Professional Documents
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Author(s): J. J. Bateman
Source: Phoenix, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Autumn, 1962), pp. 157-177
Published by: Classical Association of Canada
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1086812
Accessed: 26-02-2018 14:44 UTC
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SOME ASPECTS OF LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION
J. J. BATEMAN
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158 PHOENIX
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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 159
the modern point of view only the non-artistic proofs, the direct e
provide the true centre of discussion and dispute, but the Gree
source of the art in the artist, and hence the products of his ow
tion are the true material of his art. I say Greek here because
Quintilian (5.1.1) writes as if he believed that Aristotle origina
distinction, it actually corresponds to practice and theory befor
who is simply formulating with precision a common concepti
able, in fact, to point to the very time when this view of rheto
orator's task began to prevail. Antiphon's argumentation, a
has shown, is still centred on the non-artistic proofs. The same
the non-professional Andocides, who is here the exception wh
the rule. The situation is essentially different in Lysias and in t
speeches of Isocrates. In their speeches we find that oaths and
and the other kinds of evidence in the case are only subsidiary i
in complex arguments invented by the orator. These invented a
tend to have two new focal points which have replaced the olde
on the evidence. These points are what later rhetoricians call th
-the speaker, his opponent, or the audience-and the "deed"-the
alleged or proposed actions which are the subject of dispute.4 Hence
between Antiphon's death in 411 and Lysias' first speech in 403 against
Eratosthenes (Or. 12) and Isocrates' speech against Callimachus (Or. 18)
in 402 there has been a decided shift in the manner of arguing cases in
court. Our view of this change must of course be circumspect because it
is so obviously limited by the meagreness of our evidence. And doubtless
the change was taking place over a longer period than the eight years I
have marked out here. But it is there and we must take account of it.
What caused this shift of focus in finding and presenting arguments?
Apart from the general delight in argument for its own sake which I have
noted above and which may have found its way willy-nilly into oratory,
I suggest that the decisive answer lies in the fact that it first appears in
the work of the logographers. Their task was somewhat different from
that of the ordinary speaker. They did not need to be directly involved in
the case and for the most part probably were not. Secondly, in their busi-
ness they would be compelled to deal with many more and more varied
situations in law and politics than the ordinary citizen and perhaps even
the politician might meet. But they were being paid to win, and so they
had to find ways of virtually guaranteeing success. (An easy solution to
this difficulty is to specialize, as Isaeus seems to have done.) I believe that
constructing speeches on the model of Antiphon, that is on the basis of
the kinds of evidence, presented too many problems, whereas the "person-
deed" pattern offered a relatively easy scheme for gathering and arranging
'For the distinction between person and deed see the Rhetoric to Alexander 7. 1428A,
16 ff.; Schupp op.cit. (see n. 1) 23-26, and Solmsen op.cit.passim.
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160 PHOENIX
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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 161
"Op. cit. (see n. 3) xxvi. For its treatment by rhetoricians see Aristotle, Rhet. 2. 23,
1400A, 15 ff. (also 1397A, 7 ff. and 1399B, 13 ff.), Rhet. to Alex. 10. 1430A, 14 ff., and
Cicero, Topics 17, 21, 47-49, 53-57, 88 which has the most detailed and interesting
information on the argument; cf. Cic. De Inv. 42 and Quintilian 5. 10. 2 and 14. 2-4,
8. 5. 9-10. Quintilian 9. 3. 99 remarks on the confusion of arguments and figures, and
in 9. 2. 106 we see the e contrario treated as a figure; cf. also Ad Herennium 4. 28
and 58 f.
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162 PHOENIX
periphery of his proof, and in fact is not really part of the proo
Lysias opens with a direct attack on the character of these men an
that some of them are actually criminals. Then he reinforces t
picions he has planted by four successive arguments. The first
has the form which Gebauer describes (32):
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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 163
or setting in which the jurors are to view Nicomachus and his sup
At the same time the audience is itself implicated in each of the an
This involvement in the issue is emphasized by the vocative. If th
follow the speaker's thought and identify themselves with the "
his words, then they are led to the same logical and moral decision
he makes for them.
