1. PCSO v. New Dagupan Metro Gas Corp., GR 173171.
July 11, 2012 New Dagupan:
2. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tan, GR 178449, Oct. 17, 2008
3. 680 Home Appliances, Inc. v. CA, GR 206599. Sept. 29, 2014
4. Okabe v. Saturnino, GR 196040. Aug. 26, 2014
5. Gabriel v. RD of Rizal, GR L-17956. Sept. 30, 1963
6. Arrazola v. Bernas, GR L-29740. Nov. 10, 1978
7. Sajonas v. CA, GR 102377. July 5, 1996
8. Agbulos v. Alberto, GR L-17483. July 31, 1962
9. Baranda v. Gustilo, GR 81163. Sept. 26, 1988
10. Treasurer of the Phils. v. CA, GR L-42805. Aug. 31, 1987
11. Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui, GR 130115. July 16, 2008
12. New Durawood Co., Inc. v. CA, GR 111732. Feb. 20, 1996
13. Doronila Resources Dev. Inc. v. CA, GR L-42956-57. Jan. 12, 1988
----------------------
1. PCSO v. New Dagupan Metro Gas Corp., GR 173171. July 11, 2012
FACTS:
• Respondent Peralta is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Bonuan Blue
Beach Subdivision, Dagupan City under TCT No. 52135.
• On March 8, 1989, a Real Estate Mortgage was constituted over such property in favor
of PCSO to secure the payment of the sweepstakes tickets purchased by Galang, its provincial
distributor.
• On July 31, 1990, Peralta sold, under a Conditional Sale, the subject property to New
Dagupan, the conveyance to be absolute upon the latter’s full payment of the price of P800,000.00
• Peralta showed New Dagupan a photocopy of TCT 52135, which bore no liens and
encumbrances, and undertook to deliver the owner’s duplicate within 3 months from the execution
of the contract.
• New Dagupan executed an affidavit of adverse claim, which was annotated on the TCT
on October 1, 1991.
• In view of Peralta’s continued failure to deliver a deed of absolute sale and the owner’s
duplicate of the title, New Dagupan filed a complaint for specific performance against her with the
RTC.
• On May 20, 1992, during the pendency of New Dagupan’s complaint against Peralta,
PCSO caused the registration of the mortgage.
• On February 10, 1993, PCSO filed an application for the extrajudicial foreclosure sale
of the subject property in view of Galang’s failure to fully pay the sweepstakes she purchased in
1992. A public auction took place where PCSO was the highest bidder.
• The certified true copy of the TCT 52135 that New Dagupan obtained from ROD
reflected PCSO’s mortgage lien.
Arguments:
PCSO:
• It maintains that its right over the subject property are superior to those of New
Dagupan. Considering that the contract between New Dagupan is a conditional sale, there was
no conveyance of ownership at the time of the execution thereof on July 31, 1989.
• It likewise attributes bad faith to New Dagupan, claiming that Peralta’s presentation of
a mere photocopy of TCT, albeit without any annotation of a lien or encumbrance, sufficed to raise
reasonable suspicions against Peralta’s claim of a clean title.
• It avers that it was a purchaser in good faith and it has a superior right to the subject
property, considering that PCSO’s mortgage lien was annotated only on May 20, 1992 or long
after the execution of the conditional sale on July 31, 1990 and annotation of its adverse claim on
October 1, 1991. While the subject mortgage antedated the subject sale, PCSO was already
aware of the latter at the time of its belated registration of its mortgage lien. PCSO’s registration
was therefore in bad faith, rendering its claim over the subject property defeasible by New
Dagupan’s adverse claim.
ISSUE:
Who has a better title, PCSO or New Dagupan?
HELD:
New Dagupan has the better title.
At the time of PCSO’s registration of its mortgage lien on May 20, 1992, the subject mortgage had
already been discharged by Galang’s full payment of P450,000.00, the amount specified in the
Deed of Undertaking with First Real Estate Mortgage.
Assuming the contrary, New Dagupan is not bound by PCSO’s mortgage lien and was a purchaser
in good faith and for value.
While the subject mortgage predated the sale of the subject property to New Dagupan, the
absence of any evidence that the latter had knowledge of PCSO’s mortgage lien at the time of the
sale and its prior registration of an adverse claim created a preference in its favor.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property of another, without notice that
some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays full and fair price for the
same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property. Good faith is the opposite of fraud and of bad faith, and its non-existence
must be established by competent proof. Sans such proof, a buyer is deemed to be in good faith
and his interest in the subject property will not be disturbed. A purchaser of a registered property
can rely on the guarantee afforded by pertinent laws on registration that he can take and hold it
free from any and all prior liens and claims except those set forth in or preserved against the
certificate of title.
Xxx a person dealing with registered property need not go beyond the title and is not required to
explore outside the 4 corners thereof in search for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may
turn out to be superior.
2. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tan, GR 178449, Oct. 17, 2008
In 1974, the company co-owned by Tan, acquired a P250k loan from Metrobank. In 1976, the
same company acquired another P150k loan from Metrobank. In 1979, it again got a P600k loan
from Metrobank. These 3 loans were secured by a mortgage executed by spouses See in favor
of Metrobank. See was not part of Tan’s company not until 1979 but they’ve been securing the
loans. The loans were consolidated as a P1 Million loan in 1980 payable at P125k in 8 quarterly
payments until fully paid.
Meanwhile, Tan had a separate unsecured loan of P970k owed from Metrobank which it failed to
pay. Metrobank won a collection suit against Tan for said sum of money. Loan was still unpaid.
In 1984, Tan defaulted from paying the P1 M loan. Metrobank foreclosed the property of See
located in Paco, Manila (June 1984). Metrobank was the highest bidder at P1.7M. The Sale was
registered same month/year.
In December 1984, See assailed the foreclosure averring that the P1M loan is no longer covered
by the mortgage for the same was novated when the 3 loans were consolidated. The CA ruled the
foreclosure to be valid but proceeds therefrom should only cover the P1M loan, excess has to be
returned.
While pending on appeal before SC, Tan offered to pay P2M: P600k as downpayment and the
rest payable in 2 years w/o interest in order to release the foreclosed mortgaged property. This
was denied by the bank.
Tan and See then petitioned that Metrobank allow them to redeem the property at P1.6M. This
was in 1997.
SC’s decision (G.R. 118585) finally went out and made final CA’s ruling that the foreclosure is
valid. This was interpreted later by the RTC and the CA as giving the right to Tan to repurchase
the property.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tan may redeem the said property?
