G.R. NO.
159618 FEBRUARY 1, 2011 shock the conscience of humanity; it precludes our country from delivering
BAYAN MUNA, AS REPRESENTED BY REP. SATUR
OCAMPO, REP. CRISPIN BELTRAN, AND REP. LIZA L.
MAZA, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, AND BLAS F. OPLE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, RESPONDENTS.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to
represent the marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now
deceased, was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to
thiscase. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then
Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Having a key determinative
bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court (ICC) with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons
for the mostserious crimes of international concern and shall be complementary
to the national criminal jurisdictions
Theserious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under
international law, such as genocide, crimes againsthumanity, war crimes,
and crimes of aggression.On December 28, 2000, the RP, through Charge
d·Affaires
Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by itsterms,is subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of
the instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have
completed the ratification, approval and concurrence process. The
Philippines is not among the 92.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is void ab initio
for contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance
with universally recognized principles of international law.
Held: No. Petitioner urges that theAgreement be struck down as void ab initio
for imposing immoral obligations and/or being at variance with allegedly
universally recognized principles of international law. The immoral aspect
proceedsfrom the fact that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves
criminals immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that deeply
an American criminal to the ICC.
The above argument is a kind of recycling of petitioners earlier position,
which, as already discussed, contends that the RP, by entering into the
Agreement, virtually abdicated its sovereignty and in theprocess undermined
its treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to international law
principles.
The Court is not persuaded. Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-
surrender agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an
assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish crimes under its
national law. The agreement is a recognition of the primacy and competence
of the countrys judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and
dispense justice fairly and judiciously. Petitioner, labors under the erroneous
impression that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern to escape criminal trial and
punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have committed
acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in
the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before
the ICC, assuming that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to
the Rome Statute have been met.
Perspective wise, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender
by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without
the consent of the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime
under its existing laws. With this view, there is nothing immoral or violative of
international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal
jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender agreement over an offense
considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute
International Agreements; treaties and executive agreements. Under
international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states
concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within
their powers. However, a treaty has greater “dignity” than an executive
agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty
having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a
ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any
prior statutory enactment. Petitioner, in this case, argues that the Non-
Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the US is of dubious
validity, partaking as it does of the nature of a treaty; hence, it must be duly
concurred in by the Senate. Petitioner relies on the case, Commissioner of
Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, in which the Court stated: international
agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take
the form of treaties; while those embodying adjustments of detail carrying out
well established national policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive
agreements. According to petitioner, the subject of the Agreement does not
fall under any of the subject-categories that are enumerated in the Eastern
Sea Trading case that may be covered by an executive agreement, such as
commercial/consular relations, most-favored nation rights, patent rights,
trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and
settlement of claims. The Supreme Court held, however, that the
categorization of subject matters that may be covered by international
agreements mentioned in Eastern Sea Trading is not cast in stone. There are
no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a
treaty or an executive agreement as an instrument of international relations.
The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the
parties’ intent and desire to craft an international agreement in the form they
so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back
seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of
a treaty or an executive agreement, as the parties in either international
agreement each labor under the pacta sunt servanda principle.
International Agreements; limitations on sovereignty. The RP, by entering
into the Agreement, does thereby abdicate its sovereignty, abdication being
done by its waiving or abandoning its right to seek recourse through the
Rome Statute of the ICC for erring Americans committing international
crimes in the country. As it were, the Agreement is but a form of affirmance
and confirmation of the Philippines’ national criminal jurisdiction. National
criminal jurisdiction being primary, it is always the responsibility and within
the prerogative of the RP either to prosecute criminal offenses equally
covered by the Rome Statute or to accede to the jurisdiction of the ICC.
Thus, the Philippines may decide to try “persons” of the US, as the term is
understood in the Agreement, under our national criminal justice system; or it
may opt not to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over its erring citizens or over
US “persons” committing high crimes in the country and defer to the
secondary criminal jurisdiction of the ICC over them. In the same breath, the
US must extend the same privilege to the Philippines with respect to
“persons” of the RP committing high crimes within US territorial jurisdiction.
By their nature, treaties and international agreements actually have a limiting
effect on the otherwise encompassing and absolute nature of sovereignty. By
their voluntary act, nations may decide to surrender or waive some aspects
of their state power or agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise exclusive
and absolute jurisdiction. The usual underlying consideration in this partial
surrender may be the greater benefits derived from a pact or a reciprocal
undertaking of one contracting party to grant the same privileges or
immunities to the other.
