other than himself stated that it is raining in Donostia today.14

In speech-theoretic terms, we could say, then, that the addition of omen to a

sentence does not affect the illocutionary force of an utterance; the assertion remains

an assertion, but the propositional content is modified. In general, if we compare an

utterance of S and an utterance of Somen, we have some similarities and differences

regarding their direction of fit, their sincerity conditions, and their conditions of

satisfaction (see Table 1).

19
 S (Euria ari du) Somen (Euria ari omen du)

direction of fit words to world words to world

sincerity conditions the speaker believes that p the speaker believes that p

(it is raining in Donostia (it is raining in Donostia

today) today) was asserted by

someone other than herself

conditions of satisfaction the speech act is satisfied the speech act is satisfied

if and only if p is true (if it if and only if p (it is

is raining in Donostia raining in Donostia today)

today) was stated by someone

other than the speaker

herself

TABLE 1. Comparison of three components of the illocutionary force of S and Somen.

The difference is not in the illocutionary force, as both utterances are assertions

(albeit different assertions). Omen causes a change in the truth-conditions of the

utterance —what the world has to be like for the utterance to be true— and its

sincerity conditions —what the speaker’s mental state has to be like for her utterance

to be sincere.15

We contend there is no such difference in the case of an utterance of S and an

utterance of Sbide. If John, in the same circumstances as above, utters “Euria ari bide

du”, there is no evident change in direction of fit, sincerity conditions and conditions

of satisfaction of his utterance (see Table 2).

S (Euria ari du) Sbide (Euria ari bide du)

20
direction of fit words to world words to world

sincerity conditions the speaker believes that p the speaker believes that p

(it is raining in Donostia (it is raining in Donostia

today) today)

conditions of satisfaction the speech act is satisfied the speech act is satisfied

if and only if p (it is if and only if p (it is

raining in Donostia today) raining in Donostia today)

is true is true

TABLE 2. Comparison of three components of the illocutionary force in the case of S

and Sbide.

The bide-utterance seems to be an assertion —just like the utterance without it—,

with words to world direction of fit, belief in the same propositional content as

sincerity condition, and the truth of the very same propositional content as its

condition of satisfaction. They assert the same thing. The only difference seems to

reside in the degree of strength of the belief that constitutes the sincerity condition.

The degree of strength is listed by Searle and Vanderveken (1985, 15) and

Vanderveken (1990, 119-121) as a component of the illocutionary force of a speech

act, and bide seems just to constrain that degree of strength to be in the interval

between 0.5 and 1 (strictly higher than 0.5 and strictly lower than 1). Hence, we

conclude that bide is an illocutionary force indicator, not contributing to the

propositional content of the utterance.

Taking bide to contribute this doxastic dimension to the propositional content

of the utterance would amount to the assumption that, when John utters Sbide, what he

asserts is something like (28).

21
 (28) I believe that it is highly probable that it is raining in Donostia today, but

I am not completely certain.

Namely, a proposition that would be true if and only if John had that kind of belief, no

matter what really is happening with the weather in Donostia today. We think this is

plainly wrong. What makes John’s utterance true (or false) is a raining event in

Donostia on a particular day (or its absence). Bide points just to the speaker’s degree

of belief in the propositional content of the utterance. If John believes that it is raining

in Donostia today, he speaks sincerely; but he may be wrong in his belief and assert

something false if it is not raining.

5. Conclusion and further work

This work is a preliminary analysis of the semantics and pragmatics of the Basque

particle bide, based on our previous findings about omen. Even though they have

some similarities, we see two important differences between them:

- The doxastic element (uncertainty) associated to omen belongs to pragmatics

—it is a GCI. The doxastic element (high but incomplete certainty) associated

to bide belongs to semantics —it is its encoded meaning.

- Omen contributes to the propositional content of the utterance. Bide is an

illocutionary force indicator with no contribution to the propositional content.

22
Our conclusions are based on our intuitions as native speakers and the comparison of

omen, bide and related phrases such as the adverb nonbait and the past future as they

appear in the corpora (Ereduzko Prosa Gaur [Contemporary Reference Prose]).16

Experimental work to test these conclusions is planned for the future.

