GTC MUN 2018

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

AGENDA: Standards for Establishment of Foreign

Military Base with Special Reference to CPEC and
Bases in South China Sea, Also Reviewing Of
Permanent Countries
 LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
Greetings Delegates!

It is an honor to welcome you to the fourth edition of GTC Model United Nations 2018. It is
a matter of immense joy to be a part of this amazing conference and encourage you to
partake in this milestone event in the history of Jaipur MUN Circuit.

Model UN Conferences help you realize that no one is too small to make a change and no
voice can ever go unheard, as long it intends to construct a solution. In this edition, we will
be discussing the South China Sea Issue and the issue of establishment of foreign military
base with a special refences to CPEC along with its various dimensions. However, the study
guide is in no way exhaustive and is only to provide you with enough background
information to establish a platform for you to begin your research. We would highly
recommend that you do a good amount of research beyond what is covered in the study
guide.

The delegates are expected to maintain high level of diplomatic courtesy, accurate awareness
about one’s foreign policy leading to productive discourse in most solemn demeanor. We
aim to put you in comprehensive environment, allowing you to excel in your critical
thinking, negotiation skills, lobbying capabilities and tactical vision.

Furthermore, please take in serious consideration the following points regarding the type of
documents that you might want to produce in the committee so as to substantiate your stand.

 Valid and Binding:

1. All reports published by the United Nations and its agencies.
2. Reports by Governments and its agencies. (With respect to their country only.)

 Valid but not binding, in the order of precedence:

1. Reuters

2. Al Jazeera

3. Amnesty International
 4. Reporters without borders
 Not Valid but can be used for reference purposes:
1. Any report published by a recognized news agency or NGO.
 Not accepted under any condition:
1. Wikipedia
2. WikiLeaks
3. Blog Articles
4. The Background Guide itself
Please feel free to mail in case of any query.

Regards,

Shivansh Ahuja (President) Mamta (Vice President)

ahujashivansh@gmail.com mamtabisht104@gmail.com
9001331366 7073861125
 ABOUT THE COUNCIL

Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security. It has 15 Members, and each Member has one vote. Under the Charter, all Member
States are obligated to comply with Council decisions. The Security Council takes the lead in
determining the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression. It calls upon the
parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods of adjustment or
terms of settlement. In some cases, the Security Council can resort to imposing sanctions or
even authorize the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.

MANDATE

It gives primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the
Security Council, which may meet whenever peace is threatened.
According to the Charter, the United Nations has four purposes:
 to maintain international peace and security;

 to develop friendly relations among nations;

 to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for

human rights;
 And to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations.

When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council’s first
action is usually to recommend that the parties try to reach agreement by peaceful
means. The Council may:
 set forth principles for such an agreement;

 undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;

 dispatch a mission;

 appoint special envoys; or

 Request the Secretary General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific

settlement of the dispute.

For more information, visit: http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/

 Introduction to the Agenda

The establishment of foreign military bases is a key matter to understand the

distribution of power in spheres of influence throughout the world. Oversea bases are
the first mechanism of a mass network, which works to maintain the control exercised
by great powers, becoming the infrastructure for wars. The use of military power to
access another country’s soil is not a modern practice, but it was from the 20th century
onwards, with the two Great Wars and the consequently ascension of the USA and the
USSR as superpowers, that the establishment of oversea military bases has assumed the
configuration we are known to today. Therefore, foreign military bases became the
most important apparatus of organizations as NATO and European Union, and the
current developments regarding Ukraine, Russia and Crimea reinforce the strategic
importance of it.

The South China Sea extends from the Strait of Malacca in the southwest, to the Strait
of Taiwan in the northeast, and stretches eastwards towards Vietnam and Malaysia. It
occupies an area of approximately 1,423,000 square miles and boasts an average depth
of just under 4,000 feet. While technically still a part of the Pacific Ocean, the South
China Sea is notably diff erent as a result of the rhombus shaped basin in the eastern
part of the sea. This basin forms the border of the Eurasian tectonic plate between itself
and the Philippine Sea Plate, resulting in a deep sea dropoff off the coast of the
Philippines.

