ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner, v.

COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

TONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in
an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them
from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November
and December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to
represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized
and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly representative of
the sector they intend to represent in Congress.

Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either
by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their
existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond, whether the criteria for
participating in the party-list system laid down inAng Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the
COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani
and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the
Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in
the two aforestated cases.

Political Law- Party-list system

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list
system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation." Indisputably, the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral
parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list
system.As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list
system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we
shall designate in this Constitution."

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the party-list system
prescribed in the Constitution.

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a sectoral partyor a coalition
of parties." Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further
provides that a"political partyrefers to anorganized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform,
principles and policies for the general conduct of government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No.
7941 provides that a "sectoral partyrefers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the
sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereofwhose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of their sector."R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party.
Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a
sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any
particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must
represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of
citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and
policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.

Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists

The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not
satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC
because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented."

Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified,
although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral
parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may
have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least
one remaining qualified nominee.

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the
COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in

"well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack
"well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from
engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained.
Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present petitions should
be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

Benjamin Ligot vs Ismael Mathay

Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December
30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act
No. 4134 “fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national
government” was enacted into law and took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members
of Congress (senators and congressmen) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00
to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”
Ligot’s term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act No. 4968 which
provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total
of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis
therein provided “in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of
elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.” The House of Representatives
granted his petition however, Jose Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue
certification. The Auditor General then, Ismael Mathay, also disallowed the same.
The thrust of Ligot’s appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of
the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not
applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held
in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of
Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of
Congress “as provided by law” (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per
annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.
HELD: No. To allow Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per
annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of
achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligot’s claim cannot be sustained as far
as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on
December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit
is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their
compensation and “other emoluments” to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement
gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on
the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the
Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited
emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the
Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his
decision in the similar case of Ligot’s colleague, ex-Congressman Melanio Singson, “Such a
scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by
enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.”

Manuel Martinez vs Jesus Morfe

Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista, Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional
Convention. Both were facing criminal prosecutions. Martinez was charged for falsification of
a public document before the sala of Judge Jesus Morfe. While Bautista was charged for
violation of the Revised Election Code. The two were later arrested, this is while the
Constitutional Convention was still in session. They now assail the validity of their arrest.
They contend that under the 1935 Constitution, they are immune from arrest because the
charges upon which they were arrested are within the immunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
HELD: No. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of
Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They are accorded the
constitutional immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance
at the sessions of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in cases of
treason, felony and breach of the peace. In the case at bar, the crimes for which Martinez
and Bautista were arrested fall under the category 0f “breach of peace”. Breach of the peace
covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute.
Therefore, Martinez and Bautista cannot invoke the privilege from arrest provision of the
Constitution.

People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76.

February 3, 2000]
08OCT
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at
the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on
six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives
RULING
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.”,
this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are multifarious. The Court
cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse
to free a person validly in prison.

Sergio Osmeña, Jr. vs Salipada

Pendatun
In June 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to
Garcia”. In the said speech, he disparaged then President Carlos Garcia and his
administration. Subsequently, House Resolution No. 59 was passed by the lower house in
order to investigate the charges made by Osmeña during his speech and that if his allegations
were found to be baseless and malicious, he may be subjected to disciplinary actions by the
lower house.
Osmeña then questioned the validity of the said resolution before the Supreme Court.
Osmeña avers that the resolution violates his parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered
in Congress. Congressman Salipada Pendatun filed an answer where he averred that the
Supreme Court has not jurisdiction over the matter and Congress has the power to discipline
its members.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeña’s immunity has been violated?
HELD: No. Section 15, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity
upon members of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
parliament in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or
unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeña’s petition is dismissed.

Nicanor Jimenez vs Bartolome

Cabangbang
Bartolome Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of
its Committee on National Defense. In November 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication
of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with
the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with
communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to
place him as the president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others,
under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used
as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of
general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of
damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous.
Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of
the lower house, he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress.
HELD: No. Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace. Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and
in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not
be questioned in any other place.”
The publication of the said letter is not covered by said expression which refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in
session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and
other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing
its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was
published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is
obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing
his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not
absolutely privileged.
G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974

BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, petitioner,

vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V. VELASCO, Auditor, Congress of the
Philippines, respondents.

Maximo A. Savellano, Jr. for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General, for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J.:p

The Court dismisses the petition for review and thereby affirms the Auditor-General's decision that petitioner as a Congressman whose term
of office expired on December 30, 1969 and qualified for retirement benefits by virtue of a minimum of twenty years of government service is
entitled to a retirement gratuity based on the salary actually received by him as a member of Congress of P7,200.00 per annum. To grant
petitioner's contention that the retirement gratuity of members of Congress; such as himself whose terms expired on December 30, 1969
should be computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum under Republic Act 4134 which could only by operative
with incoming members of Congress whose terms of office would commence on December 30, 1969, by virtue of the Constitutional mandate
that such salary increases could take effect only upon the expiration of the full term of all members of Congress that approved on June 20,
1964 such increased salary, (since petitioner and other outgoing members of Congress were constitutionally prohibited from receiving such
salary increase during their term of office) would be a subtle way of going around the constitutional prohibition and increasing in effect their
compensation during their term of office and of doing indirectly what could not be done directly.