HELD: No. The decision of the SC in GR 118585 did not give the right to redeem way past the
period of redemption. This was an error in the RTC and the CA.
Tan was clearly in default hence Metrobank had the right to foreclose which it did in ’85. Tan had
a year to redeem. Though See was the registered owner, Tan had the right of redemption because
they were the actual mortgagors. But Tan never redeemed the property within the redemption
period of 1 year.
The filing of a civil suit did not forestall the period of redemption though said suit drag for more
than ten years until a decision was laid down in ’97.
Though Tan made offers and proposals to redeem property, Tan did not make simultaneous
payments (which is required in redemption) which further bolstered the fact that he did not make
valid offers of redemption (considering arguendo).
After the 1 year redemption period, the right has already vested in Metrobank, hence it could
provide for any purchase price i.e. P11M offer to sell property to spouses See.
3. 680 Home Appliances, Inc. v. CA, GR 206599. Sept. 29, 2014
Facts:
The case arose from the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings commenced by the creditor of 680
Home, Deutsche Bank AG London,[5] after the former defaulted in paying a loan secured by a
real estate mortgage over its commercial lot and building.
FSAMI consolidated its ownership after 680 Home failed to redeem the property which was
forclosed previously. A new certificate of title (TCT No. 227316) was issued in FSAMI’s name.
However,on March 20, 2009, 680 Home commenced an action to annul the mortgage and
foreclosure with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 137 (docketed as Civil Case No. 09-254).
On October 26, 2010, FSAMI commenced a petition for the ex parte issuance of a writ of
possession filed with the RTC of. Home moved to intervene and filed an opposition to FSAMI’s
application, but the RTC denied the motion in its orders. On July 8, 2011, the RTC granted
FSAMI’s application for a writ of possession; the writ, as well as the notice to vacate, were issued.
As the current occupant of the property, respondent Aldanco filed a motion to intervene in LRC
Case No. M-5444, claiming that it possessed the property as lessee of Home. RTC ruling and
declared Home’s petition to cancel the writ as prematurely filed. The CA ruled that under Section
8 of Act No. 3135, a judgment debtor may file a petition for cancellation of the writ of possession
within 30 days only after the purchaser has obtained possession of the property. To question the
ruling of the CA, Home filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
HELD:
In extrajudicial foreclosures, a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the redemption
period or (2) after the lapse of the redemption period.[15] The first instance is based on a privilege
provided under Section 7 of Act No. 3135; the second is based on the purchaser's right of
ownership. The basis of the purchaser's right to possess the property affects the nature of the
right.
Act No. 3135 governs only the manner of the sale and redemption of the mortgaged real property
in an extrajudicial foreclosure; proceedings beyond these, i.e., upon the lapse of the redemption
period and the consolidation of the purchaser's title, are no longer within its scope. This is apparent
from Section 1 of Act No. 3135, which states:
Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to any real-estate
mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other
obligation, the provisions of the following [sections] shall govern as to the manner in which the
sale and redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision for the same is made in the power.
[Emphasis ours]
In fact, the nine (9) sections of Act No. 3135 pertain to proceedings governing extrajudicial
foreclosures, from the conduct of the foreclosure sale up to the exercise of the right of redemption.
Our reading of Act No. 3135, therefore, should be consistent with the law's limited coverage.
Given the inapplicability of Section 8 of Act No. 3135, it becomes irrelevant to consider the effect
of Aldanco's continued possession of the property on 680 Home's opposition to the writ of
possession. That Aldanco's possession prevented FSAMI from acquiring actual possession of the
property neither benefited nor harmed 680 Home's case which is not dependent on FSAMI's actual
possession.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition. For the reasons stated above, we UPHOLD the
decision dated February 13, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 124735 insofar as it
affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner 680 Home Appliances, Inc.'s petition for cancellation of writ
of possession by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 141 in its Orders dated December 20,
2011 and March 23, 2012.
4. Okabe v. Saturnino, GR 196040. Aug. 26, 2014
FACTS:
The subject of the controversy is an 81 square meter property located in Makati City,
which was initially covered by TCT No. 175741 under the name of the wife of respondent Ernesto
A. Saturnino. Sometime in 1994, the couple obtained a loan with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB), which was secured by the subject property. Because of the couple’s failure to settle their
loan obligation with the bank, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage.
On August 24, 1999, the Certificate of Sale was inscribed on TCT No. 175741.
Considering that the property was not redeemed by respondent during the redemption period,
consolidation of ownership was inscribed on October 13, 2006 and a new TCT was issued in favor
of PNB. Without taking possession of the subject property, PNB sold the land to petitioner Fe H.
Okabe on June 17, 2008. TCT No. 225265 was later issued in petitioner’s name on August 13,
2008.
On November 27, 2008, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession over the subject property.
The RTC ruled, among other things, that the right of the petitioner to be placed in
absolute possession of the subject property was a consequence of her right of ownership and that
petitioner cannot be deprived of said possession being now the registered owner of the property.
Meanwhile, on November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner, which
granted her ex-parte petition and ordered that the corresponding writ of possession over the
subject property be issued in her favor.
The CA reversed RTC’s decision and opined, among other things, that although it may
be true that by virtue of the contract of sale, petitioner obtained the same rights of a purchaser-
owner and which rights she derived from erstwhile mortgagee turned owner PNB, this does not
mean that the right to file an ex-parte motion for a writ of possession under Act 3135 had also
been transferred to the petitioner. Such a special right is granted only to purchasers in a sale made
under the provisions of Act 3135.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was the proper remedy
of the petitioner in obtaining possession of the subject property.
HELD:
NO. Section 7 of Act No. 3135,28 as amended by Act No. 4118,29 states:
Section 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court
of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give
him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to
the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown
that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements
of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in the form of an ex parte motion x x
x and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed
to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order
immediately.
Under the provision cited above, the purchaser or the mortgagee who is also the
purchaser in the foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period,
upon an ex-parte motion and after furnishing a bond.
GC Dalton Industries, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank: the Court held that the issuance of a writ of
possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in nature as
such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of title.
China Banking Corporation v. Ordinario: the Court held that under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the
purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the property.
Spouses Nicasio Marquez and Anita Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog:
although the Court allowed the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to demand possession of the land
during the redemption period, it still required the posting of a bond under Section 7 of Act No.
3135.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the
property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the
sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time
following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer
certificate of title.
When bond required
The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period
except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No
such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of
the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper
application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of
the court.
