G.R. No.

L-56504 May 7, 1987

POMPILLO VALERA and EUMELIA VALERA CABADO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUDGE SANCHO Y. INSERTO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch 1, and MANUEL R. FABIANA, respondents.

Nos. L-59867-68 May 7, 1987

EUMELIA V. CABADO, POMPILLO VALERA and HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, petitioners-

appellants,
vs.
MANUEL FABIANA, JOSE GARIN and HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Tenth
Division), respondents-appellants.

Eduardo S. Baranda and Avelino T Javellana for petitioners.

Dominador G. Garin for private respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

Conflicting claims over a fishpond asserted by the administrators of the estate of deceased spouses,
on the one hand, and by the heirs of a daughter of said spouses and their lessee, on the other, have
given rise to the proceedings now docketed in this Court as (1) G.R. No. 56504 and (2) G.R. Nos.
59867-68.

Sp. Proc. No. 2223, CFI, Iloilo

In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera
and Consolacion Sarrosa 1 — in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera had been appointed administrators 2 — the heirs of a
deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking that the Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for her
failure to render an accounting of her administration. 3 Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa's
husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered to the administrator an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras, Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the
estate and she in turn moved for the return thereof to the estate, 4 so that it might be partitioned among the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin
opposed the plea for the fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property was owned by his children and this was why it had never
been included in any inventory of the estate.

The Court, presided over by Hon. Judge Midpantao Adil, viewed the Garin Heirs' motion for
contempt, as well as Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's return to the estate, as having given rise to a
claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court. 5 It accordingly set said incidents for hearing during which the parties presentee evidence in
substantiation of their positions. 6 Thereafter, the Court issued an Order dated September 17, 1980
commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the fishpond in question * * to the
intestate Estate of the Spouses. 7

The Order was predicated upon the Court's factual findings mainly derived from the testimony of the
two administrators that:

1. the fishpond originally belonged to the Government, and had been given in lease to Rafael Valera
in his lifetime;
2. Rafael Valera ostensibly sold all his leasehold rights in the fishpond to his daughter, Teresa Garin;
but the sale was fictitious, having been resorted to merely so that she might use the property to
provide for her children's support and education, and was subject to the resolutory term that the
fishpond should revert to Rafael Valera upon completion of the schooling of Teresa Garin's Children;
and

3. with the income generated by the fishpond, the property was eventually purchased from the
Government by the Heirs of Teresa Garin, collectively named as such in the Original Certificate of
Title issued in their favor.

Upon these facts, Judge Adil ruled that an implied trust had been created, obligating Teresa Garin's
heirs to restore the property to the Valera Spouses' Estate, in accordance with Articles 1453 and
1455 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

Article 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared
intentions to hold it for, or transfer it to another or the grantor, there is an implied trust
in favor of the person for whose benefit it is contemplated.

Article 1455. When any trustee, guardian or other person holding a fiduciary
relationship uses trust funds for the purchase of property and causes a conveyance
to be made to him or to a third person, a trust is established by operation of law in
favor of the person to whom the fund belongs.

The Court also held that the action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet
prescribed, Cabado's motion for the fishpond's reversion to the estate having been filed well within
ten (10) years from June 30, 1980, the date on which Teresa Garin's heirs allegedly acquired title
over it. 8

There seems little doubt, however, that the Court's pronouncement regarding the estate's title to the
fishpond was merely provisional in character, made solely to determine whether or not the fishpond
should be included in the inventory of estate assets. So it was evidently understood by the
administrators who have more than once asserted that "the probate court has jurisdiction to
determine the ownership of the fishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the
properties. 9 So it was made clear by the Probate Court itself which, at the outset, stated that the
hearing on the matter 10 was meant "merely to determine whether or not the fishpond should be included as part of the estate and
whether or not the person holding it should be made to deliver and/or return ** (it) to the estate. 11 And so it was emphasized in another
Order, denying reconsideration of the Order of September 17, 1980, which states that:

**(i)t is never the intendment of this court to write a finish to the issue of ownership of
the fishpond in dispute. The movants may pursue their claim of ownership over the
same in an ordinary civil action. Meanwhile, however, it is the finding of this probate
court that the fishpond must be delivered to the estate.