The sea is fairly isolated due to the various larger island chains and archipelagos
surrounding the bulk of the sea. Access to the sea is capable through the many connecting
channels and larger straits. To the north, the Luzon Strait between the Philippines and
Taiwan grant a large entrance out to the rest of the Pacific Ocean. Similarly, to the west,
the Strait of Malacca allows access to the Indian Ocean. Beyond these major straits,
smaller connecting channels exist through the islands of Indonesia, the Philippines, and
Malaysia.
A number of island chains and archipelagos exist within the sea. These islands are the result
of tectonic plate collapses millions of years ago, which created an uneven floor to the South
China Sea. Furthermore, a large amount of coral reefs and shoals are present within the sea,
many are only accessible from the surface when the tides change. Many of the smaller island
chains in the sea are present within the basin area to the east, between China and Vietnam on
the Asian continent, and the larger islands that make up the Philippines and Indonesia.
Notable island chains include the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands in the east and the
Natuna and Anambas Islands in the southwest. Resources are plentiful within the sea.

Notable island chains include the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands in the east and the
Natuna and Anambas Islands in the southwest. Resources are plentiful within the sea.
Fishing has been a large industry in the area for hundreds of years. The region boasts a
remarkable amount of marine biodiversity making it an important ecosystem for scientific
research in addition to the valuable fisheries that are crucial for the coastal nations.
Furthermore, some scientists estimate that the region holds up to 30% of the world’s coral
reefs. Besides the wide range of marine life within the sea, beneath the sea lies large
reserves of oil and natural gas.

These reserves have not been fully industrialized, and hold a range of economic
opportunities for the nations of the region. Outside of the potential economic gains from
the oil and natural gas deposits, the region is the second largest sea lane in the world and
sees a large amount of products and resources flow through the straits and from the
coastal nations of the region. Nations with coasts on the South China Sea include
Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, China, Indonesia, Brunei, Cambodia, Thailand, and
Taiwan. An estimated 500 million people live on the coasts of the South China Sea with a
population that is expected to grow even more within the next few years.

The South China Sea has been a region of tension many years, and continues to be. Many of
the world's most important trade routes cross the South China Sea, and billions, if not
trillions, of dollars in oil and natural gas lie beneath its surface. As such, the rights to the
territory are heavily contested. On an introductory note, it can be said that the dispute is
between the claims of ASEAN states and China, but the underlyling interests of these nations
complicate the dispute – making it, despite recent diplomatic efforts1 one of the most
structurally irresolvable territorial disputes. Situated at the crossroads of Europe, West Asia
and India on one side, and Japan and China on the other, together with abundant wealth of
natural resources, the South China Sea is also of vital commercial and strategic significance
to the states of the regions. Encompassing nearly 3.5 million square kilometres, the South
China Sea stretches from Singapore and the Straits of Malacca to the Taiwan Straits. The
international value of the South China Sea has three principle axes: resources, sea lanes, and
security. First, the South China Sea constitutes a massive potential of direct wealth to those
who possess its assets via oil, natural gas, and fishing arenas.

Oil reserves estimates range wildly from as high as 213 billion barrels to as low as 28
billion barrels. In fact, China has estimated that the South China Sea holds around two
quadrillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. Much of the speculation over hydrocarbon
amounts revolve around two archipelagos (chain or cluster of islands) called the Spratly
Islands and the Parcel Islands. According to the 1995 assessment made by the Russia's
Research Institute of Geology of Foreign Countries, the Spratly Islands area might contain
6 billion barrels of oil equivalent, of which 70% would be natural gas. While the Chinese
media called the South China Sea "the second Persian Gulf," estimating oil resources near
the Spratly islands to range from 105 billion barrels to 213 billion barrels.