The subtlety of this use of a particular kind of argument to c
situation implicating the audience intellectually and emotionally
they hear is observable in the speech against Simon (3.37-38).
trial it is the defendant who speaks Lysias' words, and the argume
contraries is part of his refutation of the charges. The object of t
is to demonstrate the innocence of the speaker by shifting the re
bility for the fight which occasioned the trial to Simon, the plaint
method is to show that Simon's statements are lies (35-39). The s
selects certain items from his account of the fight and asks the B
consider them in the light of probable experience: who are at fau
who pursue or those who run away? He answers his own quest
pursuers are to blame-, and then argues: &ore 5ewvy el irepi roVrT
56k?w Trpovo1O'jvar, 7repl &v oTrot rv7X&VovaTV o TSrt 5&Ew& KCaI rap4voAa 7TreT
The elements of the contrast are emphasized by the anaphora
syntactical parallels. Premeditation is set against criminal and mon
deeds, appearance against action. As in the example discussed abo
antitheses are imposed on the situation. But since the opposi
between "I" and "they," the defendant and his accusers, Lysia
using an introductory phrase similar to that in the other examp
simply states that the situation is betv6v without qualification,
other judgment were conceivable. The issue of premeditation
supplies the contents of the two parts of the proof embracing t
(28-34 and 34-43), is adroitly worked in here too. It is assumed o
witnesses' testimony (cf. 15-20) that Simon and his friends are th
gators of the events and the real culprits. Such a portrayal of th
prevents the audience from giving any credence to the contention
defendant planned the whole affair.13 By putting his proof in the
an argument from contraries, Lysias implies that the premi
mutually exclusive. Since the truth of the defendant's view of h
nents' actions has already been confirmed, the falsity of Simon's
tention of premeditation follows. The argument is stated concise
simply enough for its logical import to be easily grasped. The
conclusion is then driven home in the second argument from co
which follows immediately:
"The pronoun omitted with 56tco is of course iurTv. Simon had to prove malice
in order to substantiate his accusation; cf. J. H. Lipsius, Das attische Recht un
verfahren (Leipzig 1905-15) 605-607.
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164 PHOENIX
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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 165
Zn& i Ka.L 8epVi, el (Y v &Ktp V ticv ;are X&plv abcr? eZa'ae0, &v 6'
jAi,eijELav r&lAopLav 7roL7taEoOe. The neatness of the sentence stru
justifies the epithet which Plato uses of Lysias' style in th
terse (aorpo-yybXa, 234e). Despite its terse expression the arg
comparable in complexity to those quoted above. The juror
directly involved in the situation, but this time not as the o
objects of someone else's action but as the agents. It is the co
inconsistency in their actions, not those of the speaker or his
which is monstrous. It is their verdict which could be so described. The
diction used by Lysias to repeat what he has just said about Nicomachus
is abstract and probably already hackneyed.'5 But the reduction of the
deeds of Nicomachus with all their factual and emotional ramifications to
the simplest terms-willing: unwilling; suffer: do wrong-is the very
thing which permits the main contrast to stand out clearly before the
audience, and gives the argument its force. (Notice that Lysias even
avoids saying that Nicomachus was wronged or injured; he says only that
he "experienced" something.) These contrasts between what Nicomachus
did and suffered are the fulcrum on which the possible actions of the
jurors are poised. Again the diction is chosen with care in order to insinuate
a bad contrast between acquittal and condemnation. Acquittal and con-
demnation are described as gratitude (a pejorative word in this speech)
and punishment. There is no real question as to which the jurors are to
choose. The argument, the paragraph, this whole part of the proof ends
on the words: you will punish.'6
In the arguments we have been examining the logical pattern which
governs their structure is patent. Someone's behaviour is at variance with
the present circumstances, whether these circumstances are real or
imagined by the speaker, past or future. Somewhat different is an
argument met in the speech for the cripple (24.8). As in the argument
discussed above, the statement of the issue in a set of contradictory pro-
positions serves to make it crystal clear to the audience. The argument
from contraries here follows on a series of contentions in which Lysias
puts his case. The speaker, a cripple whom the prosecutor wishes to have
deprived of his public assistance, points out that his business is small
and unprofitable. In order to live he must have the obol each day from
the state (6). He follows up the description of his circumstances with a
pitiful appeal based on his age, his physical disability, and the injustice
and harshness of an adverse verdict on both himself and other disabled
16See the relevant items in the lists of antithetical terms in John E. Hollingsworth,
Antithesis in the Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus (Menasha, Wis. 1915) 73-75 and
Grover C. Kenyan, Antithesis in the Speeches of the Greek Historians (Chicago 1941) 40,
80, and 84.
'6Similar endings can be found in 3. 37, 18. 8 & 12, 24. 23, 26. 9, 31. 24.
