50th ASEP Anniversary International Convention & Exposition, “Safer, Smarter & Greener”

Technical Proceedings ISSN 1656-7757, September 28-30, 2011 Makati City, Philippines

SEISMIC RISK MANAGEMENT OF EXISTING LIFELINES

UNDER DETERIORATING ENVIRONMENTS

Takeshi Koike

ABSTRACT: In order to keep the existing lifeline network system at a favorable

seismic performance level, it is necessary to carry out retrofitting activities. This study
proposes a seismic risk assessment method for the existing deteriorated lifeline
network system based on the probability of system performance failure. Major topics
in this study are (1) new retrofitting methods developed in Japan for water systems,
(2) seismic design methods of buried pipelines for ground shaking and permanent
ground displacements due to liquefaction and fault movement, and (3) decision
making procedures for the seismic retrofit investment based on risk assessment
approaches. Numerical simulations are carried out for the existing water distribution
network system for several seismic investment strategies to support the
decision-making of seismic disaster mitigation planning. Effective planning of seismic
retrofitting activities and disaster mitigation for the existing lifeline system can be
realized using the newly developed assessment method.

KEYWORDS: Seismic risk management; water lifelines; pipe joint; retrofit

1. INTRODUCTION

Since a lifeline network system is responsible for the lives and health of its users in
addition to providing a social benefit, it is essential to keep the supply service functioning
as much as possible even when a severe seismic event occurs. Originally, existing
lifelines in Japan were designed to satisfy seismic load requirements that were
determined using the best predictions in the past, which underestimated the possible
damage caused in future scenarios. Thus, water pipelines are not sufficiently resistant to
meet potential damage by future earthquakes. Thus, additional reinforcement or
retrofitting actions are proposed to upgrade the seismic performance of existing lifelines.
These lifelines have suffered deterioration through various causes, such as corrosion,
traffic load, and third-party accidents, and so the originally designed seismic strength has
not been maintained.
An existing lifeline system is composed of many pipe segments, which vary widely in
having old- and new-type joints. Old joints offer poor resistance to large earthquake
ground motions. Approximately 80% of existing lifeline networks in Japan has old-type
joints, and so it will take considerable time to replace all of them. Since the lifeline of
many unit pipes is very long, replacing old-type with new-type joints will demand an
enormous investment. Therefore it is necessary to consider partial retrofitting, which
means that some parts of the network are replaced by new-type joints, while leaving the
remaining portions intact.

It is therefore necessary to carry out retrofitting activities to maintain a deteriorating

system at a favorable seismic performance level. In planning effective retrofitting of a

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 50th ASEP Anniversary International Convention & Exposition, “Safer, Smarter & Greener”
Technical Proceedings ISSN 1656-7757, September 28-30, 2011 Makati City, Philippines

system to mitigate seismic damage, it is necessary to develop a procedure to

quantitatively evaluate the effect of partial retrofitting on the fragility of the lifeline
network system. Some indexes, such as structural failure, performance failure, and
economic loss, allow evaluation of the seismic performance of the lifeline system, and
they are closely interrelated. In particular, the supply damage rate (ratio of unserviceable
users to all users of the water supply system) after an earthquake is the most appropriate
index for evaluating the seismic performance of a lifeline network system from the
viewpoint of the system users. However, since a network system normally has a
hierarchical structure, with a huge number of links and nodes, it is not simple to estimate
the effect of partial retrofitting on the seismic performance, such as in terms of loss of
service.
In this paper, a simple model is used to estimate the relationship between the probability
of structural failure and loss of service without using the topological characteristics of the
network system. A seismic-assessment procedure for a lifeline network system is
proposed, using the probability of system-performance failure based on the supply
damage rate as the index for evaluation, and an example seismic assessment is carried out
for the actual water-distribution network model taking into account the pipeline
deterioration.

