CHAPTER FIFTEEN
ee types of experience are what constitute self- self-evaluation maintenance, self-interest, self-monitoring,
THE SELF
ROY F. B A U M E I S T E R, Case Western Reserve University
INTRODUCTION
What is the self? In some ways, the thousands of journal
articles dealing with the self have seemed to make the an-
swer to that fundamental question more elusive rather than
clearer. Even finding a way to sort and group that mass of
information is intimidating. This overview of the social
psychology of self begins with the proposition that there
are three important roots of selfhood. These are powerful,
prototypical patterns of experience in which people grasp
the basic meaning of self.
The first is the experience of reflexive consciousness,
that is, conscious attention turning back toward its own
source and gradually constructing a concept of oneself.
When you lie awake in bed late at night, thinking about
your failures and inadequacies, or glorying in your tri-
umphs; when you look in the mirror or step on the scale or
read your resume; when after hearing about someone else's
heroic or heinous action, you pause to wonder whether you
are the sort of person who could ever do such a thing;
when you contemplate your future or your spiritual center
or your dwindling resources; or when you try to answer
some questions honestly about your opinions, traits, habits,
qualifications, and past experiences-these are the sort of
experiences that involve reflexive consciousness. Without
them, self would have no meaning or value and would
hardly exist at all. Self begins when awareness turns
around in a circle, so to speak,
I thank NIMH Grant 51482 for support, Steve Hastings and Brenda
Wilson for research assistance, and Todd Heatherton, Kristin Sommer,
Dianne Tice, and social seminar members for comments on a draft.
680
Chapter 15 I The Self
The second root is the Interpersonal
When someone looks into your
says your name, and you have a
or the same happens and you feel
join a group, or quit it; when you
celebrate an anniversary; when you
pression on someone or live up to
tions; when you discover that someone
you and you blush; when you keep
when you attend
humiliated Chil~,'~~s~:~;i?~~
your upon
and jealous
had romantic contact with
after defeating a major rival in an
or despair after losing same-c-tnese
ences reveal the interpersonal aspect of
most unthinkable outside a social
vital for making interpersonal ,e,aw,,'~
tions possible. Selves are handles
other people.
The third is the executive function,
troller, the origin. When you
when you drag yourself out of
morning; when you decide what it
to buy or work on or become; when
acting on an impulse, such as to
to hit someone, or to sleep with
you vote, or when you take out a
sist fatigue and temptation and
maximum effort, beyond the
experiences involve the executive
tive agent and decision-maker. Without
would be a mere helpless spectator
use or importance.
three things are what bodies do, and they corn-
ajor experiences of selfhood. At present they
te to encompass social psychology's wide as-
contributions to the psychology of self, and
""ill group the research findings according to
asic facets of self.
nt chapter is decidedly not trying to coin new
pose new concepts. These terms (reflexive
s, interpersonal being, and executive function)
'generic terms borrowed from prior usage.
e advantage of being broad and precise, and
inked to or based on any of the particular cur-
about the self,
ld understand all the ways that these three as-
are interrelated, one would attain to a deep and
ariding of the nature of selfhood, but that is at
decades away. For the present, there is suffi-
nge in merely fleshing out the three categories,
~lybeginning to address the questions of inte-
ssounds as if a full understanding of the self is
Off, and it is, but that does not detract from the
ial psychology has made enormous progress.
Background
eading and influential social psychologist wrote
ay safely predict that ego-psychology will
teasingly" (Allport, 1943), The subsequent
has abundantly confirmed that prediction. In-
gh Allport himself once proposed that the atti-
most important concept in social psychology,
alclaim. A recent survey of articles in psychol-
1,550 abstracts dealing with self during the two
4-1993, which is roughly the same tally found
(Ashmore & Jussim, in press). It is clear that
self has preoccupied social psychologists and
ues, as indicated by a steady flow of special
,special issues of journals, and edited books,
c ordinary flow of scientific publications. Try-
abreast of the research on self is like trying to
from a fire hose.
culty in compiling a comprehensive overview
lpsychology of self has multiple sources, be-
er volume of information. One source of diffi-
self is not really a single topic at all, but rather
te of loosely related subtopics. Indeed, if one
all the terms used by social psychologists that
he prefix self, one would have a long list that
u.to show the diversity and heterogeneity of self
:i'study.A partial list of such subtopics would in-
self-appraisal, self-as-target effect,
self-concept, self-construal, self-deception,
behavior, self-enhancement, self-esteem,
681
self-perception, self-presentation, self-protection, self-ref-
erence, self-regulation, self-serving bias, self-verification.
Providing a comprehensive overview of the research lit-
erature on self is further complicated by the fact that the re-
search community has repeatedly shifted its interests and
emphases among the many subtopics. In the 1970s, re-
search on self-perception, identity crisis, self-monitoring,
and self-concept nourished, while self-presentation and
self-schema received only sporadic interest. The latter two
topics came into their own in the early 1980s, but interest
had diminished by the end of that decade, when self-regu-
lation was instead attracting heavy interest from multiple
perspectives. Meanwhile, interest in self-awareness and
self-esteem has been perennial, but the concepts, methods,
and theories have changed, in some cases radically. Look-
ing ahead to the tum of the century, it seems safe to predict
that the self will continue to be in the center of social psy-
chology, but it is much more hazardous to guess which
subtopics will capture the interest and efforts of the leading
researchers.
Definitions
Although the word self is probably spoken by nearly every-
one every day, especially if one includes part-word usages
(e.g. yourself), it is quite difficult to define, Probably the
term is rooted in such widespread common experience and
basic linguistic, communicative needs that linguistic defin-
itions may often fail to do it justice. Even dictionaries are
quite unhelpful for defining self It is a word that everyone
uses but no one defines. The present treatment assumes
that everyone is familiar with colloquial usages of the word
self, and the word here is used in the same meaning that it
has in such everyday speech.
A particular source of confusion in social psychology is
the occasional use of self and self-concept as if the two
terms were interchangeable. A self-concept is an idea
about something; the entity to which the self-concept refers
is the self. As we shall see, there are important reasons for
confusing the two, beyond mere conceptual sloppiness or
laziness, because part of the nature of selfhood involves
cognitive construction. Yet it is easy to see the fallacy: If
the self were only a concept, how could it make decisions
or carry on relationships to people?
A well-known paper by Epstein (1973) criticized the
notion of a self-concept and said that it may be more ap-
propriate to speak of a self-theory. That is, people have
ideas about the nature of the self, about the world, and
about the interactions between the two. This view effec-
tively distinguishes the self from the self-concept (a.k.a.
self-theory), as well as placing self-knowledge in an appro-
priately pragmatic context.

PartFour / Personal Phenomena
682
Unity versus Multiple Selves Although most theories of
self and identity have emphasized unity as a defining crite-
rion, several treatments in social psychology have dis-
cussed multiple selves. But the concept of self loses its
meaning if a person has multiple selves, and the discus-
sions of multiplicity should be regarded as heuristics or
metaphors. The essence of self involves integration of di-
verse experiences into a unity. As Loevinger (1969) wrote,
"to integrate ... experience is not one ego function among
many bnt the essence of the ego" (p. 85).
In a famous, often-quoted passage, William James
wrote, "A man has as many social selves as there are indi-
viduals who recognize him and carry an image of him in
their mind" (1892, p. 179). Taken literally, the sentence is
plainly absurd. If each person who knew the man knew a
different self, his acquaintances could not even talk about
him as the same person. More likely, they know the same
self and disagree about some of his attributes. Even such
disagreements will tend to be small, if only because of cog-
nitive convenience. As Tesser and Moore (1986) pointed
out, it is extremely difficult to maintain very many differ-
ent impressions in different acquaintances. James himself
began backing off from that dramatic assertion immedi-
ately, by saying that it would be more correct to propose
that there are as many social selves as groups of individu-
als who know him, and that changes in behavior with dif-
ferent audiences resulted in "practically" a division into
different selves. The multiplicity of selfhood is a metaphor.
The unity of selfhood is its defining fact.
The attributes, therefore, cannot be mistaken for the
being of the self. This point was made cleverly long before
James. David Hnme (1739) wrote that if the self is under-
stood to be the totality of thoughts, feelings, and percep-
tions, then as soon as one learns or forgets anything-
thereby altering the sum totality-one has a new self. A
similar argument refutes the notion that memory consti-
tutes the self. Instead, memory seems to presuppose self.
As Shoemaker (1963) explained, without presupposing
selfhood, a man could not remember that he broke the front
window last week; he could only remember that someone
broke the front window last week.
More recently, Singer and Salovey (1993) have ex-
plored how the self constructs memory. Seemingly minor
events may become focal, important memories because
they embody important motivational themes of the self.
Such self-defining events can continue to evoke emotional
responses long after the fact, simply because of their con-
tinuing relevance to the self's goals.
This issue of unity versus multiplicity has not been fully
resolved. Most people would say that being a wife or a
lawyer is part of someone's identity. Yet if the person gets a
divorce or changes jobs, is she nOW someone else? Similar
misunderstandings have produced differing interpretations
of Markus and Nurins's (1986) widely cited concept of
Chapter 15 ! The Self 683
Ion, so to speak. It has 'become conventional Without it, people would not be able to grasp the meaning
"possible selves." They explained
speer of selfhood as that of being an agent, of self. This does not imply that all aspects of self are con-
ple concepts of how they mighLt
eis slightly misleading. In ordinary speech, scious. But a conscious experience is central to selfhood.
weight self, the slender self, the Sue
,ntis a matter of acting for someone else (e.g., In particular, all cognitive representations of self invoke
prison, the self as parent, and so.fo
agent or FBI agent), whereas for self theory this reflexive consciousness, at least to the extent of pro-
are all conceptions of the samese
(agency involves acting on one's own. Selves viding the entity (the self) to which they refer.
stances (and with different attribu
sand are defined in turn by the choices that In psychology, a famous and influential formulation by
In short, unity is one of the
:r this reason, the term executive function will William James (1892) distinguished between the "I" and
hood and identity. Concepts of.ll1111
to refer to the aspect of self that makes the "me" as the two main parts of the self. The "I" referred
dramatic metaphors for discusSiI1gi~
hitiates actions. to the knower, in the sense of being the active perceiver;
mention their usefulness in science
larly important aspect of the executive func- the "me" referred to the known aspect of selfhood, as in
undermining the basic concept 0
how the self acts upon itself, often altering or the self-concept. Reflexive consciousness is in these terms
have different perspectives onth
initial responses. The capacity for self-regu- a matter of the "I" perceiving the "me." Both the "I" and
may be variations among the cog
to a limited extent in many living creatures, the "me" will be covered in this section.
the self (e.g., Higgins, 1987), buUt
ore extensively developed among human be- Yet speaking in terms of the "I" and the "me" can be
()l1g other species. Indeed, it can be regarded misleading. There is no single or simple object that is the
Nature of Selfhood Thus, wha
ign or master function that is involved in "me" that can be directly perceived. This fact has plagued
the meaning of self? Ideally there
eself's activities (Higgins, 1996; see also self-awareness theory from the start. Thus, in social psy-
phenomenon that would be canst
ffeatherton, & Tice, 1994; Carver & Scheier, chology, the original and seminal formulation by Duval
cieties, and one could point to that
nderstanding of selfhood is impossible with- and Wicklund (1972) proposed that attention can be di-
hood. Instead of one, however;'!
iation of self-regulation. rected either outward or inward, that is, to the stimulus en-
pose several, because not all II
psychological self may be understood as the vironment or to the self, as if the two were on a par. The
same basic phenomenon. Three
ese three types of activities and experiences. problem with that simple and elegant formulation is it is
selfhood will be emphasized he
With the human body and involves the con- too simple: there is no one entity that is the object of such
the organizing scheme for this c
definition that entails unity and temporal con- awareness, as if you could be aware of self in the same way
categories of self-experience
~an entity marked by reflexive consciousness, you are aware of a table or a painting. David Hume raised
began. Let us briefly offer definit
roles and reputation, and executive function. this problem two centuries ago. He said that whenever he
amples given earlier.
sought to attend to his self, he found instead some act of
First, 'the experience of reflexive
pter In the following sections, social psy- perceiving something else: "I can never catch myself at any
to be common to all normal huma
~jor research findings on self will be pre- time without a perception, and never can observe any thing
the nature of selfhood. By reflexiv
ized according to the three experiential roots but the perception" (1739, p. 534).
the experience in which the pe~s9
'[his organization will allow seemingly dis- Instead, it seems more appropriate to propose that self-
term reflexive is used here in .its.li
to be presented together if they share common awareness is superimposed on other awareness; the self is
ring back to self, and it has n0th.in
about what the self is or what aspect of self is caught in the act, so to speak, of doing something else in
Reflexive consciousness is whale:
; Historical and cultural variations in selfhood interaction with the world. This is an idea that has been put
tell themselves apart. In a seerni.e
overed in a final section. forward occasionally, less often than the simple-object the-
the information-processing ca~:l
aware of their environments cart
a great deal of information will be covered in ories, but perhaps less often because it is more compli-
pages, it is inevitable that a great deal is also cated. It does have some impressive supporters. Probably
come aware of self. Without this
.effort to be broadly inclusive in the available the first and in some ways still the best formulation was in
be absent or meaningless.
~tltails that many topics will receive shorter a key passage of Kant's (178711956) Critique of Pure Rea-
Second, the self is an interpel'S
tlIeir most enthusiastic adherents will think ap- son. Kant said (agreeing with Hume) you cannot perceive
develop and flourish as atcmisti
riority has been given to main findings, core yourself directly. However, the act of perceiving something
tentialists were once fond of rema
needing further study, and especially material in the world can itself become perceived. So you perceive
(and leaves) the world alone; but
ad implications for the nature of self. This the act of perceiving (hence the term apperception, percep-
cally false: People are always bot
sto illuminate the nature of self by an integra- tion of a perception), and get some information about the
ers, and they only survive to adult
etive reading of social psychology's research self that way, although it has to be distilled. The self is not
sive social contact. Furthermor
'~• not, therefore, an exhaustive presentation of perceived, but some activity of the self is perceived, and
what they are from other peopl
ocial psychologists have had to say about the one can learn about the self from that.
identities as members of social
There are important implications that accompany Kant's
close personal relationships
point. The self is not perceived directly, but always inferred
to the development of selfhc,od·A
or deduced. The self can only be perceived in relation to the
his or her entire life in social FLEXIVE CONSCIOUSNESS
world. One can notice or imagine oneself doing various
tainly have a stunted and
of the human organism to be conscious of it- things and being in various places, but one cannot perceive
Third, the self is an entity
tinguishing feature and is vital to selfhood. or imagine oneself completely separate from all social con-
sions, initiates action, and ta1<:esres
684 Part Four I Personal Phenomena
text or situations. The self is always situated. You can be
aware of self riding a bicycle or losing an argument or ask-
ing for a date or paying bills or sitting alone, but you cannot
be directly aware of the self without some such situation.
The self that transcends situations is therefore always a
construction, which is to say a product of abstraction, in-
ference, and deduction, rather than something known di-
rectly. Only one's experiences are known directly. Con-
sider what is involved in knowing that you are shy. You
notice that you always get nervous in the presence of oth-
ers, and you prefer to avoid large social gatherings and
meeting new people; these observations permit the conclu-
sion that you are shy, in the sense that your self-concept ac-
quires the trans-situational schema of shyness. But you
cannot perceive your shyness directly, in the absence of en-
counters with the world and the absence of behavioral and
emotional responses.
A similar conclusion emerges from recent cognitive
work. In particular, Higgins (1996) argues persuasively
that self-knowledge is not primarily sought in isolation or
for its own sake. He says that people construct a "self di-
gest" that contains useful information about the self, and
the driving question behind the construction of the self di-
gest is not "Who am I?" but rather "What is my relation to
the world?" In this view, self-knowledge is pursued for the
sake of adaptive benefits of improving person-environment
fit. Knowing the self is a means, not an end in itself, and
the nature of the self-knowledge reflects this pragmatic, in-
teractive focus.
The implication is that the "me"-the conceptions of
self that the person has, and that others have of him or
her-is a construct, the result of cognitive processes, rather
than a real entity that exists in the world. These construc-
tions are tentative inferences, hypotheses, conclusions
based on observations, so they are unlikely to be a precise
fit to what the person will actnally do, althongh close.
Moreover, after a body of knowledge about the self is built
up, the person can reflect on it, and in that sense one can be
self-aware of an abstract, disembodied self. But self-aware-
ness does not yield a direct, decontextualized perception of
self. Self-knowledge is therefore more accurate than self-
perception as a term to refer to the "me." One does not
perceive the self directly, but rather one builds up knowl-
edge about the self, and so one can use and think about this
knowledge base.
The notion that the self is just an object to be perceived
like any other retains its appeal, however. It is implicit in
the modern Western conception of the inner or hidden self
that can be discovered. Indeed, many of today's leading re-
searchers on self grew up amid the hippies of the 1960s
who could speak: with a straight face of "finding yourself"
and "being yourself" and of seeking optimal attunement to
"inner vibes." The popular idea of self as buried treasure or
submerged wonderland probably reflects some belief that
perceiving the self directly is hath!?
cles, rather than being inherentlyitri
Well before the cognitive revolutid
noticed that information pert,liIl'
processed in special ways. In ani
how people would predict fututeipi!
performance feedback, Jones, Roc:
Ward (1968) found opposite patter'!
others. Specifically, feedback about
clear primacy effect, whereasf~§
showed a recency effect. Apparently,
minds about others rather qUickly1j#
to revising self-appraisals, especia
sions are implied. Later, the distill
attributions and other-attributions
nerstones of attribution theory.iriJ
(Jones & Nisbett, 1971), whichag.~
will often draw firm dispositionali
while refusing to do so about them
An early contribution to social
reference effect (Rogers, Kuiper,i*,
tion bearing on the self is processe
deeply, and hence remembered bett
tion. Subjects in Rogers et al.'s stud]
a series of words and asked to make
one. When the judgment was does'ili
people recalled the word much bette
did not involve the self. This effec
that the person decided did not per
ently, thinking about the wordiri-r
sufficient to create a stronger me
to thinking about the word in sorn~g
I11
This is not to say that the self isp
as a memory organizer. Greenwald a.
wise found self-reference effectsei
cued by self-generated nameswe
than words cued by other-generat~~
eluded that the nmemonic benefits
self's being a highly familiar and
evaluatively polarized knowledge:!ti(
hooks with similar properties I1l~Y
tages. Higgins and Bargb (l987)Ii
self-reference is neither necessary
tation of memory, and that the cffe
ory are not unique. Still, the selfis
system, and things generated by the
strong memory traces.
The self-reference effect maya
other findings. Langer (1975) sh9
chose their own lottery ticket, they!
to resell it (before the lottery) than
Chapter 15 / The Self
a particular ticket. Choice thus seems to
'_",fet'ence: the fact that people had chosen
ade it more valuable to them, even though all
ets were of the same value and each had pre-
me chance of winning.
at bear on the self are treated differently. Staw
led irrational persistence in an unsuccessful
tion. He found that persistence was greater if
nision was one's own, as opposed to someone
an (1994) showed that people will constrnct a
ive cognitive frame for loan repayment if it is
bt rather than someone else's that is to be re-
IP may be an important form of self-reference.
consists of a special bond between the self and
,>and so the existence of a self is presupposed.
92) found that attitudes toward objects (cold
ors) were affected by ownership: people liked
When they owned them, even when the gift had
ntly random and when they had not used them
familiar with them. Kahneman, Knetsch, and
0) showed that things seem to gain in value
eing owned, in the sense that people demand a
to sell something than they would give to buy
erely owning something-attaching it to the
ently endows it with special, increased value.
ership effect extends even to seemingly trivial
in (1985, 1987) has shown that people prefer
their own name over other letters of the alpha-
rd to argue that there is any rational or prag-
for such a bias. It suggests the power of the self
gs with value and affection.
Self-Awareness
of self seems to be the very essence of reflexive
ess. although the simple experience of attending
does not exhaust all the research efforts done
bric of self-awareness. Self-awareness theory
ced into social psychology in 1972 in a book
d Wicklund that was clearly ahead of its time.
ts based on measuring behavioral changes
ating subjects in front of mirrors were initially
by some psychologists as frivolous, but self-
theory has continued to evolve and add new
dconcepts, to the point at which it has become
most steadily productive spheres of self theory
the last three decades. Undoubtedly the wide
ariety of work in self-awareness indicate not
uring creativity of the original researchers but
and importance of the topic.
developed, the terms proliferated. Most re-
the conventions proposed by Carver and
self-awareness refers to the state, self
685
consciousness refers to the personality trait, and self-atten-
tion and self-focus refer to either or both.
Basic Theory Tbe original theory proposed by Duval
and Wicklund (1972) said that self-awareness was "bi-
nary" in the sense that it can be directed either inward or
outward. Some features of the original theory, such as a
distinction between different kinds of self-awareness (ob-
jective and subjective), have failed to have any meaningful
impact in the subsequent empirical work and therefore
been largely forgotten, but others have been quite influen-
tiaL In particular, Duval and Wicklund proposed that
awareness of self typically invokes a comparison to some
standard. Sheila does not merely notice the fact that she
has a certain height and weight; rather, she compares them
to standards such as an ideal height and weight. Duval and
Wicklund also observed that plenty of emotion can accom-
pany these comparisons with standards. Sheila gets upset if
she thinks she weighs too much. Duval and Wicklund went
so far as to propose that self-awareness will generally be an
aversive state, because people will usually fall short of the
standards against which they measure themselves.
Comparison to standards has been perhaps the most en-
during and influential aspect of self-awareness theory. Ap-
parently, the simple human phenomenon of reflexive con-
sciousness does not remain simple for long. Self-attention
is therefore highly evaluative and motivational. People start
wanting to change themselves so as to approach their stan-
dards, or to escape from awareness of self when change is
not possible (Steenbarger & Aderman, 1979).
The initial notion that self-awareness is generally un-
pleasant has been changed. Carver and Scheier (1981) re-
ported some of their own studies to the effect that people
enjoy self-awareness under some circumstances, which
certainly fits ample everyday observations that many peo-
ple enjoy talking and thinking about themselves and look-
ing in mirrors. The choice of standard may make a huge
difference. When people compare themselves to their
ideals, they may often feel upset or dejected because they
fall short (e.g., Higgins, 1987). But people typically be-
lieve that they are superior to the average person or to vari-
ous other targets, and so when they compare themselves to
other people (or an abstract average) they often feel quite
good about tbemselves (e.g., Brown & Dutton, 1995; Tay-
lor, 1989; Taylor & Brown, 1988).
The motivational aspect of self-awareness theory has
evolved in parallel fashion. Duval and Wicklund (1972)
pointed out that people feel bad wben they fall short of
their standards, and so they are motivated to do either of
two things: improve so as to meet the standard, or escape
from the aversive state of self-awareness. Their theory was
confirmed by research findings (see Wicklund, 1975), but
it needed to be modified to accommodate the pleasant side
of self-awareness that accompanies feeling that one is sur-
686 PartFour / Personal Phenomena
passing certain standards. Following success or other fa-
vorable comparisons, people may enjoy and seek out self-
awareness.
A study by Greenberg and Mnsham (1981) persua-
sively demonstrated the two sides of self-awareness. When
people had recently performed counterattitudinal behavior
that was designed to make them feel bad about them-
selves, they tended to avoid seats that faced toward a row
of minors. This occurred because the minors would make
them self-aware, which would be unpleasant in view of
their recent acts. In contrast, when people acted in ways
that exemplified their values, they preferred seats facing
toward minors. Thus, people seek out cues to increase
self-awareness when they have reason to feel good about
themselves.
The notion that self-awareness can motivate self-change
led Carver and Scheier (1981, 1982) to propose an elabo-
rate theory of self-awareness as a form of self-regulation,
which will be covered later (in the section on self-regula-
tion), and Higgins (1987, 1996) has likewise argued that
self-awareness is fundamentally oriented toward self-regu-
lation. Still, early work was sufficient to demonstrate the
motivational effect. Self-awareness was shown to increase
the effort people put into performing well at laboratory
tasks (Wicklund & Duval, 1971). Unfortuuately, some
tasks depend more on skill than on effort, and self-aware-
ness appears to be detrimental to skilled performance
(Baumeister, 1984). Thus, self-attention may either im-
prove or hamper task performance, depending on the type
of task.
When basic values are involved, self-awareness seems
to increase people's tendency to live up to their positive at-
titudes. People showed stronger cognitive dissonance ef-
fects in front of mirrors than when not made self-aware,
which suggests that self-attention increases the tendency to
be consistent (Wicklund & Duval, 1971). More important,
perhaps, is that moral and virtuous behavior seems to be in-
creased by self-awareness. A mirror manipulation of self-
awareness led to a reduction in cheating on a test by college
students (Diener & Wallbom, 1976). A mild form of steal-
ing-taking extra candy during a Halloween visit-was
significantly reduced among children who were made self-
aware (Beaman, KIentz, Diener, & Svanum, 1979). Sexual
morals are likewise intensified, or at least activated, by self-
awareness: Gibbons (1978) found that people with high
levels of sexual guilt and shame were more negative toward
erotic stimuli when they were made self-aware. The same
goes for aggression: men's inhibitions against attacking
women are intensified by self-awareness, resulting in lower
levels of aggression (Scheier, Fenigstein, & Buss, 1974).
The latter authors cited other (unpublished) evidence show-
ing that when aggression is presented in a positive light,
self-awareness increases aggression. Even inner restraints
that do not involve morality are intensified by self-aware-
ness. Thus, Heatherton, Polivy,lI~
(1993) showed that a failure exp~ti
eating of ice cream, but high self.;.aw
response-yet this pattern was·dniY
who have strong inner restraints aga]
In these views, self-awareness>se
beneficial function, even though it
pleasant. Yet the other side of the:
(1990) reviewed considerable evid
self-awareness are associatedwlt
chopathology, including depressid
nia, and alcoholism. Self-awareIl~~s
blessing.