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166 PHOENIX
citizens (7). It is readily apparent how Lysias has drawn these poi
the "person-deed" scheme. Their lively presentation through a
negative commands disguises the fact that they have the same
in the argument here as the statements, clothed in a different
form, in 30.15-16. In both instances material is furnished whic
lishes the situation into which the subject is put, in Or. 30 the o
Nicomachus, in Or. 24 the speaker himself. What conclusio
audience to draw from this situation? In both places Lysias'
effected by the argument from contraries; here is how it is exp
Or. 24: Kaio yap av &rorov erl, & /3ovX7', el 56e laV darXi7 aol iv v) avu
lapv 4>aLvoit/rlv Xa&upAvwv r6 alpyvptwv roror, vvv 6' 1Ire&6 Katl 7yrpas K
ra Trovro 7rb6LAevaK KCKa 7rpoayLyverati Aot, r6re a&atpeOel7v. Each pr
in this argument contains two items: the circumstances in w
speaker lived, and what he experienced or would experience f
state. To make both experiences come true would lead to a r
contradiction in the behaviour of the members of the Boul8. Ly
found the perfect formula for summing up and driving home
meaning of his contentions. The elements out of which the arg
put together are evident to anyone who examines the positio
cripple. Lysias invents nothing. But the factors cited are not ger
the real point at issue in the accusation. Lysias adroitly avoids an
the prosecutor's charges while seeming to devastate them.17 His p
is veiled by the ridicule, reinforced by the antitheses, directed
prosecutor. The device is sophistic chicanery. But the chicanery
not in the technique but in the particular application of it. The sa
of argument is used in places where the facts and the situation
Lysias' favour. For example, in the speech on the olive stump (O
defendant complains about the sycophancy of the plaintiff who
to obtain a condemnation while bringing forward only his o
supported testimony and argument (23): 5eLr6rara owiv raaoxo c,
7rapkaXero aIprvpas, robrots av t5lou LV 7areliet, Treft)6 6 OVK elatv ab
KaL Tavr7rlv rtl1iAav oLeraL Xp^Ova yevETOaL. As in the preceding argu
contrast is between what is taking place and what might take p
here the inconsistency is in the behaviour of the opponent rather
audience. The speaker insists that this inconsistency, if allow
have terrible consequences for him. The subject here is evidence
the focal points of non-artistic proof. But where Antiphon wou
developed this topic at length, Lysias deals with it in a brief, sh
turned way. What interests him is not the evidential basis of the
case, but the implications which he can draw from it that the a
a sycophant. He comes back to the topic a few moments later at t
17Cf. Sch6n, op. cit. (see n. 3) 99-101 for an analysis of the technique emplo
Similar complex arguments are 4. 13, 7. 34-35, 15. 6.
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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 167
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168 PHOENIX
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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 169
2OCf. ? 50 where the same issue is treated from a different point of view.
"For other instances of this kind of argument see 7. 15, 13. 53, 18. 16-17, 26. 10,
32. 23.
"It is interesting in this respect to compare the proportionate treatment given this
topic by Andocides in the De Myst. 90-109 and the anonymous author of the speech
against him, Ps.-Lysias 6. 37-41.
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170 PHOENIX
modern scholars, and rightly so.23 The argument also breaks the
logic for the hypothetical syllogism because Lysias has made the
error of denying the antecedent instead of the consequent. But
should not expect from Lysias rigorous compliance with rules of
knew nothing and the argument can be rewritten in correct form. T
thing to be noted here is the way he argues. He postulates a con
which would substantiate Agoratus' position. But the true facts c
this condition, and therefore validate his own opposing position
this form of argument has been carefully contrived is show
parallel in Or. 3.31 where the form is identical, though the prem
of course different.24 A survey of the arguments cast in the for
then...; but in fact...," reveals three main types which
distinguished according to whether the "but in fact" part is a s
of fact (a semeion) as in the argument just above, or a confli
probabilities of human action like the argument in Or. 12, or a
one of the premisses in the hypothesis, which turns the argume
destructive hypothetical syllogism as in 22.11-12.25 The und
rationale is the same in all three types. Lysias invents a statemen
will contradict his opponent's contention. Then he fashions out
contradictory propositions a hypothetical argument which will re
opponent's contention to absurdity. Lysias is not interested in p
or reconstructing a series of events or even a single event in its
Rather he picks out individual items in his own or his opponen
depicts them in a certain way, and compels his audience to take a
attitude toward the two parties. These three aims are inextricab
into a subtle argument.
An examination of the assumptions used by Lysias in his hyp
arguments reveals a striking dissimilarity to the kind of premis
the argument from opposites. With the exception of some argu
from consequences, almost all the hypotheses deal with the case i
majority of the arguments from opposites derive from a conside
the ethos of the speaker or his opponent. But only six of the arg
from hypothesis involve the persons rather than the facts of th
This difference suggests that the contents of the argument fre
prescribed the form it was given by Lysias.