Petitioner served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines
for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to
December 30, 1969.

During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No. 4134 "fixing the salaries of
constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government" was enacted into law
and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress
(senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per
annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases "shall take effect in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution." (section 1)

Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was held
not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this Court's
unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay1 "that the increased compensation provided by Republic
Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the
Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional
mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase."

Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his term having expired
on December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as
amended by Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee,
appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are
continuous on the basis therein provided "in case of employees based on the highest rate
received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law."2
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of P122,429.86
in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of
members of Congress which he never received during his incumbency and which under this Court's
above-quoted decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay could become operative only on December 30, 1969
with the expiration of the full terms of all members of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such
increased salary.

Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant, however, pending resolution by
the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose
term as Congressman likewise expired on December 30, 1969.

On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the warrant and
its supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim, enclosing therewith copy of the
Auditor General's adverse decision on ex-Congressman Singson's claim for retirement gratuity as
computed on the basis of the salary increase of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress
under Republic Act No. 4134.

Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied in due course on January 20, 1972, by the
Auditor General through respondent Auditor who further advised petitioner and furnished him with
copy of the 2nd indorsement of June 29, 1971, of the Office of the President, dismissing the appeal
of Congressman Singson from the Auditor General's adverse decision disallowing the claim for
retirement gratuity, computed on a salary basis of P32,000.00 per annum.

Hence the present petition for review by way of appeal from the adverse decision of the Auditor
General.

The thrust of petitioner's appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him
during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs.
Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve
therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of
his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress "as provided by law" (under Republic
Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.

Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:

1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress under Republic Act
4134 could be operative only from December 30, 1969 for incoming members of Congress when the
full term of all members of Congress (House and Senate) that approved the increase (such as
petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of the constitutional mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the
1935 Constitution, it is self-evident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for members of
Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as petitioner must necessarily be P7,200.00 per
annum, the compensation they received "as provided by law" and the Constitution during their term
of office.

2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969
computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited
by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited
emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the
Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor General in his decision in
the similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, "(S)uch a scheme would
contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative
authorities to do indirectly what can not be done directly."3

The Auditor-General further aptly observed that "(I)t should not escape notice that during his entire
tenure as Congressman (Dec. 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) comprising the last four years of his
government service, the herein claimant-retiree was unable to receive the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum for Members of Congress precisely because of the ,constitutional ban. To
allow him now to collect such amount in the guise of retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor does it
stand to reason that while he could not legally receive such rate as salary while still in the service, he
would now be allowed to enjoy it thereafter by virtue of his retirement."4

3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum was already
operative when his retirement took effect on December 30, 1969, his retirement gratuity should be
based on such increased salary cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress
similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple
reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the
Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and "other emoluments" to their salary as
provided by law.

This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez.5 In striking down Republic Act No. 3836 as null
and void insofar as it referred to the retirement of members of Congress and the elected officials
thereof for being violative of the Constitution, this Court held that "it is evident that retirement benefit
is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one
possessing any office" and that "Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in
the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the
approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately
available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to
the prohibition in Article VI, section 14 of the Constitution."6

It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o allow petitioner a retirement gratuity
computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his
compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly."

4. The other ancillary contentions of petitioner in pressing his claim were amply refuted by the Office
of the President in dismissing the appeal in the similar case of ex-Congressman Singson and
therefore likewise serve to show the untenability of petitioner's stand in this appeal, mutatis
mutandis, as follows:

It is evident, therefore, that the increased compensation of P32,000 is the rate of pay
prescribed by Republic Act No. 4134 for Mr. Singson's successor in office, while Mr.
Singson and his colleagues of the same term are limited to the annual compensation
of P7,200 fixed in the Constitution. To compute his retirement gratuity at the rate of
P32,000 per annum after the expiration of his term of office would effectively give him
the benefits of increased compensation to which he was not entitled during his term,
thereby violating the constitutional prohibition against increased compensation of
legislators during their term of office (Sec. 14, Art. VI, Const.) which was presumably
in the mind of Congress when it stated in Republic Act No. 4134 that "the salary
increases herein fixed shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx

 Neither an argument of logic nor a judicial pronouncement supports the proposition
that, as Mr. Singson's retirement legally started simultaneously with the beginning of
the term of his successor and the effective rate of pay of his successor and all
incoming members of Congress was already the new rate of P32,000 per annum, it
is this new rate of pay that should be made the basis in computing his retirement
gratuity. Suffice it to say that P7,200 per annum is Mr. Singson's authorized
compensation during his term of office and, therefore, the rate of pay prescribed by
law for him on his retirement, while P32,000 per annum is the allowable
compensation of incoming members of Congress during their term and, hence, the
rate of pay prescribed by law for them on their retirement. There is, then, no basis for
equating a constitutionally prohibited compensation for Mr. Singson with a statutory
prescribed rate of pay for his successor in computing his retirement gratuity.