Escaping Self-Awareness In-t
awareness theory said that self-aw
aversive, and so people would ofte?
Later the theory acknowledged th~\'
too, but it is nonetheless often ay~r~'
can be quite important. Earlystudi
try to avoid unpleasant states of.se
to escape were often measured.si
ance of mirrors or other self-focus
Wicklund, 1976; Greenberg & Mu
&Aderman, 1979). In everyday lff
mirrors is often not the issue and II
a miserable spell of reflecting on 'o
quacies. How do people escape self
One method that has withstoo
consume alcohol. Hull (l981)pr()
main effects of alcohol is to reduce
pairing the complex informationp
companies self-attention). Whell
themselves, therefore, they may
cated as a way of escaping from.t
enough, alcohol consumption inc
self-focused after a failure experi
Young, & Sher, 1983; Hull & YOU
holies relapse most quickly and th
high self-consciousness and expe
tive life eveuts (Hull, Young, & J()
gests that they use alcohol to esca
Alcohol may operate directly
other techniques can accomplish
ing from unpleasant self-awareness:
attention: they focus attention narro
crete, unemotional stimuli {see.Ste
and in particular they replace the:
troubling) aspects of self-awaren~~~
and-now focus on simple movemen
shifts effectively deconstruct thes~lf'
undo the elaborate and meaningful
and leave only the bare bones ofs¢~
least subject to evaluative standard
Chapter 15 / The Self
1:1pleasant emotion. Put another way, the phe-
if is shrunk to a minimum (Baumeister, 1991a).
Idely different behavioral patterns have been
ch efforts to escape self-awareness. Binge eat-
sjust such a restriction of focus to the physical
i:)f chewing, tasting, and swallowing, thus tem-
lotting out the broader issues of selfhood
11& Baumeister, 1991). Sexual masochism in-
use of pain, loss of control, and embarrassment
eordinary identity impossible to sustain and
ansform the person temporarily into someone
ister, 1988, 1989a). Meditation disciplines the
trict its focus to a minimal self-awareness, such
to one's breathing, in order to overcome the
d. motives of selfhood for the sake of spiritual
ut (Baumeister, 1991a). Suicidal behavior is
oit to terminate highly aversive self-awareness
'On (Baumeister, 1990). Spurious memories
abducted into flying saucers likewise appear to
y the motivation to escape self-awareness, and
have important parallels to the fantasies of sex-
ists (Newman & Baumeister, 1996).
failure to escape self-awareness can be quite
. Greenberg and Pyszczynski (1986) proposed
sion is centrally linked to perseverating in an
-aware state. They showed that failure tends to
ne self-aware for a while, which may be help-
Iipromprs people to examine what went wrong
ey failed. Nondepressed people soon come out
e.frowcver. Depressed people tend to stay in it
r, perseverating in their distress-filled thoughts
failures and inadequacies. The authors argued
riing indefinitely in the self-aware state is not
iseful and serves merely to prolong the distress.
c:..;0nsequences of Self-Awareness Other re-
have examined the cognitive consequences of
ness. One important view is that self-attention
rove introspection. After all, people should
is going on in their own psyches if they are at-
·t.
signs indicate that self-awareness does improve
ri. A pair of studies of attitude-behavior consis-
ryor, Gibbons, Wicklund, Fazio, and Hood
nd that self-awareness increased such consis-
precisely, self-ratings filled out in the presence
predicted subsequent behavior better than self-
out with no minor.
self-awareness seems to intensify emotional
least make them more salient. Scheier and
showed that both state and trait self-focus
with higher (i.e., more intense) ratings of
'responses to erotic pictures and mood-inducing
means by which self-awareness has this
687
effect are unclear, but one plausible explanation is simply
that self-awareness makes people more aware of their
inner states.
Hull and Levy (1979) proposed that self-awareness
should be understood as a pattern of information process-
ing. Thus, their theory presents self-awareness as a cogni-
tive process. Specifically, it involves processing informa-
tion in relation to the self, including heightened sensitivity
to implications of events for the self. They provided evi-
dence, for example, that self-awareness increased the self-
reference effect. Highly self-aware people were especially
likely to remember words that they had processed in rela-
tion to the self.
One of the most interesting cognitive consequences of
self-awareness, which seemingly follows directly from the
Hull and Levy view, is that it makes people overestimate
the degree to which external events are directed at them.
This self-as-target phenomenon (Fenigstein, 1984) may
form one basis of paranoid thinking among normal people.
A memorable study by Fenigstein used the occasion of
handing back midterm exan).s. In his study, the instructor
held up one exam before passing them back and gave a lit-
tle speech about how this exam was one of the worst (or, in
another condition, one of the best) he had ever seen. Fenig-
stein found that highly self-conscious students were most
likely to think the exam was theirs. Paranoid thinking is in
an important sense merely the high end of the self-refer-
ence effect.
Self-Concept, Self-Knowledge
The self is therefore not a simple object but rather a con-
struct. It is not directly perceived or known; instead, the
person (with the help of others) builds up a body of beliefs
about it (Higgins, 1996). The accumulation of this set of
beliefs is, in essence, the construction of the self, and it has
been a major concern of social psychology. For many
years, psychology studied "the" self-concept, as if it were
a single and unified entity. Gradually, however, it became
clear that people have a great deal of information about
themselves that is stored in a very loose fashion. It is there-
fore more appropriate to think about an aggregate of self-
schemas than about a single conception of self.
One definitional point is necessary. Dictionaries and
philosophers use the term knowledge to refer to beliefs that
are correct: "You can't know what ain't so," as philosophy
instructors chant in seminars. It is quite clear that people
have many beliefs about themselves that are far from defi-
nitely correct, and that they have some that are definitely
wrong. Conventional usage in social psychology accepts
the term serf-knowledge even for false beliefs about the
self, although informally some have acknowledged the
need for a term that would be restricted to correct beliefs.
688 Part Four I Personal Phenomena
In this chapter, self-knowledge inclndes all heliefs abont
the self, whether true or false.
Phenomenal Self An important corollary is that only a
small part of self-knowledge can be present in awareness at
any given time. In a sense, the very term "self-awareness"
is unrealistic, because a person could not possibly cram the
full stock of self-knowledge into awareness at once. Many
have adopted the term "phenomenal self" (from Jones &
Gerard, 1967) to refer to the part of self-knowledge that is
present in awareness at any given time. Other terms used
for the same purpose include the spontaneous self-concept
(McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978; McGuire,
McGuire, & Winton, 1979), and the working self-concept
(Markns & Kunda, 1986). To use the ever popular analogy
of the computer, the full stock of self-knowledge might be
compared to the disk full of information, and the phenome-
nal self would be compared to the small part of it that is
displayed on the screen at one time.
The distinction between the phenomenal self and the
full stock of self-knowledge is quite important. It means
that different beliefs about the self can coexist even if they
might be inconsistent. Only the phenomenal self would be
under pressure to be internally consistent; the person could
otherwise hold widely discrepant and even contradictory
views about self. As long as these did not become acti-
vated simultaneously, the person might never notice the
contradiction.
Such discrepancies help explain things such as the "P.
T. Barnum Effect" (Meehl, 1956), which refers to the
layperson's willingness to accept an arbitrary, ambiguous
statement by an expert as pertaining accurately to the indi-
vidual layperson, Social psychologists have used this effect
in many procedures: they administer a personality test and
then give each subject an identical, bogus personality eval-
uation, but most people believe it is indeed an individual
summary of their 'personalities (e.g., Aronson & Mettee,
1968). Of course, social psychologists are not alone in
their usage of the Barnum effect. The Barnum effect has
probably enabled astrologers, fortune tellers, and the like
to stay in business despite the lack of any valid basis for of-
fering people accurate, individual self-knowledge. Even
social psychologists like to read their fortune cookies.
The malleability and diversity of self-knowledge re-
ceived even more dramatic support from studies such as
those by Fazio, Effrein, and Falender, 1981. Biased ques-
tions asked people to furnish self-knowledge fitting broad
patterns of either extraversion or introversion (by random
assignment). Responding to these questions required the
activation of one particular type of self-knowledge, which
then predominated in the phenomenal self. Sure enough,
the subjects who furnished self-reports of extraverted acts
and tendencies later rated themselves as more extraverted
than subjects who had been asked to furnish self-reports of
introverted acts. In fact, theYev¢
traverted fashion in a sUbsequent~i
study is as follows: people haves,¢f
them seem introverted and oth
makes them seem extraverted, a.ll
vated so as to take over the pherm
When it does, self-descriptions
the pattern that has been activated.
Apart from inconsistent self-
tain beliefs about the self that IIi*$
and central or may remain neglec:~~d
ies by McGuire and his colleague~
cial composition of one's current
different features of the self -conce
become quite sensitive to factor
from other people around rhemB
otherwise female environment m
tral, and one is much more likel
prominent and important featureo
compared with being male in a.he
(McGuire et al., 1979).
The same applies to race ande
1978). If your racial or ethnicgro
likely to be quite aware of that-asp
contrast, when you are with peoplp
that aspect of identity may dropo
self. It is common for members-of
plain that minority members seem
nlc, racial, or gender idemity. but't
simple consequence of minorirysi
ity group members would likcwia
scious of their race or ethnicity jftll~
selves alone among people frorna?i
It is important to avoid assuming
are on a dichotomy or continutl
duced a crucial concept of being.e
one person may regard himself-a
dent, but another person may simp
self as one or the other.
Three Main Motives It is read
knowledge does not emerge simpl
operation of cognitive processes.
almost always subject to motivatio
can remain indifferent to irnp?rt~
about themselves. The motivati
knowledge can be grouped into tllI:
The first of these is the simple
self, which can he called the appr
this reflects a mere healthy cunosi
like to learn how others apprai
might have to say about them,-W~*
ality tests might produce, and sot?
doubts about the validity of suchm
Chapter 15 / The Self
hbJor accurate feedback. People seek to appraise
~~~s, opinions, and traits. The simple wish for
·.undeniable (Trope, 1983, 1986).
motivation is the wish for favorable informa-
the self, which is typically called the self-
himotive. Although a person may simply want
tit the self, usually he or she has strong prefer-
what that information will be, and the most
ference is to learn that one is good: competent,
any good, attractive, and so forth.
ople wish to confirm what they already believe
elves, which can.be called the consistency mo-
people have formed an opinion about them-
typically quite resistant to change. They will
out evidence that confirms it, and they dis-
ize, and often reject contrary evidence (Swann,
ere are three different types of information
If that people seek. They desire accurate infor-
"orable information, or information that con-
xisting beliefs. Assuming that people develop
the self because these are useful, helpful, and
daptive, it seems fairly easy to rank the three
terms of their usefulness. It seems fairly clear
e.self-knowledge would be the most useful, be-
beliefs about the self leave one vulnerable to
orly founded decisions. Consistency would
1 although not as helpful as accurate knowl-
fe do have a strong desire for a stable, pre-
ironment, and so people should also want self-
to be stable. (This argument parallels the
at pertains to people's views about other peo-
there seems to be a strong preference for con-
n to the point of minimizing inconsistent or
ormation; see Jones & Nisbett, 1971.) Mean-
able knowledge ahout the self would probably
useful or adaptive, especially when it consists
r.false beliefs about the self, such as delusions
priori basis, therefore, one might predict that
?1would be the strongest motivation, followed
IICY, with enhancement the weakest. Empirical
ikides (1993) concluded, however, that peo-
ations actually have the opposite ranking. He
self-enhancement is the strongest motive, fol-
usistency, with the appraisal motive being the
ether words, people are most strongly driven to
d.hear favorable, flattering things about them-
distant second, they desire information that
at they already believe about themselves. The
new, accurate information about the self is
t(although it is nonetheless real), Converging
Paulhus and Levitt (1987) showed that when
(fistracted or aroused, they tend to fall back on
689
automatic responses that are exceptionally favorable about
the self. (There may however be an automatic modesty re-
sponse when one is among close friends; see Tice, Butler,
Muraven, & Stillwell" 1995). Thus, the response of "auto-
matic egotism" again indicates a basic, deeply rooted ori-
entation toward self-enhancement. Why should self-
enhancement tendencies be so strong?
Benefits of Self-Enhancement The most likely explana-
tion is that the simple analysis presented above of the use-
fulness and adaptiveness of different types of self-knowl-
edge is wrong. Possibly self-enhancing beliefs, even if
unfounded, have strong benefits. For example, confidence
may breed persistence, which may be helpful for achieving
mauy forms of success (Taylor, 1989). Thus, a false but fa-
vorable belief about the self may lead to persistence which
in the end may produce genuine success.
Along the same lines, favorable views of self may form
a valuable resource for coping with stresses and setbacks.
Steele (1988) has proposed that high self-esteem is a kind
of resource that enables people to continue functioning
well in the face of failures and other problems. In this view,
people who think well of themselves have more of a re-
source than people who think poorly of themselves. The
greater "resourcemay help them in times of trouble.
The term positive illusions was coined by Taylor and
Brown (1988) to refer to beliefs about the self that are not
necessarily true. They provided evidence that these illu-
sions are associated with good adjustment and mental
health, and they concluded that seeing oneself in a highly
favorable,light helps to promote health and adjustment. Re-
alistic (and thus relatively negative) views of self are linked
to maladjustment, depression, and other problems (see also
Alloy & Abramsou, 1979; cf. Colvin & Block, 1994). They
proposed that positive illusions promote happiness, im-
prove interpersonal relations, boost intellectual function-
ing, and facilitate motivation and persistence, although
they noted that the evidence was sparse except for motiva-
tion and persistence.
Such benefits might seemingly be outweighed by the
dangers of illusions. After all, overconfidence might breed
fruitless persistence, overcornrnitment, and dangerous risk-
taking. Pelham (1993) described a study showing the peo-
ple with high self-esteem were more likely than others to
ride motorcycles without wearing helmets, for example.
The common theme among these dangers is that false be-
liefs (such as inflated views of the self) constitute an un-
suitable basis for making decisions.
There are two hypotheses as to how people avoid these
pitfalls of positive illusions. One is that they keep their illu-
sions relatively small, so that they can enjoy the benefits
without having their decision-making process warped by
major inaccuracies (Baumeister, 1989b). The other is that
people manage to turn off their illusions when they have an
 ~\
"

690 Part Four / Personal Phenomena Chapter 15 ! The Self 691

important decision to make. Gollwitzer and Kinney (1989)
showed that people seem to become quite accurate and re-
alistic when they are in the frame of mind associated with
making decisions; once the decision is made, they return to
a frame of mind suited to implementing it, and this latter
state is accompanied by positive illusions.
Self-Deception Processes Given the powerful motivation
to think well of oneself, it is necessary to ask how people
manage to maintain such self-flattering views in the face of
mixed and even contrary evidence. Social psychologists
have in fact devoted considerable time and effort to the
study of such processes. Insofar as these constitute ways of
supporting an inflated view of self, they may be called self-
deception. It must be acknowledged, however, that this is a
very loose definition of self-deception. More traditional
and rigorous views of self-deception require proof that the
person simultaneously knows and does not know the same
information, in order to fill both the roles of deceiver and
deceived (Gnr & Sackeim, 1979; Sackeim & Gnr, 1979;
Sartre, 1953). Very little work has satisfied these stringent
criteria, leading Gur and Sackeim (1979) to label self-de-
ception "a concept in search of a phenomenon."
Yet the evidence is clear that people do end up with in-
flated views of themselves. Self-esteem scores typically
run from the high end to the middle of possible scores, but
there are very few at the low end (Baumeister, Tice, & Hut-
ton, 1989), suggesting that self-esteem is generally some-
what inflated across the population. A survey of high
school seniors found that only 2 percent rated themselves
as below average in leadership ability and none rated them-
selves as below average on ability to get along with others
(whereas 25 percent rated themselves as being in the top 1
percent on the latter dimension!) (College Board,
1976-1977; see Gilovich, 1991). Svenson (1981) fonnd
that 90 percent of an adult sample rated themselves as
above average drivers. Cross (1977) showed that 94 per-
cent of college professors rated themselves as better than
their average colleague at their jobs.
A classic paper by Greenwald (1980) compared the self
to a totalitarian regime: it distorts the past and manipulates
the present. Whatever makes it look good is exaggerated.
Whatever makes it look bad is downplayed, discredited,
and denied. Taylor and Brown (1988) outlined three main
patterns of positive illusion (see also Goleman, 1985). Peo-
ple have unrealistically positive views of their abilities and
good traits. They also exaggerate their control over events.
And they are excessively optimistic about their own future.
Given the fact that self-deception occurs right at the in-
terface between motivation and cognition, which are two
enduring and fundamental concerns of most psychologists,
considerable research has been devoted to the multiple
processes and tricks that sustain these favorable views of
self. The major ones are as follows.
First, people show
outcomes. The self-serving
internal attributions for success
for failure. Hence the self gets Ctel:l'
but dodges the blame when thing"
(1979) reviewed thirty-eight stud!
most of them, failure led to an incr
tions. Recent evidence points to
moral transgressions: people tel1clt
deeds and transgressions by citing~*
igating circumstances (Baumeister,
1990; Gonzales, Pederson, Manning}
Second, people discover flaWsi
them in an unflattering light. They
ever, about evidence that portrays
Thus, in several studies, peopleh#
validity of tests on which theyha
Greenberg, & Holt, 1985; Wyet
Kunda, 1990). As most insrructorsk
top grades tend to think the testw
whereas those who do poorly areIli
and unfairness.
Third, people minimize theam
processing critical feedback, at leas
do so (Baumeister & Cairns, 1992
over praise or success feedback.ex
and implications, but criticism doe
the same thorough reception (exce
searching for reasons to refute it).
fore less likely to be encoded into
Fourth, and possibly as a result
time, people selectively forgetfail
calling positive information about
Crary (1966) showed that people b
by not remembering failures'K..~i
found that nondepressed people.re
rives better than unfavorable 0
processed in relation to the self.
Zeiss (1976) showed a memorybi
back about one's good traits bet
one's faults and shortcomings.
Fifth, people compare themsel
can make them look good (Will
Major (1989) proposed tbat eventh
minority groups may earn less 111011
cess than white men, they can maiu
not comparing themselves against
compare themselves against other
makes them look good. Indeed;
crease the tendency to compare?
cessful others, as well as the tende
valne others (Wills, 1981), whic
nature of this form of self-deceptio
Sixth, in response to immediat
~ir memory in a very biased way to find evi-
t!ley have desirable traits. When people are led
that introversion is desirable and is associated
g,they recall more of their own actions as intro-
they are quicker to come up with introverted
than when they are told that extraversion is as-
ith success (Sanitioso, Knnda, & Fong, 1990).
memory searches help people shift their self-
desired direction (Knnda & Sanitioso, 1989).
dHolmes (1993, 1994) provided a memorable
tion of this in the field of relationship percep-
has recently converged with self-perceptions
that people try to convince themselves of the
ality of their close relationships just as they
emselves of the high quality of their personal
en subjects were asked about conflict in their
Honships, most subjects indicated very little
nsistent with their assumption that conflict was
oubled or inferior relationship. Other subjects,
ere given bogus evidence that supposedly
some conflict is a healthy sign of a good rela-
se subjects abruptly began to recall quite a bit
their relationships.
people tend to think that their good traits are
ile their faults and flaws are common (Camp-
arks, 1984; Suls & Wan, 1987). In particular,
it their perception of others differently with re-
ions and abilities. With opinions, people over-
Vi many people are similar to them, which pre-
elps furnish the sense that one's views are
abilities, however, people underestimate how
are similar to them, which helps furnish a
ne's abilities are special or unique (Marks,
patterns are especially strong among people
If-esteem (Campbell, 1986). These patterns are
Ily strong for one's best abilities and on those
t to one's self-concept (Campbell, 1986;
4).
people shift the meaning of ambiguous traits so
imize the payoff for themselves (Dunning,
@, & Holzberg, 1989). For example, nearly
nts to be a good parent, but the precise criteria
renthood may be quite variable. Some may
good parents on the basis of never punishing
rule others may claim to be a good parent be-
g careful and stern disciplinarians. Some may
parents because they stayed home with
of the time, while others who spent little
they were good parents because they were
for hard work and because they provided
Gilovich (1991) provided a memorable il-
effect by pointing out that every kid can
dog on the block, simply by choosing a dif-
of canine excellence.
Ninth, people sometimes dismiss criticism as motivated
by prejudice or other factors that discredit it (Crocker &
Major, 1989). Crocker, VoelkI, Testa, and Major (1991)
showed that the state self-esteem of black subjects was un-
affected by derogatory feedback from white subjects, as
long as the blacks were able to assume that prejudice might
have influenced the evaluation. Only when they were told
that the white evaluators did not know their race did the
black subjects show a drop in self-esteem as a result of
those evaluations.
Thus, people have many ways of creating a favorable
bias in the way they process information about themselves.
The multiplicity of self-deceptive processes is an important
indication of the power of the self-enhancement motive.
People want to resist loss of esteem at all costs. By engag-
ing in one or more of these strategies, people can maintain
favorable views of themselves and even make their self-
images more favorable, even when objective reality does
not quite cooperate in furnishing a steady stream of flatter-
ing indications.
Maintaining Consistency The previous section argued
that self-deception is common and pervasive. There is
however an important qualification to the conclusion that
people are relentlessly concerned with raising their self-
esteem. Although a self-enhancement motive would cer-
tainly predict a great deal and variety of self-deception, a
self-consistency motive would make many of the same pre-
dictions. After all, people already think well of themselves,
perhaps better than reality shonld allow. Perhaps they en-
gage in self-deception simply to maintain this consistent
belief in their good qualities and traits.
Although consistency has certainly been the most-stud-
ied motive in the social psychology of attitudes, it has not
enjoyed equal prominence in the study of the self. Yet it
cannot be denied that people try to maintain consistent
views about themselves. Snllivan (1953) proposed tbat
once a child (or older person) forms some concept about
the self, he or she is very reluctant to change it. Most other
writers about the self have agreed with this assertion (e.g.,
Greenwald, 1980).
The self-consistency motive in social psychology has
figured prominently in the work of Swann (e.g., 1985,
1987). In an early stndy, Swann and Hill (1982) noted the
seeming contradiction that many social psychologists re-
garded self-concepts as pliable and malleable, whereas
clinical psychologists (who are in the business of trying to
change people) often found it discouragingly difficult to ef-
fect such changes. They proposed that social psychologists
may have maintained this view of self-concept malleability
by choosing ambiguous traits about which people may lack
definite self-conceptions, and by denying people the op-
portunity to resist or refute efforts to change them. In their
study, they provided people with feedback that was dis-
692 PartFour / Personal Phenomena Chapter 15 I The 5elf 693

crepant from their self-conceptions. They found that peo-
ple generally rejected that feedback and reasserted their
prior beliefs about themselves. Only when people were un-
able to make such contrary assertions did they show any
malleability of self-concept.
Swann (1985,1987) went on to coin the term self-verifi-
cation to describe people's quest for feedback that would
confirm their views about themselves. In Swann's view,
people desire stable predictability above all else, and
changes to one's self-concept are therefore unwelcome-
even including changes toward a more positive view of
self. He contended that people seek out confirmatory feed-
back, especially with regard to self-schernas about which
they are certain. When people do not have clear and defi-
nite views about themselves, they may be receptive to dis-
crepant (and favorable) information.
The consistency motive overlaps with the enhancement
motive in many cases. As already noted, most people think
well of themselves, and so the widespread preference for
favorable feedback-like the common tendencies to dis-
miss and discredit bad feedback-may serve both the en-
hancement and consistency motives. The two diverge, how-
ever, with regard to people who hold firm but unfavorable
views about themselves. Do these people with low self-
esteem prefer flattering or unflattering feedback? Do peo-
ple desire to hear that they are better than they had thonght,
and if they do receive such information do they believe it?
Different studies have provided different answers, but
gradually some common conclusions have emerged.
One conclusion is that the consistency motive tends to
dominate cognition, whereas the enhancement motive
dominates affect. For example, suppose Ellen does not
think she is beautiful, but Harry tells her that she is. She
may feel good at hearing this, but she does not necessarily
believe it; indeed, after receiving such a compliment, she
may like Harry more than she trusts him. Maybe he is just
preparing to ask to borrow some money from her. A litera-
ture review by Shranger (1975) fonnd that most of the
studies favoring enhancement motives had used affective
measures, whereas most of the ones yielding consistency
effects had used cognitive ones. Swann, Griffin, Predmore,
and Gaines (1987) proposed that these discrepant re-
sponses produce a "cognitive-affective crossfire" for peo-
ple who receive feedback telling them they are better than
they thonght (see also Jussim, Yen, & Aiello, 1995; McFar-
lin & Blascovich, 1981). The heart says yes, while the
brain says no.
A later paper proposed that the self-enhancement re-
sponse is automatic, whereas the self-verification one is
controlled (Swann, Hixon, Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert,
1990). Consistency effects therefore are slower and require
more cognitive processing than enhancement effects. Peo-
ple quickly and easily feel good when they receive highly
favorable feedback. To begin questioning it takes some
time and thought, however. In;a se
response requires the person to 0"
able reaction to the praise. For thist
effects may be less obvious ns
enhancement effects. In the long{-
sometimes prove to be the more
ones.