PIMENTEL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY DIGEST
G.R. NO. 158088 JULY 6, 2005
Facts:
1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the
signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the
Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of
the 1987 Constitution.
2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have
jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute.
The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the
Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory state.
3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and
international law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the
Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to
exercise its discretion.
Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial
duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a
member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of
the President.
The Supreme Court held NO.
1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the
external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign
nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs.
2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with
other states and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the
Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for
the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the
executive in the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit
of political maturity and growth.
 COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS VS. EASTERN SEA
TRADING (G.R. NO. L-14279)
FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the importation
from Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the
Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the
import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank
Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c
sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from
Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the
Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said
EO averring that the said EO was never concurred upon by the
Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the
latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at
least 2/3 of the Senate.
HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are
subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the
Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of
treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are
no less common in our scheme of government than are the more
formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take
the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal
documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where
ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends
and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or
exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may sometimes be difficult
of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss
here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded
from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than
those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been
negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be
sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of
1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and
that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain
classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive
without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the
inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits,
the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial
relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the
registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were
concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in
conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to
the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others,
particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against
foreign governments, were concluded independently of any
legislation.
BAYAN (BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN), A JUNK
VFA MOVEMENT V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO
ZAMORA
G.R. NO. 138570
FACTS:
The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty
on August 30, 1951, To further strengthen their defense and security
relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external
armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have
extended the presence of US military bases in the Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other
things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This
resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on
January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the
VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the
President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora,
officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,the Instrument of
Ratification, the letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant
to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners – as legislators, non-
governmental organizations, citizens and taxpayers – assail the
constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave abuse of
discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the “foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following
conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly
concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and c)
recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is
applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is
the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
ISSUES AND RULING:
1. Issue 1: Do the Petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, or legislators to question the constitutionality of the VFA?
NO. Petitioners Bayan Muna, etc. have no standing. A party bringing a suit
challenging the Constitutionality of a law must show not only that the law is
invalid, but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. Petitioners have failed to show that
they are in any danger of direct injury as a result of the VFA.
As taxpayers, they have failed to establish that the VFA involves the exercise
by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. A taxpayer's suit refers to a
case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of
public funds derived from taxation. Before he can invoke the power of
judicial review, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute
or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common
to all members of the public. Clearly, inasmuch as no public funds raised by
taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any allegation by
petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended,
petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the
VFA.
Similarly, the petitioner-legislators (Tanada, Arroyo, etc.) do not possess the
requisite locus standi to sue. In the absence of a clear showing of any direct
injury to their person or to the institution to which they belong, they cannot
sue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is also stripped of standing
in these cases. The IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the
absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its
National President to commence the present action.
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional
significance of the issues raised, the Court may brush aside the procedural
barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions.
2. Issue 2: Is the VFA governed by section 21, Art. VII, or section 25, Art.
XVIII of the Constitution?
Section 25, Art XVIII, not section 21, Art. VII, applies, as the VFA involves the
presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.
The Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the
Senate on treaties or international agreements.
Section 21, Article VII reads: “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.”
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:”[a]fter the expiration in 1991 of the
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in
by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of
the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose,
and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”
Section 21, Article VII deals with treaties or international agreements in
general, in which case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the
Members of the Senate is required to make the treaty valid and binding to the
Philippines. This provision lays down the general rule on treaties. All treaties,
regardless of subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or
appellation, requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to
treaties which involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or
facilities in the Philippines. Under this provision, the concurrence of the
Senate is only one of the requisites to render compliance with the
constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the
Philippines. Sec 25 further requires that “foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities” may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly
concurred in by the Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
national referendum held for that purpose if so required by Congress, and
recognized as such by the other contracting state.
On the whole, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of US
troops visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such
visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the US and RP
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and
aircraft, import and export of equipment, materials and supplies.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties
involving foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the
instant case. To a certain extent, however, the provisions of Section 21,
Article VII will find applicability with regard to determining the number of
votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the Senate.