It is likewise contended by Mr. Singson that the new rate of pay (P32,000) authorized
him Republic Act No. 4134 would be used in the instant case, not to compensate him
for services during the constitutionally prohibited period, but would simply serve as
basis for computing his retirement gratuity for services rendered by him not only as a
member of Congress but in other branches of the government as well. The foregoing
contention carries its own refutation. Retirement benefit is compensation for services
rendered (PHILCONSA VS. GIMENEZ, supra). Since Mr. Singson applied for
retirement as an "elected official," it is evident that he seeks compensation not only
for services rendered in other branches of the Government but also for his services
as member of Congress using P32,000, an amount prohibited for him but allowed for
his successor, in the computation of his retirement gratuity."7

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, and
THE CITY WARDEN OF MANILA, respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p

The question raised in these certiorari proceedings, one to which no authoritative answer has been yielded by past decisions, is the scope to
be accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress and
in going to and returning from the same except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace.1 Petitioners Manuel Martinez y
Festin2 and Fernando Bautista, Sr.,3 as delegate of the present Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the
protection of the above constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public
officer or employee who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor."4 For under the Constitutional Convention
Act,5 delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a representative.6 Both petitioners are facing criminal
prosecutions, the information filed against petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for falsification of a public document and two informations
against petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent
Judges in the above proceedings,7 would dispute such a contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any
criminal prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a provision of the
Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative. A careful study of the
above constitutional provision, in the light of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, adopting the then well-settled principle under
American law and of the purposes to be served by such an immunity, persuade us that the stand taken by the Solicitor General is correct.
These certiorari proceedings cannot prosper.

The facts in both petitions for certiorari are not in dispute. Petitioner Martinez y Festin8 alleged that
on June 10, 1971, an information against him for falsification a public document was filed. Its basis
was his stating under oath in his certificate of candidacy for delegate to that Constitutional
Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945, when in truth and in fact he knew that he was born
on June 20, 1946. There was on July 9, 1971, a special appearance on his part questioning the
power of respondent Judge to issue a warrant of arrest and seeking that the information be quashed.
On the same day, there was an order from the lower court suspending the release of the warrant of
arrest until it could act on such motion to quash. Then came on July 22, 1971 an omnibus motion
from him, with previous leave of court, to quash the information, to quash the warrant of arrest, or to
hold in abeyance further proceeding in the case. It was not favorably acted on. On August 21, 1971,
respondent Judge rendered an order denying the petitioner omnibus motion to quash. In his belief
that the information and the warrant of arrest in this case are null and void, the petitioner did not post
the required bond. He was arrested by the City Sheriff in the afternoon of September 6, 1971. At the
time of the filing of the petition he was confined at the City Jail in the custody of respondent City
Warden of Manila. He was on his way to attend the plenary session of the Constitutional Convention.
Such arrest was against his will and over his protest. He was arraigned on September 9, 1971.
There was at such a time a motion by petitioner to reconsider the court's order of August 21, 1971. It
was denied in open court. On the very same day, he filed the petition for certiorari and habeas
corpus, but having been released thereafter on bail on September 11, 1971, the petition is now in
the nature solely of a certiorari proceeding.9

As for petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr., 10 it was alleged that he is a duly elected and proclaimed
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. He took his oath of office and assumed the
functions of such office on June 1, 1971. He has continued since then to perform the duties and
discharge the responsibilities of a delegate. Two criminal complaints, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 146(57) and 148(58), were directly filed with the Court of First lnstance of Baguio and Benguet
by a certain Moises Maspil, a defeated delegate-aspirant who placed 15th in the order of votes
garnered against the petitioner, and his co-accused for alleged violation of Section 51 of the Revised
Penal Code in that they gave and distributed free of charge food, drinks and cigarettes at two public
meetings, one held in Sablan and the other in Tuba, both towns being in Province of Benguet.
Respondent Presiding Judge conducted the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints.
Thereafter on August 7, 1971, he issued an order for the filing of the corresponding informations.
Before a warrant of arrest in said criminal cases could be issued, petitioner in a motion of August 14,
1971 invoked the privilege of immunity from arrest and search, pursuant to Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 6132, otherwise known as the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act, in relation to Sec. 15,
Article VI of the Constitution and Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent Judge, on the
very same day, issued an order, holding in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest and setting
the hearing of said Motion on August 23, 1971. As scheduled on August 23, 1971, there was a
hearing on such motion. Petitioner however did not prevail notwithstanding his vigorous insistence
on his claim for immunity, a warrant of arrest being ordered on the same day. On September 11,
1971, there was a motion to quash such order of arrest filed by petitioner. He was unsuccessful,
respondent Judge, in an order of said date, ordering his immediate arrest. His petition
for certiorari and prohibition was filed with this Court on September 15, 1971. 11

