Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
ARTICLES 16 - 20 of fishes to be delivered to her. But no passport was found.
81. People v. Dulay (2012)
Facts:
Accused Dina Dulay was introduced to AAA, a 12-year-old
girl, as someone who was nice. One day, Dulay convinced AAA
to accompany her at a wake. But instead of going to the wake,
Dulay brought AAA to a “kubuhan” at the back of the Bulungan
Fish Port in Paranaque, telling her that she was looking for her
boyfriend. AAA was brought to a room with a man called
“Speed.” She saw Speed giving money to Dulay, and
thereafter, she was raped by Speed. AAA later on reported the
incident to her sister and her mother.
Dulay was charged with rape in conspiracy with Speed
whose true name and whereabouts was unknown.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted Dulay of rape
as co-principal by indispensable cooperation. The CA said that
common will or purpose does not necessarily mean previous
understanding for it can be explained or inferred from the
circumstances of each case. Based from the facts, the CA ruled
that Dulay cooperated in the rape without which the crime
would not have been consummated, since she prepared the
way for the perpetration thereof.
Issue: Whether or not Dulay was guilty of rape as co-principal
by indispensable cooperation.
Held: No. Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be
considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement,
or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by
indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal
resolution, a conspiracy or unity in criminal purpose and
cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing
another act without which it would not have been
accomplished. Nothing in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant
are indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The
events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant convinced
AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the
man who allegedly raped AAA, are not indispensable in the
crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and
offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA
could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her
own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still
end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable
aspect of the appellant in the crime of rape. It must be
remembered that in the Information, as well as in the
testimony of AAA, she was delivered and offered for a fee by
appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed."
The Supreme Court convicted Dulay instead of violation of
Sec. 5(a), Article III RA 7610 or Child Prostitution and Other
Sexual Abuse. The act of apellant in convincing AAA, who was
12 years old at that time, to go with her and thereafter, offer
her for sex to a man in exchange for money makes her liable
under the above-mentioned law.
82. People v. Gambao, et al. (2013)
Facts:
Lucia Chan was fish dealer based in Manila. One
afternoon, two persons went to her inquiring about a certain
passport alleged to have been mistakenly placed inside a box
The two men returned the next morning, but Chan was out.
When they returned in the evening of the same day, they
kidnapped Chan. Her son, Levy, tried to help his mother, but
one of the men pointed a gun at him. Chan was forced to
board a Tamaraw FX and was brought to a resort in Pansol,
Laguna. While Chan was held inside a room, she saw a woman
named Thian Perpenian chatting with the other kidnappers.
Meanwhile, Levy was coordinating with the police. Levy was
asked for a P400,000 ransom which he delivered to the
kidnappers in Chowking Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at
around. The police was able to intercept and arrest the men
who took the ransom money. On the same day, the police
assaulted the cottage in the resort where Chan was being held
leading to Chan’s rescue and the arrest of her other abductors.
The kidnappers, 11 of them, were charged with
kidnapping for ransom.
The RTC and CA convicted them as charged.
One of the accused, Thian Perpenian, contended that she
just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party,
hence she should not be criminally liable.
Issue: Whether or not Perpenian is criminally liable.
Held: Yes, but not as a principal. The prosecution was not
able to proffer sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as a
principal. Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution had
was the testimony of Chan to the effect that on 13 August
1998 Perpenian entered the room where the victim was
detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories
unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court opines that Perpenian
should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as
an accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence is instructive of the elements required, in
accordance with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in order
that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1)
that there be community of design; that is knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates
in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of
the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice.
Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort
thinking it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she
acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals
when she saw Chan being guarded in the room. A rational
person would have suspected something was wrong and would
have reported such incident to the police. Perpenian, however,
chose to keep quiet; and to add to that, she even spent the
night at the cottage. It has been held before that being
present and giving moral support when a crime is being
committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in
the crime committed. It should be noted that the accused-
appellant’s presence and company were not indispensable and
essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom;
hence, she is only liable as an accomplice. Moreover, this
Court is guided by the ruling in People v. Clemente, et al.,
where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather
than that of a principal.