Beyond resources, the South China Sea hosts perhaps the most significant global sea lanes in
the world. Joining the Southeast Asian states with the Western Pacific, the South China Sea
plays host to more than half the world’s annual merchant fleet tonnage and a third of all
maritime traffic. Being mostly export oriented and resources deficient, Asian Pacific States
depend heavily on sea borne trade. It is estimated that more than 41,000 ships – over half the
world’s shipping tonnage sail’s through the sea each year and more than 80% of the oil
imported by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan transits through the area. 3 The South China Sea
is proved to be rich in both living and nonliving resources. The South China Sea ranks the
fourth among the world’s 19 fishing zones in terms of total annual marine production with a
catch of over 8 million metric tons (live weight) of marine fish: this represents about 10% of
the total world catch and 23% of the total catch in Asia.

With respect to nonliving resources, the South China Sea is widely known for its rich
oil and gas reservoirs and oil and gas have been discovered in most parts of the sea. In
the context of globally increased demand for oil and gas resources and the instability
and shortage of the oil and gas supplying resources due the political turmoil in the Gulf,
it is clear that the South China Sea is expected to accommodate the need for oil and gas
resources for the States in the region thus amplifying the potential for conflicting
claims.

The South China Sea dispute is composed of two aspects: the overlapping jurisdictional
claims and the territorial dispute over groups of mid ocean islands. It is regarded as one of
the most complex disputes in the East Asia, and remains a dangerous source of potential
conflict which could worsen if it is not properly managed and resolved. Complicated by
many factors such as number of claimants, the economic and strategic nature of the area, the
South China Sea dispute of which the dispute over the sovereignty of Spratly islands is a
main problem has long attracted the attention of international community and many attempts
have been made to investigate the real causes of the dispute as well as to introduce possible
resolutions.
The complexity of situation has made the South China Sea dispute more vulnerable to armed
conflicts. In fact, a number of armed conflicts relating to the South China Sea and the Spratly
islands dispute have occurred.

Dating back to the 3rd century BC, claims have been made on territory in the South China
Sea by various nations, mainly Brunei, the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan, Malaysia,
the Philippines and Vietnam. The value of the South China Sea has been placed at over a
trillion dollars. The sea contains over 17.7 billion tons of crude oil, thus giving it the name of
the “Second Persian Sea”. The fishing in the area accounts for approximately eight percent of
the world’s catches, making the region incredibly lucrative. Many skirmishes have defined
the area. Most notably in the 20th century, China defined the ninedashed line in 1947, laying
its claim to the sea. This line has been declared by the Philippines as “against international
laws, particularly the United Nations Convention of the Laws of Seas.” In more recent
history, starting in the 1970s the new Vietnamese government reinstated claims to the Spratly
and Paracel Islands, and Taiwanese troops attacked Philippine fishing boats. Then, in 1992,
China passed a law declaring the entire Sea as its territory, triggering immense protest. In
2005, Chinese ships fired upon two Vietnamese fishing boats, killing 9 people. A partial
agreement was made in 2011 concerning a variety of topics, but no agreement was reached
on oil and natural gas drilling Tensions continue to rise in the South China Sea, with violent
occurrences happening more frequently, and with greater impact.
.

Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands Dispute

Spratly Islands have virtually no proved or probable oil reserves. Industry sources
suggest less than 100 billion cubic feet (Bcf) in currently economically viable natural gas
reserves exist in surrounding fields. However, the Spratly Island territory may contain
significant deposits of undiscovered hydrocarbons. USGS assessments estimate anywhere
between 0.8 and 5.4 (mean 2.5) billion barrels of oil and between 7.6 and 55.1 (mean
25.5) Tcf of natural gas in undiscovered resources. Evidence suggests that most of these
resources are likely located in the contested Reed Bank at the northeast end of the
Spratlys, which is claimed by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. The Philippines began
exploring the area in 1970 and discovered natural gas in 1976.
U.S. based Sterling Energy won the concession in 2002, and U.K.based Forum Energy
acquired the concession in 2005 and became its operator. However, Chinese objections
halted further development, and the concession remains undeveloped.