What is thus sought by petitioners Martinez y Festin and Bautista, Sr. is that the respective warrants
of arrest issued against them be quashed on the claim that by virtue of the parliamentary immunity
they enjoy as delegates, ultimately traceable to Section 15 of Article VI of the Constitution as
construed together with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code, they are immune from arrest. In the
case of petitioner Martinez y Festin, he is proceeded against for falsification of a public document
punishable by prision mayor. 12 As for petitioner Bautista, Sr., the penalty that could be imposed for
each of the Revised Election Code offense, of which he is charged, is not higher than prision
mayor. 13

The respondents in the above petitions were required to answer by resolutions of this Court issued
on September 10 and September 20, 1971, respectively. An answer on behalf of respondent Judge
Jesus P. Morfe in the case of petitioner Martinez y Festin was filed on September 20, 1971 with an
answer in intervention filed by respondent Executive Sheriff of Manila and the Chief of Warrant
Division likewise filed on the same date. His petition was duly heard on September 14, 1971,
Delegate Estanislao A. Fernandez vehemently pressing his claim to immunity. Thereafter on
October 29, 1971, a memorandum, comprehensive in scope and persuasive in its analysis of the
constitutional question presented, was filed on behalf of respondent Judge Morfe by Solicitor
General Felix Q. Antonio, two Assistants Solicitors General Bernardo P. Pardo and Rosalio A. de
Leon as well as Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza. A memorandum on behalf of President Diosdado
Macapagal of the Constitutional Convention, who was given permission to submit such a pleading,
was submitted on March 8, 1972 by the Committee on Legal Affairs of the Constitutional
Convention. 14

As for the petitions of Bautista, Sr., the answer on behalf of respondent Judge was filed on
September 29, 1971. When the matter was heard on October 14, 1971, he appeared through
counsel, Delegate Juanito R. Remulla, while respondent Judge was represented by Assistant
Solicitor General Rosalio A. de Leon and Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza. With the submission, on
October 30, 1971, of an able memorandum on behalf of respondent judge, again, by the same
counsel from the Office of the Solicitor General as well as a carefully-prepared memorandum of
petitioner Bautista, Sr., on December 1, 1971, the matter was deemed submitted for adjudication.

As noted at the outset, certiorari does not lie to quash the warrants of arrest issued against petitioner
Martinez y Festin as well as petitioner Bautista, Sr. Their reliance on the constitutional provision
which for them should be supplemented by what was provided for in the Revised Penal Code is
futile. There is no justification then for granting their respective pleas.

No other conclusion is allowable consistently with the plain and explicit command of the Constitution.
As is made clear in Section 15 of Article VI, the immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution
for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against the
Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. 15 A felony is act or omission
punishable by law. 16 Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal
Code or any special statute. It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be
maintained and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. Certainly then from the
explicit language of the Constitution, even without its controlling interpretation as shown by the
debates of the Constitutional Convention to be hereinafter discussed, petitioners cannot justify their
claim to immunity. Nor does Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code come to their rescue. Such a
provision that took effect in 1932 could not survive after the Constitution became operative on
November 15, 1935. As will be shown, the repugnancy between such an expansion of the
congressional immunity and the plain command of the Constitution is too great to be overcome,
even on the assumption that the penalty to which a public officer will be subjected in the event that
he did arrest one entitled thereto for an offense punishable by less than reclusion temporal suffices
to widen its scope. This is so considering not only the history of such a Constitutional grant of
immunity but also its basic purpose and objective.

1. Even if the provision granting the legislative immunity of freedom from arrest were clothed in
language less clear, its history precludes any other interpretation. As submitted to the Constitutional
Convention of 1934, the draft proposal was worded as follows: "The Members of the National
Assembly shall in all cases except treason, open disturbance of public order, or other offense
punishable by death or imprisonment of not less than six years, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the National Assembly, and in going to and returning from the same."
On December 4, 1934, upon its being considered by the Convention, an amendment was proposed
by Delegate Aldeguer so that it would read: "The Members of the National Assembly shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of the National Assembly, and in going and returning from the same."
What was sought by him was to retain the provision of the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, with
phraseology identical to that found in the American Constitution.