The precise relation between the doxastic and the evidential dimensions of

bide remains as an open issue. The problem, however, might not be in deciding how

we should categorize bide —we are ready to agree that most often, if not always, the

two dimensions come together in this case. The problem might be that what exactly

counts as evidentiality is not theoretically clear enough. For instance, does indirect

‘evidence’ that gives the speaker a degree of certainty of 0.2 about a certain

proposition p count as evidence for p? Strictly speaking, the answer is clearly no. It

rather counts as evidence for not-p. If this is so, the reportative omen does not count

as an evidential, because it semantically encodes nothing about the speaker’s certainty

on the reported proposition.

The theoretical categorization of these items in terms of (in)direct evidentials,

doxastic or epistemic, inferential, etc. is in need of refinement. And we hope our

discussion modestly contributes to that purpose. Meanwhile, we hope that we can go

on theoretically clarifying and experimentally testing our account on the semantics

and pragmatics of these particles and related items.

*
An earlier version of this article was presented at the International Conference on Evidentiality and
Modality in European Languages 2014 in Madrid (Spain). We would like to thank the audience at the
conference, and especially Marta Carretero, Karlos Cid-Abasolo, Ilse Depraetere and Björn Wiemer.
Thanks are also due to Eros Corazza, Joana Garmendia and María Ponte, for their comments. We are
also very grateful to the editors of this volume, Bert Cornillie and Juana Marín-Arrese. This work was
partially supported by grants from the Basque Government (IT780-13) and the Spanish Ministry of
Economy and Competitivity (FFI2012-37726).

23
1
Standard bilingual dictionaries (see, for example, Morris 1998) translate bide as ‘apparently’,
‘seemingly’, but these translations beg the question discussed in the paper and can be misleading.
That’s why we didn’t use those translations.
2
Abbreviations used: 1 = first person, 3 = third person, ABS = absolutive, ADL = adlative, ADV = adverb,
COMP = complementizer, DET = determiner, ERG = ergative, GEN = genitive, INDF = indefinite, INS =
instrumental, IPFV = imperfective, LOC = locative, NR = nominalizer, PART = particle, PFV = perfective,
PL = plural, PROG = progressive, PROSP = prospective, PRS = present, PRTV = partitive, PST = past, PTCP
= participle, REP = reportative, SG = singular.
3
See most importantly Euskaltzaindia [The Royal Academy of Basque Language] 1987.
4
See for similar proposals Wiemer and Socka 2010 for Polish and German reportative adverbs, Faller
2012 for reportative evidentials in Cuzco Quechua and German, and Wiemer and Kampf 2012 for
Bulgarian evidential markers.
5
See Grice 1967b/1989 and Levinson 1983 for the case of ‘believe’; for other cases of GCIs such as
disjunction, conjunction, etc., see Grice 1961 and Levinson 2000.
6
It has to be noted that while omen is quite common both in spoken and written Basque, bide is not.
7
Example adapted from a translation of Sartre’s La Nausée into Basque (1938 [2003], 111). We used
the corpora Ereduzko Prosa Gaur (EPG) [Comtemporary Reference Prose] from the University of the
Basque Country.
8
It seems that sometimes the report by some other person is the base of the inference (compare it to
‘report-based inference’ proposed by Marín-Arrese 2015), not just a perception or reasoning.
9
We keep the quote in its original version, with its original orthography.
10
Compare this to van der Auwera & Plungian’s (1998, 86-87) view, namely the overlapping between
the categories of inferential evidentiality and epistemic necessity. See Cornillie (2009) and Boye
(2010) for a challenge of this view. Boye (2012) proposes the category epistemicity which
encompasses the subcategory of evidentiality (epistemic justification) and the subcategory of epistemic
modality (epistemic support).
11
Faller 2002 reaches a similar conclusion about the Cuzco Quechua enclitic -chá. She takes both the
evidential aspect and the modal aspect to be part of the meaning of -chá: “The meaning of -chá is not
purely evidential, indicating that the speaker arrived at his or her statement by reasoning, but also
encodes that the speaker is less than 100% certain that the proposition expressed is true.” (Faller 2002,
177)
12
We do not provide a translation for this particular use of the adverb nonbait, which in its normal use
as an adverb of place means ‘somewhere’. Here it behaves exactly as bide and the past future, as far as
we can tell. See also note 1.
13
Interestingly, things look different with the verb badirudi ‘it seems/it looks like’, as the following
utterances seem perfectly correct:

(i) Ba-d-irudi euri-a egin d-u-ela, eta/baina

yes-3SG.ABS.PRS-seem rain-DET.SG do.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP and/but
euri-a egin d-u.
rain-DET.SG do.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have
‘It seems that it has rained, and/but it has.’
(ii) Ba-d-irudi euri-a egin d-u-ela, baina ez
yes-3SG.ABS.PRS-seem rain-DET.SG do.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP but not
d-u egin.
3SG.ABS.PRS-have do.PFV
‘It seems that it has rained, but it hasn’t.’
14
In the latter case, i.e. when the utterance includes omen, the proposition expressed can contain a
more determinate source, but we ignore these details here. See Korta & Zubeldia 2014 and Zubeldia
2013.
15
Cf. Faller (2002, 189-204) where she contends that the Cuzco Quechua reportative -si acts as an
illocutionary force indicator.
16
We should note, however, that in our spoken mother dialects omen, nonbait, and the past future are
profusely used and that bide is practically inexistent, as it is, in general, in contemporary spoken
Basque (with the exception of some Eastern dialects), where bide is confined to written language.

24
References

Alcázar, Asier. 2009. Subjectification in Basque evidential particles. Manuscript.

Boye, Kasper. 2010. Semantic maps and the identification of cross-linguistic generic

categories: Evidentiality and its relation to epistemic modality. Linguistic

discovery 8-1: 4-22.

Boye, Kasper. 2012. Epistemic meaning: A Crosslinguistic and Functional-Cognitive

study. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Chafe, Wallace. 1986. Evidentiality in English conversation and academic Writing.

In: Wallace Chafe and Johanna Nichols (ed.), Evidentiality: The Linguistic

Coding of Epistemology. Volume XX in the Series Advances in Discourse

Processes, 261-272. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation

Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Cornillie, Bert. 2009. Evidentiality and epistemic modality. On the close relationship

between two different categories. Functions of Language 16-1: 44-62.

Elhuyar-Elkar. 1994. Euskal hiztegi modernoa. Donostia: Elhuyar-Elkar.

Euskaltzaindia. 1987. Euskal Gramatika. Lehen Urratsak II. Bilbao.

Faller, Martina T. 2002. Semantics and Pragmatics of Evidentials in Cuzco Quechua.

PhD thesis, Stanford University.

Faller, Martina. 2006. Evidentiality below and above speech acts. Manchester:

University of Manchester, ms. Online:

http://personalpages.manchester.ac.uk/staff/martina.t.faller/documents/Evident

iality.Above.Below.pdf.

25
Faller, Martina. 2012. Evidential scalar implicatures. Linguistics and Philosophy 35:

285-312.

Grice, Paul. 1961. The causal theory of perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian

Society, Supplementary volumes 35: 121-152.

Grice, Paul. 1967a. Logic and conversation. In: Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman

(eds.) (1975), The Logic of Grammar, 64-75. Encino: Dickenson. Also

published in Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (eds.) (1975), Syntax and

Semantics 3: Speech Acts, 41-58. New York: Academic Press. Reprinted in

Paul Grice (1989), Studies in the Way of Words, 22-40. Cambridge (MA):

Harvard University Press.

Grice, Paul. 1967b. Further notes on logic and conversation. In: Peter Cole (ed.)

(1978), Syntax and Semantics 9: Pragmatics, 113-128. New York: Academic

Press. Reprinted in Paul Grice (ed.) (1989), Studies in the Way of Words, 41-

57. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.

Jendraschek, Gerd. 2003. La Modalité Épistémique en Basque. Muenchen: Lincom

Europa.

Korta, Kepa and Larraitz Zubeldia. 2014. The contribution of evidentials to utterance

content: Evidence from the Basque reportative particle omen. Language 90-2:

389-423.

Marín-Arrese, Juana I. 2015. Epistemicity and stance: A crosslinguistic study of

epistemic stance strategies in journalistic discourse in English and Spanish.

Discourse Studies 17-2: 210-225.

Matlock, Teenie. 1989. Metaphor and the grammaticalization of evidentials.