2. SEISMIC DAMAGE OF WATER LIFELINES

2.1 Current water pipelines

Modern water supply service in Japan started in Yokohama since 1887. As of now, 97.3%
of Japanese people can obtain potable water from water pipeline network systems. Most
of water lifelines in Japan were constructed in 1960s. Therefore, they might have been
deteriorated and may not satisfy the seismic performance levels required by the present
seismic code. In April 2008, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW)
promulgated the ordinance No.60 that made clear both the classification of importance
for the waterworks facilities and the requirements for their seismic performances. They
also promoted a campaign to prompt the waterworks bureaus to make the main facilities
of all waterworks earthquake-resistant until 20131). However, it does not seem that the
waterworks bureaus are positively tackling seismic investments. There are several
reasons why the seismic investments for waterworks stay inactive; the lack of the
evaluation method to judge the reasonable seismic investments for the deteriorated
facilities might be the main reason.

2.2 Current seismic damage predictions

The structural damage of water pipelines is estimated by the number of pipe and/or joint
failures per km, while the supply damage is measured as the ratio of un-service
population per the whole population in the restoration process after the earthquake.
Figure 1 shows a sample profile of water suspension rate, in which the regression curve
was established on the basis of pipe damage (JWWA 1997) data in 1995 Kobe
Earthquake, while many circle points are plotted from the data obtained from the other
earthquakes in different water network systems. This regression curve, however, cannot

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 50th ASEP Anniversary International Convention & Exposition, “Safer, Smarter & Greener”
Technical Proceedings ISSN 1656-7757, September 28-30, 2011 Makati City, Philippines

provide a good prediction of supply damage rate from the structural damage rate, because
each water network has its own network configuration and its corresponding facilities
which are different from those of Kobe water supply system.
過去の地震被害例
1
0.9

断水率(断水戸数/給水戸数)
0.8
0.7
Water suspension rate 0.6
(No. of un-service 0.5
population/the whole 0.4
population) 0.3
0.2
0.1
0 -3 -2 -1 0 1
10 10 10 10 10
被害率(件/km )

Damage rate (No. of pipe failures /km)

Figure 1. The prediction of water suspension rate from the damage rate per unit
length.

3. PERFORMANCE-BASED SEISMIC DESIGN

3.1 Current seismic design of segmented pipelines

The American Lifeline Alliance (ALA 2005) published “Seismic Guidelines for Water
Pipelines,” in which it developed a design procedure for segmented joint pipes for earth
tremors. An unrestrained, segmented pipe has joints with low strength and stiffness
relative to the pipe barrel. An example is a DCIP with push-on, bell-and-spigot gasketed
joints. The axial displacement that the joint has to be able to accommodate may be taken
as follows2):
" joint = 7l d ! soil (1)

where ! joint is the capacity against the joint pull-out at the time of the earthquake, is
the length of the pipe segment, and is the soil strain, which is transferred to the pipe
without slip. For design purposes, the ALA guidelines recommend the use of seven times
the average joint movement, based on the study of El Hamadi and O’Rourke (1990), who
investigated existing cast-iron joints that showed large random joint displacements under
seismic axial elongations.

So the seismic safety is assessed as follows:

! joint " ! seismic (2)

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 50th ASEP Anniversary International Convention & Exposition, “Safer, Smarter & Greener”
Technical Proceedings ISSN 1656-7757, September 28-30, 2011 Makati City, Philippines

where is the predicted seismic joint displacement.