So far we have been examining arguments which have a clearly
form. The arguments from contradiction are introduced by som
2"Cf. Frohberger-Gebauer, Ausgewahlte Reden des Lysias (Leipzig 1880) vol
Albert Schweizer, Die 13. Rede des Lysias (Leipzig 1936) 91 ff.; A. P. Dorjahn
Forgiveness in Old Athens, the Amnesty of 403 B.C. (Evanston 1946) 23 and 48
4Cf. also 13. 22, 36 and 30. 17.
2Cf. 1. 31, 42, 12. 32-33, 24. 11, 25. 5; and Wilcox, op. cit. (see n. 3) 20, 22 ff., 32, and
40-128 passim.
2Cf. 12. 32-33, 46-47, and 48, 7. 23-25, 16. 11, 32. 23.
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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 171
like "it would be strange if" and the two contradictory sta
usually marked by the ubiquitous 1v ... b. particles; the
arguments are of course expressed in conditional sentences.
immediately perceived, and seems to have some persuasive
own in addition to the content of the argument. The basis o
a principle of contradiction. But the prevalence of this pri
contingent on the presence of the formal expression of the
the argument from opposites, even though arguments emb
principle occur mostly in the environment of the two form
Like most of the authors of his day, Lysias has a fondness f
His antitheses are not ornaments; they serve rather to adva
ment in some way.27 In the following group of arguments
is not just a feature of the style but more important as
principle which determines the arrangement of the ma
argument.
Non-formal antithetical arguments of this kind are employed for the
most part in refutations where Lysias develops his thought through a
series of contrasts. A carefully constructed argument of this sort occurs
in the speech on the murder of Eratosthenes (Or. 1.29). The speaker, the
defendant Euphiletus, has narrated the events which led up to the dis-
covery and capture in his wife's room of the adulterer Eratosthenes. He
killed Eratosthenes, but refrains from describing the actual killing.
Instead he gives us a brief dramatic sketch of his confrontation with the
captive who is begging for mercy (25). To Eratosthenes' pleas he replies
that not he but the law of the city is executing him. There follows a
sentence or two in which he refutes some contentions of the plaintiffs.
The law on adultery is read to the court, the Areopagus. Euphiletus then
begins the proof of his innocence by arguing that his refusal to accept
money as recompense for the wrong done to him and his killing of Eratos-
thenes are legally and morally justifiable. The gist of this argument is
contained in paragraph 29 and runs:
obK iealireL, c l pe, &, XX' ca\ oX6yel &5&KcZE, Koa 67rws Ai v pI airo&avn
rVTE,c6Xet Kal lKrTeUev, &rorlvetv 5' rTOLf#OS V Xpipaara. k7c& 8 TC iTv PKelvov
T&liJCaTr&L obf aveXcpouv, Trv 5^ T7JS 67rK6Xeco V6'Ov tlovv etvat KVp&cbrepov, Kal
racbrtv tXapov Trv 8SKtlV, ^P f)eLs 6SKa&orT&Trv etvaL atyratJ&ievoL rols rct rotavra
Ek&Tiq6feoVo'v eT&aaTe.
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172 PHOENIX
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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 173
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174 PHOENIX
Kal /A.v 5b, I&v pes BLKacTaL, 6&ro& KaKbvo& faav rT btierkpq irXtietL, obbt
etXov arco&wrves' irpoI 7yp tjav ot XMyovTes Kat 7rp&TTov'Tes Xv Ob
7v Aetao KaKdI yevokaFat r 7r6XEL. 6ir6oot 5d' euvoIt aarv etvar, TrCs OiV
;5eLtav, abrot re rd,& 3EXrara X&yovreS Kal TobS etaLapraYvovas &rOTr
AXX&a jtv o6 ye 'Aptaorooavrjs r1 e'Xcov ri)v yuvalKa rIL 6 roXXoLs &v ,uaXX
i T lc iA,r trarpl, ~6tov yVWvat. i re yaip 2X&Kla oroXv &6&opos, I re
wrXeov' &KELvoV APlv y&p a v r& avTro lrp&rTTLv. 'Aptarok&vLvs b5 ob M
LStwv aXX& Kat rTvA KOLYCtv CjBOUX co rtXE,ea0at, KaL el T v at v a pbr
&vpXwaer ktirev,uiv rt,ilaoOa&.
This antithesis between the different natures of the two men, the sp
father and Aristophanes, his son-in-law, pervades Lysias' en
sentation of the material in 7-30. The speaker rapidly and briefly
the background of the trial and tells how his family became invo
Aristophanes (7-17). While 12-17 are ostensibly the story of the
speaker's father had arranged his children's marriages, their
purpose is to establish in the minds of the audience a picture of a
ested parent completely free from avarice. In a similar manner
while arguing that Aristophanes could not have left behind a lar
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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 175
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176 PHOENIX
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LYSIAS' ARGUMENTATION 177
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