It is specious to argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is inapplicable to mere
transient agreements for the reason that there is no permanent placing of
structure for the establishment of a military base. The Constitution makes no
distinction between “transient” and “permanent”. We find nothing in Section
25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or
placed permanently in the Philippines. When no distinction is made by law;
the Court should not distinguish. We do not subscribe to the argument that
Section 25, Article XVIII is not controlling since no foreign military bases, but
merely foreign troops and facilities, are involved in the VFA. The proscription
covers “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.” Stated differently, this
prohibition is not limited to the entry of troops and facilities without any
foreign bases being established. The clause does not refer to “foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities” collectively but treats them as separate and
independent subjects, such that three different situations are contemplated
— a military treaty the subject of which could be either (a) foreign bases, (b)
foreign troops, or (c) foreign facilities — any of the three standing alone
places it under the coverage of Section 25, Article XVIII.
3. Issue 3: Was Sec 25 Art XVIII's requisites satisfied to make the VFA
effective?
YES
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
(a) it must be under a treaty;
(b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so required
by Congress, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a
national referendum; and
(c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the case
of the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No.
18 is in accordance with the Constitution, as there were at least 16 Senators
that concurred.
As to condition (c), the Court held that the phrase “recognized as a treaty”
means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the
agreement as a treaty. To require the US to submit the VFA to the US
Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution, is to accord strict
meaning to the phrase. Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used
in the Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to
them prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in
common use.
The records reveal that the US Government, through Ambassador Hubbard,
has stated that the US has fully committed to living up to the terms of the
VFA. For as long as the US accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty,
and binds itself further to comply with its treaty obligations, there is indeed
compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification by the President of the VFA, and
the concurrence of the Senate, should be taken as a clear and unequivocal
expression of our nation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the
concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and responsibilities embodied
thereunder. Ratification is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken
by the head of the state, through which the formal acceptance of the treaty is
proclaimed. A State may provide in its domestic legislation the process of
ratification of a treaty. In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the
President and not, as commonly believed, in the legislature. The role of the
Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to
the ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA it now becomes obligatory and incumbent on
our part, under principles of international law (pacta sunt servanda), to be
bound by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II
declares that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
LIM V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Lessons Applicable: Locus Standi, International Law v. Muncipal Law,
Certiorari, Incorporation Clause, Treaties
Laws Applicable: Constitution
FACTS:
Pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) signed in 1999,
personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started
arriving in Mindanao to take partin "Balikatan 02-1” on January 2002. The
Balikatan 02-1 exercises involves the simulation of joint military maneuvers
pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement
entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The exercise
is rooted from the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by
President George W. Bush in reaction to the 3 commercial aircrafts hijacking
that smashed into twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City
and the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. allegedly by the al-Qaeda
headed by the Osama bin Laden that occurred on September 11, 2001.
Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition attacking the constitutionality of
the joint exercise. Partylists Sanlakas and Partido Ng Manggagawa as
residents of Zamboanga and Sulu directly affected by the operations filed a
petition-in-intervention.
The Solicitor General commented the prematurity of the action as it is
based only on a fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference and
impropriety of availing of certiorari to ascertain a question of fact specifically
interpretation of the VFA whether it is covers "Balikatan 02-1” and no
question of constitutionality is involved. Moreover, there is lack of locus
standi since it does not involve tax spending and there is no proof of direct
personal injury.
ISSUE: W/N the petition and the petition-in-intervention should prosper.
HELD: NO. Petition and the petition-in-intervention are hereby DISMISSED
without prejudice to the filing of a new petition sufficient in form and
substance in the proper Regional Trial Court - Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts
Doctrine of Importance to the Public
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in
keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws that they have not abused
the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of
procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question
based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon the
department of the government a becoming respect for each other's act, this
Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petition.
Interpretation of Treaty
The VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent
basis, in "activities," the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The
expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject
only to the approval of the Philippine government. The sole encumbrance
placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must "abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this
agreement, and in particular, from any political activity." All other activities, in
other words, are fair game.
To aid in this, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 31
SECTION 3 and Article 32 contains provisos governing interpretations of
international agreements. It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule
of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed
to verbalize the parties' intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what
may be used as aids to deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as
the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into
account alongside the aforesaid context. According to Professor Briggs,
writer on the Convention, the distinction between the general rule of
interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation is intended
rather to ensure that the supplementary means do not constitute an
alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from the general
rule.