Proceedings of the Fifteenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics

Society 15: 215-225.

26
Matthewson, Lisa. 2012. Evidence about evidentials: Where fieldwork meets theory.

In: Britta Stolterfoht and Sam Featherston (eds.), Empirical approaches to

linguistic theory: Studies in meaning and structure, 85-114. Berlin: De

Gruyter Mouton.

Matthewson, Lisa; Henry Davis and Hotze Rullmann. 2007. Evidentials as epistemic

modals: Evidence from St’át’imcets. Linguistic Variation Yearbook 7: 201-54.

McCready, Eric and Norry Ogata. 2007. Evidentiality, modality and probability.

Linguistics and Philosophy 30: 147-206.

Morris, Mikel (1998): Morris student plus. Euskara-ingelesa, english-basque.

Donostia: Klaudio Harluxet Fundazioa. http://www1.euskadi.net/morris/

Murray, Sarah. 2010. Evidentiality and the structure of speech acts. New Brunswick,

NJ: Rutgers University dissertation.

Levinson, Stephen C. 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge University Press.

Levinson, Stephen C. 2000. Presumptive Meanings. The Theory of Generalized

Conversational Implicature. Cambridge, London: MIT Press.

Novia de Salcedo, Pedro. 1887. Diccionario Etimológico del Idioma Bascongado.

Tolosa: Eusebio López.

Orpustan, Jean-Baptiste. 1993. Oihenarten Hiztegia. Lexique Basque des Proverbes et

Poésies d'Oyhenart Traduit en Français et Espagnol / par Jean-Baptiste

Orpustan. Baigorri: Izpegi.

Rijk, Rudolf P. G. de. 2008. Standard Basque: a Progressive Grammar. Vol. 1: The

grammar. Cambridge (Massachusetts): MIT Press.

Sauerland, Uli and Mathias Schenner. 2007. Shifting evidentials in Bulgarian.

Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 11: 525-539.

27
Schenner, Mathias. 2008. Double face evidentials in German: Reportative sollen and

wollen in embedded contexts. In: Atle Grønn (ed.), Proceedings of SuB12,

552-566. Oslo: University of Oslo.

Searle, John and Daniel Vanderveken. 1985. Foundations of illocutionary logic.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

van der Auwera, Johan and Vladimir A. Plungian. 1998. Modality’s semantic map.

Linguistic typology 2: 79-123.

Vanderveken, Daniel. 1990. Meaning and speech acts. Vol. 1. Principles of language

use. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

van Eys, Willem J. 1873. Dictionnaire Basque-Français. Paris: Maisonneuve;

London: Williams and Norgate.

Wiemer, Björn and Veronika Kampf. 2012. On conditions instantiating tip effects of

epistemic and evidential meanings in Bulgarian. Slovene 2: 5-38.

Wiemer, Björn and Anna Socka. 2010. How to do contrastive semantics with

propositional modifiers: The case of hearsay adverbs. Paper presented in the

symposium “Re-thinking synonymy: semantic sameness and similarity in

languages and their description”, Helsinki.

Willett, Thomas. 1988. A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticization of

evidentiality. Studies in language 12: 51-97.

Zubeldia, Larraitz. 2010. ‘Omen’ partikularen azterketa semantikoa eta pragmatikoa.

PhD thesis. University of the Basque Country.

Zubeldia, Larraitz. 2013. (Non-)determining the original speaker: reportative particles

versus reportative verbs. Research in Language 11-2: 103-130.

28
Corpora

Basque Institute of UPV/EHU: Ereduzko Prosa Gaur [Contemporary Reference

Prose]: http://www.ehu.es/euskara-orria/euskara/ereduzkoa/.

Iturriaga, Unai. 1999. Berandu da gelditzeko. Zarautz; Iruñea: Susa.

Jimenez, Edorta. 2004. Sukar ustelaren urtea. Tafalla: Txapalarta.

Mendiguren Elizegi, Xabier. 2002. 16 ipuin amodiozko. Zarautz: Susa.

Sartre, Jean-Paul. 1938. La nausée. Paris: Editions Gallimard. (Translation: Monika

Etxebarria. 2003. Goragalea. Donostia: Alberdania-Elkar)

29