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Aesthetic Life and Tragic Insight in Nietzsche's Use of Goethe


Author(s): PAUL BISHOP
Source: Colloquia Germanica, Vol. 39, No. 1, Themenheft: Goethe (2006), pp. 57-68
Published by: Narr Francke Attempto Verlag GmbH Co. KG
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23981601
Accessed: 26-02-2018 03:01 UTC

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Aesthetic Life and Tragic Insight in Nietzsche's
Use of Goethe
PAUL BISHOP

University of Glasgow

In a note in his Nachlass dated October-November 1888, Nietzsche retu


to one of his most important themes: the significance for him of Goethe
this fragment, which begins «Was Goethe angeht,» Nietzsche says, am
other things:
Eine verklärt-reine Herbstlichkeit im Genießen und im Reifwerdenlassen, - im
Warten, eine Oktober-Sonne bis ins Geistigste hinauf; etwas Goldenes und Versü
ßendes, etwas Mildes, nicht Marmor - das nenne ich Goethisch. (KSA 13, 24[10],
634)

This is a richly evocative passage, but can we be more precise about


Goethe's influence, as an emblematic writer of the eighteenth century - «man
studirt achtzehntes Jahrhundert, wenn man den <Faust> liest» (KSA 13,24[10],
635) - on Nietzsche, a philosopher who placed the cultural problems of his
day, the nineteenth century, at the heart of his intellectual concerns?2
Two books have recently examined Nietzsche's use of Goethe in the for
mulation of his philosophical aesthetics (Bishop and Stephenson; von Seg
gern). Right from his earliest work, Die Geburt der Tragödie, through his
philosophical centre-text, Also sprach Zarathustra, to his encomium of
Goethe's «Dionysian» faith in Götz en-Dämmerung, Nietzsche develops a
critical, but appreciative, set of responses to Goethe's writings, particularly
Faust. Not that Nietzsche was incapable of expressing criticism of Goethe.
In a section entitled «Goethe's Irrungen» in volume two of Menschliches, All
zumenschliches, Nietzsche discussed what he regarded as Goethe's errors (in
the first half of his life, his efforts to be a plastic artist; and, in the second half,
his belief in the importance of his scientific studies). In his attitude to poetry,
Nietzsche remarked, Goethe had been like an ancient Greek who, every now
and then, visited a mistress, but did so, wondering whether she was, in fact, a
goddess whom he could not quite name. But, Nietzsche concluded (thereby
recapitulating the eighteenth-century «doctrine of indirection»), without this
«digression through error» (Umschweife des Irrthums), Goethe would not
have become Goethe - that is, «der einzige deutsche Künstler der Schrift, der
jetzt noch nicht veraltet ist» (KSA 2,483). And in a later section entitled «Die
Faust-Idee» Nietzsche implicitly satirized the plot of Faust as the seduction

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58 Paul Bishop
and dishonouring of a little seamstress -
vergessen» (Faust 1,11.12065-66) - by a gr
of the devil: could this really be «der gr
[...], wie man unter Deutschen sagen hört»
ter to Zelter describe his own nature as b
In another (and, again, extremely sugge
evokes the qualities of the poet who
kunft» -

Kraft, Güte, Milde, Reinheit und ungewollt


und deren Handlungen: ein geebneter Bod
giebt: ein leuchtender Himmel auf Gesich
das Wissen und die Kunst zu neuer Einhei
Anmaassung und Eifersucht mit seiner Sch
und aus dem Gegensätzlichen die Grazie des
spaltes herauslockend: - diess Alles wäre
grundhafte, auf dem jetzt erst die zarten U
eigentliche Gemälde - das der immer wachs
würden. (KSA 2,420)

- and remarks in his conclusion to this ap


of the future» starts out from Goethe: «
in diese Dichtung der Zukunft.» Like his
zen-Dämmerung as «der Moral-Tromp
his strictures are primarily directed, not
Weimar classicism themselves, as against
misrepresented their cultural project.5 «
vor Allem einer viel grössern Macht als d
Nietzsche adds in the concluding sentenc
signpost to the future.
Moreover, we can pinpoint with even gr
Goethe for Nietzsche by triangulating
with a third term, the Dutch philosop
had functioned as a major reference poin
since the pantheism controversy, or the
sing, and Mendelssohn in the late eightee
centered on the interpretation of Goe
part, Goethe read Spinoza intensively i
1786,9 and in Dichtung und Wahrheit he
some detail (HA 10,34-36 and 76-80).
In the nineteenth century, Spinoza's i
tinued to grow. As one commentator has