Self-Perception versus Introspect;
cussion has emphasized how self-
shaped, and maintained, which·h~ve
concerns of social psychologists.'B
edge begin? One broad and count
formation of self-knowledge was
1972) under the title of self-percept
ory was originally proposed as an
for research findings on cognitived
it will be covered elsewhere in this
purposes, the issue is simply ho""W
serve as a model for the constructiOn
The essence of self-percepti.O#
learn about themselves in muchihe
about other people: they observe~§
ences. What is radical about self-per
minimizes the reliance on introsji
privileged access (e.g., that you ca
better than anyone else can know it
do believe in special knowledge all
cial psychology has repeatedly qriss
at least shown that introspectionist:
curate than people assume (Nisbe
treats self-perception as merely all
ception, subject to the same attribut
ference processes.
It must be acknowledged that-the
somewhat misleading. As already
perceived directly. Rather, one obs
ities and in interaction with the
draws inferences about the selfb
tions. Self-observation would thef
and apt title for the theory thansel
is admittedly easy and somewhat
one's selection of terminologythr
It is also worth noting that tbe.p
perception theory is an especially
stration of the sort of process Ka*t
self-knowledge, given that the self
rectly but merely constructed front
The self-perception processes
(1972) are fnndamentally correct
Research on attitudes has shownth
infer their opinions from their as
drastic changes to the self-concept
Zanna, & Cooper, 1977; Taylor,lg,
to infer their motivations from observing their
ther than from directly knowing what they like
(Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973). Thus, there
which people can be fooled about themselves:
induced to act in certain ways, they will draw
even false conclusions about themselves.
ther hand, self-perception appears to be just
Veral processes by which self-knowledge is
d maintained. To say that self-perception
ccur when no major self-views are at stake and
sIie within the person's latitude of acceptance
the range of what the person is willing to be-
self; Fazio et al., 1977) is to say that self-
processes are not the major causes of important
beliefs abont the self. Taylor (1975) concluded
rception processes seem limited to cases in
ssues are relatively unimportant and inconse-
hen even moderately important consequences
(in her study, choosing a member of the op-
s an interaction partner), people did not sue-
sions of self-perception and instead paused to
vailable information carefully.
rtance of inner phenomena to self-knowledge
y Andersen (1984; Andersen & Ross, 1984).
dRoss (1984) noted that research had not
preciatcd Bern's (1965, 1972) own caveats re-
f-perception processes. In particular, Bern had
If-perception based on making inferences from
ior would occur mainly when internal cues
ghts and emotions) were weak or ambiguous.
was not making the radical proposal that all
ge derived from the self-perception processes
cHc merely said that people fall back on such
hen they have nothing else to use.
se, Andersen and Ross (1984) showed the im-
inner, private phenomena. They showed that
d feelings are regarded as providing a much
to what someone is really like than mere overt
one study, subjects reported that another per-
learn more about them from knowing their
d feelings for one day than from observing
behavior for several months. Both actors and
elieved that thoughts and feelings reveal more
elf than actions. In another study, Andersen
ed that hearing about someone's thoughts and
emirs one to make more accurate inferences
erson than hearing about the person's behavior.
as measured by degree of agreement between
ratings and both the target's self-ratings and
target's close friends.)
'(jtlllection, it is useful to recall that one of the
debates in social psychology has con-
and validity of introspection. A classic
and Wilson (1977) argned that introspec-
tion is overrated: people do not use it when they think they
do, and it is often inaccurate. They proposed that even
when people try to introspect and give an honest explana-
tion for their acts, they are often merely reciting a priori
theories and standard explanations. Critical responses to
their article have objected that their experimental tests
made unreasonable demands on the introspective capacity
and were excessively negative in their conclusions (e.g.,
Sabini & Silver, 1981; Smith & Miller, 1978).
Probably the best integration of this work is to note that
people generally do know the contents of their minds but
may generally be unable to know the process by which
these emerged. Introspection may be quite valid and accu-
rate when people are asked to report what they are think-
ing and feeling. It may however be quite inaccurate when
people seek to analyze how they arrived at these thoughts
and feelings (see Wilson, Dunn, Bybee, Hyman, & Ro-
tondo, 1984).
The most appropriate conclusion appears to be that self-
knowledge is derived from several sources of information.
There is a widespread and at least somewhat valid belief
that thoughts and feelings form a very good basis for learn-
ing about the self. When such information is not readily
available, merely observing behavior and making infer-
ences is a useful alternative source.
Organization of Self-Knowledge Social psychology has
only begun to explore how self-knowledge is organized in
memory. It is clear that the organization is fairly loose, es-
pecially insofar as the phenomenal self can bring up quite
different images of self and seemingly inconsistent self-
views can coexist (e.g., Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skel-
ton, 1981; Tetlock, 1986). The general organization corre-
sponds to what Fiske and Taylor (1991) described as a
schema, in the sense that there are nodes with attributes
loosely attached to the nodes but not necessarily attached
to each other.
Of particular interest in this connection is a study by
Higgins, Van Hook, and Dorfman (1988). They used a
modified Stroop color-naming task to look for evidence
that various parts of the self-concept (i.e., various traits that
people had used to describe themselves) would prime each
other. They found no effects to suggest that different pieces
of self-knowledge are interconnected. They were not ready
to conclude that self-knowledge is thoroughly discon-
nected, but their findings suggest that interconnections
among pieces of self-knowledge can often be weak and
distant at best.
Probably the most thoroughly studied aspect of the or-
ganization of self-knowledge is Higgins's (1987; see also
Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1987) theory that people have
different self-guides. The main ones are the ideal self (con-
taining mainly positive ideas about the person one would
like to be) and the ought self (involving various moral and
694 Part Four / Personal Phenomena
other ohligations ahout what one should try to he). Hig-
gins's full theory has added that people actually have to
grapple with occasional differences between what they
themselves think they ought to be and what someone else
(e.g., a parent) thinks they ought to he. Differeutsituatious
can activate either the ought self or the ideal self.
A particularly important aspect of Higgins's theorizing
is that different emotions are implicated as a function of
which self-guide is operating. When people believe they
are falling short of their ideal selves-that is, when they
perceive a discrepancy between their actual self and their
ideal self-they tend to feel aversive emotions with low
arousal levels, such as sadness, dejection, and depressed
mood. In contrast, a discrepancy between actual self and
ought self leads to aversive but high arousal emotions, such
as anxiety and guilt.
The notion that people vary in the organization of self-
kuowledge was iutroduced hy Linville (1985, 1987). She
proposed that some people have simple organizations of
self-knowledge, which means that different features of the
self-concept are interrelated. In contrast, other people have
complex organizations, in which the different facets are
largely unrelated. Linville developed a method for assess-
ing these differences, although some researchers have sug-
gested that the particular method does not do justice to
Linville's conceptions (Buder Shapiro, 1995).
Perhaps the most intriguing consequence that accompa-
nies these differences in self-complexity is in the impact of
stress or other aversive events. The complex self has an ad-
vantage under stress because it can compartmentalize the
threatening implications. Thus, for example, if Phyllis has
a simple self in which her identities as mother and painter
overlap, then she is fully vulnerable: any failure as a
mother will also spill over into her painter identity. If she
maintains a complex self and the two identities are largely
unrelated, she may still be upset if her teenage daughter
dyes her hair purple and starts sleeping with scores of rock
musicians, but it will have less impact on her painting.
Another pattern of individual differences in the organi-
zation of self-knowledge was proposed by Hansen and
Hansen (1988). In their view, repressors manage to main-
tain a happy, untroubled attitude by using a variation on the
Freudian defense mechanism of isolation. Specifically,
they prevent associations from forming between unpleas-
ant experiences or thoughts. For many people, one upset-
ting thought will remind them of another, resulting in an
associative chain of misery. Hansen and Hansen found that
repressors got just as upset as other people in terms of their
primary response to something unpleasant, but among re-
pressors the first bad memory did not set off other bad feel-
ings and thoughts,
Compartmentalization of good and bad aspects of self-
knowledge was studied hy Showers (1992). Like Hausen
and Hansen, she proposed that keeping undesirable infer-
mation about the self isolatedinnl.~
sive way to minimize its impact. A.
broke down when the unfavorabl~
highly important, compartmenta1iZ~t
self-esteem and the absence of depre
Self-esteem may be defined asthe
son's evaluation of self. Thus, sel:f-
aspect of reflexive consciousness:.i~
ment based on self-knowledge. 1rl#
reference makes self-awarenessp
self-kuowledge possible, which in.t
possihle. Amid the social psycho]
nity's extensive shifts of intere
subtopics pertaining to self, self-
consistent and durable. Every de~a
contributions. Apparently the topi
deeply rooted or multifaceted appeal'
Interest in self-esteem is not co
community, of course, The Americ
gradually come to appreciate (so
mate; see Dawes, 1994) the importa
ordinary human functioning. Politici
workers, and others have come ton
may hold the key to understanding-au
social problems (see CaliforniaTa~~
ticular, parents and schools seemno
with ensuring that children have hig
The reality of the effects of self-
ited and prosaic than these optimi
suggest. Self-esteem is linked to s
itive outcomes, yet even with thes~
which direction the causal arrow poi
people with high self-esteem are.ge
in the face of failure than people wi
Shrauger & Roseuherg, 1970; Shr~~
It seems likely that high self-esteem
tence, but it is difficult to rule?~
higher persistence may contribntet
Meanwhile, even this advantage is .
self-esteem persist longer than cth
tence is counterproductive, so some'
ing time, effort, and other resource
lin, Baumeister, & Blascovich, 1984
Some basic disagreements rel11-
proach the topic of self-esteem.
esteem would seem to have bothc
components. (As will shortly he sh
cognitive aspects of self-esteem ha
tent with the view that self-esteemin
tive importance of these two is sllbJ~
though most researchers have re
Chapter 15 / The Self
self-kuowledge) aspect of self-esteem,
has contended that self-esteem should be
primarily an affective response: a globallik-
or, in the case of low self-esteem, a muted
extreme cases, dislike). Brown (1994) com-
(_esteem to a parent's esteem for his or her child:
response seems to appear strongly and imme-
waiting for detailed cognitive appraisals.
perennial debate is whether to emphasize
[~e';tel,m or specific dimensions. John may think
but plays tennis well, while Ann thinks she
tifully and can scarcely make contact with a
all, Attempts to predict these two individuals'
to the upcoming choir tryouts from their global
:rTl may be misguided. On the other hand, mea-
Iobal self-esteem have been used far more widely
ed far more significant results than measures of
ecific self-esteem, Some may say, though, that
pmeasures do well because they generally empha-
issues of competence, aptitude, and ability to get
hothers, which are important to nearly everyone.
tative resolution of the global versus specific
s a hierarchical model (Fleming & Courtney,
this view, people do have various domain-spe-
ppralsals, but they also have a global evaluation.
be that there is a general or global self-esteem
ich is strongly related to most of the domain-ape-
praisals. If so, self-esteem would resemble in-
,in which there are multiple distinct abilities but
pal (g) factor that is correlated with all of them.
eseeable future, it seems likely that basic re-
will continue to rely mainly on measures of
-esteem, but they may maintain some awareness
-specific variations. Global self-esteem has the
eoretical importance, but applied research may
domain-specific measures. When seeking to pre-
lies confined to a specific sphere, in particular, it
ful and advantageous to shift to the appropriate
cific measure.
rea of controversy concerns whether to regard
as a state or a trait. Although trait measures of
have dominated the research (e.g.. Janis &
9); some researchers have sought to manipulate
states, such as by giving bogus feedback (e.g.,
Mettee, 1968; Sigall & Gould, 1977). Such ma-
s-ate subject to alternative explanations involving
self-presentational concerns, so they have gener-
cd out of fashion as a preferred way of studying
. Still, recent work has provided evidence of
tions in self-esteem (e.g., Kernis, 1993), and a
asure of state self-esteem is available (Heather-
Iivy, 1991). The state measure appears to he
rrelated with the trait measures. The implication
most people have a rather stable and clear
695
baseline of self-esteem, and their current self-appraisals
fluctuate (to varying degrees) around that baseline.
Motivation: Why Care about Self-Esteem? Whatever
the optimal approach to measuring self-esteem may be,
and whatever the practical benefits mayor may not turn
out to be, it is clear that self-esteem is quite important to
people. Changes in self-esteem level are often accompa-
nied by strong emotional responses. A great deal of the re-
search in social psychology relies on the assumption that
people are motivated to protect and enhance their self-es-
teem, as indeed the discussion on self-deception earlier in
this chapter showed.
But why is it important? Contrary to popular impres-
sion, self-esteem does not have a broad range of direct con-
sequences. It is difficult to argue that nature has instilled a
strong self-esteem motive, because the evolutionary bene-
fits of self-esteem (in terms of increasing survival or repro-
duction) seem negligible. Indeed, one might invoke an
evolutionary argument that self-esteem should be counter-
productive, insofar as overconfidence could lead to danger-
ous risk-taking. Furthermore, as we shall see shortly, there
is a serious lack of evidence for beneficial or adaptive con-
sequences of self-esteem, which suggests that there is very
little pragmatic reason for people to want it.
Several answers have been proposed regarding the roots
of concern with self-esteem. Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and
Solomon (1986; see also Pyszczynski et al., 1997) have
proposed that people are fundamentally motivated hy the
fear of death and that self-esteem is a way of conquering
that fear. They have adapted Becker's (1973) view that
people are driven by death anxiety to identify with cultural
groups and values, and that self-esteem consists of seeing
oneself as a valued member of such a group, which some-
how helps to minimize the existential terror of mortality.'
To support their "terror management" views about self-
esteem, these researchers showed that high levels of self-
esteem reduced self-reported anxiety and physiological
arousal in response to cues designed to evoke thoughts of
death aud paiu (Greenherg, Solomon et al., 1992). They
also cite Paulhus and Levitt's (1987) finding that people
described themselves more positively when distracted by
stimulus words connected with death (e.g., coffin). Unfor-
tunately, these may retlect broad affective patterns rather
than being specific to death. Paulhus and Levitt found sim-
ilar patterns for emotionally laden words that were not
death-related (e.g., penis). An attempt to fiud direct links
lThis seems illogical. Self-esteem should exacerbate rather than atten-
uate the fear of death. The greater the value placed on the self-that
is, the higher the self-esteem-the greater the calamity one's death is.
Low self-esteem would seem to be the best way to deal with fear of
death, because it minimizes the value of what dies.
 Part Four / Personal Phenomena
696
between death anxiety and self-esteem failed to show any
correlations (Leary, Saltzman, & Bednarski, 1995; Leary &
Schreindorfer, 1997).
Another theory that may be relevant to the concern with
self-esteem is Steele's (1988) self-affirmation theory (see
also Spencer, Josephs, & Steele, 1993). In this view, posi-
tive opinions about the self are a valuable affective re-
source to aid in coping. Failure, misfortune, ego threats,
and other sources of stress may be debilitating to people
with low self-esteem, but people with high self-esteem can
persist and endure better.
The self-affirmation view has the advantage that it fits
nicely with the few advantages that have been associated
with high self-esteem, specifically persistence in the face
of failure. To provide further support, self-affirmation re-
searchers have shown that people with high self-esteem are
less upset by failures and other forms of bad feedback, in
part because they have plenty of positive traits to think
about even if they do fail in some particular domain. In
contrast, people with low self-esteem are more likely to be
discouraged and dejected by failures, because they do not
have a large stock of other good points with which to con-
sole themselves (Spencer et al., 1993).
The self-affirmation explanation has the added advan-
tage that it emphasizes the emotional benefits, which seem
to be the main ones. As already noted, self-esteem does not
have strong pragmatic or material consequences, and yet
people go to great lengths to preserve and protect it. Why
would they try so hard to gain and preserve something that
is worth little? A likely answer is that self-esteem makes
one feel good, regardless of objective consequences. In-
deed, there is a strong negative correlation between self-
esteem and depression, although the causal interpretation is
higWy uuclear (see Tennen & Affleck, 1993). The main
drawback of the self-affirmation theory is that it is some-
what circular as an explanation of the desire for self-
esteem. Yes, self-esteem does help one cope with threats to
self-esteem-but why are threats to self-esteem so prob-
lematic in the first place? Why is there so much affect sur-
rounding self-esteem?
A third view is that self-esteem is important because it
serves as an aid in the basic human project of getting along
with others. Leary, Tambor, Terdal, and Dowus (1995) pro-
posed that self-esteem is a sociometer, that is, an internal
measure of how one is succeeding at social inclusion. They
provided evidence that self-esteem rises when one is ac-
cepted or liked by others, while social rejection and exclu-
sion tends to bring about a decline in self-esteem.
The sociometer theory has much to recommend it. In
the first place, there is abundant evidence that people are
pervasively concerned with the need to form and maintain
interpersonal connections (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and
such a drive would have clear evolutionary benefits. The
sociometer view can also readily explain why so much
emotion is linked to self-esteem'9¢
responses are generally associated
tionships. Self-esteem as an inter
that need would be highly plausib
parent that self-esteem is based
make one appealing to others:c:d
attractiveness. Meanwhile, where
negligible correlations with self~
strongly correlated. A review of
that the average correlation bet
self-esteem is about -0.50 (Lear)!
There are several possible obj
view. It does seem that peoplec
without having -any close relatio
self-esteem seems more stable'tf
and that the link between one'si'
and self-esteem is not just a direct
cidate those issues is the currenf-c
theory.
Thus, at present there ares
about the source of the concern",
it is common to treat them asri
many respects compatible, and it
some validity. It is clear thats.~l
most people, even despite its app
objective benefits.
Cognitive and Affective Aspects
McFarliu and Blascovich (1981)f
tions about how people with 16
and approach task performanc9'
with low self-esteem want to succe
pie with high self-esteem, butthey
that they will. Thus, in a sense,t~~
are similar, but the cognitive exp~cta
tial failure causes people with}
their expectations about future.p
ple with high self-esteem iron.'
tions. The latter pattern seemsi
failure increase one's expectatio
assumes that high self-esteem
failure is an unacceptable, exec
unlikely to be repeated. Subseq
people with high self-esteemprF
ing initial failure if they have the:
esteem makes people turn theira
cies and failures in order tobri
adequate level (Baumeister &'1'1
thread is that people with high~~
to avoid repeating a failure. !h.e
with high self-esteem expect and
and they are not very interested}
In contrast, people with low self
ing their deficiencies rathert~~
Chapter 15 / The Self
aits, because they are mainly concerned with
ures.
hitive processes associated with self-esteem
d.~cisively illuminated in recent work by Camp-
Campbell & Lavallee, 1993). These studies
eng and extensive evidence of a series of cog-
ffective differences that are correlated with
>The general conclusion is that high self-
sociated with more thorough, accurate, and ex-
_knowledge than low self-esteem. These find-
from Campbell (1990) except as otherwise
e summarized as follows.
ople with high self-esteem give themselves
e self-ratings than people with low self-
pIe with low self-esteem tend to give them-
rmediate, noncommittal ratings (even on
ive dimensions), consistent with the view that
have definite self-knowledge. Further relevant
<l.sprovided by Greenwald, Bellezza, and Banaji
oshowed that people with high self-esteem can
er lists than people with low self-esteem of
isliked activities, group memberships, and simi-
nded self-reports, suggesting that high self-
scciated with more extensive self-knowledge.
people with high self-esteem have higher cer-
(their self-knowledge. When people are asked
selves on various trait scales and to say how
nfident they are that their self-ratings are cor-
teem is correlated with certainty. Likewise, it
e with low self-esteem longer to respond to
bout themselves. Campbell's (1990) conclu-
ived support from another investigation by
or (1990), who found that people with low self-
e.slower to answer questions about themselves
d broader (i.e., less precise and specific) confi-
als for those answers.
self-ratings of people with high self-esteem
over time than those of people with low self-
pbell found this in a simple test-retest proce-
lso found that prior self-ratings were more
elated with ratings of how one had acted in a
rpersonal encounter among people with high
f-esteem. Thus, low self-esteem is associated
lions in ideas about oneself, as well as with in-
between initial, global self-ratings and specific
Self-knowledge is apparently more consistent
among people with high self-esteem.
the self-knowledge of people with high self-
ore internally consistent than that of people
If-esteem. In oue study Campbell obtained self-
a'Iong measure that contained several sets of
and antonyms. People with high self-esteem
ive the same answers regardless of the precise
as used. People with low self-esteem were
697
more likely to give answers that contradicted what they had
already said about themselves.
Fifth, people with high self-esteem show more self-
serving biases in their responses to feedback and other
events. A review by Blaine aud Crocker (1993) showed
several patterns. High self-esteem is associated with a ten-
dency to take credit for success and deny blame for failure,
as well as with memory biases that exaggerate successes
and minimize failures, and with a tendency to exaggerate
one's control over events (especially ones that turn out
well). They found that people with low self-esteem and de-
pressed people do not seem to have those self-serving bi-
ases. In some studies, these people are relatively even-
handed (e.g., taking equal credit for success and failure),
and in some studies they show self-deprecating biases
(e.g., blaming oneself for failure but rejecting credit for
success).
It must be noted that there are both cognitive and moti-
vational explanations for the biases documented by Blaine
and Crocker (1993), as they were careful to explain. People
with high self-esteem may have higher and clearer expecta-
tions about how life will treat them, and these expectations
may cause them to attend to and encode different informa-
tion than what someone lacking self-esteem would. They
concluded that high and low self-esteem people have simi-
lar motivations, especially insofar as they both would like
to have successes and other positive outcomes, but people
with low self-esteem are less likely to act on the basis of
these self-enhancing motives.
Sixth, there are important emotional differences. In a
longitudinal diary study, Campbell, Chew, aud Scratchley
(1991) examined how people respond emotionally to the
eveuts of their daily lives. They found that people with low
self-esteem generally had less pleasant and less positive
moods than people with high self-esteem. They also found
that people with low self-esteem had greater emotional
variability. They provided some evidence that the events
experienced by their subjects did not vary as a function of
self-esteem; that is, it was not the case that people with low
self-esteem had more extreme or more unpleasant things
happen to them. They simply reacted to similar events with
wider and wilder mood swings. The implication is that
high self-esteem operates as a kind of emotional anchor,
producing affective stability in the face of events.
These patterns provide a consistent and compelling pic-
ture of the cognitive and emotional aspects of self-esteem.
Apparently self-knowledge is more thorough and precise
(which is not necessarily to say more accurate) among peo-
ple with high self-esteem. Put another way, people with
low self-esteem suffer from what Campbell and Lavallee
(1993) call "self-concept confusion," insofar as their ideas
about themselves are uncertain, contradictory, and unsta-
ble. The lack of firm self-knowledge may well be what
leaves those people at the mercy of daily events, and this
 ---~.

698 Part Four / Personal Phenomena Chapter 15 / The 5elf 699

vulnerability is reflected in their high emotional reactivity.
People with high self-esteem have firm and favorable
views of themselves, which they seem to protect vigor-
ously by processing information in biased, self-serving
ways, and which keep them on an even emotional keel
amid the slings and arrows of daily life.
Social and Interpersonal Patterns Self-esteem is also
associated with different patterns of social behavior, apart
from the cognitive and affective differences. (In principle
these belong in the next part of this chapter, along with in-
terpersonal patterns, but for the reader's convenience these
are presented here with the rest of the self-esteem mater-
ial.) Indeed, such differences were one of the original
sources of research interest in self-esteem. Janis (1954)
began to study self-esteem in connection with persuasion,
pursuing the hypothesis that people with low self-esteem
are more easily persuaded than people with high self-
esteem. One of the most influential and popular measures
of self-esteem was developed specifically for use in studies
of attitude change (Janis & Field, 1959).
The view that low self-esteem is associated with greater
persuasibility was supported in those early studies, and
subsequent work built upon that start to link low self-
esteem to a broad range of susceptibility to influence and
manipulation. An influential review by Brockner (1984)
concluded that low self-esteem is marked by what he
called "behavioral plasticity"-that is, people with low
self-esteem are broadly malleable. A broad variety of ex-
perimental manipulations, ranging from anxiety-provoking
stimuli to expectancy and self-focus inductions, seems to
produce stronger and more reliable effects on people with
low than with high self-esteem.
Another broad interpersonal pattern concerns the rela-
tive strength of self-enhancement versus self-protection
motives. Many studies have found self-esteem differences
more strongly or only in public (t.e., interpersonal) situa-
tions, and self-esteem may be fundamentally tied toward
self-presentational patterns (see Baumeister, Tice, & Hut-
ton, 1989, for review). More precisely, it appears that peo-
ple with high self-esteem are generally oriented toward
self-enhancement, whereas people with low self-esteem
are associated with self-protection. High self-esteem is as-
sociated with wanting to capitalize on one's strengths and
virtues and being willing to take chances in order to stand
out in a positive way. Low self-esteem is associated with
wanting to remedy one's deficiencies and seeking to avoid
standing out in a bad way.
The evidence reviewed thus far does not paint an en-
tirely consistent picture of people with low self-esteem, On
the one hand, they seem to desire success, acceptance, and
approval, but on the other hand they seem skeptical about it
and less willing to pursne it openly. Brown's (e.g., 1993a)
work has addressed this conflict directly by proposing that
people with low self-esteem sUffet
conflict. Brown and McGill (1989)
pleasant life events had adversee
health of people with low self-este"
with high self-esteem, who seemh~~
them well, low self-esteem seeJJ:l~
when too many good things happlin~
tive events exceed the expectationej,
esteem and pressure them to revise
positive direction, and such rli"i~i
stressful that they become ill.
Is High Self-Esteem Always Goad.
tngs about self-esteem in perspec:ti-
how important and beneficial high~
ern America there is a widespread.o]
beneficial. Moreover, the strong be .
major reason for high and enduIirig
among other things produced clo
books and articles (Mruk, 1995).