Clearly, there is no incompatibility between the exercise of the power of this probate
court under Section 6 in relation to Section 7, both of Rule 87, and the contention of
the movants that the proper forum to settle the issue of ownership should be in a
court of general jurisdiction. 12

Judge Adil afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of the order pending appeal, and directed the sheriff to enforce the
direction for the Garin Heirs to reconvey the fishpond to the estate. 13 The corresponding writ was served on Manuel Fabiana, the
supposed encargado or caretaker. Voicing no objection to the writ, and declaring to the sheriff that he was a mere lessee, 14 Fabiana
voluntarily relinquished possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the administrators. 15
Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the Probate Court seeking vindication of his right to the possession of the
fishpond, based on a contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and Jose Garin, as lessor. 16 But Judge Adil dismissed his complaint on
the following grounds, to wit:

(1) it was filed out of time because not only had judgment been rendered, but execution as regards
transfer of possession had already taken place; and

(2) the lease contract had not been registered and hence was not binding as against the estate. 17

G.R. No. 56504

Fabiana thereupon instituted a separate action for injunction and damages, with application for a
preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 13742 and assigned to Branch I of the
Iloilo CFI, Hon. Sancho Y. Inserto, presiding. 18 Judge Inserto issued a temporary restraining order enjoining estate
administrators from disturbing Fabiana in the possession of the fishpond, as lessee. 19

The estate administrators filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the temporary restraining order, averring that the action was
barred by the Probate Court's prior judgment which had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of the lease, and that the act sought to be
restrained had already been accomplished, Fabiana having voluntarily surrendered possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. 20 When Judge
Inserto failed to act on their motion within what the administrators believed to be a reasonable time, considering the circumstances of the
Case, the administrators filed with the Supreme Court a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus, with a prayer for Preliminary
mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order, which was docketed as G.R. No. 56504. 21 In their petition, the administrators
contended that Branch I of the Iloilo CFI (Judge Inserto, presiding) could not and should not interfere with the Probate Court (Branch I I,
Judge Adil, presiding) in the legitimate exercise of its j jurisdiction over the proceedings for the Settlement of the estate of the Valera
Spouses.

G.R. Nos. 59867-68

In the meantime, Jose Garin — having filed a motion for reconsideration of the above mentioned
order of Judge Adil (declaring the estate to be the owner of the fishpond), in which he asserted that
the Probate Court, being of limited jurisdiction, had no competence to decide the ownership of the
fishpond,22 which motion had been denied 23-filed a notice of appeal from said Order.24 But he quickly
abandoned the appeal when, as aforestated 25 Judge Adil authorized execution of the order pending
appeal, instead, he initiated a special action for certiorari prohibition and mandamus )with prayer for
preliminary injunction) in the Court of Appeals, therein docketed as CA-G. R. No. SP-1154-R.

Fabiana followed suit. He instituted in the same Court of Appeals his own action for certiorari and
injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-11577-R; this, notwithstanding the pendency in judge
Inserto's sala of the case he had earlier filed. 26

These two special civil actions were jointly decided by the Court of Appeals. The Court granted the
petitions and ruled in substance that:

1. The Probate Court indeed possessed no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership based
merely on evidence adduced at the hearing of a "counter-motion" conducted under Section 6, Rule
87;

2. The original and transfer certificates of title covering the fishpond stand in the names of the Heirs
of Teresa Garin as registered owners, and therefore no presumption that the estate owns the
fishpond is warranted to justify return of the property on the theory that it had merely been borrowed;
and

3. Even assuming the Probate Court's competence to resolve the ownership question, the estate
administrators would have to recover possession of the fishpond by separate action, in view of the
lessee's claim of right to superior possession, as lessee thereof.
From this joint judgment, the administrators have taken separate appeals to this Court
by certiorari,27 docketed as G.R. Nos. 59867 and 59868. They ascribe to the Appellate Court the
following errors, viz: Page 542

1) in holding that the Probate Court (Judge Adil, Presiding) had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
and decide the issue of title covering a fishpond being claimed by an heir adversely to the decedent
spouses;

2) in ruling that it was needful for the administrators to file a separate action for the recovery of the
possession of the fishpond then in the hands of a third person; and

3) in sanctioning the act of a CFI Branch in interfering with and overruling the final judgment of
another branch, acting as probate Court, and otherwise frustrating and inhibiting the enforcement
and implementation of said judgment.