Although China insists that the structures on Mischief Reef are intended only to provide
shelter for Chinese fishermen in the area, serious suspicions exist among Asian and
Western states that the completion of military structures on Mischief Reef foreshadows
further Chinese military activity in the South China Sea. Recent reports in fact suggest
that China might be taking secret steps to occupy the Fiery Cross atoll, another tiny islet
claimed by the Philippines.

Paracel Islands have also been traditionally under dispute, and forms a significant subset
of the larger South China Sea dispute. The Paracel Islands are disputed between Vietnam
and China. The Chinese were occupying Eastern Paracel, also known as Amphitrite group,
before 1974.
The Paracel operation was a relatively uncomplicated military maneuver that did not
require the deployment of significant naval assets. It was almost risk free for China
since there was practically no likelihood of American intervention. The US as well as
Soviet reaction to the event was muted. The US navy and the Red Cross had confined
their roles to helping the South Vietnamese to evacuate from the islands. Despite
several attempts by the Vietnamese to retake the islands between 1979 and 1982, the
Chinese remain in eff ective control of the whole of Paracel.

In conclusion, the essence of the Spratly and Paracel dispute lies in questions of
territorial sovereignty, not law of the sea issues. The 1982 LOS Convention9 prescribes
new legal rights and duties for Asian littoral states and other users of ocean space. In
the South China Sea, the extension of 12 nautical mile territorial seas and 200 nautical
mile exclusive economic zones has exacerbated conflicting claimed jurisdictions over
nonliving resources in overlapping continental shelf zones. Moreover, various political
antagonisms and disputed sovereignty claims over the Spratly Islands have seriously
complicated establishment of agreed upon baselines for territorial waters.

Territorial and Legal Claims

The complexities of overlapping claims and the dispute’s long history make determination of
national sovereignty in the South China Sea dispute extremely difficult. Obviously, if the
issue of sovereignty can be resolved, then the maritime jurisdictional principles codified in
the 1982 UNCLOS can be applied to the Spratlys and other disputed areas in the South China
Sea. Such application would cede undersea resource rights to portions of the South China Sea
to recognized legal owners. China and Vietnam claim the entire area of the South China Sea
and the islands within it while Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Brunei have laid
claims to contiguous areas.
Two principles govern the claims, both of which work against the Chinese claim to the
entire area.

One is ‘‘eff ective occupation,’’ a precedent established by the Permanent Court of

Arbitration in the Island of Palmas case in April 1928. Eff ective occupation entails an
ability and intention to exercise continuous and uninterrupted jurisdiction, which is
distinguished from conquest.

The second principle is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
which lays down the rules to decide claims to resources based on exclusive economic
zones (EEZs) and continental shelves (an EEZ is a maritime zone stretching up to 320
kilometres from the coast that supports thecoastal state’s claims to the resources there).
UNCLOS does not support claims that go beyond EEZs or declared continental shelves,
yet China’s claim goes well beyond its EEZ and overlaps with the legal claims of the
ASEAN states.

China’s claim is based on history, but such claims do not carry much weight in
international law, which from the Chinese perspective downgrades China’s ancestral
heritage and is a source of resentment.
 FOREIGN MILITARY BASES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

By definition, a military base is an installation created to serve as support for military operations
and logistics (Glebov 2009). These facilities can play different roles, being related to several types
of bases, such as navy, land or air bases. Depending on the role it takes, there are many functions
that these settlements can exert: test-ranges for new weaponry, posts of intelligence operations,
platforms for military operations, weaponry stock or even as host for military corps.