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Aesthetic Life and Tragic Insight in Nietzsche's Use of Goethe 59

ish Enlightenment was like a beam of light refracted through a prism into a
spectral band of brilliant intellectual colors spread across Western Europe,»
and this prism was Spinoza (Dimont 343). Just as Spinozism exerted a pow
erful influence on Dutch cultural life, particularly in the second half of the
nineteenth century (Thissen), so the reception of Spinoza in Germany, par
ticularly by other Jewish thinkers, became increasingly complex (Levy).
For his part, Nietzsche's major encounter with Spinoza came in 1881 in
the Engadin, as he was preparing to write Zarathustra. In the elevated atmo
sphere, both meteorologically and psychologically speaking, of Sils Maria,
Nietzsche turned to fresh intellectual tasks, including, as he told Franz Over
beck on 30 July 1881, reading Spinoza: «Ich bin ganz erstaunt, ganz entzückt!
Ich habe einen Vorgänger und was für einen!» (KSB 6, 111).10 In the same
letter, Nietzsche spoke of his «Einsamkeit» becoming a «Zweisamkeit,» an
ticipating his later use of the phrase «wurde Eins zu Zwei» to describe his
encounter with Zarathustra in his poem «Sils-Maria» (KSA 3, 649). Prob
ably a major source of Nietzsche's knowledge of Spinoza was Kuno Fischer's
Geschichte der neuem Philosophie, vol. 1, part 2, Descartes' Schule: Geulinx,
Malebranche: Baruch Spinoza (Mannheim: F. Bassermann, 21865), which
Nietzsche had asked Overbeck to send to him in Sils Maria. And his interest
at this time in Spinoza is reflected in his notebook, where he excerpts Spinoza
and comments on him (KSA 9,11 [193], 517-18). Not only is Nietzsche's pre
occupation with Spinoza reminiscent of Goethe's, but later, in 1887, he ex
pressly notes Goethe's admiration for Spinoza.11
At first sight, Spinoza might seem out of place in the tradition of Weimar
classicism which is primarily concerned with aesthetics. After all, Spinoza has
virtually nothing to say about aesthetics.12 He even argues in the appendix to
Part 1 of the Ethics that judgments of beauty are nothing other than «modes
in which the imagination is affected in different ways» (Spinoza 1928, 141).
When he writes that «if the motion by which the nerves are affected by means
of objects represented to the eye conduces to well-being, the objects by which
it is caused are called beautiful» (141), Spinoza appears to suggest that beauty
itself is a «mode of imagining», i.e., appearance. (Such moral and aesthetic
judgements would correspond to what, in the Ethics, Spinoza calls the first
mode of knowledge, i.e., imagination or experientia vaga.)n
Spinoza dismisses the idea that any significance can be attached to these
«mere modes of imagining» (Spinoza 1955, 80), according to which «things
which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled fragrant or fetid;
if through our taste, sweet or bitter, full-flavoured or insipid; if through our
touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc.» and that «whatsoever affects our
ears is said to give rise to noise, sound, or harmony» (Spinoza 1955,80). And

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60 Paul Bishop
he adds acerbically that «in this last case
lieve that even God himself takes pleasur
However, the link made above between
crucial one. For towards the end of this a
«the perfection of things is to be judg
(Spinoza 1928,142). The later parts of the
or affects; indeed, the essence of the «geo
Spinoza's endeavour to «consider human
considering lines, planes, or bodies» (Et
ture of the Affects»; Spinoza 1928, 206).1
«all the efforts, impulses, appetites, and v
ing to his changing disposition, and not
another that he is drawn hither and thith
turn» (Ethics, Part 3, «The Affects,» def
267). Of all the affects, the most import
«the transition to a greater perfection» (E
1928, 227; compare with «The Affects,
Thus, to increase one's joy is also to incr
Spinoza, the importance of joy.16
For «nothing but a gloomy and sad su
joyment,» and his conception of enjoyme
It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh
and pleasant eating and drinking, with swee
green plants, with ornament [ornatu], with m
with all things of this kind which one man c