A restrained segmented pipe has a locking ring to prevent pull-out failure from the joint.
When one locking ring is insufficient to resist the applied force, the neighboring joint can
support the residual force. If n joints are necessary to resist the applied force, the axial
tensile force is calculated by
Fstop = πDτ G l d (n + 1) (3)
in which is the pipe diameter, is the shear stress acting between the pipe surface and
surrounding soil, and is number of joints necessary to resist the applied force. The ALA
recommends that n should have a value of 3. So the seismic safety is assessed as follows:
R y ! Fstop (4)
where is the critical strength for the pull-out force.
The Japan Water Works Association (JWWA 1997), however, published “Seismic
Guidelines for Water Pipelines,” in which it developed a different design procedure for
unrestrained segmented joint pipes in the event of earth tremors. But the JWWA did not
prepare any design procedures for restrained segmented joint pipes.
In a very strong earthquake, which is defined as a Level 2 earthquake in Japan, or a
maximum considered earthquake (MCE), the following analytical procedure can estimate
the joint displacement :
!u J = $ " #1 " !uG (5)
in which is the ground relative displacement, which is defined as
& , 2/ ) #
.uG = uG %1 - cos* ld '" (6)
$ + L' ( !
where is the apparent wavelength, and .
is the conversion factor to estimate the joint displacement, given as
1
)1 = 2
(7)
&( #
1 + $$ 1 !!
% '1 "
where
K g1 2!l d
!1 = ld , "1 = (8)
EA L'

using , which are elastic rigidity, cross-section area, and spring modulus, respectively of a
segmented pipe.
The seismic design assessment is carried out by
! joint " !u J + additional load displacements (9)
in which ! joint is the critical joint displacement.
The JWWA does not have any observation data for seismic damage to restrained
segmented joint pipes. Thus, the JWWA cannot prepare any seismic safety-assessment
procedures for restrained segmented joint pipes in Japan.

3.2 Seismic-performance analysis of new-type segmented pipelines

Recently in Japan, newly developed restrained segmented joint pipes have been widely
used to replace old unrestrained pipes as part of seismic disaster-prevention measures.

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 50th ASEP Anniversary International Convention & Exposition, “Safer, Smarter & Greener”
Technical Proceedings ISSN 1656-7757, September 28-30, 2011 Makati City, Philippines

CIP and DCIP with the old-type joints, as shown in Fig.2, are being replaced by new-type
DCIP. Since the new-type DCIP has a locking system, it cannot easily be pulled out even
in the case of large displacement by an earthquake. The seismic performances of these
joints are compared in Table 1 in terms of acceptable displacement in the axial direction.

nut
bolt
spigot

lead type-CIP
(1)Old yarn fixing ring rubber (2)
ringOldinsert sleeve
type-DCIP

rubber ring centering rubber

Locking ring spigot

:effective gap
insert sleeve stopper

(3) New type-DCIP

Figure 2. Old and new types of CIP and DCIP joints.

Table 1. Seismic performance of each joint. (Wada, et al 2010)

Joint of Resistance (mm)
Mean COV
T ype
Minor Moderate Major Minor Moderate Major
Old joint 5 10 15 0.2 0.25 0.3
New joint 30 45 60 0.05 0.05 0.1

The axial force S necessary to pull out from the joint is calculated from the shear stress,
which is sinusoidally distributed along the pipe axis. If the shear stress is less than the critical
shear stress tcr , slippage is initiated at the pipe surface; the maximum pull-out force is
calculated from the shear stress tG given by the ground strain eG. When the shear stress is
greater than the critical shear stress, on the other hand, the maximum pull-out force is derived
from the critical shear stress given in Equation (10):

!(D & l eff & ' G

$ for ' G < ' cr
S=#
!(D & l eff & ' cr for ' G % ' cr
"
(10)
where,
is the effective length loaded by the shear stress acting on the pipe surface,
is the shear stress acting between the pipe surface and the surrounding ground,

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 50th ASEP Anniversary International Convention & Exposition, “Safer, Smarter & Greener”
Technical Proceedings ISSN 1656-7757, September 28-30, 2011 Makati City, Philippines

is the critical shear stress.

The deterioration behavior of old pipe joints under traffic load vibrations is assumed to be
modeled by the following deterioration factor:

d2
⎛ t ⎞
ψ (t ) = 1 − d1 ⎜⎜ ⎟⎟ (11)
⎝ DT ⎠
where d1 and d2 are parameters describing the deterioration behavior shown in Table 2, which
was prepared as sample data for this numerical analysis, and
DT = T p ! T0 : before retrofitting
DT = TD ! T p :after retrofitting (12)
in which TD is the duration period of the pipeline system.