He defended his proposal thus: "My amendment is not new. It is the same phrase granting
parliamentary immunity to the members of the Parliament of England. It is the same phrase granting
parliamentary immunity to members of Congress. It is the same phrase granting parliamentary
immunity to members of the various state legislators of the Union. Now, in reading the draft
proposed by the Sub-Committee of Seven, I found out that it is a broad rule. Mr. President, the
question is not whether we should grant privilege of immunity to the members of the National
Assembly ... " 17 He was interrupted by a point of order raised, but he was allowed to continue. He
went on: "As I was saying, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Convention, the draft gives to the
member of the National Assembly more privileges than what the nature of the office demands. My
question is that if the members of the Congress of the United States, if the members of the
Parliament, if the members of the various State Legislatures were able to perform their functions as
members of law-making bodies with the privileges and immunities granted by the phrase "breach of
peace." I wonder why the members of the future National Assembly cannot perform their duties with
the same limitations and with the same privileges. Mr. President and members the Convention, the
history of parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt members of the
National Assembly from criminal arrest. When American sovereignty was implanted into these
Islands, a new theory of government was implanted too. This theory of government places every
man equal before the eyes of the law. The grant of certain privileges to any set of persons means
the abrogation of this principle of equality before the eyes of the law. Another reason, Mr. President
and Members of the Convention, is this: The State Legislature is the agent of the State. The power
or the right of the Legislature to claim privileges is based on the right of self-preservation. The right
of the State to claim privileges is due to the fact that it has the right to carry its function without
obstacle. But we must also remember that any Legislature is but the agent of the State. The State is
the principal. Any crime committed, whether such crime is committed by a colorum or by a gangster,
endangers the State. Giving more privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature, at the expense of
the principal, which is the State, is not a sound policy. So that, Mr. President, and Members of the
Convention, believing that under the phrase "breach of peace", our future members of the Assembly
can very well perform the duties incumbent upon them. I submit my amendment for the
consideration of this Convention." 18

Delegate Manuel Roxas on behalf of the sub-committee of seven did not object. As a matter of fact,
he was for such amendment. He considered it "well-founded" and was for such immunity complying
"with the wording of the [Philippine Autonomy Act] in this particular." 19 The Convention readily
approved the amendment by acclamation.

It does not admit of doubt therefore that the immunity from arrest is granted by the Constitution was
understood in the same sense it has in American law, there being a similar provision in the American
Constitution. 20 Its authoritative interpretation in the United States was supplied by the Williamson
case, a 1908 decision. 21

According to the then Justice, later Chief Justice, White who penned the opinion, "the term "treason,
felony and breach of the peace," as used in the constitutional provision relied upon, excepts from the
operation of the privilege all criminal offenses, ... " 22 He traced its historical background thus: "A brief
consideration of the subject of parliamentary privilege in England will, we think, show the source
whence the expression "treason felony, and breach of the peace" was drawn, and leave no doubt
that the words were used in England for the very purpose of excluding all crimes from the operation
of the parliamentary privilege, and therefore to leave that privilege to apply only to prosecutions of a
civil nature." 23 Story's treatise on the Constitution was likewise cited, his view on the matter being
quite emphatic: "Now, as all crimes are offenses against the peace, the phrase "breach of the
peace" would seem to extend to all indictable offenses, as well those which are in fact attended with
force and violence, as those which are only constructive breaches of the peace of the government,
inasmuch as they violate its good order." 24

As far as American constitutional law is concerned, both Burdick 25 and Willoughby 26 could use
practically identical appraising such immunity, the former stating that it "is not now of great
importance" and the latter affirming that it "is of little importance as arrest of the person is now
almost never authorized except for crimes which fall within the classes exempt from the priviledge."
The state of the American law on this point is aptly summarizedby Cooley: "By common
parliamentary law, the members of the legislature are privileged from arrest on civil process during
the session of that body, and for a reasonable time before and after, to enable them to go to and
return from the same."27 A prosecution for a criminal offense, is thus excluded from this grant of
immunity. So it should be Philippine law, if deference were to be paid to what was explicitly agreed
upon in the Constitutional Convention.

2. Would it make a difference however in the availability of the writs of certiorari sought by petitioners
considering that Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code would impose upon any public officer or
employee who shall, while the Congress is in regular or special session, arrest or charge any
member thereof except in case such member has committed a crime punishable by penalty higher
than prision mayor? 28 The assumption here indulged is that the effect of the above in the Revised
Penal Code was to expand the grant of parliamentary immunity under the Philippine Autonomy Act,
although its literal language does not go that far. It is to be remembered, however, that it took effect
on January 1, 1932 before the enforcement of the present Constitution in 1935. Considering that
both under the then organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act and equally so under the present
Constitution, such a more generous treatment accorded legislators exempting them from arrest even
if warranted under a penal law, the question as to whether it did survive becomes unavoidable. It is
our opinion that the answer must be in the negative.

The Constitution is equally explicit on the following point: "All laws of the Philippine Islands shall
continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such
laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution until amended, altered,
modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, and all references in such laws to the
government or officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution." 29 In People v. Linsangan 30 decided
in December, 1935, barely a month after the Constitution took effect, the continued applicability of
Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code that would allow the prosecution of a person who
remains delinquent in the payment of cedula tax, 31 this Court, in its opinion thru the pen of the then
Justice, later Chief Justice, Abad Santos, after setting forth that the Constitution prohibits the
imprisonment for debt on non-payment of poll tax, 32 held: "It seems too clear to require
demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1,
clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment for non-
payment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of the
Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code became
inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be based thereon." 33

