Russia's War in Georgia Lessons and Consequences

Small Wars & Insurgencies
Vol. 20, No. 2, June 2009, 400–424
Russia’s war in Georgia: lessons and consequences

Carolina Vendil Pallina and Fredrik Westerlundb
a
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden; bSwedish Defence Research Agency,
Stockholm, Sweden
The Russian military operation during the Five-Day war in Georgia points to
a number of lessons with strategic implications for Russia. The deficiencies
in its military performance – not least concerning C4ISR and precision strike
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capability – have underscored the need for a modernization of the Armed

Forces and a diversification of Russia’s military capability. Russia needs to
arrive at a strategic decision on the priorities for the future development of its
military and defence industry: should it prepare for large-scale wars or post-
modern warfare and counter-insurgence? In the meantime, the scope of
Russian military strategy will be clearly limited and military force will
remain a powerful but blunt security policy instrument.
Keywords: interoperability; military force; command and control;
communications; weapon systems; intelligence; electronic warfare; recon-
naissance; capacity; Russia; Georgia; strategy
[S]trategy, which defines its task in the conduct of military operations as combining
operations for achieving the ultimate goal, is not only interested in stating the goal of
an operation, but also makes certain requirements of the methods of achieving it.1
For all the international turmoil and tensions it caused, the Five-Day War in
Georgia was a limited military operation for a military organization such as
Russia’s. On a strategic level, the war was combined with other measures such
as diplomatic ones, but militarily it cannot qualify as a grand military
operation.2 It was successful in that it reached the main military objective of
the operation, to take irreversible control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but
the Russian casualties and the deficiencies and problems it struggled with
during the operation have implications for the future development of its
military. This is obvious from the analyses made in Russia and from statements
from its military and political leadership.
Plans for a military operation existed, and a military exercise (‘Caucasus
2008’) in the North Caucasus as late as in July 2008 rehearsed a similar scenario.
In other words, Russia was prepared and could deploy forces to South Ossetia
relatively quickly in spite of the considerable challenges caused by the terrain –
especially the bottleneck at the Roki tunnel.3 The swift deployment of close to
20,000 men in a couple of days was key to success against even the limited size
Emails: carolina.vendilpallin@ui.se; fredrik.westerlund@foi.se
ISSN 0959-2318 print/ISSN 1743-9558 online

q 2009 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09592310902975539
http://www.informaworld.com
Small Wars & Insurgencies 401
of the Georgian armed forces. Compared to Russia’s first war in Chechnya in
1994– 1996, this was a military operation that was planned carefully, executed in
the main according to plan with formations and units that had trained together and
coordinated with other measures such as cyber warfare and a diplomatic
offensive. In contrast to the two Chechen wars, Russia’s armed forces faced
regular units waging conventional warfare, i.e. an adversary that better suited the
Russian military organisation.
In spite of these undisputable signs that Russian military capability has
improved considerably compared with the 1990s, the record has made military
analysts raise concerns about the future of Russia’s military. It was clear that
much Russian equipment was obsolete compared even to that of Georgia’s
military, which by and large also was equipped with Soviet weapon systems,
albeit modernised. Perhaps the greatest worry was breakdowns in command and
control, the inability of the army and air force to cooperate efficiently, and poor
performance when it came to electronic warfare and the use of precision
weapons. This is especially troubling for a country that wants to compete with the
West and claim its place as one of a handful of great powers globally rather than
satisfy itself with a role as a regional power capable of taking on smaller
neighbours. In fact, even a limited operation of this size exposed the fundamental
challenges that remain for Russia when it comes to reforming its armed forces
and the considerable gap that exists between its global ambitions as a great power
and the economic and military power to sustain such claims.
Russia’s dilemma in a nutshell

Russian rhetoric became increasingly anti-Western and, in particular, anti-
American during Putin’s second term as president. There was a widespread sense
of NATO advancing dangerously close to Russia’s borders, taking into account
NATO enlargement and the planned missile defence installations in Poland and
the Czech Republic. Russia wished to be regarded as one of a handful of great
military powers globally and not only because of its nuclear arsenal. Threats of
a nuclear attack are a blunt foreign policy instrument to be used with care.
Threatening to use nuclear weapons or even threats of deploying missiles in, for
example, the Kaliningrad oblast, could have unforeseen consequences or escalate
rhetoric and provoke response measures that are opposite to the initially desired
effect. Most importantly, when Russia talks of nuclear weapons as a way of
de-escalating a conflict this has anything but a soothing effect on its potential
adversaries.4 The bluntness of the nuclear threat is especially urgent if you do not
possess conventional military power to calibrate the nuclear threat with.
In conventional military technology Russia is lagging behind the West in
some of the key areas in modern warfare. Its precision weapons cannot compete
with Western versions and its C4ISR capabilities (command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) are
in need of upgrading even after recent investments and procurement to improve
402 C. Vendil Pallin and F. Westerlund
command and control.5 This has not hindered Russia from becoming one of the
world’s most prominent arms exporters in recent years. However, the products
are based on Soviet designs, and if the Russian defence industry cannot
implement new technologies it will find it difficult to maintain its position as arms
supplier in the longer term.6
To remove the technological gap will take massive investment, but even that
could be less than enough given the problematic age structure of Russia’s military
research and development sector as well as its defence industry. The outlook is
bleak for the Russian state being able to finance a full-scale modernization of the
defence industry on its own, but opening up for private and foreign investment,
and thus availing itself of control and independence, has not constituted an
appealing alternative for the political leadership. Furthermore, new, ‘smart’
technology will require that Russia is able to recruit skilled and intelligent
soldiers and junior officers that can handle the new weapons and equipment and
make independent decisions in the field.7 Trusting junior personnel with more
responsibility, however, would entail a radical shift in Russian military culture
and will not come easy.
At the same time, Russia’s most pressing security challenges are not to be
found on its Western flank. Few if any serious military analysts in Russia
believe that NATO is about to attack Russia or that a Russia-NATO military
confrontation is imminent. Instead, Moscow’s main security dilemma is located
on its southern border, not least in the South Caucasus, and within Russia and
the North Caucasus. The most likely large-scale conflict with another great
power would be with China, not with the West, and even that threat is anything
but urgent. To prepare for large-scale conventional confrontation with the West
is necessary for Russia’s status as a great power, but from a national security
perspective local wars, counterinsurgency warfare and anti-terrorist measures
stand out as far more acute to implement.8 Fighting insurgency and terrorism in
the Caucasus is not done best while entertaining a fierce rhetoric against the
West and alienating neighbouring states such as Georgia and Ukraine. In the
words of Dmitri Trenin there is little use in repeating maxims about ‘permanent
interests and impermanent friends’ or about how the ‘army and navy are
Russia’s only true friends’. In reality, there is a ‘danger of the country’s isolation’.9
Nor will Russian oil revenues be able to sustain both missions. This was evident
even before the onset of the economic crisis; in 2009 the prospects for such a two-
pronged approach are even less auspicious from a strictly economic point of view.
Furthermore, from an organisational point of view it is doubtful whether it is
even possible to successfully maintain capability for both large-scale conventional
warfare and fighting insurgencies and terrorism within one and the same
organisation, as they require very different methods, training and equipment.10
Overall, the ambition to compete with the West in conventional military
terms would be difficult if at all possible for the Russian state to sustain. It would
signify an enormous burden on the country’s economy and it is most doubtful
whether Russia would be able to significantly close the technological gap that has
developed between it and the West in a situation of confrontation instead of
cooperation. Russia’s other option is to modernize a smaller army and to
concentrate on the threats that are most imminent – local wars and insurgencies.
To straddle both options, which appears to be the current strategy, is damaging to
Russia’s economic growth and to its national security, something that the war in
Georgia made obvious.
Russian military strategy in the Five-Day War

The main goal of the military operation in Georgia and the Black Sea was, as stated
above, to take irreversible control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The establishment
of sizable Russian military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as control
over critical mountain crossings has significantly improved Russia’s strategic
military position in the Caucasus region. Apart from ground force bases, Russia
started preparations to create a complementary naval base for the Black Sea Fleet in
Ochamchire11 and to base aircraft at the former Soviet airbase in Gudauta in
Abkhazia.12 This will make the Russian military presence on Georgian territory as
large or larger than it was before Russia withdrew from its three remaining military
bases in Akhalkalaki, Batumi and Vaziani. It will furthermore form a military
staging ground in the South Caucasus and the Black Sea. An adjustment of the
military-strategic situation in the region to Russia’s advantage, by removing the
geographical bottlenecks to southbound military power projection, may have been
an additional strategic military goal from the very beginning of the campaign.
In order to attain the military goal, the Russian military strategy consisted of
swiftly achieving an overwhelming superiority in numbers by combining massive
ground deployments with supporting air and naval operations. In other words, a
strategy fully in line with Soviet military thinking. The primary military objective
seems to have been to take control over the territory of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia and establish air and sea supremacy. A secondary, perhaps equally
important, objective was to prevent Georgian and foreign troop reinforcements.
This was achieved by cutting off vital Georgian ports, roads and railroads,
through aerial attacks on reserve units that were called up and by rendering
Georgian airfields difficult to use.
An analysis of the conduct of the Russian troops after the ceasefire suggests
that an additional objective was to neutralize Georgian military capability by
destroying infrastructure and wrecking or seizing weapons and equipment.
Judging by the reported air strikes, the strategy did not include disruption of
critical civilian infrastructure in order to paralyse the Georgian political
leadership, but centred on reducing the country’s military capability. The Russian
forces that took part in the Five-Day War clearly had instructions on how far they
were allowed to go when it came to selecting targets and advancing into Georgia.
One military commentator was of the opinion that the military operation would
have been more successful if Russian troops had been allowed to attack political
targets, such as the Georgian political leadership and vital infrastructure.13
Elements indicative of an evolution of Soviet strategy towards contemporary
Western warfare could also be observed during the Five-Day War. Units
belonging to other power ministries, albeit in small numbers, took part in the
military operations, indicating an ambition towards performing joint and inter-
ministerial operations. Furthermore, in parallel with the military operation,
Russia initiated information operations, consisting of efforts towards creating
pro-Russian media coverage of the conflict and possibly also IT attacks on
official Georgian web servers. The Russian General Staff’s information and
media management has, however, been criticized by Russian analysts, as has the
lack of Information Warfare (IW) units within the armed forces. The military
command seemingly does not dispose of personnel qualified to perform
professional and efficient IW operations.14 Furthermore, it should be noted that
the official Russian declarations that the military incursion into Georgia was a
peace support operation did not materialize into military strategy. As far as can be
deduced, the declarations were merely part of Russian maskirovka, a strategic
deception intended to act as a smoke screen and to mislead the international
opinion.15 An important part of the overall military strategy was also to appear as
the victim, not the initiator of the war, despite all the planning and preparations.
This would be congruent with military strategy in previous Russian and Soviet
wars, such as the Afghan and Chechen wars.16
An influence from the recent development in Western warfare was visible in
the Russian conduct,17 and joint and inter-ministerial operation has been part of
several Russian military exercises in the past years. However, the limited success
of these elements suggests that Russian strategy has not developed beyond Soviet
military thinking. There is an ambition to move towards postmodern warfare and
new thinking about military strategy is taking form, but the thinking is far from
becoming integrated in standard operations.
The Five-Day War and Russia’s military capability

That Russia was able to subdue Georgia was hardly surprising given the disparity
in size of the respective armed forces of the two countries. However, even a
militarily inferior adversary such as Georgia made obvious a series of flaws and
deficiencies in Russia’s military capability. Georgia was indeed a midget
compared to Russia, but much of its equipment was modern compared to the
Russian equivalent, and the Georgian side proved skilful in taking advantage of
the Russian military weaknesses, such as poor command and control technology,
the breakdowns in interoperability between the air force and army, and Russia’s
difficulties to locate Georgian artillery – to mention a few examples.
Planning and implementation of the operation

Judging by the swift deployment of a considerable number of troops and heavy
equipment deep into Georgia, Russian war plans had been prepared long in
advance.18 A military operation encompassing several armed services interacting
in adverse geographical conditions requires meticulous planning, even against
an inferior adversary. However, the military high command – as well as the
political leadership – seems not to have anticipated the timing of the outbreak of
the war.
A major Russian military operation in Georgia had been planned for at least
several years. The armed forces, as well as other Russian armed structures, have
over the past years consistently developed their capacity to handle armed
conflicts and local wars in the Caucasus.19 Within the ground troops, two new
mountain troop brigades have been created within the North Caucasus Military
District (NCMD),20 and several units have been transformed to permanent
readiness units, mainly manned with contract soldiers. Apart from organizational
changes, the training and exercise activity has focused on joint operations with
units from other services and arms of the armed forces as well as units belonging
to the Federal Security Service and the Ministry of the Interior. Furthermore, the
Russian military intelligence service, the GRU, probably followed the
developments in Georgia closely, in particular in South Ossetia where it
manned key positions in the breakaway republic’s intelligence service, the
KGB.21
The existence of one or several military plans for a war in Georgia does not
necessarily signify that there was an intention to attack Georgia. The military
high command should have up-to-date contingency planning for possible
instances of armed conflicts. In the case of Georgia, an armed conflict was not
only plausible, but likely. The fact that Russia undertook practical preparations
for a future operation is more interesting in this context.
Preparations for a major military operation in Abkhazia were made during the
spring and early summer of 2008. In June and July, Russian railroad troops made
repairs on a total of 54 kilometres of railroad track in Abkhazia, despite Georgian
protests against their presence in the breakaway republic. As Russian heavy
military equipment is transported by railroad and not by road, functioning railway
links are crucial to a swift forward deployment of mechanized Russian units.22
The Russian peacekeeping unit in Abkhazia had already been reinforced with
additional artillery in April,23 and further reinforcements were possibly secretly
transferred by rail in late July.24
In July 2008, the military exercise ‘Caucasus 2008’ took place in the
southern parts of the NCMD with the participation of at least 8000 troops, 700
military vehicles and more than 30 aircraft. According to official statements, the
main purpose of the exercise was to train for anti-terror operations, but another
aim was to practice peace-enforcement operations in zones of conflict.25 Several
of the units that were later to take part in the military operation in Georgia were
involved in the exercise, among them the Black Sea Fleet large assault ship
(BDK) Tsezar Kunikov, which took part in the amphibious landing element of
‘Caucasus 2008’. Russian as well as American analysts have regarded
‘Caucasus 2008’ as a dress rehearsal for an operation in South Ossetia.26
Furthermore, many units had not returned to the bases when the war broke out;
according to media reports, command posts remained operational after the
exercise had ended and the 58th Army remained in a state of alert.27
Despite all the planning and preparations and the repeated warnings in
Russian media of Georgian aggression towards the breakaway republics,28 the
top leadership appears to have been taken by surprise when the war did break
out. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Security Council Secretary Nikolai
Patrushev both attended the Beijing Olympics. President Dmitry Medvedev
gave the order to start the military operations without consulting parliament,
even though according to the Constitution use of troops outside Russia’s
borders should be decided by the upper house, the Federation Council.
The Security Council did not convene until several hours after Russian troops
had crossed the border to South Ossetia and air strikes on target in Georgia
proper had commenced.29 The military high command was likewise taken
by surprise, as will be discussed in the following. However, on the

whole there is no doubt that Moscow was prepared for a war with Georgia at
some point.
Within a few days time, an overwhelming military force had been deployed
outside Russian territory. All in all, some 10,000 Russian soldiers advanced into
South Ossetia and another 9000 troops were deployed to Abkhazia.30 A large
number of units from different arms and services took part in the operation:
airborne troops; motorized infantry and armour units, artillery units, surface-to-
surface missile and rocket units belonging to the 58th Army; attack helicopters,
ground attack, bomber and long-range bomber aviation as well as transport and
reconnaissance aviation from the air force; surface ships and marine infantry
belonging to the Black Sea Fleet; railroad troops and rear services units; and
Spetsnaz (special forces) units from the armed forces (the GRU) and, probably,
the Ministry of the Interior.
On the whole, the operation was conducted according to a well-prepared plan
and the military goal was achieved, mainly due to the numerical inferiority of the
adversary. The armed forces were able to deploy combat ready ground, air and
naval forces within hours of the outbreak of the war. Russia furthermore achieved
local air superiority, which was necessary for Russian ground and naval elements
of the operation.31 Considering the weak Georgian air force, no other outcome
was to be expected.
For the Russian navy the Five-Day War was the first combat assignment since
the fall of the Soviet Union (apart from naval infantry in the wars in Chechnya).32
The Black Sea Fleet swiftly achieved sea supremacy and cut off the most
important Georgian ports. Marine infantry and airborne troop units were landed
on the shores of Abkhazia and Georgian navy vessels were destroyed. However,
as the Abkhazi coast was undefended and the Georgian navy consisted of a
handful missile and patrol boats, the Black Sea Fleet never met any serious
opposition. Regardless of this, managing to plan and carry through manoeuvres
of this size requires considerable skills, underscoring that the Black Sea Fleet is
still a military force to be reckoned with.
It should also be noted that the Russian forces, in contrast to the conduct in
the two Chechen wars, managed to attain the military goals without an
indiscriminate use of military force. A certain restraint could be detected in the
way ground and air elements of the operation were conducted, limiting the force
projection to mainly military targets. For instance, the Russian ground forces’
advance towards Tskhinvali was reportedly held back to allow for Georgian
villages north of the South Ossetian capital to be evacuated.33 The Russian air
strikes seem to have been directed mainly at military rather than civilian
infrastructure and the Georgian political leadership was not targeted.
The Russian military operation was nevertheless sufficiently powerful for it
to attain the goals set out before third parties could intervene.
Command and control

The strategic command over the armed forces initially stumbled and it is doubtful
whether effective command and control was fully established during the short war.
The chief of the General Staff, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, had recently been
appointed, and the key department within the Ministry of Defence, the Main
Operations Directorate, lacked a commanding officer when the war broke out,
since the post as chief of operations had been left vacant for some time. Moreover,
most operations officers were on leave, as the directorate was in the middle of
relocating its offices, resulting in vital maps and documents being hard to find.
Furthermore, the General Staff allegedly could not reach Minister of Defence
Anatoliy Serdyukov via telephone for more than 10 hours, which resulted in
important decisions not being taken.34 This most likely affected the capacity of the
General Staff and the Ministry of Defence to exercise command and control during
the war.
On the operational command level the inter-service coordination seems to
have been limited to an overall coordination in time. The naval and air elements
of the operation did coincide with the ground troops’ manoeuvres, but due to
lacking inter-service communications equipment and the absence of a unified
command the war was a ‘joint’ operation only in a superficial meaning of the
word. For instance, the NCMD commander allegedly had no authority over the
air force, which was directed personally by the commander of the air force,
Colonel-General Aleksandr Zelin from his office by mobile phone.35
On the tactical level, the Russian command and control capability was hampered
by inferior communications equipment compared to the Georgian troops.36 The
Georgian forces were, moreover, successful in disturbing Russian communications,
which were challenged by the mountainous terrain. Russian commanders found
themselves having to rely on personal mobile phones rather than military
communications systems. A journalist present at the command headquarters of the
58th Army even claimed that a commander borrowed his satellite telephone at one
point.37 The lack of functioning battlefield command, control and communications
equipment within the ground troops, rendered the troops more or less ‘blind and
deaf’ – something that was lambasted by Russian media.38 On the whole, this
must have slowed down the momentum and contributed to losses in friendly fire.
Air defence and air support

The Russian air component in the Five-Day War indicated a remarkably limited
capacity to wage air combat for a country aspiring to be a military great power.
In several aspects, the Russian performance was far from satisfactory and the
Russian forces appeared technologically challenged. The Georgian air defence
forces managed to down four Russian aircraft according official statements.
Another two have been attributed to Georgian units as well as one friendly-fire
incident.39 Adding aircraft damaged beyond repair, Russia’s losses have been
estimated to have exceeded 10 aircraft during some 200 missions in total.40

On 8 August, the first day of the war, Russia lost five aircraft: one Tu-22M3
long-range bomber aircraft on a reconnaissance mission, one Su-24MR
reconnaissance aircraft and three Su-25 attack planes.41 The early losses more
or less put a halt to the Russian air assault on 9 August, and it did not regain pace
until the following day.42 Georgia lacked fighter aircraft as well as a
comprehensive and integrated air defence, but in spite of this managed to
impose losses on the Russian air force during the short war.43
The Russian air crews that took part in the air assault were most likely among
the most experienced Russian pilots, belonging to ground attack regiments with
extensive experience from air operations in Chechnya or strategic bomber
aviation regiments within the Russian Long Range Aviation. The losses indicate
that even within these units there are deficiencies in pilot training and the
technical level of the aircraft. Despite steady budget increases for the Russian
aviation in the past few years, the many years of neglect still seem to have a
visible negative impact on the capability to perform air operations. The losses
may partly have been a result of a lack of intelligence about Georgian air defence
units and their positions. In that case, the air force’s intelligence capability was
clearly not up to its task.
The Georgian air force consisted of a dozen Su-25 attack aircraft, but
managed to perform attack missions towards Russian units until the very last day
of the war.44 Even though the Georgian air attacks were sporadic and on the
whole not very successful, it is remarkable that the Russian air and air defence
units did not manage to neutralize this weak opposition and establish
air supremacy in the area of operations. Another shortcoming in the Russian
air element of the operation was insufficient support for the ground units. The air
force lacked forward air controllers in South Ossetia that would have been able to
direct attack airplanes and helicopters, and the ground units could not
communicate with the attack helicopters and aircraft crews as the army and the
air force did not use compatible radio systems.45 In addition, the Russian
helicopters experienced difficulties traversing the Caucasus mountain range,
which resulted in helicopters being put to extensive use only in the last days of the
war when a temporary airbase had been established in South Ossetia.46 This
resulted in the ground units having to fight with little or no close air support,47
leaving the troops vulnerable to Georgian ambushes. As a direct consequence of
this, the Russian mechanized units apparently suffered casualties when they
emerged from the strategically important Roki tunnel.48
The Russian air force appears to have lacked the training and weapon systems
needed for high precision strikes in situations of low visibility. There are a
number of guided weapons in the air force weapons arsenal, but their use proved
to be limited in the Five-Day War. The maximum launch distance for the guided
weapons currently used by Russian attack aircraft is 12 kilometres, and the
guidance systems require flying on a straight course before and after launch,
exposing the aircraft to enemy air defence. Furthermore, the meteorological
conditions in Georgia during the war, with recurrent cloudiness and a low cloud
base, restricted the use of laser and TV guided weapons, which make up the bulk
of the guided weapons in the Russian arsenal.49 Because of this, the Russian air
force had to rely on unguided bombs and air-to-surface rockets during the
Five-Day War. Moreover, the Georgian air defence radar units were operational,
albeit with obvious limitations, several days into the war, which implies that the
Russian air force for some reason did not use its Kh-28 and Kh-58 anti-radiation
missiles.50 The lack of precision strike weapons meant that a larger number of
sorties had to be made in order to destroy a given target, exposing more aircraft to
the enemy air defence.
Furthermore, attack aircraft strikes with unguided weapons imply even
shorter launch distances and thus a greater risk of attracting enemy air defence
fire. This might explain the somewhat unexpected use of strategic long-range
bombers in a local war; although primarily intended for targets in the enemy’s
rear in large-scale war scenarios, their ability to drop unguided bombs from
altitudes well above the reach of many air defence systems makes them useful
also in local conflicts. Nevertheless, the Tu-22M3 bomb runs over Georgia rather
underscored the fact that the Russian air force obviously lacked suitable standoff
weapons. Cruise missiles with a conventional warhead have been part of the
Russian air force inventory for some years, albeit in small numbers, and the
Tu-22M3 bombers can carry such weapons. However, there are no indications of
air-launched cruise missiles having been used in the Five-Day War, which puts
the air force capability to precision strikes over longer distances into question.51
It also implies that Russia cannot conduct air strikes from a safe distance even in
a local war close to its own borders; Russian pilots have to enter enemy air space
when carrying out air raids and this exposes them to enemy fire. Moreover, the
Russian air units were forced to carry out missions mainly in daylight, since
many aircraft lacked night-vision equipment. This was not the case with the
modernized Georgian Su-25 aircrafts, which were able to operate at night.52
Also, the Russian air force almost completely lacked the ability to wage
electronic warfare, which could have contributed to suppressing the Georgian
air defence.53
In sum, the Russian ability to combat enemy air defence – one of the key
elements in modern warfare – was clearly limited, even against a small and not
particularly advanced adversary. The same seems to hold true for another key
element in modern warfare: close air support to ground units. This, in
combination with the underdeveloped Russian precision and standoff strike
capability, suggests that Russian attack and bomber aviation have only a limited
air combat capability. In contrast to the attack aviation, the Military Transport
Aviation (MTA) performed its duties more or less without mishaps. The MTA
transported several airborne units from different parts of Russia to North Ossetia
and Abkhazia, and the airlift started early in the war. The MTA does not appear to
have performed any paradrops to spearhead the ground assault in Georgia though;
the airborne units were landed in airports on friendly territory.
Military equipment
The Russian military equipment used in the Five-Day War was sufficient for a
victory, but this was due to an overwhelming quantity rather than the quality of the
material. In the course of the Russian operation a number of deficiencies
concerning the military equipment came to light. The armour on the Soviet-made
combat vehicles turned out to be insufficient, in particular in urban warfare. Russian
as well as Georgian tanks proved to be vulnerable to handheld anti-tank rockets
fired at their sides, which was evident from pictures of blown up tanks in the streets
of Tskhinvali. It has also been reported that the reactive armour canisters mounted
on the T-72 tanks belonging to the 58th Army were empty, rendering them useless.
There had not been time to fill the canisters before the units left for Georgia.54
The armoured personnel carriers could not resist anti-tank rockets or mines or small
calibre armour piercing ammunition. This is why Russian troops prefer to travel
sitting on top of their vehicles rather than inside them.55 Since tanks are vulnerable
in mountainous areas, a Tank Support Combat Vehicle (with the Russian acronym
BMPT) armed with nine weapon systems and an advanced target acquisition
system has been developed in Russia.56 The armed forces ordered the first 10 serial
production BMPTs in 2007 after concluding State Tests and the first deliveries were
planned for 2008,57 but no BMPTs were available to the NCMD.
The technical status of the Russian ground troops’ heavy vehicles also
negatively affected Russian performance. A number of vehicles suffered
breakdowns and caused traffic jams on the only road leading south into Georgia
from North Ossetia.58 Not even the command of the 58th Army seems to have
had fully functional vehicles. The headquarters command vehicle initially
refused to start and eventually only got some 50 metres before the muffler fell
off.59 Within the 58th Army, a large number of the tanks consisted of older
models: T-62 and T-72 tanks made up 60% to 75% of the total number.60
The older models of tanks lacked IFF-equipment (Identification Friend or Foe),
increasing the risk for friendly-fire incidents – a particular problem when facing
an opponent that was also fielding Soviet-era armoured vehicles. The Russian
forces had limited access to modern systems for combat in darkness and reduced
visibility,61 which made it possible for the better equipped Georgian troops to
regain during night ground lost during daytime. This slowed down the Russian
advance. Even on an individual level, the Georgian soldiers were clearly better
equipped than their Russian counterparts.
The Russian artillery units engaged in the Five-Day War did not use precision
munitions, but instead had to rely on less efficient unguided munitions.
The terrain in South Ossetia, with broken ground and dense foliage, rendered
laser designators less effective and thus restricted the use of laser guided
munitions such as Santimetr, Krasnopol, Kitolov, Smelchak and Gran.62 Artillery
munitions guided by satellite navigation systems could have proven a useful
alternative, but such munitions are not part of the Russian arsenal. The use of
unguided munitions, albeit several times less costly a piece, resulted in prolonged
fire and a larger amount needed per target, which reduced the combat speed and
exposed the artillery units to enemy counter measures.
Nor did the ground forces appear to have unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in
sufficient numbers. For instance, UAVs for target acquisition and target
designation could have allowed for a more adequate use of laser guided artillery
munitions, and radio relay UAVs could have compensated for the difficult
signalling conditions in mountainous territory. During the war, the Russian forces
lacked reconnaissance drones,63 a problem that is not easily solved since the
acquisition of UAVs does not appear to be part of the State Procurement Program
for 2007 – 2015.64 Moreover, the lack of artillery localization radar systems on
the Russian side made it more difficult to combat Georgian artillery units.65
The Russian forces in Georgia also had very limited access to equipment for
satellite navigation and positioning. The Russian satellite navigation
system, GLONASS, was not fully operative due to a subcritical number of
satellites in orbit and the ground units lacked receivers.66 The Russian units
reportedly lacked an autonomous targeting system, which partly obstructed joint
operations.67
The Soviet armed forces had a highly developed electronic warfare (EW)
capacity, but this Soviet legacy has been squandered over the years.
The ineffectiveness of Russian EW systems during the military operations in
Georgia was later acknowledged by the General Staff.68 The weaknesses in
Russian EW were obvious before the Five-Day-War and in order to improve the
armed forces’ EW capability Russia had begun the process of creating
independent EW troops directly under the General Staff with modern Russian
EW systems and contract soldiers.69 So far, this does not seem to have allowed
Russia to improve its EW capability significantly.
Russian intelligence also suffered from lack of military equipment. On the
strategic command level, the fact that there were no satellite reconnaissance
resources resulted in incomplete information on the Georgian preparations for the
attack on Tskhinvali.70 On the operative and tactical command level, the shortage
of modern reconnaissance systems, including UAV systems, negatively affected
the intelligence capability.71
The above-mentioned Russian losses in the air battle indicate that Russian
aircraft have insufficient protection against portable SAM systems and possibly
that the technical status leaves room for improvement. Other shortcomings in the
military equipment are the lack of precision and standoff air strike weapons and
the limited supply of support systems for combat in darkness and low visibility.
In an assessment of the Five-Day War by the International Institute of Strategic
Studies, the authors concluded that ‘[t]he urgent need to modernise the air force
may thus be one of the main lessons for the Russian military command to take
away from the recent conflict’.72
On the whole, deficiencies in military equipment plagued the armed forces

during the Five-Day War and will continue to limit Russian military operations in
the foreseeable future. A particular concern is the limited C4ISR capability and the
technical status of military vehicles. One conclusion is that the military equipment
currently available to the Russian armed forces does not fully correspond to needs
for combat situations of the kind prevalent in the Five-Day War.
Conduct and professionalism of Russian forces

The ground forces’ advance into South Ossetia was spearheaded by airborne
troop units, and the interaction between the two seems to have run smoothly.
However, the airborne units were not dropped into the area, but drove into
South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel, indicating that the NCMD did not possess
readily available units that could lead the way and secure the terrain for the
armoured units. This would arguably have been a suitable task for the NCMD
motorized mountain brigades, but neither of the two was reported to have
participated in the military operation, despite the fact that they have officially
been operational since 2007. The Russian rear services were put to the test during
the Five-Day War and several analysts have criticised their performance.
The demanding terrain and the concentration of traffic on the few roads available
in the area resulted in difficult logistics and the situation was complicated by the
long supply lines once the Russian units advanced into Georgia proper.73
The Five-Day War was also the first live test of the value of permanent
readiness units manned with so-called kontraktniki in accordance with the
reintroduced contract soldier system. Initially, the General Staff asserted that
only contract soldiers would participate in the combat in Georgia. However, as
young conscripts soon began turning up in hospitals and morgues, it is obvious
that units with conscript soldiers were deployed as well. Despite this, the test of
the new system turned out positive; the NCMD now possesses a larger number of
readily available – and arguably better trained – units than during the Chechen
wars, and the Russian soldiers displayed better fighting morale and motivation
than their Georgian counterparts. Even though conscript units were thrown into
combat, most of the units were manned with contract soldiers with several years
of military training behind them. However, it would be erroneous to conclude that
the Russian kontraktniki are professional soldiers in a Western sense – they are
more accurately described as mercenaries. The organisational culture and the
quality of military equipment and training within the Russian armed forces do not
support the development of soldier skills radically different from those of
conscripted personnel. Furthermore, many contract soldiers are far from the ideal
professional soldier; the lack of attractiveness of a military career has resulted in
a large number of kontraktniki with poor health and little or no education coming
from rural and socially challenged origins. Finally, the fact that the NCMD had to
use conscripts in an operation that had been brewing for quite some time indicates
that the problems of professionalizing the armed forces are far from solved.74
Nor were the Russian troops equipped according to official regulations.

According to one military analyst, incidents of friendly fire occurred not just
because of the deficiencies in electronic equipment. He lamented the habit of
Russian soldiers choosing personal equipment themselves, with the result that
Russian troops in Georgia looked like partisans, which also accounted for why
they were reduced to using armlets to identify themselves, and that it was possible
to distinguish commanding officers at a far distance.75 This constituted a further
sign of lacking professionalism.
Implications for future Russian military strategy

What implications do the lessons from the Five-Day War have for Russian
military strategy? What are the practical consequences for military strategy from
an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses revealed during the war in Georgia?
It should be underlined that a short and local war such as the Five-Day War in
Georgia does not readily lend itself to far-reaching conclusions about all aspects
of Russian strategy or military capability.76 Furthermore, a comparison with the
strategy and battle performance in the two previous Chechen wars is difficult to
make. Even though most of the Russian units deployed in the Five-Day War also
took part in the Chechen wars, the war in Georgia differed substantially in
character. In Chechnya, the Russian forces only rarely faced larger enemy units
and never an adversary with a technical level comparable to that of the Georgian
forces. The Chechen units were highly motivated and soon retreated to guerrilla
warfare, while the Russian forces in South Ossetia encountered regular military
units with a rapidly subsiding morale. However, some tentative conclusions can
be made in the light of the Five-Day War.
The character of the Russian intervention – as well as military exercises in
recent years – bears witness to an ambition, as well as an aspiring capacity, to
joint (inter-service) operations. The overall success of the military operation in
Georgia will most likely strengthen the notion of joint operations as an essential
element of future Russian military strategy. However, had the Georgian forces
put up more serious opposition, even wider cracks in the joint operation veneer
would have appeared. In order to incorporate the concept of joint operations into
future Russian strategy, a number of improvements need to be made. First and
foremost, the infrastructure and routines for command, control and communi-
cations (C3) need to develop in order to allow for unified command within the
armed forces. On the national level, inter-service C3 infrastructure and
procedures are also require more investment and training of personnel for Russia
to be able to perform truly joint inter-service operations.
The capacity for air support and air combat also needs to be significantly
enhanced. The Russian air forces’ capacity for close air support to ground troops
and suppression of enemy air defence, as displayed in the Five-Day War, has
serious deficiencies and will not be able to fully support ground and naval units in
a joint operation. The EW and IW capability also needs to be improved in order to
be able to wage postmodern warfare.

Future Russian military strategy will most likely be based on other elements
of postmodern warfare as well such as the capacity to make precision strikes from
a safe distance. The Russian defence industry has been developing such systems
for the armed forces, but the record from the war in Georgia suggests that Russian
ground and air forces still have a long way to go before the ability to make
precision strikes is developed sufficiently, in particular in mountainous and
overgrown terrain such as in the Caucasus. The current lack of precision strike
weapons, a satellite positioning system that is operational, and the intelligence
and reconnaissance resources needed to support tasking leads to the conclusion
that it will take time before such a capacity can become a reliable part of Russian
military strategy.
Another important technological aspect influencing Russian strategy is the
poor quality of Russian combat support systems revealed in the Five-Day War.
Battalion and company level C4ISR systems were scarce and of low quality. This
negatively affected the situational awareness and the ability to perform efficient
targeting for the Russian troops. The lack of modern night vision equipment
brought the Russian offensive to a near standstill when dark. This will limit the
scope of Russian military strategy in near future, but can with time be remedied.
The Russian armed forces can only to a limited extent wage postmodern
warfare, as they lack the necessary qualities in personnel, equipment,
organisation, training and leadership. This will take considerable time to change,
not least since the organisational culture of the armed forces does not support the
development of postmodern warfare qualities.77 In the meantime, Russian
military strategy will have to rely on good planning, brute force and strength in
numbers. This will suffice against an inferior adversary relying on traditional
military tactics in fair weather and daylight.
The question is, of course, what future wars Russia is most likely to find itself
engaged in. In Russia, the Chechen wars, as well as the Afghan war, have been
regarded as exceptions to the norm, which still appears to be a large-scale military
confrontation with NATO forces. The Five-Day War was not a large-scale war, but
provided a clean and clear military conflict, with an easily distinguished and suitably
inferior adversary providing readily attainable and morally justifiable military goals.
In short, the kind of war that old school military strategists would like to prepare for.
However, much points to the Five-Day War being an exception and counter-
insurgency warfare being the norm in the future. A well-developed joint inter-
agency operations capability is critical for effectively waging counter-insurgency
warfare,78 and would also serve Russia better in the hypothetical conflict with
NATO forces. The current Russian military strategy would serve Russia well in a
regular military confrontation with any other state in the former Soviet area, but it
would face difficulties if the opponent were well versed in asymmetric and guerrilla
warfare or in high-technology postmodern warfare.
The Russian military in domestic politics

Any hopes Russia’s military officers might have harboured that its success in
reaching the military objective in Georgia in August 2008 would translate into
greater influence over national security or even the fate of the armed forces were
dashed when Minister of Defence Anatoliy Serdyukov made public new plans to
cut back on the number of servicemen. Despite earlier promises that military
reform was over and that the time had come for consolidation and
‘modernization’ as late as December 2007, Russia’s officer corps found itself
faced with the most far-reaching plans to sack officers since the Yeltsin era.79
These plans must have been sanctioned at the very apex of Russia’s political
leadership and were probably the result of planning and analyses taking
place before the war in Georgia. Although the reform plan as a whole was neither
prepared as a result of lessons learned in Georgia nor primarily by Serdyukov, the
Five-Day War influenced the way in which it was presented and executed.
The war in Georgia was used to emphasise the urgency of reform and the need to
invest in new equipment to improve Russia’s military capability. The chief of the
General Staff, Makarov, stated in front of foreign military attachés that ‘taking into
account both military training of troops and experiences from military conflicts in
recent years, among which the military action of our troops in Southern Ossetia, it is
impossible to not notice a certain gap between theory and practice’. He went on to
say that it was time to stop prepare Russian troops from yesterday’s war and that they
had to prepare for battle with ‘a strong and technologically equipped adversary
taking into account all the news that have appeared in military theory’.80
The evaluation of Russian military capability from the very apex of the military
organization was thus highly critical in spite of the fact that the military objective in
South Ossetia had been reached. Apart from the military decorations awarded for the
military operation in Georgia, the officers of the armed forces as a whole would be
unwise to expect large dividends from the war.
Serdyukov’s reform plans signified a substantial reduction of the officer corps
by 2012. For example, the number of colonels was to be reduced from over
15,000 to 3114. The overall aim was to change the ratio of one officer for every
two or three soldiers to one per fifteen. In addition, the target for the overall size
of the armed forces was 1,000,000 men – a reduction of about 200,000 – 300,000
servicemen (it is notoriously difficult to establish the size of the armed forces).
However, a substantial part of these will still be employed by the armed forces
and retain their assignments, albeit as civilians. The reform plans solicited fierce
criticism from officers and a number of military analysts – this in spite of the fact
that much of its content was far from new. Apart from the personnel reductions
among officers, the round and even figure of one million men has figured in
previous reform initiatives;81 nor is the move to a military organization divided
into brigades rather than divisions and regiments entirely new.82
In spite of increased defence budgets, the military operation in Georgia and
the predilection of top political leaders to visit military units – often sporting a
uniform – the military is not a towering force in Russian politics or even in
overall security policy-making. Its attempts at playing a political role have been
inept. During Putin’s term as president, the military has instead been forced to
accept that some of the top positions inside the Ministry of Defence were taken
over by former security service officials. The defence budget may have increased
nominally but remains at the same level of GDP not least since all increases are
eaten away by inflation. Meanwhile, other power ministries have managed to
move forward their positions at the expense of the military.83 The war in Georgia
did not change the position of the military in this respect to the better and as the
reality of the economic crisis hit Russia in late 2008 and early 2009, even the
limited increased funding promised was put in question. In spite of Medvedev’s
assurances that procurement would continue according to plan, the question
remains where the money would come from at a time when the Russian budget is
coming under increasing pressure as a result of falling oil prices and crumbling
domestic industries that need and receive state support to survive.
Nor did the boost of morale that the war initially signified for the armed forces
result in an increased willingness of Russian youth to serve in its ranks.
The Ministry of Defence continued to have problems convincing young Russian
men that the military was a promising career. In part, this was due to the fact that
society had changed and that there were a number of more luring opportunities
around. A talented young man could receive many times the salary in private
business compared to what the armed forces were able to offer. The fact that
servicemen are restricted when it comes to travelling abroad also reduced the
attractiveness of the military profession, as did the tarnished reputation of the
profession due to the accident prone nature of the service as well as the frequent
reports of hazing and exploiting of conscripts and contract soldiers by
commanding officers for personal financial gain. The main reason, however,
is probably to be found in the fact that Russian soldiers, whether conscripts or
contract soldiers, more or less lose their human rights when they enter service.
Many soldiers find themselves humiliated and deprived of basic comforts while
discovering that violence is used routinely to instil discipline. Even in South
Ossetia in late 2008, Russian soldiers taking part in what surely must be a
prioritised military activity for Russia complained of squalid conditions.84
The controversial desertion of Aleksandr Glukhov reinforced the impression that
soldiers still had to suffer hardships while serving in the Russian military.
Russian authorities claimed initially that Glukhov had been captured and
pressured into discrediting the Russian army, while Tbilisi maintained that he had
surrendered himself to Georgian police voluntarily because of being beaten by
the major in his unit.85 Later, Russia acknowledged that Glukhov had indeed left
his unit voluntarily and pressed charges for desertion, while Georgia granted
Glukhov refugee status.86
If Russia’s military is less than successful in pressing its agenda upon the rest
of society – short of symbolic displays of unity when military victories and
history is used to infuse society with patriotism – the political leadership has
proved unable to make sure its decisions are transformed into practical action
inside the Ministry of Defence. As most bureaucracies, Russia’s military officers

are deeply sceptical of radical changes. However, when it comes to the officer
corps, the claimed monopoly on military know-how and the lack of transparency
and independent oversight of the armed forces have made political control over
them superficial at best. The level of corruption inside the Ministry of
Defence and the armed forces is staggering, and the possibilities for subverting
political directives through sheer inertia are endless. The chances of this
situation changing for the better in the near future are not auspicious. For all the
brouhaha about radical reform under Serdyukov, the political leadership in the end
will most likely prove unwilling to take the political risk involved in antagoni-
zing the military organization by pushing through painful and costly reforms, in
particular if more pressing political issues emerge in the wake of the global financial
crisis and a deep economic crisis with possible social unrest to follow.
Russian military power in the international arena

Russia drew the conclusion that the military operation in Georgia was
successful overall, but that it made obvious a number of weaknesses of its
military organization if it were to compete with the West. Even before the war
in Georgia, the Kremlin and the military leadership knew perfectly well that it
was lagging behind the West when it came to conventional warfare and that it
would not be able to engage in such a conflict with NATO. This is clear both
from official documents, such as the so-called White Paper that the Russian
Ministry of Defence published in 2003, and from the Russian analyses made
after the wars in Iraq in 1990 and 2003. Russia was nowhere near the
technological level of the West when it came to, for example, precision
weapons and development of command and control. Fortunately, the risk of
military confrontation between Russia and the West was very low. However,
Russia had by no means abandoned the ambition to compete with the West
militarily in the future.
Russian inferiority in modern conventional warfare was not overlooked by
Western analysts. Although the military operation in Georgia was immensely
better planned and implemented than the war in Chechnya in 1994 –1996, the
deficiencies were obvious and serious enough to make the West conclude that
Russia is nowhere close to catching up with the West technologically or when it
comes to recruiting and training the kind of soldiers and junior officers needed for
warfare in the twenty-first century.
The fact that Russia’s armed forces are perceived as equipped and trained for
wars of the past together with Western disillusion with Russia’s political position
in recent years (not least the decision to recognize the independence of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia) will make international military cooperation difficult in
the near future. Although NATO and Russia re-established their relations in early
2009, the illusions and hopes attached to the NATO-Russia Council in 2002 have
been thoroughly dashed. Apart from Russia’s participation in the NATO
operation Active Endeavour, there are precious few examples of practical

military cooperation. Russia is anything but impressed with the European Union
as a military actor on the international arena, and countries such as Sweden
decided to freeze all military cooperation as a direct result of Russia’s recognition
of the separatist regions in Georgia. Apart from the political aspects, the limited
Russian capacity for postmodern warfare results in Russian troops being more
restricted in their use in international peacekeeping missions than you would
expect of a military great power. Nor is the Russian view of what peace
operations entail compatible with most Western countries’ apprehension, judging
from the ‘peace enforcement’ operation in Georgia and previous Russian peace
supporting interventions.87 Furthermore, Russian soldiers apparently behaved in
a manner not desirable within a peacekeeping operation, looting military and
civilian property during and after the war. Any military cooperation between
Russia and the West in the near future will take place in spite of analyses of
Russia’s military performance in Georgia rather than because of them.
From a Russian perspective, the war was a success if it dissuaded other small
neighbouring states from seeking confrontation with Moscow in the future. Russia
displayed both its readiness to use military force and its ability to deploy quickly in
the Five-Day War. However, Russia’s relations with its neighbours are more
complicated than this, and few other neighbouring states are comparable with
Georgia. The Russian war record, moreover, raises doubts as to whether its military
would be able to wage war against a more advanced adversary or one able to deploy
larger forces or attract help from a third party. The logistical problems also raise the
question of Russia’s ability to sustain an operation for a longer period of time.
Furthermore, the Russian military has severe constraints on its ability to wage counter-
insurgency warfare. In other words, Russia suffers from a lack of diversification
in military capability. In the introductory quote, Aleksandr Svechin states that
strategy apart from stating the goal of an operation ‘also makes certain
requirements of the methods of achieving it’. It would follow that a narrow array
of methods limits the scope for adapting appropriate and efficient strategies to
different challenges.
In order to use its military as an efficient tool in the future, Russia will have to
rectify many of the deficiencies an analysis of the Five-Day War made obvious and,
more importantly in times of scarce resources, it will have to make a strategic
decision as to how it should prioritize when modernizing its armed forces.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Vasily Zatsepin, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for the
Economy in Transition, for providing perceptive comments and advice on a draft of this
article. Needless to say, any errors or transgressions that remain are solely the
responsibility of the authors.
Notes
1. Svechin, Strategy, 269.

2. Vitaly Shlykov has defined it as ‘an armed low-intensity conflict with conventional
weapons and completely traditional tactical methods’. Shlykov, ‘Voina c neizvestnoi
tseliu’.
3. Allison, ‘Russia resurgent? Moscow’s campaign to “coerce Georgia to peace”’, 1149.
4. Schneider, ‘The Nuclear Forces and Doctrines of the Russian Federation’, 411.
5. Cimbala and Rainow, Russia and Postmodern Deterrence, x –xiii. See also Kiselev,
‘Distantsionnoe protivoborstvo’, 83.
6. CAST, ‘Preliminary Results of Russia’s Arms Trade in 2007’; Nezavisimoe voennoe
obozrenie, ‘Dengi reshaiot ne vse’.
7. Cimbala and Rainow, Russia and Postmodern Deterrence, 43.
8. Klein, ‘Military implications of the Georgia War’, 17 – 18.
9. Trenin, ‘Moscow the Muscular’.
10. Even a military superpower such as the US has had obvious difficulties in this
respect. See for instance Fishel, ‘Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP,
and Things That Go Bump in the Night’.
11. Simonian, ‘Chernomorskii flot dreifuet v Ochamchiru’.
12. Simonian, ‘Moskva prikroet Abkhaziiu s vozdukha’.
13. Tsyganok, ‘Uroki piatidnevnoi voiny v Zakavkaze’, 3.
14. Tsyganok, ‘Uroki piatidnevnoi voiny v Zakavkaze’; Shcherbakov, ‘Spetspropaganda
otsidelas v kustakh’ [The Special Propaganda hopes it will soon blow over].
15. For an analysis of the ‘peacekeeping’ aspects of the Russian military intervention,
see Allison, ‘Russia resurgent?’, 1155– 61.
16. This was also part of the Soviet strategy for the 1967 Six-Day War. Ginor and
Remez, Foxbats over Dimona, 116.
17. Shanker, ‘Russians Melded Old-School Blitz With Modern Military Tactics’.
18. Allison, ‘Russia resurgent?’, 1151.
19. Cf. IISS, ‘Russia’s rapid reaction’.
20. The 33rd and 34th Motorized Mountain Troop Brigades based in Botlikh, Dagestan
and Zelenchukskaia, Karachai-Cherkessiia respectively were reportedly established
in 2007. The units are exclusively manned with contract soldiers. Litovkin, ‘General
Shamanov tratit milliardy’.
21. On the debate about the GRU’s ability or failure to warn Moscow, see Shlykov,
‘Voina s neizvestnoi tseliu’.
22. Felgenhauer, ‘Russian Rail Road Troops Complete Mission in Abkhazia’.
24. Menkiszak, ‘Russian Invasion of Georgia, Developments, Objectives and
Consequences’.
25. Tichonov, ‘“Kavkaz-2008”: zaslon terroru’.
26. Felgenhauer, ‘Russian Rail Road Troops Complete Mission in Abkhazia’; Muchin,
‘V armii: Voenno-ekonomicheskie manevry’; Shanker, ‘Russians Melded Old-
School Blitz With Modern Military Tactics’.
27. Cited in Klein, ‘Military Implications of the Georgia War’, 13. See also Kedrov,
‘Voina na Kavkazskogo khrebta’.
28. See, for instance, Socor, ‘Moscow Orchestrates War Scare in South Ossetia’.
29. Baev, ‘Russian “Tandemocracy” Stumbles into a War’.
30. Baranov, ‘The August War between Russia and Georgia’.
31. Khramchikhin, ‘Uroki ratnykh uspekhov i neudach’.
32. Marine infantry units did indeed take part in the first Chechen War, however not in
their capacity as naval forces but merely for want of available infantry units.
33. Baev, ‘Russian “Tandemocracy” Stumbles into a War’.
34. Bozheva, ‘Ravniais! SMI . . . Otstavit!’
35. Ibid.

