Victoria v.
Inciong (1988) the National Labor Relations Commission, the ad hoc
Petitioners: SATURNO A. VICTORIA
Respondents: HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, DEPUTY MINISTER,
AND FAR EAST BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC. (FEBC)
Ponente: Fernan
Topic: Work Enlightenment
FACTS:
 Victoria was employed on March 17, 1956 by FEBC as a
radio transmitter operator.
 Sometime in July 1971, he and his co-workers organized
FEBC Employees Association.
 After registering their association with the then Department
of Labor, they demanded recognition of said association by
the company but the latter refused on the ground that being a
non-profit, non-stock, non-commercial and religious
corporation, it is not covered by Republic Act 875, otherwise
known as the Industrial Peace Act, the labor law enforced at
that time.
 In conciliation meetings at the Department of Labor, the
Director of Labor Relations Edmundo Cabal advised the
union members that the company could not be forced to
recognize them or to bargain collectively with them because it
is a non-profit, non-commercial and religious organization.
 Notwithstanding such advice, the union members led by
Victoria as its president, declared a strike and picketed the
company’s premises on September 6, 1972 for the purpose of
seeking recognition of the labor union.
 As a countermeasure, the company filed a case for damages
with preliminary injunction against the strikers before the CFI
Bulacan. Said court issued an injunction enjoining the three-
day-old strike staged against the company. The complaint was
later amended seeking to declare the strike illegal.
 Upon the declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972
and the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 21 creating
National Labor Relations Commission took cognizance of the
strike through "FEBC Employees Association v. FEBC” and
“Generoso Serino v. FEBC,” both cases for reinstatement due
to FEBC’s refusal to accept the union's offer to return to work
during the pendency of the case in the CFI.
 On December 28, 1972, Arbitrator Flavio Aguas rendered a
joint decision in the two cases recognizing the jurisdiction of
the CFI Bulacan. The dispositive portion stated: “This Order
shall, however, be without prejudice to whatever decision the
[CFI] Bulacan may promulgate in Civil Case No. 750-V and
to the requirements the existing order may need of people
working with the mass media of communications.”
 The decision of the arbitrator was successively appealed to
the ad hoc NLRC, the Secretary of Labor and the Office of
the President of the Philippines, and was affirmed in all
instances.
 On April 23, 1975, CFI Bulacan rendered judgment,
“declaring that the strike admitted by the defendants to have
been declared by them is illegal inasmuch as it was for the
purpose of compelling the plaintiff-company to recognize
their labor union which could not be legally done because the
plaintiffs were not covered by Republic Act 875.”
 On April 24, 1975, by virtue of the CFI decision, FEBC
notified Victoria that he is dismissed effective April 26, 1975.
 Thereupon, Victoria filed a case before the NLRC against
FEBC alleging violation of Article 267 of the Labor Code
which requires clearance from the Secretary of Labor for
every shutdown of business establishments or dismissal of
employees.
 On February 27, 1976, the Labor Arbiter decided in
Victoria’s favor declaring the dismissal to be illegal, thereby
ordering reinstatement with full backwages.
 On appeal, the arbiter’s decision was affirmed by the NLRC.
  On appeal to the Secretary of Labor, it was set aside. The
Secretary ruled: “We do not agree with the [NLRC ruling]
that an application for clearance to terminate [Victoria] is
mandatory on the part of [FEBC] before terminating
[Victoria’s] services. We believe that what would have been
necessary was a report as provided for under Section 11 [f],
Rule XIV, Book V of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code. Moreover, even if an
application for clearance was filed, this Office would have
treated the same as a report. Otherwise, it would render
nugatory the Decision of the Arbitrator dated December 28,
1972 in Case Nos. 0021 and 0285 which was affirmed by the
Commission, the Secretary of Labor and the Office of the
President of the Philippines, ordering his temporary
reinstatement, subject to whatever Decision the CFI Bulacan
may promulgate in Civil Case No. 750-V. It could be clearly
inferred from said [NLRC] Decisions that if the strike is
declared illegal, the strikers will be considered to have lost
their employment status under the then existing laws and
jurisprudence, otherwise strikers could stage illegal strike
with impunity. Since the strike was declared illegal, [FEBC]
acted in good faith when it dispensed with the services of
[Victoria]. For failure of [FEBC] to file the necessary report
and based on equitable considerations, [Victoria] should be
granted separation pay equivalent to one-half month salary
for every year of service.”
 Victoria insists that Article 267(b) (Note: repealed) of the
Labor Code is very clear. It does not make any distinction as
to the ground for dismissal. Whether or not the dismissal
sought by the employer company is for cause, it is imperative
that the company must apply for a clearance from the
Secretary of Labor.
ISSUES:
 WoN a clearance from the Secretary of Labor is still
necessary before Victoria can be dismissed
o NO. In Madrigal & Company, Inc. v. Zamora,
penned by Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento
promulgated on June 30, 1987, the Court ruled in
agreement with the findings of then Presidential
Assistant for Legal Affairs Ronaldo Zamora that the
purpose in requiring a prior clearance from the
Secretary of Labor in cases of shutdown or dismissal
of employees is to afford the Secretary ample
opportunity to examine and determine the
reasonableness of the request.
o We agree with the Solicitor General. Technically
speaking, no clearance was obtained by Victoria from
the then Secretary of Labor, the last step towards full
compliance with the requirements of law on the
matter of dismissal of employees. However, the
rationale behind the clearance requirement was fully
met. The Secretary of Labor was apprised of FEBC’s
intention to terminate Victoria’s services. This in
effect is an application for clearance to dismiss
Victoria from employment. The affirmance of the
restrictive condition in the dispositive portion of the
labor arbiter's decision (in the earlier two cases) by
the Secretary of Labor and the Office of the President
of the Philippines signifies a grant of authority to
dismiss Victoria in case the strike is declared illegal
by CFI Bulacan. Consequently and as correctly stated
by the Solicitor General, FEBC acted in good faith
when it terminated the employment of Victoria upon
a declaration, of illegality of the strike by CFI
Bulacan. Moreover, the then Secretary of Labor
manifested his conformity to the dismissal, not once,
but twice. In this regard, the mandatory rule on
clearance need not be applied.