The meaning of the word “activities" was deliberately made that way to give
both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. Thus, the VFA gives legitimacy
to the current Balikatan exercises. Both the history and intent of the Mutual
Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related
activities -as opposed to combat itself -such as the one subject of the instant
petition, are indeed authorized.
The Terms of Reference are explicit enough. Paragraph 8 of section I
stipulates that US exercise participants may not engage in combat "except in
self-defense." ." The indirect violation is actually petitioners' worry, that in
reality, "Balikatan 02-1" is actually a war principally conducted by the United
States government, and that the provision on self-defense serves only as
camouflage to conceal the true nature of the exercise. A clear
pronouncement on this matter thereby becomes crucial. In our considered
opinion, neither the MDT nor the VFA allow foreign troops to engage in an
offensive war on Philippine territory. Under the salutary proscription stated in
Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all
other treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a
party, must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution especially Sec. 2,
7 and 8 of Article 2: Declaration of Principles and State Policies in this case.
The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief
Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall
be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate." Even more pointedly Sec. 25 on Transitory
Provisions which shows antipathy towards foreign military presence in the
country, or of foreign influence in general. Hence, foreign troops are allowed
entry into the Philippines only by way of direct exception.
International Law vs. Fundamental Law and Municipal Laws
Conflict arises then between the fundamental law and our obligations arising
from international agreements.
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: “Withal, the fact that international law
has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the
primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under
the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of
international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national
legislation.”
From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over
municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence,
"[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed
by them in good faith." Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke
the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty."
Our Constitution espouses the opposing view as stated in section 5 of Article
VIII: “The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and order of lower
courts in:
(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.”
Ichong v. Hernandez: “provisions of a treaty are always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, or that it is subject to the
police power of the State”
Gonzales v. Hechanova: “our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a
treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it
runs counter to an act of Congress.”
The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited /
from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.
NICOLAS V ROMULO
**This case is consolidated with Salonga vs Daniel Smith &
BAYAN vs Gloria Arroyo
On the 1st of November 2005, Daniel Smith committed the crime of rape
against Nicole. He was convicted of the said crime and was ordered by the
court to suffer imprisonment. Smith was a US serviceman convicted of a
crime against our penal laws and the crime was committed within the
country’s jurisdiction. But pursuant to the VFA, a treaty between the US and
Philippines, the US embassy was granted custody over Smith. Nicole,
together with the other petitioners appealed before the SC assailing the
validity of the VFA. Their contention is that the VFA was not ratified by the
US senate in the same way our senate ratified the VFA.
ISSUE: Is the VFA void and unconstitutional & whether or not it is self-
executing.
HELD: The VFA is a self-executing Agreement because the parties intend
its provisions to be enforceable, precisely because the VFA is intended to
carry out obligations and undertakings under the RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty. As a matter of fact, the VFA has been implemented and executed,
with the US faithfully complying with its obligation to produce Smith before
the court during the trial.
The VFA is covered by implementing legislation inasmuch as it is the very
purpose and intent of the US Congress that executive agreements registered
under this Act within 60 days from their ratification be immediately
implemented. The SC noted that the VFA is not like other treaties that need
implementing legislation such as the Vienna Convention. As regards the
implementation of the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty, military aid or
assistance has been given under it and this can only be done through
implementing legislation. The VFA itself is another form of implementation of
its provisions.
SAGUISAG V OCHOA
FACTS:
The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an executive
agreement that gives U.S. troops, planes and ships increased rotational
presence in Philippine military bases and allows the U.S. to build facilities to
store fuel and equipment there. It was signed against the backdrop of the
Philippines' maritime dispute with China over the West Philippine Sea. The
US embassy and DFA exchanged diplomatic notes confirming all necessary
requirements for the agreement to take force. The agreement was signed
on April 2014. President Benigno Aquino III ratified the same on June 2014.
It was not submitted to Congress on the understanding that to do so was no
longer necessary. Petitions for Certiorari were filed before the Supreme
Court assailing the constitutionality of the agreement. Herein petitioners
now contend that it should have been concurred by the senate as it is not an
executive agreement. The Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 105
expressing a strong sense that in order for EDCA to be valid and binding, it
must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation and concurrence.
ISSUES: Whether or Not the EDCA between the Philippines and the U.S. is
constitutional
HELD: - The EDCA is an executive agreement and does not need the
Senate's concurrence. As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with
existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement. - Petitioners contend
that the EDCA must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred by Senate.