Indeed «this mode of living,» Spinoza a


universally commended» (Ethics, Part
1928, 327-28). We might compare Spino
pressed by Serlo in Wilhelm Meisters Leh

Man sollte alle Tage wenigstens ein kleines L


treffliches Gemälde sehen und, wenn es mö
ge Worte sprechen.17

In the case of Spinoza and Goethe alike, t


aesthetics, are characterized by their emin
so immediately obvious that Nietzsche'
are. For although Zarathustra's world i
eagles, in Ecce Homo Nietzsche is explicit
climate, location, recreation - in short, h
Casuistik der Selbstsucht,» and he insists

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Aesthetic Life and Tragic Insight in Nietzsche's Use of Goethe 61

über alle Begriffe hinaus wichtiger als Alles, was man bisher wichtig nahm»
(KSA 6,295).
In Nietzsche's thought, such a «transfiguration» (Verklärung) of «exis
tence» (das Dasein) in «the highest and most illustrious human joys» (den
höchsten und erlauchtesten Menschen-Freuden) is represented by the figure
of Dionysos (KSA 11, 41 [6], 680). And it is, of course, in the name of Dio
nysos that Nietzsche baptizes the faith he ascribed to Goethe in the famous
passage in Götzen-Dämmerung, in which he again recalls Goethe's enthusi
asm for Spinoza:

Ein solcher freigewordner Geist steht mit einem freudigen und vertrauenden Fa
talismus mitten im All, im Glauben, daß nur das Einzelne verwerflich ist, daß
im Ganzen sich alles erlöst und bejaht - er verneint nicht mehr... Aber ein solcher
Glaube ist der höchste aller möglichen Glauben: ich habe ihn auf den Namen des
Dionysos getauft. - (KSA 6,152)

In this celebratory passage, Nietzsche builds in a quotation from Goethe, an


allusion to a passage from Dichtung und Wahrheit (Part 3, Book 12), where
Goethe attributes to Johann Georg Hamann the following view: «Alles, was
der Mensch zu leisten unternimmt, es werde nun durch Tat oder Wort oder
sonst hervorgebracht, muß aus sämtlichen vereinigten Kräften entspringen;
alles Vereinzelte ist verwerflich» - «eine herrliche Maxime!» is Goethe's
comment (HA 9,514).18
This affirmation of the totality (of the individual) is linked to the affirma
tion of the totality (of the whole), an idea expressed in the concept of amor
fati, when Nietzsche writes of Goethe: «Was er wollte, das war Totalität [...]
Ein solch freigewordner Geist steht mit einem freudigen und vertrauenden
Fatalismus mittem im All [...]» (KSA 6,152). Precisely this acceptance of fate
constitutes, in Nietzsche's eyes, the source of greatness: «Meine Formel für
die Grösse am Menschen ist amor fati: dass man Nichts anders haben will,
vorwärts nicht, rückwärts nicht, in alle Ewigkeit nicht. Das Nothwendige
nicht bloss ertragen, noch weniger verhehlen - aller Idealismus ist Verlogen
heit vor dem Nothwendigen -, sondern es lieben ...» (KSA 6,297).19 Goethe,
too, demonstrates a dialectical understanding of the relation between free
dom and necessity when he writes in Dichtung und Wahrheit (Part 3, Book
11) about the task of biography:

Unser Leben ist, wie das Ganze, in dem wir erhalten sind, auf eine unbegreifliche
Weise aus Freiheit und Notwendigkeit zusammengesetzt. Unser Wollen ist ein
Vorauskünden dessen, was wir unter allen Umständen tun werden. Diese Umstän
de aber ergreifen uns auf ihre eigne Weise. Das Was liegt in uns, das Wie hängt selten
von uns ab, nach dem Warum dürfen wir nicht fragen, und deshalb verweist man
mit Recht aufs Quia. (HA 9,478)20

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62 Paul Bishop
This affirmation of fate constitutes th
Goethe, and Nietzsche in the context o
teenth century.