o The strike staged by the union in 1972 was a futile
move. The law then enforced, Republic Act 875
specifically excluded FEBC from its coverage. Even
if the parties had gone to court to compel recognition,
no positive relief could have been obtained since the
same was not sanctioned by law. Because of this,
there was no necessity on the part of FEBC to show
specific acts of Victoria during the strike to justify his
dismissal.
o This is a matter of responsibility and of
answerability. Victoria as a union leader, must see
to it that the policies and activities of the union in
the conduct of labor relations are within the
precepts of law and any deviation from the legal
boundaries shall be imputable to the leader. He
bears the responsibility of guiding the union along
the path of law and to cause the union to demand
what is not legally demandable, would foment
anarchy which is a prelude to chaos.
o Victoria should have known and it was his duty to
impart this imputed knowledge to the members of
the union that employees and laborers in non-
profit organizations are not covered by the
provisions of the Industrial Peace Act and the
Court of Industrial Relations [in the case at bar,
the CFI] has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions
of labor unions or organizations of said non-profit
organizations for certification as the exclusive
bargaining representatives of said employees and
laborers.
o As a strike is an economic weapon at war with the
policy of the Constitution and the law at that time, a
resort thereto by laborers shall be deemed to be a
choice of remedy peculiarly their own, and outside of
the statute, and as such, the strikers must accept all
the risks attendant upon their choice. If they succeed
and the employer succumbs, the law will not stand in
their way in the enjoyment of the lawful fruits of their
victory. But if they fail, they cannot thereafter invoke
the protection of the law for the consequences of their
conduct unless the right they wished vindicated is one
which the law will, by all means, protect and enforce.
o We further agree with the Acting Secretary of Labor
that what was required in the case of petitioner's
dismissal was only a report as provided under
Section II [f] of Rule XIV of the Rules and
Regulations implementing the Labor Code which
provides:
 “Every employer shall submit a report to the
Regional Office in accordance with the form
presented by the Department on the following
instances of termination of employment,
suspension, lay-off or shutdown which may
be effected by the employer without prior
clearance within five [5] days thereafter:
 x x x x x
x xxx
 [f] All other terminations of employment,
suspension, lay-offs or shutdowns, not
otherwise specified in this and in the
immediately preceding sections."
o To hold otherwise would render nugatory the
conditions set forth in the decision of Labor Arbiter
Aguas on the basis of which Victoria was temporarily
reinstated.
ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife
MERRIDY JANE P. DULAY, v. ABOITIZ JEBSEN
MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC.
13 June 2012 | J. Peralta
FACTS: Nelson Dulay was employed by R General Charters Inc.
(subsidiary of P Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc) since 1986, intially as
an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on a contractual basis. He was
detailed in P's vessel, MV Kickapoo Belle, from 3 Sept 1999 to 19
July 2000.
 13 August 2000: 25 days after the completion of his
employment contract, Nelson died due to acute renal failure
secondary to septicemia. At the time of his death, Nelson was
a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and
Seaman’s Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP), GCI’s
collective bargaining agent. Nelson’s widow, Merridy Jane,
thereafter claimed for death benefits through the grievance
procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between AMOSUP and GCI. However, the grievance
procedure was “declared deadlocked” as petitioners refused to
grant the benefits sought by the widow.
 5 March 2001: Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC
Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in General Santos City
against GCI for death and medical benefits and damages.
 8 March 2001: Joven Mar, Nelson’s brother, received
P20,000.00 from R pursuant to article 20(A)2 of the CBA and
signed a “Certification” acknowledging receipt of the amount
and releasing AMOSUP from further liability. Merridy Jane
contended that she is entitled to the aggregate sum of Ninety
Thousand Dollars ($90,000) pursuant to Article 20 (A)1 of
the CBA. Merridy Jane averred that the P20,000 already
received by Joven Mar should be considered advance
payment of the total claim of US$90,000.
LA took cognizance of the case by virtue of LC 217(a), par. 6 and the
existence of a reasonable causal connection between the er-ee
relationship & claim asserted. It ordered payment of P4,621,3000
(equivalent of $90,000 less P20,000) at the time of judgment. It also
ruled that proximate cause of Nelson's death was not work-related.
NLRC affirmed LA's grant of death benefits under the CBA, but
reversed the ruling re: proximate cause of Nelson's death.
Special civil action for certiorari with CA, contending that NLRC
committed GAD in affirming jurisdiction its jurisdiction over the
case; ruling that a diff. provision of the CBA covers the death claim;
reversing LA findings that cause of work is not work-related; setting
aside the release & quitclaim executed by the attorney-in-fact; and not
considering the P20,000 already received by Merridy Jane through
her attorney-in-fact.
CA: granted petition and referred case to the NCMB for the
designation of the Voluntary Arbitrator or constitution of a panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators for the appropriate resolution of the issue on the
matter of the applicable CBA provision. It ruled that while the suit
filed by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same basically involves
the interpretation and application of the provisions in the subject
CBA. As such, jurisdiction belongs to the voluntary arbitrator and not
the labor arbiter; MR denied
ISSUE: W/N LA had jurisdiction over the case
HELD: No.
Arguments
 Petitioner: Sec. 10 of RA 8042 (Migrant Workers &
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) vests jurisdiction on the
appropriate branches of the NLRC to entertain disputes
regarding the interpretation of a collective bargaining
 agreement involving migrant or overseas Filipino workers;
while Article 217 (c) of the Labor Code which, in turn,
confers jurisdiction upon voluntary arbitrators over
interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining
agreements and interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies.