They hinge their argument under the following Constitutional provisions: o
Sec. 21, Art. VII: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3rds of all the Members of the
Senate.” o Section 25, Article XVIII: “ xxx Military Bases, foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except
under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate xxx ” - The President,
however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement
an existing law or treaty - In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea
Trading: Executive Agreements are defined as international agreements
embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national
policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less
temporary nature. - Treaties are formal documents which require ratification
with the approval of two-thirds of the Senate. The right of the Executive to
enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. - The Visiting
Forces Agreement – a treaty ratified by the Senate in 1999 – already allowed
the return of US troops. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and
framework of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA. The practice of
resorting to executive agreements in adjusting the details of a law or a treaty
that already deals with the presence of foreign military forces is not at all
unusual in this jurisdiction
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES VS. DUQUE III
(Austria-Martinez, October 9, 2007)
Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
Petitioner: Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines
Respondents: DOH Sec. Francisco Duque III, DOH Undersecretaries Dr.
Ethelyn Nieto, Dr. Margarita Galon, Atty. Alexander Padilla and Dr. Jade Del
Mundo; and Asst. Secretaries Dr. Mario Villaverde, Dr. David Lozada and Dr.
Nemesio Gako
Facts:
- Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres.
Aquino on Oct. 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to
her under the Freedom Constitution.
(1) One of the preambular clauses of TMC – the law seeks to give
effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substituttes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the WHA
(World Health Assembly) in 1981.
- In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of the instrument mandates that States
should take measure to diminish infant mortality and should ensure that
all segments of society are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding.
- From 1982 – 2006, the WHA adopted several resolutions to the effect
that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected,
hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
- May 15, 2006 – DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to
take effect on July 7, 2006. – The RIRR imposes a ban on all
advertisements of breastmilk substitutes
- June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary
injunction.
- August 15, 2006 – the Court issued a Resolution granting the TRO,
enjoining the respondents from implementing the assailed RIRR.
 - Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC
thereby amending and expanding the coverage of the said law.
- DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but
also various international instruments regarding infant and young child
nutrition. They posit that the said international instruments are deemed
part of the law of the land and therefore may be implemented by the
DOH in the RIRR.
Issue: W/n the RIRR is unconstitutional?
Sub-issue(s): W/n the RIRR is in accord with TMC? W/n pertinent
international agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of
the land and may thus be implemented through an RIRR, if so, is the RIRR in
accord with such international agreements?
Note: I focused on the parts on international law. The other matters (in case
ma’am asks) are at the bottom of the digest.
Held: No. However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk
Code which in turn is based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law
of the land. The other WHA Resolutions however cannot be imposed as they
are not deemed part of the law of the land.
Ratio:
1. Are the international instruments referred to by the respondents part of
the law of the land?
- The various international instruments invoked by respondents are:
(1) The UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child
(2) The International Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights
(3) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women
- These instruments only provide general terms of the steps that States
must take to prevent child mortality. Hence, they do not have anything
about the use and marketing of breastmilk substitutes
- The ICMBS and other WHA Resolutions however, are the international
instruments which have specific provisions on breastmilk substitutes
- Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of
domestic law in 2 ways:
(1) Transformation – an international law is transformed into a domestic
law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation
 Treaties become part of law of the land through this method,
pursuant to Art 7, Sec 21 – wherein “no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid.. unless concurred by at least 2/3 of
Senate”
 The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are NOT treaties as they
haven’t been concurred in by the required 2/3 vote.
 HOWEVER, the ICMBS has been transformed into domestic
law through local legislation that is TMC.
 Therefore, it is not the ICMBS per se that has the force
of law but it’s TMC.
o While TMC is almost a verbatim reproduction of the
ICMBS, it did not adopt the latter’s provision on the
absolute prohibition on advertising of products within
the scope of the ICMBS. Instead the MC provides that
advertising promotion or other marketing materials may
be allowed if such materials are approved by a
committee.
(2) Incorporation – by mere constitutional declaration, international law
is deemed to have the force of domestic law
 This is found under Art 2, Sec 2 – The Philippines… adopts
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land
 In Mihares v. Ranada: International law becomes customary
rules accepted as binding as a result of two elements:
1.) Established, widespread, and consistent practice on part of
the state
2.) Opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity.
