Esquivias vs CA

Three (3) issues need to be resolved: (a) Was the appellate court correct in holding that no earnest
effort towards a compromise between members of the same family was made, in contravention of Art.
222 of the Civil Code? (b) Did the Report/Recommendation of the Solicitor General in the disbarment
case, which was adopted by the Supreme Court, rule on the validity of the sale executed by Julia
Domalaon? (c) Who has a better right over the subject property, the Esquiviases or the Domalaons?

Petitioners contend that Atty. Esquivias is only a brother-in-law of Jose and Elena Domalaon. Atty.
Esquivias is not a member of the family of his wife and is outside the scope and coverage of the law
requiring that the same members of a family should exert efforts to bring about a compromise before
the commencement of a litigation.

We agree with petitioners. Article 222 of the Civil Code provides that no suit shall be filed or maintained
between members of the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made but the same have failed. The reason for the law is that a lawsuit between
family members generates deeper bitterness than one between strangers. Hence, it is necessary that
every effort should be made towards a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and
passion in the family.[11]

But this requirement in Art. 222 of the Civil Code applies only to suits between or among members of
the same family. The phrase "between members of the same family" should be construed in the light of
Art. 217 of the Civil Code[12] under which "family relations" include only those (a) between husband
and wife, (b) between parent and child, (c) among other ascendants and their descendants, and (d)
among brothers and sisters.

As correctly pointed out by petitioners, Atty. Salvador S. Esquivias is not included in the enumeration of
who are members of the same family, as he is only a brother-in-law of respondents Jose and Elena by
virtue of his marriage to their sister Alicia. His relationship with respondents is based on affinity and not
on consanguinity. Consequently, insofar as he is concerned, he is a stranger with respect to the family of
his wife and, as such, the mandatory requirement of "earnest effort toward a compromise" does not
apply to him. In Magbaleta v. Gonong[13] we ruled that "efforts to compromise" are not a jurisdictional
prerequisite for the maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto,
whether as necessary or indispensable one. An alien to the family may not be willing to suffer the
inconvenience of, much less relish, the delay and the complications that wranglings between and among
relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it is neither practical nor fair that the rights of a family be
made to depend on a stranger who just happens to have innocently acquired some interest in a
property by virtue of his affinity to the parties. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find no
reason to give Art. 222 a broader scope than its literal import.

Finally, while the certificates of title in the names of Jose G. Domalaon and Elena G. Domalaon are
indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the whole world, including the government itself, they do
not create or vest title. They merely confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be
used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud; neither does they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of others.[23]

Although a review of the decree of registration is no longer available on account of the expiration of the
one-year period from entry thereof, an equitable remedy is still available to the Esquiviases who were
wrongfully deprived of their property, i.e., to compel Jose G. Domalaon in whose name the house and
lot in question had been wrongfully registered, to reconvey the property to the Esquiviases, provided
that the same has not yet been transferred to innocent persons for value.[24]

The registered property is deemed to be held in trust for the real owners by the person in whose name
it has been registered. In this action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case, the title thereof,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal
owners.[25]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals reversing that of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 54, Gubat, Sorsogon, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision of the latter court in favor of
petitioners as quoted in pages four (4) and five (5) hereof is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. Costs against
private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Lee vs CA

I. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is improper since private
respondents seek to have the entry for the name of petitioners mother changed from Keh Shiok Cheng
to Tiu Chuan who is a completely different person. What private respondents therefore seek is not
merely a correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Shengs
legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a bastardization of
petitioners.[16] Petitioners thus label private respondents suits before the lower courts as a collateral
attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the
Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.[18] The petitions
filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners records of birth were
intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to
have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners
contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the
prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to
establish that the former are not the latters children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood
relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.

A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the
instant case, where a child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his
wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as
they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action
impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it refused to
apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late
Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos,

Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to
establish the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners true mother, and their real status, simply
because they had discovered the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much
later date. This is especially true in the case of private respondents who, as their fathers legitimate
children, did not have any reason to suspect that he would commit such deception against them and
deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mothers (Keh Shiok Chengs) estate. It was only
sometime in 1989 that private respondents suspicions were aroused and confirmed. From that time
until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.

Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the registration of
the last birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private respondents had
discovered the false entries in petitioners birth records in 1989. Petitioners base their position on the
fact that birth records are public documents, hence, the period of prescription for the right of action
available to the private respondents started to run from the time of the registration of their birth
certificates in the Civil Registry.

We cannot agree with petitioners thinking on that point.