Here, petitioner does not fall under the circumstances of the aforequoted case and the
provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, since she bought the property long after the
expiration of the redemption period. Thus, it is PNB, if it was the purchaser in the foreclosure sale,
or the purchaser during the foreclosure sale, who can file the ex-parte petition for the issuance of
writ of possession during the redemption period, but it will only issue upon compliance with the
provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135.
Remedy of purchaser subsequent to the foreclosure sale purchaser
Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 33. Deed and possession to
be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given. – If no redemption be
made within one (1) year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is
entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60)
days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the
time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and
possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from
the date of registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the
officer making the sale or his successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same validity
as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the
property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser
or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor.
When issuance of writ of possession is ex-parte and non-adversarial
From the foregoing, upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or
redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the
judgment debtor to the property, and its possession shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.
In which case, the issuance of the writ of possession ceases to be ex-parte and non-adversarial.
When issuance of writ of possession requires hearing
Thus, where the property levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a
judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to conduct a hearing to determine the nature of
said possession, i.e., whether or not he is in possession of the subject property under a claim
adverse to that of the judgment debtor.
Summary of rules
It is but logical that Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court be applied to cases
involving extrajudicially foreclosed properties that were bought by a purchaser and later sold to
third-party-purchasers after the lapse of the redemption period. The remedy of a writ of
possession, a remedy that is available to the mortgagee-purchaser to acquire possession of the
foreclosed property from the mortgagor, is made available to a subsequent purchaser, but only
after hearing and after determining that the subject property is still in the possession of the
mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee or a third party during the redemption period,
a writ of possession may issue ex-parte or without hearing. In other words, if the purchaser is a
third party who acquired the property after the redemption period, a hearing must be conducted to
determine whether possession over the subject property is still with the mortgagor or is already in
the possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor or mortgagor.
If the property is in the possession of the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be issued.
Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of possession is no longer available to such purchaser, but he can
wrest possession over the property through an ordinary action of ejectment.
5. Gabriel v. RD of Rizal, GR L-17956. Sept. 30, 1963
FACTS: Petitioner Elisa D. Gabriel, filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila, an adverse claim,
against the properties registered in the name of oppositor-appellant, Juanita R. Domingo, her
sister. As grounds for the adverse claim, petitioner allege — Notwithstanding the registration of
the foregoing properties in the name of Juanita R. Domingo, the same properties have been
included in the amended inventory of the estate of the late Antonia Reyes Vda. de Domingo, filed
by Elisa Domingo de Gabriel as they are in fact properties acquired by the deceased during her
lifetime. The registration of the titles of these properties,; should have been made in the name of
said Antonia Reyes Vda. de Dominga, but due to commission of fraud and deceit, by said Juanita
R. Domingo, who was then living in the same house with the deceased, all the titles of the above
stated properties were registered instead in her name, thus depriving herein adverse claimant who
is likewise an heir of Antonia Reyes Vda. de Domingo of her lawful rights, interests and
participations over said properties.
A similar notice of adverse claim was presented by petitioner with the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
on the properties registered in the name of Juanita R. Domingo, located in Rizal Province,
anchoring that the subject properties are included in the amended inventory of the estate of their
late mother Antonia Reyes Vda, de Domingo, who is the true owner of said properties, and
considering that the registrations in the name of Juanita R. Domingo were only made fraudulently,
thus depriving herein adverse claimant of her lawful rights, interest and participations over said
properties.
Domingo opposed, claiming that the Adverse claim was instituted for harassment, had no legal
basis, and such opposition will do irreparable loss to her.
The Register of Deeds of Manila, elevated the matter to the Land Registration Commission en
Consulta, for determination as to whether the registration of the claim is proper determination by
this Commission.
The Register of Deeds of Rizal denied registration of the Notice of Adverse Claim, stating that
such has been found to be legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law and is therefore
denied on the ground that where there are other provisions of remedies under this Act, the affidavit
of adverse claim is not applicable.
Elisa D. Gabriel appealed the above denial to the Land Registration Commission.1awphîl.nèt
The Land Registration Commission rendered a decision holding that the notices of adverse claim
filed by Elisa D. Gabriel with the Registries of Manila and Rizal are registrable. Registration should
not however be confused with validity. The registration of the adverse claim will not by itself alone
make them valid. Their validity will ultimately decided in Special Proceeding No. 2658 or, in
alternative, in the more expeditious remedy provided for in 110 of Act No. 496, i.e., a speedy
hearing upon the question the validity of the adverse claim.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the adverse claims are registrable; and
2. In holding that it is the mandatory duty of the Register of Deeds to register the instant
notices of adverse claims "whether or not they are valid, and "whether or not they are frivolous
merely intended to harass."
HELD
1. In addition to the well-taken disquisitions of the L.R.C., it should be observed that
section 110 of Act No. 496, which is the legal provision applicable to the case, is divided into two
parts: the first refers to the duty of the party who claims any part or interest in registered land
adverse to the registered owner, subsequent to the date of the original registration; and the
requirements to be complied with in order that such statement shall been titled to registration as
an adverse claim, thus showing the ministerial function of the Register of Deeds, when no defect
is found on the face of such instrument; and the second applies only when, after registration of
the adverse claim, a party files an appropriate petition with a competent court which shall grant a
speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and to enter a decree, as
justice and equity require; and in this hearing, the competent court shall resolve whether the
adverse claim is frivolous or vexatious, which shall serve as the basis in taxing the costs. In the
instant case, the first part was already acted upon by the L.P.C. which resolved in favor of the
registrability of the two adverse claims and this part should have been considered as closed. What
is left, is the determination of the validity of the adverse claims by competent court, after the filing
of the corresponding petition for hearing, which the appellant had not done.
2. As to the second issue, the Land Registration Commission did not state that it was
mandatory for a Register of Deeds to register invalid or frivolous documents, or those intended to
harass; it merely said that whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not
the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that it is his
concern to see whether the documents sought to be registered conform with the formal and legal
requirements for such documents.
The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of the Land Registration Commission, holding the
registrability of the adverse claims filed by Elisa Gabriel.
6. Arrazola v. Bernas, GR L-29740. Nov. 10, 1978
FACTS:
Elviro Bernas disinherited his adopted daughter Teresita and when he was 79 years old , he
executed a notarized will instituting his brother and sister as heirs to all his properties including
the lots which he had involuntary transferred to Teresita. In 1967, Elviro died. On December,
1967, Pedro A. Bernas filed with the register of deeds of Capiz a verified notice of adverse claim.