The belief that high self-esteem!
tal health and good adjustment.isj,
(e.g., Bednar, Wells, & Peterson, 1.9
& Brown, 1988). In many studi~sj
measured as an index of good adjus
erational definition of healthy fune
~~~~;~i'tf~~,~~i~~~~n, 1981; Ka~1
In support of the presumed link
and mental health, there are importa
ready noted, self-esteem is negativ
pression (Tennen & Affleck, 199
(Leary & Kowalski, 1995). The ca
but nonetheless people with high s
healthier and happier than lowsr.P
self-esteem and other social pathol
many to hope that raising self-esteem
lems. The California Task Force to
and Personal and Social Responsibili
self-esteem is a "social vaccine"
sorted problems ranging from dru
nancy. Across the country, many sc
ers began to place a high prioriryo
were all encouraged to have high
was muted, standards were dilute
ated. Thus, instead of reservingtr
tive champions, most children's sp0:rt
phies to everyone who shows up CAg
On the other hand, the enthuslas
did find a strong empirical
nia Task Force was accompanied
cussing the empirical links
personal and social ills it was
tors of the volume summarized
consistent!y reported, however, is that the asso-
etween self-esteem and its expected conse-
re mixed, insignificant, or absent" (Mecca,
Vasconcellos, 1989, p. 15). Dawes (1994) has
riticized what he calls the "myth" that self-
eneficial,
hers have been slower, however, to link bad out-
high self-esteem. One reason may be that re-
bias in favor of self-esteem has influenced the
scale items. When researchers study favorable
[sal under other names, such as narcissism or
is: easier to find problematic or undesirable links
" Novacek, & Hogan, 1991; Wink, 1991).
teworthy pattern is that it is high rather than low
that seems conducive to interpersonal violence
r; Smart, & Boden, 1996). Aggression seems to
mmon among people who think well of them-
ncounter someone who disputes their favorable
isal. In particular, inflated, unrealistic, or fluctu-
s.of high self-esteem are conducive to violence,
because they are most vulnerable to ego threats
is, Granneman, & Barclay, 1989, Kernis et aI.,
Ie appear to lash out at others who criticize or
ern as a way of avoiding any downward revi-
it' self-esteem and the accompanying affect (es-
arne; see Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gram-
l·
Ience pattern involves an apparently potent com-
self-esteem and ego threat. Blaine and Crocker
others have noted that people with high self-
ill to change their behavior drastically when
with ego threats. Normally people with high
do not seem defensive, but that may be because
Ough life thinking well of themselves and ex-
succeed at most things. When they do fail or are
their surprise. they may respond dramatically.
fensive and occasionally self-destructive nature
s to ego threats was examined by Baumeister,
iand Tice (1993). Subjects performed a task for
and then were asked to bet any amount on their
rmance. To earn the most money, one had to bet
perform well, but one could also keep some
making a low bet, especially if one did not ex-
orm well on the final trial. Thus accurate self-
and self-prediction would be very useful.
orable conditions, people with high self-esteem
ell, making appropriate bets and earning good
allowing an ego threat, however, they tended to
mely optimistic predictions and then perform
ereby losing their money. Thus, self-esteem
belinked to accurate self-knowledge and making
te commitments under favorable conditions, but
eat undermines all that and produces costly, de-
espouses.
Another approach is to look at inflated self-esteem.
Colvin, Block, and Funder (1995) contrasted self-descrip-
tions with acquaintance descriptions as a means of identi-
fying people who' regard themselves more favorably than
their friends regard them. Such self-enhancing patterns
were linked to poor social skills and psychological malad-
justment in longitudinal data. In a laboratory study, these
people with inflated self-esteem were observed to interrupt
others, be socially awkward, express hostility, irritate oth-
ers, talk at instead of talking with partners, and perform a
variety of other negatively evaluated behaviors. The com-
posite picture is one of a self-centered, conceited person
who lacks genuine regard for others. Such a picture is quite
consistent with the literal meaning of high self-esteem,
even if it does not fit the most popular stereotype.
Based on the currently available evidence, the conse-
quences of self-esteem can be summarized as follows.
First, high self-esteem is linked to various positive out-
comes and low self-esteem to bad outcomes, but often the
self-esteem is the result rather than the cause. Second, high
self-esteem does seem to make people feel better, and so it
is subjectively pleasant. Third, high self-esteem has a small
number of practical, material benefits, such as greater per-
sistence in the face of failure. Fourth, most social and per-
sonal problems are not caused by a lack of self-esteem, so
raising self-esteem is unlikely to solve them. Fifth, high
self-esteem, especially when not grounded in actual ac-
complishments, may breed interpersonal violence and
other possible undesirable consequences. Sixth, the combi-
nation of high self-esteem and an ego threat seems to be an
especially potent source of problematic responses that can
be destructive to both self and others.
Summary aud Implications
Self-knowledge begins when attention turns around toward
its source, a phenomenon commonly called reflexive con-
sciousness. Social psychology has made great progress
with studying how the self knows itself. The broad outlines
have become clear, even though many specific questions
remain, and some subtopics are controversial or poorly un-
derstood. The self cannot be known directly or observed in
quiescent isolation, but one can form elaborate knowledge
about the self based on observing it in action and knowing
its thoughts and feelings. Information bearing on the self is
processed in special ways, including more thorough, exten-
sive cognition and stronger affect. Most people seem to
feel a quick and special affection for whatever is linked to
the self, including possessions and symbols.
Self-awareness begins with the basic phenomenon of
reflexive consciousness, but it typically adds the evaluative
comparison to abstract standards. Its effects are extensive
and complex. Thus, self-awareness can improve task per-
formance by increasing the motivation to measure up to
700 Part Four / Personal Phenomena
standards, but it can impair performance by undermining
skill. It can increase inhibitions (such as by making stan-
dards more salient), and it can decrease impulsive generos-
ity-or impulsive violence. It can be pleasant or unpleas-
ant, depending on which standards are used and how the
self compares. Aversive self-awareness has been linked to
various pathological patterns, and the effort to escape from
self-awareness produces a broad range of strange and
seemingly paradoxical behavior.
The accumulation of self-knowledge is guided by three
main motives: people want accurate self-knowledge, they
want confirmation of what they believe, and they want fa-
vorable feedback. Among these, the self-enhancement mo-
tive (for favorable information) seems strongest and is
most directly tied to emotional responses. The accuracy
and consistency motives may have greater influence over
cognitive responses, such as whether to agree with an eval-
uation one receives.
The interface between motivation and cognition can be
seen in the ways people maneuver to sustain favorable or
inflated views of self, and these maneuvers form the main
thrust of self-deception. People avoid bad feedback, selec-
tively forget it, actively discredit it, judge themselves by bi-
ased and self-serving criteria, and selectively compare
themselves against inferior targets or weak standards. The
assortment of self-deceptive techniques presumably re-
flects both the difficulty and the widespread desirability of
convincing yourself that you are better than objective real-
ity might warrant.
Social psychology's early efforts to study self-knowl-
edge were strongly influenced by behaviorist and black-
box views, but these have largely given way to cognitive
and even introspectionist approaches, although the biases
and limits of introspection have been well documented.
Still, people do identify with their thoughts and feelings
more than with mere behaviors. Self-perception processes,
which propose that self-knowledge (like knowledge about
others) is formed by observing behavior, are important but
operate mainly in the absence of other sources of self-
knowledge. More common, perhaps, are processes in
which situations and behavior activate some parts of self-
knowledge, making them more salient than others. The re-
lation between the focal portion of self-knowledge (the
phenomenal self) and the far more extensive but tacit do-
main of self-knowledge is far from fully understood.
Likewise, social psychology has only begun to under-
stand the organization of self-knowledge. Most findings
pertain to defensive responses that isolate some parts of
self-knowledge from others, so as to minimize vulnerability
to unfavorable feedback or the self's deficiencies. Whether
there are other theoretically interesting issues regarding the
organization of self-knowledge remains to be seen.
Self-esteem involves a global value judgment about the
self. People are powerfully and pervasively driven to
achieve and maintain high self-est~e
ety currently places great hopesal1d~
ing self-esteem. Yet the clear. bendi.tS
confined to being an affective nisb
misfortune, such as persisting in tlIe:
ing better after setbacks. Researchtif
more critical of high self-esteem,iesp
of self, as studies link such views
risk-taking, and maladjustment. M
ings involve high but threatenedse
to elicit irrational and dangerousit~~
pears that ego threats (interactingW
warrant special attention fronrflit
while, there are several competing.th,
ple care so much about self-esteem
satisfactory.
Individual differences in self~esM
extensively. Low self-esteem is acco
and deficits in self-knowledge, inch]
tain, less consistent, and less stable.
esteem show greater emotionalr
leability in response to external}
orientations toward self-protection,
INTERPERSONAL
In principle, a full-fledged self might
than a body and reflexive consciousn
ever, selves always develop amidfre
personal relations, and probably th<#
proper, successful developmentof
only a consequence but an active par
relationships.
Thus, a second crucial aspect of
is essentially an interpersonal tool
selves is in order to facilitate interac
with others. Anyone who has ever
date during an identity crisis, fore~~
how difficult it is to relate to anorhe
understandin!?.of self. Such observa
prompted Erik Erikson (1950, 19~
assertion that identity is a prerequis
sense that people must settle thepr
fore they are developmentally ready
The sequence may not be that simpl
intimacy seem to develop togethen.b
two is hard to deny (OrlofksyM
Tesch & Whitbourne, 1982).
The social identity is also const
social roles. An elaborate series
Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Ethier
main types of social identities:r~l~
ling), vocational or avocationalrcl
political affiliation (Republican'}
Chapter 15 ! The Self
homeless person, fat), and religion or ethnicity
,Hispanic). As products of the culture and soci-
&gain reveal the interpersonal dimension of self-
be a mother, a policeman, a philanthropist, or an
bmake the self fit a script that is collectively de-
h person may interpret a given role in a slightly
ay, but the role is nonetheless understood by the
lIP and is a way of relating to others.
,reflexive consciousness itself may depend
interpersonal contact. Sartre's (1956) famous
fconsciousness emphasized what he 'called "the
is, the subjective experience of looking at some-
~I1d knowing that that person is -looking at you.
adolescent self-consciousness and social awk-
is in part a result of the increased cognitive abil-
rstand how one appears to others.
Are Self-Views Affected By Others?
rtant set of processes concerns how interpersonal
hape and alter the self. The tabula rasa view of
ture that is occasionally popular holds that selves
cducts of interpersonal relations. Although such
elegant and sometimes politically appealing, they
est too passive or simple a role of the self.
oader issue is how selihood is maintained in an
al environment. It seems essential to postulate
f the self exists in other people's minds-or, at
people form an important repository for knowl-
t the self. Selfhood cannot be achieved or con-
solitude. Indeed, we have already seen evidence
steem is centrally concerned with social accep-
, Tambor et al., 1995).
Appraisals Undoubtedly much information
self is gleaned through interactions with other
ften information about the self is only meaning-
tion to others, as social comparison theory ern-
being tall or short, smart or stupid, fast or slow,
r.grumpy are not absolute properties but are rela-
er.people. In such cases, self-knowledge can only
through interpersonal processes and indeed
involves other people.
hile, other people are important sources of social
For example, Sullivan's (1953) interpersonal the-
sonality described how one close friendship dur-
clesccnce often serves a crucial developmental
by simply giving the young person feedback
he or she is perceived by others, in many spe-
ces.
interactionism provided a systematic view of
of self-knowledge (e.g., Mead, 1934). In
little originates inside the individual; rather,
701
most of what is known about the self is derived from oth-
ers. One learns about oneself from others. The process of
reflected appraisals (i.e., how other people's appraisals of
you shape your Self-understanding) is often described with
Cooley's (1902) term the looking-glass self.
An influential literature review by Shrauger and
Schoeneman (1979) sought to compile the evidence to see
whether the symbolic interactionist view was correct, at
least with regard to the basic prediction that how people
perceive themselves should be essentially similar to how
they are perceived by others. They found, however, that the
correlations tended to be rather low. Self-concepts do not
closely resemble the way those same people are perceived
by others who know them. Subsequent studies have man-
aged to find some positive correlations, although these gen-
erally remain small (Edwards & Klockars, 1981; Felson,
1981; Funder, 1980; Kemick & Stringfield, 1980; Koestner,
Bernieri, & Zuckerman, 1989; Malloy & Albright, 1990),
and even some of these weak links can be questioned on
methodological grounds, as noted by Felson (1989).
On the other hand, Shrauger and Shoeneman found (and
subsequent work has replicated) that self-concepts were
highly correlated with how people believed that others per-
ceived them. There was a link after an (although the causal
direction is unclear and probably bidirectional) between
self-perceptions and other-perceptions. The discrepancy
arises between how people actually perceive Fred and how
Fred thinks other people perceive him. But his view of
himself is quite similar to how he thinks others see him.
There seem to be two major causes that contribute to
the discrepancy between how people believe others regard
them and how the others actually regard them (see Felson,
1989). The first is that people do not generally tell some-
one precisely what they think of him or her (Jones & Wort-
man, 1973). The exchange of interpersonal evaluations is
highly distorted by such factors as the desire to make a
good impression on others and to win the liking of others,
as well as the desire to avoid hostile or distressed re-
sponses. When refusing a date, for example, people tend to
give false and misleading explanations, often resulting in
their being unable to discourage further invitations from
the same person (e.g., Folkes, 1982). Even when people are
engaging in deliberate self-presentation, they are not very
accurate at estimating the impression they actually make
on another person (e.g., Depaulo. Kenny, Hoover, Webb, &
Oliver, 1987). Given that people do not tell a person pre-
cisely what they think of him or her, it is no surprise that
the person's self-concept remains blissfully unaffected by
those concealed opinions and appraisals.
The other source of distortion is self-deception. As ex-
plained earlier in this chapter, people do not accept infor-
mation directly into their views of themselves. Instead, they
filter it, bias it, and adapt it to fit in with what they already
believe and what they prefer to believe. Hence even if oth-
702 Part Four I Personal Phenomena Chapter 15 / The 5elf 703

ers do tell Fred exactly what they think of him, he may dis-
count or ignore the unwelcome parts of the message.
Influence of Others' Expectancies If people do not sim-
ply internalize what others think of them, perhaps they co-
operate in shaping themselves according to the guidelines
and expectations of other people. It has long been estab-
lished that people are influenced by the expectancies of
others. Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) showed that teach-
ers' initially false expectancies about their students led to
changes in the performances of the students that confirmed
those expectancies.
Do self-concepts change in response to others' ex-
pectancies? Darley and Fazio (1980) noted that there are
three different outcomes that can all be labeled a self-ful-
filling prophecy: the perceiver's expectancy can be con-
firmed by the perceiver's final belief, by the target's actnal
behavior, or by the target's self-appraisal. The evidence for
the last of these was the weakest, however. Thus, per-
ceivers may often believe that their expectancies are con-
firmed, and their actions may sometimes cause the target to
respond behaviorally to confirm the expectancies, but it is
rarer for the target to come to share the perceiver's initially
false belief about him or her.
For example, one of the most widely cited studies of
self-fulfilling prophecies was done by Snyder, Tanke, and
Berscheid (1977). In their study, male subjects were given
bogus photos of female interaction partners and then had
telephone conversations. The males' expectancies regard-
ing the attractiveness and social charm of their interaction
partners were confirmed in the males' beliefs and in the be-
havioral responses of the female partners. The women did
not however accept the way the men treated them when it
was unfavorable. When the man thought the woman was
unattractive and treated her accordingly, she tended to re-
ject and discount (as inaccurate) his view of her.
A subseqnent stndy by Snyder and Swann (1978) in-
duced expectancies that one's interaction partner was hos-
tile. The subsequent interaction, featuring a noise weapon,
showed confirmation of these expectancies in both the per-
ceivers' views and in the targets' responses. The crucial
question was however whether the target would then go on
to act in a hostile manner with a new interaction partner,
which would suggest some degree of generalization and
possible internalization. Snyder and Swann only found
such carry-over effects in a condition in which the targets
were induced to make dispositional attributions about the
way they had acted during the first interaction. In other
words, an experimental manipulation was necessary in
order to help them see their actions as reflecting their traits.
Otherwise the hostile behavior did not carry over into the
next interaction. These results again suggest that it is not
easy to alter another person's self-appraisal.
Altering the Self How do self-cone
question has considerable theoretic~i
tance. Answers have been slow inc:o
of the difficulty of measuring selfc¢
partly because some self-concept chan
cal to induce. Still, some conclusid
and many of them point to the impo~
factors'ii>
The stability of self-conceptionsi~
degree on interpersonal relations. Bt~'
ple, is a deliberate attempt to ch~
views extensively. A common featurg
cessful brainwashing programs isth
rated from all those who knew hi
contacts continue with one's olde
prisoners who spend the day undetir
return to their fellow prisoners in the.t6
ing tends to fail (see Baumeister, 198
When people try to change them
sonal involvements are again extre
nants of success or failure. Heatherto
compared two samples of accounts:
had changed in an important way,
people had tried bnt failed to change,
dence of involvement by others. S
often instigated by others (e.g., press
to quit smoking). Sometimes the mo
stimulated by observing someoneel~
occurrences were associated withsu
nnsuccessfnl changes). Lastly, peopl
ported considerable help and sUPPo
much more than people who failcdtoc
These findings emphasize actual,
There is also reason to consider chan
that may occur independent of real
way to change the self-concept is to
ent person and then change yours
Another, presumably easier route iss
self-concept without having to change
In any case, evidence points to the
cial environment for self-concept cha
ies by Harter (1993) have providede
in self-esteem. Self-esteem is most
points in life where there is a substa
social environment. When one gra?~a.
and begins college, for example; itof
reduces interactions with many fa111il
friends and instead begins inreracti
peers at college. Self-esteem chang
mon at such times than during period
to interact with the same people. The
tent with the implication of the brain
self becomes much more malleablew
the people that know it well. Another way to de-
;spattern is to suggest that other people, especially
lationship partners, may inhibit change, possibly
eople expect each other to remain the same and
ure on each other to be consistent.
ization of Behavior One of the most compelling
self-concept change is through internalization of
. Self-perception theory and other theories have
ample reason to think that if people can be in-
act in a certain way, they may gradually see them-
being the sort of person who acts that way. Self-
change may therefore derive from behavioral
y some process of internalization.
ikely mechanism has to do with the multifaceted
(the self. A certain behavior pattern may access
knowledge about the self, and so that knowledge
h most heavily in subsequent judgments about the
arch by Fazio et a1. (1981) provided importaut
y evidence of such changes. Subjects responded
questions designed to make them regard them-
~introverted or extraverted. Accessing relevant
",ledge (in order to answer the loaded questions)
HY had at least a temporary effect, in that people
themselves as being the sort of person the ques-
implied. Thus, people who had to describe how
ld liven up a dull party were more likely to de-
ernselves as extraverts than people who had been
hat they dislike about crowded settings. Fazio et a1.
so showed behavioral changes: those who had re-
to the questions biased in favor of extraversion
e likely to strike up a conversation with a confed-
ron, in an ostensibly unrelated setting.
attern of findings reported by Fazio et a1. (1981)
rated into a biased scanning theory of self-con-
ge by Joues et a1. (1981). They proposed that
ple reflect on themselves, they scan all the avail-
ation about themselves-but recent experiences
this scan so that they are more likely to think of
ds of information. In their studies, subjects were
() present themselves in certain ways, and they
d.their self-concepts as consistent with the ways
resented themselves.
lased scanning and accessibility theories essen-
cribe intrapsychic processes of self-concept
e person observes his or her behavior, thinks of
information about the self, and that information
s center stage the next time the person is asked
f-conceptions. More recent work, however, has
e emphasis from intrapsychic to interpersonal
+--or, more precisely, it has shown that the in-
iei processes are heavily dependent on interper-
es, Self-concept change thus appears to be one
version of the interplay between interpersonal and in-
trapsychic processes (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985).
Tice (1992) noted that despite the intrapsychic thrust of
biased scanning theory, the experimental procedures had
been interpersonal, and she hypothesized that the interper-
sonal dimension was decisive. In her studies, people only
showed the self-concept (and behavioral) changes if their
actions had been observed by others. The same behaviors
done in a private or confidential context failed to alter self-
concept. Thus, one tends to internalize actions mainly
when those actions gain social reality from being observed
by others; apparently other people have an important ca-
pacity to magnify the self-perception process.
The role of other people's awareness was confirmed by
Schlenker, Dlngolecki, and Doherty (1994), who then went
on to challenge the biased scanning view. These re-
searchers included several conditions in which biased scan-
ning was induced but the interpersonal behavior did not
occur (e.g., people prepared for a certain interaction which
was canceled at the last minute), and yet no self-concept
change was found. In a final study, they had people present
themselves one way and then engage in biased scanning
for the opposite view (e.g., present yourself as an extravert,
and then scan your memory for introverted acts). The scan-
ning appeared to have little or no effect on self-concept
change. Only the interpersonal actions were internalized.
In retrospect, resistance to self-concept change may
have the same interpersonal dimension. Swann and Hill
(1982) showed that self-ratings changed if people passively
received discrepant feedback, but if they were allowed to
respond (and dispnte the feedback), they did not chauge. It
may well have been the public assertion of the self-view
that enabled it to resist pressure to change.
At present, then, the precise mechanism of internaliza-
tion and self-concept change needs further study. Tice in-
terpreted her internalization findings as fitting a biased
scanning view, with the important addition that interper-
sonal interaction seems important for causing the scanning
to take place. Schlenker et a1. (1994) found, as Tice did,
that self-concept change occurred in public but not in pri-
vate circumstances, yet they doubt that the biased scanning
mechanism is a correct description of the process. In any
case, the importance of the social, interpersonal context
seems more clearly established than the precise intrapsy-
chic mechanism that mediates its effects.
Self-Presentation
Undoubtedly the most obvious and proactive way that the
self participates in social life is through self-presentation,
which is defined as people's attempts to convey informa-
tion about or images of themselves to others. Part of the self
exists outside, in the minds of others: one does not have an
704 Part Four I Personal Phenomena Chapter 15 ! The Self 705

identity unless it is validated by others, which means that
others must recognize and acknowledge one's self.
Concern over self-presentation is extremely pervasive.
Baumeister (1982) showed that many of social psychol-
ogy's effects only were obtained as a result of self-presen-
tation: that is, people only showed many of the effects
when others were watching. Cognitive and intrapsychic
theories that explained many effects seemed to be missing
something, because the effects depended on interpersonal
contexts. Thus, helping, attitude change, emotion, aggres-
sion, attributional patterns, and other responses seemed to
change when the individual's acts would be seen by others.
Leary (1995) has furnished an even longer and more im-
pressive list, showing effects of self-presentation in con-
texts ranging from sports teams to business meetings to the
beach to mental hospitals.
Hence it was necessary to reappraise how social the
person was. Unfortunately, some of the early efforts were
carried out in a hostile, antagonistic fashion, such as the fa-
mous assertion that cognitive dissonance did not actually
produce attitude change but merely reflected a superficial
tendency of people to pretend they were changing in order
to make a good impression (Tedeschi, Schlenker, &
Bonoma, 1971). Later work however adopted a more mod-
erate tone and concluded that actual attitude change does
occur as a result of self-presentational factors, and indeed
that some dissonance can occur without self-presentational
motivations, although self-presentation is quite a funda-
mental and potent cause of dissonance (Schlenker, 1982;
also Baumeister & Tice, 1984; Paulhus, 1982).
The dissonance debate provided a model for subsequent
debates about the role of self-presentation. Self-presenta-
tion often appeared as an alternative explanation for in-
trapsychic theories, and often a series of experiments were
done to contrast whether people "really" had the intrapsy-
chic responses originally proposed or were instead merely
superficially reporting such responses out of self-presenta-
tional concerns. In an influential paper, Tetlock and
Manstead (1985) proposed that such debates were likely to
remain unresolved and that it was often a theoretical dead
end to pit intrapsychic and interpersonal processes against
each other. They proposed instead that researchers seek to
develop theories that would integrate self-presentational
and intrapsychic processes. This is a crucial and important
suggestion, because as we shall see there is substantial and
bidirectional influence between interpersonal and intrapsy-
chic processes.
Self-Presentational Motives Two main kinds of motiva-
tions for self-presentation are important. One is largely in-
strumental, aimed at influencing others as a means toward
gaining practical and material rewards. The other is expres-
sive, aimed at constructing a certain image of self and
claiming an identity for oneself. A full understanding of
the empirical evidence of self-preseTl
quires both (Baumeister, 1982).
The instrumental uses of self-pl'e#
been apparent to researchers (e.g.,J()n~
heavily and extensively dependent 011
favorable impression on someone is6
help secure the rewards that others C6h
ward at stake is a major promotionor
kin, the person who comes across as
competent is less likely to secure tha
of others.
