CANON 7:

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004.]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI'A BAR, ATTY.
FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J p:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been rendered
moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition 1 to
disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has
three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases
Nos. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also
purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez' wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the
Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement
letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court's Resolution 2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer, 3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired
Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez.
Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being
their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident
and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts
complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word
"Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation 4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure
against Meling in this wise:

Leg Ethics 1
 The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to
disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar
Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing
them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from
good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but
one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity
is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal
law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under
Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar." 5
As regards Meling's use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not
acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as
"attorney" whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his
communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by
the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a person
liable for indirect contempt of court. 6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling's membership in the
Shari'a Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court. 7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the
Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a
member of the Shari'a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari'a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character. 8 The
requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to
aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal,
judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or
crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration
required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that. IaDcTC

Leg Ethics 2
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral
character of the applicant. 10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the
Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of
such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Meling's concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the
requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari'a
Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go
unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya, 11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney"
by members of the Shari'a Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several
correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court
declared that:
. . . persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may
only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one
who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors," in the sense that
they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title
"attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice
law in this jurisdiction. 12
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of administering
justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest
employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and integrity.
Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the
constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar examinations
and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to
continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a
member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari'a Bar is
hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member
of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari'a Courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Leg Ethics 3
 RULE 139-A

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Section 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the "Integrated Bar of the
Philippines," composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of
the Supreme Court.

Section 2. Purposes. — The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall be to elevate the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Section 3. Regions. — The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions of the Integrated Bar, to wit:

(a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos
Sur, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, and Quirino.

(b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Pangasinan, Tarlac, and
Zambales;

(c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon City;

(d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque, Occidental Mindoro,
Oriental Mindoro, Quezon, and Rizal;

(e) Bicolandia, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes, Masbate, and
Sorsogon;

(f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern Samar, Samar, and
Southern Leyte;

(g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor.

(h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan Del Sur, Bukidnon, Camiguin,
Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Misamis Oriental, Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur; and

(i) Western Mindanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga, and the provinces of Cotabato, Lanao del
Norte, Lanao del Sur, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur.

In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of Governors shall, with the approval of the Supreme Court,
determine the Region to which the said province shall belong.

Section 4. Chapters. — A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be organized in every province. Except as hereinbelow
provided, every city shall be considered part of the province within which it is geographically situated.

A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political subdivisions or areas;

(a) The sub-province of Aurora;

(b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila;

Leg Ethics 4
 (c) Quezon City;

(d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;

(e) Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;

(f) Cebu City; and

(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City.

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the
Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof, his residence is
located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.

Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed by the Board of
Governors and approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this Rule notwithstanding.

Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions on matters and problems of common concern.

Section 5. House of Delegates. — The Integrated Bar shall have a House of Delegates of not more than one hundred
twenty members who shall be apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as may be according to the number of their
respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. On or before December 31, 1974, and every four
years thereafter, the Board of Governors shall make an apportionment of Delegates.

The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening of the annual convention of the House and shall
end on the day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next succeeding annual convention. No person may
be a Delegate for more than two terms.

The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of Governors at any time during the month of April of
each year for the election of Governor, the reading and discussion of reports including the annual report of the Board of
Governors, the transaction of such other business as may be referred to it by the Board, and the consideration of such
additional matters as may be requested in writing by at least twenty Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be
called by the Board of Governors to consider only such matters as the Board shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates who
have registered for a convention, whether annual or special, shall constitute a quorum to do business.

Section 6. Board of Governors. — The Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine Governors shall be
elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis of one Governor from each Region.
Each Governor shall be chosen from a list of nominees submitted by the Delegates from the Region, provided that not
more than one nominee shall come from any Chapter. The President and the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the
Governors from outside of themselves as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso factobecome members of the Board.

The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and until their successors
shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for more than two terms.

The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and such time and place as it shall designate. A
majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business. Special meetings may be called by the
President or by five members of the Board.

Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt By-Laws and promulgate Canons of Professional
Responsibility for all members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws and the Canons may be amended by the Supreme
Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.

Leg Ethics 5
The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the
Integrated Bar as well as the provisions of this Rule.

Section 7. Officers. — The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an Executive Vice President who shall be chosen by the
Governors immediately after the latter's election, either from among themselves or from other members of the Integrated
Bar, by the vote of at least five Governors. Each of the regional members of the Board shall be ex officio Vice President for
the Region which he represents.

The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and
until their successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President shall automatically become the President for
the next succeeding full term. The Presidency shall rotate from year to year among all the nine Regions in such order or
rotation as the Board of Governors shall prescribe. No person shall be President or Executive Vice President of the
Integrated Bar for more than one term.

The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and employees as may be required by the
Board of Governors, to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board, and to hold office at the pleasure of
the Board or for such terms as it may fix. Said officers and employees need not be members of the Integrated Bar.

Section 8. Vacancies. — In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his duties shall be performed by the
Executive Vice President; and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice
President shall serve as Acting President during the remainder of the term of the office thus vacated. In the event of the
death, resignation, removal, or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors
shall elect an Acting President to hold office until the next succeeding election or during the period of disability.

The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors, and all other positions of Officers of the Integrated
Bar shall be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or position is for a fixed period, the person chosen
to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Section 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collection
from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
deceased members thereof.

Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

Section 11. Voluntary termination of membership; re-instatement. — A member may terminate his membership by filing a
written notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall immediately bring the matter to the
attention of the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from
the Roll of Attorneys. Reinstatement may be made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the
Board of Governors and approved by the Court.

Section 12. Grievance procedures. — The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for grievance procedures for the
enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the members of the Integrated Bar, but no action involving the
suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his name from the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective without
the final approval of the Supreme Court.

Section 13. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar shall be strictly non-political, and every activity tending to impair this
basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial,
or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election
of appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
Leg Ethics 6
his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to
any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.

Section 14. Positions honorary. — Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the Supreme Court, no Delegate
or Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member shall receive any compensation, allowance or
emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any service rendered therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any
expense incurred in the discharge of his functions.

Section 15. Fiscal matters. — The Board of Governors shall administer the funds of the Integrated Bar and shall have the
power to make appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause proper Books of Accounts to be kept and
Financial Statements to be rendered and shall see to it that the proper audit is made of all accounts of the Integrated Bar
and all the Chapters thereof.

Section 16. Journal. — The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a quarterly Journal of the Integrated Bar, free
copies of which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar.

Section 17. Voluntary Bar associations. — All voluntary Bar associations now existing or which may hereafter be formed
may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes therewith.

Section 18. Amendments. — This Rule may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation
of the Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.

Section 19. Organizational period. — The Commission on Bar Integration shall organize the local Chapters and toward this
end shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all Judges throughout the Philippines. All Chapter
organizational meetings shall be held on Saturday, February 17, 1973. In every case, the Commission shall cause proper
notice of the date, time and place of the meeting called to organize a Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose,
including the election of a President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and five Directors.

The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and apportion the same among all the Chapters as nearly as may
be in proportion to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. The
President of each Chapter shall concurrently be its Delegate to the House of Delegates. The Vice President shall be his
alternate, except where the Chapter is entitled to have more than one Delegate, in which case the Vice President shall also
be a Delegate.

The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect additional as well as alternate Delegates.

The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on Saturday, March 17, 1973 for the Purpose of electing a
Board of Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and forthwith meet to elect the Officers of the
Integrated Bar. The Officers so chosen shall immediately assume their respective positions.

Section 20. Effectivity. — This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973.

Leg Ethics 7
 EN BANC

[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP Administrative
Case No. MDD - 1).

SYNOPSIS

For respondent's stubborn refusal to pay his memebership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since the
latter's constitution, notwithstanding due notice, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
unanimously adopted and submitted to the Supreme Court a resolution recommending the removal of respondent's name
from its Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.
Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, questions the
all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the
provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense
that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the
IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his
name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
of an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar are valid exercise of the police
power over an important profession; that to compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate; that the requirement to pay membership fees is imposed as a regulatory measure
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration; that the penalty provisions for non-
payment are not void as unreasonable or arbitrary; that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and power to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is expressly provided by Art.X, Section 5(5) of the Constitution and held as an inherent
judicial function by a host of decided cases; and that the provisions of Rules of Court 139-A ordaining the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines and the IBP By-Laws complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS; BAR INTEGRATION; NATURE AND PURPOSE. — An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every
lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is
afforded an opportunity to do his share incarrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all

Leg Ethics 8
lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar,
and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason
for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
offending member.
2. ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; PRACTICE OF LAW NOT A VESTED RIGHT BUT A
PRIVILEGE. — All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a
privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to
his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. The practice of law being clothed with public
interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest
he has created. The expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police
power"
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION TO EFFECT THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR. — The Congress in enacting Republic
Act No. 6397, approved on September 17, 1971, authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police
power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively," the Supreme Court inordaining the
integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the
Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May
4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands
of pressing public necessity.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION OF RESTRAINTS JUSTIFIED. — The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere
with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the
Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should
not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is
an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
5. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION VESTS SUPREME COURT WITH PLENARY POWER IN ALL CASES REGARDING ADMISSION TO AND
SUPERVISION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — Even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to
the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law, "(Sec. 5[5], Art. X, 1973 Costitution)
it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
6. ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OF A LAWYER'S CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO
ASSOCIATE. — To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He becomes a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by
the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.
7. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE; A REGULATORY MEASURE NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW. — There is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits the Supreme Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses
Leg Ethics 9
of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY PROVISIONS, NOT VOID. — If the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize,
then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary. The practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the
inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public responsibilities.
9. ID.; POWER TO PASS UPON FITNESS TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE BAR VESTED IN THE SUPREME COURT. — The
matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities. The power of the Supreme Court
to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not
be misused or prostituted.

10. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The provisions of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court ordaining the integration of the Bar of the
Philippines and the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is neither unconstitutional nor illegal, and a lawyer's
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, notwithstanding due
notice, in violation of said Rule and By-Laws, is a ground for disbarment and striking out of his name from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J p:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads:
". . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail
to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned."
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above;
he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on
March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features

Leg Ethics 10
of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines
was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's
name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority
of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership inthe
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name
of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule: LLphil
"SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter
be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court."
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
"SEC. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. . . . ."
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to
be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support
of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending
that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature
pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of
such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta,
et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous
pronouncement that it was.
". . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive
Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly
constitutional and legally unobjectionable' . . ."
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations
organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a
process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the
Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for
the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional

Leg Ethics 11
responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing,
a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public
welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon
the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a
vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. 4 The practice of law
being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to
the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression
"affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York,
291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectivity." Hence, the
Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on
January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate
through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare
and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens inorder to secure the general prosperity
and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme
lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to
restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the
explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of
the Philippines, which reads:
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . .",
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit inorder to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking
solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law, " it at once

Leg Ethics 12
 becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases
regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of
interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation,
he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim. prLL
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of
the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by
the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership
fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession
to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds
for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted
to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country should be
and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize,
then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow
to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment
proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: The

Leg Ethics 13
power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds.
It is a power which is inherent inthis court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of
justice . . . the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the
legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an
unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It
is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the ideals and traditions of an honorable
profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the
power will not be misused or prostituted. . ."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power
to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Bar . . ." (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. cdll
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial
A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of
the Court.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 4749. January 20, 2000.]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Soliman M. Santos, Jr., a member of the bar, sent a letter-complaint dated February 8, 1997 to this Court. He alleged that
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas for a number of years had not indicated the proper Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Official Receipt Numbers and data (date and place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only
indicated "IBP Rizal 259060," but he had been using this for at least three years already. This matter was being brought in
the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies a that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law." In his comment, Atty. Llamas claimed that since 1992, he publicly made it
clear in his Income Tax Return that he had only a limited practice of law and his principal occupation is farming. And being
a senior citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 in the payment of taxes. Thus, he
honestly believed in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only a limited practice, the subsequent
payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. Nonetheless, despite such honest belief, he
was ready to tender such fulfillment on payment.
The Court ruled that respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his
practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of
individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by
the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of
membership or association dues. Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
filed in court indeed merited the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express
willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, the Court believed that the penalty of
one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, was appropriate.

Leg Ethics 14
 SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP); MEMBERSHIP DUES; PAYMENT IS REQUIRED TO LIMITED
PRACTICE. — Respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice
is "limited."
2. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7432; SENIOR CITIZENS EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP OR ASSOCIATION DUES ARE NOT INCLUDED THEREIN. — While it
is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided,
that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association
dues.
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; VIOLATED BY MISREPRESENTATION OF LAWYER
TO PUBLIC AND COURTS THAT HE HAS PAID HIS IBP DUES. — By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. CANON 10 — A LAWYER
OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY; MITIGATED BY LAWYER'S ADVANCED AGE, EXPRESS WILLINGNESS TO PAY HIS IBP DUES AND PLEA
FOR MORE TEMPERATE APPLICATION OF LAW. — Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the
pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his
express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one
year suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J p:

This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of the
bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP
O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal
259060" but he has been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the following attached
sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)
Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-
25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030,
RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM
Annex C — "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for Extension of Time to File Required Comment and
Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA
6th Div.
Leg Ethics 15
 This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly
admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law." There is
also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months
shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one
year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of
which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any
PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not
only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also
copy furnishing some of these courts). cdtai
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on
October 28, 1981 (in SCRA)
2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66,
Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997
referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondent's signature above his name,
address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of the order, 2 dated February 14, 1995,
issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he
has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice, after which
the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum, 4 dated
June 3, 1998, respondent alleged: 5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same
O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good
standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above
cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction
for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and
respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati,
Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court
of Appeals and is still pending.

Leg Ethics 16
 Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never
set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that
he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a
farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt
under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an
example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law,
but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is
covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be
voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that
he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is
willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and
penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again
irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act
of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in
all good faith, to the contrary. prLL
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the
decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution, 7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, §12(b) of
the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering respondent's suspension for three
months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR
numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of
"IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R.
Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked
and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
xxx xxx xxx
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that
he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it
clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par.
4 of Respondent's Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

Leg Ethics 17
 On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the
IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his
actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP dues. He
likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060"
in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP
chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is
only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such
as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to
ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled
members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it does not
matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the
payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include
payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he
had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the most
severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more
temperate application of the law, 8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate. LLjur
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land.
SO ORDERED.

Leg Ethics 18
CANON 8:

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6672. September 4, 2009.]

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J p:

This is a complaint for disbarment 1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law
Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services. SEDaAH
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients 2 to
transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance 3and expeditious collection on their
claims. 4 To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit 5 of James Gregorio attesting that
Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent's
services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent's" calling card: 6
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE *
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)

Leg Ethics 19
 Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said
calling card. 7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, 9 found that
respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 10 and other canons 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain,
personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 12 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD
recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier
penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended
penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainant's professional
practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said
misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyer's
services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 — A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers
should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. 13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or
skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public's estimation and impair its ability to
efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called. 14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03.A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO
SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS. HDacIT
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers. 15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. 16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03.A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR
PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MAN'S CAUSE.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a measure to protect the community from barratry
and champerty. 18
Complainant presented substantial evidence 19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons
coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent's office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well
as profited from referrals' suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano's actions, respondent's law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labiano's word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon
3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Leg Ethics 20
 With regard to respondent's violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal
another lawyer's client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees
for his services. 20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor
receiving benefits from Labiano's "referrals". Furthermore, he never denied Labiano's connection to his
office. 21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another's legal practice. He cannot escape
liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR. THIECD
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule
16.04:
Rule 16.04 — A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he
is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer's fees for transcript of stenographic
notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer's independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment
may not be adversely affected. 22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his
entire devotion and fidelity to the client's cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client's
case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its
outcome. 23 Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his
client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in
violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client's cause. 24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice 25 which calls for the exercise of the
Court's disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with
a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. 26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to
protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal
profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to
clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty
is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer's best advertisement is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. 27 For this
reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer's name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced. 28
Labiano's calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance". The phrase was clearly used to entice
clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions.
Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress
and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the
legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to
rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano's calling cards.
Leg Ethics 21
 WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon
3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. DcTaEH
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of
the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to
be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

CANON 9:

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 7269. November 23, 2011.]

ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, complainant, vs. ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana) against
Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant
Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso's deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No.
SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC),
San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was
filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela
Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente's
collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25
November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices specified Dela
Rosa as Busmente's collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer. IDTSaC
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue
misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente's former secretary.
Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the
Answer 1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
Leg Ethics 22
 The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation, 2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa
was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmente's collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP-
CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of
her separation from employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of
the case, were all sent to Busmente's designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated that Busmente's only excuse was
that Dela Rosa connived with his former secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmente's staff, alleging
Macasieb's failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that
Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulaso's case in her affidavit and that there was no mention that she actually witnessed
Macasieb withholding pleadings and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted that Macasieb was still working
at Busmente's office in November 2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift Order of Default that she
signed. However, even if Macasieb resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005,
which belied Busmente's allegation that Dela Rosa was able to illegally practice law using his office address without his
knowledge and only due to Dela Rosa's connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmente's allegation that his signature
on the Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to submit any report from the NBI despite the
lapse of four months from the time he reserved his right to submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente's suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years. On 26
May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, 3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of Busmente's suspension to six
months. DaESIC
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report 4 from the NBI stating that the signature
in the Answer, when compared with standard/sample signatures submitted to its office, showed that they were not
written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of Governors
denied Busmente's motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal
practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the
public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of his services. 5 The Court further
ruled that holding one's self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying
oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office
for the general practice of law. 6
The Court explained:
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client,
and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to
the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus,
the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to
Leg Ethics 23
 be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 7 ESCacI
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar, misrepresented herself as
Busmente's collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly
assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa's employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela Rosa was able to
continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmente's staff. As
pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa
continued to represent Ulaso until 2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmente's office until 2005.
The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosa's practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmente's office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7 December 2004
Order 8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela
Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order, Judge Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil
Case No. 9284 on 8 February 2005. It would have been impossible for Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the
case, considering Busmente's claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in
Busmente's office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a copy of the NBI
report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen signatures
submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The report shows that Busmente only
submitted to the NBI the questioned signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however, showed that there were
other documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November 2003 and Motion to Lift Order
of Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as
well as three letters dated 29 August 2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all signed by
Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in these other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came to know about
the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its status. Busmente's allegation contradicted the Joint
Counter-Affidavit 9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that: cEAHSC
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE AND
ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed by IRENE BIDES
and LILIA VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment docketed as Civil Case No.
9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan, Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit
that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other court records as
our legal counsel the same could not be taken against us for, we believed in good faith that she was a
lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred her to us (sic), she was handling
some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which she filed in
court in connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal
counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;
f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following elements of the offense are not present, to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;
2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;
Leg Ethics 24
 3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false; SIDTCa
4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the narration of facts.
And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which is not so in the
instant case.
g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her whether she
was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would have been unethical and
shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that she has legal qualifications to
represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us and
attend our hearings in short, she gave us paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he
allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente
was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of
the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law
for six months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in
the land.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 9604. March 20, 2013.]

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, complainants, vs. ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY.
JANUS T. JARDER, respondents.

Leg Ethics 25
 DECISION

CARPIO, J p:

The Case
This administrative case arose from a Complaint filed by Rodrigo E. Tapay (Tapay) and Anthony J. Rustia (Rustia), both
employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo (Atty. Bancolo) and Atty. Janus T. Jarder
(Atty Jarder) for violation of the Canons of Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public Document, Gross Dishonesty,
and Harassment. HICATc
The Facts
Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia received an Order dated 14 October 2004 from the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of
public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr. (Divinagracia), a co-
employee in the Sugar Regulatory Administration. The Complaint 1 dated 31 August 2004 was allegedly signed on behalf of
Divinagracia by one Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo Law Office based in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed
against them before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia since he had yet
to meet Divinagracia in person. When Rustia showed him the Complaint, Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature
appearing above his name as counsel for Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit
to attest to such fact. On 9 December 2004, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying his supposed signature appearing on
the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman and submitted six specimen signatures for comparison. Using
Atty. Bancolo's affidavit and other documentary evidence, Tapay and Rustia filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia
of falsifying the signature of his alleged counsel, Atty. Bancolo.
In a Resolution dated 28 March 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman provisionally dismissed the Complaint since the
falsification of the counsel's signature posed a prejudicial question to the Complaint's validity. Also, the Office of the
Ombudsman ordered that separate cases for Falsification of Public Document 2 and Dishonesty 3 be filed against
Divinagracia, with Rustia and Atty. Bancolo as complainants.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his Counter-Affidavit dated 1 August 2005 denying that he falsified the signature of his
former lawyer, Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an affidavit dated 1 August 2005 by Richard A. Cordero,
the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracia's case and that the Complaint
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo's instructions. Divinagracia
asked that the Office of the Ombudsman dismiss the cases for falsification of public document and dishonesty filed against
him by Rustia and Atty. Bancolo and to revive the original Complaint for various offenses that he filed against Tapay and
Rustia.
In a Resolution dated 19 September 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case for falsification of
public document (OMB-V-C-05-0207-E) for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion states: IaDTES
WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence, without prejudice to
the re-filing by Divinagracia, Jr. of a proper complaint for violation of RA 3019 and other offenses
against Rustia and Tapay.
SO ORDERED. 4
The administrative case for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-05-0219-E) was also dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in a
Decision dated 19 September 2005.
On 29 November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint 5 to disbar
Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo's law partner. The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a
harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants
stated further that the signature of Atty. Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants
Leg Ethics 26
attached a Report 6 dated 1 July 2005 by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory 6 which examined three other
letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that
the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not
written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained that not only were respondents engaging in
unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute
innocent people.
On 9 January 2006, complainants filed a Supplement to the Disbarment Complaint Due to Additional Information. They
alleged that a certain Mary Jane Gentugao, the secretary of the Jarder BancoloLaw Office, forged the signature of
Atty. Bancolo.
In their Answer dated 26 January 2006 to the disbarment complaint, respondents admitted that the criminal and
administrative cases filed by Divinagracia against complainants before the Office of the Ombudsman were accepted by the
Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo alleged that after being informed of the
assignment of the cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the necessary pleadings and documents. However,
due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the pleadings and communications be signed in his name by the
secretary of the law office. Respondents added that complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate against them
since the cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by testimonial and
documentary evidence. Respondents also denied that Mary Jane Gentugao was employed as secretary of their law office.
Tapay and Rustia filed a Reply to the Answer dated 2 March 2006. Thereafter, the parties were directed by the Commission
on Bar Discipline to attend a mandatory conference scheduled on 5 May 2006. The conference was reset to 10 August
2006. On the said date, complainants were present but respondents failed to appear. The conference was reset to 25
September 2006 for the last time. Again, respondents failed to appear despite receiving notice of the conference.
Complainants manifested that they were submitting their disbarment complaint based on the documents submitted to the
IBP. Respondents were also deemed to have waived their right to participate in the mandatory conference. Further, both
parties were directed to submit their respective position papers. On 27 October 2006, the IBP received complainants'
position paper dated 18 October 2006 and respondents' position paper dated 23 October 2006. AHDaET
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On 11 April 2007, Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP, submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancoloviolated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same Code. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the practice of law and Atty. Jarder be
admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities in their law firm.
In her Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner opined:
. . . . In his answer[,] respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo admitted that his signature appearing in the
complaint filed against complainants' Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony J. Rustia with the Ombudsman
were signed by the secretary. He did not refute the findings that his signatures appearing in the various
documents released from his office were found not to be his. Such pattern of malpratice by respondent
clearly breached his obligation under Rule 9.01 of Canon 9, for a lawyer who allows a non-member to
represent him is guilty of violating the aforementioned Canon. The fact that respondent was busy
cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally. After all respondent is a member of a law
firm composed of not just one (1) lawyer. The Supreme Court has ruled that this practice constitute
negligence and undersigned finds the act a sign of indolence and ineptitude. Moreover, respondents
ignored the notices sent by undersigned. That showed patent lack of respect to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippine[s'] Commission on Bar Discipline and its proceedings. It betrays lack of courtesy and
irresponsibility as lawyers.
On the other hand, Atty. Janus T. Jarder, a senior partner of the law firm Jarder Bancolo and Associates
Law Office, failed to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his law firm. As a
senior partner[,] he failed to abide to the principle of "command responsibility". . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Leg Ethics 27
 Respondent Atty. Janus Jarder after all is a seasoned practitioner, having passed the bar in 1995 and
practicing law up to the present. He holds himself out to the public as a law firm designated as
Jarder Bancolo and Associates Law Office. It behooves Atty. Janus T. Jarder to exert ordinary diligence to
find out what is going on in his law firm, to ensure that all lawyers in his firm act in conformity to
the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a partner[,] it is his responsibility to provide efficacious
control of court pleadings and other documents that carry the name of the law firm. Had he done that,
he could have known the unethical practice of his law partner Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. Respondent Atty.
Janus T. Jarder failed to perform this task and is administratively liable under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7
On 19 September 2007, in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97, the Board of Governors of the IBP approved with modification the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The Resolution states:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent Atty. Bancolo's
violation of Rule 9.01, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year. HAEDCT
However, with regard to the charge against Atty. Janus T. Jarder, the Board of Governors RESOLVED as
it is hereby RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the case for lack of merit. 8
Tapay and Rustia filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Likewise, Atty. Bancolo filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22
December 2007. Thereafter, Atty. Jarder filed his separate Consolidated Comment/Reply to Complainants' Motion for
Reconsideration and Comment Filed by Complainants dated 29 January 2008.
In Resolution No. XX-2012-175 dated 9 June 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied both complainants' and
Atty. Bancolo's motions for reconsideration. The IBP Board found no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner and affirmed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-97 dated 19 September 2007.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful review of the records of the case, we agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board and find
reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty. Bancolo administratively liable.
Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed in
his name by a secretary of his law office. Clearly, this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by
law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
This rule was clearly explained in the case of Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio, 9 where we held: AacDHE
The lawyer's duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client,
and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to
the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus,
the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to
be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or
Leg Ethics 28
 corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, 10 we held that the preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal
work involving the practice of law which is reserved exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty. Bancolo's
authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of a pleading to another
lawyer, he may not delegate it to a non-lawyer. Further, under the Rules of Court,counsel's signature serves as a
certification that (1) he has read the pleading; (2) to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground
to support it; and (3) it is not interposed for delay. 11 Thus, by affixing one's signature to a pleading, it is counsel alone who
has the responsibility to certify to these matters and give legal effect to the document.
In his Motion for Reconsideration dated 22 December 2007, Atty. Bancolo wants us to believe that he was a victim of
circumstances or of manipulated events because of his unconditional trust and confidence in his former law partner, Atty.
Jarder. However, Atty. Bancolo did not take any steps to rectify the situation, save for the affidavit he gave to Rustia
denying his signature to the Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo had an opportunity to
maintain his innocence when he filed with the IBP his Joint Answer (with Atty. Jarder) dated 26 January 2006.
Atty. Bancolo, however, admitted that prior to the preparation of the Joint Answer, Atty. Jarder threatened to file a
disbarment case against him if he did not cooperate. Thus, he was constrained to allow Atty. Jarder to prepare the Joint
Answer. Atty. Bancolo simply signed the verification without seeing the contents of the Joint Answer.
In the Answer, Atty. Bancolo categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and
pleadings filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Undoubtedly,
Atty. Bancolo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a
pleading. This violation is an act of falsehood which is a ground for disciplinary action.
The complainants did not present any evidence that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of, or even
participated in the wrongful practice of Atty. Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign pleadings for him. Thus,
we agree with the finding of the IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable. AHSaTI
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty. Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted. We also find
proper the dismissal of the case against Atty. Jarder.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. Jarder for lack of merit.
We find respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let
copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Leg Ethics 29