 Respondents: Article 217, paragraph (c) as well as Article
261 of the Labor Code remain to be the governing provisions
of law with respect to unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation and implementation of collective bargaining
agreements. Under these provisions of law, jurisdiction
remains with voluntary arbitrators.
RATIO:
A careful reading of RA8042 would show that there is no specific
provision which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved
grievances regarding the interpretation or implementation of a CBA.
Section 10 simply speaks, in general, of “claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.”
On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor Code are
very specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction
over cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of
collective bargaining agreements.
In the present case, the basic issue raised by Merridy Jane in her
complaint filed with the NLRC is: which provision of the subject
CBA applies insofar as death benefits due to the heirs of Nelson are
concerned. The Court agrees with the CA in holding that this issue
clearly involves the interpretation or implementation of the said
CBA. Thus, the specific or special provisions of the Labor Code
govern.
Article 13.1 of the CBA between GCI and AMOSUP provides: "The
Company and the Union agree that in case of dispute or conflict
in the interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this
Agreement, or enforcement of Company policies, the same shall
be settled through negotiation, conciliation or voluntary
arbitration. The Company and the Union further agree that they will
use their best endeavor to ensure that any dispute will be discussed,
resolved and settled amicably by the parties hereof within ninety (90)
days from the date of filing of the dispute or conflict and in case of
failure to settle thereof any of the parties retain their freedom to take
appropriate action."
From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties, in the first place, really
intended to bring to conciliation or voluntary arbitration any dispute
or conflict in the interpretation or application of the provisions of their
CBA. It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a
procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to
voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed.
Also, the above-quoted provisions of the CBA are in consonance with
Rule VII, Section 7 of the present Omnibus Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022, which states that “[f]or
OFWs with collective bargaining agreements, the case shall be
submitted for voluntary arbitration in accordance with Articles 261
and 262 of the Labor Code.”
Section 29 of the prevailing Standard Terms and Conditions
Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean
Going Vessels, promulgated by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), provides as follows:
Section 29. Dispute Settlement Procedures. − In cases of
claims and disputes arising from this employment, the
parties covered by a collective bargaining agreement shall
submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators. If the parties are not covered by a collective
bargaining agreement, the parties may at their option submit
the claim or dispute to either the original and exclusive
 jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 8042, otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 or to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. If there is no
provision as to the voluntary arbitrators to be appointed by
the parties, the same shall be appointed from the accredited
voluntary arbitrators of the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and
Employment.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide disciplinary action on cases, which are
administrative in character, involving or arising out of
violations of recruitment laws, rules and regulations involving
employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino
seafarers.
With respect to disputes involving claims of Filipino seafarers
wherein the parties are covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, the dispute or claim should be submitted to the
jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. It is
only in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement that
parties may opt to submit the dispute to either the NLRC or to
voluntary arbitration.
The above interpretation of the DOLE, DFA and POEA is also in
consonance with the policy of the state to promote voluntary
arbitration as a mode of settling labor disputes (Section 3, Article XIII
and LC 211).
St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations
Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995.
However, there was no contract of employment executed between
him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly
payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment
for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00. Petitioner on the other
hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the
uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St.Martin’s Funeral
Home and in January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so
the latter took over the management of the business.
Amelita made some changes in the business operation and private
respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the
management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint
charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. The
labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that
no employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and
therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: WON the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court
of Appeals.
RULING:
The Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from
the NLRC to the SC were eliminated, the legislative intendment was
that the special civil action for certiorari was and still is the proper
vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the
word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have Philippine Transmarine Carriers v. Leandro Legaspi
June 19, 2013| J. Mendoza| NLRC; LA
noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari
and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review
SUMMARY: A seafarer, Legaspi, was claiming disability benefits
addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between
under a CBA to the amount of USD80,000.00 and sick pay to the
them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned
amount of USD1,320. After the proceedings with LA, he was
here is that the special civil action for certiorari is within the
awarded his claim plus 10% attorney’s fees. The LA decision was
concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of
affirmed by the NLRC. NLRC also denied PTC’s MR and an entry of
Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by
judgment was issued to certify that the decision was already final.
certiorari to the SC are allowed would not subserve, but would
Legaspi commenced execution proceedings and the company was
subvert, the intention of the Congress as expressed in the sponsorship
constrained to pay the full judgment award. Paying Legaspi, they
speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
executed a document recognizing that the payment would not bar
PTC’s right to file a petition for Certiorari (elevating it to the CA) and
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P No. 129 to
if it succeeds, Legaspi would return the money paid to him because of
supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
the execution proceedings. CA ruled that Legaspi was entitled to only
interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for
USD60k and PTC manifested that the decision should be modified
certiorari under Rule65. Consequently, all such petitions should
and asked Legaspi to return the excess amount of USD29,452.00 to
henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
the company. CA denied this motion and ruled that the petition should
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
have been dismissed for being moot and academic because the NLRC
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
decision had already become final and executory ten days after the
denial of MR and that the company had already paid the money (in
fact it was paid before petition was filed). SC held that NLRC
decision was subject to judicial review of the CA by filing a petition
for certiorari within 60 days from notice of decision or resolution
being assailed. Thus, the NLRC decision could still be modified or
nullified.

DOCTRINE: In cases where a petition for certiorari is filed after the

expiration of the 10-day period under the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure but within the 60-day period under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the CA can grant the petition and modify, nullify and reverse a
decision or resolution of the NLRC

FACTS:
• Respondent Leandro Legaspi was employed as Utility Pastry
on board the vessel "Azamara Journey" under the employment of
petitioner Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.