These instrumental forms ofself.,
described as strategic se(f-presentatiq
of impressing others is a strategy{
goals. Jones and Pittman (1982) pro
instrumental goals that one can purs
of impression management, as fo118
volves convincing others that youh~"$
a way of getting them to like you'f~f
making others fear you, usually by co
you have the dangerous potential}?
willing to use it. Self-promotion is<'i
one's competence and aptitude, in orde
spect you. Exemplification refers to co
you are a goodperson, in the sense
moral virtues. Last, supplication invo
ers that you are needy, dependent-an
to induce them to give you aid and oth
The purpose of these strategies is
to manipulate others. If people Iikey
will generally reward you and refrairi
because to punish you would cause
they respect your competence, theyi\y
you, give you rewards that accompa
ment. If they fear you, they will des
with what you want to do. If they fee
will try to help you. And if they respe
they will refrain from criticizing Y0tlr~
main a respected member of the COl1m]-R
The situational importance of sU9~<~t
tation was nicely demonstrated by:£)-
(1990). Subjects were asked to desc .
supervisor, who did or did not hay
them tasks later (and these includcdc
People altered their self-presentations
visor had power. Apparently, they
exert themselves self-presentatio~al1
some advantage to be had by manipulati
The other form of self-presentatlc
sive: constructing the self. Sometimes
an impression on others in orderjt
Hence people sometimes present-the
trary to what others will like and app~
this kind of self-presentation is in studi
h~s shown that people will assert their freedom
those who have sought to curtail it. Clearly, such
lis self-assertion is not designed to please the per-
inst whom the rebellion is directed. But it often
in vitally important to people to convey to pre-
~t person that they are not giving in to his or her
.A confidential assertion of one's freedom is not
aer, Hinkle, Smith, & Fenton, 1980; Heihnan &
976).
tdguing program of research on this expressive
If-presentation was conducted by Wicklund and
r (1982). They too provided evidence that people
times engage in self-presentation that is contrary
e intended audience wil1like or approve. In a
Ie study, male subjects got to meet a confederate
ebbie. who had already made it clear that she pre-
onfident and self-enhancing people-or, in the
dition, modest and self-deprecating people. This
ti?ll would seemingly make it easy for the subject
her approval, simply by conforming to the norms
had implicitly set. Yet if the subjects had been led
secure about their claims to their most important
hey were unable to follow the norm to be modest.
bjects had taken a bogus personality test, suppos-
nether context, and they received feedback that
enor the sort of person who was likely to be sue-
their chosen field. They were unable to conform
desty norm. Even though Debbie had shown that
ed boastful, self-enhancing people, they insisted
nting themselves very positively with regard to
sen field. (In contrast, people who had received re-
feedback about their identity claims were less dri-
ake positive claims to Debbie, and so they were
obe modest and self-deprecating with her when
e.)
csponses to Debbie thus capture the seemingly
al nature of expressive self-presentation: one pre-
self in a way that the other person will likely dis-
isapprove, as long as this is consistent with one's
ate image of one's desired identity. Self-presenta-
us sometimes driven by the values and ideals of
ather than those of the audience to whom one is
icating. Needless to say, the opposite is true of the
strumental) form of self-presentation: if the goal is
rewards from the other person, then one tries to
neself as closely as possible to the other person's
4preferences.
roader point is that people use self-presentation to
tan identity for themselves. Most people have a
(leal image of the person they would like to be. It is
gh merely to act like that person or to convince
hat one resembles that person. Identity requires
Iidation. The common assumption seems to be
not really a great artist, or an attractive lover,
or a trustworthy partner, or a success in your job unless
other people perceive you as such. Self-esteem, self-decep-
tion, and similar intrapsychic processes may be fine as far
as they go, but they are inadequate for identity.
Thus, self-presentation often occurs in the tension of
opposing forces: Should one present oneself consistent
with one's own values and ideals, or with those of the in-
tended audience? Fortunately the two motives probably
agree in many cases, especially insofar as people interact
with friends and others who share the same values. Still,
there are cases in which people must choose' between two
opposing forces: conforming their self-presentations to
what the interaction partner would like best versus being
true to their own identity aspirations.
Favorability of Self-Presentation A general tendency
toward favorable self-presentations is not without excep-
tions. For example, people do on occasion "play dumb" in
order to please someone who may like that better (Leary,
1995). There is some validity to the stereotype of women
feigning intellectual inferiority when interacting with men,
but in other contexts men are more likely to play dumb,
and overall there does not appear to be a sex difference in
frequency of playing dumb (Dean, Braito, Powers, & Brit-
ton, 1975).
Still, in general, people want to present themselves fa-
vorably. In terms of seeking feedback for one's self-con-
cept, I noted earlier that people are often tom between the
conflicting motives of consistency and self-enhancement.
A similar distinction applies to self-presentation, with
some interesting twists due to the interpersonal constraints.
The basic question is this: How favorably should one pre-
sent oneself? People's answers appear to depend on several
factors. In Schlenker's (1980, 1986) terms, self-presenta-
tion is often the result of a tradeoff between the opposing
forces of favorability and plausibility. On the one hand,
people want to make a good impression, and they often be-
lieve that making positive and favorable claims is the best
way to accomplish this. On the other hand, excessively
positive claims about the self may not be believed, and
they run the additional risk of being discredited. Moreover,
having one's favorable self-assertions shown to be false
can be humiliating, and the net resulting impression may
often be quite poor.
Accordingly, the self-presenter must strike a balance
between favorability and plausibility. A particularly impor-
tant constraint on plausibility is whether the intended audi-
ence is likely to gain independent verification of one's
claims. After all, it is easy to claim to be a great swimmer
or an accomplished pianist when chatting with someone on
a ski lift, because there is little chance of having to back up
such assertions with performance. To make similar claims
when lounging by a pool or a piano (respectively) is an-
other matter, however.
706 Part Four / Personal Phenomena
In one of the earliest and most cited experiments on
self-presentation, Schlenker (1975) gave subjects feedback
about their abilities on a novel task prior to a group perfor-
mance session. Then they were asked to describe them-
selves to the group members. Schlenker wanted to see
whether subjects would describe themselves consistent
with the (sometimes negative) feedback or in more posi-
tive, favorable terms. He found that the answer depended
on whether the upcoming group performance was expected
to be public or private. If it was to be private, so that no one
would know one's performance, then subjects presented
themselves in rather favorable terms. But if they thought
other people would be able to see how well they did, they
refrained from boasting. Thus, people seemed to present'
themselves as favorably as they could get away with: they
boasted when it was safe to do so but remained modest and
circumspect when it seemed likely that the truth would be
found out.
The possibility of future disconfirmation is not the only
interpersonal constraint on self-presentational favorability.
Another is rooted in the past one's prior actions or other
socially available information about the self form the point
of departure for any subsequent self-presentations to peo-
ple who know you. After all, people do not simply form a
wholly new impression of someone with every single inter-
action. New information is added to old information. The
self-presenter must anticipate this and know that whatever
he or she does now will be combined, in the observer's
mind, with what the observer already knows.
An initial study of the constraining effects of prior
knowledge on self-presentation was conducted by
Baumeister and Jones (1978). Subjects were told that their
interaction partner would read their personality profile,
based on a previous test. As in Schlenker's (1975) study,
people felt constrained to be consistent with what the inde-
pendent information said: in this case, they conformed
their self-presentations to the randomly assigned feedback,
even depicting themselves unfavorably if that was what
their test results said. Yet they did not leave the matter at
that: they sought to compensate for the unfavorable image
of themselves by presenting themselves extra favorably on
other, unrelated dimensions. Thus, they were indeed con-
strained to be consistent with what the observer already
knew about them, but they could make up for a bad impres-
sion by bringing in unrelated, highly favorable information
about themselves.
The general thrust toward favorable self-presentation
may therefore have severe limits. An additional and quite
important limit was recently identified by Tice, Butler, Mu-
raven, and Stillwell (1995). These authors noted the irony
that nearly all self-presentation research had been done on
first meetings between strangers, whereas the vast majority
of actual social interactions take place between people who
already know each other. They showed that people tend to
be positive and self-enhancingwff
strangers-but they turn modest and
ing themselves to friends.
Why? Strangers know nothing a modesty (which is an unusual way to act when
necessary to convey one's good traits'
vorable impression on them; moreov
any basis for disputing an overly fay
tion. In contrast, friends already. have
tion about you, and so it is not neces
one's good traits that they alread
friends will know when you are exa
you are correct in touting your gO()~
like the immodesty of such statemenn
Cognition and Self-Presentation
noted exhortation by Tetlock andM
trapsychic and self-presentationalt
tle work has examined the cognitive
sentation. The methodological difflc
research are probably one factor,
One basic question is how accura
their success at self-presentation:th
what impressions they convey toot
Hoover, Webb, and Oliver (1987) iny
by having subjects conduct a round-
tern. Each subject interacted witht
time, in interactions that were structu
tasks (e.g., a teaching task and a co
interaction, both subjects rated theiri
ner and the impression they thought.t
partner. By seeing how well those.rati
researchers could assess how wellpe
the impressions they made.
The answers were mixed. There-w
accuracy, although most of the corte
low. People could tell in a general~~
son's impression of them changed.o
not however very effective at inferring
them the most or perceived them-as
other words, you probably cannot.fo
guess of which person you made the
Another large gap between perc
sions is that people tended to think.t
same impression on everyone, w~~t
partners formed quite different imp~
person. People seem to overestimate
image they project to different person~i
Cognitive processes that occurdliB
were studied by Baumeister, Huttou-atr
jects in that study were interviewed'
ber of each pair had been taken asi
instructions to self-present in either
hancing fashion. After the interviews
surprise recall test for both their ()""tli
Chapter 15 / The Self
iltations, as well as for impressions of the partner.
who had been instructed to be modest and self-
s.howed impaired memory for the interaction. Ap-
g oneself to strangers) consumes cognitive re-
rid thus interferes with one's encoding of the in-
Another finding was that subjects seemed un-
the effect they had on the other person (see
Jones, 1986). Thus, for example, if Bob presents
,By saying highly favorable things about himself,
llY also start to say highly favorable things about
which will lead Bob to conclude that Harry must
conceited or at least have high self-esteem. In
gh, Harry's self-promotion was merely a response
act that deliberate self-presentation seems to con-
~~itive resources and thereby interferes with other
'on processing may help explain some of the find-
Paulo et al. (1987). Wheu people are concentrat-
ing to make a certain impression, they may not be
to attend to how the other person is responding.
ries of interactions, what may be salient in their
cry is that they tried to make roughly the same
ression on each interaction partner, rather than
that the partners did not all seem to respond in
same way.
findings suggest that the consequences of self-
lion may often be driven primarily by the inner
itive processes that accompany it. People seem to
ed by the impression they are trying to make, to a
xtent than by the actual interpersonal responses
equcnces, and indeed the cognitive work that ac-
Ies a difficult self-presentation may often reduce
ity to discern those interpersonal responses and
ces.
Aspects of Self-Presentation A series of
~s associated with self-presentation was docu-
y Leary, Tchividjian, and Kraxberger (1994).
over how one is seen by others can lead people to
various risky and harmful behaviors. These indi-
the drive to impress others can take precedence
rational and self-preservation motives.
ancer provides one relevant sphere. People be-
a suntan makes them look attractive, but in recent
nings of the carcinogenic and other harmful ef-
n exposure have proliferated. Leary and Jones
that the risky behaviors of sunbathing were
to Concern about how one is viewed by oth-
one's physical appearance, rather than con-
of concern) about health. People sunbathe to
'rriselves attractive, often ignoring the physical
behavior is also influenced by self-presen-
707
tation. Condoms are generally regarded as the safest
method for having intercourse outside of stable, monoga-
mous relationships, but many people do not use them. Rea-
sons for not taking these precautions are often self-presen-
tational, including embarrassment over buying them and
fear of what store clerks and patrons will think, as well as
fear that having a condom and wanting to use it will make
a bad impression on one's anticipated sexual partner
(Leary, 1995).
Other risks reviewed by Leary et al. (1994) include baz-
ardous dieting and eating patterns, use of alcohol and ille-
gal drugs, cigarette smoking, steroid use, accidental injury
and even death (e.g., not wearing safety equipment), and
complications from cosmetic surgery. Taken together, these
provide strong evidence that self-presentational concerns
often take precedence over the concerns with maintaining
health and even protecting life.
Interpersonal Consequences of Self-Views
It is clear that the nature of the self exerts some influence
over interpersonal relations. One of the best-known find-
ings in social psychology is the link between similarity and
attraction (Byrne, 1971; Schiller, 1932; Smeaton, Byrne, &
Murnen, 1989), which means that in some sense people
seek out and like partners who resemble them. (Or, at least,
they avoid and dislike people who are different from them;
Rosenbaum, 1986.) Similarities on important, heritable
traits are especially potent bases for liking and disliking
others (Crelia & Tesser, 1996; Tesser, 1993).
Although the preference for others similar to oneself is
well established, it is not safe to conclude that specific
views about the self lead invariably to effects on interper-
sonal relations. This section will examine what is known
about how self-views shape such relations, including per-
ceptions of other people and the formation of relationship
patterns. (The interpersonal consequences of self-esteem
were covered earlier.)
Self-Views Alter Person Perception Does the self-con-
cept operate as an important anchor or filter that shapes
how people understand others? The operation of self-
schemas in person perception was studied by Markus,
Smith, and Moreland (1985; see also Fang & Markus,
1982). They proposed that having a self-schema in a partic-
ular domain makes one act like an expert in that domain.
More precisely, such schematic people will be quicker than
others to spot information relevant to their domain, better
able to integrate it with previously acquired information,
better able to make up the gaps in new information, and
better able to integrate the details of actions with the big
picture. In their research, people who were schematic for
masculinity tended to form larger units in the masculinity-
relevant behavior of a stimulus person, and they saw the
708 Part Four / Personal Phenomena
stimulus person as more masculine and more like them-
selves than did aschematic individuals. When attending to
detail was important, the schematics shifted more than
other subjects toward greater processing of details.
Thus, aspects of self-concept can influence the percep-
tion of others (although it is conceivable that some prior
interest in the area leads to the expertise and the self-per-
ception). The key point appears to be that a particularly
well developed aspect of self-knowledge makes one act
like an expert in that sphere. If your view of yourself em-
phasizes loyalty, for example, you will likely be extra sen-
sitive to loyalty or disloyalty in others, and you may move
more readily between specific details of loyalty (or disloy-
alty) and the broader patterns and issues than would some-
one else.
The self-image bias is one mechanism by which peo-
ple's self-concepts bias the way they perceive others
(Lewicki, 1983, 1984). According to this bias, people tend
to judge others according to the traits on which they them-
selves look good. The self-image bias shows a correlation
between how favorably the person rates himself or herself
on some dimension and the centrality of that dimension in
the person's perceptions of others (Lewicki, 1983). (Cen-
trality refers to the number of other dimensions correlated
with it.) For example, students who did well in a computer
science course tended to place more emphasis on computer
skills in perceiving others than did the other, less successful
students (Hill, Smith, & Lewicki, 1989). Lewicki (1984)
showed that the self-image bias serves a defensive function:
When people receive critical, upsetting feedback, the effect
of self-image bias on perception of others is increased.
Another link between self-concepts and perception of
other people involves the way people define the crucial
traits. Dunning, Perie, and Story (1991) found that people
construct prototypes of social categories such as intelli-
gence, creativity, and leadership in ways that emphasize
their own traits. Thus, inquisitive people think inquisitive-
ness is a valuable aid to creativity, but noninquisitive peo-
ple disagree. These prototypes then influence how people
evaluate others.
Most research has emphasized how people's views of
themselves affect person perception, but it may be that de-
fensive processes (such as rejecting a view of self) can
exert an effect too. Newman, Duff, and Baumeister (1997)
put forward a new model of the Freudian defense mecha-
nism of projection, which in essence means seeing one's
faults in other people rather than in oneself. Newman et al.
built on evidence that when people try not to think about
something, that something tends to become highly accessi-
ble in memory (Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner, Schneider,
Carter, & White, 1987). They also found that certain peo-
ple tend to deny their bad traits and yet see other people as
having those same traits. A laboratory experiment showed
that when people tried to suppress thoughts about some
bad trait that had been imputed toth~
terpreting other people's behavioI'<l
trait. Thus, person perception call be
you are trying to deny in yourself;jll
traits that you do see in yourself.
Accessibility appears to be the-e
all tbese effects. The attributes the'
those the self seeks to deny, operate
categories for.interpreting others'beh
& Mavin, 1982). Social perceptidrl
centered and self-biased. Still, thes
specific and limited, and one should
terpersonal perception is wildly
appraisals. In particular, these effects
cases in which information aboutth
biguous (Lambert & Wedell, 1991}$
ski, 1993).
Self-Evaluation Maintenance S
between the quest for self-esteem-a
tions have been elaborated in Tosser
tion maintenance theory. Among.oth
theory explains how people maydr
away from relationship partners as
maintain self-esteem.
Two main processes link self-vievV~
comes, according to Tesser. The first.c
process, by which one gains esteem-a
linked to successful others. Peoples
esteem simply because their cousin
tournament, because they slept with
gressman, because their child was val
they once shared a taxi with a movie
colleagues have shown how people.b
of institutions, such as by wearing
quently following a team victoryt
(Cialdini et aI., 1976; Cialdini & Ri
The other process is one of com
1954; Wills, 1981), and it can yield
ple may compare themselves with
and feel bad if the other person is.o
your sibling gets better gradest~~Il
brother-in-law earns double your-s
knows more about cars than you do,
Thus, the reflection and compari
opposite results in terms of how one'
the achievements of close others;'I'e:
fore gone on to look for factorst~
process will predominate. One sucllf~
of the ability to one's own sel
cousin's golf tournament vietoryrrl~Y
the reflection process prediets~I)~
highly relevant to your own self-est~~
same tournament and lost jgnomini
Chapter 15 / The Self
make you look that much worse by compar-
ne1tirrtes people prefer to see strangers succeed
11 close friends, because the stranger's success in-
less salient comparison and is less humiliating.
d Smitb (1980) showed that people will do more
stranger than a friend to succeed at a task that is
t6their own self-esteem.
hile, the closer the bond, the stronger the out-
llgain (or lose) more esteem if your spouse wins
ward than if your former neighbor wins it. Close
ips may therefore be especially vulnerable to dis-
ough the comparison process. If a romantic part-
eeds on something irrelevant to one's own self-
one may pull closer to that person, but if the
in something relevant to one's own strivings then
feel jealous or threatened, and the intimate rela-
ay be damaged (Beach, 1992). When the com-
recess makes you look bad, the only way to limit
ge may be to reduce closeness. Pleban and Tesser
owed that people may distance themselves from
who performs too well on something that is
levant to their self-concepts.
itoring An early and influential theory about
differences in how the self structures interper-
esses was proposed by Snyder (1974, 1987).
gan with an interest in cross-situational consis-
ulated by Bern and Allen's (1974) suggestion
people have more traited consistency than oth-
istinguished between high self-monitors, who at-
esiruation and the behavior of others for cues as
obehave and modify their own actions accord-
<flow self-monitors, who do not try to alter their
to suit each situational nuance. For example, Sny-
wann (1976) sbowed high attitude-behavior con-
for people with low self-monitoring: Their atti-
dieted their verdicts in a simulated jury case. In
high self-monitors' attitudes did not predict their
well at all, presumably because they modified
ements on the case to fit the immediate situational
and cues. Snyder (1987) explained that bigh self-
do not see any necessary relation between their
liefs and their public actions, and so discrepan-
t bother them.
there is a basic difference in how these two types
see themselves. Low self-monitors regard them-
having strong principles and as consistently up-
em. High self-monitors see themselves as prag-
flexible rather than principled. They respond to
ion and do what they regard as appropriate, which
~»des altering their own self-presentations.
uent work elaborated the different interaction
accompany the different levels of self-moni-
low self-monitors, friendship is based on the
709
emotional bond, and they prefer to spend most of their time
with the people they like best. High self-monitors, how-
ever, see friendship in terms of shared activities, and so
they spend time with-whoever is best suited to the relevant
activity. Thus, for example, the low self-monitor would
prefer to play tennis with his best friend, regardless of how
well the friend plays. The high self-monitor would rather
play tennis with the best tennis player among her acquain-
tances (or the one best matched to her own abilities). As a
result, the social worlds of high self-monitors are well
compartmentalized, with different friends and partners
linked to specific activities. Those of low self-monitors are
relatively undifferentiated by activities, and people are
chosen instead based on the emotional bonds.
The interpersonal patterns carryover into romantic ac-
tivities too (Snyder, 1987; Snyder & Simpson, 1984). High
self-monitoring males choose dating patterns based mainly
on physical appearance, whereas low self-monitors look
for personality and other inner qualities. High self-moni-
tors tend to have more romantic and sexual partners than
lows. When it comes to marriage, high self-monitors again
look for shared activities and interests, whereas low self-
monitors emphasize mainly the pleasures and satisfactions
of simply being together.
Partner Views of Self A simpler theory about how inter-
personal relationships are shaped by self-views was put
forward by Swann (1992) as an extension of self-verifica-
tion theory. In his view, people prefer a romantic partner
who sees them as they see themselves. Several important
theoretical issues are relevant. As the earlier discussion of
motivations surrounding self-concepts made clear, people
are sometimes torn between a desire to see themselves fa-
vorably and a desire to confirm what they already think of
themselves. Moreover, love is widely regarded as distort-
ing interpersonal appraisal, so that someone in love may
tend to see the beloved partner in an idealized fashion.
Wonld that be helpful or harmful?
Swann and his colleagues (1992; Swann, Hixon, & De
La Ronde, 1992) have examined such dilemmas in various
relationships, ranging from roommates to spouses. On a
variety of measures, they have found support for consis-
tency effects. People choose, like, and retain partners who
see them accurately (or at least who see them consistently
with their self-views, which are not necessarily accurate).
In this view, the idealizing effects of love would be down-
rigbt dangerons and harmful to the relationship. Apparently
people want their friends and lovers to see all their faults.
A large independent investigation failed to replicate
those patterns, however. Murray, Holmes, and Griffin
(1996) found that favorable views of one's partner were as-
sociated with better relationships. Idealization was associ-
ated with greater satisfaction and happiness about the rela-
tionship, and in an as yet unpublished follow-up study it
710 PartFour I Personal Phenomena
also predicted greater stability and durability of the rela-
tionship. In this view, then, there is good reason for love to
be blind (or at least nearsighted enough to wear rose-col-
ored glasses when looking at one's beloved), Idealization
and positive illusions about one's partner seem to
strengthen the relationship, making it more pleasant and
more likely to last. Seeing the real you beneath the facade
is not always the beginning of real intimacy; sometimes it
is the beginning of the end.
These somewhat discrepant results do at least agree that
it is quite important for people to believe that their friends
and lovers appreciate their good points. Whether they want
their partners to see their faults and flaws too is less clear.
One possible moderator is that most of the self-consistency
work has emphasized traits about which the person is
highly certain of and committed to having, whereas the en-
hancement effects tend to emphasize a broader spectrum of
less central and less certain traits. Possibly people want
their close relationship partners to recognize one or two fa-
vorite faults but otherwise maintain a highly favorable
view of them.
There is also intriguing but preliminary evidence that
relationship partners can help sustain consistency. Swann
and Predmore (1985) gave people feedback tbat was dis-
crepant from their self-concepts and watched how they and
their romantic partners responded. When the partner saw
the subject as the subject saw himself or herself, the pair
tended to join forces to reject the feedback: they discussed
its flaws and decided how best to refute or dismiss it. In
contrast, when the partner's view of the subject differed
from the subject's self-concept, the discrepant feedback led
to further disagreements within the couple. Although this
study's sample was small and the emotionally potent dis-
tinction between positive (idealizing) and negative (dis-
paraging) discrepancies was glossed over, the implications
are important and worthy of further study. It may be that
one vital function of close relationship partners is to help
maintain and defend one's self-concept against the attacks
of the outer world.
Emotionality of Interpersonal Self
Emotion is undoubtedly linked to interpersonal relations.
In a review of evidence about the motive to form and main-
tain close attachments, Baumeister and Leary (1995) pro-
vided evidence that a broad assortment of negative affects
result from threat or damage to relationships, whereas in-
creasing attachment generally brings positive affect. One
function of emotion is apparently to alert the self to
changes in its interpersonal relations.
Emotions often reflect value judgments relevant to the
self. Recent work has increasingly emphasized interper-
sonal determinants and processes of emotion. Thus, it ap-
pears that the interpersonal self is prominently involved in
emotion. Tangney and Fischer (I 995)1l
lection of works on The Sclf-Consciou
though self-consciousness mightse~
reflexive awareness of self, the intcrp
processes figure prominently in mall)'
Shame and Guilt Undouhtedly the
element of shame and guilt in self-
emotions seem to have strong intell?
The difference between the two apP5
of self-reference: guilt condemns as
self, whereas shame condemnstIl&
1971; Tangney, 1992, 1995).
Shame is regarded as the morede
emotions. Because shame signifies
bad, simple reparations or construe
meaningless. Shame is therefore linke
comes (Tangney, Burggraf, & Wag.n~t,
seems to produce socially undesirab]
mediate impact of shame seems t()iP.
when one feels ashamed, one wantstd
ers. Other people however respond#.l
(Tangney et a1., 1992). The shift fro
may be a defensive effort to repudiat
evaluation implicit in shame, and.th
that it can lead to violent outbursts
Boden, 1996). Kitayama, Markus,aH~
have proposed that the movement fr()J:Il:
fleets the independent selfhood model
cultures and may not occur in cultures
interdependent selves.
