Hüseyin Güngör Wednesday, 8 November 2017

PHIL58W

Parson’s “Arithmetic and the Categories”

- Kant’s remark “In mathematical problems there is no question of existence at

all” (A719/B747) is a curious one. Parsons suggests (p. 137) that we should take the
category of possibility rather than that of existence in mathematics by citing Schulz.
This might seem problematic for those who are familiar with the existence questions
ubiquitous in mathematics. For instance, the question “Is there a bijection between
the set of natural numbers and real numbers?” is as much an existence question as
it gets. The possibility interpretation, therefore, should have us read the question as
“Is a bijection possible between the set of natural numbers and real numbers?” I
have two qualms with this: 1) Possibility invoked here must be possibility of
existence and this, in turn, reduces down to the question of existence. This makes
us go back to square one; 2) This is nowhere less problematic as long as the nature
of possibility is not clarified. For instance, the possibility can be understood in
various ways including logical, metaphysical, epistemic, conceptual et cetera. The
best possible category here is that of conceptual possibility. However, this feels
circular, since we must, first, construct the concept of having a bijective mapping
between sets or some other related concept and then evaluate whether the
existence of this mapping is antecedently-constructed-conceptually possible. Thus,
either this bijection will be trivially possible, since we hand-made the logical space
within which it can reside or it will be meaningless.

• I am sure that I have made a bad use of some apparatus or notion above and I
would appreciate to be corrected.

- “In one way or another, Kant must regard some objects of arithmetic and algebra as
at a conceptual remove from the intuitions that found statements about them. This,
rather than his conception of existence, seems to me to be the most principled
difficulty in the way of Kant's adopting the “mathematical objects picture" (p. 139)” I
completely agree. This problem is analogous to a foundationalist charge against
constructivism in that constructivist needs some basic elements to construct his
concepts. Analogously, Kant needs some algebraic and arithmetic objects to effect
his constructions.

- I have found the distinction of compositum, totum and quantum also illuminative for
Kant’s concept of number (discussion at pp. 142—143). As I understand them, totum
and quantum are coarse-grained categories whose elements or parts one cannot

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Hüseyin Güngör Wednesday, 8 November 2017
distinguish. Compositum is, on the other hand, fine-grained and can be chunked
down into its members, e.g. a set or a heterogenous collection. If the members fall
under the same concept, i.e. being homogenous, then compositum becomes a
totum, that is, parts or members of a compositum become indistinguishable from
each other.

- Overall, I believe that this was one of the best texts we have read so far. Especially,
Parsons is so adept at showing Kant’s unsettled position with regard to the concept
of numbers. At some times, Kant seems to suggest that numbers apply to objects of
experience (maybe in the form of magnitudes); however, our conception of them
depends on the pure intuitions of space and time. At other times, Kant seems to
treat numbers as constructions out of pure intuitions and without our construction of
them, there would be nothing to apply to objects of experience. Parsons does a
swell job of pointing out these tensions and oscillations.