It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.[56] Petitioners liken their
birth records to land titles, public documents that serve as notice to the whole world. Unfortunately for
the petitioners, this analogy does not hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a persons parentage
cannot be acquired by prescription. One is either born of a particular mother or not. It is that simple.

Cabang vs Basay

Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot No. 7777, Ts- 222 located in Molave, Zamboanga
del Sur. Said lot was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-2,768 pursuant to Decree No. N-64 and
issued on March 9, 1966. However, Felix Odong and his heirs never occupied nor took possession of the
lot.
On June 16, 1987, plaintiff-appellants bought said real property from the heirs of Felix Odong for
P8,000.00. Consequently, OCT No. 0-2,768 was cancelled and in its stead, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-22,048 was issued on August 6, 1987 in the name of plaintiff-appellants. The latter also did not occupy
the said property.

Defendant-appellees, on the other hand, had been in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse
possession of the same parcel of land since 1956 up to the present. They were the awardees in the
cadastral proceedings of Lot No. 7778 of the Molave Townsite, Ts-222. During the said cadastral
proceedings, defendant-appellees claimed Lot No. 7778 on the belief that the area they were actually
occupying was Lot No. 7778. As it turned out, however, when the Municipality of Molave relocated the
townsite lots in the area in 1992 as a big portion of Lot No. 7778 was used by the government as a public
road and as there were many discrepancies in the areas occupied, it was then discovered that
defendant-appellees were actually occupying Lot No. 7777.

On June 23, 1992, plaintiff-appellants filed a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 92-20-127 for
Recovery of Property against defendant-appellees.

On July 19, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff

Holding that the rights of the plaintiffs to recover the land registered in their names, have been
effectively barred by laches

WHEREFORE, the judgment herein appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the plaintiffs-appellants to be entitled to the possession of Lot No. 7777 of the
Molave Townsite, subject to the rights of the defendants-appellees under Article (sic) 448, 546, 547 and
548 of the New Civil Code.

Respondents thereafter elevated their cause to the appellate court which reversed the trial court in
its May 31, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 76755. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution[5] dated September 21, 2007.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners insist that the property subject of the controversy is a duly constituted family home
which is not subject to execution, thus, they argue that the appellate tribunal erred in reversing the
judgment of the trial court.

As aptly pointed out by the appellate court, from the inception of Civil Case No. 99-20-127, it was
already of judicial notice that the improvements introduced by petitioners on the litigated property
are residential houses not family homes. Belatedly interposing such an extraneous issue at such a
late stage of the proceeding is tantamount to interfering with and varying the terms of the final and
executory judgment and a violation of respondents right to due process because
As a general rule, points of law, theories and issues not brought to the attention of the trial court
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. For a contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse
party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory,
which it could have done had it been aware of if at the time of the hearing before the trial court.[20]

The refusal, therefore, of the trial court to enforce the execution on the ground that the
improvements introduced on the litigated property are family homes goes beyond the pale of what
it had been expressly tasked to do, i.e. its ministerial duty of executing the judgment in accordance
with its essential particulars. The foregoing factual, legal and jurisprudential scenario reduces the
raising of the issue of whether or not the improvements introduced by petitioners are family homes
into a mere afterthought.

Even squarely addressing the issue of whether or not the improvements introduced by petitioners
on the subject land are family homes will not extricate them from their predicament.

The most important phase of any proceeding is the execution of judgment.[31] Once a judgment
becomes final, the prevailing party should not, through some clever maneuvers devised by an
unsporting loser, be deprived of the fruits of the verdict.[32] An unjustified delay in the enforcement
of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposing of justiciable controversies with
finality.[33] Furthermore, a judgment if not executed would just be an empty victory for the
prevailing party because execution is the fruit and end of the suit and very aptly called the life of the
law.[34]

The issue is moreover factual and, to repeat that trite refrain, the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts. It is not the function of the Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative
value of the evidence presented. A question of fact would arise in such event. Questions of fact
cannot be raised in an appeal via certiorari before the Supreme Court and are not proper for its
consideration.[35] The rationale behind this doctrine is that a review of the findings of fact of the
appellate tribunal is not a function this Court normally undertakes. The Court will not weigh the
evidence all over again unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally
devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion.[36]
Although there are recognized exceptions[37] to this rule, none exists in this case to justify a
departure therefrom.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2007 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 76755 declaring respondents entitled to the writ of execution and ordering petitioners
to vacate the subject property, as well as the Resolution dated September 21, 2007 denying the
motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.