Guilt, in contrast, is more manag,Y~B
disruptive than shame. Considerabl~B'f
personal and prosocial functions ()fpH.·
Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heathen
guilt is focused on a specific transgr
sequence is often a wish to repairt
amends. Guilt also seems to arise m
and communal relationships (Bali
Heatherton, 1994, 1995; Jones, Kug
Identical transgressions may produc
the victim is a relationship partner tha
Embarrassment Like shame and-g
seems to be a mixture of self-evaluati
concerns. Modigliani (1971) linkede
public self by showing that the best pi
ment was a situational, perceivedlo
Edelmann (1985) made a similarpo
embarrassability correlates more hi~?
consciousness than with private self-
Two theoretical perspectives one: 7?
predominated in recent years, as indic
Chapter 15 / The Self
rview by Miller (1995). One emphasizes concern
one is being evaluated by others. Embarrassment
tiues concern over the other people and specifically
Wthey evaluate oneself. The alternative view in-
·tnply the difficulty and unpleasantness of awkward
teractions. Parrott, Sabini, and Silver (1988) pro-
pport for this view using a hypothetical scenario in
he subject asks someone for a date and is refused.
l.'eported they would feel less embarrassed if the
sed a transparent excuse that they knew to be a lie
e rejector bluntly rebuffed them, even though the
evaluation by the other person was presumably the
iller (1995) however reported other evidence that
an excuse may itself convey a positive evaluation,
concern for the rejected person's feelings. In re-
the available evidence, he concluded that both per-
shave some validity, but the concern over social
en appears to be the stronger and more common
embarrassment.
ping is one common sign of embarrassment, yet
es people blush even when no clear social evalua-
ing made. Leary, Britt, Cutlip, and Templeton
neluded that the main cause of blushing is un-
cial attention. Still, the interpersonal processes of
are complex. Leary (1995) offered this seemingly
al pattern. In an informal survey, most subjects
that they would not feel embarrassed over un-
with either their spouse or their same-sex parent
e room. They would however feel embarrassed
essing with both the spouse and the same-sex
resent.
their functional analyses of blushing and embar-
tend to focus on dealing with unfavorable evalua-
others. Leary et a1. (1992) suggest that blushing is
other appeasement behaviors, by which an indi-
11 minimize punishment for transgressing or for
social norms. Embarrassment does seem to miti-
evaluations from others: Semin and Manstead
bowed that a stimulus person who transgressed ac-
y(by knocking over a display iu a grocery store)
better if he responded with evident embarrass-
if he merely rebuilt the display without seeming
sed.
nxtety Schlenker and Leary (1982) explicitly
cial anxiety to self-presentation. In their view, so-
ety arises when the person wants to make a partie-
ired impression but fears that he or she will fail to
sLeary aud Kowalski (1995) put it, social anxiety
core a concern about controlling one's public im-
·i Making a particular impression is a vital means
ing two of the main, possibly innate social goals,
; inclusion and status. Given the importance of
rceivcd in certain ways by others, it is hardly sur-
711
prising that some people become extremely concerned and
anxious.
Disclosing Emotion Alongside the question of when do
people feel emotions is the question of when they reveal
them, and indeed such revelations may be central to the in-
terpersonal operation of emotions. Clark, Pataki, and
Carver (1995) have proposed some intriguing answers and
provided experimental support. People selectively reveal
their happiness when they want others to like them. They
show anger to other people in order to encourage the others
to go along with their preferences and wishes. And they ex-
press their sadness to get others to see them as helpless and
dependent, as a way of eliciting help from others. These
correspond to the self-presentational tactics of ingratiation,
intimidation, and supplication (Jones & Pittman, 1982).
Another manipulative self-presentation of emotion was
found by Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heathertou (1995):
people sometimes exaggerate how hurt or upset they are by
another person's actions, in order to make that person
guilty. The guilt makes the other person more willing to
comply with the inducer's wishes.
A more general statement was provided by DePaulo
(1992). People have moderate success at both exaggerating
and suppressing the nonverbal expression of emotion, in
order to serve their self-presentational goals. That is, some-
times it is best to pretend to be having a strong emotional
reaction, and other times it is advantageous to conceal
one's emotions. DePaulo found, however, that the more
strongly motivated people are to deceive others, the less
successful they are at it.
Summary and Implications
Although the self is formed through extensive social inter-
actions, it is far from a passive receptacle of external influ-
ences. Rather, it actively transforms and incorporates what
it receives from the interpersonal world. Selves are shaped
by the expectations and feedback of others, but mainly in-
sofar as they choose to be and actively accept that input.
People do not simply internalize what others think or ex-
pect of them: they are not robots programmed by society,
culture, or mass media.
Interpersonally, the self is a receiver but also a sender. In
self-presentation, people try to construct particular images
in the eyes of others, sometimes even engaging in risky and
dangerous activities to make a good impression. These im-
ages are often finely tailored to the situation, reflecting the
high motivation and extensive cognitive processing that go
on behind self-presentational activity. Thus, the favorabil-
ity of self-presentation is a balance between the desire to
make a favorable impression, the various constraints posed
by the other person's knowledge, and the limits of plausi-
bility. There is also an assortment of self-presentational
712 Part Four / Personal Phenomena Chapter 15 / The Self 713

tactics aimed at making a specific impression on others for
the sake of manipulating them in useful ways (e.g., to be
afraid of you and hence do what you want).
Aspects of self influence social relations in other ways
than self-presentation. Self-conceptions shape person per-
ception, mainly by making some categories more accessi-
ble than others. Several motivational aspects of self-con-
ceptions (such as a desire to see one's positive traits as
important, and a desire to believe one does not have partic-
ular undesired traits) seem to draw attention to certain
kinds of traits which are then influential in interpreting am-
biguous behavior of other people. The desire to maintain
favorable self-evaluations makes people sensitive to
processes of reflected glory and social comparison, and as
a result people may pull closer to or away from particular
others.
The link between close relationships and self has begun
to be explored. Some processes of self-deception and self-
enhancement have parallels in the way people think about
their relationships. Norms and behavioral patterns change,
such as the fact that people present themselves favorably
toward strangers but modestly toward friends. Intimates can
serve as a buffer that stabilizes the self-concept against ex-
ternal feedback. Some emotions, such as guilt and jealousy,
seem to function mainly to regulate the self's close rela-
tionships. High self-monitors choose partners to suit their
activities, whereas lows prefer the same partners for all ac-
tivities. People remain longest and happiest in relationships
with partners who share their inflated views of themselves.
The self exhibits several intriguing processes that con-
struct the self by means of influencing other people. Thus,
people require others to validate their identity claims, and
so the construction of self requires one to influence or per-
suade others. Self-concept change is not simply the inter-
nalization of one's own behavior through self-observation
but rather depends on involving other people to lend social
reality to the pivotal actions. People seem to choose to
enter or avoid various interpersonal encounters and possi-
bly even close relationships based partly on the chances to
protect, confirm, or enhance thei.r views of themselves.
The interplay between cognitive processes, emotional
processes, and interpersonal behavior looms as a major
challenge for the coming generation of research. At pre-
sent, it appears that people disclose or conceal (or possibly
exaggerate) certain emotions for self-presentational rea-
sons, and self-presentational activities seem to create a
cognitive load that impairs the processing of information
about the other person (but intensifies internalization
processes). Such findings hint at far more extensive and
complex links.
EXECUTIVE FUNCTION
The third major aspect of the self is its executive function:
the self makes decisions, initiates actions, and in other
ways exerts control over both self atld~
mon terms agency, choice, control;iirt
refer to this aspect of self. Without thi
self would be merely a passive speer
and related to others, but unable to do
ceive and interpret the flow of events (
tions). Such a theory would be defic]
more than interpret and belong. Indee
trol is one of the most fundamental
of human selfhood. Self-regulation
self's most remarkable capacity.
Action, especially moral or respon
poses (and defines) a self. Indeed, 6
between action and mere behaviori
self. An eyeblink, a drool, or a wiggli
ify as behavior, and no self is require
sponses. Action, however, refers to be
the person acting as a unity. Marrying
a vow, or voting, for example, are-act
sons, not just by a certain body parts;
cations for the entire self. The entire se
the entire self does many. By the sa
responsibility invoke the entire person
consequences and implications ofacy
self. If one's irresponsible actions lea
vorce, or arrest, it is the entire self thai
Social psychology has been slower
tive function of the self than tos
being or the cognitive construction.of
may be suggested for this, but among'
tendency to treat laboratory particips
than subjects. One can readily arran
for the experimental participant and
sponse; it is much more difficult tos
arrange their own situations and ini
outside a certain menu preselected
Still, this indifference to agency is"
the influence of the large body ofre
tion.
Another possible reason that the
self has received less attention isth
not dramatic. The rational pursuitof~~
ing theme in the actions of most peqp
This is unfortunately so obvious that
advance their careers by demonstrati
people will generally choose the rn8(
or prefer to date the more attractive
get the best price for their house or
foods they most like to eat, are unsu
Therefore there has been somethi
on finding ways in which people act
nal self-interest. This very searchgr~
siveness of self-interested rauouality-i
almost automatically are seen as.lnt
chologists have therefore become}
people choose the worst offer, accept a poor
what they would most like, even though
up only a small percentage of the total variance
n decisions. They reveal flaws in the executive
and are therefore important indications about how
es.
est in the executive function may also get a boost
burgeoning interest in automatic versus controlled
s (e.g., Bergh. 1982, 1994). The self is the con-
f controlled processes. The executive function of
in other words, is what makes controlled responses
To Choose-Or Not?
ems to be little doubt but that people desire con-
road variety of behavior patterns reflect the quest
01. People identify much better with circumstances
hey have chosen than those assigned to them (Lin-
per, & Jones, 1967). When deprived of control,
and in negative ways, such as trying to do what is
#or aggressing against the person who took away
I1trol (Brehm, 1966). Cnriosity, skilled play, explo-
and similar patterns are pervasive and suggest a
[control. Stressful experiences become much more
and traumatic when the person lacks control (e.g.,
Singer, 1972; Seligman, 1975). And even when
not have control, they prefer to develop illusions
1 (Langer, 1975), which seem to be beneficial de-
lack of pragmatic usefulness (Taylor, 1983).
,it seems clear that the desire for control is one of
motivations of the self. Actually, control motiva-
ot Iimited to human selfhood and may in fact flour-
g other species without requiring much in the way
od. Nonetheless, the self evolves in an organism
ndamentally motivated to seek control, and the
fore takes on the orientation toward control.
y speaking, control and esteem are probably the
important motivations of the self. People almost
IlY react badly to any major loss of either esteem
1, and they generally seem to desire and enjoy op-
ies to gain either esteem or control. Both are
linked to happiness (Campbell, 1981; Campbell,
,& Rogers, 1976), and people will often angment
stantive esteem and control with inflated, exagger-
perceptions.
e other hand, there do seem to be instances in
9ntrol is avoided or relinquished. Several patterns
exceptions were listed by Burger (1989). People
es dislike control when it involves being responsi-
ossible bad outcomes. They also will give up con-
II it is in their best interest to do so (e.g., letting
else drive if that person is a better driver or
Iso, sometimes control can focus attention on bad
s, and that focus increases anxiety. They may also
avoid control when control will not guarantee any im-
provement in their material outcomes (Skowronski & Carl-
ston, 1982). Still, by and large, it is safe to say that people
desire, seek, and prefer control.
One crucial point is that not all behavior involves
choices or initiative. Some theories (e.g., Surtre,
1943/1956) have contended that people are "condemned to
be free" and that everything a person does reflects free
choice, insofar as the person could conceivably have done
something else. While such a view may make an appealing
doctrine in politics or religion, it is poor psychology.
Clearly people perform a great deal of behavior without
making any sort of deliberate choice, and they may often
ignore alternatives that others might see. A manied woman
could, in principle, sleep with a different man on any given
night, but it is misleading to say that therefore one must
conclude that she freely chooses each night to sleep with
her husband. It is more accurate to say that she decided
long ago that she would sleep with one particular man reg-
ularly, and she married him. She probably does not go
through an actual choice process each evening.
The implication is that one does not need to invoke the
self's executive function to explain every single behavior.
Most likely, active choice and initiative by the self are in-
volved in a minority, although a very important minority,
of behaviors. Most behaviors may occur without bei.ng di-
rected or initiated by the executive function. Still, the exec-
utive function is very important just based on the cases in
which it does take action.
Steering may serve as a useful analogy. To steer prop-
erly, you do not have to be exerting control at all times.
The person who is steering merely intervenes from time to
time, such as to make a turn and then straighten out again.
But even though you are not actively steeri.ng most of the
time, you would not reach your destination without those
few very important moments.
Control, Self-Efficacy, Antonomy
A long tradition of psychological theory has asserted that
people are fundamentally motivated to seek control.
Although Freud's thinking neglected control in favor of
sexual, aggressive, and self-preservation drives, Adler's
theories (e.g., 1927; based on Nietzsche, 1887/1964) em-
phasized the need for power as the main motivation, and
power can be regarded as one form of control. More pre-
cise assertions of control motivation date back at least to
Murray (1938), who asserted achievement and autonomy
as important psychological needs. Perhaps the most influ-
ential and best-known formulation was White's (1959) ex-
pression of effectance motivation. He rejected the then-
popular drive theories of motivation as inadequate, because
they fail to explain exploratory behavior and the urge to be
competent at environmental mastery for its own sake.
Since then, psychologists have continued to emphasize
714 Part Four / Personal Phenomena
control motivations. DeCharms (1968) distinguished be-
tween being an origin and being a pawn, and he said that
people are motivated to have some personal causation (i.e.,
to be an origin sometimes). Burger and Cooper (1979)
have delineated individual differences in control motiva-
tion. Deci and Ryan (1991) have developed a theory about
the need for autonomy, to which we will return shortly.
An important advance to theory of control motivations
was furnished by Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder (1982),
who distinguished between primary and secondary control.
They proposed that primary control consists of attempts to
change the environment to suit the self. Secondary control
consists of changing the self to fit the environment. They
reviewed a broad assortment of experimental findings
showing that people systematically seek out both forms of
control. Subsequent work has shown that both aspects of
control predict success and adjustment, in somewhat dif-
ferent spheres. In highly controllable settings such as
school performance, primary control is important, whereas
in adjusting to many other circumstances secondary con-
trol is more important (Band & Weisz, 1988; Shaw, 1992;
Weisz, McCabe, & Dennig, 1994).
What happens when people lack control? Research with
animals suggested that deprivation of control leads quickly
to a condition of learned helplessness, in which the animal
gives up trying to control and fails to learn new contingen-
cies (Seligman, 1975). With human beings, however, the
first studies quickly showed that there is often the opposite
pattern: When people are deprived of control, they try
harder to reassert it, and it takes an impactful pattern of re-
peated failures to make them give up (Roth & Bootzin,
1974; Roth & Kubal, 1975).
The notion that people systematically resist losses of
control was elaborated into a broad theory by Brehm
(1966), who called such resistance reactance. According to
Brehm, when people feel that their freedom is threatened
in some way, they seek to reassert what is being taken
away from them. In other cases, they may respond by ag-
gressing toward the person or agent who has restricted
their freedom. Although as noted above some reactance re-
sponses are due to self-presentational concerns, there are
others that do not seem to depend on maintaining a particu-
lar public image (see Wright & Brehm, 1982).
Another very interesting response to the deprivation of
control is to develop illusions of control. In other words,
when the self cannot actually control its environment,
sometimes it satisfies itself with convincing oneself that it
can. Langer's (1975) seminal article on the illusion of con-
trol showed several ways in which people cultivate and
maintain false beliefs in their control. In particular, people
who are taking part in a lottery seem to become more con-
fident of winning as the time for drawing approaches, and
they become more confident as they think more about the
lottery (and presumably about winning it). In some cases
they treat chance events as if these in.v
falsely thinking that they may be ablet,)
A compelling demonstration ofth~
was furnished by Alloy and Abrams()n(
cally asked subjects to estimate their
the situation. They found that nondept~s
atically overestimated how muchc6ri
positive outcomes. (Depressed pedpl~
handed and more accurate in jUdgihg
they have.)
The findings about illusions oftd
importance of the self. One doesndt
lieve that control exists in the world-so
cultivates the belief that oneself in p
might be argued that selfhood is not-a
trol motivations, and indeed one may
trol motivations in other species who
of selfhood. But such animals do not
illusions of control. The linking of c
of self is indicated by the illusions of
There is of course something cfa
ally having control would be qUite~s~f
cause it enables you to make the world
the other hand, illusions of controlwo
useful. Indeed it might be downright
you are in control when you are not.
motivated to believe they are in controf
One broad and general answer-Is
dura's (1977) research on self-efficacy
posed that when people believe theyc
the sense of having confidence that ill
sired response, they are better able to
sponse. As in learned helplessness; a.b
make the requisite response (i.e., a-de
may prevent the person from acting hi
duce desired outcomes. A rich series
dura, 1982, 1986, 1989, for reviews) h
advantages of self-efficacy beliefs.
The implication is that even ilh.isi()¥
sought because of the generally helpful
one has control. More precisely, if()~e­
unlikely that one will always make the,
situational contingencies-it is better'
when it is objectively lacking than toa.s
control when one could have had it.
Another thonghtful and detailed sta
fits of perceived control was furnishe
who noted that there are important affe
efits for coping. She found that trauma
benefit from such illusions of control.
breast cancer seemed to derive affectiv
from medically unfounded beliefsalJ
control the spread of cancer or preve~
nothing else, illusions of control help
Chapter 15 / The Self
thereby support the optimism that one can eventu-
some things turn out well.
termination A novel and important approach to
Iltic aspect of the self has been taken by Deci and
.g., 1995). They have articulated the importance of
at the self as an agent who initiates acts, as op-
merely responding to events. Their emphasis on
as been accompanied by a strong focus on the mo-
alrather than the cognitive features of selfhood.
toots of self-determination theory lie in Deci's pio-
work in intrinsic- motivation (e.g., Deci, 1971).
Ie distinction was that extrinsic motivation in-
doing something for the sake of external rewards
efirs, whereas intrinsic motivation led to doing it
ake of the activity itself. Research studied these
rns of motives, particularly with respect to how
cmotives would come to dominate and undermine
'bmotivation (e.g., Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett,
Subsequent work showed, however, that under
cumstances rewards and external reinforcers can
or even strengthen intrinsic motivation, such as if
'fey symbolic affirmations of competence (Rosen-
lger, & Adelman, 1980) or as a function of inter-
context and communication (Ryan, 1982; Ryan,
Koestner, 1983). Such findings gradnally compli-
picture and led Deci and Ryan to propose that
hould move beyond the simple intrinsic/extrinsic
n.
ir current thinking, Deci and Ryan (1991, 1995)
that self-determination involves activities initiated
If in pursuit of its three main intrinsic motives.
otives are as follows. First, a need for competence
learning to control the environment and experi-
self as capable and effective, as opposed to feeling
or incompetent. Second, a need for autonomy in-
e experience of an internal locus of causality for
tions-that is, feeling that one's acts originate
hin the self, as opposed to being controlled or di-
Y external forces. Third, the need for relatedness
the construction and maintenance of satisfying in-
nts in the world of other people, including know-
aring for other people as well as believing that
about oneself.
heoretical issue that lies at the core of self-deter-
theory is that some of one's actions must reflect
endent, autonomous pursuit of these goals, as op-
being driven by external forces. In particular, Deci
an.• emphasize that it is not enough that the self con-
ddeliberately, intentionally initiate some actions.
ve provided a thoughtful critique of Bandura's
rid similar positions that in their view gloss over
ortanr distinction between deliberately responding
er's influence and deliberately acting from within
715
the self. True autonomy does not involve behaving
thoughtfully in service of someone else's directives.
As a vivid example, Hawk (1985) fonnd records of self-
criticism sessions held for Cambodian torturers during the
Khmer Rouge regime (see also Becker, 1986). The self-
criticism process (which was standard in many Communist
organizations) presumably led to thoughtful and effective
action in service of the regime and its ideology, although it
was certainly quite well focused. Hawk found, for exam-
ple, that there were ample instances of self-criticism for not
keeping proper records, for letting the prisoner die too
early in the process, and even for failing to keep pencils
sharpened, but there was little sign of reproaching oneself
for participating in inhumane acts, such as inflicting grue-
some pain and death on innocent fellow citizens. Deci and
Ryan would say that these self-reflective torturers were
acting intentionally but not really pursuing the self's intrin-
sic goals.
Closer to home, Deci and Ryan have sorted some of the
major goals and motives that drive people into the intrinsic
and extrinsic varieties and to look at some of the conse-
quences. Thus, Kasser and Ryan (1993, 1996) considered
personal growth, meaningful relationships, and community
contributions to be among the main intrinsic motivations
listed among the aspirations of a large sample of college
students. These goals were regarded as being ends in them-
selves and fostering the intrinsic motives of competence,
autonomy, and relatedness. In contrast, they labeled the
pursuit of financial success, fame, and physical attractive-
ness as extrinsic aspirations, because they are largely in-
strumental means toward other ends and because they em-
body external controls on one's actions (e.g., needing to do
jobs for others to gain money).
Kasser and Ryan then looked at how the relative em-
phasis among these intrinsic and extrinsic aspirations was
associated with various measures of subjective well-being
and ill-being, including mental health, adjustment, and
happiness. The more emphasis people placed on wanting to
be rich, famous, and physically attractive, the less well off
they were in terms of anxiety, depression, social function-
ing, vitality, self-actualization, and other measures. In con-
trast, placing emphasis on the intrinsic aspirations such as
growth and meaningful relationships was positively linked
to good adjustment and well-being.
On the basis of such findings, Deci and Ryan (1995)
have criticized self-esteem research for simplistically ig-
noring the same distinction between self-determined and
merely intentional acts. The successful pursuit of exter-
nally controlled rewards, such as money or fame (or the ap-
proval of the torture supervisor) may furnish high self-es-
teem, but this is not the same as self-esteem that is based
on self-determined behaviors. Deci and Ryan consider only
the latter to be true self-esteem, insofar as it is based on au-
tonomous, integrated aspects of the self.
716 PartFour / Personal Phenomena Chapter 15 / The Self 717

Active versus Passive Responses An underused but
promising way to study the executive function is differ-
ences between active and passive responses. The executive
function is by nature active, and so one would expect active
responses to have different consequences than passive re-
sponses. (As the next section will make plain, however, in-
action is not always passive, because an active internal re-
sponse may sometimes be required to prevent oneself from
doing something.)
There is some evidence of asymmetry between active
and passive responses. Fazio, Sherman, and Hen (1982)
had subjects judge the funniness of various cartoons with a
procedure that either required them to press a button if it
was funny but do nothing if it was not funny, or vice versa.
Active responses led to more extreme subsequent ratings
than passive ones. Allison and Messick (1988) had subjects
express attitudes by marking a box versus doing nothing,
and they too found that active responses led to stronger
subsequent attitudes as well as an increased false consen-
sus effect.
Cioffi and Garner (1996) showed behavioral conse-
quences of active versus passive responses, and once again
the active ones were more potent. Even when passive re-
sponses were made unambiguous, active ones were more
likely to lead to behavioral follow-through: specifically,
people were induced to volunteer either actively or pas-
sively to help with an AIDS project, and those who did so
actively were more likely to show up. Also, subjects who
responded actively (in either direction) gave more reasons
for their decision than did those who responded passively,
suggesting that active responses involve more extensive in-
ternal processing than passive ones-consistent with the
notion that it activates the executive function of the self.
Most of these researchers have treated the active-pas-
sive differences as merely being a curious anomaly within
self-perception theory: that is, even though active and pas-
sive responses might seem equally meaningful in principle,
people draw stronger inferences from active than passive
ones. The implications of these findings may be far more
profound than that, however, if considered in the context of
the executive function of the self. Active responses use the
executive function and perhaps therefore have stronger and
more dramatic consequences than passive responses, which
scarcely invoke the self.
Self-Regulation
The capacity of the self to change itself is one of the most
important, useful, and adaptive aspects of the executive
function. Indeed, Higgins (1996) has emphasized what he
calls the sovereignty of self-regulation to refer to its cen-
trality for understanding the nature of the self. Unlike other
aspects of the self, self-regulation only became widely ap-
preciated by social psychologists dnring the 1980s. AI-
though the distinction between' auto
processes was found increasinglYlls~f
ogy's theorizing (e.g., Bargh, 1982),1
recognize that being the control]
processes was a crucial aspect of sel
Behavior can occur without muc
Other species have minimal selves bu
be sure, one does probably need a bo
but not much more than that.} Tl11l.
structed psychological self-is not
havior. The self can become quitei
intervening in the ongoing sequence
it. A useful analogy would involve a
lines in the middle of a performaIl¢
follow and could simply fcllow.al
quence. But the executive functionn
tally involved if she decided to devi
speak new, different lines. The infl
function on behavior should perh
terms of changing and steering the
than initiating it from a state of inacti
The term self-regulation seernst
the attempt to make learning theory
phisticated so as to encompass a great
behavior. Laboratory rats may simply
imenter's presentation of reward a
gencies, but people sometimes set the
such as by promising yourself a rewa
can get an A on the chemistry test
garden. By establishing contingencies
or punishing themselves, people regular
recent notions emphasize the con~()WI1
ings, impulses, actions, and perforIIlCl
general effort to change the self tO
I11
own goals-what Banaji and Prentice
self-improvement motivation, thatis;f
oneself closer to what one should or
be" (p. 299).
Of particular importance is thcm
havior toward distal goals. Most anini
sponding to immediate stimuli; and
sponse theory proved reasonabl
psychological theorizing was confi~f
People can however resist the presser
immediate stimuli in order to pursue.gc
cases years or decades in the future.
Perhaps the most important empiri
of self-regulation has been the studies
tion, such as by Mischel and his calIf
1974, 1996, for reviews). In theses!
person must choose between taking
small reward or a larger but delaye~
capacity to delay gratification is cruc
getting an education or building a caree
lCation requires the individual to transcend the im-
Situation, in the sense that one must see beyond it
late the more valuable but more remote goal.
jecent work has emphasized a broad spectrum of
g impulsive behavior. Spurred by societal interest
e problems, from dieting to sex to violence to ad-
sychologists have examined how people succeed
ythey fail) at self-control. Other work has exam-
people control their thoughts and their emotions,
their performances,
r useful context for understanding self-regula-
distinction between primary and secondary con-
bribed earlier). The concept of self-regulation
extensively with that of secondary control, de-
phanging oneself to fit the environment. The better
is to change and adapt oneself, the easier it is to
and healthy in a wide range of circumstances.
ng-term stability and adaptive value of self-regu-
the individual personality have been best demon-
Mischel and his colleagues. Mischel, Shoda, and
88) assessed children's ability to delay gratlfica-
n.they were four and five years old. Those who
.~. best in self-control at that age were significantly
a decade later, in terms of school performance,
petence, and coping effectively with frustration
s. A follow-up found that those same self-con-
ildren at age four and five had higher SAT scores
e t Shoda, Mischel, and Peake, 1990). These re-
gest that some aspects of self-control take shape
ife and continue to yield benefits for many years.
control always good? The present state of the lit-
ggests that the answer is yes, or very nearly.
almost no evidence of instances in which self-con-
stematically disadvantageous to the person. Mean-
ere is abundant evidence of its benefits. In this it is
tdifferent from self-esteem, which as noted pre-
lias relatively few benefits (other than feeling
some significant costs and drawbacks. Self-con-
e put in service of bad ends, such as if self-disci-
bles one to become an expert mass murderer or a
ccessful torturer. But such cases seem to involve
the tool for what it builds. Weakening self-control
6treally solve the problem. A high capacity for
.1ation appears to be an unmitigated good in that it
~one's chances for success in nearly every en-
which it is relevant.