«A philosopher's real powe


resides not in his metaphysi
in the spirit and tendencie
him to adopt those formu

Given the title of his first major work,


tween Nietzsche and tragedy is clear. B
and, as we have seen, Goethe claimed he
ter geboren,» because his nature was
did outline a theory of tragedy in an ess
Poetik» [HA 12,342-45]).21 Yet, in the s
cept of tragedy, all three - Spinoza, Goet
In his notes from the Nachlass, later
Nietzsche claimed that he had been the
«Ich habe das Tragische erst entdeckt
penhauer, Nietzsche teaches that trage
furchtbaren und fragwürdigen Dinge dar
der Macht und Herrlichkeit am Künstler:
giebt keine pessimistische Kunst... Die
In another note, Nietzsche contrasts th
with the «tragic»: in the case of the firs
heiligen Sein,» whereas in the second -
genug, um ein Ungeheures von Leid noch
the first, «der christliche [Mensch] vern
den: er ist schwach, arm, ernterbt genug
zu leiden»; in the case of the second, «der
herbste Leiden: er ist stark, voll, vergött
266).
Earlier, in the section entitled «Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen,» Ni
etzsche had declared that «die Kunst ist das grosse Stimulans zum Leben,»
and concluded about the role of the tragic artist as follows:

Was theilt der tragische Künstler von sich mit ? Ist es nicht gerade der Zustand ohne
Furcht vor dem Furchtbaren und Fragwürdigen, das er zeigt? -[...] dieser siegrei
che Zustand ist es, den der tragische Künstler auswählt, den er verherrlicht. (KSA
6,127-28)

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Aesthetic Life and Tragic Insight in Nietzsche's Use of Goethe 63

And in the section «Was ich den Alten verdanke,» Nietzsche defined the trag
ic feeling even more explicitly as the affirmation of life:

Die Psychologie des Orgiasmus als eines überströmenden Lebens- und Kraftge
fühls, innerhalb dessen selbst der Schmerz noch als Stimulans wirkt, gab mir den
Schlüssel zum Begriff des tragischen Gefühls [...].
[...] Das Jasagen zum Leben selbst noch in seinen fremdesten und härtesten
Problemen; der Wille zum Leben, im Opfer seiner höchsten Typen der eignen Un
erschöpflichkeit frohwerdend - das nannte ich dionysisch, das errieth ich als die
Brücke zur Psychologie des tragischen Dichters. (KSA 6,160)

These passages recall Nietzsche's argument at the end of section 7 of Die


Geburt der Tragödie that tragedy arises from insight into «das Entsetzliche
oder Absurde des Daseins,» expressed in the sublime {das Erhabene) as «die
künstlerische Bändigung des Entsetzlichen» and in the comic {das Komische)
as «die künstlerische Entladung vom Ekel des Absurden.» Both the sublime
and the comic, combined in the satyr chorus of the dithyramb, turn it into the
saving deed of Greek art - «der Satyrchor des Dithyrambus ist die rettende
That der griechischen Kunst» (KSA 1, 57). For this reason in section 16 the
voice of tragedy itself invites us to declare, «Wir glauben an das ewige Leben»
(KSA 1,108).
This affirmation of life is the Dionysian, is «die dionysische Lust» which
alone can suffice - «reicht aus» (KSA 11, 25[95], 33); which turns art {die
Kunst) into «[die] rettende, heilkundige Zauberin» (KSA 1, 57). This is the
Dionysos who is «die religiöse Bejahung des Lebens, des ganzen, nicht ver
leugneten und halbirten Lebens» (KSA 13, 14[89], 266); this Dionysos, «der
in Stücke geschnitte Dionysos», is «eine Verheißung ins Leben: es wird ewig
wiedergeboren und aus der Zerstörung heimkommen» (KSA 13,14[89], 267);
and this Dionysos is identified precisely with pantheism, when Nietzsche
writes that «mit dem Wort <dionysisch> ist ausgedrückt»:

Ein Drang zur Einheit, ein Hinausgreifen über Person, Alltag, Gesellschaft, Rea
lität, als Abgrund des Vergessens: das leidenschaftlich-schmerzliche Uberschwel
len in dunklere vollere schwebendere Zustände; ein verzücktes Jasagen zum Ge
sammt-Charakter des Lebens, als dem in allem Wechsel Gleichen, Gleich-Mächti
gen, Gleich-Seligen; die große pantheistische Mitfreudigkeit und Mitleidigkeit,
welche auch die furchtbarsten und fragwürdigsten Eigenschaften des Lebens gut
heißt und heiligt, aus einem ewigen Willen zur Zeugung, zur Fruchtbarkeit, zur
Ewigkeit hinaus: als Einheitsgefühl von der Nothwendigkeit des Schaffens und
Vernichtens ... (KSA 13,14[14],224)