83. Ong v. People (2013)
Facts:
The private complainant was the owner of 44 Firestone
truck tires which he bought for P223,401.81. After selling 6
tires, 38 remained inside his warehouse. But later on, the
warehouse was robbed and all 38 tires were stolen. Private
complainant reported the incident to the police. Pending
investigation, he canvassed from numerous business
establishments in an attempt to locate the stolen tire. And he
actually found 13 of his tires at a store owned by accused
Jaime Ong. A buy-bust team conducted a raid and arrested
Ong.
Ong was charged with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
The RTC and the CA convicted Ong as charged.
Ong, who had been engaged in the business of buying
and selling tires for 24 years, denied that he had any
knowledge that he was selling stolen tires. He claimed that a
certain Ramon Go sold him the 13 tires allegedly from
Caloocan City for P3,500 each. Ong bought all the tires for
P45,500 for which he was issued a Sales Invoice with the letter
head “Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise.”
Issue: Whether or not Ong is guilty of violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law.
Held: Yes. Fencing is defined in Section 2(a) of P.D. 1612 as
the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal,
sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal
in any article, item, object or anything of value which he
knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as
follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
(2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys
and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or
should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one
accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.
With respect to the third element, the accused knew or
should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote the
fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence
would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another
or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for
the past twenty-four (24) years, ought to have known the
ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown
seller. Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the
thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for proof of
ownership of the tires. The entire transaction, from the
proposal to buy until the delivery of tires happened in just one
day. His experience from the business should have given him
doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering
that it was his first time to transact with Go and the manner it
was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in
the streets.
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling
second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D. 1612 requires stores,
establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of
any good, article, item, object or anything else of value
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to
secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station
commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or
city where that store, establishment or entity is located before
offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, Ong has
practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances from the police
station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this
particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent
businessman who should have exercised prudence.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt
issued to him by Go. Logically, and for all practical purposes,
the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a
legitimate transaction and may be raised as a defense in the
charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable. In this
case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed,
and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its
address were fictitious. Ong failed to overcome the evidence
presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of
the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie
presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.
84. Dimat v. People (2012)
Facts:
Jose Mantequilla was the owner of a Nissan Safari which
he mortgaged to RCBC. It was carnapped and was allegedly
sold to accused Mel Dimat, who, in turn, sold it to Sonia
Delgado for P850,000.00 two years later. The police spotted
the car on E. Rodriquez Avenue and noticed that the plate
number was suspicious. Upon inspection, they discovered that
the engine and chassis numbers appearing in the car was
actually altered, and that it was in fact the same Nissan Safari
which was reported stolen a few years ago.
Dimat was charged with violation of the Anti-Fencing Law.
The RTC and the CA convicted Dimat as charged.
Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequeilla and that
he bought the car in good faith and for value from a certain
Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine
number as TD42-126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60-
YO3553 (The engine number was actually TD42-119136 and
its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111).
Issue: Whether or not Dimat’s defense is meritorious.
Held: No. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him,
when stopped on the road and inspected by the police, turned
out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan
Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of
sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicles engine
and chassis.
First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when
stopped on Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law
and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum,
requiring no proof of criminal intent. Of course, the
prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have
known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to
Delgado was derived from theft or robbery and that he
intended to obtain some gain out of his acts. road and
inspected by the police, turned out to have the engine and
chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla.
This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct
numbers of the vehicles engine and chassis.
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn
Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as
collateral for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old
certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle and
even promised to give him a new certificate of registration and
official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on
this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentinos failure to deliver the
documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado
himself could not produce any certificate of registration or
official receipt.
Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the
Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said
that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and
official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because, the
vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents
to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his
promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to
Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still,
Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made
no effort to check the papers covering her purchase. That she
might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she
did not stand accused in the case.