The main controversial issue concerning military bases is its establishment in foreign states’
territory, a common practice related to global distribution of power in spheres of influence. Usually
linked with great powers’ foreign policy, military installations abroad have led the international
community to many debates associated with the principle of sovereignty.
Sovereignty is a concept which has its roots in philosophers from Socrates to Thomas Hobbes.
However, the idea formally became a principle in the Westphalian context where the Nation-states
were born (Jackson 2003). It represents the highest authority exerted by a legal state within its
territory (Calster, n.d.). Thus, state sovereignty is directly linked with the notion of borders and
territory.
Territory is simultaneously a condition for a state to exist and a limitation to its rights: in principle,
a state is sovereign only in its territory. (…) Sovereignty, in regard to a portion of the globe, has
been described as a right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the function of a
state (Calster, n.d.).
Therefore, according to this concept of sovereignty, no other state can impose its jurisdiction
abroad, only inside its own territory. In other words, the principle of sovereignty of a state clashes
with the implementation of military bases belonging to other country inside another one’s territory.
In this sense, as the presence of foreign military bases increased since the late of the 20th century,
the need to solve this paradox and the importance of regulating this situation based on International
Law have become apparent (Manson 2012). The results of this discussion were the Visiting Force
Agreement (VFA) and the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA).
 CHINA PAKISTHAN ECONOMIC CORRIDOR

HINA-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a $ 52 billion project (China’s investment

in Pakistan) being implemented since 2015, when both Pakistan and China signed an
agreement to construct this Economic Corridor. This is a huge project comprising the
construction of about a dozen power projects, a grand road and Railway network
connecting the Kashghar city of the Xiang Autonomous Region of China with the Gwadar
port city of Pakistan. The project also includes construction of 11 industrial zones and
laying of fibre optic from Kashghar to Islamabad. While the Corridor would connect
China and Pakistan, it would also connect South and Central Asian countries and China
with each other and with the outer world and vice versa for trade and travelling, saving
their precious time and cost since it would be a shorter and cheaper route. This facility
would be equally available to all South Asian countries including, India provided those
countries are willing to join the CPEC. Since all other South Asian countries are willing to
join the CPEC, China and Pakistan desire that India should also join the CPEC project to
draw related major economic advantages and also enable other SAARC countries to join
the project.

But India is opposing the construction of the CPEC rather than deciding to join it.
Apparently India is opposing the CPEC by offering the logic that the Corridor will be
passing through Gilgit-Baltistan region of Pakistan, which is a disputed area being part of
the former princely State of Jammu & Kashmir. This is a worldwide known fact that
Jammu & Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India is recognized by the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC), that has passed resolutions since 1948 to resolve the
dispute based on holding a plebiscite under its supervision to enable the Kashmiris to
exercise their right of self determination to express through a vote whether they wanted to
join Pakistan or India. In this context, whereas Pakistan was willing then and is willing
even today to hold the plebiscite under UNSC supervision, it is India that refused then and
even refuses today to hold the plebiscite under UNSC supervision since India knows that
Jammu & Kashmir being a Muslim majority state the outcome of the plebiscite will be in
favour of Pakistan and India would lose the state. Therefore, India’s declared pretext to
oppose the CPEC on the ground that it passes through the disputed territory over which
India has also a claim is not the actual reason, in fact there are other larger reasons for
India opposing the CPEC.

Firstly, keeping up with its traditional desire and strategy of establishing hegemony in
South Asia, India does not want to see strenghting of Pakistan’s economy by enhancing its
trade and investment through development of the CPEC. Therefore, India is playing
negative politics by misleading the world through its propaganda by taking an untenable
stance that the CPEC is passing through the disputed territory. In this context to establish
its claim that Gilgit-Baltistan is its soil it should now agree for holding a plebiscite in
Jammu and Kashmir. To counter its argument Pakistan can also conveniently say that why
India is building various projects in the Indian Occupied Kashmir since it is part of
Pakistan as per the 1947 partition formula. Indian leaders should keep in mind that the
construction of the CPEC will be completed despite India’s negative propaganda and its
sponsored terrorist acts in Balochistan.