 Generally accepted principles of international law refer to norms
of general or customary international law which are binding on
all states, valid through all kinds of human societies, and basic
to legal systems generally
 Fr. Bernas has a definition similar to the one above. Customary
international law has two factors:
1.) Material factor – how states behave
 The consistency and the generality of the practice
2.) Psychological or subjective factor – why they behave the
way they do
 Once state practice has been established, now
determine why they behave they do. Is it ouor of
 courtesy or opinio juris (the belief that a certain type of
behavior is obligatory)
 When a law satisfies the two factors it becomes part of
customary international law which is then incorporated into our
domestic system
2. Since the WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local
legislation, have they attained the status of customary law and hence
part of our law of the land?
- The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international
specialized agencies of the UN.
- According to the WHO Constitution, it’s the WHA which determines the
policies of the WHO, the former also has the power to “adopt
regulations concerning advertising and labeling of pharmaceutical and
similar products” and “to make recommendations to members on any
matter within the Organization’s competence”
- Note that the legal effect of a regulation as opposed to recommendation
is quite different
(1) Regulations which are duly adopted by the WHA are binding on
member states
(2) On the other hand, recommendations of the WHA do not come into
force for its members unlike regulations. Rather, they carry moral
and political weight as they constitute the judgment on a health
issue of the collective membership of the highest body in the field of
health.
- The WHA resolution adopting the ICMBS and the subsequent WHA
resolutions urging states to implement the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding.
- Hence, unlike the ICMBS which has become TMC through legislative
enactment, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, which provide for
exclusive breastfeeding and prohibition on advertisements and
promotions of breastmilk have not been adopted as domestic law.
- WHA Resolutions have been viewed to constitute “soft law” or non-
binding norms, which influence state behavior. Soft law has been noted
to be a rapid means of norm creation, in order to reflect and respond to
the changing needs and demands of constituents (of the UN.)
- As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered
customary law, it must be established that such rule is followed by
states because it is considered obligatory (opinio juris).
- In the case at bar, respondents have not presented any evidence to
prove that the WHA Resolutions are in fact enforced or practice by
member states. Further, they failed to establish that provisions of
pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that may be
deemed part of law of the land.
- Hence, legislation is necessary to transform the WHA resolutions into
domestic law. They cannot thus be implemented by executive agencies
without the need of a law to be enacted by legislature.
On other issues:
W/n the petitioner is the real party in interest? Yes.
- An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of
direct interest of its members are affected by the action. An
organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.
(Exec Sec vs CA)
- The Court has rules that an association has the legal personality to
represent its members because the results of the case will affect their
vital interests. (Purok Bagong Silang Association Inc. vs. Yuipco)
- In the petitioner’s Amended Articles of Incorporation, it states that the
association is formed “to represent directly or through approved
representatives the pharmaceutical and health care industry before the
Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical professions
and the general public.”
- Therefore, the petitioner, as an organization, has an interest in fulfilling
its avowed purpose of representing members who are part of the
pharmaceutical and health care industry. Petitioner is duly authorized
to bring to the attention of the government agencies and courts any
grievance suffered by its members which are directly affected by the
assailed RIRR.
- The petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with its members,
should be considered as a legal party-in-interest which stands to be
benefited or injured by any judgment in the case.
W/n the DOH has the power to implement the WHA Resolutions under the
Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law? Only
the provisions of the Milk Code. (as per the discussion above)
- Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the RAC of 1987 provides that the DOH
shall define the national health policy and can issue orders and
regulations concerning the implementation of established health
policies.
- A.O. No 2005 -0014 which provides the national policy on infant and
young child feeding, does not declare that as part of its policy, the
advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be
absolutely prohibited.
- Only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of the subsequent
WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the
subject RIRR.
W/n the provisions of the RIRR being in accordance with the Milk Code? Not
all of them
- Assailed provisions: [1] extending the coverage to young children; [2]
imposing exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months; [3]
imposes an absolute ban on advertising and promotion for breastmilk
substitutes; [4] requiring additional labeling requirements; [5] prohibits
the dissemination of information on infant formula; [6] forbids milk
manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in research and
continuing education Although the DOH has the power under the Milk
Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk
substitutes, this power is not absolute because it has no power to
impose an absolute prohibition in the marketing, promotion and
advertising of breastmilk substitutes. Several provisions of the Milk
Code attest to the fact that such power to control information is not
absolute.
- Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code
because such provisions impose an absolute prohibition on advertising,
promotion and marketing of breastmilk substitutes, which is not
provided for in the Milk Code. Section 46 is violative of the Milk Code
because the DOH has exceeded its authority in imposing such fines or
sanctions when the Milk Code does not do so. Other assailed
provisions are in accordance with the Milk Code.
W/n Section 13 of the RIRR providing a sufficient standard? Yes.
- Questioned provision, in addition to Section 26 of Rule VII provide
labeling requirements for breastmilk substitutes  found to be in
consonance with the Milk Code
- The provisions in question provide reasonable means of enforcing
related provisions in the Milk Code.
W/n Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws?
- Section in question only repeals orders, issuances and rules and
regulations, not laws. The provision is valid as it is within the DOH’s
rule-making power.
- An administrative agency has quasi-legislative or rule-making power.
However, such power is limited to making rules and regulation
subjected to the boundaries set by the granting statute and the
Constitution. The power is also subject to the doctrine of non-
delegability and separability of powers. The power, which includes
amending, revising, altering or repealing, is granted to allow for
flexibility in the implementation of the laws.
W/n On Section 4, 5(w), 11, 22, 32, 47 and 52 violates the due process
clause of the Constitution (Article III Section 1)?
- Despite the fact that the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise
as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to
intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare… free
enterprise does not call for the removal of protective regulations. It must
be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly
how such protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade.
- Section 4 – proscription of milk manufacturers’ participation in any
policymaking body; Section 22 – classes and seminars for women and
children; Section 32 – giving of assistance, support and logistics or
training; Section 52 – giving of donations
- In the instant case, petitioner failed to show how the aforementioned
sections hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. They also failed to
establish that these activities are essential and indispensable to their
trade.
Disposition: The Petition is Partially Granted. Only sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of
A.O. 2006-0014 are declared null and void for being ultra vires. The TRO is
lifted insofar as the rest of the provisions of A.O. 2006-0012 is concerned.
RAZON VS. TAGITIS
GR No. 182498 December 3, 2009
Facts: Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary
Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme,
was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an
IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October
31, 2007 from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in
at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for
his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from
this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. The receptionist related that
Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left
his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text
message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis’
whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP
professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB,
reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7,
2007, Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the
circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a
Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-
Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla. The petition was directed against Lt. Gen.
Alexander Yano, Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I.
Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal,
Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response;
Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael,
Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners].
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ
of Amparo, set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the
petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from
service of the writ.
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the
disappearance of Tagitis was an “enforced disappearance” under the United
Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for writ of amparo is proper in this case
Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete
in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s
rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state
the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary
details.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the
unique Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to
determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner under the
circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the
victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party
action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms
of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements –
namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or
threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security – are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the
circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after
engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found
despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too, under its paragraph 7,
in relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable
information, police operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction. It also
clearly alleged how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security were violated
when he was “forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of
burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,” and then taken “into
custody by the respondents’ police intelligence operatives since October 30,
2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against his
will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with
different terrorist groups.”
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the
pleader’s knowledge about Tagitis’ disappearance, the participation by
agents of the State in this disappearance, the failure of the State to release
Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his whereabouts, as well as
the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition cannot be faulted
for any failure in its statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of
supporting affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing
to the summary nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the
resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for
supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the
affiant’s direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as
an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not
strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially
complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition sufficiently
detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement that an
affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach
the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness
(Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and
17 and February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the
petition. Thus, even on this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
We reject the petitioners’ argument that the respondent’s petition did not
comply with the Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule (that a prior
investigation must have been made), as the petition specifies in its paragraph
11 that Kunnong and his companions immediately reported Tagitis’
disappearance to the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were
relatively certain that he indeed had disappeared. The police, however,
gave them the “ready answer” that Tagitis could have been abducted by the
Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government groups. The respondent also
alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a “complaint”
with the PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of “an
intriguing tale” by the police that her husband was having “a good time with
another woman.” The disappearance was alleged to have been reported, too,
to no less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed by the respondent’s
personal inquiries that yielded the factual bases for her petition.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent’s petition for the
Writ of Amparo is sufficient in form and substance and that the Court of
Appeals had every reason to proceed with its consideration of the case.
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the “writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.” We note that
although the writ specifically covers “enforced disappearances,” this concept
is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction.
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in
this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component
criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
special laws.
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is
not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to
promulgate “rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,”
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we
do not rule on any issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or
enforced disappearance. This is an issue that requires criminal action before
our criminal courts based on our existing penal laws. Our intervention is in
determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken place and who is
responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and impose
the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities
to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is
twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts
at disclosure andinvestigation are undertaken under pain of indirect
contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the
individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance,
so that the life of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security
restored.
Article 2 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance defined enforced disappearance as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, “enforced
disappearance” is considered to be the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law.
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that
there is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance and that this right
is non-derogable.
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so
that the country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced
disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal law, however, is
not a stumbling block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned;
underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the
Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter
made in a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but
have its effects on the country, given our own adherence to “generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.”
We characterized “generally accepted principles of international law” as
norms of general or customary international law that are binding on all
states. We held further: [G]enerally accepted principles of international law,
by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws
of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. The classical
formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as
binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and
apsychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion
as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the
Convention on enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome
Statute) and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific
crime, the above recital shows that enforced disappearance as a State
practice has been repudiated by the international community, so that the ban
on it is now a generally accepted principle of international law, which we
should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon
to the extent already allowed under our laws and the international
conventions that bind us.
MIJARES VS. RANADA
FACTS:
 May 9 1991: a complaint was filed by ten Filipino citizens representing a
class of 10,000 members who each alleged having suffered human
rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands
of police or military forces during the Marcos regime with the United
States District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii, against the
Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos
Estate)
 US District Court and Affirmed by US CA: awarded them
$1,964,005,859.90
 Petitioners filed Complaint with Makati RTC for the enforcement of the
Final Judgment
 Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-
payment of the correct filing fees paying only P410
 Petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign
judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation
 RTC: estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately
P472 and dismissing the case without prejudice
 Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
ISSUE: W/N the enforcement of a foreign judgment is incapable of pecuniary
estimation
HELD: NO. (But belongs to "other actions not involving property") petition is
GRANTED.
 There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in
rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is
deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in
personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title
 However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to
impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Thus,
the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against
the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential that
there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in
order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy
even if such judgment has conclusive effect as in the case of in rem
actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity
to challenge the foreign judgment. Consequently, the party attacking a
foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its
validity. Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-
judicial body, the claim for enforcement of judgment must be brought
before the regular courts.
 There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of
action arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that
arising from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign
judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an
essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be
vindicated. Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from
there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other
hand, in an action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof
is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.
 As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally
restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of
personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The
limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy
in all legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.
Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party
expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the
harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be
increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger
sense to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to
be the goal of all law: "rest and quietness." If every judgment of a foreign
court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation.
 Marcos Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court
of Appeals:
 In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of
first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it
is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this
Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
 litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
 An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant
complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of
pecuniary estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts
 The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable
of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based
on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of
Section 7(a) of Rule 141. It is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it
does, "other actions not involving property." The petitioners thus paid
the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion
for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule
and dismissed the complaint.
SEC OF JUSTICE V LANTION
Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court
(RTC). The Department of Justice received a request from the Department of
Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S.
The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting
documents for said extradition were attached along with the request.
Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded
with the technical evaluation and assessment of the extradition treaty which
they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then
requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request
and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice
denied request on the following grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the
evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating
whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD
1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty)
have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by
the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in
criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the
accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the
information in the documents.
3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in
connection with an extradition request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna
Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC
presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to
issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further
proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of
the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a
local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation,
however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates
that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of
incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing,
but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the
accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the
individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally
accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as
part of the law of the land.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the
accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the
individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we
recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally
accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as
part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the
local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of
the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark
Jimenez) a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence.
“Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of
the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such
rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
“The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the
local state.
“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both
since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard
for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the
incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
“In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has
to be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal
courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are
accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
“The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land
does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as
applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given
equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain
biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their
ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered
nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal
Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition
on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom
of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination
based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the
first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
reports by COMELEC’s field personnel. replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution; As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
grounds. in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely
Held: moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law
or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be

prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the
COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission
into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the
moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal

and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal