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perfection in his 1755 essay “On Sentiments” (Beiser 206). The problem, as it arose there,
concerned the fact that one often finds the aesthetic experience of perceiving various kinds of
imperfections in art as somehow pleasing. This reality poses a problem for any aesthetics of
perfection inasmuch as such aesthetic theories contend that pleasure is the sensuous intuition of
the perfection of an object (Guyer 259–260). The problem, or paradox, then concerns how it is
the case that experience proves that one often does take pleasure in the intuition of tragic events
In the present essay, I will explain how Mendelssohn overcomes the “problem of tragic
pleasure” (Beiser 198) by developing his theory of ‘mixed sentiments’. I will ultimately show
how the notions of love and sympathy in Mendelssohn’s theory of mixed sentiments allows him
to circumvent the problem of tragic pleasure in a way that had momentous significance for the
As noted above, Mendelssohn first wrote on the problem of tragic pleasure in the early
essay “On Sentiments”. There, Mendelssohn describes the problem thus: “Human beings are so
2
peculiar in their delights that often they take pleasure in what ought to arouse their sorrow;
indeed even in the very instant that it arouses their sorrow …The grisly sight pleases”
(Philosophical Writings 36).1 Mendelssohn then poses the question, “[w]hence this peculiar
Mendelssohn for many years over the course of the development of theory of mixed sentiments
up until the 1771 second version of the “Rhapsody or addition to the Letters on sentiments”. On
this point, Frederick Beiser states that “Mendelssohn’s thinking about tragedy was turbulent,
At this earliest stage of Mendelssohn’s grappling with the problem of tragic pleasure, i.e.,
in the dialogue “On Sentiments”, the problem was posed with reference to the aesthetic intuition
of a painting of a sea ship in the midst of being torn asunder during a violent storm. In the
dialogue Mendelssohn (under the guise of Euphranor) states to his interlocutor Theocles: “You
yourself, Theocles, how often have you doted on the painting that shines in my father’s cabinet
… It is a ship that, having battled long enough with the storm and waves, is finally sinking …
And this sight pleases you Theocles?” (PW 36-37). The reasons for how it possible is that such a
sight—a tragic and therefore imperfect sight—could please Theocles is what Mendelssohn’s
aesthetics of perfections must uncover, and in such a way that the very possibility of an
aesthetics of perfection is not undermined by an irrationalism which would allow for pleasurable
1
Hereafter
cited
as
PW.
2
Cf. Beiser: “Behind the conundrum of tragic pleasure there lurked an even greater danger:
irrationalism. Since perfection is the form or structure of reason, the pleasure that we take in the
imperfection of tragedy seems to show that we are not entirely rational beings. Indeed, it
suggests that we enjoy things just because they are disorderly, destructive, frenzied, and even
mad” (206)
3
Here it will be helpful to explain a bit more in detail why such a pleasure in something
distinguishes the differences between imperfections in objects and perfections in objects in the
“Rhapsody”. Here, Mendelssohn states: “the affirmative features of a matter constitute the
elements of its perfection, just as the negative features on the same constitute the elements of its
“multiplicity which harmonizes in something common”, where this “something common” is the
natural law, or reason, which harmonizes the multiplicity into a unity (PW 133; Cf. Koller 329–
330). Hence Mendelssohn’s definition of a pleasant sentiment as “nothing other than the clear,
Mendelssohn refers to such a pleasant sentiment as the “pleasure of beauty” (PW 24). The
intuition of the beautiful is the clear but indistinct intuition of the harmonizing of the many in the
unity of the natural law that binds them as a unity. This is to say that when intuiting the beautiful,
one does not analyze each distinct aspect of the parts of thing which comprise its unity, but rather
sees the whole simply in its wholeness, i.e., as indistinct but nevertheless whole in its pleasurable
If one were to view each distinct law-like adherence of each discrete part of a unity, one
would get caught up in a process of endless micro-analysis and would thereby not be able to
view the unity of the multiplicity wherein consists the pleasure of intuitions of the beautiful. As
4
an example of the intuition of sensuous perfection, Mendelssohn offers the intuition of two dwarf
trees. He writes:
If you observe two dwarf trees in your fruit garden and pay heed to the branches which
ascend in circular order, you then appreciate the sensuous beauty of the trees. Its
appearance pleases you, and your sensuous feeling is excited. A type of perfection is, to
be sure, bound up with the beauty since given the general design of beauty a reason may
be given why the branches are aligned just so. But the purpose of the order is to delight
the senses through a simple proportion, and the perfection depends upon the beauty (PW
24)
What is important to note in this example is that, while it is the case that there is a
“general design”, a “circular order” and a “reason” for why the “branches are aligned just so” for
the dwarf trees, it isn’t the reason as reason, which is intuited in sensuous experience, but rather
the clear but indistinct whole as pleasurable, which is to say as beautiful. By stating that the
perfection depends upon beauty in this example, Mendelssohn means that one has to have the
pleasurable experience of the object as a beautiful intuition (and therefore not as an intellectual
intuition of perfection) in order for “sensuous perfection” to be gleaned.3 This move marks a
To recap, sensuous perfection is the pleasure in intuitions of the beautiful: one is pleased
by the beauty of the clear intuition of on a object (for example, the dwarf trees), despite the fact
3
Here
it
is
necessary
to
qualify
this
remark
by
pointing
out
an
ambiguity
in
Mendelssohn’s
account
of
whether
the
perfection
depends
upon
the
beauty
or
whether
the
opposite
is
the
case,
as
Mendelssohn
notes
in
the
“Rhapsody”:
“As
far
as
pleasant
sentiments
are
concerned,
they
are
an
effect
of
perfection,
a
gift
of
heaven
inseparable
from
knowledge
and
from
the
choice
of
the
good”
(PW
151).
I
contend
that
Mendelssohn’s
comments
in
the
“Rhapsody”
take
philosophical
precedence
over
his
earlier
remarks
in
“On
Sentiments”.
One
way
to
deal
with
this
ambiguity
is
to
contend
that
in
aesthetic
intuition
the
pleasure
in
the
beauty
of
an
object
is
what
the
specifically
aesthetic
perfection
“depends”
on,
but
inasmuch
as
aesthetic
intuition
is
a
lesser
kind
of
intuition
than
intellectual
intuition,
aesthetic
perfections
are,
in
fact,
an
effect
of
the
highest,
i.e.
intellectual
perfections.
I
contend
that
this
is
the
case.
5
that one does not at the same time intuit each distinct natural law within the multiplicity for “why
the branches are aligned just so” (PW 24). It is intellectual perfection, as opposed to sensuous
perfection, which is concerned with the intuition of each distinct natural-law-abiding connection
in the multiplicity of the tree and its connection to everything else. On this point, Mendelssohn
states: “consider these leaves, these branches, these buds here, those blossoms there; what sort of
common final purpose binds them together. In what connection do they stand to the tree and,
through it, to the whole of things?” (PW 24). Intellectual intuitions are thus concerned with
distinct objects, their connections, and their final purposes, which is to say their reasons for
being.
perfection, it is now possible to unravel the problem of tragic pleasure: why it is the case that
objects which should not please us, i.e., objects with imperfections, nonetheless do please us in
some way. First, it is important to note why it is the case that something tragic in an object, for
example the image of the impending death of sailors aboard a ship in peril, comprises its being
imperfect. This will require a brief description of Mendelssohn’s notion of the will.
will. Following Plato, Mendelssohn contends that everyone desires the good. This is perhaps
nowhere more evident than in the “Rhapsody” where Mendelssohn states: “each spirit generally,
is originally oriented to the good and perfect, and that the choice of a spirit which is free could
not possibly have anything but perfection as its sufficient reason” (PW 150). It is with respect to
this theory of the will that the “problem of tragic pleasure” is so troublesome for Mendelssohn.
How can it be the case that every spirit desires the good and desires perfection, and yet a spirit
can find pleasure in that which has imperfections? Importantly, the fact that tragic objects are
6
imperfect is evident in the fact that upon viewing them, even as in some manner pleasurable, we
nevertheless also feel a certain pain or repulsion; and these feelings necessarily denote an
To repeat a remark from above, Mendelssohn states that “the affirmative features of a
matter constitute the elements of its perfection, just as the negative features on the same
constitute the elements of its imperfection” (PW 132–133). The fact that one feels a degree of
displeasure in the viewing of tragic objects denotes the fact that there is something imperfect in
them; there is a lack of pleasurable harmony in our intuition of them inasmuch as their content
contains these negative features, i.e., the tragic features, which displease the viewer (PW 133).
Inasmuch as Mendelssohn’s aesthetics of perfection as well as his theory of the will cannot allow
that rational beings find pleasure in imperfect things, i.e., things which contravene the rational
being’s desire for the good, he must find a way of overcoming this problem. He does so with his
him to claim that the pleasure that we feel in viewing tragic objects is not a pleasure felt for the
object itself, but rather for the subjectively affirmative powers that the tragic objects arouse in us.
imperfect/tragic object and the approval of the enhanced perfection of the soul in knowing of
… arouse dissatisfaction in relation to the object and satisfaction in relation to the mind’s
projection which intuitively knows and disapproves of the object” (PW 146).
In mixed sentiments concerning the intuition of something tragic4 in objects, one feels
repelled by the tragic object itself, but finds pleasure in the powers of the soul which are able to
determine the imperfections in the object; and it is such determinations which increase the
perfection of the soul itself—an increase in perfection the soul cannot but find pleasurable.
Alexander Rueger aptly describes the pleasure that the soul finds in its powers to perfect itself in
the intuition of mixed sentiments thus: “That we feel our mental faculties set in motion by the
repulsive object, that we feel repulsed, is in itself a fact that suggests a perfection—the soul is
doing what it is supposed to do, it is engaging in its natural activity, and this realization gives us
i.e., as meaning the striving toward the good and “drive for perfection” of each thing (PA 150).
With respect to the intuition of tragic objects (e.g. the painting of the ship in a storm) or tragedy
on stage, it is a decidedly moral kind of perfection which the soul feels upon knowing that and
why the tragic objects which it intuits are displeasing. It is at this point that the notions of love
and sympathy (mitleid) are of great significance for Mendelssohn’s theory of mixed sentiments.5
In the case of the intuition of the painting of the ship one feels sympathy for those aboard it; and
4
It
is
important
to
note
that
mixed
sentiments
concerning
tragedy
in
objects
are
not
the
only
kinds
of
mixed
sentiments.
However,
for
reasons
of
space,
they
are
the
only
kinds
of
mixed
sentiments
I
will
discuss
here.
5
Mendelssohn
also
stressed
the
significance
of
“admiration”
in
for
his
theory
of
mixed
sentiments
concerning
the
intuition
of
tragic
objects.
Space
constraints
do
not
allow
me
to
discuss
the
role
of
admiration
here.
For
an
excellent
account
of
the
role
of
admiration
in
mixed
sentiments
of
the
tragic,
I
refer
the
reader
to
Frederick
Beiser’s
book
Diotima’s
Children,
p.
209.
8
the feeling of sympathy is a moral perfection of the soul—an intuition which is nevertheless
Similarly, in the intuition of tragic plays it is the feelings of love and sympathy for the
tragic hero which the soul takes pleasure in, despite the repulsiveness of the tragic events
besetting the tragic hero her/himself. On this point, Mendelssohn writes: “in those ill-fated
occurrences [i.e., the tragic events in the play] nothing but sympathy is the soul of our pleasure”
(PW 73).6 Thus it is the soul’s feelings of sympathy for the tragic hero which the soul finds
pleasure in. Importantly, the notion of sympathy is intertwined with the notion of love for the
tragic hero. On this point, Mendelssohn writes, in “On Sentiments” that, with regard to sympathy
in mixed sentiments a “quite noticeable, positive feature presents itself … by means of which
this emotion [sympathy] distinguishes itself from all others. It is nothing but the love for an
object combined with the conception of a misfortune that befalls its; a physical evil for which it
In the “Rhapsody”, Mendelssohn echoes the above passage when he writes, with specific
reference to tragic plays, that “since every love is bound up with the willingness to put ourselves
in the position of the beloved, we must share all sorts of suffering or pathos with the beloved
person [i.e., the tragic hero], what one very emphatically calls sympathy” (PA 142). The most
important point here is that, for Mendelssohn, the subjective feelings of love and sympathy one
has upon intuiting an object which is itself displeasing, are pleasurable for the soul inasmuch as
the soul intuits its own moral enhancement toward ever increasing perfection.
Such striving for moral perfection, toward the good, denotes for Mendelssohn, a higher
kind of perfection than mere sensuous perfection. On this point, Mendelssohn states: “every
6
Cf.
PW,
p.
72:
“The
pleasures
that
tragedies
afford
us
is
governed
by
the
measure
of
good act, every virtuous action, is joined with a sentiment of the soul that is sweeter than all
sensuous gratification” (PA 150). While it is no doubt the case that viewers can take pleasure in
certain sensuous aspects of degrees of perfection in the aesthetic tragic object7, it is of greater
importance for Mendelssohn to show how reason takes precedence over sensuous perfections:
each spirits strives toward its natural, final purpose, which is to say, the good which it desires.
Mendelssohn’s theory of mixed sentiments by highlighting the fact that it is entirely plausible
that Immanuel Kant would not have had the inspiration to develop his notions of ‘reflective
judgement’, the ‘free play of the faculties’, and a ‘purposiveness without purpose’ amongst other
perfections8 from both objective perfections and objective imperfections in his theory of mixed
sentiments.9
7
For
reasons
of
space,
I
have
not
discussed
these
here.
8
Subjective
perfections
are
those
which
concern
the
perfections
of
the
soul.
Objective
perfections
are
perfections
in
objects.
I
have
primarily
been
concerned
in
this
essay
with
subjective
moral
perfections,
namely
those
of
sympathy
and
love.
9
On
the
significance
of
Mendelssohn’s
theory
of
mixed
sentiments
for
Kant’s
aesthetic
philosophy
I
refer
the
reader
to
Rueger’s
excellent
essay
“Enjoying
the
Unbeautiful:
From
Mendelssohn’s
Theory
of
‘Mixed
Sentiments’
to
Kant’s
Aesthetic
Judgments
of
Reflection”
(2009).
Rueger
notes:
“the
Kantian
colonization
of
the
realm
of
beauty
proceeded
after
a
model
that
was
supposed
to
tame
the
pleasure
in
the
tragic
…
phenomena
that
seemed
to
lie
outside
of
reason’s
domain
altogether.
The
experience
of
beauty
appears
autonomous
(in
the
specified
sense
of
independence
from
the
perfection
of
the
object)
in
Kant’s
theory
because
he
used
a
model
for
beauty
that
was
designed
for
what
had
been
considered
to
be
autonomous
all
along:
the
unbeautiful”
(187-‐188).
10
Works Cited:
Beiser, Frederick. Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Rueger, Alexander. “Enjoying
the
Unbeautiful:
From
Mendelssohn’s
Theory
of
‘Mixed
Sentiments’
to
Kant’s
Aesthetic
Judgments
of
Reflection”
The
Journal
of
Aesthetics
and
Art
Criticism
67
(2009):
181-‐189.