• Legaspi’s employment was covered by a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) wherein it was agreed that the
company shall pay a maximum disability compensation of up to
US$60,000.00 only.
• While on board the vessel, respondent suffered "Cardiac
Arrest S/P ICD Insertation."
• He was checked by the ship’s doctor and was prescribed
medications.
• On November 14, 2008, respondent was repatriated to receive
further medical treatment and examination. The company designated
physician assessed his condition to be Disability Grade 2.
• Not satisfied, respondent filed a complaint for full and
permanent disability compensation against petitioner before the Labor
Arbiter (LA).
• LA: Ruled in favor of Legaspi (See Notes for awards)
o Award was based on the ITF Cruise Ship Model Agreement
for Catering Personnel, not on the CBA.
• Not satisfied, petitioner appealed the LA decision before the
NLRC
• NLRC: Affirmed the decision of the LA.
• Petitioner agreed to pay respondent US$81,320.00. The terms
and conditions of said payment were embodied in the Receipt of
Judgment Award with Undertaking, wherein respondent
acknowledged receipt of the said amount and undertook to return it to
petitioner in the event the latter’s petition for certiorari would be
granted.
o It was also agreed upon that the remaining balance would be
given on the next scheduled conference.
• On November 8, 2010, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
with the CA
• In the meantime, LA issued a writ of execution which noted
petitioner’s payment of the amount of US$81,320.00.
• CA: The CA partially granted the petition for certiorari and
modified the assailed resolutions of the NLRC, awarding only
US$60,000.00 pursuant to the CBA between Celebrity Cruise Lines
and Federazione Italianaa Transporti CISL.
o Unaware of a) the September 5, 2010 entry of judgment of
the NLRC, b) the October 22, 2010 payment of US$81,320.00, and c)
the writ of execution issued by the LA, the CA rendered its Decision,
dated June 29, 2011.
• Petitioner: since it had already paid the total amount of
US$89,452.00, it was entitled to the return of the excess payment in
the amount of US$29,452.00.
• CA: denied the motion and ruled that the petition should have
been dismissed for being moot and academic because:
o the assailed decision of the NLRC had become final and
executory on September 5, 2010, and
o the said judgment had been satisfied on October 22, 2010,
even before the filing of the petition for certiorari on November 8,
2010
o Cited Career Philippines Ship Management v. Geronimo
Madjus : the satisfaction of the monetary award rendered the petition
for certiorari moot.
• Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
by the CA in its assailed July 20, 2012 Resolution.
• Petitioner:
o They filed its petition for certiorari within the 60-day
reglementary period and, thus, the NLRC resolutions could not have
attained finality
Cites Delima v. Gois : NLRC cannot declare that a decision
has become final and executory because the period to file the petition
has not yet expired
The finality of the NLRC judgment did not render the petition
moot and academic because such is null and void ab initio
o The Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking (which
was never refuted by respondent) clearly stated that the payment of
the judgment award was without prejudice to its right to file a petition
for certiorari with CA
Career Philippines (cited by CA) not applicable because not
on all fours with this case
Applicable case should be Leonis Navigation Co. Inc v.
Villamater: satisfaction of the monetary award by the employer does
not render the petition for certiorari moot before the CA
• Respondent: reiterates the CA ruling; voluntary satisfaction
by petitioner of the full judgment award rendered the case moot
RULING: Petition GRANTED
Whether or not petition for Certiorari is moot and academic—NO
• Section 14, Rule VII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure
provides that decisions, resolutions or orders of the NLRC shall
become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof by the parties, and entry of judgment shall be made upon the
expiration of the said period
• In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, however, it was ruled
that judicial review of decisions of the NLRC may be sought via a
petition for certiorari before the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court; and under Section 4 thereof, petitioners are allowed sixty (60)
days from notice of the assailed order or resolution within which to
file the petition.
• Hence, in cases where a petition for certiorari is filed after the
expiration of the 10-day period under the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure but within the 60-day period under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, the CA can grant the petition and modify, nullify and reverse a
decision or resolution of the NLRC.
• Accordingly, in this case, although the petition for certiorari
was not filed within the 10-day period, petitioner timely filed it before
the CA within the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65.
• Thus, CA’s review of the decisions or resolutions of the
NLRC under Rule 65, particularly those which have already been
executed, does not affect their statutory finality, considering that
Section 4 Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, provides
that a petition for certiorari filed with the CA shall not stay the
execution of the assailed decision unless a restraining order is issued.
• Leonis Navigation case said:
o “The CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it
finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, committed
grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily
disregarding evidence that is material to or decisive of the
controversy; and it cannot make this determination without looking
into the evidence of the parties.”
o “Necessarily, the appellate court can only evaluate the
materiality or significance of the evidence, which is alleged to have
been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the
NLRC, in relation to all other evidence on record. Notably, if the CA
grants the petition and nullifies the decision or resolution of the
NLRC on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction, the decision or resolution of the NLRC
is, in contemplation of law, null and void ab initio; hence, the decision
or resolution never became final and executory.”
NOTES:
• US$80,000.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment as
permanent disability compensation; US$1,320.00 or its peso
equivalent as sick wages;
CASE DIGEST: Abbott Laboratories Phil. et.al. v. Pearlie Ann F.
Alcaraz [G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013]
Subject: Labor Law – Probationary employees – Standards to
qualify as a regular employee
Decision (Perlas-Bernarbe, J.)
Dissent (Brion, J.)
FACTS:
On June 27, 2004, Abbott Laboratories, Philippines (Abbott) caused
the publication in a major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a
Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager who would: (a) be
responsible for drug safety surveillance operations, staffing, and
budget; (b) lead the development and implementation of standard
operating procedures/policies for drug safety surveillance and
vigilance; and (c) act as the primary interface with internal and
external customers regarding safety operations and queries.