Table 2. Deterioration factors for pipe joints. (Wada, et al 2010)

Deterioration factors
Type d1 d2
Old joint 0.5 0.25
New joint 0.1 0.05

Table 3. Seismic response at joint portion. (Wada, et al 2010)

Seismic Response (mm)

Type M ean COV
EQ1 8 0.3
EQ2 37 0.4

In this assessment, the joint resistance with displacement in the pull-off direction represents
the residual strength R. This value can be estimated based on the deterioration factor of
Equation (21) as follows:
R − (0, T p ) = ψ (T p − T0 ) ⋅ R (0, T0 )
( )
R + C S , T p = RY
( )
R(C S , T X ) = ψ T X − T p ⋅ R + C S , T p ( ) (13)

in which R − (C S , T p ), R + (C S , T p )and R(C S , TX ) are the joint deformation capacity before the
retrofitting, the capacity after the retrofitting, and the capacity at time TX after the retrofitting,
respectively.

Figure 3 shows the schematic profile of the deteriorating process of the segmented pipe joint
before and after retrofitting with new-type DCIP.

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 50th ASEP Anniversary International Convention & Exposition, “Safer, Smarter & Greener”
Technical Proceedings ISSN 1656-7757, September 28-30, 2011 Makati City, Philippines

R (CS , T p )
+

New joint
R(CS , t )

Old joint

R (0, T p )
−

t
T0 Tp TX

Figure 3. Schematic profile of the joint deformation capacity of deteriorating pipes.

4. SEISMIC PERFORMANCE AND MITIGATION

The seismic performance of the lifeline network system should be related to the limit states of
the system, which can be described as the serviceability limit state, repairable limit state, and
ultimate limit state for the corresponding seismic disasters. Table 4 shows the definitions of
the required seismic performance of a lifeline system. In these definitions, both the
seismic-performance damage mode and the component damage mode are also defined
quantitatively for seismic disasters of Level 1 (EQ1) and Level 2 (EQ2) ground motions
caused by the maximum operational earthquake (MOE) and MCE, respectively.

The most important facilities and transmission pipelines are required to have higher safety in
seismic performance 2 than in seismic performance 3 because those structural components
are always necessary for immediate recovery. The distribution pipelines and their facilities
should have the capacity to recover from seismic performance 3 in due course.

In Table 4, the limit state function of Z provides the critical condition that the structural
damage mode occurs when a seismic load exceeds the critical value. The limit state function
of D provides the critical condition that the functional damage mode occurs when a seismic
load exceeds the critical value.

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 50th ASEP Anniversary International Convention & Exposition, “Safer, Smarter & Greener”
Technical Proceedings ISSN 1656-7757, September 28-30, 2011 Makati City, Philippines

Table 4 Definitions of seismic performance and failure modes. (Imai & Koike 2009)
Component
Seismic Performance
Definition damage
performance damage mode
mode
The system performance can be maintained without any minor minor
1 disruption for the Level 1 earthquake ground motion minor minor
D EQ Z EQ1
1
(EQ1), if the system is slightly damaged or undamaged.
The system performance can be restored after quick repair moderate moderate
2 for the Level 2 earthquake ground motion (EQ2), if the moderate
D EQ moderate
Z EQ
2 2
system is not significantly damaged.

The system performance can be restored after recovering major major

3 from disruption for the Level 2 earthquake ground motion major
D EQ major
Z EQ
2 2
(EQ2), if the system is not completely damaged.

