RULE 119 – TRIAL

1. CONCEPCION CUENCO, et. al. v. RAUL RISOS, et. al.

G.R. NO. 152643. August 28, 2008. THIRD DIVISION. (NACHURA, J.)

FACTS:

 Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Cebu
City where they made it appear in a deed of real estate mortgage that Concepcion, the owner of the
mortgaged property, affixed her signature to the document. Hence, the criminal case.
 Respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in Criminal Case on the ground of
prejudicial question; that the Civil Case—action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be
resolved. RTC granted the motion.
 This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before the CA seeking the
nullification of the RTC orders.
 The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter's deposition explaining the need to perpetuate
Concepcion's testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of
mobility.
 RTC directed that Concepcion's deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.
 After several motions for change of venue of the deposition-taking, Concepcion's deposition was finally
taken at her residence—Cebu city.
 Aggrieved, respondents assailed the RTC orders in a special civil action for certiorari before the CA.
 CA observed that despite the defect in the respondents' petition, by not impleading the People of the
Philippines, an indispensable party, it resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that Section 15, Rule 119
and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court govern the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present
case. Pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcion's deposition should have been taken before the judge
or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of
Makati City.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Concepcion's advanced age and health condition exempt her from the application of Section 15,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.

RULING:

 NO.
 Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or
infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning.
 Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her
motion would have been denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would
have been compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper.
 Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. Thus, it is required that the conditional examination be made before
the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending.
 There is nothing in the rule which may be interpreted that such requirement applies only to cases where
the witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away, as in the present
case.
  If the deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention.
This requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the witness' deportment to enable him
to properly assess his credibility.
 The court cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's
constitutional rights.
 The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside
of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.

Petition is denied. CA decision and resolution are affirmed.

2. People of the Philippines v. Buenaventura Mariano y Tabaquin
G.R. No. L-19243, February 29, 1964, EN BANC (Concepcion, J.)
Facts:
- Buenaventura Mariano was charged of having illegally engaged in the business of carrying, conveying or
transmitting letters or packages for monetary consideration, without authority.
- Mariano pleaded not guilty, and when the case was set for hearing, it was postponed for several times
upon his motion.
- When the trial was set for June 7, 1961, Mariano moved for the appointment of assessors, which, the lower
court denied for the following reasons:
1) That the appointment of assessors is discretionary for the court which, under the circumstances,
felt should be exercised adversely to the accused; and
2) That the motion had merely a dilatory purpose. **
Issue:
1) W/N the defendant is entitled to the appointment of assessors
2) W/N said motion of Mariano was a mere dilatory tactic
Ruling:
1) YES. (But not granted- read no. 2)
- The lower court erred in ruling that the appointment of assessors under Sec. 154 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, is merely directory and does not in any way imply a duty on the part of the court to grant the
petition.
- Sec. 154, as has been applied in several precedents is mandatory. The appointment of assessors is a
substantial right granted by law. Once the motion to this effect has been filed, the court is duty-bound to
act on the motion.
2) YES. Lower court affirmed in denying the motion.
- The insistence of the defense to have assessors appointed is merely part of the dilatory tactics employed
by the defense. The case was filed on August 11, 1960. When the case was called for the arraignment of
the defendant, the defense sought and obtained a postponement on the gorund that it had sought the
reinvestigation of the case. Finally, the defendant was arraigned on September 26, 1960. On November
14, 1960, the date set for trial, the defendant moved for postponement on the ground that his original
counsel had withdrawn and that he needed time to secure the services of another counsel. This was granted
in an order dated November 18, 1960. The hearing was set for January 4, 1961. On January 3, 1961, the
defense filed a motion for permission to withdraw his original plea of not guilty to enable him to file a
motion to quash. The Court granted the defense permission to file the said motion which was in fact filed
on January 9, 1961. On the same date, the Court denied the motion to quash and the case was set for
hearing on March 6, 1961. On March 3, 1961, the defense, alleging that they had to file several briefs and
memoranda, moved for the postponement of the hearing. The defense counsel, however, taking for granted
perhaps, that the Court would grant their motion to postpone, failed to appear on March 6, 1961,
whereupon the Court ordered them to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. On March 16,
1961, the Court excused counsel for this non-appearance. The trial was set for June 7, 1961. On June 3,
1961, the defense filed his original motion for the appointment of assessors.
- Defendant did not even try to explain why it took him over eight (8) months since his arraignment, on
September 26, 1960, and almost seven (7) months since the case was first set for trial, to ask for the
appointment of assessors.
- The circumstance and the delay in moving for the appointment of assessors after several postponements
of the hearing upon defendant’s request, clearly indicates that his purpose in filing the motion was purely
 dilatory. The request for the appointment of assessors should be made at the earliest convenient time so
as not to hinder or delay the trial or to unnecessarily inconvenience the progress of the work of the court.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the defendant. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
4. ROMEO JACA v. MANUEL BLANCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
G.R. No. 2792. May 23, 1950. EN BANC (Ozatea, J.)

FACTS
 Petitioner Jaca was accused before the CFI of Iloilo of triple homicide through reckless imprudence.
 After arraignment the case was called for trial. The accused was present. But as nobody appeared for the
prosecution, the court then and there dismissed the case without prejudice.
 Four (4) minutes later counsel for the private prosecution and the City Fiscal together with the witnesses
for the prosecution, and explained to the court that their tardiness was due to the fact that the chauffer of
the jeep in which they were riding was detained by a policeman for driving on the wrong side of the street.
 Satisfied with the explanation, the respondent judge granted the request.
 Counsel for the accused moved for the reconsideration of the order of the court setting aside its order of
dismissal reinstating the case, on the ground that the court had exceeded its jurisdiction in doing so.
 The motion having been denied, the accused filed the present petition for certiorari, contending that by
setting aside its order of dismissal and reinstating the case, the respondent judge placed him in double
jeopardy inasmuch as he had been arraigned and the dismissal of the case was without his express consent.

ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner Jaca was placed in double jeopardy with the reinstatement of the case by respondent
judge.

HELD
NO. The dismissal contemplated in Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as relied by the
petitioner contemplates a definite and unconditional dismissal which terminates the case, and not a dismissal
without prejudice (conditional or provisional dismissal) like in the present case. If the accused should deem such
conditional or provisional dismissal to be unjust and prejudicial to him, he could and should object to such
dismissal and insist that the case be heard and decided on the merits. Upon such objection and insistence of the
accused, if the prosecution does not present its evidence and if its failure to do so is unjustified, the court should
dismiss the case for the failure to prosecute. Such dismissal would come under the purview of Section 9, Rule
113.

In the case at hand, both the accused and his attorney were present when the respondent judge dictated the
order of dismissal without prejudice, but interposed no objection thereto. As such, the Court finds that under the
circumstances there is no violation of any constitutional right of the accused by the respondent judge in
reconsidering his previous order of dismissal after it was dictated and in reinstating the case against the accused.
For the accused had been neither previously convicted nor acquitted, nor had the case against him been definitely
dismissed since the dismissal was without prejudice.

The petition is DENIED, without costs against the petitioner.

6. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALFREDO CATOLICO,
DISTRICT JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, BRANCH III, RENATO HORTAL,
ALIAS RENE, AND FELIPE CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. L-31260. February 29, 1972. (TEEHANKEE, J.)

FACTS:
 A criminal information was filed charging respondents Renato Hortal and Felipe Cruz and six other still
unidentified persons with robbery in band committed at midnight at Carmona, Cavite.
 Having failed to post bail, accused were placed under detention and case was set for trial. However, trial
could not be held on this date because of the absence of the offended parties and their witnesses.
 Respondent court then ordered the deputy sheriff to proceed to the residence of the complainants and
personally serve them with the court's subpoena requiring their appearance at the trial as reset for the next
day, October 14, 1969 at 8:30 a.m.
 Provincial fiscal appeared at the scheduled day and hour, and noticing that the complainants and
prosecution witnesses were not yet in court, moved that the case be called at 10:00 a.m. of the same day.
 At 10:00 a.m., the complainants and their witnesses were not in court and the provincial fiscal was
constrained to ask for a provisional dismissal which was consented by the accused.
 Within minutes after respondent court dictated the order of provisional dismissal, the complainants and
other prosecution witnesses arrived in the courtroom. Provincial fiscal then immediately moved for a
reconsideration of the provisional dismissal order and having learned that they had been delayed by engine
trouble, manifested to respondent court said reason for their delay.
 The provincial fiscal urged the court to act favorably on his motion to lift the provisional dismissal order
but respondent court ruled that "having been dictated in open court it automatically inured in favor of the
herein accused" and that the State's remedy "should be the refiling of the same case."
 The provincial fiscal orally moved respondent court to reconsider its verbal order of denial and that no
substantial rights of the accused would be prejudiced by such reconsideration but respondent court
likewise verbally denied reconsideration and caused the issuance by the clerk of court of the release
order then and there, even before its verbal order of provisional dismissal could be reduced to writing
and duly signed.
ISSUE:
 W/N the court’s order is valid.
HELD:
 NO. Respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction and that
its questioned orders should accordingly be annulled and set aside.
 A trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution for
reconsideration of an order of dismissal and that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set aside
to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to prove the offense charged against the accused and
to prevent miscarriage of justice, when no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced thereby.
 A timely motion to reinstate the provisionally dismissed case was made within 2 or 3 minutes after
respondent judge had dictated in open court his order of dismissal and the offended parties and their
witnesses, who had been delayed by engine trouble and had to change vehicles, then arrived. No
substantial rights of the accused would be prejudiced by rescinding the verbal order of provisional
 dismissal. The verbal order had not yet been put in writing and duly signed by respondent judge, and
hence could be withdrawn or set aside so that it would produce no legal force and effect.
 Respondent court failed to take into account that accused-respondents were not permanent residents of the
resettlement area at Carmona where the robbery took place, and were without means to put up bail and
hence were under detention. For it to order their immediate release from custody even though its verbal
orders of dismissal and denial of reinstatement of the case were yet to be duly reduced to writing and
signed, was an unauthorized and arbitrary procedure. Its peremptory denial of the timely motion to
reinstate the case has put the State to needless great expense and trouble, to say the least, to cause again
the apprehension of respondents-accused — if the police agencies succeed in finding them — when they
could very well have been made to face trial then and there on October 14, 1969, as scheduled.
 Technicalities, when instead of promoting the speedy administration of justice delay it, are not looked
with the speedy administration of justice delay it, are not looked with favor. More so in this case where
it appears that the setting aside of the order of dismissal caused petitioner no substantial prejudice
admitting as he does that he could have been made to face the same charge all over again in a separate
action.

WHEREFORE , the writ of certiorari is granted and the three orders of respondent court all dated
October 14, 1969 are hereby annulled and declared without legal effect. The writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction heretofore issued is made permanent and respondent court is further ordered to
proceed to the prompt trial of the reinstated criminal case (No. N-2296) and thereafter render judgment
thereon in accordance with law. With costs against private respondents.
7. PEOPLE VS. MAMACOL

Supreme Court En Banc, G.R. No. L-1748, September 29, 1948

PONENTE: Perfecto, J.

