SEC 11 The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall

hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years
or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Su-
preme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.

Up to when are the members of the judiciary entitled to hold on to their positions?

• Members of the SC and judges of lower court:

1. during good behaviour until they reach 70 years or;

2. become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office.

• Powers of the SC en banc:

1. discipline judges of lower courts

2. order their dismissal - vote of majority of the members who actually took part in
the deliberations on issues in the case and voted thereon.

JUDGE RUBEN AYSON VS. THE RTC JUDGES OF BAGUIO CITY

FACTS: The following administrative matters most of which are offshoots of the dis-
approval by Hon. Antonio C. Reyes, as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baguio City, of the January 24, 2002 order of inhibition issued by RTC Judge
Ruben C. Ayson of the same city, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 5140-R, in which the
latter inhibited himself from hearing the case.

Judge Ayson issued, on January 24, 2002 another order n which he not only
delved on the issue of inhibition against Hon. Antonio C. Reyes, but dwelt on matters
alien therefrom and proceeded to ascribe on his colleagues in Baguio City what to
him are acts constituting misconduct, corruption and immorality. Named as erring
officials were RTC Judges Amado S. Caguioa, Antonio Esteves, Clarence J. Vil-
lanueva, Abraham B. Borreta, Edilberto T. Claravall and Antonio C. Reyes of Branch
Nos. 4, 5, 7, 59, 60, and 61, respectively.

RULING:

I. A. M. NO. RTJ-05-1925 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-989-RTJ): Grace F. Munsayac-De

Villa, et al. Complainants, vs. Judge Antonio C. Reyes, Respondent - Grace F.
 Munsayac-de Villa, et al., charged respondent Judge Reyes with Serious Miscon-
duct and Inefficiency. In sum, the complaint alleges that the respondent judge
exhibited extreme hostility against complainants and manifest partiality towards
the oppositors in SP No. 704-R, and took unusual interest in the case. Respondent's
unreasonable delay in resolving a motion for his inhibition and for gross ignorance
of the law form the basis for the charge of serious inefficiency.

HELD: From the evidence adduced, the Court is unable to make out a case for
serious misconduct and inefficiency against respondent Judge Reyes. Accordingly,
complainants' appropriate recourse therefrom would have been to raise the issue
of the validity of such orders to the CA or this Court in a certiorari proceedings and
not in an administrative case. For, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate
remedy for every judicial act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judi-
cial remedy exists and is available.

II. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1926 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 01-1248-RTJ): Ramon K. Ilusorio vs. Judge
Antonio C. Reyes, RTC Baguio City, Br. 61 - Judge Reyes's acceptance of a favor
from Atty. Agcaoili during the pendency of complainant Ilusorio's civil case against
the Club is highly censurable; it certainly does not speak well of Judge Reyes's sense
of delicadeza.

HELD: It behooves the Court to once again remind the respondent judge,
however, and all members of the bench for that matter, that they are expected to
so conduct themselves as to be beyond reproach and suspicion;[16] to endeavor
to keep at all times the high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of
justice,[17] and, last but not least, to avoid situations likely to erode the faith of the
people in the judiciary and bring it to disrepute.[18] Judge Reyes cannot plausibly
feign ignorance of this basic but wise counsel which had doubtless guided men in
robes throughout the years and in the process evade any form of sanction. To be
sure, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct contains a caveat against allowing
the prestige of the judicial office to be used or lent to advance the private interests
of others or to convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence a judge. Judge Reyes's acts of impropriety and patent
lack of delicadeza verily run counter to the injunction prescribed by the aforecited
rule of the Code.

III. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1927 (A.M. OCA IPI NO. 02-1435-RTJ): Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs.
RTCJudges of Baguio City -

A. Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs. Judge Clarence J. Villanueva for immorality

- Judge Ruben C. Ayson alleged that Judge Villanueva has with his mistress,
Emy Tumaneng, a daughter named Shaira Marjorie Tumaneng and has with
 the same woman a son named Richard Clarence Tumaneng acknowledged
by Judge Villanueva as his child. The acknowledgment appears in the birth
certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar Baguio City.