A copy of the will was attached to the adverse claim.
After the register of deeds had annotated the adverse claim on the transfer certificates of title,
Teresita filed in the cadastral and probate proceedings a motion for the cancellation of the
annotation of adverse claim. The motion was predicated on the grounds that she was not served
with prior notice" of the adverse claim and that there was "no petition for approval or justification"
filed with the court. Pedro A. Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio opposed the motion. The lower
court in its order of August 20, 1968 granted it and ordered the register of deeds to cancel the
annotation. The oppositors appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not expected hereditary rights do not constitute adverse claim
RULING:
Yes, the contingent, expectant and inchoate hereditary rights of the children of a living parent do
not constitute an adverse claim during his lifetime which could be annotated on the titles covering
the parent's land. That is an illustration of a frivolous or vexatious adverse claim.
In the instant case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of the adverse claim because the will
of Elviro Bernas had not yet been probated. It reasoned out that before the probate Pedro A.
Bernas and Soledad Bernas Alivio are merely presumptive heirs with a "contingent, expectant and
inchoate" interest in the two lots.
The purpose of annotating the adverse claim on the title of the disputed land is to apprise third
persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to preserve and protect the
right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the controversy. It is a notice to third persons
that any transaction regarding the disputed land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.
It has been said that the annotation of an adverse claim should not be confused with its validity
which should be litigated in a proper proceeding and that the registration of an invalid adverse
claim is not as harmful as the non-registration of a valid one.
7. Sajonas v. CA, GR 102377. July 5, 1996
FACTS: Essentially, the case before us is for cancellation of the inscription of a Notice of Levy on
Execution from a certificate of Title covering a parcel of real property. The inscription was caused
to be made by the private respondent on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-79073 of the Register
of Deeds of Marikina, issued in the name of the spouses Ernesto B. Uychocde and Lucita Jarin,
and was later carried over to and annotated on Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-109417 of the
same registry, issued in the name of the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R. Sajonas, who
purchased the parcel of land from the Uychocdes, and are now the petitioners in this case.
The facts are not disputed, and are hereby reproduced as follows:
On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed to sell a parcel
of residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas and Conchita R.
Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated September 22, 1983. The
property was registered in the names of the Uychocde spouses under TCT No. N-79073 of the
Register of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the
annotation of an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject
property, which was inscribed as Entry No. 116017. Upon full payment of the purchase price, the
Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas
couple on September 4, 1984. The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after, or
on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares (defendant-appellant) filed Civil Case No. Q-28850
for collection of sum of money against Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25, 1980, a Compromise
Agreement was entered into by the parties in the said case under which Ernesto Uychocde
acknowledged his monetary obligation to Domingo Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to
pay the same in two years from June 25, 1980. When Uychocde failed to comply with his
undertaking in the compromise agreement, defendant-appellant Pilares moved for the issuance
of a writ of execution to enforce the decision based on the compromise agreement, which the
court granted in its order dated August 3, 1982. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued on
August 12, 1982 by the CFI of Quezon City where the civil case was pending. Pursuant to the
order of execution dated August 3, 1982, a notice of levy on execution was issued on February
12, 1985. On February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said
notice of levy on execution before the Register of Deeds of Marikina and the same was annotated
at the back of TCT No. 79073 as Entry No. 123283.
When the deed of absolute sale dated September 4 1984 was registered on August 28, 1985,
TCT No. N-79073 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. N-109417 was ssued in the name
of the Sajonas couple. The notice of levy on execution annotated by defendant sheriff was carried
over to the new title. On October 21, 1985, the Sajonas couple filed a Third Party Claim with the
sheriff of Quezon City, hence the auction sale of the subject property did not push through as
scheduled.
On January 10, 1986, the Sajonas spouses demanded the cancellation of the notice of levy on
execution upon defendant-appellant Pilares, through a letter to their lawyer, Atty. Melchor Flores.
Despite said demand, defendant-appellant Pilares refused to cause the cancellation of said
annotation. In view thereof, plaintiffs-appellees filed this complaint dated January 11, 1986 on
February 5, 1986.[1]
Spouses Sajonas decided to buy on instalment from Spouses Uychocdes a piece of land. A deed
of absolute sale with adverse claim was issued to them. But there was a compromise agreement
between the vendor spouses and the Spouses Pilares (their creditor). A notice of levy of execution
was inscribed in the title.
Held: The validity of the above-mentioned rules on adverse claims has to be reexamined in the
light of the changes introduced by P.D. 1529, which provides:
Sec. 70 Adverse Claim- Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other
provision is made in this decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth
fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of
certificate of title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of
the land in which the right or interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimants residence, and
a place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration
as an adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of
thirty days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse
claim may be cancelled upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided,
however, that after cancellation, no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be
registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of
First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court
shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall
render judgment as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
registration thereof shall be ordered cancelled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing
shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount
not less than one thousand pesos, nor more than five thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the
lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of
Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from the date of registration.
A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys property of another without notice that
some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the
same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claims or interest of some other
person in the property.[36] Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any
unconscientious advantage of another.[37] Thus, the claim of the private respondent that the sale
executed by the spouses was made in fraud of creditors has no basis in fact, there being no
evidence that the petitioners had any knowledge or notice of the debt of the Uychocdes in favor
of the private respondents, nor of any claim by the latter over the Uychocdes properties or that the
same was involved in any litigation between said spouses and the private respondent. While it
may be stated that good faith is presumed, conversely, bad faith must be established by
competent proof by the party alleging the same. Sans such proof, the petitioners are deemed to
be purchasers in good faith, and their interest in the subject property must not be disturbed.
At any rate, the Land Registration Act (Property Registration Decree) guarantees to every
purchaser of registered land in good faith that they can take and hold the same free from any and
all prior claims, liens and encumbrances except those set forth on the Certificate of Title and those
expressly mentioned in the ACT as having been preserved against it. Otherwise, the efficacy of
the conclusiveness of the Certificate of Title which the Torrens system seeks to insure would be
futile and nugatory.[38]
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 17,
1991 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
February 15, 1989 finding for the cancellation of the notice of levy on execution from Transfer
Certificate of Title No. N-109417 is hereby REINSTATED.
The inscription of the notice of levy on execution on TCT No. N-109417 is hereby CANCELLED.
8. Agbulos v. Alberto, GR L-17483. July 31, 1962
By virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila on March 16, 1959
in Civil Case No. 18644 entitled Jose Agbulos, plaintiff, vs. Jose C. Alberto, defendant, the rights,
interests and participation of the latter in a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 24643 of the land records of Manila were levied upon. After due proceedings the
corresponding execution sale thereof was made on June 15, 1959, with herein appellant Agbulos
(judgment creditor in the case) as the highest bidder. The officer who made the sale issued the
certificate of sale on July 8, 1959 and the same provided that "The redemption of the above
described property from the purchaser may be made at any time within twelve (12) months after
the sale."
The same was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila on July 18 of the same
year. The entry or annotation made on the back of the title of the property reads as follows:
Entry No. 9221/T24653 — CERTIFICATE OF SALE — In favor of JOSE AGBULOS — Affecting
the rights, interest and participation of Jose C. Alberto in the property herein described for the sum
of P6,000.00 by the sale having been made at public auction by the Sheriff of Manila, pursuant to
the Notice of Levy inscribed hereon under Entry No. 5324/EO3701 subject to redemption within
one (1) year from registration hereof.
Date of instrument — July 8, 1959
Date of inscription — July 18, 1959 at 3:40 p.m.
On June 23, 1960, appellee herein (judgment debtor in the case) paid the Sheriff of Manila the
total sum P6,670.00 for the redemption of the property and said officer executed in his favor on
the same date the responding certificate of redemption.
It appears that on the same date (June 23, 1960) appellant filed with the Sheriff of Manila a verified
request for the execution and delivery to him of the final deed of sale upon the ground that the
judgment debtor not redeemed the property within the period of one year after the sale. On June
29 of the same year the Sheriff replied that he could not accede to the request, giving the following
as his reasons for the denial: (a) that the certificate of sale in favor of appellant was registered
only on July 18, 1959, for which reason the period of redemption commenced to run only from
such date; and (b) that the judgment debtor had deposited on June 23, 1960, that is, before the
expiration of the one-year period of redemption the total sum of P6,670.00 in full redemption of
property.
In view of the action taken by the Sheriff, on July 5, 1960 appellant filed a motion in Civil Case No.
18644 praying for an order annulling the certificate of redemption issued by the Sheriff of Manila
in favor of appellate and directing said officer to issue the corresponding certificate of absolute
sale in his favor. Appellee opposed the motion, and on July 22, 1960 the lower court denied the
same. Hence, this appeal taken by Agbulos who claim that the lower court erred in ruling that the
only period of redemption commenced to run only from the deed of the registration of the certificate
of sale and, consequently erred likewise in denying his motion of July 5, 1960.
Section 26, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that "the judgment debtor, or redemptioner,
may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within twelve months after the sale"
(Emphasis supplied) without specifying whether the period should start from (1) the date when the
execution sale was made, or (2) from the date when the certificate of sale was executed by the
sheriff who made the sale, or (3) from the date when said certificate of sale was registered in the
office of the corresponding register of deeds.
The property involved in the present case is registered land. It is the law in this jurisdiction that
when property brought under the operation of the Land Registration Act is sold, the operative act
is the registration of the deed of conveyance. The deed of sale does not "take effect as a
conveyance, or bind the land" until it is registered (Section 50, Act No. 496; Tuason v. Raymundo,
28 Phil. 635; Sikatuna v. Guevara, 43 Phil. 371; Worcester v. Ocampo, 34 Phil. 646). Undoubtedly,
to be in consonance with this well settled ruled, Section 24, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, provides
that a duplicate of the certificate of sale given by the sheriff who made the auction sale to the
purchaser must be filed (registered) in the office of the register of deeds of the province where the
property is situated.
In Garcia v. Ocampo, G.R. No. L-13029, June 30, 1959, we held that the twelve months period of
redemption provided for in Sec. 26, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court "begins to run not from the date
of the sale, but from the time of registration of the sale in the office of the register of deeds." The
entry or annotation made on the back of the certificate of title of the property in question on July
18, 1959 (supra) was in accordance with this ruling when it provided that the execution sale was
"subject to redemption within one (1) year from registration hereof."
A case similar to the present is that of Gonzales, et al. v. Philippine National Bank, et al., 48 Phil.
824, where we held that the provision of Section 32, Act 2938 (Charter of the Philippine National
Bank) providing for a right of redemption in favor of the bank's mortgagor "within one year after
the sale of the real estate as a result the foreclosure" should be construed to mean one year after
the confirmation of the foreclosure sale, because the sale becomes valid only after confirmation.
Along same line we may say in this case that the period of year after the sale must likewise start
only from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, because it is only then that the certificate
takes "effect as a conveyance in accordance with Act 496.
Aside from what has been said heretofore, appellant now estopped from claiming that the one-
year period redemption started earlier than the date when the certificate of sale was registered,
for the reason that he failed timely to question the entry or annotation made on the back of the
certificate of title of the property he had purchased, to the effect that the sale thereof in his favor
was subject to redemption within one year from the registration of said certificate of sale.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed with costs.
9. Baranda v. Gustilo, GR 81163. Sept. 26, 1988
FACTS: A parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara,
Iloilo covered by original certificate of title no. 6406 is the land subject of the dispute between
petitioner (Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia) and respondents(Gregorio Perez, Maria
Gotera and Susan Silao). Both parties claimed ownership and possession over the said land.
However during the trial, it was found that the transfer certificate of title held by respondents was
fraudulently acquired. So the transfer certificate of title was ordered to be put in the name of
petitioners. In compliance with the order or the RTC, the Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso
annotated the order declaring TCT T-25772 null and void, cancelled the same and issued new
certificate of titles in the name of petitioners. However, by reason of a separate case pending in
the Court of Appeals, a notice of lis pendens was annotated in the new certificate of title. This
prompted the petitioners to move for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in the new
certificates. Judge Tito Gustilo then ordered the Acting Register of Deeds for the cancellation of
the notice of lis pendens but the Acting Register of Deeds filed a motion for reconsideration
invoking Sec 77 of PD 1529.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the duty of the Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice of lis
pendens in a Torrens certificate of title?
HELD: Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the Acting Register of Deed’s stand that
the notice of lis pendens cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of the case in the Court
of Appeals. The function of the Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds,
encumbrances, instrument and the like is ministerial in nature. The acting register of deeds did
not have any legal standing to file a motionfor reconsideration of the Judge’s Order directing him
to cancel the notice of lis pendens. Sec. 10 of PD 1529 states that: “It shall be the duty of the
register of deeds to immediately register an instrument presented for registration dealing with real
or personal property which complies with all the requisites for registration.