FACTS:
 Defendant- appellant was sentenced by the lower court to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the amount of P2,000 and to pay the costs, for the killing of Dagodob in the early morning
of October 16, 1946, in Ramitan, Malabang, Lanao.
 The counsel of the appellant questioned the absence of the appellant during the last hearing at Iligan on
July 16, 1947 which according to the record, appellant was not present during the last hearing as he was
still in Dansalan, and this is a reversible error as, according to section 1 (a) of Rule 111, the accused is
entitled to be present at every stage of the proceeding and when the crime charged is a capital one, such
right cannot be waived. He beseech that the lower court erred in not allowing defendant to present evidence
after denying a motion for dismissal made when the prosecution rested, without reserving the right to
present said evidence in the event the motion is denied and that the evidence of the prosecution is
insufficient to convict appellant.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON the absence of the appellant during the last hearing when the crime charged is a capital offense is a
reversible error
2. WON the lower court erred in not allowing defendant to present evidence after denying a motion for
dismissal made when the prosecution rested, without reserving the right to present said evidence in the
event the motion is denied.
3. That the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to convict appellant.

RULING:
 The first question is not necessary, however, to decide in view of the result the court have arrived at in
deciding the last two questions.
 On the second question, where the motion to dismiss is denied, there is no harm to the interest of the
administration of justice to allow defendant to present evidence, which might show his innocence, may
lead to a miscarriage of justice. We rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss made by an accused, with
or without reservation to present his evidence, will not impair his right to present it. The substantial rights
of an accused should not be impaired because of his counsel's anxiousness to have him promptly acquitted.
The need of applying the rule appears to be more emphatic in a case like this where life or death or
perpetual imprisonment of the accused are at stake.
 Upon the last question we hold, after going over the evidence presented by the prosecution, that the
testimonies of Apuntok Mamangcas and Payocan Moro, the two witness for the prosecution, are enough
to give the latter a prima facie case.

DISPOSITIVE:

The appealed decision is set aside and the case is ordered remanded to the lower court to allow the
accused to present evidence and for further proceedings.
8. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
vs.
MELECIO TORRES ET AL.

G.R. No. L-43406 January 30, 1936

Facts:
The appellants, Melecio Torres, Fidel Gervasio, Nicolas Chavez, Engracio Varona, and Macario Garillo, were
charged in the Court of First Instance of Cavite with the crime of forcible abduction with physical injuries. After
due trial, they were found guilty: and Melecio Torres, as the principal culprit, was sentenced to suffer not less
than eight years of prision mayor and not more than twelve years one day of reclusion temporal, while Fidel
Gervasio, Nicolas Chavez, Engracio Varona and Macario Garillo, were each sentenced to suffer less than and one
day of prision mayor. In assessing the penalty to be imposed, the court took into consideration the aggravating
circumstances that the crime was committed in the nighttime and by a band.

The facts which led to the filing of the information against the appellants are fully set forth in the decision of the
trial court, and it would be a work of supererogation.

Most of the errors assigned both in the brief for the appellant Nicolas Chavez and in that for the other appellants,
relate to the correctness of the findings of fact made by the trial court. It is contended that "the court a quo erred
in not finding as it is a fact that the accused Melecio Torres had amorous relations with the alleged offended party,
Dalisay Bonifacio, previous to the 8th of November 1934." It is also contended that "the court a quo erred in not
finding it as a fact that the accused Melecio Torres and the complainant Dalisay Bonifacio, on November 6, 1934
agreed to elope on the 8th of November, 1934, and consequently, that what happened was in reality a fake
abduction." No evidence was adduced in support of these contention except the testimony of Melecio Torres
himself the truth of which was challenged by Dalisay Bonifacio denied having sustained amorous relations with
Melecio Torres. She also denied having agreed to elope with him. The circumstance which the girl was carried
away by Melecio Torres and his co-accused were such as to preclude the conclusion that it was done with her
consent If there was really an agreement between Melecio Torres and Dalisay Bonifacio to elope, it is
inconceivable why they did not select a more auspicious occasion to carry out their plan. It is likewise
inconceivable why Melecio Torres had to secure the assistance of four other men

Issue:
W/N the lower court erred in not granting Nicolas Chavez a separate trial

Held:
The record shows that the application for a separate trial was made after two witnesses for the prosecution had
already testified. The application came too late; it should have been made before the commencement of the trial.
(U.S. vs. Morales, 8 Phil., 300.)

That there was conspiracy to abduct Dalisay Bonifacio and that Nicholas Chavez not only had knowledge of, but
took part in the conspiracy, the evidence leaves no room for a reasonable doubt. We find no merit in the contention
that Nicholas Chavez had no knowledge of the unchaste designs of Melecio Torres.
9. JAMES JOSEPH, MIGUEL ROMULO, ET AL., vs. HON. ONOFRE VILLALUZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-46329-30 April 10, 1979, EN BANC (FERNANDEZ, J.)

The petitioners, James Joseph, Miguel Romulo, Antonio Santamaria, Ramon Ignacio Moran, Eugenio
Lopez III, and Jaime Claparols Jr., were charged by Noemi L. Garcia with the crime of multiple rape in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The complaint was docketed as Criminal Case No. 20380 but upon
transfer to the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, the same was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-VIII-
1750-Rizal.

The petitioners Jaime Claparols, Jr. and Ramon Ignacio Moran were also charged with another offense
of multiple rape by the same complainant before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The complaint was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 20381 but upon transfer to the Circuit Criminal Court, the same was
docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1751-Rizal.