So it was in De los Santos v. Mallare. 34 Again under the provision of the Revised Administrative
Code the President could remove at pleasure any of the appointive officials under the Charter of the
City of Baguio. 35Relying on such a provision, the then President Quirino removed petitioner De los
Santos who was appointed City Engineer Baguio of on July 16, 1946, and chose in his place
respondent Gil R. Mallare. The Revised Administrative Code was a legislation that dates back to
1917, 36 eighteen years before the Constitution prohibited any officer or employee in the civil service
being removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. 37Again this Court, in the light of
aforecited provision in an opinion of Justice Tuason, held: "So, unlike legislation that is passed in
defiance of the Constitution, assertive and menacing, the questioned part of section 2545 of the
Revised Administrative Code does not need a positive declaration of nullity by the court to put it out
of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent, outlawed and eliminated from the statute
book by the Constitution itself by express mandate before the petitioner was appointed." 38 In the
language of the constitutional provision then that portion of Article 145 penalizing a public official or
employee who shall while the Congress is in regular or special session arrest or search any member
thereof except in case he has committed a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code by a
penalty higher than prision mayor is declared inoperative.

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There
is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise
delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to
discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience.
Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom
from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in
reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune
during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to
be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently
and well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate
event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong public
interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be expressed that
the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it
suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution,
solicitous of the rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of
power. The presumption of course is that the judiciary would main independent. It is trite to say that
in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus by Delegate Manuel Martinez by Festin
in L-34022 and the petitions for certiorari and prohibition by Delegate Fernando Bautista, Sr. in L-
34046 and L-34047 are hereby dismissed. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO G.

JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of

Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction
for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is [1]

pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be

allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance
at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

The issue raised is one of first impression.

Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules
which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering the
query, we are called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the
judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.

The accused-appellants "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As

Member of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that

1. Accused-appellants reelection being an expression of popular

will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any
right or interest not even the police power of the State.

2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representative

amounts to taxation without representation.

3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amounts

to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandate
entrusted to him by the people.

4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte

wants their voice to be heard.

5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker to

attend sessions of the U.S. Congress.

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide member

thereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its
mandate.

7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail

the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with the

conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.

The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He

states that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del
Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected
by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by
the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by
insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the
exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity of
government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be
enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.

We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-
executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is
an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment
to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common
restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from
the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the
requirement of obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House
of Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises
from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that
the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the
ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.

The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:

Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of

Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; xxx.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the
exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-
appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not
claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general
laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending
appeal.

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in

all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,
 be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and
in going to and returning from the same.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no
immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent
to confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding
portion of the provision, to wit:

xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member

involved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its
adjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise such
privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the
obligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody
of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or
committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it
is enough that Congress is in session.

The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress function to attend

sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which
states that

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do

business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner,
and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if
the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Accused-appellants reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos , which

[2]

states, inter alia, that

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior
to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with
 the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded
or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It
is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to
practically overrule the will of the people.

will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the
above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case involves the administrative
removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It
does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law.
Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman
unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final

conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as
an example and warning to others.

A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, it is the injury
[3]

to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the
injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the
accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk
of his absconding. [4]

The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him
into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape
eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his
regular place of confinement.

It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants arrest was

issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the
House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender
voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he
initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present
motion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its
being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery
of the aims of the States penal system.

Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court

of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati
City Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:
 a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held at
the Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether to
expel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;

b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of his

dentist in Makati City;

c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati Medical

Center, Makati City;

d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In this

case, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane and
private vehicle.

He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New
Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to
leave the prison premises, to wit:

a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the

purpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2)
planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For this
purpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his own
vehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and his
place of confinement.

b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist

in Makati City.

c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for

his heart condition.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a

member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or
upon court orders.

What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing

accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings
for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all
the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be
a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in
this regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe: [5]

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and

fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the
utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of
their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech
should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest,
however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,
without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a
criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their
attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the
same. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a
legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and
well, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law.
Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be
treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong
public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.
To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the
government might unjustly go after legislators belonging to the
minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards
thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the
rights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an
attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that the
judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each
and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of
the essence.

The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District of

Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he is
treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges
a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims that
the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to
discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the
conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.

We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of
the House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office
situated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of Representatives
Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staff
paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also
provided with an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant
further admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and
resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other
monetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging
his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the
restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee,
accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison
authorities at the National Pentientiary to perform these acts.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress,

they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action.
They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative
results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a
more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he is
suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may
no longer serve his full term in office.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of

constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall
[6]

be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The

[7]

organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows

different treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation
which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed
by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant
asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government.
The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with
the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of
Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court
can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse
her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique
skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. An
elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise,

insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types of
individuals.[8]

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by

public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded. [9]

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a

reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and
duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class
of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and
apply to all those belonging to the same class. [10]

Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty; coercion exercised

upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. [11]

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of ones

liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal,
and is personal to the accused. The term refers to the restraint on the
[12]

personal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place to

place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure and
will. Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will depriving him of
[13]

his power of locomotion and it "[is] something more than mere loss of
[14]

freedom. It includes the notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any
exterior barrier." [15]
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an
individuals status in society. Prison officials have the difficult and often
[16]

thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as

well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-
entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the
curtailment and elimination of certain rights. [17]

Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-

appellants claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right
or interest, including the police power of the State.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN

BENGZON, J.:

On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for
"declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman
Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the
ground of infringenment of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that said members
of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President with the admonition
that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.