ARTICLES 21 - 88
85. People v. Arrojado (2001)
Facts:
Accused Salvador Arrojado, was living with his cousin,
Mary Ann Arrojado and the latter’s father who was already
sickly after surviving a stroke. Salvador helped care for Mary
Ann’s father. One day, Salvador went to the house of another
cousin, and reported that Mary Ann committed suicide. The
doctors found that Mary Ann suffered 10 stab wounds. It
turned out the relationship between Salvador and Mary Ann
had long been strained.
Salvador was charged with murder.
The RTC convicted Salvador of murder and sentenced him
to imprisonment of 30 years of reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC was correct in imposing the
penalty of 30 years of reclusion perpetua.
Held: No. The penalty of reclusion perpetua remains
indivisible despite the fixing of its duration from 20 years and 1
day to 40 years. Salvador should suffer the entire extent of 40
years of reclusion perpetua.
86. People v. Nelmida (2012)
Facts:
Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte,
together with his security escorts composed of some members
of the AFP, PNP and civilian aids, were on board a yellow pick-
up service vehicle en route to Salvador. A group of men
ambushed the vehicle and opened fire at it causing the death
of two aides. The others sustained injuries.
The assailants were charged with double murder with
multiple frustrated murder and double attempted murder.
The RTC and the CA convicted them as charged.
Issue: Whether the conviction of the accused must be for: (A)
the separate crimes of 2 counts of murder and 7 counts of
attempted murder or (B) for the complex crime of double
murder with multiple frustrated and double attempted murder.
Held: (A). In a complex crime, two or more crimes are
actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the
conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime,
thus, only one penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of
complex crime. The first is known as compound crime, or
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies while the other is known as complex crime proper, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single
bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different
rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a
number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various
victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes.
From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the
killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a
single discharge of firearms by the appellants and their co-
accused. To note, appellants and their co-accused opened fire
and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-
tawan and his group. As a result, two security escorts died
while five (5) of them were wounded and injured. The victims
sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of their bodies.
Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one bullet had
hit the victims. Moreover, more than one gunman fired at the
vehicle of the victims. As held in People v. Valdez, each act by
each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms,
aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute
distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex
crime.82 Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed
not only a single act but several individual and distinct acts in
the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code would not apply for it speaks only of a "single act."
The Supreme Court discussed the case of People v. Lawas
(Lawas Doctrine) where the members of the Home Guard
simultaneously and successively fired at several victims
resulting in the death of 50 people. It was held in Lawas that if
the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal
impulse, it constitutes a single offense. However, "single
criminal impulse" was not the only consideration in applying
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in the said case because
there was therein no evidence at all showing the identity or
number of persons killed by each accused. There was also no
conspiracy to perpetuate the killing, thus, collective criminal
responsibility could not be imputed upon the accused. Since it
was impossible to ascertain the number of persons killed by
each of them, this Court was "forced" to find all the accused
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
guilty of only one offense of multiple homicide instead of
holding each of them responsible for 50 deaths.
Notably, conspiracy was not proven in Lawas. Thus, the
Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than the general rule.
In Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code because of the impossibility of
ascertaining the number of persons killed by each accused.
Since conspiracy was not proven therein, joint criminal
responsibility could not be attributed to the accused. Each
accused could not be held liable for separate crimes because
of lack of clear evidence showing the number of persons
actually killed by each of them.
Our repeated ruling is that in conspiracy, the act of one is
the act of all. It is as though each one performed the act of
each one of the conspirators. Each one is criminally responsible
for each one of the deaths and injuries of the several victims.
The severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article 48.
The applicability of Article 48 depends upon the singularity of
the act, thus the definitional phrase "a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies." This is not an
original reading of the law. In People v. Hon. Pineda, the Court
already recognized the "deeply rooted x x x doctrine that when
various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute
separate and distinct crimes." As we observed in People v.
Tabaco, clarifying the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, this Court further stated in Hon. Pineda that "to
apply the first half of Article 48, x x x there must be singularity
of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written
into the law." With all the foregoing, this Court holds
appellants liable for the separate crimes of two (2) counts of
murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder.