Jurisdiction of Probate Court

As regards the first issue, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court),
acting as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, 28 and thus has no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the
decedent, unless the claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the
interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced, 29 the reason for the exception being that the
question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., probate, land registration, etc.,
is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which
may be waived. 30

The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule.
As already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if
cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of
settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly
left for determination "in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or should
not be included in the inventory. 31 This function of resolving whether or not property should be
included in the estate inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence,
although the Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties. 32

The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court,
expressly invoked by the Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on the issue arising
from the parties' conflicting claims over the fishpond. 33 The examination provided in the cited section
is intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of the decedent from persons suspected of
having possession or knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away the
same. Of course, if the latter lays no claim to the property and manifests willingness to tum it over to
the estate, no difficulty arises; the Probate Court simply issues the appropriate direction for the
delivery of the property to the estate. On the other hand, if the third person asserts a right to the
property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court would have no authority to resolve the issue;
a separate action must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property. 34

Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the Probate Court could have admitted and
taken cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in intervention after obtaining the consent of all interested
parties to its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of title to the fishpond, or ascertaining the
absence of objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed the complaint in intervention instead. And all
this is now water under the bridge.

Possession of Fishpond Pending

Determination of Title Thereto

Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely
provisional, not binding on the property with any character of authority, definiteness or permanence,
having been made only for purposes of in. conclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced
at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of execution, as against its possessor
who has set up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess
has not been ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These considerations assume
greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names but
in others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule.

In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered

by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be
given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary,
the holder thereof should be consider as the owner of the property in controversy
until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly,
when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named
in the title. 35

Primary Jurisdiction over Title issue in

Court Taking Cognizance of Separate Action

Since, too, both the Probate Court and the estate administrators are one in the recognition of the
proposition that title to the fishpond could in the premises only be appropriately determined in a
separate action, 36 the actual firing of such a separate action should have been anticipated, and
should not therefore have come as a surprise, to the latter. And since moreover, implicit in that
recognition is also the acknowledge judgment of the superiority of the authority of the court in which
the separate action is filed over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be heard to
complain that in such a separate action, the court should have issued orders necessarily involved in
or flowing from the assumption of that jurisdiction. Those orders cannot in any sense be considered
as undue interference with the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. Resulting from the exercise of
primary jurisdiction over the question of ownership involving estate property claimed by the estate,
they must be deemed superior to otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate Court in the
exercise of what may be, regarded as merely secondary, or provisional, jurisdiction over the same
question.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 56504 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The petitions in G.R.
No. 59867 and G.R. No. 59868 are DENIED, and the judgment of the Appellate Court, subject
thereof, is affirmed in toto. The temporary restraining order dated April 1, 1981 is lifted. Costs
against petitioners.

Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18148 February 28, 1963

DEOGRACIAS BERNARDO, executor of the testate estate of the deceased EUSEBIO CAPILI;
and the instituted heirs, namely: ARMANDO CAPILI and ARTURO BERNARDO, ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMOGENA REYES, namely:
FRANCISCO REYES, ET AL., and JOSE ISIDORO, ET AL., respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for petitioners.

Romerico F. Flores for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is a petition by certiorari for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan holding that the probate court in Special Proceeding 1101 had
jurisdiction to determine the validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the
question of title or ownership of the properties mentioned therein.

The facts are briefly stated in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:

Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27,
1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of
the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing
of his properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all
surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena
Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the
estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and
intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and
Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.

On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in
accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the
testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her
collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an opposition to
the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own,
claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the
theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the
spouses.

The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively,
set the two projects of partition for hearing, at which evidence was presented by the parties,
followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the
memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the
properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively
and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half
 share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful
standing or grounds to question the validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that
they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the testate
proceeding but in a separate civil action.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äw phï1.ñët

The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of
donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal character to the properties, aside
from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that since the
donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share
of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will.

On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an
order declaring the donation void without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature,
that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the
first category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between
spouses during the marriage; and considered under the second category, it does not comply
with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same
Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved both
projects of partition and directed the executor to file another," dividing the property
mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties
mentioned in the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the deceased
Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that
the said properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses." On September 27,
1960, the executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention
previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the
properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's
declaration of the nullity of the donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which it
was based." The motion for new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners filed this
present petition for review by certiorari.

The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate
court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in
applying the exception to the rule.

In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to
property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings,"1 except where one of the
parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case
the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action.2 However, we have also held that when the parties interested are
all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to
property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual
v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the
parties, matters affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the
court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced
(Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).
In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals
erred in upholding the power of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the testate
proceedings, the question as to whether the properties herein involved belong to the conjugal
partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband exclusively?