Secondly, as per Modi’s anti Pakistan declared policy, India was struggling to isolate
Pakistan at regional and world levels. However, as India got disappointed to observe that
due to the construction of the CPEC, Pakistan was getting popular at the regional and
world levels and India’s efforts of isolating Pakistan were failing, it started opposing the
CPEC out of frustration. In this regard Indian leaders should learn this lesson that negative
politics do not succeed in the 21st Century. Moreover, Indian leaders should realize that it
is harmful to go against the tide. Therefore, it is better that India should give up its
negative politics being played against the CPEC and instead of opposing the project, it
should decide to join it to draw related major economic benefits to advance its own
economy. And also instead of criticizing the project by referring to its passage through a
disputed territory, India should sit with Pakistan and resolve the Kashmir dispute on a
permanent basis so that South Asian countries could focus on their economic development
through intra regional and inter regional integration to be facilitated by the CPEC.
Thirdly, India does not want China to enhance its trade and investment in other countries
through the connectivity to be facilitated by the CPEC. Since India considers itself as a
competitor to China at regional and world levels, it does not want China to further
advance economically and in economic diplomacy based on CPEC-related connectivity.
Hence, by opposing the construction of the CPEC and by sponsoring terrorist acts in
Balochistan India wants to discourage China to give up pursuing the CPEC project. In this
context, Indian leaders should rest assured that while India’s propaganda cannot mislead
the world on CPEC, its sponsoring of terrorist acts in Balochistan will also fail to deter the
Chinese from working on the CPEC as Pakistan would be providing foolproof security to
them. The importance of the CPEC could be felt from the fact that most of the regional
and other countries have already agreed to join the CPEC. For example, Afghanistan,
Central Asian Republics (CARs), other South Asian countries, Russia, Iran, the UK and
many other countries have stated their desire to join the CPEC.

Fourthly, India is opposing the CPEC to slow down China’s economic growth and contain
its peaceful rise. This is again a negative politics being played by India against China,
because while China has invited India to join the CPEC, India is endeavouring to harm the
project. In this context, Indian leaders need to understand that it is more profitable to
achieve India’s economic progress through cooperative strategies rather than opposing
China’s useful regional development projects like the CPEC. Being well aware of the fact
that India has no capacity to contain China, India may be opposing CPEC to please the
US, its strategic ally, by showing that it is in the forefront in containing China and
harming Pakistan’s interests since Pakistan is cooperating with China in the construction
of the CPEC.
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that India is opposing the CPEC to
achieve multiple objectives. For example, to maintain its hegemony in South Asia, India
wants to limit Pakistan’s economic development options. It also desires to publicize its
false claim over Azad Jammu & Kashmir. While India aims to undermine China’s
economic advancement in a bid to contain its peaceful rise, by not joining the CPEC, India
too wants that other South Asian smaller countries in its north-east do not join the CPEC
since it will end India’s hegemony. By denying to join the CPEC India also intends to
constrain Afghanistan from joining the project, if India joins the project, then Afghanistan
will also join and in that case, both the countries will be under pressure to agree for peace
in Afghanistan and for keeping good relations with Pakistan. If this happens India will not
be able to carry on with its game plan of defaming Pakistan by blaming it for Afghanistan-
related terrorism since with the better understanding of mutual regional integration goals
Afghan reconciliation would take place since all the regional countries would be on the
same page.
At the end it can be said that it is beyond doubt that India will ultimately fail in its
negative politics in South Asia and under social pressure of regional countries, it will be
ultimately convinced to leave its anti-development politics in South Asia and join the
CPEC although by then enough precious time would have been wasted to achieve South
Asia’s intra-regional economic integration and this region’s economic integration with
China and Central Asia.
 PRESENT THREATS AND DISPUTES

We have seen various historical maritime skirmishes in the South China Sea, so much
so, that South China Sea has more shipwrecks than any other sea in the world. The
present dispute over the South China Sea also tempts escalation, and is a constant threat
to International Peace and Security, as China has historically never shown reluctance in
the use of military force in exercising control, and even despite recent diplomatic esorts
such as the ASEAN Six Point Principles, the mutually agreed Code of Conduct among
others, the possibility of military confrontation and inevitable United States
involvement makes the South China Sea dispute a very critical tipping balance in
longstanding International Peace in the region since Vietnam.
There are many sources of concern, and many of those concerns were renewed after the
stando between China and Philippines during Scarborough Shoal incident (discussed
later in the document).