87. People v. Punzalan (2012)
Facts:
A group of navy personnel were having a drinking session
at a videoke bar. One of them, Evelio Bacosa, suggested that
the flickering light bulb be turned off. Accused Arturo
Punzalan, Jr. misinterpreted what Bacosa said, thinking that
Bacosa wanted to kill him. They eventually decided to leave
the bar and return to their camp. Soon after the navy
personnel passed by the sentry gate, the sentries flagged
down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van. The
sentries approached the van and recognized Punzalan, who
was reeking of liquor, as the driver. Even before he was given
the go signal to proceed, Punzalan shifted gears and sped
away and hit the group of the walking navy personnel. This
resulted in the death of two navy personnel and injuries of
others.
Punzalan was charged with the complex crime of double
murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, convicted him with the
complex crime of double murder and attempted murder.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly convicted Punzalan of
a complex crime.
Held: Yes. Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill
the navy personnel, and committed a single act of stepping on
the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming
through the navy personnel, causing the death of SN1 Andal
and SN1 Duclayna and, at the same time, constituting an
attempt to kill SN1 Cuya, SN1 Bacosa, SN1 Bundang and SN1
Domingo. The crimes of murder and attempted murder are
both grave felonies as the law attaches an afflictive penalty to
capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death) for murder
while attempted murder is punished by prision mayor, an
afflictive penalty.
88. People v. Dulay (2014)
Facts:
Orlando, Sr. and Orlando Jr. (Junior) were at their yard
when accused Dante Dulay, Junior’s uncle, threw a grenade at
them. When the grenade exploded, Junior was hurt in his
pelvic area, while his father was fatally hit by shrapnel causing
his death.
Dulay was charged with the complex crime of murder with
frustrated murder.
The RTC, convicted Dulay of the complex crime of murder
with attempted murder.
The CA modified the RTC’s ruling by reverting to the
original charge of frustrated murder with respect to the crime
committed against Junior.
Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct.
Held: Yes. The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that
the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
would produce the felony; and (2) that the felony is not
produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will.‖
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, Dulay has performed
all acts of execution in throwing the grenade which could have
caused Junior’s death as a consequence, but because of
immediate medical assistance, a cause independent of Dulay’s
will, Junior survived.
89. Santiago v. Garchitorena (1993)
Facts:
In 1991, Miriam Defensor Santiago was charged with
violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for allegedly favoring “unqualified” aliens with the
benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. Santiago filed a
motion for a bill of particulars, saying that while the
information alleged that she had approved the application or
legalization of aliens and gave them indirect benefits and
advantages, it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to
Santiago, unless she was furnished with the names and
identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and
prepare for trial. At the hearing on the motion, the prosecution
said that they would file one amended information against
Santiago. However, the prosecution filed a motion to admit 32
amended informations, which the Sandiganbayan granted.
Thus, Santiago filed a petition for certiorari, contending that
the prosecution had split the original information.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of 32 amended informations
was proper.
Held: No. We find that, technically, there was only one crime
that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there
should only be one information to be file against her. The 32
Amended Informations charge what is known as delito
continuado or "continued crime" and sometimes referred to as
"continuous crime."
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist
there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of
time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal
intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of
the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant
or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal
purpose or aim. According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito
continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is
only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries
on the Revised Penal Code. Padilla views such offense as
consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution.
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of
the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied to crimes penalized
under special laws. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code,
the Code shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the
latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed
from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary
capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a
period of time creates a single offense or separate offenses
has troubled also American Criminal Law and perplexed
American courts as shown by the several theories that have
evolved in theft cases. The trend in theft cases is to follow the
so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of several
things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at
the same time and place constitutes but one larceny. Many
courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under
which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each
victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine that the government
has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or
for as many distinct offenses as there are victims.
In the case at bench, the original information charged
petitioner with performing a single criminal act — that of her
approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified
under the law to enjoy such privilege. The original information
also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner
was in violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated
April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one offended
party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e.,
on or about October 17, 1988. The 32 Amended Informations
reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information,
except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original
information each amended information states the name of the
individual whose stay was legalized.
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were
committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about
October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the
approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the
32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the
approval was embodied in the same document. Likewise, the
public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a
bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm
or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13,
1992 stated as follows: “Equally, the prosecution has stated
that insofar as the damage and prejudice to the government is
concerned, the same is represented not only by the very fact
of the violation of the law itself but because of the adverse
effect on the stability and security of the country in granting
citizenship to those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).”
90. People v. Quiachon (2006)
Facts:
2001 – Roberto Quiachon was charged with qualified rape
for raping his eight-year-old daughter who was also deaf and
mute. The rape was witnessed by Quiachon’s son.
The RTC convicted Quiachon as charged and sentenced
him to death. The case was automatically elevated to the
Supreme Court, but pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo,
it was referred to the CA, which also affirmed the RTC’s
decision.
Issue: Whether or not Quiachon should be sentenced to
death.
Held: No. In view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion
perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof. The
aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this
case pursuant to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt
amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable
to accused are given retroactive effect. However, appellant is
not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346
provides that “persons convicted of offenses punished with
reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible
for parole.”
91. People v. Salome (2006)
Facts:
1997 – Sally Idanan, a 13-year-old girl, was sleeping with
her three-year-old brother inside their house when accused
Nicanor Salome entered their house. Salome poked Sally with
a knife, and then raped her. Thereafter, Salome threatened
Sally that he would kill her and her family if she told anybody
of what happened. Fearful for her life and for her family’s
safety, she did not inform anyone of the incident. She left her
province to work as a domestic helper in the house of a police
officer in San Juan City. Later on, Sally found out that she was
pregnant. This prompted her to report the rape incident to the
police.
Salome was charged with rape.
The RTC convicted Salome as changed and sentenced him
to death. The case was automatically elevated to the Supreme
Court, but pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo, it was
referred to the CA, which also affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC was correct in imposing death
penalty.
Held: Yes. The above ruling is in accordance with Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code which provides that in all cases in
which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when an
aggravating circumstance, such as dwelling in this case, is
present in the commission of the offense. The Court, therefore,
has no recourse but to apply the law and affirm the trial court’s
imposition of the death penalty. In light, however, of the
passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled “An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,” which was
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on June
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
24, 2006, the imposition of the death penalty has been
prohibited.
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by
law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still
heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still
P75,000. On the other hand, the automatic appeal in cases
when the trial court imposes the death penalty will henceforth
not apply, since its imposition is now prohibited, so that there
is a need to perfect an appeal, if appeal is desired, from a
judgment of conviction for an offense where the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua in lieu of the death penalty
pursuant to the new law prohibiting its imposition.
92. Colinares v. People (2011)
Facts:
Rufino Buena and his companion were walking down the
road one night when the accused Arnel Colinares appeared out
of nowhere and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge
stone causing him to fall unconscious.
Colinares was charged with frustrated homicide.
The RTC convicted him as charged and sentenced him to
imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional
as minimum to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment
was only up to 6 years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the CA, seeking conviction for the lesser
crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of
the penalty imposed on him. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, it was held
that Arnel was only guilty of attempted homicide as the injuries
sustained by Rufino were not life-threatening.
Issue: Whether or not Arnel may still apply for probation after
appealing his conviction, despite the fact that the Probation
Law disqualifies an accused who appeals from a judgment of
conviction from availing of probation.
Held: Yes. Firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere
privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to such
privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right
to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum
jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court
allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered
penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not
to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the
full circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the
accused who appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is
disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation.
But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been
meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide
by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a
conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court. If
the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard
position, it will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the
trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will not be
entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such
judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s
judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter
penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s
judgment—even if this has been found in error. And, worse,
Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court’s
erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa
kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is
justice there?
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires
that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before
he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws
the element of speculation on the part of the accused—to
wager on the result of his appeal—that when his conviction is
finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at
hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now
applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch’ thus rendering
nugatory the appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction."
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that
would have allowed him to apply for probation. He did not
have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a
position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply
for probation." The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on
him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow
Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly
diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in
Francisco1. It remains that those who will appeal from
judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of
correctness of the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that
the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for
attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a
probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought from
the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the
law would allow him to apply for probation. In a real sense,
the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated
homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original
conviction that for the first time imposes on him a
probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the
start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and
imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four
months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to
apply for probation.
93 - 94. Villareal v. People (2014) and People v. CA
(2014)
Facts:
This is the continuation of the case Respondents Tecson
et al., filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No.
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a
clarification as to the effect of our Decision insofar as their
criminal liability and service of sentence are concerned.
1
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the
accused guilty of grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term
of one year and one day to one year and eight months of prision
correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still,
he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to
apply for probation. When the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation.
The Court would not of course let him. It served him right that he wanted to
save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal and
probation.
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
According to respondents, they immediately applied for
probation after the CA rendered its Decision (CA-G.R. No.
15520) lowering their criminal liability from the crime of
homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight
physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence.
Tecson et al. contend that, as a result, they have already been
discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against
them closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by
virtue of their Applications for Probation on various dates in
January 2002 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as
amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law. They argue
that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC)
had already granted their respective Applications for Probation
on 11 October 2002 and, upon their completion of the terms
and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and
declared the criminal case against them terminated on various
dates in April 2003.
It turned out, however, that when they applied for
probation with the RTC, the CA’s decision lowering their
criminal liability to slight physical injuries has not yet attained
finality.
Issues: (1) Whether or not the RTC’s order granting the
application for probation of Tecson et al.; (2) Whether or not
probation extinguishes the criminal liability of Tecson et al.;
and (3) Whether or not Tecson et al. may still reapply for
probation.
Held:
(1) No. In the first place, Tecson should have applied for
probation with RTC Branch 121, the court that convicted them,
and not Branch 130. Second, the records of the case were still
with the CA when the RTC granted the probation applications.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, ―[n]o
penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment.‖
A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of
the offense charged becomes final under any of the following
conditions among others: after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives the right to
appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal of an appeal; when the
sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or
served; or when the accused applies for probation. When the
decision attains finality, the judgment or final order is entered
in the book of entries of judgments. If the case was previously
appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or
final order must be attached to the original record, which shall
then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the
appeal was taken. The court of origin then reacquires
jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during
this time that the court of origin may settle the matter of the
execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution
thereof, including the convicts’ applications for probation.
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not
yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan
City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for
Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their
respective applications while a motion for reconsideration was
still pending before the CA and the records were still with that
court. The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the
Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven
months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the
trial court. In September 2002, or almost a month before the
promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002
granting the probation applications, the OSG had filed
Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the
CA and this Court. Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA
judgments by filing before this Court a Petition for Certiorari on
25 November 2002. We noted the petition and then required
respondents to file a comment thereon. After their submission
of further pleadings and motions, we eventually required all
parties to file their consolidated memoranda.56 The records of
the case remained with the CA until they were elevated to this
Court in 2008.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek
probation at the time they applied for it. Note that they already
appealed from the judgment convicting them of homicide, and
note that at that time they applied for probation in 2002, the
Supreme Court had not yet promulgated its decision in
Colinares v. People (2011). Hence, the old rule applied, that is
an appeal, even for the purpose of lowering the penalty,
amounts to a waiver.
(2) No. Probation is not one those enumerated under Art.
89 which extinguish criminal liability. Neither can it be
considered as tantamount to “service of sentence.” Probation
is in effect a suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not
a final judgment but is rather an “interlocutory judgment” in
the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his
reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of discharged,
if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a
final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated.
(3) Yes. This time, the Supreme Court applied the doctrine
laid down in Colinares and held that Tecson et al. may reapply
for probation: “While we cannot recognize the validity of the
Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the Applications for
Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have
fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous probation
program and have eventually been discharged therefrom.
Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial court may, at
its discretion, consider their antecedent probation service in
resolving whether to place them under probation at this time
and in determining the terms, conditions, and period thereof.”
95. Suyan v. People (2014)
Facts:
Neil Suyan was convicted of violation of Sec. 16, Article II
of RA 6425 and was granted probation. But while on
probation, Suyan again violated the same crime twice. Two
Informations were filed against him. Meanwhile, the Chief
Probation and Parol Officer filed a motion to revoke the
probation which the RTC granted. Suyan filed a petition for
certiorari against the RTC’s order which the CA granted on the
ground that the RTC had not complies with the procedural
requisites for the revocation of probation. To be specific, no
Violation Report was submitted by the Probation Office. Upon
hearing, the RTC again revoked Suyan’s probation to which the
latter filed an appeal with the CA. This time, the CA affirmed
the RTC’s order revoking the probation.
Issue: Whether or not Suyan’s probation was validly revoked.
Held: Yes. We adopt the ruling of the CA inthat petitioner
squandered his own opportunity when, instead of rebutting the
allegations mentioned in the Violation Report, he merely
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)
questioned the absence of any such report when his probation
was first revoked. On substantive grounds, we believe that
there was sufficient justification for the revocation of his
probation. Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been
convicted, and that he has served out his sentence for another
offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of
another offense is a direct violation of Condition No. 9 of his
Probation Order, and the effects are clearly outlined in Section
11 of the Probation Law which provides: “A probation order
shall take effect upon its issuance, at which time the court
shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and
explain that upon his failure to comply with any of the
conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of
another offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the
offense under which he was placed on probation.”
Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in revoking
the probation of petitioner and ordering him to serve the
penalty for the offense for which he was placed on probation.
As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was
bound to observe full obedience to the terms and conditions
pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of revocation
of this privilege. Regrettably, petitioner wasted the opportunity
granted him by the RTC to remain outside prison bars, and
must now suffer the consequences of his violation. The Court's
discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the
benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant probation, it
follows that the trial court also has the power to order its
revocation in a proper case and under appropriate
circumstances.
96. Almero v. People (2014)
Facts:
Enrique Almero was convicted by the MTC of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and multiple physical injuries.
The decision was promulgated on Jan. 8, 2007 but Almero
applied for probation only on Sept. 7, 2007, claiming that he
was informed of his conviction only upon being serve the
warrant for his arrest. The MTC denied the application,
prompting him to file a petition for certiorari with the RTC.
While his first petition raised the sole issue of the denial of his
application for probation, he filed a supplemental petition
which assailed the validity of the promulgation of judgment.
He also impleaded the private complainants in his petition.
The RTC granted Almero’s petition, finding that the MTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering judgment
without first ruling on Almero’s formal offer of exhibits since,
technically, he had not yet rested his case. It also ruled that
the promulgation of judgment was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, because Almero was not present.
The private complainants appealed to the CA, which
reversed the RTC’s ruling. According to the CA, the RTC should
have confined itself to determining whether or not the MTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Almero’s
application for probation.
Issues: (1) Whether or not private complainants had the right
to appeal from the RTC’s ruling; and (2) Whether or not
Almero is entitled to probation.
Held:
(1) Yes. Petitioner (Almero) contended that in criminal
cases, the offended party is the State, and that private
complainants’ interest is limited to the civil liability arising
therefrom. Petitioner's application for probation purportedly did
not involve the civil aspect of the case. The OSG, on the other
hand, argued that what petitioner filed with the RTC was a
petition for certiorari, which is a special civil action. It cannot
be considered an appeal in a criminal case over which only the
State has an interest, but an appeal in a civil action from which
private persons can appeal in the event of an adverse
outcome.