HELD: The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must
be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his discharge of judicial
duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. As we
articulated in Castillo vs. Calanog,[20] there is no dichotomy of morality: a public
official, particularly a member of the judiciary, is also judged by his private morals.
A judge's official life cannot simply be detached from his personal existence. His
public as well as his private life must be above suspicion.

The charge of immorality proven against Judge Villanueva demonstrates his

unfitness to remain in office and continue to discharge the functions of a judge.[21]
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies immorality as a serious offense. It is punishable
by dismissal from the service with accessory penalties. With the view we take of the
case, there is no reason for not meting out the severest form of disciplinary sanction,
specially since the offense was committed in the very city where the respondent
judge holds office.

B. Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs. Judges Abraham B. Borreta, Amado S.

Caguioa, Antonio M. Esteves & Clarence J. Villanueva for Gambling and
Drinking in the Court Premises During Office Hours.

HELD: We can allow that what the three (3) respondent judges played was no
more than just a friendly game of "pusoy" to while away their time. They, however,
used the court premises for this past time, thus adding an inappropriate dimension
to what would have otherwise been an insignificant isolated event. To borrow from
Alumbres vs. Caoibes,[26] misbehavior within the court premises diminishes its sanc-
tity and dignity. Respondents Caguioa, Esteves and Borreta should, therefore, be
fined and warned against a repetition of such improper conduct. This particular
complaint should, however, be dismissed as against respondent Judge Villanueva
for insufficiency of evidence.

The Court need not delve further on the charge of drinking hard liquor in the
court premises during office hours. Suffice it to state in regard to this charge that
Judge Ayson has not discharged his burden, like any complainant in administrative
disciplinary proceedings, of proving by substantial evidence the allegations of his
complaint.

C. Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs. Judge Amado S. Caguioa for gross miscon-
duct, incompetence and for allowing collection of commissioner's fees in ex-
parte hearings and allowing ex-parte reception of evidence by non-law-
yers/employees of his court.
 HELD: While admonition with warning may be in order for Judge Caguioa's
act of allowing his court stenographer and/or interpreter to participate in ex-parte
hearings, absent any showing to vitiate the bona fides of such act, a heavier penalty
should be meted him for his failure to strictly adhere to the prescription of Circular
No. 12, series of 1986, of this Court. As recommended by the Investigating Justice, a
fine of P10,000.00 should be imposed on the respondent judge.

D. Judge Ruben C. Ayson versus Judge Antonio C. Reyes for assigning to

himself a case without benefit of raffle.

HELD: At bottom then, what is before the Court are conflicting evidence pre-
sented by complainant Judge Ayson and respondent Judge Reyes on the raffle (or
absence thereof) of the Jadewell case, Civil Case No. 4892-R. Given this perspec-
tive, and considering the submission of the Minutes of Special Raffle, supra, it is not
amiss to say, as did the Investigating Justice, that this particular charge against
Judge Antonio C. Reyes has not been satisfactorily established. Accordingly, its dis-
missal for insufficiency of evidence is clearly indicated.

E. Judge Ruben C. Ayson versus Judge Edilberto Claravall for conduct un-
becoming a judge.

Held: On balance then, Judge Ayson's evidence, failing as it does to conclu-

sively establish that respondent Judge Claravall implicated him to the incident in
question, cannot support a case for conduct unbecoming of a judge. For this rea-
son, the complaint for that offense against Judge Claravall must fail.

IV. A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1928 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1485-RTJ): Judge Clarence J. Vil-
lanueva vs. Judge Ruben C. Ayson - for perjury

HELD: The Court finds no merit in the complaint of Judge Villanueva which, at
bottom, turns on the question of whether or not what Judge Ayson wrote under oath
about the former playing the game of "pusoy" on the date in question is false. Ac-
cordingly, Judge Villanueva's complaint against Judge Ayson is, as recommended
by the Investigating Justice, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

V. A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1929 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1552-RTJ): Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs.
Judge Abraham B. Borreta - for serious misonduct; According to Judge Ayson,
Judge Borreta's act of entering into transactions/deals may constitute engaging in
the private practice of law and violate certain provisions of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.