4.1 Structural failure

Let us define the damage modes for structural components in the following way, where R, D,
L, S, CS, Tp are the residual strength for each damage mode, dead load, live load, seismic load,
retrofitting investment, and present time, respectively:
minor
Z EQ ( ) ( )
C S , T p = R minor C S , T p − (D + L ) − S ⋅ 1EQ < 0
moderate
Z EQ ( ) ( )
C S , T p = R moderate C S , T p − (D + L ) − S ⋅ 1EQ < 0 (14)
major
Z EQ ( ) ( )
C S , T p = R major C S , T p − (D + L ) − S ⋅ 1EQ < 0
where,
⎧1 : an earthquake occurs at t EQ
1EQ = ⎨ (15)
⎩ 0 : an earthquakedoes not occur at t EQ

The expected value of 1EQ equals the probability of an earthquake occurring in the residual
service period (TD-Tp), and it is given by the following equation using the return period of the
possible future earthquake:

[ ] [
E 1EQ = P DEQ ] (16)

A pipeline is characterized as a long, stretched structure, in which potential cracks that

initiate a leakage failure due to seismic load effect are randomly located along the pipeline.
Assuming that damage in a pipeline follows a Poisson process, the probability of pipe failure
(El Hamadi & O’Rourke 1990) in the i-th link is given by:
[ minor
P Z link ]
(li ) EQ1 = 1 − exp ⎡⎢− ∫0i ν minor (x )dx ⎤⎥
⎣
l

⎦ (17)
[ moderate
P Z link ]
(li ) EQ2 = 1 − exp ⎡⎢− ∫0i ν moderate (x )dx ⎤⎥
⎣
l

⎦
[ major
P Z link ]
(li ) EQ2 = 1 − exp ⎡⎢− ∫0i ν major (x )dx ⎤⎥
⎣
l

⎦

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 50th ASEP Anniversary International Convention & Exposition, “Safer, Smarter & Greener”
Technical Proceedings ISSN 1656-7757, September 28-30, 2011 Makati City, Philippines

where the damage rate per unit pipe length at point x is given by:

ν mz (x ) = ν 0 P Z EQ
mz
EQ [ ] (18)

where, mz indicates the structural damage mode of minor, moderate, and major, and n0
denotes the number of pipe joints per unit pipe length.

Most structural facilities, including river-crossing bridges, pumping facilities, storage tanks,
and control-valve equipment, are located along the link, while the most important facilities,
such as water-purification plants, are represented as individual nodes. Structural failure of all
these facilities is evaluated in a probabilistic manner using fragility curves.

4.2 Performance failure

Performance failure can be estimated as a loss of water supply immediately after an

earthquake and/or as a restoration period in the recovery process several weeks after the
earthquake.
Figure 4(1) shows a profile of water serviceability in the life-cycle stage between the initial
g(t) g(t)
ΔG
g(t)
()
g Tp
Annual suppy

g0
g0
Δt
t t t
T0 TD T0 Tp Tp T p + Δt

(1) Profile in the life-cycle period (2) Quake occurrence (3) Restoration process

Figure 4. Schematic profile of water serviceability in the life-cycle stage and

malfunction during the restoration process after an earthquake.

time point T0 and the terminal time point TD. Figure 4(2) is a conceptual illustration of a short
disruption in the lifeline service (Imai & Koike 2009) during the restoration period after
seismic damage has occurred. When an earthquake occurs at Tp, some restoration time Dt is
necessary after the quake, as indicated in Figure 4(2). The detailed restoration process is
presented in Figure 4 (3), in which DG is the loss of serviceability caused by seismic damage.
The restoration process is shown in more detail in Figure 5, in which the process is divided
by the four time points of T1, T2, T3, and T4. The time point T1 is the day after the earthquake,
when the water serviceability level is provided to undamaged areas, which are identified by a
site survey of damage points along all the pipelines.
The time point T2 is when the transmission mains have recovered; the time point T3 is when
temporary pipelines have been installed for emergency use in the damaged areas. T4 is the
completion time when all the damaged pipelines have been restored.

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 50th ASEP Anniversary International Convention & Exposition, “Safer, Smarter & Greener”
Technical Proceedings ISSN 1656-7757, September 28-30, 2011 Makati City, Philippines
(1) (2) (3) (4)
One day Recovered Supply by Complete
after the main lines temporary lines recovery
quake
1

Serviceability level
T4
0.8
T3
0.6
0.4
T2
0.2
T1
0
0 10 20 30
Days

Figure 5. Schematic profile of the restoration process after an earthquake.