At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in the sense
advanced by appellants that the trial court had completely no authority to pass upon the title to the
lands in dispute, and that its decision on the subject is null and void and does not bind even those
who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision because, it is contended, jurisdiction is a
creature of law and parties to an action can not vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants' contention is
correct, then there can be no exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the
case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason:
"Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The responding
Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession
of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It
affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an independent ordinary action) which
may be waived". Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not over the
subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding
the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in
probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of
the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means
determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses.3 Thereafter,
distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him.
The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into
the mass whatever community property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary
corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in
dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete
settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected.4

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the
properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively.
This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate
the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now
represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the
executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be
affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the
widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought
to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an
heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the
parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title
under the testator.

Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
probate court, for the purpose of the determination of the question of ownership of the disputed
properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were
the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the
testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed
the project of partition and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them
must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the
petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of partition and,
thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character of the properties is
correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents". In other words, by presenting
their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated
by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the
properties — which is well within the competence of the probate court — and just because of an
opposition thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the
jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection
are the ones who set the court in motion.5 They can not be permitted to complain if the court, after
due hearing, adjudges question against them.6

Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of
the properties involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the
inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed
an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants
require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of
his rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge
works no estoppel.7 In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the deed
of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-
vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the required formalities
similar to a will.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the same is
hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and
Regala, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., took no part.
G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978

Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA,
Administrator, PRIMA PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA,
namely, MARIA P. YAMUTA DE ATAY, EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P.
YAMUTA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PANGILINAN,
namely, FRANCIS, ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed
PANGILINAN, and CRISPIN BORROMEO, oppositors-appellees.

G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978

FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant,

vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her
Children, claimants-appellees.

Casiano U. Laput and Lorenzo D. de Guzman for appellants.

Paulino A. Conol and Felicidario M. Batoy for appellees.

AQUINO, J.:

These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel of land, whether
belonging to the deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding or
in a separate action. Also in issue in these two cases is the liability of the decedents' estate for the
litigation expenses allegedly incurred in a case regarding that same land.

Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was allowed in this Court's resolution of
August 13, 1969.

The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They
possession a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or
Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental.

One parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1927. It has an area of 3.9791 hectares. It was covered by
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10 of the registry of deeds of Oriental Misamis in the name of
Juan Pangilinan issued in 1927. It is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86 (T-10) of the
registry of deeds of Misamis Occidental (p. 7, Appellees' brief in L-27082).

The other parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1112. It has an area of 18.0291 hectares. It is covered by
OCT No. P-8419 issued on November 21, 1961 in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pan , represented
by Concepcion Pan de Yamuta (p. 73, Record on Appeal in
L-27082).

According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight
hectares which was surveyed in the name of Concepcion Pan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and
1112, also forms part of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses (pp. 61-64, Record on
Appeal).

The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria,
Eusebio and Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who
died in 1961, and (3) Francis, A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the children of
Francisco Pan who died in 1948 and who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is
not clear whether Roseller, Demosthenes and Eliza, all surnamed Japay, were the children of the
deceased Helen Pangilinan, presumably a daughter of Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.
See pages 81-82, Record on Appeal).

Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental was instituted on
September 5, 1963 for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan
and Teresa Magtuba.

On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined
areas of Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927, or 22.0082 hectares, were partitioned as follows:

(a) To Crispin Borromeo as payment of his attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 560 or
CA-G.R. No. 6721-R, February 27, 1952, Crispin Labaria vs. Juan C. Pangilinan, in
accordance with the lower court's decision dated July 19, 1965 in Civil Case No.
2440. Borromeo vs. Coca (p. 11, Appellees' brief in L-27082), three hectares which
should be taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-A;

(b) To the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Mrs. Pizarras and children), 5.3361
hectares taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-B;

(c) To Prima Pangilinan, 6.3361 hectares, taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated
as Lot No. 1112-C, and presumably a daughter of Francisco Pan 81-82, Record on
Appeal).

(d) To the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, 7.3360 hectares, consisting of Lot No.
1927 and the remainder of Lot No. 1112, which remainder is designated as Lot No.
1112-D.

It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum of P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the
estate to Concepcion Pan should be divided equally among the three sets of heirs, or P1,696.16 for
each set of heirs, and that Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should pay that
amount to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan.