Such a tragic outlook constitutes, in the words of the French philosopher Mi


chel Onfray, «le tragique nietzschéen,» in which «the-fact-of-having-to-die»
{devoir mourir) becomes «the-task-of-having-to-live» {avoir à vivre). «Ce

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64 Paul Bishop
qui mobilise et motive l'homme tragiqu
voir mourir - ce qui soucie optimistes et
bien vivre, à mieux vivre» (Onfray 279).22
Thus tragedy, as we encounter it in Spin
a tragedy of death, but a tragedy of life.
the Ethics-. «A free man thinks of nothin
is not a meditation upon death but upon
1928,346).

Notes

A shortened version of this paper was prese


Century I panel at the Thirtieth Annual Co
28.9. -1.10.2006). My thanks to fellow panel m
deregg), the moderator (Angus Nicholls), the
audience at the session for making this panel so
See, in particular, Nietzsche's essays on Friedr
Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen.
In this section Nietzsche echoes a letter by Ste
Stendhal's letter of 20 January 1838 to G.C.; s
See Goethe's letter to Zelter of 31 October 1831.
Compare with Benno von Wiese's lament on
Verkennung und Verfälschung, die Schiller du
See von Seggern 127-47.
See Beiser 48-83. For the relevant texts themse
See Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Über die Lehre
On Goethe's reading of Spinoza, see Bell.
KSB 6, 111. As Nietzsche rightly says, he was
Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, he cited the
to him, along with Kepler, as an instance of
described him as «den reinsten Weisen» (KSA
Goethe, and along with Epicurus and Montai
penhauer - as one of the dead philosophers w
22,533-34). The ambivalence of Nietzsche's rel
Die fröhliche Wissenschaft where, as well as a
und Wahrheit (HA 10,35; cf. HA 7,235) of Eth
380) (KSA 3, 489), he questions Spinoza's intell
duction to his Political Treatise «not to laugh at
to hate them, but to understand them» - as not
jene Drei auf Einmal fühlbar werden» (KSA
of the amor intellectualis dei: «Philosophiren w
ihr nicht an solchen Gestalten, wie noch der
Unheimliches?» (KSA 3,624). For a discussion o
of the eternal recurrence, see note 7 from a s
Nihilismus,» dated lOJune 1887 (KSA 12,5[71