.~ Loops Self-regulation theory received a boost
ortant work by Carver and Scheier (1981, 1982),
.bined Powers' (1973) elaboration of cybernetic
ith Dnval and Wicklund's (1972) self-awareness
ey proposed that self-awareness is often a matter
ing how one is doing vis-a-vis one's goals and
other standards). It is not merely an idle curios-
ity, however, but part of a process of changing the self to
bring it up to meet those standards.
The core idea they took from cybernetic theory was the
feedback loop, summarized by the acronym TOTE (for
test, operate, test, exit). The self-appraisal of how one is
doing is the first test. If one finds oneself falling short of
the standard (e.g., one is not keeping one's room clean
enough), one proceeds to operate on the self to effect
change (one cleans up the room). Soon one conducts an-
other test to see whether one has reached the standard. If
not, one resumes or continues the operation of changing. If
so, then the control process is ended, and one can exit the
loop (think about something else, or get a beer).
A second important idea in Carver and Scheier's work
is that there is a hierarchy of feedback loops. Higher levels
refer to broader units of behavior, whereas lower ones refer
to smaller units. The lower levels are thus often means to-
ward the goals of the higher ones (see also Vallacher &
Wegner, 1985, 1987). When one is blocked in one's efforts
to reach a goal at one level, self-awareness often shifts
down to a lower level, in order to find and solve the prob-
lem. For example, perhaps you cannot seem to get your
room clean enough because you keep leaving half your
clothes on the floor, and so it may be necessary to buy an-
other chest of drawers.
The role of emotion in service of self-control was elabo-
rated in a later work (Carver & Scheier, 1990). Early self-
awareness theory said, quite plausibly, that people feel
upset when they conclude that they are falling short of their
goals (Duval & Wicklnnd, 1972). Carver and Scheier ob-
served however that people are always falling short of some
goals and yet are not always feeling bad, even when they
are self-aware and reflecting on these goals. They proposed
therefore that emotion is often a response to the first deriva-
tive (over time) of one's standing vis-a-vis these goals. That
is, one feels good when one is moving toward one's goals,
and one feels bad when one is moving away from them (or
moving toward them too slowly). In other words, the speed
of improvement sets off emotional responses.
Much of social psychology's thinking about self-regula-
tion has been heavily influenced by Carver and Scheier's
work and the feedback-loop model. Issues of comparing
oneself to standards have exerted considerable influence on
self-awareness and self-regulation research. The hierarchy
concept has received less research attention, partly because
of the difficulty of operationalizing the main ideas, but in
view of the concept's importance it seems only a matter of
time before some creative researchers devise effective
methods for testing and developing this aspect of the the-
ory. Indeed, that very hierarchy of goals is quite central to
the self and broadly directs the executive function most of
the time.
One further and useful implication of the feedback-loop
model is that it specifies several of the key ingredients of
718 Part Four / Personal Phenomena
self-regulation, and so researchers interested in self-regula-
tion failure can look for breakdowns in any area. Successful
self-regulation apparently requires clear and viable stan-
dards, effective monitoring of self, and some potent means
of operating on the self. Sure enough, self-regulation fail-
ure is often due to confused or conflicting standards, poor
monitoring, and lack of strength or other capacity to pro-
duce change (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994).
Although research has emphasized the concept of
bringing oneself closer to desired standards, there are also
what Carver and Scheier (1981) have called positive feed-
back loops in which the goal is to increase the discrepancy
of self from some negative standard, such as by maximiz-
ing the difference between oneself and a prejudiced or dis-
honest self. Often the motivation to change oneself away
from something is more powerful than the motivation to
change toward something (Ogilvie, 1987). Recent work by
Higgins (1996) has been particularly aimed at showing that
discrepancy-reducing and discrepancy-increasing
processes differ in many ways and that self-regulation the-
ory must encompass both. Roney, Higgins, and Shah
(1995) have shown that the same task can sometimes be
framed in either term (e.g., succeeding versus not failing),
with very different results, such as that a focus on succeed-
ing increases effort and confidence whereas a focus on not
failing increases anxiety.
Monitoring and Ironic Processes Wegner (1994) has
proposed a somewhat different and less idealized view of
self-regulation processes (or, in his preferred term, mental
control processes; Wegner & Pennebaker, 1993). He shares
with earlier theorists the view that effective monitoring is
essential to successful self-regulation, but he has also indi-
cated how monitoring can backfire and undermine self-reg-
ulation.
Wegner's work in this area began with studies that
asked subjects to try not to think about a white bear (Weg-
ner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987; Wegner, 1989).
These studies found that thought suppression efforts were
only partly successful. Moreover, once the suppression ex-
ercise ended, subjects often experienced a resurgence of
the forbidden thought, which the researchers dubbed the
rebound effect. These unwanted side effects of thought
suppression proved a fertile topic for research, yielding
such findings as the fact that suppressing thoughts about
sex sometimes created more arousal than thinking about
sex (Wegner, Shortt, Blake, & Page, 1990), that romantic
contacts or relationships seem to gain a special allure when
they have to be kept secret (Wegner, Lane, & Dimitri,
1994), and that depressed people (unlike others) seem to
distract themselves from upsetting thoughts by thinking of
other things that are also depressing, resulting in a change
of thought content but not a change of mood (Wenzlaff,
Wegner, & Roper, 1988).
Subsequent work led to a mare el<lb
tive theory of ironic processes (Wegn
self-regulation requires both a monit6
operating process: the monitoring pr'
matic, searches for signs of the forbid
tivity, and the (controlled) operatingp
resulting impulses or thoughts. A dieter
automatically monitor the environtrie
When one is spotted, the operatingpr()
tion to resist the temptation, such as
close the refrigerator.
A problem may arise, however,
processes continue to function even~
or taxed to invoke the operatingpt?5
main advantage of automatic processes
far less cognitive resources thanccW
Bargh, 1982). When the dieter is under
she may continue to watch for food cu
the wherewithal to resist them. Asa
doxically eat more than she wouldi
in the first place. Smart and wegne
this pattern "the evil monitor" becau
itoring process switches easily from
lation process to undermining it. Th
nism that helps people achieve their
most of the time can undermine them
tracted or stressed (Wegner, 1994).
Strength and Exertion Several sour
gued that self-regulation conforms toa
consistent with traditional concepts of
1996; also Baumeister & HeathertoIl,
Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). In this view,
tain strength or intensity, and overcomin
fore require a corresponding formof-s
differ from views of self-regulation as
Consistent with a strength view..e
self-regulation often requires mental
Pennebaker and Chew (1985) requir
lie amid a series of truthful answers
edge" paradigm. They found thatth
with a reduction (presumably an irilit
behavior as well as an increaseinph
Notarius, Wemple, Ingraham, Bur~~,
likewise found that inhibiting facialexp
was accompanied by increased arousal
that people must exert themselves (heW
hibit behaviors.
That self-regulation consumcs cogn
elegantly demonstrated hy Gilbert;
(1988). Suhjects watched a videotap~?
teraction but containing an irrelcvants
less stimuli at the bottom of the set
able to form a thoughtful impressioIl
Chapter 15 / The Self
Idii,tnlct"d by the irrelevant stimuli. In another con-
wever, subjects were instructed to ignore the ir-
stimuli, and so they had to mobilize some cogni-
rces to do what everyone else was doing anyway.
pressions of the stimulus persons were relatively
ial and incomplete, presumably because the effort
ing the irrelevant information detracted from the
al resources they could devote to processing the
'on. In short, cognitive capacity is apparently re-
yself-regulatory efforts, even if these are only de-
doing what one would do anyway.
nee about naturally OCCUlTing failures in self-regu-
em consistent with a strength and depletion model.
e crimes, addictive relapses, dietary failures (eat-
es), inappropriate emotional outbursts, and other
?~ns in self-control are more common when people
dol' under stress (e.g., Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990;
meister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994).
clition, some laboratory evidence has indicated that
latory exertions are followed by a subsequent re-
iii self-regulatory performance. A well-known se-
udies hy Glass and Singer (1972; see also Glass,
Friedman, 1969) showed that having to cope
redictable, stressful noise led to a "psychic cost"
of poorer subsequent tolerance for frustration.
,Tice, and Baumeister (in press) showed that self-
ry exertions such as trying to suppress white bear
or trying to alter one's emotional response were
by poor performance on unrelated self-regulatory
the basic question of how self-regulatory opera-
rk has begun to be answered in terms of a strength
Which is to say that people have a limited and de-
but renewable) capacity to control themselves.
to control multiple things at once (such as when
es several New Year's resolutions) may be il1-ad-
nd the imposition of new self-regulatory demands
tress, work pressures, or adapting to new circum-
ay undermine self-control in other spheres. A
~ilt and effective measure of individual differences
cgulatory capacity would likely provide a powerful
research in this area, and new methods for study-
narnics of strength (e.g., increasing it through ex-
e needed as welL
~trength model might help explain another seeming
iwhich concerns the role of emotion in self-regula-
already noted, Carver and Scheier (1990) have
an elegant theory about how emotion may aid
lation, and certain emotions such as guilt seem to
to regulatory success (e.g., Baumeister, Reis, &
1995). Yet a large body of evidence has repeat-
emotional distress as a cause of self-regu-
(e.g., Heatherton & Baumeister, 1991;
Herman, & Polivy, 1991; Heatherton & Polivy,
719
1992; Kirschenbaum, 1987). How can the apparently
harmful effects of emotional distress be reconciled with the
theorizing that depicts them as helpful?
One possible answer (among others) is that emotional
distress is itself often a drain on regulatory strength, inso-
far as people try to cope with and escape from the bad feel-
ings. These efforts leave less strength left to use for task
persistence, resisting temptation, and the like. Still, this is
only a tentative answer. Clarifying the relations between
emotional distress and regulatory success and failure will
be one of the most theoretically interesting challenges of
the coming years.
Acquiescence A controversial and theoretically conse-
quential issue is whether (or to what extent) self-regulation
failure involves the acquiescence of the individual. Thus,
are people passively overwhelmed by irresistible impulses,
or do they simply decide to give in to temptation? Clearly
the implications for understanding the self's executive
function are important.
Both views have their advocates. Western culture has a
long tradition of emphasizing personal and individual re-
sponsibility. Concepts of sin hold people responsible for
what they do; indeed, five of the "seven deadly sins" of
medieval Christian thought involved self-regulation failure
(i.e., actions based on greed or avarice, lust, gluttony, sloth
or laziness, and wrath). In contrast, medical models, de-
fense lawyers, and addict support groups have spearheaded
a modern movement to view many impulses as irresistible
and to regard people who fail at self-regulation as rela-
tively innocent victims.
Recent years have seen several attacks on and critiques
of the irresistible impulse view. Reed (1985) found that the
accounts of compulsions and obsessions rarely indicated
overwhelmingly powerful impulses but often emphasized
weakness or inability to control the self. Rachman and
Hodgson (1980) cited evidence that people with obses-
sive/compulsive disorder are more vulnerable than other
subjects to experimentally created obsessions.
Perhaps the most strident voice against the irresistible
impulse view in social psychology is that of Peele (1989).
He reviewed multiple studies questioning the prevailing
theories about addiction as an overwhelming impulse or
compulsion. For example, American soldiers who were ad-
dicted to heroin in Vietnam often recovered immediately
and without treatment from the addiction upon returning
home, and some even used heroin in the United States
without a resumption of their addiction! Likewise, the spi-
raling drinking binges among alcoholics appear to be due
more to beliefs and expectations (as indicated by placebo
effects) rather than the actual physiological dependency
and effects of initial consumption of alcohol (Marlatt,
Demming, & Reid, 1973). Peele also cited cultural differ-
ences, such as the fact that American Jews often drink but
 <,"1

720 Part Four I Personal Phenomena Chapter 15 ! The Self 721

rarely become alcoholic, presumably because their cultural
emphasis on personal responsibility does not exempt
drinkers.
A recent review of the literature on self-control has
yielded a conclusion that self-control failure involves miti-
gated acquiescence (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996;
Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994). That is, people do
not simply and freely choose (in most cases) to abandon
self-control, but there is abundant evidence that they do go
along and participate actively in the abandonment, espe-
cially after they start. For example, one cannot simply lie
back and let forbidden activities of eating, drinking, or
smoking happen-one must at least use hands and mouth
to ingest the forbidden substances. Meanwhile, the argu-
ments in favor of irresistible impulses seem too often disin-
genuous and self-serving (e.g., by defense lawyers). Per-
haps it is most accurate at present to say that self-regulation
is often a difficult and unpleasant task, especially when re-
sisting a favorite pleasure, and it requires ongoing exer-
tions-and so when people decide in a moment of weak-
ness to break down, they avoid reconsidering the decision
and instead participate actively in pursuing the forbidden
activity. Shapiro (1996) has pointed out that self-deception
may often be centrally involved in patterns of self-regula-
tion failure, such as when people justify their indulgences
(or indeed cite irresistible impulses). In any case, more re-
search is needed on the causes, patterns, justifications, and
degrees of acquiescence in self-regulatory failure.
One of the most interesting possibilities regarding ac-
quiescence combines the hierarchy model of Carver and
Scheier (1981) with the active/passive distinction. A dieter
or reformed alcoholic may decide that it is too difficult to
resist temptation, give in, and then actively take part in
procuring and ingesting the forbidden delights. Thus, pas-
sivity at a high level is combined with active participation
at a lower level. Even though the executive function ceases
to function at a high level it is still able to operate at the
lower one.
Self-Defeating Behavior
Self-defeating behavior has held a perennial fascination for
psychologists because of its fundamental and paradoxical
nature. The pursuit of enlightened self-interest is widely re-
garded as the essence of rationality. Therefore, to act in
contrary ways is the essence of irrationality. Why do peo-
ple do things that bring them suffering, failure, and other
misfortunes?
The study of self-defeating actions promises to reveal
much about the executive function of the self. When people
act rationally to pursue material advantages, there is little
need for elaborate theories about volition, choice, control,
and initiative, and some would say that simple reinforce-
ment theories are sufficient. In contrast, when people
thwart their own best interests,the nbb
greater, and these explanations seem
erable light on how people make dec;
tiona. This approach can be compared
by perception and cognitive psycho!
brain damage and lesions among phtsi
gists, and even the Freudian projectoj'
mal functioning by studying neurosis!
perhaps, self-defeating behavior canis
executive function operates. Let usn6w
these patterns.
Self-Handicapping In principle,p
want to perform up to the best oft
would manage their affairs and arrall
so as to maximize their chances fors
pattern was first proposed by Jones
sometimes people create obstacles
mance. These obstacles may includ
and withholding effort, abusing alco
preparation. The pattern is called self-H
The first experimental demonstrati
1978) involved taking drugs that we'"
to impair intellectual performance;jll~
gence test. All subjects took an initial
offered a choice between a drug thafW
them temporarily smarter and onetha
performance. They were told that they
test after the drug had entered theirs
menters made a fuss over how remarkab
had supposedly performed on the firstte
Actually the first test had been rigge
perimenter simply administered sol
said that the number the subject had
above average. For others, however;
solvable, and the subject had to make
the multiple-choice format). The exp
told the subject that his or her guess
these latter (noncontingent success)~u
performance-impairing drug. The-rea
they presumably knew that theiroste
merely a series of lucky guesses, and
the second test they would not Iiveup
expectations of the experimentera.To
failure, they chose the drug that wou11
for performing poorly on the second.tes
did fail ou the follow-up, it would bet
power of the drug, rather than a dispr
mous intellectual brilliance.
Self-handicapping captured the in
ment of the social psychology researc
because its implications spill overim
field (e.g., Higgins, Snyder, & Bergla
cognitive implications, especially-reg
handicapping, one can forestall the drawing of un-
g attributions about oneself. Self-handicapping
ailure meaningless, and so if people already think
are intelligent, the upcoming test cannot change
jession.
is also a strong motivational aspect to self-handi-
.iPeople want to preserve favorable views of them-
d indeed they may want to enhance their reputa-
e beauty of the self-handicapping strategy is that it
th benefits, namely, protection against failure and
rnent of success. As Jones and Berglas (1978)
out, the student who does poorly in school after not
ard is protected against the implication of being
~ecause the lack of effort is seen as the main expla-
or poor performance, Meanwhile, though, the stu-
¢ does well in school after not trying hard is per-
~sespecially gifted, because the success cannot be
ed to high effort and so must reflect high ability.
h motive predominates? Tice (1991) created situa-
hich only success or only failure would be mean-
he other being ambiguous), in order to see which
'cit self-handicapping. The response depended on
em. People with high self-esteem self-handicapped
~e their successes, and they seemed largely uncon-
about protecting themselves against possible fail-
esumably they do uot think they are going to fail
.).People with low self-esteem, however, engaged
andicapping in order to protect themselves against
failure. Thus, both motives lead to self-handicap-
ending on the person and the situation.
is also a strong interpersonal aspect to self-handi-
"Kolditz aud Arkin (1982) manipulated whether
crucial aspects of the situation were public (i.e.,
others) or private (i.e., known only to the sub-
-handicapping emerged mainly in the public con-
at is, when the subject's handicap and subsequent
ancc would be known to others. Almost no self-
ping was found when the experimenter would be
of the handicap (i.e., which drug the subject took).
tly, self-handicapping is done mainly to control
one is viewed by others, as a self-presentational
People are less likely to self-handicap merely for
of protecting or enhancing their own private views
mselves.
If-handicapping self-destructive at all? One might
at it seems a highly rational strategy, given that it
fects against failure and enhances one's credit for
.The cost, however, is that the actual quality of the
ance suffers, as Tice and Baumeister (1990)
Failing to study for a test or getting drunk prior to
rtant presentation may have attributional benefits,
~o tend to prevent one from doing one's best. Self-
pping thus sacrifices the quality of the performance
to manipulate the meaning of the outcome.
Excessive Persistence American culture extols the value
of persistence, as indeed it should, because success often
requires continuing to strive and try despite initial failures.
On the other hand, there are undoubtedly cases in which
persistence in a losing endeavor simply brings more losing,
often with increased costs. The obstinate refusal to change
wrong opinions, to cancel programs and policies that are
failing, to stop investing money in fiscally unsound enter-
prises, or to treat people in ways that consistently backfire
is hardly a sign of the virtues of persistence. Rather than
praising all persistence, it may be more appropriate to
praise judicious persistence, which involves both the ca-
pacity to keep trying and the ability to judge whether cou-
tinued efforts are likely to lead to success or failure.
Research has examined what causes people to persist in
costly failures. One crucial factor is the feeling of commit-
ment generated by sunk costs. That is, people feel that they
have already invested a certain amount of time, energy,
care, or other resources into some endeavor, and if they
quit now they will lose all they have put in. Rubin and
Brockner (1975) gave subjects an initial monetary amount
and offered them a series of choices between keeping what
they had and investing it in the hope of earning more. The
investments were rigged to do poorly, and people had to
decide whether to keep putting in more, just as a gambler
needs to keep coming up with more money in the hope of
recouping losses and ending up ahead. Still, people contin-
ued to invest. In fact, nearly all of them continued to invest
past the break-even point (at which even if they were to
win they would still end up with less than what they had
had at the start).
Thus, people seem to become psychologically en-
trapped in certain situations. They persist well beyond the
point at which it would seem rational or desirable to con-
tinue. Sustained by the momentum and commitment of
their initial investment, they feel unable to withdraw: "too
much invested to quit" (Teger, 1980).
As with self-handicapping, research has shown that ex-
cessive persistence is mediated by cognitive, motivational,
and interpersonal factors. Cognitive processes can increase
or decrease destructive persistence. When people are en-
couraged to make careful and accurate calculations about
their decisions and the relevant contingencies, they are less
likely to persist beyond the rational poiut (Conlon & Wolf,
1980). Persistence thus may reflect a lack of thoughtful
evaluation of the situation and its possibilities. If they have
been told about the dangers of becoming entrapped in a
persistence situation, they also seem better able to resist
the self-defeating patteru (Nathansou et al., 1982). Wit-
nessing another person come to grief through costly persis-
tence, especially if the model says that persisting was a
mistake, makes subjects less likely to repeat that mistake
(Brackner et a1., 1984).
Meanwhile, interpersonal motivations contribute to per-
722 PartFour / Personal Phenomena
sistence. People become entrapped in persistence situations
because of concern about how others will evaluate them.
Sometimes people are reluctant to back out because they
think others will think poorly of them. If they believe that
the audience will think well of them for withdrawing, they
are more willing to withdraw and hence can resist the per-
sistence trap (Brockner, Rubin, & Lang, 1981).
The concern with others' perceptions of one's decision
brings up an interpersonal aspect to the self's executive
function. As noted earlier, action brings a sense of respon-
sibility, which is often merely increased by the awareness
of others. Staw (1976) showed that people are more prone
to persist in a losing investment paradigm if the initial de-
cision had been their own instead of someone else's, which
shows the importance of feelings of personal responsibil-
ity. In particular, if the initial investment turned out badly,
the person who made the initial decision will feel responsi-
ble for the bad outcome, which heightens the tendency to
persist. Bazerman, Giuliano, and Appelman (1984) showed
that such feelings of personal responsibility foster a sense
of commitment, and the person may become determined to
continue until eventual success, which the person refuses
to doubt.
The interpersonal aspect of responsibility was high-
lighted by Fox and Staw (1979), who found that people
were especially likely to persist if the initial decision had
been made in the face of other people's objections. Appar-
ently people are loath to expose themselves to the possibil-
ity of someone telling them that "I told you so." Teger
(1980) noted that even when self-presentational or inter-
personal concerns are largely irrelevant to the initial deci-
sion, persistence may come to be mediated by them later
on, because losing face becomes increasingly salient as
one's responsibility for bad outcomes increases.
For the purposes of understanding the role of the execu-
tive function of the self, one of the most relevant papers
was by Brockner, Shaw, and Rubin (1979). Their experi-
ment manipulated whether quitting or persisting was the
passive option; that is, some subjects had to respond ac-
tively to quit but could continue by doing nothing (similar
to letting one's stock investment ride), whereas others
were in the reverse situation in which they had to make an
active response to continue (akin to placing a new bet).
The passive option was the more common response in
both situations. Thus, destructive persistence was more
common when it did not require the self to do anything.
When the executive function of the self is mobilized, it
seems to reduce some of the tendency toward excessive
persistence.
The notion of the passive option shows that sometimes
the involvement of the executive function is merely op-
tional. The next generation of self researchers may begin to
study the factors that determine whether the self adopts an
active response or not. As this section has shown, active
participation by the self is no guarantee of positive out-
comes, for destructive persistence can be
or passively, but it can make a differerite)
Why Do People Self-Destruct? Sev
motivational causes of self-defeating~
noted in connection with self-handicappi
persistence (in the preceding sections)
roots of self-defeating behavior, it is 11
them in the context of other, parallelj,
view was attempted by Baumeister and
on a priori grounds identified three le{,~
in self-defeating behavior and soughfeYi
them. The three levels of intentionalit~iii
utive function of the self in quite differerl
The first and most obvious would-be
struction, in which the person can Pres
self-defeating consequences and choose
tion so as to cause them. In plain terms,
suffer or faiL There are hardly anye
tions of such patterns, and close exanii
suggests that even in them the people
the bad outcomes for their own sake.
that people have self-destructive motives
one in psychology (e.g., Menningerj'I
not appear to be correct, at least in the
studied by social psychologists.
The second is the opposite extreme,
neither foresees nor desires the self
This category could be labeled uninteh
tion, insofar as people would preferro
comes they bring on themselves.i'I'he
counterproductive approaches, ofte~~.
standing of self and world. The person is
a positive outcome but goes about it.irr
duces a negative outcome. Although
they do not really show the executive
be irrational-s-merely misinfonned.In
tional self-destruction results from.nil
such as making oneself do something
patterns of destructive persistence pr()"/
of this form of self-defeat. Persisters
positive outcomes, yet they do so iri'W
tive ones. Poor understanding of contin
ulation of self bring about their count~
The third category lies in betweent
tradeoffs-that is, circumstances.in
negative outcomes are linked. The bad
foreseeable but is not desired. Thepe
an action for the sake of the positive
the negative one as an accompanying
ping is a good illustration of thetr~
handicappers seek the positiveollts
against humiliating failure and enha
success. They accept the cost (of h~11l
reluctantly, but it presumably seems.we
Chapter 15 / The Self
are therefore the most useful and revealing
.~~lf-defeating behavior for learning about the exec-
netion of the self. People make choices with fore-
bad consequences for themselves, and in the long
yioften regret these choices-but they make them
ess. Why?
al key factors that contribute to these self-defeat-
offs can be identified. First, self-defeating choices
mvolve immediate benefits but delayed costs (see
wenstein & Elster, 1992; Platt, 1973). Second,
to involve definite rewards but only probable, un-
isks. Third, the situations that elicit them often
involve some high awareness of self. Fourth, these
tlsalso tend to involve aversive emotional states, or
"he threat of them. It now appears that emotional
fosters self-defeating behavior by creating a ten-
§choose high-risk courses of action (Leith &
ister, 1996). Once again, self-handicapping ilIus-
se (except for the time delay factor): the attribu-
efits are there either way, whereas the poorer per-
outcome is not guaranteed. Concern over how
tsperceived leads to self-handicapping, as does
11 anxiety or other negative affect.