The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the pertinent portions of which reads as
follows:

WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of
the House of Representatives from the Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor
of this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;

WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the Congressman from the Second District of
Cebu stated the following:.

xxx xxx xxx

 The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your unpopular
administration the free things they used to get from the government are now for sale at
premium prices. They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity
or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as
long as he can come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an anomalous situation
would reflect badly on the kind of justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .

WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the Second District of Cebu, if made
maliciously or recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would constitute a serious
assault upon the dignity and prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is the one
visible symbol of the sovereignty of the Filipino people, and would expose said office to
contempt and disrepute; . . . .

Resolved by the House of Representative, that a special committee of fifteen Members to be

appointed by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created to investigate the truth of the
charges against the President of the Philippines made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in
his privilege speech of June 223, 1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to summon
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, jr., to appear before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to
issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to require the attendance of witnesses and/or
the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do
so to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House. The special
committee shall submit to the House a report of its findings and recommendations before the
adjournment of the present special session of the Congress of the Philippines.

In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first, the Resolution violated his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his
words constituted no actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and
words, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House provides that
if other business has intervened after the member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall
not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House.

Although some members of the court expressed doubts of petitioner's cause of action and the
Court's jurisdiction, the majority decided to hear the matter further, and required respondents to
answer, without issuing any preliminary injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its
implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent adjournment of the legislative session, the
special committee continued to perform its talk, and after giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to
defend himself, submitted its reports on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House approved on the same day—before
closing its session—House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.

Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda,
San Andres Ziga, Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of this
Court to entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with
suspension, upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress
having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee—whose members are the sole
respondents—had thereby ceased to exist.

There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege speech delivered before the House,
made the serious imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted in Resolution No. 59
and that he refused to produce before the House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to
substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that for having made the imputations and
for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the House, suspended
from office for a period of fifteen months for serious disorderly behaviour.

Resolution No. 175 states in part:

WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under and by virtue of Resolution No. 59,
adopted on July 8, 1960, found Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour for making without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious,
reckless and irresponsible charges against the President of the Philippines in his privilege
speech of June 23, 1960; and

WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character that they affronted and degraded the
dignity of the House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it

RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be,
as he hereby is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and . . .

As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that: (1) the Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (20
that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3)
supposing he could be questioned and discipline therefor, the House had lost the power to do so
because it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes
the additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the Constitution, to suspend one of its
members.

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the
Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place."
This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United
States. In that country, the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt
from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may,
nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any
other place" than Congress.

Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7),
recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in

every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and
that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise
of that liberty may occasion offense."2 Such immunity has come to this country from the practices of
Parliamentary as construed and applied by the Congress of the United States. Its extent and
application remain no longer in doubt in so far as related to the question before us. It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are
considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United States Congress,
Congressman Fernando Wood of New York was censured for using the following language on the
floor of the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of the many infamous acts of the
infamous Congress." (Hinds' Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen were
censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2 Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case,
a member of Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by him in debate, but invoked
his parliamentary privilege. The Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be

censured, committed to prison3, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The appendix to this
decision amply attest to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional
power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members, including
imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a legislator in a
foreign country.

And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April 1949, suspended a senator for one
year.

Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary
practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its
proceedings.

This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no longer take action against me, he
argues, because after my speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other
business. Respondents answer that Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House,
that such approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard
parliamentary practice may done by unanimous consent.

Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may suspended the operation of its Rules, it may
not, however, affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had already lapsed.

The situation might thus be compared to laws4 extending the period of limitation of actions and
making them applicable to actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United States has
upheld such laws as against the contention that they impaired vested rights in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states hold divergent views. At any
rate, court are subject to revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them."5 And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observancem, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisited number of members have agreed to a particular
measure."6

The following is quoted from a reported decision of the Supreme court of Tennessee:

The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is
within the power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or waive their own rules of
procedure, adopted for the orderly con duct of business, and as security against hasty
action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass, 433; Holt vs. Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411;
City of Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex parte Mayor, etc., of Albany,
23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277, 280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220, 230. 81 N. e. 977,
124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann. Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696, 65 So.
888; McGraw vs. Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N. W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co.
145 Ky. 181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.) [Takenfrom the case of
Rutherford vs. City of Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.]

It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted
the Speaker, for which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House approved the
resolution, despite the argument that other business had intervened after the objectionable remarks.
(2 Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have been advanced.
We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends
mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in
black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court
assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it
would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer
upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously
observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it
has been said, had exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its
own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)

SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. — The principle is well established that the
courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an interference by the judicial
department with the legislature since each department is equally independent within the
power conferred upon it by the Constitution. . . . .

The general rule has been applied in other cases to cause the courts to refuse to intervene in
what are exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the stated Senate is given the power
to example a member, the court will not review its action or revise even a most arbitrary or
unfair decision. (11 Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].