If the instrument is not registerable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and in form the
presentor or such denial in writing, stating the ground and reasons therefore, and advising him of
his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Sec 117 of this decree.” On the other hand, Sec
117 of PD 117 states that: “When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step
to be taken or memoranda to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument
presented to him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the action taken
by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted
to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest
through the Register of Deeds.”
The function of ROD is ministerial in nature
The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances,
instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not
have any legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order
directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over the subject parcel of land.
In case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other instrument
presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration
now, the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in
accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
No room for construction for the laws on functions of ROD
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute
are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and
the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The statute concerning the function of the
Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no room
for construction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987 order of the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued by the trial court
which annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private
respondents.
10. Treasurer of the Phils. v. CA, GR L-42805. Aug. 31, 1987
FACTS: The petitioner asks us to reverse a decision of the respondent court affirming that of the
trial court holding the Assurance Fund subsidiarily liable for damages sustained by the private
respondents under the following established facts.
Sometime in 1965, a person Identifying himself as Lawaan Lopez offered to sell to the private
respondents a parcel of land located in Quezon City and consisting of 1,316.8 square meters,
which he claimed as his property. His asking price was P85.00 per square meter but after a
month's haggling the parties agreed on the reduced price of P76.00 per square meter. The sale
was deferred, however, because the prospective vendor said his certificate of title had been
burned in his house in Divisoria, and he would have to file a petition with the court of first instance
of Quezon City for a duplicate certificate of title. He did so and the petition was granted after
hearing without any opposition. Following the issuance of the new duplicate certificate of title, the
said person executed a deed of sale in favor of the private respondents, who paid him the
stipulated purchase price of P98,700.00 in full. The corresponding transfer certificate of title was
subsequently issued to them after cancellation of the duplicate certificate in the name of Lawaan
Lopez. 1
Trouble began two years later when another person, this time a woman, appeared and, claiming
to be the real Lawaan Lopez, filed a petition in the court of first instance of Quezon City to declare
as null and void the transfer of her land in favor of the private respondents, on the ground that it
had been made by an impostor. 2 After trial, the questioned deed of sale was annulled, (together
with the duplicate certificate of title issued to the impostor and the transfer certificate of title in the
name of the private respondents) and the real owner's duplicate certificate of title was revalidated.
3 Neither the Solicitor General nor the private respondents appealed the decision, but Lawaan
Lopez did so, claiming that the defendants should have been required to pay damages to her and
the costs. The appeal was dismissed, with the finding by Justices Jose Leuterio, Magno Gatmaitan
and Luis B. Reyes of the Court of Appeals that there was no collusion between the private
respondents and the impostor. 4
Subsequently the private respondents filed a complaint against the impostor Lawaan Lopez and
the Treasurer of the Philippines as custodian of the Assurance Fund for damages sustained by
the plaintiffs as above narrated. Both the trial court * ruled the respondent court ** ruled in their
favor, holding the Assurance Fund subsidiarily liable for the sum of P138,264.00 with legal interest
from the date of filing of the complaint, in case the judgment could not be enforced against the
other defendant who had been defaulted and could not be located. 5 The petitioner, disclaiming
liability, is now before us and prays for relief against the decision of the respondent court which
he says is not in accord with law and jurisprudence.
RULING: Commenting on this provision, Commissioner Antonio H. Noblejas, in his book on Land
Titles and Deed 6 notes that recovery from the Assurance Fund could be demanded by:
1) Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following conditions:
a) that there was no negligence on his part; and
b) that the loss or damage was sustained through any omission, mistake, or misfeasance
of the clerk of court, or the register of deeds, his deputy or clerk, in the performance of their
respective duties under the provisions of the land Registration Act,' or
2) Any person who has been deprived of any land or any interest therein under the
following conditions:
a) that there was no negligence on his part;
b) that he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his land or interest therein
under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree; or by the registration by any other
persons as owner of such land; or by mistake, omission or misdescription in any certificate or
owner's duplicate, or in any entry or memorandum in the register or other official book, or by any
cancellation; and
c) that he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action for the recovery of
such land or interest therein, or claim upon the same.
A careful reading of the above provision will readily show that the private respondents do not come
under either of the two situations above mentioned.
The private respondents argue that from the time the new transfer certificate of title was issued in
their name on January 28, 1965, until it was cancelled on October 12, 1967, they were the true
and exclusive owners of the disputed property. Hence, the cancellation of their title on the latter
date had the effect of depriving them of the said land and so entitles them now to proceed against
the Assurance Fund.
As this Court held in La Urbana v. Bernardo 10 "it is a condition sine qua non that the person who
brings an action for damages against the Assurance Fund be the registered owner and as the
holders of transfer certificates of title, that they be innocent purchasers in good faith and for value."
Being neither the registered owners nor innocent purchasers, the private respondents are not
entitled to recover from the Assurance Fund.
They are, of course, not entirely without recourse, for they may still proceed against the impostor
in a civil action for recovery and damages or prosecute him under the Revised Penal Code,
assuming he can be located and arrested. The problem is that he has completely disappeared.
That difficulty alone, however, should not make the Assurance Fund liable to the private
respondents for the serious wrong they have sustained from the false Lawaan Lopez. The
Government — like all governments, and for obvious reasons — is not an insurer of the unwary
citizen's property against the chicanery of scoundrels.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 26,
1976 is set aside, and Civil Case No. 12426 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal is
dismissed. No costs.
11. Ting Ho, Jr. v. Teng Gui, GR 130115. July 16, 2008
Facts:
Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia Ting Ho Belenzo against their
brother, respondent Vicente Teng Gui. The controversy revolves around a parcel of land, and
the improvements which should form part of the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting Ho,
and should be partitioned equally among each of the siblings. Petitioners alleged that their father
Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26, 1970, and left upon his death an estate. According to
petitioners, the said lot and properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of
respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese
citizen, was then disqualified to own public lands in thePhilippines; and that upon the death of
Felix Ting Ho, the respondent took possession of the same for his own exclusive use and benefit
to their exclusion and prejudice.
Issue: Whether or not the sale was void
Ruling:
No, the sale was not void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code has provided that if the price is simulated,
the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donatin, or some other act or
contract. The sale in this case, was however valid because the sale was in fact a donation. The
law requires positive proof of the simulation of the price of the sale. But since the finding was
based on a mere assumption, the price has not been proven to be a simulation.