If-Defeating Patterns Probably the most wide-
orm of self-harm involves substance abuse. Drink-
hal, taking drugs, smoking cigarettes, and similar
esring up a costly toll in terms of human misfor-
'I; these choices are tradeoffs, because people take
stances for the sake of pleasure and satisfaction
the harmful consequences. They provide a good
of immediate, definite rewards combined with un-
delayed costs, which is typical of self-defeating
er common pattern involves neglect of health,
ly in terms of failing to take medicine or comply
sicians' instructions. Noncompliance risks contin-
~ss and even death, yet ironically people pay for
e and then fail to follow through (e.g., Dunbar &
, 1979). People especially fail to comply witb
regimens that are costly, inconvenient, or unpleas-
nether tradeoff is the pursuit of revenge at cost to
Brown (1968) showed that people are especially
accept costly means of getting even with someone
have been embarrassed or humiliated. When the
merely financial, people would only seek revenge
.as it was profitable. Thus, interpersonal concerns
e-saving and negative affect (feeling humiliated)
ople more willing to engage in this pattern.
ri are also some findings suggesting that people
it~ctly choose an unpleasant outcome. Although
nitially seem to suggest deliberate self-destructive
close inspection they resemble tradeoffs. On the
fa just world (Lerner, Miller, & Holmes, 1976),
723
people sometimes seem to think that they will get a fixed
amount of suffering, and so they may as well get it over
with. When they believe (often irrationally) that present
suffering will produce positive future outcomes or merely
reduce future suffering, they will choose to suffer more in
the present (Curtis, Rietdorf, & Ronell, 1980; Curtis,
Smith, & Moore, 1984).
Also, in several studies, people are led to expect that
they will be required to eat a worm or caterpillar. When of-
fered a reprieve at the last minute, many will go ahead and
choose to eat the worm anyway (Aronson, .Carlsmith, &
Darley, 1963; Foxman & Radtke, 1970; Waister, Aronson,
& Brown, 1966). Comer and Laird (1975) showed tbat
these choices were mediated by just-world beliefs (e.g.,
they deserved to suffer) and reinterpretation (e.g., the worm
was not so bad). Although it is a stretch to call such choices
self-defeating, the research findings do suggest an interest-
ing pattern regarding the executive function of the self. Ap-
parently what happens is that the person becomes focused
on accommodating his or her reactions to the upcoming
aversive event (i.e., secondary control). The last-minute op-
tion of backing out would require a shift of the executive
function to primary control, by making a choice to change
the situation, and apparently that is a difficult choice.
Lastly, people sometimes seek to fail when there are
some attributional benefits or payoffs. Baumgardner and
Brownlee (1987) found that people high in social anxiety
may intentionally fail in order to escape the burden of other
people's expectations for subsequent performance.
Baumeister, Cooper, and Skib (1979) showed that people
will fail when failure has been described as diagnostic of a
desirable trait.
Implications for Executive Function At the start of this
section, it was suggested that one crucial justification for
the study of self-defeating behavior (which, to be sure, is
of interest in its own right) is that it may shed light on the
executive function of the self. It is therefore important to
consider the relevant implications briefly.
Nothing in the evidence about self-defeating behavior
contradicts the notion that the pursuit of self-interest is the
overriding, rational goal of the executive function. Self-de-
feating acts occur when people are misguided or mistaken,
or when they fail to ascertain or pursue what would be best
for them. They do not seem to desire failure, suffering, or
other bad outcomes. When the executive function has a
clear grasp of its best interest, it nearly always pursues it.
Self-defeating behavior therefore reflects some impair-
ment or befuddlement of the executive function. Appar-
ently people are prone to focus disproportionately on im-
mediate and definite outcomes, to the (sometimes costly)
neglect of long-term or merely possible consequences. The
human executive function may be distinguished from that
of other species by its exceptional capacity to appreciate
long-term outcomes, but this capacity is underutilized.

724 Part Four / Personal Phenomena
People do respond strongly to immediate, salient pressures
when making decisions. They are often sorry later.
Aversive emotional states seem to mediate many self-
defeating acts. There is a long and dubious tradition in
popular thinking of regarding emotions as irrational. The
involvement of emotion in self-defeat lends some credence
to that view. Just as emotion was apparently able to impair
proper self-regulation, so it is also apparently capable of
fostering self-defeating acts. Thus, broadly speaking, emo-
tion appears to disturb the executive function. It seems that
emotional distress leads to a highly risky pattern of deci-
sion-making, and so often the results will be catastrophic
when people make important life decisions while they are
angry or emotionally distraught. Beyond that, the relation
between emotional distress (or emotion in general) and the
executive function of the self is another high priority for
further research.
Concern over self-esteem and especially over how one
is perceived by others is another cause of several self-de-
feating processes. There is one particular combination of
self-appraisals that is disaster-prone. That consists of a
self-appraisal that is very favorable and a salient external
appraisal that is bad, or at least substantially less favor-
able-in short, threatened egotism. People can remain ra-
tional after substantial material setbacks, but a blow to the
ego tends to produce high order irrationality. Ego-threat-
ened people tend to become both self-destructive and
other-destructive. In terms of self-destruction, the cause
seems to be a failure to use available knowledge, respond-
ing to superficial and misleading rather than adaptive situa-
tional cues (interpretations). In a sense it is a failure of self-
control, such as making a decision based on short-term
desires and impulses rather than properly appreciated long-
term best interest. Meanwhile, with other-destructiveness,
the mediation appears clearly to be premature abandon-
ment of self-control. Thus, threatened egotism and the ac-
companying emotional distress seem often inimical to the
executive function. They thwart its adaptive functioning.
Summary and Implications
The executive function of the self is a mechanism that initi-
ates, alters, and directs behavior. It is not always "on," be-
cause many behaviors can occur without active interven-
tion by the self, but its activities are quite important.
Making choices, exerting control, and regulating the self
are among its crucial functions, even if they only occur oc-
casionally. Social psychology has not understood the exec-
utive function as well as the other two aspects of self cov-
ered in this chapter, but it seems fair to expect that at some
point in the foreseeable future, the executive function will
be the main focus of social psychology's research on the
self, because it is starting to have the biggest unanswered
questions, and because methods are becoming available.
The quest for control is one ofth.~
both in terms of changing the env1J:6
tofle
and in terms of altering the self
or measure up to standards. By irript
person and environment, the executiV
ful tool to improve health, happiness,
trol over the environment is widely,
usualiy itself inherently pleasant,a
sortment of mostly positive outed
an
over the self is usually beneficial
tive outcomes. When it is operating
function is beneficial in many ways;
When people are deprived of y()
gain control, and sometimes they cul
trol to compensate. If deprivation
distress such as frustration and de
to exhibit various maladaptive patt
aggression. Some degree of autono
as a broad pattern of internal centre
levels, may be important for health(~#
The executive function can bese~~
passive) and controlled (rather thaB~
Such responses seem to require menta
Active responses leave stronger inte
titudinal) traces than passive ones.GQ
sus passive and controlled versus auto
be a valuable research strategy forill*
ecutive function operates.
The rational pursuit of self-interes
ciple of the executive function; and
other irrational behavior patternsat
Many of these involve ignoring Iong-t
favor of immediate concerns. Emetic
causes seem to heighten the short-
leads to destructive outcomes.
Self-regulation likewise seems!
physical effort, which raises the ta~t
decision-making and self-controldr
resource of selfhood. Feedback-loop
considerable insight into how people
portant standards. Yet many proce~$
ways. Thus, emotional distress canin
to measure up to standards, but it can
regulation. An automatic monitoring
regulation under favorable circumst
mine it in times of stress; fati~~
Meanwhile, misregulation of selfc~n
self-defeating patterns, such as wheI\
selves to persist in a doomed or losin
The issue of acquiescence in selff
both theoretical and practical imPB
model of self-control may be helpful.
decide to give up and become passiv
level they may actively participate ill.
pulses. Whether this reflects self-dece
Chapter 15 / The Self
difficulty) of different levels is a crucial issue
n seems to activate the executive function, for
orse. Emotional distress can either help or im-
egulation, and likewise it can either help or im-
ol-seeking and decision-making. Thus, emotion
lleither beneficial nor harmful to the executive
ut it is quite capable of altering its operation and
t present, a reasonable guess would be that one
tion of emotion is to alter or activate the execu-
RAL AND HISTORICAL VARIATIONS
INSELFHOOD
of the research covered thus far has been con-
i.North American universities with samples of
erican college students. Although much of value
earned from these groups, one does wonder
here are aspects of human selfhood that may be
ed or underappreciated because of the empirical
~~that most social psychologists use. Given how
¢lythe self is a social construct, one would expect
tural and historical variation. Before closing,
,it is useful to review briefly the current thinking
h.variation.
Culture and Society
j#cultural determinants of selfhood has expanded
years. A seminal and influential article by Trian-
Jintegrated a large body of research to identify
y.featurcs of selfhood that vary across different
In.particular, cultures vary in the relative ernpha-
lace on each of the following. First, the private
to how people understand themselves. It illvolves
d, self-esteem, illtrospection, and individual deci-
'g. Second, the public selj'refers to how the indi-
perceived by other people, thus including issues
putation, specific expectations of others, and im-
management. Third, the collective self involves
berships in various social groups, from the fam-
employing organization or an ethnic group. In
view, individualistic societies such as the United
to emphasize the private and public selves and
the collective self, whereas other (e,g., Asian)
end to emphasize the collective self while plac-
~ly little importance on the private self.
,Triandis (1989) proposed several important di-
along which societies vary and which have im-
plications for the control and formation of self.
ividualism versus collectivism: individualistic
support diversity, self-expression, and the rights
~~als, whereas collectivistic societies promote
'0/ and a sense of obligation to the group. Another
I OJ
725
dimension is tightness, which refers to the degree of social
pressure on individuals: tight societies put strong demands
on individuals to conform to the group's values, role defin-
itions, and norms, whereas loose ones allow people more
flexibility to do what they want. (For that reason, tight so-
cieties tend to promote the public and collective selves,
whereas loose ones allow more scope for the private self to
flourish.)
A third dimension of cultural variation proposed by
Triandis (1989) is the complexity of the society, which is
defined in terms of the number of different relationships
and groups to which an individual belongs. In a complex
society, an individual tends to belong to many different
groups, and so it is less imperative to stay on good terms
with any of them. The collective self is therefore not so
crncially important (although it may be highly developed
in the simple sense that one belongs to many collectivities).
Meanwhile, complex societies allow greater development
of the private self (again because of the broad availability
of many social relationships), and the public self is quite
important because it is the common feature of all one's so-
cial relations. In contrast, in a simple society one belongs
to relatively few groups, each of which is then quite impor-
tant in defining the self. The collective self flourishes in
adapting to these memberships, whereas the need to con-
form to the group tends to stifle the private self.
In a vivid and timely comparison, Triandis (1989) illus-
trated some of his central ideas by contrasting American
and Japanese societies. Japan tends to be more collectivis-
tic and tighter than the United States, and as a result there
is much greater homogeneity: Japanese citizens tend to eat
and dress similarly rather than allowing the private self to
choose from a broad assortment as in the United States.
Certain Asian traditions, such as having the oldest male
order the same food for the entire table, would be unthink-
able in American restaurants, where each individual's spe-
cial preferences are elaborately cultivated.
Furthermore, Americans place a premium on sincerity,
which can be approximately described as a congruency be-
tween public and private selves: one is supposed to say
what one means and mean what one says. In Japan, in con-
trast, the public actions are what matter most, and private
sentiments are less important. Triandis cited survey re-
search using hypothetical dilemmas which included the op-
tion of thinking one thing and saying something quite dif-
ferent. Americans tended to object strongly to such an
option, which they saw as hypocritical (e.g., privately ob-
jecting to an interracial romance for one's daughter but
publicly supporting it). Japanese, however, tended to ap-
prove of such options.
Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that the basic
difference ill selfhood between Asian and Western cultures
involves the dimension of independence versus interdepen-
dence. In their view, Western cultures emphasize the inde-
pendent self: people are supposed to attend to themselves,
 '\

726 Part Four / Personal Phenomena Chapter 15 / The Self 727

to discover and express their unique attributes, and to try to
stand out in important ways. In contrast, Asian cultures
emphasize interdependence. Asians are expected to attend
to others, to conform to group demands and role obliga-
tions, and to try to fit in to the group in important, harmo-
nious ways. At bottom is a fundamental difference in the
conception of selfhood: to the Western mind, the self is an
autonomous unit which is essentially separate and unique,
whereas the Asian view begins with an assumption of the
basic and pervasive connectedness of people.
Multiple consequences can be linked to these differ-
ences between an independent and an interdependent view
of self, as Markus and Kitayama reviewed. People from in-
dependent cultures tend to think of selves somewhat inde-
pendent of context, focusing on the knowledge they have
gleaned from mnltiple observations (e.g., he is stingy). In
contrast, people from interdependent cultures tend to de-
scribe people more in terms of behaviors in particular con-
texts (e.g., "He behaves properly with guests but feels
sorry if money is spent on them" p. 232). Pressures for
cognitive consistency among private thoughts and feelings
may be mainly associated with independent, self-contained
selves, whereas such inner processes are of secondary con-
cern in the interdependent view and may therefore not be
seen as highly important. Politeness among independent
selves involves giving the other person the maximum free-
dom to express and obtain unique, special, changing
wishes. Politeness among interdependent selves involves
anticipating what the other might want and showing appre-
ciation for what the other does.
There are also emotional consequences, as Markus and
Kitayama explain. In the West, the expression versus sup-
pression of anger has long been a vexing point of contro-
versy, because anger is socially disruptive yet helps assert
the rights and needs of the self. In Asian cultures, however,
there is no controversy, and anger is to be avoided at all
costs.
The important implication is that many features of self-
hood need to be examined for cultural relativity. The avail-
able body of empirical research findings on the self, like
that on most psychological topics, has mainly been col-
lected in the West, and as a result it may exaggerate the
fundamental nature and pervasiveness of several features.
Although certainly there are many important similarities
among the concepts of selfhood in different cultures, there
are important differences too.
Historical Evolution of Self
It is not necessary to visit multiple cultures to find varia-
tions in selfhood. There is often ample variation within a
single culture. Indeed, our own culture's dominant ideas
about selfhood have changed and evolved dramatically
over the past few centuries (see Baumeister, 1986, 1987).
Thus, the special nature of the modern Western form of
selfhood can be understood in a. hist
well as a context of cross-culturalc()
The burgeoning psychology of sel
flection that the self confronts them6
ual as a problem and puzzle. TheiiI1t
self, knowing oneself, identitycrisi-
and the rest arises from this histo1'i
ment. Medieval Westerners did not.w
or have identity crises the way mode
One important source of change
are based on changing rather thansr
lier times, one's age, gender, and fa
sive determinants of one's life, and-s
in a simple and clear fashion. In con
have often made explicit efforts-to
those factors (such as by bannin,gse
their contribution to self is reduced.
one's life is left much more up toch
ceived traits, and such determinants
ble and flnid. The modem Westernse
ation and renegotiation to a much-g
self of earlier eras.
The instability or openness ofti1¢
also undermined the stability ofs~l
past, one lived among the same peal'
life, and there were clear and fixedr
cial status: aristocrats were superiort
ple. Now, however, few people livej
among the same associates for many
no presumption that some people-are
others. Indeed, although there is still~
the rich and famous as elite beings,i
ple to rise from obscurity to that elit
fall back into it. All this means that
entity in a changing environment.
The greater freedom has alsos
defining the self onto the individual;
cient reason for people to see the self
lem. To put it crudely, a rigid soci~t
who they were, and there was Tlotgt
about it. Today each individual C~I18
spectrum of possible identities;>aIlqJ
with it the difficnlty of finding way"
increasing the importance of kno\\iiH
other traits so as to choose an apptopri
so forth. The burden falls most heavil
cause adolescence ends with the form
(e.g., Erikson, 1968). Hence in
lescence has become a period
experimentation, and identity
Tice, 1986).
A crucial step in the evolution
volved coming to see it as a hj'1d"n,
you lived among the same
you quite well, and even
Some identification was accomplished by often
'girl dress codes. Hence the self was obvious. In
the emergence of modem life multiplied contacts
'strangers and reduced the visible markers of iden-
bUng some people to pretend to be something they
t. The concern over the difference between inner
er selves became acute in the sixteenth century, as
bcted in the literature, drama, philosophy, and other
,,(e.g., Trilling, 1971). A hidden self is harder to
a define than a self that is explicit in one's acts and
nee. Inner selves are not known directly but.arc
erred.
legacy of Puritanism, which is especially strong in
a, diminished the certainty of self-knowledge by
ng awareness of self-deception. Puritans believed
·tally important aspect of the hidden self-c-specifi-
ether one was destined to spend eternity in heaven
was fixed and could be discerned by observing the
titans therefore spent a relatively high amount of
deffort scrutinizing themselves for signs of whether
re among the Elect few or the damned many. Grad-
ey began to recognize that they, or at least their
(S, were biasing these tests so as to boost their con-
in their eternal salvation. Self-knowledge had once
ded as an especially secure form of knowledge,
rtainty gradually deteriorated as the pervasive pos-
f self-deception rendered it increasingly suspect.
point was perhaps in the twentieth century move-
psychoanalysis, which regarded self-knowledge as
ely difficult. Only after many expensive years of
ik and frequent consultations with a trained expert
eone even begin to approach self-knowledge.
t.facet of the modern dilemma of selfhood con-
tles (see Baumeister, 1991b). Throughout most of
moral values were inimical to selthood: to act in a
virtuous way was the opposite of acting in a self-
Modernization and secularization of Western soci-
ted a value gap, however, in the sense that there
rtage of finn, consensually recognized criteria of
wrong. One response to the value gap has been to
e self into a major value. Modern Westem indi-
it as a right and even a moral duty to learn
selves, cultivate their talents, and generally pur-
own interests. There is some evidence that the self
ing other basic values aside. For example, if there
nflict between what is best for the marriage and
est for the self, earlier generations often placed
ation to marriage as the supreme duty, but more
es have placed the self higher (see Zube, 1972).
,this new value placed on selfhood has wrought
ntal changes in the way people understand their
eir religion, their free time, and their mortality.
se of the self as a basic value places a much
den on selfhood than it carried in previous eras.
ging, uncertain, and partly metaphorical entity to
fill the role of providing value to life is asking a great deal.
In any case, it is hardly surprising that research on the self
has flourished in the modern West, because the problem-
atic nature is more acute and more pressing in this culture
than in others.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has proposed that selfhood has three basic
universal aspects (beyond the bare fact of a physical
body), and that social psychology's contributions can be
understood in relation to them. They are the experience of
reflexive consciousness, interpersonal relatedness, and the
executive function of choice and control (including self-
control).
Selves everywhere have these three aspects. This is not
to say that there are no cultural variations in selfhood,
which wonld be patently false. Rather, these are the build-
ing blocks that cultures and societies can work on to shape
distinctive forms of selfhood. Thus, all selves have an in-
terpersonal dimension, but culture and society can have
considerable influence on how selves belong, interact, and
respond to other people.
The self area has a number of influential minitheories
about important patterns or features of selfhood, such as
self-esteem theory, self-monitoring theory, and self-evalua-
tion maintenance theory. It is noteworthy that the major
minitheories have gradually evolved to cover these three
aspects of selfhood, even if the initial formulations ne-
glected one or two. Future theorists of selfhood might ben-
efit by treating the three aspects as one guideline for theory
development. That is, even though one's theory may ini-
tially focus on interpersonal aspects of self, it may be
worth considering what it could say to make contact with
the large body of knowledge about the executive function.
Of the three areas, it seems clear that the executive
function lags behind the other two in theoretical and
methodological development. Given that researchers gravi-
tate toward unsolved problems, it therefore seems likely
that the executive function will be an important focus
sometime soon. Rising interest in controlled processes and
self-regulation patterns is one sign of that trend.
Once the broad outlines of the three aspects are under-
stood, it will be time to understand how they are integrated.
Indeed, already some subtopics have moved to connect
them, such as the evolution of self-concept change research
from a matter of reflexive self-understanding to one in
which social reality is crucial.
It is fortunate that self researchers have largely moved
beyond constraining distinctions between cognition, emo-
tion, and motivation, for all are heavily interrelated when it
comes to self. The interrelations among these three remain
a fertile topic for study, such as in self-deception (i.e., mo-
tivated cognition) and self-defeating behavior (in which
emotion biases cognition, often under the influence of con-
728 PartFour / Personal Phenomena
flicting motivations). At present, it seems that the cognitive
features of self have been most successfully understood, al-
though many issues remain. The cognitions in reflexive
self-understanding have been well illuminated, but the in-
terplay between cognition and interpersonal or executive
processes has only begun to be understood.
There is also broad agreement about the major motiva-
tions associated with self, although an integrative paradigm
for these is not yet in place. Moreover, a fuller understand-
ing of how the self executes other motivations, especially
with regard to the distinction between autonomous action
versus carrying out externally motivated projects, remains
for further work. Still, self researchers do not seem widely
divided about what the self's motivations are, but only
about how these various motivations compete and interact.
In contrast, the role of emotion in selfhood is not well
understood, for the many scattered findings do not easily
fit together into a coherent picture, and many basic, fasci-
nating, important questions remain unanswered. Emotion
clearly plays an important role in interpersonal relations,
and just as clearly emotion exerts considerable influence
over the executive function, but these two seem to suggest
quite different views of what emotion is and how it is in-
volved in selfhood.
The great surge of interest in self is probably driven in
part by the culture's optimism that selfhood contains im-
portant answers to life's great questions and solutions to its
problems. This positive, optimistic approach to the study of
self has recently been compensated by a rather overdue
skepticism about the virtues and values of selfhood. Evi-
dence about the drawbacks of self-esteem, self-awareness,
self-presentation, and other features has enabled a more
balanced, evaluatively neutral (or ambivalent) view of self
to begin to emerge. Probably this optimistic pattern has de-
layed the study of some topics on the more unsavory side
of selfhood, such as self-pity, arrogance, and self-indul-
gence. These remain ripe for creative researchers to tackle.
The quest to know the nature of human selfhood has oc-
cupied eminent thinkers from many lands and eras, and it
has retained its fascination even while the very nature of
human selfhood has changed. The modern self is in some
ways especially problematic and elusive, yet the method-
ological tools for studying it are also especially potent. So-
cial psychologists deserve to be proud of the important and
extensive contributions our discipline has made to under-
standing the self. It is to he hoped that that pride will help
sustain the effort needed to continue and-dare we dream
of it?-to finish the joh.
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CHAPTER
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN
HILDHOOD AND ADULTHOOD
DIANE N. RUB LE, New York University
J AC QUEL I NE J. GOO D N OW, MacQuarie University
past twenty years, four reviews of research on so-
have appeared in the Annual Review of
(Collins & Guuuar, 1990; Hartup & vau
1995; Hoffman, 1977; Parke & Asher, 1983). In
will this review offer something new? First, we
the review with a double audience in mind: de-
psychologists and social psychologists. We
inform both and will break down the sense of
fields. That aim sterns partly from the review being
for the Handbook of Social Psychology. It stems also
~r conviction that the two fields are not completely
te and can contribute to one another. Social psycholo-
ay find no difficulty in regarding developmental stud-
likely to benefit from the models and methods that so-
ychologists have brought to bear on topics such as
perception or attitude change. We would argue that
equal benefit in asking what a developmental per-
would add to the way social psychologists view be-
d to the questions they might ask
d, we have strived to bring out the structure of de-
ntal studies. Research in social development cov-
e range of topics and can present at first a picture
est endless diversity. We shall concentrate on c1ari-
be issues and the concepts that underlie the choice
. topics, designs, and populations. This concen-
ateful to Ann Boggiano, Philip Costanzo, William Green,
tz, and Catherine Tamis-LeMonda for reading and com-
an an earlier draft and to Stephanie Aubry and Faith Greulich
graphic assistance. Preparation of this chapter was supported
a Research Scientist Award (MHOI202) and a research grant
from NIMH.
741
SIXTEEN
tration on the structure of the field, rather than on compil-
ing results, helps differentiate among projects and illumi-
nate the lines along which historical change has occurred.
It also makes developmental studies more intelligible to
anyone not immersed in the field. (It must be said, how-
ever, that we have also benefited from the exercise.)
Third, we have drawn from studies of development in
both childhood and adulthood. Past reviews have stopped
with young adults, and there has been little integration of
that material with what happens over the rest of the life
course. This is regrettable. It contributes to the misleading
view of developmental studies as being "all about chil-
dren" (one more reason for social psychologists to feel that
developmental studies are not relevant to their interests). In
addition, reviewing both literatures-even selectively-
turns out to be a way of heightening our understanding of
what is happening at anyone age. Overall, the larger share
of our examples comes from studies of childhood; the re-
view of later phases of the life span is limited to asking
what such studies add to the picture.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first cov-
ers some general features of developmental studies, to-
gether with points of overlap and difference between devel-
opmental and social psychological studies. The features
have to do with (a) the kinds of topics covered; (b) thc
presence of a mixed research agenda; (c) the presence of a
wide age span; and (d) a pervasive concern with the nature
and the course of change. The second section concentrates
on approaches to the task of specifying the nature of social
development: what changes and the course that change fol-
lows. This section is organized around the dimensions that
differentiate among approaches, with each considered as it
appears in studies of childhood and then in studies of