Upon arraignment, the accused-petitioners entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. A joint trial on the merits of
both cases of all the accused was commenced and the prosecution presented its evidence.

After the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence in chief, the petitioner Claparols, Jr. filed a
motion to dismiss dated November 19, 1976; the petitioner Lopez filed a motion to acquit dated November 19,
1976; the petitioners Romulo, Santamaria and Joseph filed a motion to dismiss dated November 22, 1976; and
the petitioner Moran filed a motion to dismiss dated November 22, 1976.

The respondent judge, Hon. Onofre Villaluz, then heard the oral arguments of the movants in amplification of
their formal motions to dismiss/acquit and the oral arguments of the prosecution in support of their opposition
thereto.

The respondent judge denied the motions in an order dated February 7, 1977.

The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners of the order denying the Motions to Dismiss/Acquit was likewise
denied by the respondent Judge in an order dated February 28, 1977 on the ground that "the issues raised and
arguments adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration together with the opposition thereto were the same grounds
adduced in the Motion to Dismiss and/or Acquit were virtually covered by the extensive arguments of both parties
..."

Issue: Whether or not the judge exercised grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:

The submission that the petitioners were deprived of their constitutional right to be presumed innocent and the
right against self-incrimination by the denial of their Motions to Dismiss/Acquit by the respondent Judge has no
merit. The respondent Judge made a thorough perusal of the records of the cases and considered the exhaustive
arguments of the parties which lasted for almost eight (8) hours before resolving the Motions to Dismiss/Acquit.
The motion for reconsideration of the order denying the Motion to Dismiss/Acquit was denied because said
motion contained the same grounds adduced in petitioners' Motions to Dismiss/Acquit. There is no showing that
the respondent Judge denied the Motions to Dismiss/Acquit allegedly because of his opinion that the Rules of
Court in omitting provisions for a demurrer to evidence in criminal cases prohibited it.

The petitioners are not precluded from presenting their evidence. In fact, the continuation of the hearing of both
cases was set on September 22, 24, 27 and 29, 1977 for the reception of the evidence for the defense.
It is true that an accused is presumed innocent until his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. However, after
the prosecution has adduced evidence, the constitutional presumption of innocence must yield to what has been
so amply and persuasively demonstrated.

The respondent Judge did not disregard any constitutional right of the petitioners. Said respondent Judge is
presumed to have considered the evidence adduced by the prosecution when he denied the Motion to
Dismiss/Acquit of the petitioners.

The Court cannot decide in this special civil action whether or not the evidence adduced by the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the petitioners. It is now petitioners' duty to neutralize the
evidence of the State in order to maintain the presumption of their innocence of the crime of which they are
charged.

In the absence of a clear knowing that the respondent Judge has committed a grave abuse of discretion or acted
in excess of jurisdiction, this Court will not annul an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss a criminal
case. Appeal is the proper remedy of the, petitioners in order to have the findings of fact of the respondent judge
reviewed by a superior court.

The petitioners' application for separate trial is meritorious. Section 8, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 8. Trial of joint defendants. — When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any
offense they shall be tried jointly unless the court. n its discretion upon motion of the fiscal or any
defendant orders separate trials. In ordering separate trials, the court y order that one or more
defendants be each separately tried, or may order that several defendants be jointly tried in another
trials, or may order that each defendant be separately tried.

The foregoing provision does not state when the application or separate trial may be made. As a matter of law,
the granting of a separate trial when two or more defendant are jointly barged with an offense is discretionary
with the trial court.

Considering the established circumstances, the cause of the State would not be jeopardized by the granting of
separate trials to the accused. Inasmuch as the petitioners are said with capital offenses, great care should be taken
the evidence of one should not prejudice the others. It appears they have different defenses which may be
antagonist to each other. in the interest of justice, this Court a separate trial may be granted even after f the
prosecution as finished presenting its evidence in chief. It is understood, however, that the evidence in chief of
the prosecution shall remain in the record as evidence against al the petitioners. It is not necessary for the
prosecution to adduce all over again its evidence in chief in each separate trial of the accused. In the separate trial
of the accused, only the accused presenting evidence has to be present.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent judge denying the Motion to Dismiss/Acquit of the petitioners are
hereby affirmed and the petition to prohibit the continuation of the trial of Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-17-00-
Rizal and Criminal Case No. CCC-VII-1751-Rizal and to compel the respondent judge to acquit the petitioners
is denied. The petition for habeas corpus is also denied.

However, the order dated June 10, 1977 denying petitioners' motion for lifting of consolidation of trial and/or
separate trial is set aside and the petition for separate trial for each accused. is hereby granted. The evidence to be
adduced by each accused-petitioner should not be considered as evidence against the other accused-petitioners.
Only the accused presenting evidence is obliged to attend the trial. The prosecution does not have adduce all over
again its evidence in chief which shall be considered against all the petitioners, without prejudice to the right of
the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence in each separate trial.

SO ORDERED.
11. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs. VIRGILIO OPLADO and VISITACION FERNANDEZ
GUYOT,
G.R. No. L-20146. September 30, 1964. EN BANC. (Bautista Angelo, J.)

Facts: Virgilio Oplado and Visi tacion Fernandez Guyot were charged by the latter’s husband with the crime of
adultery.

In view of the failure of the prosecution to arrest Visitacion Fernandez Guyot, the trial of the case had to be
repeatedly postponed, although the prosecution had always been ready to proceed with the trial with respect to
the co-accused Virgilio Oplado.

The Court a quo, upon motion of co-accused Virgilio Oplado ordered the provisional dismissal of the case. This
was objected by the prosecution.

City Fiscal appealed.