Registration of grants and patents involving public lands is governed by Section 122 of Act No.
496, which was subsequently amended by Section 103 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, viz:
Sec. 103. Certificate of title pursuant to patents.Whenever public land is by the Government
alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Decree. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation,
grant, patent or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument to be filed with
the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies, and to be there registered like
other deeds and conveyance, whereupon a certificate of title shall be entered as in other cases of
registered land, and an owners duplicate issued to the grantee. The deeds, grant, patent or
instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and
the grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is the
act of registration that shall be the operative act to affect and convey the land, and in all cases
under this Decree registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds of the province
or city where the land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee. After due
registration and issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to be registered land
to all intents and purposes under this Decree.[16] (Emphasis supplied)
Under the law, a certificate of title issued pursuant to any grant or patent involving public land is
as conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued to private lands in the ordinary
or cadastral registration proceeding. The effect of the registration of a patent and the issuance of
a certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him an incontestable title to the land, in the same
manner as if ownership had been determined by final decree of the court, and the title so issued
is absolutely conclusive and indisputable, and is not subject to collateral attack.[17]
Nonetheless, petitioners invoke equity considerations and claim that the ruling of the RTC that an
implied trust was created between respondent and their father with respect to the subject lot
should be upheld.
This contention must fail because the prohibition against an alien from owning lands of the public
domain is absolute and not even an implied trust can be permitted to arise on equity
considerations.
This rule does not apply where the land covered by a patent issued by the Government had
previously been determined in a registration proceeding and adjudicated in favor of a private
individual other than the patentee, which situation is not present in this case.
12. New Durawood Co., Inc. v. CA, GR 111732. Feb. 20, 1996
FACTS:
On February 14, 1990, a Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Lost Owners Duplicate
Certificates of TCT Nos. 140486; 156454 and 1404855. was filed in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal by petitioner-corporation, represented by its Branch Manager, Wilson
M. Gaw x x x. Attached to said petition was an Affidavit of Loss dated December 31, 19906 of
respondent Orlando S. Bongat, one of the stockholders of petitioner-corporation.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, respondent Judge set the case for
hearing on March 18, 1991. On April 16, 1991, respondent Judge issued the questioned order.
Sometime in May, 1991, petitioner discovered that the original TCT Nos. N-140485, N-140486
and 156454 on file with the Register of Deeds of Rizal had been cancelled and, in lieu thereof,
TCT Nos. 200100, 200101 and 200102 had been issued in the name of respondent Durawood
Construction and Lumber Supply, Inc. Surprised by this cancellation, petitioner - after investigation
- found out about the reconstitution proceeding in the respondent trial court. So, on July 17, 1991,
petitioner filed suit7 in the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. 25434 praying for the annulment
of the assailed order in LRC Case No. 91-924 penned by respondent Judge. It also prayed for the
cancellation of the new certificates (TCT Nos. 200100, 200101 and 200102). On May 31, 1993,
the respondent Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision and on August 30, 1993, the
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present recourse to the Supreme
Court.
The main issue here is: does a court have jurisdiction to issue a new owners duplicate of a Torrens
certificate of title if it is shown that the existing owners copy has not, in fact and in truth, been lost
or destroyed? The Court resolved this issue in the negative in this petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 promulgated on May 31, 1993
and the subsequent Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. The said Rulings
dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 25434 and in effect affirmed the order3 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch LXXI, Antipolo, Rizal4 dated April 16, 1991 in LRC Case No. 9 1-924, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the owner s duplicate copy of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 140486, 156454 and
140485 which were lost, null and void and of no further force and effect and in lieu thereof.
(b) Hereby orders and directs that new copy of the said titles be issued to the petitioner giving
them the same faith and credit and carrying over the same terms and conditions appearing on the
originals thereof, upon payment of the required fees.
RULING:
The First Issue:
Law Governing Issuance of
Lost Owners Duplicate Titles
To resolve this issue, it is necessary to reexamine the following provisions referred to by the
parties:
(1) Section 13, Republic Act No. 26:8
Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be
published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and
to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing.
The court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at
the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein whose address is known, at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. Said notice shall state, among other things, the number of
the lost or destroyed certificate of title, if known, the name of the registered owner, the names of
the occupants or persons in. possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties
and all other interested parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on
which all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the
petition. The petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of
the notice as directed by the court.
(2) Section 109, P.D. 1529 (amending R.A. 496):
Sec. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. - In case of loss or theft of an owners
duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his
behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as soon as the loss or
theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person
applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any instrument, a sworn
statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other
person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after notice
and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a
memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all
respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be
regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
A reading of both provisions clearly shows that Section 109 of P.D. 1529 is the law
applicable in petitions for issuance of new owners duplicate certificates of title which are lost or
stolen or destroyed. On the other hand, R.A. 26 applies only in cases of reconstitution of lost or
destroyed original certificates on file with the Register of Deeds. This is expressly provided for
under Section 110 of P.D. 1529 as follows:
Sec. 110. Reconstitution of lost or destroyed original of Torrens title. - Original copies of
certificates of title lost or destroyed in the offices of Registers of Deeds as well as liens and
encumbrances affecting the lands covered by such titles shall be reconstituted judicially in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with
this Decree. The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificate
prescribed in said Act may be availed of only in case of substantial loss or destruction of land titles
due to fire, flood or other force majeure as determined by the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority: Provided, That the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged should
be at least ten percent (10%) of the total number in the possession of the Office of the Register of
Deeds: Provided, further, That in no case shall the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged
be less than five hundred (500).
Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial reconstitution shall be furnished by the Register of
Deeds of the place where the land is situated and to the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority. No order or judgment ordering the reconstitution of a certificate of title shall become
final until the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority of a notice of such order or judgment without any
appeal having been filed by any such officials. (As amended by R.A. 6732; italics supplied)
13. A. Doronila Resources Dev. Inc. v. CA, GR L-42956-57. Jan. 12, 1988
FACTS: The facts, as found by the respondent appellate court, are as follows:
l. Blue Chips Projects, Inc. a Corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines, is the registered owner of a parcel of land containing an area of One Million Two
Hundred Fifty Six Thousand Two Hundred and Sixty Nine (1,256,269) sq. meters, more or less,
situated in Barrio Paths, Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal and covered by TCT
Certificate of Title No. 344936 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal (See Original Record in LRC
Consults No. 887).