HELD: Going over the evidence presented, the Court can concede, as Judge
Borreta urges, that there is nothing illegal or immoral per se about his having entered
into an agreement with Purita Llorente for the sale of her property and the side trans-
actions concluded to bring the same under the CMP scheme. However, since the
acts complained of occurred during his watch as Presiding Judge of Branch 59, RTC,
Baguio, Judge Borreta's transfer is really of little moment in this administrative pro-
ceedings.

Like the judge in another disciplinary case charged with, and eventually ad-
judged guilty of, a similar offense,[35] Judge Borreta ought to be penalized with a
fine in the amount of P2,000.00 and warned to be more discreet in his private and
business activities.

VI. A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1930 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1559-RTJ): Atty. Cristeta R. Caluza-
Flores vs. Judge Amado S. Caguioa - Atty. Cristeta R. Caluza-Flores, Branch 4 Clerk
of Court of the RTC of Baguio City, charges Judge Amado S. Caguioa with incom-
petence and improper judicial conduct. In it, she attributes to Judge Caguioa cer-
tain acts and personal habits and enumerate incidents/events which she perceives
to support her complaint. And in a virtual repeat of what she said when she testified
as Judge Ayson's witness

HELD: As to the other acts complained of by Atty. Flores, like Judge Caguioa
being a slave driver, who only sees her and her co-workers' bad points, and about
what the respondent judge painted on his taxicabs, the Court, like the Investigating
Justice, finds them so trivial to require belaboring. Suffice it to state that judges, like
any human being, have their own idiosyncrasis and subject to human limitations.[37]
Certainly, perceived personality flaws and human frailties, of which everyone is an
heir to, cannot, without more, plausibly be the subject of an administrative com-
plaint.

VII. A.M. NO. P-05-2020 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1358-P): Hon. Amado S. Caguioa vs.
Atty. Cristeta R. Caluza- Flores

HELD: The recommendation and the premises holding it together commend

themselves for concurrence. Indeed, respondent Flores has adequately addressed
and very well acquitted herself against the allegations against her.
OCAMPO VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

Facts: In her appeal to the DOJ, petitioner contended that the investigating prose-
cutor showed bias in favor of complainants Magdalena and Erlinda ("complain-
ants") for not conducting a clarificatory hearing and unilaterally procuring the au-
topsy report. Petitioner also alleged that it is the Office of the Ombudsman which
has jurisdiction over the case, and not the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.

The DOJ Secretary3 denied Laila G. De Ocampo’s ("petitioner") petition for review
of the investigating prosecutor’s finding of probable cause against her for homi-
cide4 in relation to Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 ("RA 7610")5
and for violation of the same provision.

The OSG contends that instead of Rule 65, Rule 43 is applicable to the present case.
Thus, the OSG argues that the petition should be dismissed outright for being filed
with this Court, instead of with the Court of Appeals, under a wrong mode of appeal.
On the other hand, assuming Rule 65 applies, the OSG points out that the petition
for certiorari should be filed with the Court of Appeals.

Based on Memorandum Circular No. 58,12 the resolution of the DOJ Secretary is
appealable administratively to the Office of the President since the offenses
charged in this case are punishable by reclusion perpetua.13 From the Office of the
President, the aggrieved party may file an appeal with the Court of Appeals pursu-
ant to Rule 43.14

Issue: Whether the DOJ Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering
the assailed Resolutions amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Ruling: In a petition for certiorari like this case, the primordial issue is whether the DOJ
Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of juris-
diction. The Court rules that the DOJ Secretary did not commit grave abuse of dis-
cretion in finding that there is probable cause to charge petitioner of the crimes of
homicide and child abuse. The Court further rules that the investigating prosecutor
did not act with grave abuse of discretion in securing motu proprio the autopsy re-
port and in not calling for a clarificatory hearing.

DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
DE LA LLANA VS ALBA

Facts: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”, was passed. Gualberto De la
Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would
be one of the judges that would be removed because of the reorganization and
second, he said such law would contravene the constitutional provision which pro-
vides the security of tenure of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme
Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.

Issue: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by
the legislature by such statute (BP 129).

Ruling: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: “Moreover, this Court is empowered “to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order
their dismissal.” Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Ju-
diciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. In the implemen-
tation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges
are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this
Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two depart-
ments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the
matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be ap-
pointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the
hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore
from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge
that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the
power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or dis-
regarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint,
even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust.
Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that
in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which
would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.”
 SEC 12 The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established
by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.

GARCIA VS MACARAIG

Facts: Judge Catalino Macaraig, Jr. took his oath as Judge of the CFI of Laguna
and San Pablo City on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created
CFI branches, had to be organized from scratch. From July 1, 1970 to February 28,
1971. When Macaraig realized that it would be some time before he could actually
preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he
had worked in the Department of Justice, he had, due to pressure of duties, never
gone on extended leave, resulting in his forfeiting all the leave benefits he had
earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the law). The Secretary of
Justice, however, convinced Macaraig to forego his leave and instead to assist the
Secretary, without being extended a formal detail, whenever he was not busy at-
tending to the needs of his court.

Paz Garcia on the other hand filed a complaint alleging that Macaraig is in-
competent, dishonest and has acted in violation of his oath as a judge. Also ques-
tioned was the fact that a member of the judiciary is helping the the DOJ, a depart-
ment of the executive oi charge of prosecution of cases.

Ruling: On the other hand, none of these is to be taken as meaning that the Court
looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed
in the DOJ to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of
exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge
may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or
officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept
clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which
our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually
eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the
public service.

It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present constitutional

scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should
place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for ac-
tion or resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, re-
versal, before they can have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be. Needless to say, the Court feels
very strongly that it is best that this practice is discontinued.
MANILA ELECTRIC VS. PASAY TRANSPORTATION

Facts: Act No. 1446 was passed. Section 11 of the Act provides:

"Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corpora-
tion, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the
grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall use such
right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other
person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme
Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be
final."

Pursuant to said Act, Meralco filed a petition requesting the members of the Su-
preme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain
transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila
Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company
by such transportation companies.

Copies of the petition were directed to be sent to transportation companies af-

fected by the petition. Opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public
utility operators.

Issue: Can the members of the Supreme Court sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and
compensation as is asked of them in this case?

Ruling: The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divi-
sions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which
is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it. The Supreme Court and its members
should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or
to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial
functions.

Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a
democratic government constitutionally established, and that it would be improper
and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators,
the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act on the petition of the Manila
Electric Company.
LOPEZ VS ROXAS 17 SCRA 756

Facts: Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President
in the 1965 elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in
the law that:

“There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the

sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
president-elect and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines.”

In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez
assailed the law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with
the case. Lopez averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in
the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other
ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed before
the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed
before the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.

Held: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new function
to the Supreme Court. Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to
determine which body should decide controversies relating to the election of the
President or the Vice President. RA 1793 did not create another court within the SC
for pursuant to the Constitution, “the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and
in such inferior courts as may be established by law”

The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in
the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial
power, but “the” judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the
entirety or “all” of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers
upon some other agency, such as the power to “judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications” of members of the Senate and those of the
House of Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Sen-
ate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.

The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely
added the court’s jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It
merely conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This
is valid because the determining of election contests is essentially judicial.
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER OF THE ILOCOS
NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE

FACTS: Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, an Executive Judge in RTC in Bangui, Ilocos

Norte was appointed as a member of Provincial Committee on Justice created pur-
suant to Presidential EO 856. Petitioner requested the Court to allow him to accept
the appointment and to consider his membership in the committee as neither viola-
tive to his judicial function. He also added that his membership in the said Committee
is still part of the primary functions of an Executive Judge.

Upon examination of EO 856 reveals that:

Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition

of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus
alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions
of the Committee are—

3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, final or judge
who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and
refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;

3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the
proper administration of criminal justice.

ISSUE: Whether the membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee discharges as administrative functions and will be in violation of the
Constitution.

RULING: Yes. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature
or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-
07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks Law Dictionary).

Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts estab-
lished by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Petition denied.