Alcaraz – who was then a Regulatory Affairs and Information
Manager at Aventis Pasteur Philippines, Incorporated (another
pharmaceutical company like Abbott) – showed interest and
submitted her application on October 4, 2004.
On December 7, 2004, Abbott formally offered Alcaraz the above-
mentioned position which was an item under the company’s Hospira
Affiliate Local Surveillance Unit (ALSU) department.
In Abbott’s offer sheet, it was stated that Alcaraz was to be
employed on a probationary basis.
Later that day, she accepted the said offer and received an electronic
mail (e-mail) from Abbott’s Recruitment Officer, Teresita C.
Bernardo (Bernardo), confirming the same. Attached to Bernardo’s
e-mail were Abbott’s organizational chart and a job description
of Alcaraz’s work.
On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract
which stated that she was to be placed on probation for a period
of six (6) months beginning February 15, 2005 to August 14, 2005.
During Alcaraz’s pre-employment orientation, Allan G. Almazar,
Hospira’s Country Transition Manager, briefed her on her duties
and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager:
(a) she will handle the staff of Hospira ALSU and will directly report
to Almazar on matters regarding Hopira’s local operations,
operational budget, and performance evaluation of the Hospira ALSU
Staff who are on probationary status;
(b) she must implement Abbott’s Code of Good Corporate Conduct
(Code of Conduct), office policies on human resources and finance,
and ensure that Abbott will hire people who are fit in the
organizational discipline;
(c) Kelly Walsh, Manager of the Literature Drug Surveillance Drug
Safety of Hospira, will be her immediate supervisor;
(d) she should always coordinate with Abbott’s human resource
officers in the management and discipline of the staff;
(e) Hospira ALSU will spin off from Abbott in early 2006 and will be
officially incorporated and known as Hospira, Philippines; and
(f) the processing of information and/or raw material data subject of
Hospira ALSU operations will be strictly confined and controlled
under the computer system and network being maintained and
operated from the United States. For this purpose, all those involved
in Hospira ALSU are required to use two identification cards: one, to
identify them as Abbott’s employees and another, to identify them as
Hospira employees.
On March 3, 2005, Maria Olivia T. Yabut-Misa, Abbott’s Human
Resources (HR) Director, sent Alcaraz an e-mail which contained
an explanation of the procedure for evaluating the performance
of probationary employees and further indicated that Abbott had
only one evaluation system for all of its employees. Alcaraz was
also given copies of Abbott’s Code of Conduct and Probationary
Performance Standards and Evaluation (PPSE) and Performance
Excellence Orientation Modules (Performance Modules) which
she had to apply in line with her task of evaluating the Hospira
ALSU staff.
Abbott’s PPSE procedure mandates that the job performance of a
probationary employee should be formally reviewed and
discussed with the employee at least twice: first on the third month
and second on the fifth month from the date of employment.
The necessary Performance Improvement Plan should also be
made during the third-month review in case of a gap between the
employee’s performance and the standards set. These performance
standards should be discussed in detail with the employee within
the first two (2) weeks on the job. It was equally required that a
signed copy of the PPSE form must be submitted to Abbott’s
Human Resources Department (HRD) and shall serve as
documentation of the employee’s performance during his/her
probationary period. This shall form the basis for recommending the
confirmation or termination of the probationary employment.
On April 20, 2005, Alcaraz had a meeting with Cecille Terrible,
Abbott’s former HR Director, to discuss certain issues regarding
staff performance standards. In the course thereof, Alcaraz
accidentally saw a printed copy of an e-mail sent by Walsh to
some staff members which essentially contained queries regarding
the former’s job performance. Alcaraz asked if Walsh’s action
was the normal process of evaluation. Terrible said that it was
not.
On May 16, 2005, Alcaraz was called to a meeting with Walsh and
Terrible where she was informed that she failed to meet the
regularization standards for the position of Regulatory Affairs
Manager. Thereafter, Walsh and Terrible requested Alcaraz to
tender her resignation, else they be forced to terminate her
services. She was also told that, regardless of her choice, she
should no longer report for work and was asked to surrender her
office identification cards. She requested to be given one week to
decide on the same, but to no avail.
On May 17, 2005, Alcaraz told her administrative assistant, Claude
Gonzales (Gonzales), that she would be on leave for that
day. However, Gonzales told her that Walsh and Terrible already
announced to the whole Hospira ALSU staff that Alcaraz already
resigned due to health reasons.
On May 23, 2005, Walsh, Almazar, and Bernardo personally
handed to Alcaraz a letter stating that her services had been
terminated effective May 19, 2005. The letter detailed the reasons
for Alcaraz’s termination – particularly, that Alcaraz:
(a) did not manage her time effectively;
(b) failed to gain the trust of her staff and to build an effective rapport
with them;
(c) failed to train her staff effectively; and
(d) was not able to obtain the knowledge and ability to make sound
judgments on case processing and article review which were
necessary for the proper performance of her duties.
Alcaraz felt that she was unjustly terminated from her employment
and thus, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against
Abbott and its officers, namely, Misa, Bernardo, Almazar, Walsh,
Terrible, and Feist. She claimed that she should have already been
considered as a regular and not a probationary employee given
Abbott’s failure to inform her of the reasonable standards for her
regularization upon her engagement as required under Article
295 of the Labor Code. In this relation, she contended that while her
employment contract stated that she was to be engaged on a
probationary status, the same did not indicate the standards on
which her regularization would be based. She further averred
that the individual petitioners maliciously connived to illegally
dismiss her when:
(a) they threatened her with termination;
(b) she was ordered not to enter company premises even if she was
still an employee thereof; and
(c) they publicly announced that she already resigned in order to
humiliate her.