The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that project of partition. They
contended that the proposed partition contravened the lower court's order of December 6, 1963
which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112;
that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan should be excluded from the partition;
that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while
that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not been properly allowed.

The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the administrator to pay the debt of the
estate to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition until the
ownership of the twelve hectares, which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and the six
hectares, which were claimed by Crispen Borromeo (eighteen hectares in all which were excluded
from the inventory in the court's order of December 6, 1963) is determined in an ordinary action.

On may 14,1966 the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan filed a supplemental opposition wherein they
asked that Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares, which lot was surveyed at should be
included in the project of partition.

On August 31, 1966 the lower court, apparently acting on its own volition, tackled once more the
project of partition. After noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership of
the twelve hectares, it issued an order approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve
hectares claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan.

That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after excluding the twelve hectares, the
lower court did not bother to decide how the remainder should be partitioned and whether Prima
Pangilinan had a share in that remainder.

That is the order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca as administrator, Prima Pangilinan and
the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. However, the said appellants in their brief also assail the lower
court's order of December 6, 1963, excluding eighteen hectares from the inventory, which order was
sustained by the Court of Appeals in its decision in Atay vs. Catolico, CA-G.R. Nos. 33165-R, and
3426-R, May 14,1964, 5 CAR 1200. This Court refused to review that decision in its resolution of
July 29, 1964, in
L-23088-89, Atay vs. Court of Appeals.

The other incident involves the lower court's order of May 11, 1968 which directed that the claim of
the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan for reimbursement of litigation expenses (apart from the sum of
P1,459.49, as the value of the produce of the twelve hectares already mentioned, which was
appropriated by the special administrator), be referred to the clerk of court for reception of the
evidence.

In another order, also dated May 11, 1968, the lower court reiterated its order of October 2, 1965
that the administrator should pay the heirs of Concepcion Pan the. amount to be reimbursed to her
estate. The court further directed the administrator to account for the income of the estate, to recover
any amount due from the special administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and the
amount due to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan as directed in its order of August 31, 1966 and in
its approval of the accounting of the special administrator.

The administrator, Filomeno Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pan also appealed
from those two orders dated May 11, 1968 (L-29545).

The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the
ownership of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or the
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve
hectares when it ordered their exclusion from the project of partition. So, the problem is how the title
to the twelve hectares should be decided, whether in a separate action or in the intestate.
proceeding.

It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a
jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which
may be waived" (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232. Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re
jurisdiction over the issue).
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or
intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-
42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That general rule has qualifications or exceptions
justified by expediency and convenience.

Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its
final determination in a separate action Lachenal vs. Salas, supra).

Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the
interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not
impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership (Pascual vs.
Pascual 73 Phil. 561; Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892; Cunanan vs.
Amparo, supra; 3 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 4731).

We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of
title should be ventilated in a separate action.

Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare
portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory The only interested
parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.

As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be
forced to incur additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to determine
the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.

The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to the in
the intestate, proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 568, a motion in the form of a complaint wherein
they should set forth their claim for the twelve hectares in question, stating the ultimate facts in
support of their claim, such as the partition made by Juan C. Pangilinan, their acquisition of the
share of Prima Pangilinan and the usufructuary rights of their parents, their long possession of the
said portion, their claim for the produce of the land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No.
560, Labaria vs. Pangilinan, and their contention that Lot No. 1920 forms part of the estate of the
Pangilinan spouses.

Copies of that motion should be serves upon the administrator and upon Prima Pangilinan and the
heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan (who are all represented by the same lawyers). They should answer
the motion within fifteen days from service. In their answer the appellants should set forth the
ultimate facts and the defenses (such as the violation of section 118 of the Public Land Law) to
support their theory that Lot No. 1112 still forms part of the estate of the spouses Juan C. Pangilinan
and Teresa Magtuba and that the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should bear one-third of the
expenses incurred by Concepcion Pan in Civil Case No. 560.

After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable settlement has been reached, the
probate court should receive evidence or, as indicated by the Court of Appeals in Atay vs.
Catolico, supra a full-dress hearing should be held.

Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectares but only for the purpose of
deciding what portion of the estate should be given to him in satisfaction of his share. His claim for
the sum of P416 had already been adjudicated by the lower court in its order of August 31, 1966 (pp.
26- 27, Record on Appeal in L-29545). No appeal was interposed from that adjudication.
After trial the lower court's decision on the issues as to what constitutes the estate of the Pangilinan
spouses should include the partition thereof and should indicate what portion of the estate should be
allocated to Crispen Borromeo. If necessary, the validity of the donation or partition of Lot No. 1112,
made by Juan C. Pangilinan during his lifetime, should be passed upon.