The performance level of the network system after the seismic event can be estimated by the
supply damage rate. The supply damage rate immediately after a seismic event strongly
depends on the structural damage rate of the water-distribution network system.
The water un-serviceability over the distribution areas is summarized by the following
equation: ⎧ n
⎪ 1− at T p = T1
( )
Γmajor T p
⎪
= ⎨
N
⎛ T p ⎞ (19)
⎪1 − g T ⎜⎜ ⎟ at T2 ≤ T p ≤ T4
⎟
⎪
⎩ ⎝ T4 ⎠
where n/N is the water-supply ratio and is a restoration function showing the recovery ratio at
time point Tp.
Therefore, the supply damage rate in the damaged network system can be expressed by the
following equation:

 {Z link (li )}⎥ = Γmajor (T p )

⎡ major NL
major
⎤
P ⎢ D EQ
⎣⎢ i =1 ⎥ ⎦ (20)
major
where D EQ is the major damage state in terms of serviceability of water supply.

4.3 Seismic mitigation

4.3.1 Decision-making measure for seismic mitigation

Generally, an insurance company can manage all kinds of risks on the basis of expected risk
evaluations. The public sector managing a water pipeline system, however, has to take active
measures to reduce the seismic risk of the system by seismic retrofit activities.
Communication with regard to risk is necessary among stakeholders to obtain the final
acceptance of the investment in seismic retrofit activities; to this end, the engineer must
prepare an appropriate decision-making measure on a cost basis that can be understood by the
stakeholders. In this regard, one proposed approach to establishing decision-making measures
is outlined below.
The final balance of cost and income over the life-cycle period (Porter et al 2004) should be
the key factor in evaluating the feasibility of a water pipeline-maintenance project. This
balance (Imai et al 2010), which we call the value index V0, is the resulting value that can be
produced by the project operation and can be expressed in terms of
Vo = B + I − E − (C0 + C M ) (21)
in which B,I,E,C0, and CM are the accumulated total amounts of social benefit, income gain,
operational expense, initial cost, and maintenance cost, respectively, during the life of the

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Technical Proceedings ISSN 1656-7757, September 28-30, 2011 Makati City, Philippines

project.
If a seismic investment, CS, is taken into account, the value index V1 can be represented by
V1 = B + I − E − (C0 + CM + CS ) = V0 − CS (22)
It should be noted that the seismic vulnerability of the lifeline system causes not only
structural damage to the network links but also functional damage to the demand nodes in
terms of serviceability loss. This loss results, in turn, in the loss of social benefit, DB, and
income gain, DI. The value index V2 in this situation is given by
( )
V2 = B + I − E − (C0 + C M + C S ) − (C R + ΔB + ΔI ) ⋅ 1EQ t EQ
{ ( )}
= V0 − C S + C EQ ⋅ 1EQ t EQ
(23)

where CR is the restoration cost and CEQ is the seismic damage cost, which is defined as
C EQ = C R + !B + !I (24)
and
( ) ⎧ 1 : an earthquake occurs over some time duration t EQ
1EQ t EQ = ⎨ (25)
⎩0 : an earthquakedoes not occur over some time duration t EQ
V2major
= B + I − E − (C0 + C M + C S ) − C EQ
EQ
{
⋅ 1D = V0 − C S + C EQ
major major major major
⋅ 1D
EQ
} (26)
major
in which C EQ is the seismic damage cost in the major damage mode.
In the formulation of the value index of Equations (21) to (26), a discount rate is not taken
into account because the public budget accounting system for water-supply projects cannot
manage free cash flow for its own financial investment.