The above statement of American law merely abridged the landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In
1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having taken a
bribe, filed mandamus proceeding to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them no
hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The Supreme
Court of California declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language:

Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has
been held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the
power, every legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state
has the implied power to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient.
In Hiss. vs. Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme court of Mass. says, in
substance, that this power is inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary to the to
enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;'
'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative body must necessarily be the
sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise. '. . . There is no
provision authority courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by either house
of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative department
and therefore, in the exercise of the power this committed to it, the senate is supreme. An
attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the
exercise of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is
expressly forbidden to do.

We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the
principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied to
other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the
courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.

Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery of
impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse to
disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in
the interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a conscientious survey of governing principles
and/or episodic illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the United States taking the
position upon at least two occasions, that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute
unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders.8 And in several instances, it took action against
offenders, even after other business had been considered.9

Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to suspend is the Alejandrino precedent.
In 1924, Senator Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from office for 12 months
because he had assaulted another member of the that Body or certain phrases the latter had uttered
in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this Court for reinstatement, challenging the
validity of the resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the separation of powers, it had no
jurisdiction to compel the Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say the Senate
had no power to adopt the resolution because suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and
the Jones Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the Senate no power to remove
an appointive member, like Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that "each
house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
votes, expel an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word "elective."

The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor General to appoint "without consent
of the Senate and without restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion, best
represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one appointive Senator.

It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral
district of representation without that district being afforded any means by which to fill that vacancy."
But that remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then
the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged with the duty to represent the
Twelfth District and maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of the Governor-
General, who had appointed him.

It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those power which were
granted to it by the Jones Law10; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and
preprogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the
Alejandrino case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did not give the Senate the
power it then exercised—the power of suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the
Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension11 which the Constitution did not
impair. In fact, as already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a Senator for 12 months in
1949.

The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations
are found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by
usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the
Constitution provides otherwise. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)

In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the district's representation can not be
more weightly in the matter of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator; yet
deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to commit one of their members to jail.12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition intended to prevent the Special
Committee from acting tin pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no preliminary injunction
had been issued, the Committee performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved
the suspension order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as
such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for having become moot or
academic.13 Of course, there is nothing to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all
members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement and thereby to present a justiciable
cause. Most probable outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a pronouncement of lack of
jurisdiction, as in Vera vs. Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15

At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the important questions of political law, the Court
thought it proper to express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were deemed relevant and
decisive.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon,
JJ., concur

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,

vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the
recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of
money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome
Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground
that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication. This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present
appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.

The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and,
if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not.

The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of
the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that
pursuant to the Constitution:

The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at
the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any
speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section
15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls
within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in
this provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress,
while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session
or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question.1

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint
herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when
Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in
several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that,
in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either
as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding
made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the
communication began with the following paragraph:

In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had nevertheless involved
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks against the duly elected members
of Congress of engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to
address this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which, under the
present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to expose. 1äwphï1.ñët

It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three operational plans under
serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some civilian political
strategists.

Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the second paragraph.
The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then Secretary of
National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be
prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this end, the "planners" are said to "have
adopted the sales-talk that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in the Philippines."
Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and psychological warfare funds" of the Department of
National Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" — the letter says — are "available to
adequately finance a political campaign". It further adds:

It is reported that the "Planners" have under their control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor
Jimenez of NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt. Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP,
(4) Col. Fidel Llamas of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological Warfare Office,
DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of the Public information Office, DND. To insure this control,
the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while
Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col.
Deogracias Caballero, Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA to study and
while Caballero was in USA, he was relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners" wanted
to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is
considered a missing link in the intelligence network. It is, of course, possible that the offices
 mentioned above are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no
knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)

Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the letter lists, under the heading "other
operational technique the following:

(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk
on "Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy over the military;

(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and hundreds of letters — "typed in two (2)
typewriters only" — to Editors of magazines and newspapers, extolling Secretary Vargas as
the "hero of democracy in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";

(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and criticizing the administration;

(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack
key positions in several branches of the Armed Forces with men belonging to his clique;

(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such a way as to give the impression that
they reflect the feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to undermine the
administration.

Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with which the "planners" had gone no further
than the planning stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future
developments".

Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage the President and
the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a speech
challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in an effort to rally the officers and men of the
AFP behind him, and gain popular and civilian support.

The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the
Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a
civilian, not a professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that
Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence
agencies in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies
mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by
Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano
clique"; (7) that all military personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except
those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in
Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or training divisions
throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding
or undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".

We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support plaintiffs' action for damages.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons therein alluded
to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs
"probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added
that "it is of course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based
explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that
they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory
to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers of
our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National
Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group
therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high ranking officers.

It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by the defendant,
knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose them to public
hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to alienate them from their associates, but these
allegations are mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not
prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in
their complaint that said communication is false, they could not have possibly meant that they were
aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners".
Again, the aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not
among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not be "tools", much less,
unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.