While USA, Philippines and China have played Bellicose Rhetoric and war games in
the South China Sea, the possibility of war was previously seen unlikely but concerns
remain nonetheless. These sources of concerns, due to their potential to destruct
longstanding peace in the South China Sea also form the UNSC’s direct agenda items.

Firstly, China’s Intent of the Use of Force to drive out Vietnam, Philippines and other nations
that occupy some features in the South China Sea despite its own unacknowledged territorial
claims in the region may scale up to become a devastating conflict. Secondly, United States
of America’s inevitable and direct involvement in the conflict would be beyond its harmless
use of South China Sea as a media of propagating Sino American rivalry as it might come at
a great cost, at the same time tipping the balance of peace in the world. Any intervention by
United States of America will be reckless and cause great damage to not only the sea but also
convert East Asia into an undesirable Theatre of War. Thirdly, South China
Sea’s denial of free passage by hostile takeover by any claimant will directly affect the
economy of almost 150 nations of the world resulting in not only military but great economic
pressure on the claimant. Chinese Denial of India’s right of exploration in the South China
Sea is a mild example of such an incident, which upon up scaling can become a worldwide
conflict. Lastly, the assertion of claims that have the tendency to take violent forms as seen in
many incidents in the past year.

While United States of America and Philippines joint exercises in the South China Sea
could be nothing but flexing the military muscle, a military conflict would be dangerous,
large, exponentially harmful as it will result in Sino American warlike state given
Beijing’s already assertive behavior and result in a power struggle that will also include
military giants like America. South China Sea is universally seen as a relatively dormant
territorial and sovereignty dispute, but the effects of Beijing’s determination can be
unwholesome and painful.

The What-If argument of Risk Potential

The stando between Philippines and Chinese after the former arrested Chinese fishing
vessels elicited an unprecedented and a very strong military response from China and
seriously strained diplomatic relations between the two countries. The net result is that
China has taken 'elective and arbitrary control' of the disputed shoal. This increased
assertiveness by all claimants in the case of South China Sea, as seen from the Shoal
stando is a direct and impending threat to disruption of world peace, and a foremost
concern for the UNSC.

What is more scaring is the thought about the results of any, god forbid, any future
Scarborough Shoal standos wherein now that America maintains a strong military
presence, there can be a stage of conflict that rises above the containable status of any
such war. China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC),
challenging both the legitimacy and the strength of such a mechanism that diplomatically
asserts on the parties to maintain self restraint while dealing with unavoidable military
standos in the South China Sea that is administered by multiple nations further diluting
any one’s authority.
 MAJOR BLOC POSITIONS

Southeast Asia

Many nations in this region are trying to lay claim to parts of the South China Sea. Most
notably are China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei. China
bases its claims of "indisputable sovereignty" in a map drawn in 1947 by the ruling Chinese
Nationalist Party, which currently governs Taiwan. The map uses a nine dashed line
surrounding all of the significant geographical features in the Sea to indicate China's
historical claim to the Sea dating to the 15th century. In 1979, Vietnam's foreign ministry
released a statement outlining the extent of its claims in the Sea, which include the Paracels
and Spratly islands, and justifying four historical events from the 18th to the 20th centuries.
The Philippines currently occupies 9 of the Spratly islands and claims ownership of 50 in the
same region it calls the Kalayaan Islands Group. Malaysia has occupied five of the Spratly
islands since 2009 when it submitted a joint proposal with Vietnam to the Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf. Since, Malaysia has constructed a military installation, an
airstrip, and a diving resort.

ASEAN

ASEAN has promoted multilateral talks on disputed areas without settling the issue of
sovereignty, and in 2002 joined with China in signing a Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea that committed all parties to those territorial disputes
to “reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and over flight
above the South China Sea as provided for by the universally recognized principles of
international law” and to “resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful
means, without resorting to the threat or use of force.” Since then ASEAN has attempted
to promote a code of conduct for the SCS but has failed to secure unanimity. At the
ARF in Brunei there was agreement to hold consultations on the issue in Beijing.
Thailand is seeking to coordinate the ASEAN position in advance.