Abbott maintained that Alcaraz was validly terminated from her
probationary employment given her failure to satisfy the prescribed
standards for her regularization which were made known to her at the
time of her engagement.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in Abbott’s favor. The NLRC reversed,
upholding Alcaraz’s allegations. The CA affirmed the NLRC
decision.
ISSUES:
1) WON Alcaraz was sufficiently informed of the reasonable
standards to qualify her as a regular employee
MAJORITY: YES. Abbott clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties
and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager prior to, during
the time of her engagement, and the incipient stages of her
employment. On this score, the Court finds it apt to detail not only the
incidents which point out to the efforts made by Abbott but also those
circumstances which would show that Alcaraz was well-apprised of
her employer’s expectations that would, in turn, determine her
regularization:
(a) On June 27, 2004, Abbott caused the publication in a major
broadsheet newspaper of its need for a Regulatory Affairs Manager,
indicating therein the job description for as well as the duties and
responsibilities attendant to the aforesaid position; this prompted
Alcaraz to submit her application to Abbott on October 4, 2004;
(b) In Abbott’s December 7, 2004 offer sheet, it was stated that
Alcaraz was to be employed on a probationary status;
(c) On February 12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract
which specifically stated, inter alia, that she was to be placed on
probation for a period of six (6) months beginning February 15, 2005
to August 14, 2005;
(d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott’s employment offer, Bernardo
sent her (d) On the day Alcaraz accepted Abbott’s employment offer,
Bernardo sent her copies of Abbott’s organizational structure and her
job description through e-mail;
(e) Alcaraz was made to undergo a pre-employment orientation where
Almazar informed her that she had to implement Abbott’s Code of
Conduct and office policies on human resources and finance and that
she would be reporting directly to Walsh;
(f) Alcaraz was also required to undergo a training program as part
of her orientation;
(g) Alcaraz received copies of Abbott’s Code of Conduct and
Performance Modules from Misa who explained to her the procedure
for evaluating the performance of probationary employees; she was
further notified that Abbott had only one evaluation system for all of
its employees; and
(h) Moreover, Alcaraz had previously worked for another
pharmaceutical company and had admitted to have an “extensive
training and background” to acquire the necessary skills for her job.
Considering the totality of the above-stated circumstances, Alcaraz
was well-aware that her regularization would depend on her ability
and capacity to fulfill the requirements of her position as Regulatory
Affairs Manager and that her failure to perform such would give
Abbott a valid cause to terminate her probationary
employment. Verily, basic knowledge and common sense dictate
that the adequate performance of one’s duties is, by and of
itself, an inherent and implied standard for a probationary
employee to be regularized; such is a regularization standard
which need not be literally spelled out or mapped into technical
indicators in every case.
DISSENT (Brion, J.): NO. The Offer Sheet was designed to
inform Alcaraz of the compensation and benefits package offered
to her by Abbott and can in no way be read as a statement of the
applicable probationary employment standard. It was
communicated even prior to engagement when the parties were
negotiating, not at the point of engagement as the law requires.
The pre-employment orientation on Alcaraz’s duty to implement
Abbott’s Code of Conduct, office policies and training
program likewise cannot be characterized as performance
standards; they simply related to activities aimed at acquainting
and training Alcaraz on her duties and not for the purpose of
informing her of the performance standards applicable to
her. What stands out is that they do not pertain specifically to
Alcaraz and the required performance standard applicable for her
qualification for regular employment; they related to the staff
Alcaraz managed and supervised. Additionally, these were all
relayed prior to or after Alcaraz was engaged by Abbott.
An important distinction to remember at this point is that Alcaraz’s
knowledge of the duties that her work entailed, and her
knowledge of the employer’s performance standard, are two
distinct matters separately requiring the presentation of
independent proof.
MAJORITY: Keeping with [the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code], an employer is deemed to have made known the
standards that would qualify a probationary employee to be a
regular employee when it has exerted reasonable efforts to
apprise the employee of what he is expected to do to accomplish
during the trial of probation.This goes without saying that the
employee is sufficiently made aware of his probationary status as well
as the length of time of the probation.
The exception to the foregoing is when the job is self-descriptive
in nature, for instance, in the case of maids, cooks, drivers, or
messengers. Also in Aberdeen Court, Inc v. Agustin, it has been held
that the rule on notifying a probationary employee of the
standards of regularization should not be used to exculpate an
employee in a manner contrary to basic knowledge and common
sense in regard to which there is no need to spell out a policy or
standard to be met. In the same light, an employee’s failure to
perform the duties and responsibilities which have been clearly
made known to him constitutes a justifiable basis for a
probationary employee’s non-regularization.
DISSENT (Brion, J.): Based on these premises, the ponencia then
deftly argues that because the duties and responsibilities of the
position have been explained to Alcaraz, an experienced human
resource specialist, she should have known what was expected for
her to attain regular status. The ponencia’s reasoning, however, is
badly flawed.
1st. The ponencia impliedly admits that no performance standards
were expressly given but argues that because Alcaraz had been
informed of her duties and responsibilities (a fact that was and is not
disputed), she should be deemed to know what was expected of her
for purposes of regularization. This is a major flaw that the ponencia
satisfies only via an assumption. The ponencia apparently forgets
that knowledge of duties and responsibilities is different from the
measure of how these duties and responsibilities should be
delivered. They are separate elements and the latter element is
missing in the present case.
2nd. The ponencia glosses over the communication aspect. Not only
must there be express performance standards; there must be effective
communication. If no standards were provided, what would be
communicated?
3rd. The ponencia badly contradicts itself in claiming that actual
communication of specific standards might not be necessary “when
the job is self-descriptive in nature, for instance, in the case of maids,
cooks, drivers, or messengers.” Alcaraz, in the first place, was
never a maid, cook, driver or a messenger and cannot be placed
under this classification; she was hired and employed as a human
resources manager, in short, a managerial employee. Plain and
common sense reasoning by one who ever had been in an
employment situation dictates that the job of a manager cannot be
self-explanatory, in the way the ponencia implied; the complexity of
a managerial job must necessarily require that the level of
performance to be delivered must be specified and cannot simply be
assumed based on the communication of the manager’s duties and
responsibilities.
