Petitioner : Republic of the Philippines public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
Respondents : Vda De Castellvi, Et al.
Doctrine : Eminent domain; “Taking” of property; Elements of.—A number of
circumstances must be present in the “taking” of property for purposes of eminent
domain: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into
private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into the
property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must
be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously
affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Just compensation; Value of property expropriated determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint.
FACTS :
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its
Civil Case No. 1623, an expropriation proceeding.
 The herein petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain, on June 26,
1959, against respondents Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the
estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi and Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun over lands
situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga
 July 1, 1947 when the Philippine Air Force occupied Castellvi’s land by a
virtue of a contract renewable in a year to year basis.
 1956 Castellvi refused to renew the contract and demanded the
government through a letter dated July 11, 1956 to vacate the property within 30
days.
 January 12, 1957 the government answered the letter refusing to vacate
and that expropriation proceedings will be recommended to the President.
 Castellvi filed a Civil Case in the CFI-Pampanga ejecting the Philippine Air
Force. While the ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted the
expropriation proceedings.
 During the determination of the value of the property, the republic argued
that they had taken the property when the contract commenced not when the
expropriation proceedings begun. While Castellvi maintains that two essential
elements in “taking” of property under the power of eminent domain where not
present, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor upon the private
property for more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a
enjoyment of the property.
 The trial court ordered the Republic to pay Castellvi at a price as of 1959
when the Republic took the property and commenced the expropriation
proceedings. Hence this petition.
ISSUES :
1. Whether or not the court erred in holding that the “taking” of the properties
under expropriation commenced with the filing of this action.
RULING :
No. The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the “taking” of the
property under expropriation commenced with the filing of the complaint.
A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of property for
purposes of eminent domain.
1. The expropriator must enter a private property.
2. The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period.
3. The entry into the property should be under Warrant.
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected.
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
In the case at bar, the court find that there are two essential elements in the
“taking” of property under the power of eminent domain that where not present
when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property, namely: (1) that
the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or
indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was
ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use.
Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation” is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that
when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the
filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine
National Bank, L- 14158, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 957, 961–962). In the instant case, it
is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property,
by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castellvi property
for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore,
be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

Note.—a) Existence of necessity.—To authorize the condemnation of any particular

land by a grantee of the power of eminent domain, a necessity must exist for the
taking thereof for the proposed uses and purposes. The very `foundation of the
right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be
of a public character. The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or
accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land (City of Manila vs. Arellano Law
Colleges, L-2929, February 28, 1950). Necessity for expropriation of property for a
particular purpose does not mean absolute, but only reasonable or practical,
necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least
inconvenience and expense to the parties in interest, consistent with such benefit
(Ilocos Norte vs. Compania General de Tabacos, L-7361, April 20, 1956).