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Aesthetic Life and Tragic Insight in Nietzsche's Use of Goethe 65
11 KSA 12,9[176], 439; compare Goethe's letter to Knebel of 11 November 1784.
12 The opinion of the commentators on Spinoza is divided. James Morrison has argued that
«once the good life is identified with the life of reason, and reason is opposed to emotion,
imagination, and sense, art and beauty become suspect» (Morrison 363), and his claim
has been extended by David Bidney to the entire concept of value in Spinoza (Bidney
408-37). Against this approach, Lee Rice has contended that «there is a framework with
in Spinoza's system for an aesthetic theory, rooted in the sensible nature of human imagi
nation, but extended to social apprehension of shared objects of value» (Rice 488). Rice
cites the view advocated by Filippo Mignini that «il existe dans la philosophie de Spinoza
une question esthétique, c'est-à-dire une doctrine de l'imagination et de la cupiditas, et
un ensemble de textes fragmentaires à propos du beau et de l'art, qui peuvent et doivent
être interprétés dans leur ensemble» (Mignini 125).
13 The other modes of knowledge are a second kind (equated with ratiocination and dis
cursive thought), and a third kind, which he calls «intuitive knowledge» or scientia in
tuitiva (Ethics, Part 2, proposition 40, scholium 2) (Spinoza 1928, 186). This third kind
of knowledge is defined by Spinoza in Part 5 as follows: «The third kind of knowledge
proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of
the essence of things» (Spinoza 1928,386). For discussion of Spinoza's classifications of
knowledge, see Wolfson 131-63.
14 In this sense - that is, in the sense that Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten defined «die
Ästhetik» as «die Wissenschaft der sinnlichen Erkenntnis» (scientia cognitionis sensiti
vae) (Baumgarten 3) - Spinoza is interested in aesthetics. Likewise, the poet, Herder ar
gued, should express feelings (Herder 1985,402), and the function of Schillerian Schein
is to serve as a «symbol» of human feelings, in the sense that Susanne K. Langer uses this
term (Wilkinson 1955,225; Langer 24—43). The affects are understood by Spinoza above
all in a bodily way: «The human body can be affected in many ways by which its pow
er of acting is increased or decreased» (Ethics, Part 3, definition 3, postulate 1; Spinoza
1928,207). The notion of the body as the site of many contestations is one of the sources
of Deleuze's interest in Spinoza (Deleuze 1968; Deleuze 2003; and his lectures on Spino
za <http://www.deleuze.com>). See, too, the articles by Julie Saada-Gendron, Pascal
Séverac, Pierre Zaoui, Épaminondas Vamboulis, Laurent Bove, and Lamine Hamlaoui
in Astérion: Philosophie, histoire des idées, pensée politique, 3 (September 2005), special
issue on «Spinoza et le corps.» <http://asterion.revues.org/sommaire31.html>.
15 Compare with Zarathustra's comment in «Von den Freuden- und Leidenschaften»: «Am
Ende wurden alle deine Leidenschaften zu Tugenden» (KSA 4,43).
16 In On the Improvement of the Understanding, Spinoza states his goal as «continuous,
supreme, and unending happiness» (Spinoza 1928,1). In his Ethics, Spinoza's list of joy
ous passions includes joy, love, inclination (propensio), devotion, hope, confidence, glad
ness (gaudium), favour, compassion, pride, self-satisfaction, self-exaltation, benevolence,
thankfulness or gratitude, courtesy or moderation; while his list of sad passions includes
sorrow, hatred, aversion, derision, fear, despair, remorse, indignation, over-estimation,
contempt, envy, humility, repentance, despondency, shame, regret, anger, vengeance,
cruelty or ferocity, fear, luxuriousness [ = immoderate desire for good living], drunken
ness [= immoderate desire for drinking], avarice [= immoderate desire for riches], lust
[= immoderate desire for sexual intercourse], jealousy (all listed in part 3, «The Af
fects»).
17 Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, Book 5, chapter 1 (HA 7, 284); compare with Goethe's
programme for his own life as laid out in his letter to Hetzler of 24 August 1770: «Die

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66 Paul Bishop
Sachen anzusehen so gut wir können, sie in u
zu seyn und keinen Tag ohne etwas zu samme
senschafften obliegen, die dem Geist eine gew
iedes an seinen Platz zu stellen, iedes Wehrt zu
ich, und eine gründliche Mathesin [= mathesis
thun haben. Dabey müssen wir nichts seyn, so
nicht öffter stille stehen und ruhen, als die No
erfordert.» For further discussion of Goeth
and - most recently - Armstrong.
In the third volume of his Philosophie der sym
his outlook from Hamann to Johann Gottfr
following passage from letter 25 of the Brief
Herder embracing the idea of totality in te
tus: «Vollkommenheit eines einzelnen Mensch
Existenz Er selbst sei und werde. Daß er die K
mgut gegeben hat; daß er damit für sich und
passages from this twenty-fifth letter demonst
outlook: «Wozu hätten sich Menschen verein
bessere, glücklichere Menschen würden? [...] [
und das Beste davon andern mitteilen [...]» (
ics, Part 2, notice, where Spinoza shows how h
of our social existence» as well as contributin
(Spinoza 1928,204).
The concept of amorfati is introduced in §276 o
and is applied in the epilogue to Nietzsche con
6, 436). The notes in the Nachlass make a lin
«Höchster Zustand, den ein Philosoph erreich
meine Formel dafür ist amor fati...» (KSA 13,
Nietzsche argues consistently against the not
his letter to Schuller of October 1674 he uses
the air might believe it chooses to do so (Spino
«Thus the infant believes that it is by free w
believes that by free will he wishes vengeance;
he seeks flight; the drunkard believes that by a
things which when sober he wishes he had left
reason, clearly teaches that men believe them
conscious of their own actions, knowing nothi
mined» (Ethics, Part 3, proposition 2, scholiu
For further discussion, see Wilkinson 1957.
Onfray reminds us that «être nietzschéen,
comme lui,» and he argues, tellingly, that «l'h
as «l'hédonisme propose une esthétique, une v
fidèlement assumée: sentir - experimenter ph
280-81).

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Aesthetic Life and Tragic Insight in Nietzsche's Use of Goethe 67
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