4th. The ponencia also forgets that what these “performance
standards” or measures cannot simply be assumed because they
are critically important in this case, or for that matter, in any case
involving jobs whose duties and responsibilities are not simple or
self-descriptive. If Alcaraz had been evaluated or assessed in the
manner that the company’s internal rules require, these standards
would have been the basis for her performance or lack of it. Last but
not the least, Alcaraz’s services were terminated on the basis of the
performance standards that, by law, the employer set or prescribed at
the time of the employee’s engagement. If none had been prescribed
in the first place, under what basis could the employee then be
assessed for purposes of termination or regularization?
2) WON Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment
MAJORITY: NO. Abbott failed to follow the above-stated
procedure in evaluating Alcaraz. For one, there lies a hiatus of
evidence that a signed copy of Alcaraz’s PPSE form was submitted to
the HRD. It was not even shown that a PPSE form was completed to
formally assess her performance. Neither was the performance
evaluation discussed with her during the third and fifth months of her
employment. Nor did Abbott come up with the necessary
Performance Improvement Plan to properly gauge Alcaraz’s
performance with the set company standards.
The Court modified Agabon v. NLRC in the case of Jaka Food
Processing Corporation v. Pacot where it created a distinction
between procedurally defective dismissals due to a just cause, on one
hand, and those due to an authorized cause, on the other.
If the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 296 of the
Labor Code but the employer failed to comply with the notice
requirement, the sanction to be imposed upon him should be
tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by
an act imputable to the employee
If the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 297
but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the
sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was
initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management
prerogative.
Alcaraz’s dismissal proceeded from her failure to comply with the
standards required for her regularization. As such, it is
undeniable that the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by
an act imputable to the employee, akin to dismissals due to just
causesunder Article 296 of the Labor Code. Therefore, the Court
deems it appropriate to fix the amount of nominal damages at the
amount of P30,000.00, consistent with its rulings in
both Agabon and Jaka.
DISSENT (Brion, J.): YES. Alcaraz was dismissed as she “failed to
qualify as regular employee in accordance with the prescribed
standards set by the Company.” Even granting for the sake of
argument that Abbott had apprised Alcaraz of an applicable
performance standard, the evidence failed to show that Alcaraz did
not meet this standard in a manner and to the extent equivalent to
the “just cause” that the law requires.
In defense of Abbott’s failure to observe the two-notice requirement,
the ponencia argues that a different procedure applies when
terminating a probationary employee; the usual two-notice
requirement does not govern, citing for this purpose Section 2, Rule I,
Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code. The ponencia,
however, forgets that the single notice rule applies only if the
employee is validly on probationary basis; it does not apply where
the employee is deemed a regular employee for the company’s
failure to provide and to communicate a prescribed performance
standard applicable to the probationary employee.
3) WON the individual petitioners herein are liable
MAJORITY: NO. Other than her unfounded assertions on the
matter, there is no evidence to support the fact that the individual
petitioners herein, in their capacity as Abbott’s officers and
employees, acted in bad faith or were motivated by ill will in
terminating Alcaraz’s services. The fact that Alcaraz was made to
resign and not allowed to enter the workplace does not necessarily
indicate bad faith on Abbott’s part since a sufficient ground existed
for the latter to actually proceed with her termination. On the alleged
loss of her personal belongings, records are bereft of any showing that
the same could be attributed to Abbott or any of its officers.
DISSENT (Brion, J.): YES. The NLRC exhaustively discussed
Abbott’s bad faith, as demonstrated by the actions of the individual
petitioners:
First, Alcaraz was pressured to resign:
(1) she was threatened with termination, which will surely damage
her reputation in the pharmaceutical industry;
(2) she was asked to evacuate her Commission and ordered not to
enter the Company’s premises even if she was still an Abbott
employee; and
(3) Terrible and Walsh made a public announcement to the staff that
Alcaraz already resigned even if in reality she did not.
The CA also described in detail the abrupt and oppressive manner in
which Alcaraz’s employment was dismissed by Abbott:
On May 23, 2005, Alcaraz still reported for work since Abbott had
not yet handed the termination notice to her. However, the security
guard did not allow her to enter the Hospira ALSU office pursuant
to Walsh[’s] instruction. She requested Walsh that she be allowed to
enter the company premises to retrieve her last remaining things in
her office which are mostly her personal belongings. She was allowed
to enter. However, she was surprised to see her drawers already
unlocked and, when she opened the same, she discovered that her
small brown envelope x x x, white pouch containing the duplicate
keys, and the staff’s final evaluation sheets were
missing.Alcaraz informed Bernardo about the incident. The latter
responded by saying she was no longer an employee of the company
since May 19, 2005.
Alcaraz reported the matter to the Pasig Police Station and asked for
help regarding the theft of her properties. The Pasig Police incident
report stated as follows:
x x x x When confronted by the suspect, in the presence of one SOCO
officer and staff, named Christian Perez, Kelly Walsh allegedly
admitted that she was the one who opened the drawer and got the
green folders containing the staff evaluations. The Reportee was told
by Kelly Walsh that her Rolex wristwatch will be returned to her
provided that she will immediately vacate her office.
On the same date, Alcaraz’s termination letter dated May 19, 2005
was handed to her by Walsh, Almazar and Bernardo.
RESULT: CA reversed. In favor of Abbott.