Considering that the respective claims of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan . and the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan for reimbursement of the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in Civil Case
No. 560 will be included in the trial, the two orders of the trial court dated May 11, 1968 regarding
those matters (L-29545) should not be enforced. They should be set aside.

WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding twelve hectares
from the partition of the estate of the deceased Pan spouses (L-27082) and (2) the two orders dated
May 11, 1968, regarding the claim of Guadalupe Pizarras and her children and the debt of the estate
to Concepcion Pangilinan (L-29545) are reversed and set aside.

A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of the proper pleadings and in case no
amicable settlement is reached. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should file their motion within
thirty days from notice of the entry of judgment in this case.

The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines
already set forth. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

Santos, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL
ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO – MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO
FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL
ROSARIO, respondent..

BUENA, J.:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to
any of the heirs?

Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of public
respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:

"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and
set aside and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del
Rosario in favor of defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds
to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court.
No costs.

"So ordered."

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land
with an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 11889. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely:
Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real
property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each
of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six
children.
1âw phi 1.nêt

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-
Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children,
share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters
leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No.
35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate
lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442
and the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443.
Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.3

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No.
1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55,
herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the
employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear
that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia
Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of
such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married
to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory
heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already
distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not
anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996
holding:8

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is
prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of
property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a
judicial separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into)
a contract of sale;

"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally
prohibited by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;

"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however
be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory
heir of the deceased."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter
alia:

"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of
the estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title,
went beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding
for the settlement of estate of a deceased person. XXX

"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance.
What the court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave
the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that
purpose. XXX"

Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and
the facts of the case."

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings,
in this wise:
 "XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for
ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

"XXX

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact."

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a
special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to
definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special
proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."9

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are
instituted and prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at
law or suits in equity, and that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not
ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and prosecuted according to some special mode as in
the case of proceedings commenced without summons and prosecuted without regular
pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special proceeding must
therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief, such
as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice."10

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged
to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on
the person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same
provision11contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor
of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover,
under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a
probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent
Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:

"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first
settle the estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the
court a quo determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the
subject property owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without
observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited
discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform
acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules.
Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance."12

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the
Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its
limited probate jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence,
it is procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived".15

Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as
the six children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general
jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing
principle that although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet
if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.16

Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:

"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking
appointment as estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of
estate that would have invited the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court.17 (emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir
may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent
must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property
owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be
added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can
be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced
the legitimes.19

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals
that the trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the
estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance
of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate
court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the
issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del
Rosario's estate.
1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is

hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, G.R. No. 154322
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION,*

ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA,*
HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA
FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN
FIGURACION and
MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ,
Respondents. Promulgated:

August 22, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari,[1] petitioner Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla challenges the decision[2] and

resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 49, which dismissed her complaint for partition. The properties involved are two parcels of

land which belonged to her late father, Leandro Figuracion.

The facts of the case follow.[4]

Spouses Leandro and respondent Carolina Figuracion (now both deceased) had six children: petitioner and respondents
Elena Figuracion-Ancheta (now deceased), HilariaFiguracion, Felipa Figuracion-Manuel, Quintin Figuracion and

Mary Figuracion-Ginez.

On August 23, 1955, Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of his six children. When he

died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land: (1) Lot 2299 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta consisting of 7,547 square

meters with Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4221-P in the name of Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento and

(2) Lot 705 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta with an area of 2,900 sq. m. with TCT No. 4220-P also in the name

of Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento. Leandro had inherited both lots from his deceased parents,[5] as evidenced

by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) Nos. 16731 and 16610, respectively, issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province

of Pangasinan.
 Leandro sold a portion of Lot 2299 to Lazaro Adviento, as a result of which TCT No. 4221-P was cancelled and TCT

No. 101331 was issued to Lazaro Adviento, married to Rosenda Sagueped as owner of the 162 sq. m. and Leandro Figuracion,

married to Carolina Adviento as owner of 7,385 sq. m. This lot continued to be in the name of Leandroin Tax Declaration No.

616 for the year 1985.

What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between petitioner and her sister, respondent

Mary, over the eastern half of Lot 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta with an area of 3,164 sq. m.

Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento, as evidenced by OCT No. 15867 issued on February 9,

1916. When Adviento died, his two daughters, Agripina Adviento (his daughter by his first wife) and respondent Carolina (his

daughter by his second wife), succeeded him to it. On November 28, 1961, Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner

over the one-half eastern portion of Lot 707. Agripina died on July 28, 1963, single and without any issue. Before her half-sisters

death, however, respondent Carolina adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the entire Lot

707 which she later sold to respondents Felipa and Hilaria. The latter two immediately had OCT No. 15867 cancelled, on

December 11, 1962. A new title, TCT No. 42244, was then issued in the names of Felipa and Hilaria for Lot 707.

In February 1971, petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed for ten years. Returning in

1981,[6] she built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707. She continued paying her share of the

realty taxes thereon.

It was sometime later that this dispute erupted. Petitioner sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held in

common by her and respondents. On May 23, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint in the RTC of Urdaneta City, Branch 49, for

partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against respondents, praying, among others,

for: (1) the partition of Lots 2299 and 705; (2) the nullification of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by respondent

Carolina over Lot 707, the deed of absolute sale in favor of respondents Felipa and Hilaria, and TCT No. 42244; (3) a declaration

that petitioner was the owner of one-half of Lot 707 and (4) damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. U-5826.

On the other hand, respondents took the position that Leandros estate should first undergo settlement proceedings

before partition among the heirs could take place. And they claimed that an accounting of expenses chargeable to the estate was

necessary for such settlement.

On June 26, 1997,[7] the RTC[8] rendered judgment nullifying Carolinas affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of

absolute sale of Lot 707. It also declared Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties of Leandro Figuracion and therefore part of

his estate. The RTC, however, dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages on the ground that it could not

grant the reliefs prayed for by petitioner without any (prior) settlement proceedings wherein the transfer of title of the properties
should first be effected.
 On appeal, the CA upheld the dismissal of petitioners action for partition for being premature. The CA reversed the

decision, however, with respect to the nullification of the self-adjudication and the deed of sale. Upholding the validity of the

affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of sale as to Carolinas one-half pro-indiviso share, it instead partitioned Lot 707.

Dissatisfied, respondents elevated the CA decision to this Court in G.R. No. 151334, entitled Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et al.

v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla.[9]

The issue for our consideration is whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate (that is, an

accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus compliance with other legal

requirements, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed.

Respondents claim that: (1) the properties constituting Leandros estate cannot be partitioned before his estate is settled and (2)

there should be an accounting before anything else, considering that they (respondents) had to spend for the maintenance of the

deceased Leandro Figuracion and his wife in their final years, which support was supposed to come from the income of the

properties. Among other things, respondents apparently wanted petitioner to share in the expenses incurred for the care of their

parents during the ten years she stayed in the United States, before she could get her part of the estate while petitioner apparently

wanted her gross share, without first contributing to the expenses.

In any event, there appears to be a complication with respect to the partition of Lot 705. The records refer to a case

entitled Figuracion, et al. v. Alejo currently pending in the CA. The records, however, give no clue or information regarding what

exactly this case is all about. Whatever the issues may be, suffice it to say that partition is premature when ownership of the lot is

still in dispute.[10]

Petitioner faces a different problem with respect to Lot 2299. Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to compel the
partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent
of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all other persons interested in the property.

The right to an inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by operation of law, at the moment of death of the

decedent. There is no doubt that, as one of the heirs ofLeandro Figuracion, petitioner has a legal interest in Lot 2299. But can she

compel partition at this stage?

There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2[11] and through

commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.[12]

Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedents estate. While Section 8 of
Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real propertys income (rentals and profits) in the course of an action for
partition,[13] there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property belonging to the decedents estate may be

answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of

Court.

In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While

petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracions only legal

heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that certain expenses including those related to her fathers final illness and burial

have not been properly settled.[14] Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their fathers estate to settlement

because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.

In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which the estate must

answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may take possession thereof even

before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the payment of the estates obligations.[15]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision and resolution in CA-G.R. CV No.

58290 are AFFIRMED in so far as the issue of the partition of Lots 2299 and 705 is concerned.

But with respect to Lot 707, we make no ruling on the validity of Carolina vda. de Figuracions affidavit of self-

adjudication and deed of sale in favor of Felipa and HilariaFiguracion in view of the fact that Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et al.

v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla (G.R. No. 151334) is still pending in this Division.

Costs against petitioner.