4.3.2 Decision-making criteria for seismic mitigation

For the engineer managing the water-pipeline system, the probability of performance failure
should be less than the target value. For the director managing this system, on the other hand,
the probability of value loss should be less than the target value. The optimal solution of the
seismic investment must be to satisfy these two design criteria on the target values:
p Dmajor ! p major
Target
, DEQ
(27)
[ ]
EQ

P V2major < 0 ≤ pmajor

Target
,V
(28)
2

in which
[ ] [ ] [ (
P V2major < 0 ≡ P V2,EQ < 0 = P V0 < C S + C EQ
major
)
major
DEQ major
P DEQ ][ ] (29)

5. CONCLUSIONS

In the previous sections, an assessment procedure using the probability of

system-performance failure for the existing lifeline network system is proposed, and case
studies are carried out in order to evaluate the effectiveness of retrofitting strategies for the
existing water-distribution network model.

Several important results can be summarized as follows:

(1) Old segmented pipes with poor mechanical joints should be replaced by newly developed
segmented pipe joints with locking mechanisms, whose remarkable strength makes them
appropriate in seismic-disaster prevention.

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 50th ASEP Anniversary International Convention & Exposition, “Safer, Smarter & Greener”
Technical Proceedings ISSN 1656-7757, September 28-30, 2011 Makati City, Philippines

(2) For optimal decision making with seismic investment, our proposed measure of the value
index is useful for all stakeholders in understanding any problems relating to financial
planning.

REFERENCES

American Lifelines Alliance, (2005): Seismic Guidelines for Water Pipelines, American Lifelines
Alliance (ALA).

El Hamadi, K. and O’Rourke, M., (1990): Seismic damage to segmented buried pipelines,
Earthquake Engineering and Structural Dynamics, Vol.19, No.4, pp.529-539.

Ellsworth, W.L. Matthews, M.V., Nadeau, R.M, Nishenko, S.P., Reasenberg, P.A. and Simpson,
R.W. (1999): A physically based earthquake recurrence model for estimation of long-term earthquake
probabilities, USGS Open-file report, pp.99-522.

Imai, T. and Koike, T. (2009): Seismic risk management for an existing lifeline system,
ICOSSAR2009, Osaka., Japan.

Isoyama, R., Ishida, E., Yune, S. and Shiromizu, Y. (1998): Seismic damage prediction of water
pipelines, Japan Water Works Association (JWWA), Vol.67, No.2, pp.25-40.(in Japanese)
JWWA, (1997): Seismic design guideline for waterworks pipeline and facilities, Japan Water
Works Association (JWWA).

Imai, T., Wada, S. and Koike, T. (2010): Seismic risk assessment and mitigation for the existing
lifeline, The International Symposium on Advances in Urban Safety, Kobe, Japan.

McGuire, Robin K. (2004): Seismic Hazard and Risk Analysis, EERI MNO-10.

Porter, K. A., Beck, J.L., Shaikuhutdinov, R.V., Mizukoshi, K., Miyamura, M., Ishida, H., Moroi, T.,
Tsukada, Y. and Masuda, M.(2004) : Effect of seismic risk on lifetime property value, Earthquake
Spectra, Vol.20, No.4, pp.1211-1237.

Straub, Daniel., Armen Der Kiureghian (2009): Bayesian network as a framework for structural
reliability analysis in infrastructure systems, ICOSSAR2009, Osaka, Japan.

Takemura, M., Ohno, S. and Takahashi, K. (1999): Near fault ground motions on the base rock as
the minimum requirement of the maximum considered earthquake, 25th Japan Earthquake
Annual Conference, pp.61-64. (in Japanese)

Wada, S., Imai, T. and Koike, T. (2010): Seismic risk assessment and mitigation design for an
existing lifeline, 9-th US National and 11-th Canadian Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Paper
No.16, Toronto, Canada.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

The author Takeshi Koike is the Professor of Department of Civil and Earth Resources Engineering,
Faculty of Engineering, Graduate School of Engineering, Kyoto University. He may be contacted at
C Cluster, Kyotodaigaku-katsura, Nishikyo-ku, Kyoto 615-8540 JAPAN. TEL: (075)383-3247, FAX:
(075)383-3243, E-mail : koike.takeshi.7n@kyoto-u.ac.jp

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