2. Blue Chips Projects, Inc. purchased said property from Purita Landicho the lawful
registered owner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 167681 (id.);
3. On December 11, 1972, petitioner-appellant A. Doronila Resources Development Inc.
availed of the remedy of lis pendens in Civil Case No. 12044 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
the same having been annotated on Transfer Certificate Title No. 344936 in the name of Blue
Chips Projects, Inc. (id.);
4. On August 8, 1973, petitioner thru its President Alfonso Doronila, filed an affidavit of
adverse claim for registration on Transfer Certificate of title No. 344936 with the Register of deeds
of Rizal on the ground that the property covered by the aforesaid title registered in the name of
Blue Chips Projects Inc. is a portion of a big parcel of land which was purchased by petitioner
corporation from Alfonso Doronila (Adverse Claim of petitioner-appellant- Record of LRC Consults
No. 887);
5. Respondent-appellee, the Register of Deeds of Rizal denied the registration of the
affidavit of the aforementioned adverse claim on the ground that a notice of lis pendens remain
registered on the certificate of title involved should be a bar to the registration of an affidavit of
adverse claim. Considering that the rights and interests of the petitioner are already amply
protected thereby without imposing a further burden on the registered owner by the registration of
an affidavit of adverse claim which would be serving the same purpose. After all an affidavit of
adverse claim does not add anything to the validity of one's claim nor does it create a non-existent
right (Letter of denial dated August 13, 1973. Record of LRC Consults 887);
6. Petitioner elevated the matter en consulta to the Land Registration Commission
(Records, LRC Consults No. 887);
7. On November 6, 1973, the Land Registration Commission issued its Resolution holding
that the affidavit of adverse claim be denied registration (LRC Consult No. 887);
8. On November 5,1973,Transfer Certificate of Title No.344936 registered in the name of
Blue Chips Projects, Inc. was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 425582 was issued
in favor of the purchaser Winmar Poultry Farms, Inc. with an annotation at the back thereof that
the property therein described is subject to the Resolution of LRC Consult No. 887 (Record, LRC
Consult 894);
9. Petitioner A. Doronila Resources Dev. Inc. again sought the registration of an affidavit
of adverse claim Identical to that which was the subject of LRC Consult No. 887 on TCT No.
425582 registered in the name of Winmar Poultry Farms, Inc. (Adverse Claim, LRC Consulta 894);
10. Respondent-appellee Register of Deed elevated the records to the Land Registration
Commission for resolution under Sec. 4 of RA No. 1151 (Letter dated Nov. 27, 1973, Record of
LRC Consult No. 894); .
11. The Land Registration Commission rendered on January 8, 1974, a resolution in L.R.C.
Consult No. 894 main its oponion L.R.C. Consult No. 887 and ruling against registrability of the
affidavit of adverse claim (Resolution LRC Consult No. 894);

12. Not satisfied with the above resolution, petitioner-appealed to this Honorable Court
(Notice of Appeal, Record of LRC Consult No. 894);
13. On March 12, 1974, appellant filed before this Honorable Court a petition for
Consolidated (sic) of Case SP-02569 (LRC Consult 887) and Case SP-02711 (LRC Consult 894)
which was granted by this Honorable Court on March 19, 1974 (p. 11, Appellant's Brief). pp. 2-5,
Brief for the Respondent-Appellee. 1
On 26 November 1975, the respondent Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered a decision,
affirming the resolutions of the Land Registration Commission in LRC Consults Nos. 887 and 894
2 The Court of Appeals said:
Besides, it cannot really be said that the rights and interests of the petitioner over the land in
question are amply protected by the annotation at the back of TCT 425582 issued in the name of
Winmar Poultry Farms, Inc., that "the property therein described is subject to the resolution of LRC
Consults No. 887." The statement that the property described is subject to the resolution of a
consulta, unlike a statement of adverse claim, cannot serve as a notice and warning to third
persons dealing with the property that someone is claiming an interest in the same or a better title
than that of the registered owner thereof. A consulta, as is generally understood, is but the
reference of a question to the Commissioner of Land Registration by a Register of Deeds when
he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken when a deed or instrument is presented to him for
registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

1. CONSIDERING: This as this court understands position position of appellant Doronilla

Resources, it was and is true registered owner of subject land as successor in interest of original
registered owner, Meerkamp & Company under OCT 301 issued on 14 January, 1907.

But that thru certain manipulation another title was issued to same land, namely, TCT 167681 in
the name of Landicho, which in turn was conveyed unto Blue Chips, and new title issued in the
name of blue Chips, TCT 344936 in November, 1971, and finally, this last title was conveyed unto
Winmar Poultry Farms and new title TCT 425582 was issued unto Winmar in November, 1973 —
therefore, Doronila Resources contends that as a matter of right on its part, and a ministerial duty
of Register of Deeds, its notice of ADVERSE CLAIM should be annotated in TCT 344936 and its
successor, TCT 425582, — and the denial by Commissioner of Land Registration to that
registration was wrong, the denial having been based on the ground that appellant Doronila
Resources had already filed Civil 12044 in CFI Rizal and had there already secured annotation of
LIS PENDENS on TCT 344936; which Doronila Resources claims was no ground at all for denial,
because lis pendens and Adverse Claims are different, and it had itself asked cancellation of its
Lis Pendens as to TCT 344936 (pages 5-6, Decision)

xxx xxx xxx

... if therefore, instead of at once filing adverse claim, he filed suit, as in present case in the mind
of this Court, the annotation, the further annotation, of adverse claim becomes redundant, ... (page
7, Decision). 3

Hence, the present recourse.

RULING:
The sole issue involved is whether or not the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of
a certificate of title precludes the subsequent registration on the same or successor certificate of
title of an adverse claim.

The Land Registration Commission, in its resolutions in the Consultas, abovementioned, declared,
and the respondent appellate court affirmed, that since the petitioner had already availed of the
remedy of lis pendens, and that the rights and interests of adverse claimant are already amply
protected by the registration of such notice of lis pendens, "it does not seem fair to have a title
saddled by two encumbrances arising from one and the same source, and serving one and the
same purpose." 4

This Court, however, has ruled differently, i.e., that the two remedies, notice of lis pendens and
adverse claim, are not contradictory or repugnant to one another; nor does the existence of one
automatically nullify the other, and if any of the registrations should be considered unnecessary
or superfluous, it would be the notice of lis pendens, and not the annotation of an adverse claim
which is more permanent and cannot be cancelled without adequate hearing and proper
disposition of the claim involved.