Issue: Whether the grant of provisional liberty was proper and whether one of the accused in a prosecution for
adultery may be separately tried in the absence of the other accused where both the prosecution and the other
accused are ready to go to trial.

Held: It is now well settled in this jurisdiction that while the husband cannot institute a prosecution f or the crime
of adultery without including therein both of the guilty parties if they are both living, the statute does not require
that both must necessarily be tried together.

Hence, a defendant in an adultery case may be tried alone or separately from his codefendant if the prosecution
and the party available are ready for it.

The trial Court granted the motion of the accused Oplado for the provisional dismissal of the case on the ground
that he is entitled to a speedy trial.

This is not only an error but an abuse of discretion, for the very right of accused Oplado to a speedy trial demanded
that the case against him be heard and prosecuted to a conclusion without waiting for the arrest of his co-accused.

Dispositive portion: WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded
to the lower Court for further proceedings. No costs.
13. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE HIDALGO and MAURA GOTENGCO
GR No. L-6273. December 27, 1957. EN BANC (Endecia, J.)

FACTS:
 In the evening of October 8, 1950, the second floor of appelants’ building was burned. Immediately after the
fire had been put out, the fire department inspected the second floor and found two broken glass jars, ten
unbroken glass jars containing gasoline, lines of toilet paper dipped in the gasoline content of the jar and
arranged in such a manner as to connect them to one another, and eleven green tin covers.
 It was also discovered that the first floor and undivided one-half of the second floor of the building were
owned by the appellant spouses who insured the entire building with four insurance companies under their
different policies for a total sum of P75,000.
 After the investigation, an information was filed against herein appellants, Florencio Camilo, James Uy, and
Aw Ming. But Florencio Camilo was excluded from the information to be utilized as a government
witness, and thus Florencio Camilo was allowed to testify in the case.
 The testimony of Camilo consists of an admission that he, James Uy and Aw Ming caused the burning of the
building upon the order and the assistance of the spouses-appellants.
 CFI acquitted Uy and Ming but convicted herein appellants.
 Appellants argue that Camilo’s testimony was not given credence by the lower court with respect to
appellants' co-accused James Uy and Aw Ming who were acquitted and, therefore, it should not also be given
weight with regard to the herein appellants, for if Camilo's testimony as regards the guilt of James Uy and
Aw Ming was not credible, it should likewise be unworthy of credence as regards the appellants' alleged
complicity in the crime at bar. Also, appellants question the exclusion of Camilo from the complaint in order
for him to be a state witness.

ISSUES:
1. WON the CFI erred in convicting the appellants in view of Uy and Ming’s acquittal
2. WON the CFI erred in not requiring the prosecution to present proof in support of its motion for the
discharge of Florencio Camilo before allowing him to be a witness for the state.

HELD:
1. NO.
 It is a settled rule that the courts may believe one part of the testimony of a witness and disbelieve another
part. Courts are not required to accept or reject as a whole the testimony of a particular witness.
 In the case at bar, the lower court found that Camilo's testimony concerning the accused James Uy and Aw
Ming was not corroborated and, except said testimony, there was nothing in the evidence presented by the
prosecution which would connect them with the perpetration of the crime charged against them, this being
the main reason for their acquittal. In other words, James Uy and Aw Ming were acquitted on the
insufficiency of evidence and not on a finding that Camilo's' testimony was not worthy of credence.
 On the other hand, the lower court gave credence to the testimony of Florencio Camilo with respect to the
participation of the appellants in the burning of their building, because it is corroborated by the fact that
Maura Gotengeo issued the checks testified to by the witnessand by the other fact, that the spouses had
heavily insured the building in question for P175,000 prior to the fire when the insurable value thereof was
only about P78,000 or P79,000.

2. NO.
 Section 9, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, does not require presentation of proof before a motion for
exclusion of an accused to be witness for the state is granted. The law only requires that hearing thereof be
had and, in the case at bar, there has been auch hearing.
14. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. SIMPLICIO MARCELLANA ET AL.,
AGATON PANGANIBAN
G.R. No. 18242. March 6, 1923. FIRST DIVISION (Johns, J.)

Facts

 Defendant Agaton Panganiban was charged with others, including Simplicio Marcellana, in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas with the crime of murder for the killing of Jose Par.

 Eleuterio Poco was discharged by the trial court upon motion of the fiscal so that he could be used as a witness
for the Government.

 At the conclusion of the evidence on behalf of the prosecution and of the defendants Agaton Panganiban,
Simplicio Marcellana and Candido Villanueva, the defendant Victorino Catapang offered to withdraw his plea
of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, if the fiscal would amend his information so as to charge the crime of
homicide instead of murder. The court granted the motion.

 The court convicted Marcellana, Catapang, and Panganiban as principals and Villanueva as an accomplice of
the crime of homicide.

 Panganiban appealed to the SC, contending, first, that the trial court erred in granting the petition of the fiscal
to discharge Poco, so that he could be used as a witness for the Government, and that the evidence was not
sufficient to convict him of the crime of homicide beyond a reasonable doubt.

Issue

W/N under the provisions of Act No. 2706, the trial court erred in discharging Poco to use him as a witness for
the prosecution.

Ruling

 Act No. 2709 was largely enacted for the use and guidance of the trial court, and where there is nothing in the
record which tends to show that at the time the trial court discharged the defendant Poco, so that he could be
used as a witness for the prosecution, that the court knew or had reason to believe that Poco had been
previously convicted of an illegal marriage, and that fact was first developed on his cross-examination, the
defendant could not then take advantage of the order.

 The SC has no right to assume that the trial court had knowledge of the fact that Poco had previously been
convicted of another crime at the time the order was made. If that fact had been called to the attention of the
court before the order was made, the defendant would then have a right to complain.

 Where it appears from the record that during the trial the fiscal agreed in open court that the crime charged in
the information should be reduced to homicide, to which two of the defendants plead guilty and were duly
sentenced, the information, as modified, should also apply to the defendant, as appellant, and the penalty
ought not to be increased in this court.

All things considered, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
16. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S.
SANSAET, respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997], REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:
Paredes, a Provincial Attorney, applied for a free patent. It was granted by later on cancelled
as it was obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations, as the land had been designated
and reserved as a school site. A case for perjury was filed against him, and the Tanodbayan
issued a recommendation for criminal prosecution. In all these cases, Atty. Sansaet was the
counsel for Paredes. They filed a motion for reconsideration on the recommendation for the
Tanodbayan attaching falsified documents, making it appear that a criminal prosecution
would bring about double jeopardy. Later on, a case before the Sandiganbayan was filed
against Paredes, Atty, Sansaet, and another for violation of R.A. 3019. The issue in this case
is whether Atty. Sansaet can be discharged as a state witness. The Sandiganbayan refused
saying that it was against attorney client privilege, but the court held that Sandiganbayan
erred as there was no such privilege in conspiring to do unlawful acts.

ISSUE:
Did Sandiganbayan err in not allowing Atty. Sansaet to become a state witness
against his former client?

HELD:
YES. Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already
committed, made by a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are
privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect
that communications between attorney and client having to do with the client’s
contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of
privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client.

Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of

falsification which he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It
is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be
privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end.

It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such
unlawful communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are
nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel
from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant to a conspiracy,
because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties
in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
18. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE COURT OF APPEALS* (Third Division.
G.R. No. L-55533 July 31, 1984. FIRST DIVISION (TEEHANKEE, J.)

FACTS:

Miguel Roncesvalles, together Jose V. Perez, Amadea Consul Perez, Cipriano Ladines and Flavia C.
Valdenor wilfully, unlawfully and illegally made false statements and misrepresentation of material facts in the
application for agricultural loan signed by FLAVIA C. VALDENOR and in the other supporting papers,
calculated to produce semblance of compliance with the legal requirements, making it appear that accused
FLAVIA C. VALDENOR is an eligible borrower which misrepresentation or false statements of facts were
considered as the credit factors in the approval and the granting of the loan to accused FLAVIA C. VALDENOR
in the amount of P30,000.00, by the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.

All the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After the prosecution had already presented seven witnesses,
the state prosecutors filed a motion with the court, asking that accused Roncesvalles be discharged from the
information in order that he may be used as a state witness against his co-defendants, alleging that Roncesvalles
had not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude; that he did not appear to be the most
guilty; that there was absolute necessity for his testimony; that there was no other direct evidence available for
the proper prosecution of the offense committed and that his testimony could be substantially corroborated in its
material points. The motion was set for hearing and after the parties were heard, the trial court, issued the
questioned order denying the motion on the ground that, ". . . Miguel Roncesvalles cannot be said to be the least
guilty. He would be a principal by direct participation, or a co-principal if he acted upon instruction of another as
the prosecution alleges," and that, "the prosecution having presented all its witnesses, the Court, after going over
their testimony, cannot see how Roncesvalles' testimony, if ever he is discharged, would be corroborated."

Reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with
respondent appellate court praying for the annulment and setting aside of the trial court's questioned orders.
Respondent court sustained the trial court's ruling in its decision, subject of the petition at bar and denied
reconsideration thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in
sustaining that there is no absolute necessity for Miguel Roncesvalles to be considered as a state witness.

HELD:

Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court prescribes the conditions in order that one or several accused may be
used as witnesses against their co-accused, to wit:

(a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge is requested;

(b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except
the testimony of said defendant;

(c) the testimony of said defendant can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

(d) said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty; and
 (e) said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude."

While it is true that the court has the exclusive responsibility to see that the conditions prescribed by the rule
exists, this grant of discretion is not a grant of arbitrary discretion, but rather a sound judicial discretion to be
exercised with due regard to the proper and correct administration of justice.

The trial court manifestly erred in denying the prosecution's motion to discharge accused Roncesvalles or, the
ground that he "cannot be said to be the least guilty." All that the law requires, in order to discharge an accused
and to use him as a state witness is that the defendant whose exclusion is requested does not appear to be the most
guilty, not necessarily that he is the least guilty. The trial court's order itself shows that Roncesvalles does not
appear to be the most guilty since it acknowledged that "he would be a principal by direct participation or a co-
principal if he acted upon instruction of another as the prosecution alleges."

The Rules say that it is necessary that the "said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty from which the
conclusion follows that the guilt of an accused of the crime charged is no reason why he may not be excluded as
witness for the State. As a matter of fact, the candid admission of an accused, of his participation in a crime, is a
guaranty that if he will testify in court he will testify truthfully.

The ground underlying the rule is not to let a crime that has been committed go unpunished; so an accused who
is not the most guilty is allowed to testify against the most guilty in order to achieve the greater purpose of securing
the conviction of the more or most guilty and the greatest number among the accused permitted to be convicted
for the offense they have committed.