AMA Computer College-Santiago City, Inc. vs. Chelly P. Nacino,
G.R. No. 162739, February 12, 2008)
FACTS:
Aggrieved, Nacino filed on December 13, 2002 a Complaint10 for
Illegal Suspension and Termination before the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) in Tuguegarao City. On January 10,
2003, Maria Luanne M. Jali-jali (Jali-jali), AMA's representative,
signed the submission Agreement, accepting the jurisdiction of
Voluntary Arbitrator Nicanor Y. Samaniego (Voluntary Arbitrator)
over the controversy.
Before the Voluntary Arbitrator, the parties agreed to settle the case
amicably, with Nacino discharging and releasing AMA from all his
claims in consideration of the sum of P7,719.81. The
Decision11 embodying the Compromise Agreement and the
corresponding Quitclaim and Release,12 both dated February 21,
2003, were duly prepared and signed, but the check in payment of the
consideration for the settlement had yet to be released.
On April 1, 2003, Nacino died in an accident. On April 15, 2003, the
Voluntary Arbitrator rendered the assailed Decision,13 ordering
Nacino's reinstatement and the payment of his backwages and
13th month pay. Therein, the Voluntary Arbitrator manifested that,
due to AMA's failure to pay the sum of P7,719.81, Nacino withdrew
from the Compromise Agreement, as shown by the conduct of a
hearing on March 15, 2003 where both parties appeared and were
directed to file their position papers. The Voluntary Arbitrator also
stated that Nacino complied, but AMA failed to file its position paper
and to appear before him despite summons. On May 7, 2003, the
Voluntary Arbitrator issued a Writ of Execution14 upon motion of
Nacino's surviving spouse, one Bernadeth V. Nacino. AMA filed a
Motion to Quash the said Writ but the Voluntary Arbitrator allegedly
refused to receive the same.15 Thus, on May 22, 2003, the heirs of
Nacino were able to garnish AMA's bank deposits in the amount
of P52,021.70.
On June 16, 2003, AMA filed a Petition16 for Certiorari under Rule
65 before the CA. On June 23, 2003, the CA dismissed the said
petition because it was a wrong mode of review. It held that the
proper remedy was an appeal by way of Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Accordingly, the CA opined, an erroneous appeal shall be
dismissed outright pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
AMA filed its Motion for Reconsideration but the CA denied it in its
Resolution dated March 3, 2004.
Hence, this petition based on the sole ground that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE FILED BY HEREIN PETITIONER.
AMA claims that Jali-jali was misinformed and misled in signing the
Submission Agreement, subjecting AMA to the jurisdiction of the
Voluntary Arbitrator; that the Voluntary Arbitrator's Decision was
issued under the Labor Code and, as such, the same is not appealable
under Rule 43, as provided for by Section 217 thereof, but under Rule
65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and that the petition
for certiorari is the only plain, speedy and adequate remedy in this
case since the Voluntary Arbitrator acted with grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding the parties' compromise agreement, in
rendering the assailed Decision, and in issuing the Writ of Execution
without affording AMA its right to due process.
On the other hand, the heirs of Nacino refused to receive this Court's
Resolution requiring them to file their Comment18 and, as such, were
considered to have waived their right to file the same.19
The instant petition lacks merit.
Pertinent is our ruling in Centro Escolar University Faculty and
Allied Workers Union-Independent v. Court of Appeals,20 where we
held:
We find that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that
petitioner used a wrong remedy when it filed a special civil
action on certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court held
in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon
Development Bank Employees that decisions of the voluntary
arbitrator under the Labor Code are appealable to the Court of
Appeals. In that case, the Court observed that the Labor Code
was silent as regards the appeals from the decisions of the
voluntary arbitrator, unlike those of the Labor Arbiter which
may be appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission. The Court noted, however, that the voluntary
arbitrator is a government instrumentality within the
contemplation of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129
which provides for the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals. The decisions of the voluntary arbitrator are akin to
those of the Regional Trial Court, and, therefore, should first
be appealed to the Court of Appeals before being elevated to
this Court. This is in furtherance and consistent with the
original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform
procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all
quasi-judicial agencies not expressly excepted from the
coverage of Section 9 of BP 129. Circular No. 1-91 was later
revised and became Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-
 95. The Rules of Court Revision Committee incorporated said
circular in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
inclusion of the decisions of the voluntary arbitrator in the
Rule was based on the Court's pronouncements in Luzon
Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees. Petitioner's argument, therefore, that the
ruling in said case is inapplicable in this case is without merit.
We are not unmindful of instances when certiorari was granted
despite the availability of appeal, such as (a) when public welfare and
the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader
interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and
void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority. 21 However, none of these recognized
exceptions attends the case at bar. AMA has sadly failed to show
circumstances that would justify a deviation from the general rule.
Verily, rules of procedure exist for a noble purpose, and to disregard
such rules in the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such
purpose. Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere
technicalities. They may not be ignored to suit the convenience of a
party. Adjective law ensures the effective enforcement of substantive
rights through the orderly and speedy administration of justice. Rules
are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate litigation. But they
help provide for a vital system of justice where suitors may be heard
following judicial procedure and in the correct forum. Public order
and our system of justice are well served by a conscientious
observance by the parties of the procedural rules.25
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The assailed Court of Appeals Resolutions dated June 23, 2003 and
March 3, 2004 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

While it is true that, in accordance with the liberal spirit which

pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, a petition
for certiorari may be treated as having been filed under Rule 45, the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before the CA cannot be
treated as such, without the exceptional circumstances mentioned
above, because it was filed way beyond the 15-day reglementary
period within which to file the Petition for Review.22 AMA received
the assailed Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator on April 15, 2003
and it filed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA
only on June 16, 2003.23 By parity of reasoning, the same
reglementary period should apply to appeals taken from the decisions
of Voluntary Arbitrators under Rule 43. Based on the foregoing
disquisitions, the assailed Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator had
already become final and executory and beyond the purview of this
Court to act upon.24