The EU

The EU has a major interest in the SCS because of its role for trade and investment in the
region. In its 2012 Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia, the EU
stressed the importance of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and encouraged the
parties to peacefully resolve disputes in accordance with international law, particularly the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Additionally, the EU suggested in the guidelines to look at previous examples and offered to
share experience if wished by the conflict parties.

United States of America

The US has no territorial or resource claims in East Asia, but Hillary Clinton stated at the
2010 ARF meeting in Hanoi that “the United States has a national interest in freedom of
navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in
the South China Sea.” US has not yet ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
With Donald Trump coming into power as president of USA the stance has been
fluctuating but one thing is really care that USA is trying to test the patience of the chinese
army and government and for that they are carrying out the naval exercises on a regular
basis.

People’s Republic of China

Official Position : Paracel and Spratly islands for the last 2000 years integral part of
Chinese territory, reconfirmed by 1947 map. Arbitration started by the Philippines is
illegal and founded on illegal occupation of Chinese islands and reefs, thus UNCLOS
should not apply.

Stance: No international arbitration but only by states directly concerned, joint

development of the area; strict adherence to Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea (DOC).

Philippines

Official position: Chinese ninedash line violates UNCLOS provisions to which China
and the Philippines are signatories; China has declined invitation to use settlement
mechanisms under Part XV of UNCLOS. Having exhausted almost all political and
diplomatic avenues for a peaceful negotiated settlement of its maritime dispute with
China Secretary of Foreign Affairs Del Rosario stated that therefore ''the Philippines
has taken the step of bringing China before the Arbitral Tribunal under Article 287 and
Annex VII under UNCLOS.

Stance: International arbitration, joint development only after settling of dispute and
clarification of claims; establish legally binding Code of Conduct (COC).

Vietnam

Official position: Vietnam possesses sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel archipelagos
in accordance with UNCLOS.

Stance: Focus on strict implementation of the DOC between ASEAN and China in 2002;
hopes that ASEAN members and China launch official talks on a COC. Speaking at the
Shangrila conference in June, PM Dung called for completion of an ASEAN led Code of
Conduct for avoiding confrontation at sea, thus facilitating “peaceful dispute settlement on
the basis of international law, not threats of force”.

Malaysia

Official position: Claims territory that falls within economic exclusion zone under
UNCLOS and to a small number of islands in the Spratlys

Stance: Dialogue and cooperation, establish COC, no involvement of ‘extra regional

states’; joint development of resources; no passing on of dispute to the next generation.
Points to the example of the joint development zone in waters claimed by Thailand and
Malaysia.
 QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

1. Which claims to the region are the most legitimate?

2. In what way can the region be divided in order to appease all nations involved?

3. Do any attacks and violence occurring in the Sea reduce the legitimacy of any
claims?

4. How can armed conflict be avoided?

5. What regulations must be placed/enforced in the South China Sea?

6. With all the competing claims to the South China Sea, whose role is it to say whose
claim is legitimate?

7. There seems to be a recent international trend towards supporting ASEAN claims

to this water, what are the origins of this trend?

To what extent will U.S. involvement in the South China Sea strengthen or endager
regional stability?

8. How can the security and free passage of large quantities of trade through the region
be ensured?

9. How can potential conflicts be identified and mitigated before they ignite?
 REFERENCES

1.http://blogs.reuters.com/greatdebate/2015/06/09/everythingyouneedtoknowaboutthes
outhchinaseaconflictinunderfiveminutes/

2.http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows_pages/fell
ows_papers/nguyen_0506_vietnam.pdf

3. https://www.cfr.org/interactives/globalconflict
tracker#!/conflict/territorialdisputesinthesouthchinasea

4.http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55097#.Wb0QP8gjFPY
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