Respondent appellate court itself sustained the People's contention on this score, simply stating that "respondent
Court erred when it ruled that it could not grant the motion for the discharge of Roncesvalles because it does not
appear that he is the least guilty of the accused. What Section 9, Rule 119 requires as one of the conditions for
the discharge of one of the accused to testify as a witness for the Government is that said 'defendant does not
appear to be the most guilty.' "

The Court overrules respondent court's finding that there is no absolute necessity for the testimony of
Roncesvalles. The testimony of Roncesvalles is absolutely necessary to prove conspiracy among the accused who
are charged of conspiring and confederating with each other in defrauding the Lucena Rural. Roncesvalles was
the Assistant Chief Inspector of the Lucena Rural Bank and he was the one who signed the investigation report
which contained false information as to the credit standing of accused Flavia N. Valdenor. Nobody is in a better
position to testify and prove the existence of conspiracy than accused Roncesvalles, because he is an officer of
the bank.

It is noteworthy that these assertions appear to be based on solid ground for the prosecutors presented their motion
for discharge of Roncesvalles as a state witness only after they had presented seven witnesses and could then
show the absolute necessity for his testimony in consonance with what was to be held by the Court in Flores vs
Sandiganbayan that the trial court should act on said discharge motion when the prosecution has presented all its
other evidence and it could then "fully determine whether the requisites prescribed in Section 9, Rule 119 of the
New Rules of Court, are fully complied with."

A trial judge cannot be expected or required to inform himself with absolute certainty at the very outset of the
trial as to everything which may be developed in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the
accused in the commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were practicable or possible, there would
be little need for the formality of a trial. In coming to his conclusion as to the 'necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is re. requested'; as to the 'availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative
evidence'; as to which of the accused is the 'most guilty'; and the like, the judge must rely in a large part upon the
suggestions and information furnished by the state prosecutors.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

ACCORDINGLY, respondent appellate court's decision affirming the trial court's questioned orders denying the
discharge of Miguel Roncesvalles as a state witness is hereby SET ASIDE. As prayed for, the trial court is
ORDERED to allow the discharge of said accused Miguel Roncesvalles from the information before it in Criminal
Case No. 0399 so that he may testify therein as a state witness.
19. CECILIA C. BARRETTO and ROBERT SORIANO, , vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57333-37 September 16, 1986. Enbanc. YAP, J.

Cecilia Barretto, Esperanza Magadia and Robert Soriano were charged in five separate
informations before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents.

Barreto is a Chief of Project Compassion Office in Province of Batangas, while Magadia and
Soriano are both casual employees in said office. Alleged in the information charged against the accused,
Magadia upon direction of Barreto, make it appeared on a Time Book and Payroll of their respective office
that one Leticia Serrano, a separated casual employee of Project Compassion Office, rendered actual
services and worked for a certain period. Magadia then falsified the signature of Leticia. Barreto and
Soriano, despite the knowledge of the falsified documents affixed their signature thereto as a witness to
the authenticity of the document. The timebook and paybook was presented in the office of the treasurer
and thereafter the purportedly wages of Leticia was delivered to Barreto who converted the same to her
personal use and benefit.

The cases were tried jointly. Prosecution filed a motion to discharged Magadia to be utilized as a
state witness. Motion was granted by the Sandiganbayan.

CASE: — Sandiganbayan convicted petitioners of the crime charged in the 5 informations. A petition for
reconsideration is filed before the SC.

ISSUE: W/N the uncorroborated testimony of Magadia as relied by the Sandiganbayan is sufficient to
convict the petitioners?

HELD: No.

Section 9(c), Rule 119 of the Rules of Court requires, as one of the essential conditions for the
discharge of an accused in order to be utilized as state witness, that his testimony can be substantially
corroborated in its material points. The testimony of Magadia failed to meet this condition, and yet, the
respondent court believed her and utilized her testimony to convict the petitioners,

In People vs. Tabayoyong, 1 we held that the testimony of a self- confessed accomplice or
co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and
without corroboration, be considered as proof to a moral certainty that the latter committed or
participated in the commission of the crime; thus, it is required that the testimony be substantially
corroborated by other evidence in all its material points.

In the case at bar, the accused-turned-state witness Magadia admitted having falsified the payroll,
but tried to exculpate herself by shifting the responsibility to her co-accused. She claimed that she merely
acted upon the orders of Barretto who was her superior and whom she could not refuse for fear that she
would not renew her appointment. Magadia's testimony on this point is not corroborated by any evidence.
Not only that, there is evidence in the records of this case showing that Barretto did not have the appointing
power

What the court failed to note in its decision was that Magadia gave two statements to the NBI. She
gave an earlier statement on January 30, 1979, in which she admitted having falsified the signatures of
Leticia in the payrolls, but did not implicate Barretto. It is apparent that her later statement was made in
an effort to exculpate herself by pointing to her chief, Cecilia Barretto, as the person responsible for the
scheme of falsifying the payrolls. The trial court obviously failed to consider this.
 Judging from the acts done by Esperanza Magadia, she appears to be the most guilty. As such, she
has the strongest motive to point to petitioners as the guilty parties, in exchange for her discharge and
eventual acquittal.

Without the testimony of Magadia, the petitioners would certainly have been acquitted as there
would have been no evidence to link them to the commission of the offense. The judgment of conviction
was based on the sole testimony of the accused-turned-state witness, Esperanza Magadia. Such testimony,
coming from a polluted source, cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction, without being
corroborated in its material points by other evidence.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court in Criminal Cases Nos. 1812 to 1816 is REVERSED
and set aside. Petitioners are hereby ACQUITTED, and declared without liability of whatever nature
arising from the incidents of this case.

SO ORDERED.
21. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. THE CITY COURT OF SILAY, ET AL.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who
were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with
sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas (weight report cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there
was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas were to be false making it
appear to be heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then were charged with “Falsification by
private individuals and use of falsified document”. After the prosecution had presented, the respondent moved
to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidences presented were not sufficient to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court issued its order dismissing the case
on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not constituted the crime of falsification as strictly
enumerated in the revised penal code defining the crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that their
case be dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double jeopardyis not tenable even if the case at bar
was dismissed because according to them, it was done with the consent of the accused therefore waiving there
defense of double jeopardy. The accused on the other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due
to lack of merits of the prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will bar the
prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional for the accused due to
double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff.

Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico in
double jeopardy

Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has
been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on a
motion of the accused however this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for the
evidence beyond reasonable ground which the prosecution had not been able to do which would be tantamount
to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution of another case. As it was stated on the requirements of a valid
defense of double jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint, second would be that such complaint
be filed before a competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was previously
acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent of the accused in which were
all present in the case at bar. There was indeed a valid, legitimate complaint and concern against the accused
Sensio, Millan and Jochico which was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also
mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it was proven that the case used against
the accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which
translates to acquittal. It explained further that there are two instances when we can conclude that there
is jeopardy when first is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to insufficiency of evidence and
second, when the proceedings have been reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy
trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was the first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar where there was
dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar the approval of the petition in the case at bar
for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the accused which the law despises.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We are constrained to DISMISS this Petition of the People. Without
pronouncement as to costs. Let copy of this Decision be entered in the personal file of Judge Reynaldo Alon.
22. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FRANCISCO CONCEPCION
G.R. No. L-1553. October 25, 1949. EN BANC. (PARAS, J.)

FACTS:
 This is an appeal from a judgment of the People's Court finding the accused appellant, Francisco
Concepcion, guilty of treason on three counts.
 The evidence for the prosecution shows that three individuals were apprehended by Concepcion or at his
instigation, due to their guerrilla connections.
 Concepcion contended that:
a) the lower court committed an error in allowing the prosecution to present evidence of his Filipino
citizenship after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had moved for dismissal;
b) the charges of which the appellant was convicted have not been approved in accordance with the
two-witness rule;
c) the he was an ex-USAFFE officer and joined the Japanese under duress.
 Concepcion has filed a motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence to show that the appellant
was merely a liaison officer between the Provincial Government of Cebu and the Japanese Military Police;
that three of the prosecution witnesses are retracting, and that the appellant had saved some Filipinos
arrested by the Japanese.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appealed judgment be affirmed.

RULING:
 YES
a) As the matter of reopening a case for the reception of further evidence after either the prosecution or the
defense has rested is within the discretion of the trial court.
b) There may not be corroboration between the two prosecution witnesses, but said witnesses are uniform in
their testimony—that Basilio Severino was arrested on December 7, 1944. The latter important detail
constitutes the overt act of treason charged.
c) There is nothing in the record which tends to indicate that the appellant apprehended or aided in the arrest
of his victims under actual and imminent threats of death or bodily harm in case he should do otherwise.
Upon the other hand, the evidence shows that he willingly perpetrated the acts of treason of which he was
convicted by the lower court.

 The first point is sought to be established by affidavits of two Japanese war prisoners. These are not
entitled to credit, as their affidavits were executed after, the defeat of Japan in the last war, of which fact
the Japanese affiants may be assumed to be aware.
 The alleged civilian position of Concepcion did not prevent him from becoming a traitor to his country.
 Neither are the three retracting witnesses entitled to credit, since their affidavits are obviously the result
of an afterthought, and if they could have lied during their testimony in court for some consideration or
motive, they can now by the same token commit another falsity.
 The alleged circumstance that the Concepcion helped some of his countrymen arrested by the Japanese
certainly does not exempt him from criminal liability.

The appealed judgment is affirmed.

23. Goodland Company, Inc. v Abraham Co and Christine Chan
G.R. No. 196685, December 14, 2011, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio, J.)

Facts:
- On February 29, 2000, the defendants were charged for Falsification of Public Documents under Art. 172
of the RPC, in connection with a Real Estate Mortgage, causing it to appear that Mr. Gilbert Guy, Vice
President of Goodland Company, Inc., participated in the preparation and execution of said Real Estate
Mortgage whereby Goodland Co. Inc., mortgaged to Asia United Bank a real property in Makati.
- After the prosecution’s presentation of evidence, the respondents filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file
Demurrer to Evidence with attached Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the prosecution failed to establish
the second and third elements of the crime and cited the prosecution’s failure to adduce evidence that Co
and Chan caused it to appear in a document that Gilbert Guy participated in the act and that the latter did
not participate in the said act.
- On October 16, 2008, the MeTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the case for failure of
the prosecution to present sufficient and competent evidence to rebut the presumption of innocence of the
accused; RTC and CA affirm. **Judge Moreno
- Petitioner seeks to reverse the acquittal on the ground of Grave Abuse of Discretion by the MeTC.
Issue:
W/ N the Demurrer to Evidence completely disregarded material prosecution evidence against Co and
Chan.
Ruling: NO. CA affirmed.
- An order granting an accused’s Demurrer to Evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits, and it
amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would result
to double jeopardy.
- The only grounds upon which an acquittal may be recalled or withdrawn is when the prosecution is denied
due process of law or when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case
by granting the accused’s Demurrer to Evidence, which negates the attachment of jeopardy.
- There was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the MeTC, RTC, and CA, respectively.
- Grave abuse of discretion is an act of a court performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and personal hostility.
- In the present case, Goodland failed to prove that 1) the subject Real Estate Mortgage was in blank at the
time it was submitted to Asia United Bank; 2) respondents filled-in the blanks in the Real Estate Mortgage;
and 3) Guy did not appear before the notary public.
- Grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to the lower courts since Goodland failed to meet the
quantum of proof required in criminal cases to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 112769.