37. Baranets, ‘Armiia shla na voinu v starykh latakh’.
38. Borisov, ‘Boi vtemnuiu’.
39. Aminov, ‘Georgia’s Air Defense in the War with South Ossetia’.
40. IISS, ‘Russia’s rapid reaction’.
41. Aminov, ‘Georgia’s Air Defense in the War with South Ossetia’.
43. Shanker, ‘Russians Melded Old-School Blitz With Modern Military Tactics’;
Khramchikhin, ‘Uroki ratnykh uspekhov i neudach’.
45. Petrov, ‘Russian Army’s weaknesses exposed during war in Georgia’.
46. Baranov, ‘The August War between Russia and Georgia’.
47. Tsyganok, ‘Uroki piatidnevnoi voiny v Zakavkaze’.
49. Rastopshin, ‘K beskontaktnym operatsiiam XXI veka ne gotovy’.
50. Ibid.
51. As cruise missiles are expensive compared to conventional bombs, economic
considerations may have motivated the use of other munitions.
53. Khramchikhin, ‘Uroki ratnykh uspekhov i neudach’; Tsyganok, ‘Uroki piatidnevnoi
voiny v Zakavkaze’.
55. Rastopshin, ‘K beskontaktnym operatsiiam XXI veka ne gotovy’; Tsyganok, ‘Uroki
piatidnevnoi voiny v Zakavkaze’.
56. Petrov, ‘Russian Army’s weaknesses exposed during war in Georgia’.
57. Frolov, ‘Ispolnenie gosudarstvennogo oboronnogo zakaza Rossii v 2007 godu’.
58. Babchenko, ‘Gruziia-200’ (the title of the article refers to the Russian military term
gruz-200, which is a cover word for transporting deceased personnel); Felgenhauer,
‘It Was No Spontaneous, But Planned War’.
61. Ibid.; Nikolskiy, ‘Voina meniaet biudzhet armii’.
62. Rastopshin, ‘K beskontaktnym operatsiiam XXI veka ne gotovy’.
63. Nikolskiy, ‘Voina meniaet biudzhet armii’.
64. Solovev, ‘“Ot rossiiskogo informbiuro . . . ” – ne polychilos’.
65. Kedrov, ‘Voina na Kavkazskogo khrebta’.
66. Lukanin, ‘Tsena pobedy’.
68. Nikolskiy, ‘Voina menyayet biudzhet armii’.
69. Tikhonov, ‘Protivoborstvo v diapazonakh chastot’.
70. Rastopshin, ‘K beskontaktnym operatsiiam XXI veka ne gotovy’; Solovev,
‘“Ot rossiiskogo informbioro . . . ” – ne polychilos’.
71. Nikolskiy, ‘Voina meniaet biudzhet armii’.
73. Felgenhauer, ‘It Was No Spontaneous, But Planned War’; Baranov, ‘The August
War between Russia and Georgia’.
74. Klein, ‘Military Implications of the Georgia War’, 13.
75. Kedrov, ‘Voina na Kavkazskogo khrebta’.
76. Shlykov, ‘Voina s neizvestnoi tseliu’.
77. van Bladel, The All-Volunteer Force in the Russian Mirror: Transformation without
Change, 217.
78. Fishel, ‘Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, The GAP, and Things That Go Bump
in the Night’, 386– 8.

79. Vendil Pallin, ‘Russia and its military: Between reform and modernization’.
80. Litovkin, ‘Genshtab informiruet zagranitsu’.
81. It will most probably prove difficult for Russia to maintain armed forces of one
million. A more realistic figure is somewhere between 500,000 and 700,000 if the
goal is for the troops to have modern equipment and soldiers and officers in high
readiness units. See, for example, Arbatov, ‘Military reform’, 113.
82. For description of Serdyukov’s reform, see Solovev, ‘Voennaia reforma 2009– 2012
godov’, Konovalov, ‘Perestroiku armii provedut bez glasnosti’ and Herspring,
‘Russia’s military in the throes of change’.
83. Vendil Pallin, ‘The role of the military in Russian foreign policy’, 111– 18. On the
relative size of the defence budget, see Cooper, ‘Military expenditure in the three-
year federal budget of the Russian Federation, 2008– 10’.
84. RFE/RL. ‘Russian Soldiers in South Ossetia Living In “Horrendous” Conditions’.
85. Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, ‘Novosti’, 29 January 2009. See also
RFE/RL, ‘Russia Demands Return of Soldier from Georgia’.
86. RIA Novosti, ‘Sledstvie ubedilos, chto serzhant Glukhov sam sbezhal iz chasti’.
87. See Allison, ‘Russia resurgent?’, 1155– 9.
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Small Wars & Insurgencies

Vol. 20, No. 2, June 2009, 400–424

Russia’s war in Georgia: lessons and consequences

capability – have underscored the need for a modernization of the Armed

Emails: carolina.vendilpallin@ui.se; fredrik.westerlund@foi.se

ISSN 0959-2318 print/ISSN 1743-9558 online

Russia’s dilemma in a nutshell

Russian military strategy in the Five-Day War

The Five-Day War and Russia’s military capability

Planning and implementation of the operation

by surprise, as will be discussed in the following. However, on the

Command and control

Air defence and air support

estimated to have exceeded 10 aircraft during some 200 missions in total.40

On the whole, deficiencies in military equipment plagued the armed forces

Conduct and professionalism of Russian forces

Nor were the Russian troops equipped according to official regulations.

Implications for future Russian military strategy

be able to wage postmodern warfare.

The Russian military in domestic politics

inside the Ministry of Defence. As most bureaucracies, Russia’s military officers

Russian military power in the international arena

operation Active Endeavour, there are precious few examples of practical

1. Svechin, Strategy, 269.

36. Khramchikhin, ‘Uroki ratnykh uspekhov i neudach’.

in the Night’, 386– 8.

mil.ru/info/1069/details/index.shtml?id¼57476. (Accessed 18 March 2009).

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Russia's War in Georgia Lessons and Consequences

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