The Supreme Court agreed with the OSG. While the
present petition originated from a criminal proceeding, what
petitioner filed with the RTC was a special civil action, in which
he himself impleaded private respondents. He cannot now
belatedly change his stance to the prejudice of private
respondents, who would otherwise be deprived of recourse in
a civil action they did not initiate. In any case, this Court has
consistently ruled that private parties may be clothed with
sufficient personality if the facts show that the ends of
substantial justice would be better served, and if the issues in
the action could be determined in a more just, speedy and
inexpensive manner.
(2) No. The law expressly requires that an accused must
not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of
probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part
of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that
when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal… he now
applies for probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering
nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction.
In this case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether
to question the judgment, or apply for probation, which is
necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While he
did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed
the validity of the conviction in the guise of a petition
supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he
attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D.
1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation mutually
exclusive remedies.
The assignment of errors in the Petition before us reflects
the diametrically opposed positions taken by accused
petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects committed
by the trial court during the promulgation of the judgment,
thus casting doubt on the judgment itself. Yet in the same
breath, he persists in his application for probation, despite the
waiver and admission of guilt implicit in any procedure for
probation – precisely the unhealthy wager the law seeks to
prevent. Petitioner applied for probation beyond the
reglementary period, yet the trial court still allowed the filing
before ultimately denying it for lack of merit.
97. Moreno v. Comelec (2006)
Facts:
A petition was filed to disqualify Urbano Moreno from
running for Punong Baranagay on the ground that he was
convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arrbitrary
Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months by the RTC.
Moreno contended that he was not disqualified, because he
was already granted probation, which had the effect of
 Criminal Law Review (5th Assignment)

suspending the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him
well as the accessory penalties pursuant to Baclayon v. Mutia. by the court but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation order.
The Comelec division and en banc disqualified Moreno,
because of Sec. 40 (a) of the Local Government, which It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have
provides that “those sentenced by final judgment for an misapprehended the real issue in this case. They focused on
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable the fact that Morenos judgment of conviction attained finality
by 1 year or more of imprisonment, within 2 years after upon his application for probation instead of the question of
serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective whether his sentence had been served. The Comelec could
local position.” According to the Comelec en banc, the have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to
provisions of the Local Government Code take precedence over the letter. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the unequivocally disqualifies only those who have been sentenced
Probation Law, because the Local Government Code is a much by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment
latter enactment and a special law setting forth the of one (1) year or more, within two (2) years after serving
qualifications and disqualifications of elective officials. sentence. It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local
Government Code afford us no clue as to the intended
In its comment, the OSG argued that a conviction for an
meaning of the phrase service of sentence, i.e., whether the
offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the candidate
legislature also meant to disqualify those who have been
was granted probation, pursuant to Dela Torre v. Comelec.
granted probation. The Courts function, in the face of this
Issue: Whether or not Moreno should be disqualified from seeming dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize the
running for Punong Barangay. Probation Law and the Local Government Code.Interpretare et
concordare legis legibus est optimus interpretandi.
Held: No. Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable.
Our pronouncement therein that the grant of probation does Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local
not affect the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code was enacted in 1991, some seven (7) years
Government Code was based primarily on the finding that the after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided. When the legislature
crime of fencing of which petitioner was convicted involves approved the enumerated disqualifications under Sec. 40(a) of
moral turpitude, a circumstance which does not obtain in this the Local Government Code, it is presumed to have knowledge
case. At any rate, the phrase within two (2) years after serving of our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of probation on
sentence should have been interpreted and understood to the disqualification from holding public office. That it chose not
apply both to those who have been sentenced by final to include probationers within the purview of the provision is a
judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those clear expression of the legislative will not to disqualify
who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense probationers. On this score, we agree with Moreno that the
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. The Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the
placing of the comma (,) in the provision means that the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a
phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local later law which sets forth the qualifications and
Government Code. disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is
a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general in
placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute,
in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier
that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the statute.
imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as
the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We
thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph
which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her
teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory
penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were
similarly suspended upon the grant of probation. It appears
then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not
even disqualified from running for a public office because the
accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on
hold for the duration of the probation. Clearly, the period
within which a person is under probation cannot be equated
with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation
Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends
the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation,