G.R. No.
L-58011 & L-58012 November 18, 1983 thought that the vessel would 'trade in
VIR-JEN SHIPPING AND MARINE SERVICES, INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ROGELIO
BISULA RUBEN ARROZA JUAN GACUTNO LEONILO
ATOK, NILO CRUZ, ALVARO ANDRADA, NEMESIO ADUG
SIMPLICIO BAUTISTA, ROMEO ACOSTA, and JOSE
ENCABO respondents.
Antonio R. Atienza for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent NLRC,
Quasha, Asperilia, Ancheta &- Valmonte Pena Marcos Law
Offices for private respondents.
RESOLUTION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Before the Court en banc is a motion to reconsider the decision
promulgated on July 20, 1982 which set aside the decision of
respondent National Labor Relations Commission and
reinstated the decision of the National Seamen Board.
To better understand the issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration, we reiterate the background facts of the case,
Taken from the decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission: têñ.£îhqwâ£
It appears that on different dates in
December, 1978 and January, 1979, the
Seamen entered into separate contracts of
employment with the Company, engaging
them to work on board M/T' Jannu for a period
of twelve (12) months. After verification and
approval of their contracts by the NSB, the
Seamen boarded their vessel in Japan.
On 10 January 1919, the master of the vessel
complainant Rogelio H. Bisula, received a
cable from the Company advising him of the
possibility that the vessel might be directed to
call at ITF-controlled ports said at the same
time informing him of the procedure to be
followed in the computation of the special or
additional compensation of crew members
while in said ports. ITF is the acronym for the
International Transport Workers Federation, a
militant international labor organization with
affiliates in different ports of the world, which
reputedly can tie down a vessel in a port by
preventing its loading or unloading, This is a
sanction resorted to by ITF to enforce the
payment of its wages rates for seafarers the
so-called ITF rates, if the wages of the crew
members of a vessel who have affiliated with
it are below its prescribed rates.) In the same
cable of the Company, the expressed its
regrets for hot clarifying earlier the procedure
in computing the special compensation as it
Caribbean ports only.
On 22 March 1979, the Company sent
another cable to complainant Bisula, this time
informing him of the respective amounts each
of the officers and crew members would
receive as special compensation when the
vessel called at the port of Kwinana Australia,
an ITF-controlled port. This was followed by
another cable on 23 March 1979, informing
him that the officers and crew members had
been enrolled as members of the ITF in
Sidney, Australia, and that the membership
fee for the 28 personnel complement of the
vessel had already been paid.
In answer to the Company's cable last
mentioned, complainant Bisula, in
representation of the other officers and crew
members, sent on 24 March 1979 a cable
informing the Company that the officers and
crew members were not agreeable to its
'suggestion'; that they were not contented
with their present salaries 'based on the
volume of works, type of ship with hazardous
cargo and registered in a world wide trade':
that the 'officers and crew (were) not
interested in ITF membership if not actually
paid with ITF rate that their 'demand is only
50% increase based on present basic salary
and that the proposed wage increase is the
'best and only solution to solve ITF problem'
since the Company's salary rates 'especially
in tankers (are) very far in comparison with
other shipping agencies in Manila ...
In reply, the Company proposed a 25%
increase in the basic pay of the complainant
crew members, although it claimed, that it
would "suffer and absorb considerable
amount of losses." The proposal was
accepted by the Seamen with certain
conditions which were accepted by the
Company. Conformably with the agreement
of the parties which was effected through the
cables abovementioned, the Seamen were
paid their new salary rates.
Subsequently, the Company sought authority
from the NSB to cancel the contracts of
employment of the Seamen, claiming that its
principals had terminated their manning
agreement because of the actuations of the
Seamen. The request was granted by the
NSB Executive Director in a letter dated 10
April 1979. Soon thereafter, the Company
cabled the Seamen informing them that their
contracts would be terminated upon the
vessel's arrival in Japan. On 19 April 1979
they Arere asked to disembark from the
vessel, their contracts were terminated, and
they were repatriated to Manila. There is no
showing that the Seamen were given the
opportunity to at least comment on the
Company's request for the cancellation of
their contracts, although they had served only
 three (3) out of the twelve (12) months'
duration of their contracts.
The private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and non-payment of earned wages with the National Seamen
Board. The Vir-jen Shipping and Marine Services Inc. in turn
filed a complaint for breach of contract and recovery of excess
salaries and overtime pay against the private respondents. On
July 2, 1980, the NSB rendered a decision declaring that the
seamen breached their employment contracts when they
demanded and received from Vir-jen Shipping wages over and
above their contracted rates. The dismissal of the seamen was
declared legal and the seamen were ordered suspended.
The seamen appealed the decision to the NLRC which reversed
the decision of the NSB and required the petitioner to pay the
wages and other monetary benefits corresponding to the
unexpired portion of the manning contract on the ground that the
termination of the contract by the petitioner was without valid
cause. Vir-jen Shipping filed the present petition.
The private respondents submit the following issues in their
motion for reconsideration: têñ.£îhqwâ£
A. THIS HONORABLE COURT DID
VIOLENCE TO LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT HELD THAT
THE FINDING OF FACT OF THE NATIONAL
SEAMEN BOARD THAT THE SEAMEN
VIOLATED THEIR CONTRACTS IS MORE
CREDIBLE THAN THE FINDING OF FACT
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION THAT THE SEAMEN DID
NOT VIOLATE THEIR CONTRACT.
B. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT VIR-JEN'S HAVING
AGREED TO A 25% INCREASE OF THE
SEAMEN'S BASIC WAGE WAS NOT
VOLUNTARY BUT WAS DUE TO THREATS.
C. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED
WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE
ADDENDUM AGREEMENT; ASSUMING
THAT THE ADDENDUM AGREEMENT
COULD BE TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF, THIS
HONORABLE COURT ERRED WHEN' IT
FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
HAD VIOLATED THE SAME.
D, THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT FIND PETITIONER
VIRJEN LIABLE FOR HAVING
TERMINATED BEFORE EXPIRY DATE THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS, THERE BEING NO LEGAL
AND JUSTIFIABLE GROUND FOR SUCH
TERMINATION.
E. THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE PREPARATION BY
PETITIONER OF THE TWO PAYROLLS
AND THE EXECUTION OF THE SIDE
CONTRACT WERE NOT MADE IN BAD
FAITH.
F. THIS HONORABLE COURT
INADVERTENTLY DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
At the outset, we are faced with the question whether or not the
Court en banc should give due course to the motion for
reconsideration inspite of its having been denied twice by the
Court's Second Division. The case was referred to and accepted
by the Court en banc because of the movants' contention that
the decision in this case by the Second Division deviated from
Wallem Phil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of Labor (L-50734-37,
February 20, 1981), a First Division case with the same facts
and issues. We are constrained to answer the initial question in
the affirmative.
A fundamental postulate of Philippine Constitutional Law is the
fact, that there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions
all other courts are required to take their bearings. (Albert v.
Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948; Barrera v. Barrera, 34
SCRA 98; Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226). The
majority of the Court's work is now performed by its two
Divisions, but the Court remains one court, single, unitary,
complete, and supreme. Flowing from this nature of the
Supreme Court is the fact that, while ' individual Justices may
dissent or partially concur with one another, when the Court
states what the law is, it speaks with only one voice. And that
voice being authoritative should be a clear as possible.
Any doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court, whether
en banc or in Division, may be modified or reversed only by the
Court en banc. (Section 2(3), Article X, Constitution.) In the rare
instances when one Division disagrees in its views with the other
Division, or the necessary votes on an issue cannot be had in a
Division, the case is brought to the Court en banc to reconcile
any seeming conflict, to reverse or modify an earlier decision,
and to declare the Court's doctrine. This is what has happened
in this case.
The decision sought to be reconsidered appears to be a
deviation from the Court's decision, speaking through the First
Division, in Wallem Shipping, Inc. v. Hon. Minister of Labor (102
SCRA 835). Faced with two seemingly conflicting resolutions of
basically the same issue by its two Divisions, the Court.
therefore, resolved to transfer the case to the Court en banc.
Parenthetically, the petitioner's comment on the third motion for
reconsideration states that the resolution of the motion might be
the needed vehicle to make the ruling in the Wallem case clearer
and more in time with the underlying principles of the Labor
Code. We agree with the petitioner.
After an exhaustive, painstaking, and perspicacious
consideration of the motions for reconsideration and the
comments, replies, and other pleadings related thereto, the
Court en banc is constrained to grant the motions. To grant the
motion is to keep faith with the constitutional mandate to afford
protection to labor and to assure the rights of workers to self-
organization and to just and humane conditions of work. We
sustain the decision of the respondent National labor Relations
Commission.
There are various arguments raised by the petitioners but the
common thread running through all of them is the contention, if
not the dismal prophecy, that if the respondent seamen are
sustained by this Court, we would in effect "kill the en that lays
the golden egg." In other words, Filipino seamen, admittedly
among the best in the world, should remain satisfied with
relatively lower if not the lowest, international rates of
compensation, should not agitate for higher wages while their
contracts of employment are subsisting, should accept as
sacred, iron clad, and immutable the side contracts which
require them to falsely pretend to be members of international
labor federations, pretend to receive higher salaries at certain
foreign ports only to return the increased pay once the ship
leaves that port, should stifle not only their right to ask for
improved terms of employment but their freedom of speech and
expression, and should suffer instant termination of employment
at the slightest sign of dissatisfaction with no protection from
their Government and their courts. Otherwise, the petitioners
contend that Filipinos would no longer be accepted as seamen,
those employed would lose their jobs, and the still unemployed
would be left hopeless.
This is not the first time and it will not be the last where the threat
of unemployment and loss of jobs would be used to argue
against the interests of labor; where efforts by workingmen to
better their terms of employment would be characterized as
prejudicing the interests of labor as a whole.
In 1867 or one hundred sixteen years ago. Chief Justice Beasley
of the Supreme Court of New Jersey was ponente of the court's
opinion declaring as a conspiracy the threat of workingmen to
strike in connection with their efforts to promote unionism,
têñ.£îhqwâ£
It is difficult to believe that a right exists in law
which we can scarcely conceive can produce,
in any posture of affairs, other than injuriois
results. It is simply the right of workmen, by
concert of action, and by taking advantage of
their position, to control the business of
another, I am unwilling to hold that a right
which cannot, in any, event, be advantageous
to the employee, and which must always be
hurtful to the employer, exists in law. In my
opinion this indictment sufficiently shows that
the force of the confederates was brought to
bear upon their employer for the purpose of
oppression and mischief and that this
amounts to a conspiracy, (State v.
Donaldson, 32 NJL 151, 1867. Cited in
Chamberlain, Sourcebook on Labor, p. 13.
Emphasis supplied)
The same arguments have greeted every major advance in the
rights of the workingman. And they have invariably been proved
unfounded and false.
Unionism, employers' liability acts, minimum wages, workmen's
compensation, social security and collective bargaining to name
a few were all initially opposed by employers and even well
meaning leaders of government and society as "killing the hen
or goose which lays the golden eggs." The claims of workingmen
were described as outrageously injurious not only to the
employer but more so to the employees themselves before
these claims or demands were established by law and
jurisprudence as "rights" and before these were proved
beneficial to management, labor, and the nation as a whole
beyond reasonable doubt.
The case before us does not represent any major advance in
the rights of labor and the workingmen. The private respondents
merely sought rights already established. No matter how much
the petitioner-employer tries to present itself as speaking for the
entire industry, there is no evidence that it is typical of employers
hiring Filipino seamen or that it can speak for them.
The contention that manning industries in the Philippines would
not survive if the instant case is not decided in favor of the
petitioner is not supported by evidence. The Wallem case was
decided on February 20, 1981. There have been no severe
repercussions, no drying up of employment opportunities for
seamen, and none of the dire consequences repeatedly
emphasized by the petitioner. Why should Vir-jen be all
exception?
The wages of seamen engaged in international shipping are
shouldered by the foreign principal. The local manning office is
an agent whose primary function is recruitment and who .usually
gets a lump sum from the shipowner to defray the salaries of the
crew. The hiring of seamen and the determination of their
compensation is subject to the interplay of various market
factors and one key factor is how much in terms of profits the
local manning office and the foreign shipowner may realize after
the costs of the voyage are met. And costs include salaries of
officers and crew members.
Filipino seamen are admittedly as competent and reliable as
seamen from any other country in the world. Otherwise, there
would not be so many of them in the vessels sailing in every
ocean and sea on this globe. It is competence and reliability, not
cheap labor that makes our seamen so greatly in demand.
Filipino seamen have never demanded the same high salaries
as seamen from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan
and other developed nations. But certainly they are entitled to
government protection when they ask for fair and decent
treatment by their employer.-, and when they exercise the right
to petition for improved terms of employment, especially when
they feel that these are sub-standard or are capable of
improvement according to internationally accepted rules. In the
domestic scene, there are marginal employers who prepare two
sets of payrolls for their employees — one in keeping with
minimum wages and the other recording the sub-standard
wages that the employees really receive, The reliable
employers, however, not only meet the minimums required by
fair labor standards legislation but even go way above the
minimums while earning reasonable profits and prospering. The
same is true of international employment. There is no reason
why this Court and the Ministry of Labor and. Employment or its
agencies and commissions should come out with
pronouncements based on the standards and practices of
unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners, who claim they cannot
survive without resorting to tricky and deceptive schemes,
instead of Government maintaining labor law and jurisprudence
according to the practices of honorable, competent, and law-
abiding employers, domestic or foreign.
If any minor advantages given to Filipino seamen may somehow
cut into the profits of local manning agencies and foreign
shipowners, that is not sufficient reason why the NSB or the
ILRC should not stand by the former instead of listening to
unsubstantiated fears that they would be killing the hen which
lays the golden eggs.
Prescinding from the above, we now hold that neither the
National Seamen Board nor the National Labor Relations
Commission should, as a matter of official policy, legitimize and
enforce cubious arrangements where shipowners and seamen
enter into fictitious contracts similar to the addendum
agreements or side contracts in this case whose purpose is to
deceive. The Republic of the Philippines and its ministries and
agencies should present a more honorable and proper posture
in official acts to the whole world, notwithstanding our desire to
have as many job openings both here and abroad for our
workers. At the very least, such as sensitive matter involving no
less than our dignity as a people and the welfare of our
workingmen must proceed from the Batasang Pambansa in the
form of policy legislation, not from administrative rule making or
adjudication
Another issue raised by the movants is whether or not the
seamen violated their contracts of employment.
The form contracts approved by the National Seamen Board are
designed to protect Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners who
can take care of themselves. The standard forms embody' the
basic minimums which must be incorporated as parts of the
employment contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.) They are not
collective bargaining agreements or immutable contracts which
the parties cannot improve upon or modify in the course of the
agreed period of time. To state, therefore, that the affected
seamen cannot petition their employer for higher salaries during
the 12 months duration of the contract runs counter to
established principles of labor legislation. The National Labor
Relations Commission, as the appellate tribunal from decisions
of the National Seamen Board, correctly ruled that the seamen
did not violate their contracts to warrant their dismissal.
The respondent Commission ruled: têñ.£îhqwâ£
In the light of all the foregoing facts, we find
that the cable of the seamen proposing an
increase in their wage rates was not and could
not have been intended as a threat to comp el
the Company to accede to their proposals.
But even assuming, if only for the sake of
argument, that the demand or — proposal for
a wage increase was accompanied by a
threat that they would report to ITF if the
Company did not accede to the contract
revision - although there really was no such
threat as pointed out earlier — the Seamen
should not be held at fault for asking such a
demand. In the same case cited above, the
Supreme Court held: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Petitioner claims that the
dismissal of private
respondents was justified
because the latter
threatened the ship
authorities in acceding to
their demands, and this
constitutes serious
misconduct as
contemplated by the Labor
Code. This contention is
not well-taken. But even if
there had been such a
threat, respondents'
behavior should not be
censured because it is but
natural for them to employ
some means of pressing
their demands for
petitioner, the refusal to
abide with the terms of the
Special Agreement, to
honor and respect the
same, They were only
acting in the exercise of
their rights, and to deprive
them of their freedom of
expression is contrary to
law and public policy.
There is no serious
misconduct to speak of in
the case at bar which would
justify respondents'
dismissal just because of
their firmness in their
demand for the fulfillment
by petitioner of its
obligation it entered into
without any coercion,
specially on the part of
private respondents.
(Emphasis supplied).
The above citation is from Wallem.
The facts show that when the respondents boarded the M/T
Jannu there was no intention to send their ship to Australia. On
January 10, 1979, the petitioner sent a cable to respondent
shipmaster Bisula informing him of the procedure to be followed
in the computation of special compensation of crewmembers
while in ITF controlled ports and expressed regrets for not
having earlier clarified the procedure as it thought that the vessel
would trade in Carribean ports only.
On March 22, 1979, the petitioner sent another cable informing
Bisula of the special compensation when the ship would call at
Kwinana Australia.
The following day, shipmaster Bisula cabled Vir-jen stating that
the officers and crews were not interested in ITF membership if
not paid ITF rates and that their only demand was a 50 percent
increase based on their then salaries. Bisula also pointed out
that Vir-jen rates were "very far in comparison with other
shipping agencies in Manila."
In reply, Vir-jen counter proposed a 25 percent increase. Only
after Kyoei Tanker Co., Ltd., declined to increase the lumps sum
amount given monthly to Vir-jen was the decision to terminate
the respondents' employment formulated.
The facts show that Virjen Initiated the discussions which led to
the demand for increased . The seamen made a proposal and
the petitioner organized with a counter-proposal. The ship had
not vet gone to Australia or any ITF controlled port. There was
absolutely no mention of any strike. much less a threat to strike.
The seamen had done in act which under Philippine law or any
other civilized law would be termed illegal, oppressive, or
malicious. Whatever pressure existed, it was mild compared to
accepted valid modes of labor activity.
We reiterate our ruling in Wallem. têñ.£îhqwâ£
Petitioner claims that the
dismissal of private
respondents was justified
because the latter
threatened the ship
 authorities in acceding to
their demands, and this
constitutes serious
misconduct as
contemplated by the Labor
Code. This contention is
not well-taken. The records
fail to establish clearly the
commission of any threat,
But even if there had been
such a threat, respondents'
behavior should not be
censured because it is but
natural for them to employ
some means of pressing
their demands for
petitioner, who refused to
abide with the terms of the
Special Agreement, to
honor and respect the
same, They were only
acting in the exercise of
their rights, and to deprive
them of their form of
expression is contrary to
law and public policy. ...
Our dismissing the petition is premised on the assumption that
the Ministry of Labor and Employment and all its agencies exist
primarily for the workinginan's interests and, of course, the
nation as a whole. The points raised by the Solicitor-General in
his comments refer to the issue of allowing what the petitioner
importunes under the argument of "killing the hen which lays the
golden eggs." This is one of policy which should perhaps be
directed to the Batasang Pambansa and to our country's other
policy makers for more specific legislation on the matter, subject
to the constitutional provisions protecting labor, promoting social
justice, and guaranteeing non-abridgement of the freedom of
speech, press, peaceable assembly and petition. We agree with
the movants that there is no showing of any cause, which under
the Labor Code or any current applicable law, would warrant the
termination of the respondents' services before the expiration of
their contracts. The Constitution guarantees State assurance of
the rights of workers to security of tenure. (Sec. 9, Article II,
Constitution). Presumptions and provisions of law, the evidence
on record, and fundamental State policy all dictate that the
motions for reconsideration should be granted.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are hereby
GRANTED. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Fernando, C.J., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and
Relova, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
Being the ponente of the Wallem case, upon whose ruling the
decision of the Court en banc in this case is mainly made to rest,
at least insofar as said Court now finds that the respondent
seamen have not committed any misconduct which would
constitute a just cause for the termination of their services just
after three months of the 12-month term of their contract, a brief
explanation why I voted in the Second Division in favor of the
petitioner company in the instant case, and not the respondent
seamen, as I did in the Wallem case, is obviously called for.
During our deliberations in the Division, it was made clear that
in the instant case,' threat was employed by the seamen against
the company or shipowners to obtain consent to the 50% raise
of wages as proposed by the seamen upon being informed that
they would touch on ITF-controlled ports. I joined my colleagues
in the Second Division in concurring in the decision penned by
Justice Barredo, now retired, in the belief that threat was indeed
committed, constituting a just cause for termination of the
services of the seamen with still nine months to go of their 12-
month contract with the petitioner. As the facts are more
thoroughly and accurately presented and discussed in the
decision so brilliantly written by Justice Gutierrez, I am
persuaded that on the basis of the ruling of the Wallem case, a
mistake was committed in finding the existence of a just cause
for the instant and unexpected termination of the services of the
seamen.
The facts of this case show that to the proposal of the seamen
for a 50% increase, made because they were informed that they
would touch on ITF-controlled ports, the company countered
with an offer of only 25% raised The proposal of 5% was much
lower than the rates which the ITF would surely force upon the
company When the company made a counter proposal of 25%
raise the seamen accepted. The trip went on smoothly until upon
arriving at a port which afforded haven and safety to the
shipowner, the latter suddenly, and with imperious finality,
terminated the services of the seamen and repatriated them to
Manila. These are the simple facts that call for the application of
the law, mainly the provisions of the Labor Code. That law is
none other than what is indicated in how the Walem case was
decided — in vindication of how the Seamen were given a raw
deal in being lulled into a false sense of security in their
employment contract only to be rudely terminated and ordered
repatriated.
In the Wallem case, the seamen pressed their demand for the
enforcement of a special agreement entered into by the
shipowner or company with the ITF. For this act, their services
were terminated and they were repatriated by their employer
shipping company. What the First Division said in favor of the
seamen, is in my opinion, the correct ruling which We should
reaffirm in the instant case. Thus — têñ.£îhqwâ£
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private
respondent was justified because the latter
threatened the ship authorities in acceding to
their demands, and this constitutes serious
misconduct as contemplated by the Labor
Code. This contention is not welltaken. But
even en if there had been such a threat,
respondents' behavior should not be
censured because it is but natural for them to
employ some means of pressing their
demands on petitioner, who refused to abide
with the terms of the Special Agreement, to
 honor and respect the same. They were only
acting in the exercise of their rights, and to
deprive them of their freedom of expression is
contrary to law and public policy. There is no
serious misconduct to speak of in the case at
bar which would justify respondents' dismissal
just because of their firmness in their demand
for the fulfillment by petitioner of its obligation
it entered into without any coercion, specially
on the part of private respondents. (Emphasis
supplied).
This above ruling is the law on the matter and, in my opinion.
controlling on the case at bar. Whatever policy may prove more
beneficial to the cause of labor in general, as is sought to be
offered as argument in support of the Second Division decision,
is not a proper ground for making said policy prevail over the
applicable law or jurisprudence, Questions of policy are better
left to the Batasan Pambansa. We should confine ourselves to
applying the law as it is. In so doing, We are not allowed to apply
it to suit, or to respond to, the demands of what We may deem
the better policy than what the law clearly intends. The policy is
the law, and the law is the policy. We might be treading on
forbidden ground to bend the law to what We perceive to be a
desirable policy.
Courts are called upon only to apply the law. Does the law permit
the termination of the services of the seamen in violation of their
contract except only upon a just cause? This is the only question
to be answered in this case. The answer is given with eloquent
persuasiveness in the decision in which I concur
wholeheartedly.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, ,Concepcion, Jr. and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
Being the ponente of the Wallem case, upon whose ruling the
decision of the Court en banc in this case is mainly made to rest,
at least insofar as said Court now finds that the respondent
seamen have not committed any misconduct which would
constitute a just cause for the termination of their services just
after three months of the 12-month term of their contract, a brief
explanation why I voted in the Second Division in favor of the
petitioner company in the instant case, and not the respondent
seamen, as I did in the Wallem case, is obviously called for.
During our deliberations in the Division, it was made clear that
in the instant case,' threat was employed by the seamen against
the company or shipowners to obtain consent to the 50% raise
of wages as proposed by the seamen upon being informed that
they would touch on ITF-controlled ports. I joined my colleagues
in the Second Division in concurring in the decision penned by
Justice Barredo, now retired, in the belief that threat was indeed
committed, constituting a just cause for termination of the
services of the seamen with still nine months to go of their 12-
month contract with the petitioner. As the facts are more
thoroughly and accurately presented and discussed in the
decision so brilliantly written by Justice Gutierrez, I am
persuaded that on the basis of the ruling of the Wallem case, a
mistake was committed in finding the existence of a just cause
for the instant and unexpected termination of the services of the
seamen.
The facts of this case show that to the proposal of the seamen
for a 50% increase, made because they were informed that they
would touch on ITF-controlled ports, the company countered
with an offer of only 25% raised The proposal of 5% was much
lower than the rates which the ITF would surely force upon the
company When the company made a counter proposal of 25%
raise the seamen accepted. The trip went on smoothly until upon
arriving at a port which afforded haven and safety to the
shipowner, the latter suddenly, and with imperious finality,
terminated the services of the seamen and repatriated them to
Manila. These are the simple facts that call for the application of
the law, mainly the provisions of the Labor Code. That law is
none other than what is indicated in how the Walem case was
decided — in vindication of how the Seamen were given a raw
deal in being lulled into a false sense of security in their
employment contract only to be rudely terminated and ordered
repatriated.
In the Wallem case, the seamen pressed their demand for the
enforcement of a special agreement entered into by the
shipowner or company with the ITF. For this act, their services
were terminated and they were repatriated by their employer
shipping company. What the First Division said in favor of the
seamen, is in my opinion, the correct ruling which We should
reaffirm in the instant case. Thus — têñ.£îhqwâ£
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private
respondent was justified because the latter
threatened the ship authorities in acceding to
their demands, and this constitutes serious
misconduct as contemplated by the Labor
Code. This contention is not welltaken. But
even en if there had been such a threat,
respondents' behavior should not be
censured because it is but natural for them to
employ some means of pressing their
demands on petitioner, who refused to abide
with the terms of the Special Agreement, to
honor and respect the same. They were only
acting in the exercise of their rights, and to
deprive them of their freedom of expression is
contrary to law and public policy. There is no
serious misconduct to speak of in the case at
bar which would justify respondents' dismissal
just because of their firmness in their demand
for the fulfillment by petitioner of its obligation
it entered into without any coercion, specially
on the part of private respondents. (Emphasis
supplied).
This above ruling is the law on the matter and, in my opinion.
controlling on the case at bar. Whatever policy may prove more
beneficial to the cause of labor in general, as is sought to be
offered as argument in support of the Second Division decision,
is not a proper ground for making said policy prevail over the
applicable law or jurisprudence, Questions of policy are better
left to the Batasan Pambansa. We should confine ourselves to
applying the law as it is. In so doing, We are not allowed to apply
it to suit, or to respond to, the demands of what We may deem
the better policy than what the law clearly intends. The policy is
the law, and the law is the policy. We might be treading on
forbidden ground to bend the law to what We perceive to be a
desirable policy.
Courts are called upon only to apply the law. Does the law permit
the termination of the services of the seamen in violation of their
contract except only upon a just cause? This is the only question
to be answered in this case. The answer is given with eloquent
persuasiveness in the decision in which I concur
wholeheartedly.
Separate Opinions
DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
Being the ponente of the Wallem case, upon whose ruling the
decision of the Court en banc in this case is mainly made to rest,
at least insofar as said Court now finds that the respondent
seamen have not committed any misconduct which would
constitute a just cause for the termination of their services just
after three months of the 12-month term of their contract, a brief
explanation why I voted in the Second Division in favor of the
petitioner company in the instant case, and not the respondent
seamen, as I did in the Wallem case, is obviously called for.
During our deliberations in the Division, it was made clear that
in the instant case,' threat was employed by the seamen against
the company or shipowners to obtain consent to the 50% raise
of wages as proposed by the seamen upon being informed that
they would touch on ITF-controlled ports. I joined my colleagues
in the Second Division in concurring in the decision penned by
Justice Barredo, now retired, in the belief that threat was indeed
committed, constituting a just cause for termination of the
services of the seamen with still nine months to go of their 12-
month contract with the petitioner. As the facts are more
thoroughly and accurately presented and discussed in the
decision so brilliantly written by Justice Gutierrez, I am
persuaded that on the basis of the ruling of the Wallem case, a
mistake was committed in finding the existence of a just cause
for the instant and unexpected termination of the services of the
seamen.
The facts of this case show that to the proposal of the seamen
for a 50% increase, made because they were informed that they
would touch on ITF-controlled ports, the company countered
with an offer of only 25% raised The proposal of 5% was much
lower than the rates which the ITF would surely force upon the
company When the company made a counter proposal of 25%
raise the seamen accepted. The trip went on smoothly until upon
arriving at a port which afforded haven and safety to the
shipowner, the latter suddenly, and with imperious finality,
terminated the services of the seamen and repatriated them to
Manila. These are the simple facts that call for the application of
the law, mainly the provisions of the Labor Code. That law is
none other than what is indicated in how the Walem case was
decided — in vindication of how the Seamen were given a raw
deal in being lulled into a false sense of security in their
employment contract only to be rudely terminated and ordered
repatriated.
In the Wallem case, the seamen pressed their demand for the
enforcement of a special agreement entered into by the
shipowner or company with the ITF. For this act, their services
were terminated and they were repatriated by their employer
shipping company. What the First Division said in favor of the
seamen, is in my opinion, the correct ruling which We should
reaffirm in the instant case. Thus — têñ.£îhqwâ£
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private
respondent was justified because the latter
threatened the ship authorities in acceding to
their demands, and this constitutes serious
misconduct as contemplated by the Labor
Code. This contention is not welltaken. But
even en if there had been such a threat,
respondents' behavior should not be
censured because it is but natural for them to
employ some means of pressing their
demands on petitioner, who refused to abide
with the terms of the Special Agreement, to
honor and respect the same. They were only
acting in the exercise of their rights, and to
deprive them of their freedom of expression is
contrary to law and public policy. There is no
serious misconduct to speak of in the case at
bar which would justify respondents' dismissal
just because of their firmness in their demand
for the fulfillment by petitioner of its obligation
it entered into without any coercion, specially
on the part of private respondents. (Emphasis
supplied).
This above ruling is the law on the matter and, in my opinion.
controlling on the case at bar. Whatever policy may prove more
beneficial to the cause of labor in general, as is sought to be
offered as argument in support of the Second Division decision,
is not a proper ground for making said policy prevail over the
applicable law or jurisprudence, Questions of policy are better
left to the Batasan Pambansa. We should confine ourselves to
applying the law as it is. In so doing, We are not allowed to apply
it to suit, or to respond to, the demands of what We may deem
the better policy than what the law clearly intends. The policy is
the law, and the law is the policy. We might be treading on
forbidden ground to bend the law to what We perceive to be a
desirable policy.
Courts are called upon only to apply the law. Does the law permit
the termination of the services of the seamen in violation of their
contract except only upon a just cause? This is the only question
to be answered in this case. The answer is given with eloquent
persuasiveness in the decision in which I concur
wholeheartedly.
G.R. Nos. L-57999, 58143-53 August 15, 1989
RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL,
ANGELITO MENDOZA, ANTONIO TANEDO, AMORSOLO
CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS, ISIDRO BRACIA,
RAMON DE BELEN, ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN
MALABANAN, ROMEO HUERTO and VITALIANO PANGUE,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO and
MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC., respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-64781-99 August 15, 1989
RESURRECCION SUZARA, CESAR DIMAANDAL,
ANGELITO MENDOZA, ANTONIO TANEDO, RAYMUNDO
PEREZ, AMORSOLO CABRERA, DOMINADOR SANTOS,
ISIDRO BRACIA, CATALINO CASICA, VITALIANO PANGUE,
RAMON DE BELEN, EDUARDO PAGTALUNAN, ANTONIO
MIRANDA, RAMON UNIANA, ERNESTO SABADO, MARTIN
MALABANAN, ROMEO HUERTO and WILFREDO
CRISTOBAL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD (now the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration), and
MAGSAYSAY LINES, INC., respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peñ;a and Nolasco for petitioners.
Samson S. Alcantara for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These petitions ask for a re-examination of this Court's
precedent — setting decision in Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine
Services Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.
(125 SCRA 577 [1983]). On constitutional, statutory, and factual
grounds, we find no reason to disturb the doctrine in Vir-Jen
Shipping and to turn back the clock of progress for sea-based
overseas workers. The experience gained in the past few years
shows that, following said doctrine, we should neither deny nor
diminish the enjoyment by Filipino seamen of the same rights
and freedoms taken for granted by other working-men here and
abroad.
The cases at bar involve a group of Filipino seamen who were
declared by the defunct National Seamen Board (NSB) guilty of
breaching their employment contracts with the private
respondent because they demanded, upon the intervention and
assistance of a third party, the International Transport Worker's
Federation (ITF), the payment of wages over and above their
contracted rates without the approval of the NSB. The
petitioners were ordered to reimburse the total amount of
US$91,348.44 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency
representing the said over-payments and to be suspended from
the NSB registry for a period of three years. The National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision of the NSB.
In a corollary development, the private respondent, for failure of
the petitioners to return the overpayments made to them upon
demand by the former, filed estafa charges against some of the
petitioners. The criminal cases were eventually consolidated in
the sala of then respondent Judge Alfredo Benipayo. Hence,
these consolidated petitions, G.R. No. 64781-99 and G.R. Nos.
57999 and 58143-53, which respectively pray for the nullification
of the decisions of the NLRC and the NSB, and the dismissal of
the criminal cases against the petitioners.
The facts are found in the questioned decision of the NSB in
G.R. No. 64781-99.
From the records of this case it appears that
the facts established and/or admitted by the
parties are the following: that on different
dates in 1977 and 1978 respondents entered
into separate contracts of employment (Exhs.
"B" to "B-17", inclusive) with complainant
(private respondent) to work aboard vessels
owned/operated/manned by the latter for a
period of 12 calendar months and with
different rating/position, salary, overtime pay
and allowance, hereinbelow specified: ...; that
aforesaid employment contracts were verified
and approved by this Board; that on different
dates in April 1978 respondents (petitioners)
joined the M/V "GRACE RIVER"; that on or
about October 30, 1978 aforesaid vessel, with
the respondents on board, arrived at the port
of Vancouver, Canada; that at this port
respondent received additional wages under
rates prescribed by the Intemational
Transport Worker's Federation (ITF) in the
total amount of US$98,261.70; that the
respondents received the amounts appearing
opposite their names, to wit: ...; that aforesaid
amounts were over and above the rates of
pay of respondents as appearing in their
employment contracts approved by this
Board; that on November 10, 1978, aforesaid
vessel, with respondent on board, left
Vancouver, Canada for Yokohama, Japan;
that on December 14, 1978, while aforesaid
vessel, was at Yura, Japan, they were made
to disembark. (pp. 64-66, Rollo)
Furthermore, according to the petitioners, while the vessel was
docked at Nagoya, Japan, a certain Atty. Oscar Torres of the
NSB Legal Department boarded the vessel and called a meeting
of the seamen including the petitioners, telling them that for their
own good and safety they should sign an agreement prepared
by him on board the vessel and that if they do, the cases filed
against them with NSB on November 17, 1978 would be
dismissed. Thus, the petitioners signed the. "Agreement" dated
December 5, 1978. (Annex C of Petition) However, when they
were later furnished xerox copies of what they had signed, they
noticed that the line "which amount(s) was/were received and
held by CREWMEMBERS in trust for SHIPOWNERS" was
inserted therein, thereby making it appear that the amounts
given to the petitioners representing the increase in their wages
based on ITF rates were only received by them in trust for the
private respondent.
When the vessel reached Manila, the private respondent
demanded from the petitioners the "overpayments" made to
them in Canada. As the petitioners refused to give back the said
amounts, charges were filed against some of them with the NSB
and the Professional Regulations Commission. Estafa charges
were also filed before different branches of the then Court of
First Instance of Manila which, as earlier stated, were
subsequently consolidated in the sala of the respondent Judge
Alfredo Benipayo and which eventually led to G.R. Nos. 57999
and 58143-53.
In G.R. Nos. 64781-99, the petitioners claimed before the NSB
that contrary to the private respondent's allegations, they did not
commit any illegal act nor stage a strike while they were on
board the vessel; that the "Special Agreement" entered into in
Vancouver to pay their salary differentials is valid, having been
executed after peaceful negotiations. Petitioners further argued
that the amounts they received were in accordance with the
provision of law, citing among others, Section 18, Rule VI, Book
I of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code
which provides that "the basic minimum salary of seamen shall
not be less than the prevailing minimum rates established by the
International Labor Organization (ILO) or those prevailing in the
country whose flag the employing vessel carries, whichever is
higher ..."; and that the "Agreement" executed in Nagoya, Japan
had been forced upon them and that intercalations were made
to make it appear that they were merely trustees of the amounts
they received in Vancouver.
On the other hand, the private respondent alleged that the
petitioners breached their employment contracts when they,
acting in concert and with the active participations of the ITF
while the vessel was in Vancouver, staged an illegal strike and
by means of threats, coercion and intimidation compelled the
owners of the vessel to pay to them various sums totalling
US$104,244.35; that the respondent entered into the "Special
Agreement" to pay the petitioners' wage differentials because it
was under duress as the vessel would not be allowed to leave
Vancouver unless the said agreement was signed, and to
prevent the shipowner from incurring further delay in the
shipment of goods; and that in view of petitioners' breach of
contract, the latter's names must be removed from the NSB's
Registry and that they should be ordered to return the amounts
they received over and above their contracted rates.
The respondent NSB ruled that the petitioners were guilty of
breach of contract because despite subsisting and valid NSB-
approved employment contracts, the petitioners sought the
assistance of a third party (ITF) to demand from the private
respondent wages in accordance with the ITF rates, which rates
are over and above their rates of pay as appearing in their NSB-
approved contracts. As bases for this conclusion, the NSB
stated:
1) The fact that respondents sought the aid of
a third party (ITF) and demanded for wages
and overtime pay based on ITF rates is shown
in the entries of their respective Pay-Off
Clearance Slips which were marked as their
Exhs. "1" to "18", and we quote "DEMANDED
ITF WAGES, OVERTIME, DIFFERENTIALS
APRIL TO OCTOBER 1978". Respondent
Suzara admitted that the entries in his Pay-Off
Clearance Slip (Exh. "1") are correct (TSN., p.
16, Dec. 6, 1979).lâwphî1.ñèt Moreover, it is
the policy (reiterated very often) by the ITF
that it does not interfere in the affairs of the
crewmembers and masters and/or owners of
a vessel unless its assistance is sought by the
crewmembers themselves. Under this
pronounced policy of the ITF, it is reasonable
to assume that the representatives of the ITF
in Vancouver, Canada assisted and
intervened by reason of the assistance sought
by the latter.
2) The fact that the ITF assisted and
intervened for and in behalf of the
respondents in the latter's demand for higher
wages could be gleaned from the answer of
the respondents when they admitted that the
ITF acted in their behalf in the negotiations for
increase of wages. Moreover, respondent
Cesar Dimaandal admitted that the ITF
differential pay was computed by the ITF
representative (TSN, p. 7, Dec. 12, 1979)
3) The fact that complainant and the
owner/operator of the vessel were compelled
to sign the Special Agreement (Exh. "20") and
to pay ITF differentials to respondents in order
not to delay the departure of the vessel and to
prevent further losses is shown in the
"Agreement" (Exhs. "R-21") ... (pp. 69-70,
Rollo)
The NSB further said:
While the Board recognizes the rights of the
respondents to demand for higher wages,
provided the means are peaceful and legal, it
could not, however, sanction the same if the
means employed are violent and illegal. In the
case at bar, the means employed are violent
and illegal for in demanding higher wages the
respondents sought the aid of a third party
and in turn the latter intervened in their behalf
and prohibited the vessel from sailing unless
the owner and/or operator of the vessel
acceded to respondents' demand for higher
wages. To avoid suffering further incalculable
losses, the owner and/or operator of the
vessel had no altemative but to pay
respondents' wages in accordance with the
ITF scale. The Board condemns the act of a
party who enters into a contract and with the
use of force/or intimidation causes the other
party to modify said contract. If the
respondents believe that they have a valid
ground to demand from the complainant a
revision of the terms of their contracts, the
same should have been done in accordance
with law and not thru illegal means. (at p. 72,
Rollo).
Although the respondent NSB found that the petitioners were
entitled to the payment of earned wages and overtime
pay/allowance from November 1, 1978 to December 14, 1978,
it nevertheless ruled that the computation should be based on
the rates of pay as appearing in the petitioners' NSB-approved
contracts. It ordered that the amounts to which the petitioners
are entitled under the said computation should be deducted from
the amounts that the petitioners must return to the private
respondent.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the NSB's findings. Hence, the
petition in G.R. Nos. 64781-99.
Meanwhile, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 57999 and 58143-53
moved to quash the criminal cases of estafa filed against them
on the ground that the alleged crimes were committed, if at all,
in Vancouver, Canada and, therefore, Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction. The respondent judge denied the motion. Hence,
the second petition.
The principal issue in these consolidated petitions is whether or
not the petitioners are entitled to the amounts they received from
the private respondent representing additional wages as
determined in the special agreement. If they are, then the
decision of the NLRC and NSB must be reversed. Similarly, the
criminal cases of estafa must be dismissed because it follows
as a consequence that the amounts received by the petitioners
belong to them and not to the private respondent.
In arriving at the questioned decision, the NSB ruled that the
petitioners are not entitled to the wage differentials as
determined by the ITF because the means employed by them in
obtaining the same were violent and illegal and because in
demanding higher wages the petitioners sought the aid of a third
party, which, in turn, intervened in their behalf and prohibited the
vessel from sailing unless the owner and/or operator of the
vessel acceded to respondents' demand for higher wages. And
as proof of this conclusion, the NSB cited the following: (a) the
entries in the petitioners Pay-Off Clearance Slip which contained
the phrase "DEMANDED ITF WAGES ..."; (b) the alleged policy
of the ITF in not interfering with crewmembers of a vessel unless
its intervention is sought by the crewmembers themselves; (c),
the petitioners' admission that ITF acted in their behalf; and (d)
the fact that the private respondent was compelled to sign the
special agreement at Vancouver, Canada.
There is nothing in the public and private respondents'
pleadings, to support the allegations that the petitioners used
force and violence to secure the special agreement signed in
Vancouver. British Columbia. There was no need for any form
of intimidation coming from the Filipino seamen because the
Canadian Brotherhood of Railways and Transport Workers
(CBRT), a strong Canadian labor union, backed by an
international labor federation was actually doing all the
influencing not only on the ship-owners and employers but also
against third world seamen themselves who, by receiving lower
wages and cheaper accommodations, were threatening the
employment and livelihood of seamen from developed nations.
The bases used by the respondent NSB to support its decision
do not prove that the petitioners initiated a conspiracy with the
ITF or deliberately sought its assistance in order to receive
higher wages. They only prove that when ITF acted in
petitioners' behalf for an increase in wages, the latter manifested
their support. This would be a logical and natural reaction for any
worker in whose benefit the ITF or any other labor group had
intervened. The petitioners admit that while they expressed their
conformity to and their sentiments for higher wages by means of
placards, they, nevertheless, continued working and going about
their usual chores. In other words, all they did was to exercise
their freedom of speech in a most peaceful way. The ITF people,
in turn, did not employ any violent means to force the private
respondent to accede to their demands. Instead, they simply
applied effective pressure when they intimated the possibility of
interdiction should the shipowner fail to heed the call for an
upward adjustment of the rates of the Filipino seamen.
Interdiction is nothing more than a refusal of ITF members to
render service for the ship, such as to load or unload its cargo,
to provision it or to perform such other chores ordinarily incident
to the docking of the ship at a certain port. It was the fear of ITF
interdiction, not any action taken by the seamen on board the
vessel which led the shipowners to yield.
The NSB's contusion that it is ITF's policy not to intervene with
the plight of crewmembers of a vessel unless its intervention
was sought is without basis. This Court is cognizant of the fact
that during the period covered by the labor controversies in
Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Minister of Labor (102
SCRA 835 [1981]; Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine Services, Inc. v.
NLRC (supra) and these consolidated petitions, the ITF was
militant worldwide especially in Canada, Australia, Scandinavia,
and various European countries, interdicting foreign vessels and
demanding wage increases for third world seamen. There was
no need for Filipino or other seamen to seek ITF intervention.
The ITF was waiting on its own volition in all Canadian ports, not
particularly for the petitioners' vessel but for all ships similarly
situated. As earlier stated, the ITF was not really acting for the
petitioners out of pure altruism. The ITF was merely protecting
the interests of its own members. The petitioners happened to
be pawns in a higher and broader struggle between the ITF on
one hand and shipowners and third world seamen, on the other.
To subject our seamen to criminal prosecution and punishment
for having been caught in such a struggle is out of the question.
As stated in Vir-Jen Shipping (supra):
The seamen had done no act which under
Philippine law or any other civilized law would
be termed illegal, oppressive, or malicious.
Whatever pressure existed, it was mild
compared to accepted and valid modes of
labor activity. (at page 591)
Given these factual situations, therefore, we cannot affirm the
NSB and NLRC's finding that there was violence, physical or
otherwise employed by the petitioners in demanding for
additional wages. The fact that the petitioners placed placards
on the gangway of their ship to show support for ITF's demands
for wage differentials for their own benefit and the resulting ITF's
threatened interdiction do not constitute violence. The
petitioners were exercising their freedom of speech and
expressing sentiments in their hearts when they placed the
placard We Want ITF Rates." Under the facts and circumstances
of these petitions, we see no reason to deprive the seamen of
their right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the Philippine
Constitution and the fundamental law of Canada where they
happened to exercise it.
As we have ruled in Wallem Phil. Shipping Inc. v. Minister of
Labor, et al. supra:
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of private
respondents was justified because the latter
threatened the ship authorities in acceding to
their demands, and this constitutes serious
misconduct as contemplated by the Labor
Code. This contention is now well-taken. The
records fail to establish clearly the
commission of any threat. But even if there
had been such a threat, respondents'
behavior should not be censured because it is
but natural for them to employ some means of
pressing their demands for petitioner, who
refused to abide with the terms of the Special
Agreement, to honor and respect the same.
They were only acting in the exercise of their
rights, and to deprive them of their freedom of
expression is contrary to law and public
policy. ... (at page 843)
We likewise, find the public respondents' conclusions that the
acts of the petitioners in demanding and receiving wages over
and above the rates appearing in their NSB-approved contracts
is in effect an alteration of their valid and subsisting contracts
because the same were not obtained through. mutual consent
and without the prior approval of the NSB to be without basis,
not only because the private respondent's consent to pay
additional wages was not vitiated by any violence or intimidation
on the part of the petitioners but because the said NSB-
approved form contracts are not unalterable contracts that can
have no room for improvement during their effectivity or which
ban any amendments during their term.
For one thing, the employer can always improve the working
conditions without violating any law or stipulation.
We stated in the Vir-Jen case (supra) that:
 The form contracts approved by the National
Seamen Board are designed to protect
Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners who
can take care of themselves. The standard
forms embody the basic minimums which
must be incorporated as parts of the
employment contract. (Section 15, Rule V,
Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code).lâwphî1.ñèt They are not
collective bargaining agreements or
immutable contracts which the parties cannot
improve upon or modify in the course of the
agreed period of time. To state, therefore, that
the affected seamen cannot petition their
employer for higher salaries during the 12
months duration of the contract runs counter
to estabhshed principles of labor legislation.
The National Labor Relations Commission, as
the appellate tribunal from the decisions of the
National Seamen Board, correctly ruled that
the seamen did not violate their contracts to
warrant their dismissal. (at page 589)
It is impractical for the NSB to require the petitioners, caught in
the middle of a labor struggle between the ITF and owners of
ocean going vessels halfway around the world in Vancouver,
British Columbia to first secure the approval of the NSB in Manila
before signing an agreement which the employer was willing to
sign. It is also totally unrealistic to expect the petitioners while in
Canada to exhibit the will and strength to oppose the ITF's
demand for an increase in their wages, assuming they were so
minded.
An examination of Annex C of the petition, the agreement signed
in Japan by the crewmembers of the M/V Grace River and a
certain M. Tabei, representative of the Japanese shipowner
lends credence to the petitioners' claim that the clause "which
amount(s) was received and held by CREWMEMBERS in trust
for SHIPOWNER" was an intercalation added after the
execution of the agreement. The clause appears too closely
typed below the names of the 19 crewmen and their wages with
no similar intervening space as that which appears between all
the paragraphs and the triple space which appears between the
list of crewmembers and their wages on one hand and the
paragraph above which introduces the list, on the other. The
verb "were" was also inserted above the verb "was" to make the
clause grammatically correct but the insertion of "were" is
already on the same line as "Antonio Miranda and 5,221.06"
where it clearly does not belong. There is no other space where
the word "were" could be intercalated. (See Rollo, page 80).
At any rate, the proposition that the petitioners should have
pretended to accept the increased wages while in Vancouver but
returned them to the shipowner when they reached its country,
Japan, has already been answered earlier by the Court:
Filipino seamen are admittedly as competent
and reliable as seamen from any other
country in the world. Otherwise, there would
not be so many of them in the vessels sailing
in every ocean and sea on this globe. It is
competence and reliability, not cheap labor
that makes our seamen so greatly in demand.
Filipino seamen have never demanded the
same high salaries as seamen from the
United States, the United Kingdom, Japan
and other developed nations. But certainly
they are entitled to government protection
when they ask for fair and decent treatment
by their employer and when they exercise the
right to petition for improved terms of
employment, especially when they feel that
these are sub-standard or are capable of
improvement according to internationally
accepted rules. In the domestic scene, there
are marginal employers who prepare two sets
of payrolls for their employees — one in
keeping with minimum wages and the other
recording the sub-standard wages that the
employees really receive. The reliable
employers, however, not only meet the
minimums required by fair labor standards
legislation but even go away above the
minimums while earning reasonable profits
and prospering. The same is true of
international employment. There is no reason
why this court and the Ministry of Labor and
Employment or its agencies and commissions
should come out with pronouncements based
on the standards and practices of
unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners, who
claim they cannot survive without resorting to
tricky and deceptive schemes, instead of
Government maintaining labor law and
jurisprudence according to the practices of
honorable, competent, and law-abiding
employers, domestic or foreign. (Vir-Jen
Shipping, supra, pp. 587-588)
It is noteworthy to emphasize that while the Intemational Labor
Organization (ILO) set the minimum basic wage of able seamen
at US$187.00 as early as October 1976, it was only in 1979 that
the respondent NSB issued Memo Circular No. 45, enjoining all
shipping companies to adopt the said minimum basic wage. It
was correct for the respondent NSB to state in its decision that
when the petitioners entered into separate contracts between
1977-1978, the monthly minimum basic wage for able seamen
ordered by NSB was still fixed at US$130.00. However, it is not
the fault of the petitioners that the NSB not only violated the
Labor Code which created it and the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code but also seeks to punish the
seamen for a shortcoming of NSB itself.
Article 21(c) of the Labor Code, when it created the NSB,
mandated the Board to "(O)btain the best possible terms and
conditions of employment for seamen."
Section 15, Rule V of Book I of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code provides:
Sec. 15. Model contract of employment. —
The NSB shall devise a model contract of
employment which shall embody all the
requirements of pertinent labor and social
legislations and the prevailing standards set
by applicable International Labor
Organization Conventions. The model
contract shall set the minimum standards of
the terms and conditions to govern the
employment of Filipinos on board vessels
engaged in overseas trade. All employers of
Filipinos shall adopt the model contract in
connection with the hiring and engagement of
the services of Filipino seafarers, and in no
case shall a shipboard employment contract
be allowed where the same provides for
 benefits less than those enumerated in the
model employment contract, or in any way
conflicts with any other provisions embodied
in the model contract.
Section 18 of Rule VI of the same Rules and Regulations
provides:
Sec. 18. Basic minimum salary of able-
seamen. — The basic minimum salary of
seamen shall be not less than the prevailing
minimxun rates established by the
International Labor Organization or those
prevailing in the country whose flag the
employing vessel carries, whichever is higher.
However, this provision shall not apply if any
shipping company pays its crew members
salaries above the minimum herein provided.
Section 8, Rule X, Book I of the Omnibus Rules provides:
Section 8. Use of standard format of service
agreement. — The Board shall adopt a
standard format of service agreement in
accordance with pertinent labor and social
legislation and prevailing standards set by
applicable International Labor Organization
Conventions. The standard format shall set
the minimum standard of the terms and
conditions to govern the employment of
Filipino seafarers but in no case shall a
shipboard employment contract (sic), or in
any way conflict with any other provision
embodied in the standard format.
It took three years for the NSB to implement requirements which,
under the law, they were obliged to follow and execute
immediately. During those three years, the incident in
Vancouver happened. The terms and conditions agreed upon in
Vancouver were well within ILO rates even if they were above
NSB standards at the time.
The sanctions applied by NSB and affirmed by NLRC are
moreover not in keeping with the basic premise that this Court
stressed in the Vir-Jen Shipping case (supra) that the Ministry
now the Department of Labor and Employment and all its
agencies exist primarily for the workingman's interest and the
nation's as a whole.
Implicit in these petitions and the only reason for the NSB to take
the side of foreign shipowners against Filipino seamen is the
"killing the goose which lays the golden eggs" argument. We
reiterate the ruling of the Court in Vir-Jen Shipping (supra)
There are various arguments raised by the
petitioners but the common thread running
through all of them is the contention, if not the
dismal prophecy, that if the respondent
seamen are sustained by this Court, we would
in effect "kill the hen that lays the golden egg."
In other words, Filipino seamen, admittedly
among the best in the world, should remain
satisfied with relatively lower if not the lowest,
international rates of compensation, should
not agitate for higher wages while their
contracts of employment are subsisting,
should accept as sacred, iron clad, and
immutable the side contracts which require:
them to falsely pretend to be members of
international labor federations, pretend to
receive higher salaries at certain foreign ports
only to return the increased pay once the ship
leaves that port, should stifle not only their
right to ask for improved terms of employment
but their freedom of speech and expression,
and should suffer instant termination of
employment at the slightest sign of
dissatisfaction with no protection from their
Government and their courts. Otherwise, the
petitioners contend that Filipinos would no
longer be accepted as seamen, those
employed would lose their jobs, and the still
unemployed would be left hopeless.
This is not the first time and it will not be the last where the threat
of unemployment and loss of jobs would be used to argue
against the interests of labor; where efforts by workingmen to
better their terms of employment would be characterized as
prejudicing the interests of labor as a whole.
xxx xxx xxx
Unionism, employers' liability acts, minimum
wages, workmen's compensation, social
security and collective bargaining to name a
few were all initially opposed by employers
and even well meaning leaders of
government and society as "killing the hen or
goose which lays the golden eggs." The
claims of workingmen were described as
outrageously injurious not only to the
employer but more so to the employees
themselves before these claims or demands
were established by law and jurisprudence as
"rights" and before these were proved
beneficial to management, labor, and the
national as a whole beyond reasonable doubt.
The case before us does not represent any
major advance in the rights of labor and the
workingmen. The private respondents merely
sought rights already established. No matter
how much the petitioner-employer tries to
present itself as speaking for the entire
industry, there is no evidence that it is typical
of employers hiring Filipino seamen or that it
can speak for them.
The contention that manning industries in the
Philippines would not survive if the instant
case is not decided in favor of the petitioner is
not supported by evidence. The Wallem case
was decided on February 20, 1981. There
have been no severe repercussions, no
drying up of employment opportunities for
seamen, and none of the dire consequences
repeatedly emphasized by the petitioner. Why
should Vir-Jen be an exception?
The wages of seamen engaged in
international shipping are shouldered by the
foreign principal. The local manning office is
an agent whose primary function is
 recruitment and who usually gets a lump sum
from the shipowner to defray the salaries of
the crew. The hiring of seamen and the
determination of their compensation is subject
to the interplay of various market factors and
one key factor is how much in terms of profits
the local manning office and the foreign
shipowner may realize after the costs of the
voyage are met. And costs include salaries of
officers and crew members. (at pp. 585-586)
The Wallem Shipping case, was decided in 1981. Vir-Jen
Shipping was decided in 1983. It is now 1989. There has'been
no drying up of employment opportunities for Filipino seamen.
Not only have their wages improved thus leading ITF to be placid
and quiet all these years insofar as Filipinos are concerned but
the hiring of Philippine seamen is at its highest level ever.
Reporting its activities for the year 1988, the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) stated that there
will be an increase in demand for seamen based overseas in
1989 boosting the number to as high as 105,000. This will
represent a 9.5 percent increase from the 1988 aggregate.
(Business World, News Briefs, January 11, 1989 at page 2)
According to the POEA, seabased workers numbering 95,913 in
1988 exceeded by a wide margin of 28.15 percent the year end
total in 1987. The report shows that sea-based workers posted
bigger monthly increments compared to those of landbased
workers. (The Business Star, Indicators, January 11, 1988 at
page 2)
Augmenting this optimistic report of POEA Administrator Tomas
Achacoso is the statement of Secretary of Labor Franklin M.
Drilon that the Philippines has a big jump over other crewing
nations because of the Filipinos' abilities compared with any
European or westem crewing country. Drilon added that cruise
shipping is also a growing market for Filipino seafarers because
of their flexibility in handling odd jobs and their expertise in
handling almost all types of ships, including luxury liners. (Manila
Bulletin, More Filipino Seamen Expected Development,
December 27, 1988 at page 29).lâwphî1.ñèt Parenthetically, the
minimum monthly salary of able bodied seamen set by the ILO
and adhered to by the Philippines is now $276.00 (id.) more than
double the $130.00 sought to be enforced by the public
respondents in these petitions.
The experience from 1981 to the present vindicates the finding
in Vir-Jen Shipping that a decision in favor of the seamen would
not necessarily mean severe repercussions, drying up of
employment opportunities for seamen, and other dire
consequences predicted by manning agencies and recruiters in
the Philippines.
From the foregoing, we find that the NSB and NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in finding the petitioners guilty of using
intimidation and illegal means in breaching their contracts of
employment and punishing them for these alleged offenses.
Consequently, the criminal prosecutions for estafa in G.R. Nos.
57999 and 58143-53 should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The
decisions of the National Seamen Board and National Labor
Relations Commission in G. R. Nos. 64781-99 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered holding the petitioners
not guilty of the offenses for which they were charged. The
petitioners' suspension from the National Seamen Board's
Registry for three (3) years is LIFTED. The private respondent
is ordered to pay the petitioners their earned but unpaid wages
and overtime pay/allowance from November 1, 1978 to
December 14, 1978 according to the rates in the Special
Agreement that the parties entered into in Vancouver, Canada.
The criminal cases for estafa, subject matter of G. R. Nos. 57999
and 58143-53, are ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80918 August 16, 1989
JOSEFINA M. PRINCIPE, petitioner
vs.
PHILIPPINE-SINGAPORE TRANSPORT SERVICES, INC.
and CHUAN HUP AGENCIES, PTE. LTD., NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYEES EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION,
respondents.
R. C. Carrera Law Firm for petitioner.
Eladio B. Samson for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Once again this Tribunal is faced with the issue of the validity of
the quitclaim executed by the employee's heir in favor of the
employer.
Petitioner is the widow of the late Abelardo Principe who was
then the Chief Engineer of M/V OSAM Falcon, a commercial
vessel of Singaporean registry owned by Chuan Hup Agencies,
Pte. Ltd. (Chuan Hup for brevity), one of the private respondents
herein, who is the principal of Philippine-Singapore Transport
Services, Inc. (PSTSI), also a private respondent herein. The
contract of employment of the deceased with private respondent
Chua Hup provides, among others, that Principe would receive
Singapore $2,800.00 a month to commence on September 7,
1982, medical benefits and insurance coverage through group
hospitalization and surgical insurance and group and personal
accident insurance for a capital sum of US$75,000.00. It also
provides that the laws of Singapore shall apply in cases of
disputes arising out of the said appointment and that said
disputes are to be resolved by the courts of the Republic of
Singapore. 1
On September 15,1982, while Principe was on duty in Malintoc
Field, Palawan, Philippines, he suddenly contracted a serious
illness which eventually resulted to his death.2
On July 5, 1983, petitioner filed a complaint 3 against PSTSI with
the Workers Assistance and Adjudication Office of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), seeking the
payment of death compensation benefits and other benefits
accruing to her deceased husband. While the aforesaid case
was pending, the parties entered into a compromise agreement.
On December 22, 1983, petitioner executed a release and
quitclaim in favor of PSTSI in consideration of the sum of Seven
Thousand Pesos (P7,000.00) together with hospital, burial and
other incidental expenses previously disbursed by PSTSI in
favor of petitioner's deceased husband. 4 Consequently, Atty.
Wellington Lachica, counsel for petitioner, with the latter's
conformity, filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice I
against PSTSI and without prejudice as against Chuan Hup 5 N
C
On the basis of the compromise agreement and the motion to I
dismiss dated November 23, 1983, the POEA issued an order P
dated December 27, 1983, dismissing petitioner's complaint with L
prejudice against PSTSI. E
,
o
On April 21, 1986, petitioner filed with the POEA another claim f
for death benefits against PSTSI, this time including Chuan Hup. l
The new case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 86-04-328. e
In the decision dated January 27, 1987, the POEA dismissed the g
complaint on the ground that there exist identity of parties, a
subject matter and cause of action between the previous case, l
POEA Case No. L-635-83 and the new case, and that the a
present case is barred by prior judgment based on a g
compromise agreement in the previous case. 6 e
,
Petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).lâwphî1.ñèt In a resolution dated September 25, 1987, w
the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. 7 i
d
Hence, the present petition. o
w
It is the position of the petitioner that the release and quitclaim ,
that she signed in favor of private respondent PSTSI is null and a
void on the ground that the consideration given in exchange n
thereof in the amount of P7,000.00 is extremely low and d
unconscionable. Petitioner added that she was merely misled to r
sign the quitclaim due to the assurance given by PSTSI that it e
will help her recover the death compensation and insurance s
proceeds due her deceased husband. She argued that even on i
the assumption that the quitclaim is valid, the release should d
benefit PSTSI alone and should not include Chua Hup as the e
quitclaim was executed only in favor of PSTSI. Further she n
contended that notwithstanding the quitclaim executed in favor t
of PSTSI, the latter may still be held liable since it is an agent of a
Chuan Hup here in the Philippines. 8 t
1
2
The Solicitor General supports petitioner's view stating that the 8
principle of res judicata is inapplicable to the case at bar since 7
petitioner and PSTSI agreed that the dismissal of the suit -
against the latter is without prejudice insofar as the principal E
Chuan Hup is concerned; that the quitclaim is null and void as ,
the consideration given is unconscionably low as it is not even G
equal to one percent (1%) of petitioner's claim; and that the .
quitclaim is inequitable and incongrous to the declared policy of T
the State to afford protection to labor, citing Section 3, Article u
XIII of the 1987 Constitution. 9 a
z
We rule for the petitioner. o
n
The release and quitclaim in question reads as follows:
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WITNESSETH, that:
WHEREAS, on July 5, 1983, Josefina M.
Principe fled a complaint for death benefits
against Philippine-Singapore Transport
Services, Inc. as a shipping agency of Chuan
Hup Agencies Pte. Ltd. of the Republic of
Singapore for the death of her husband, Engr.
Abelardo D. Principe, on September 15, 1982
in Matinloc Field, Offshore Palawan,
Philippines while in the course of as
employment as Chief Engineer of OSAM
Falcon' in POEA Case No. (L) 635-83 of the
Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, entitled Josefina M. Principe
vs. Philippine-Singapore Transport Services,
Inc.;'
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to settle
the above- entitled case amicably.
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration
of the sum of SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P7,000.00), Philippine currency and of the
hospital, burial and other incidental expenses
previously disbursed by Philippine-Singapore
Transport Services, Inc., receipt of which in
full is hereby acknowledged to her full and
complete satisfaction, JOSEFINA M.
PRINCIPLE have (sic) released and
discharged, as she hereby releases and
discharges, Philippine-Singapore Transport
Services, Inc., its directors, officers,
employees, principals and agents from any
a and all claims, actions obligations and
r liabilities which she have or might have
t against Philippine-Singapore Transport
i Services, Inc. in connection with the death of
n her husband Abelardo D. Principe on
e September 15, 1982 in Matintoc Field,
z Offshore Palawan under the circumstances
B narrated in the aforementioned case.
l
d That she hereby represents and warrants to
g Philippine-Singapore Transport Services, Inc.
. that she is the surviving spouse legally
, entitled to claim for damages/support which
may arise from the death of said Abelardo D.
D Principe, and further, that she hereby
a manifests that any and all rights or claims
s which she, as a surviving forced heir of the
m late Abelardo D. Principe might have against
a Philippine-Singapore Transport Services,
r Inc., its directors, employees, principals and
i agents arising out of or by reason of the death
n of said Abelardo D. Principe are hereby
a deemed waived and discharged and she have
s (sic) Philippine-Singapore Transport
, Services, Inc., its directors, officers,
M employees, principals and agents and
a whoever may be held liable, completely free
n and harmless from any claim and/or liabilities
i that may arise from the death of said Abelardo
l D. Principe (sic).
a
. That in the event that any other
person/persons, as surviving spouse of the
deceased Abelardo D. Principe should claim
against Philippine-Singapore Transport
Services, Inc. for such damages/support
arising from the death of Abelardo D. Principe,
and the claim is held valid, then Josefina M.
Principe hereby undertakes and agrees to
reimburse to Philippine-Singapore Transport
Services, Inc. the amounts hereunder
received, plus legal interest therein.
That she further states that the foregoing
consideration is voluntarily accepted by her
as a full and final compromise, adjustment
and settlement of any and all claims that she
may have against Philippine-Singapore
Transport Services, Inc., its directors, officers,
employees, principals and agents; and she
hereby irrevocably affirm (sic) that Philippine-
Singapore Transport Services, Inc. has made
this settlement solely to buy peace, avoid
litigation and on human consideration, and
she acknowledges that the payment of said
consideration is not and shall never be
construed as an admission of liability or
obligation by Philippine-Singapore Transport
Services, Inc., its officers, directors,
employees, principals and agents. 10
It is true that a compromise agreement once approved by the
court has the effect of res judicata between the parties and
should not be disturbed except for vices of consent and forgery.
However, settled is the rule that the NLRC may disregard
technical rules of procedure in order to give life to the
constitutional mandate affording protection to labor and to
conform to the need of protecting the working class whose
inferiority against the employer has always been earmarked by
disadvantage. 11
The Court finds that the compromise agreement entered into by
the petitioner in favor of PSTSI was not intended to totally
foreclose her right over the death benefits of her husband. First,
the motion to dismiss, filed by petitioner through Atty. Lachica
before the POEA, which cited the compromise agreement
entered into by the parties, clearly and unequivocally reflects the
undertaking that the release is without prejudice as regards
private respondent Chuan Hup. This fact was acknowledged in
the decision of POEA Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso in
POEA Case No. (L) 86-04-328. It is surprising why both the
POEA and the NLRC failed to consider this aspect in the
resolution of the second complaint filed by the petitioner against
PSTSI and Chuan Hup.
The second complaint was filed by petitioner to enforce the joint
and several liability of PSTSI and Chuan Hup per joint affidavit
of responsibility executed by said parties in entering into a
principal agent relationship after PSTSI failed to live up to its
commitment to assist petitioner in the recovery of death
compensation. 12 This observation is supported by the
provisions of the release signed by the petitioner wherein the
parties referred to therein were only the petitioner and PSTSI.
The release is from any claim against PSTSI. Chuan Hup is not
a party thereto. He cannot be considered covered by the
release.
Moreover, the Court sees no reason why petitioner, with the
assistance of a counsel would ever agree to foreclose her right
against Chuan Hup over the death benefits of her husband in
exchange for a very measly sum of Seven Thousand Pesos
(P7,000.00). They must have been aware that should she
pursue her case, she was assured of getting at least One
Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred Singapore dollars
(US$100,800.00). This Court has laid down the rule in similar
cases that applying the Singapore Maritime Laws in case of a
seaman's death, the heirs of the seaman should receive the
equivalent of 36 months wages of the deceased seaman. 13
The fact that petitioner received the sum of P7,000.00 only
should not be taken to mean as a waiver of her right. The
circumstances she was confronted with during that time left her
with no other alternative but to accept the same as she was in
dire need of money due to the sudden death of her husband.
PSTSI contends that it was precisely because of her need for
cash that petitioner thereby totally waived her right over the
death benefits of her husband. We do not think so. What is
plausible is the protestation of petitioner that PSTSI took
advantage of her financial distress and led her to signing the
release and quitclaim without explaining the consequences to
her. While it may be true that her counsel assisted her in the
process, said counsel must have been persuaded by the
assurance of PSTSI that it shall help obtain for her the
corresponding benefits from Chuan Hup.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the quitclaim had
foreclosed petitioner's right over the death benefits of her
husband, the fact that the consideration given in exchange
thereof was very much less than the amount petitioner is
claiming renders the quitclaim null and void for being contrary to
public policy. 14 The State must be firm in affording protection
to labor. The quitclaim wherein the consideration is scandalously
low and inequitable cannot be an obstacle to petitioner's
pursuing her legitimate claim. 15 Equity dictates that the
compromise agreement should be voided in this instance.
Lastly, it must be noted that the first complaint of petitioner was
merely an action against PSTSI whereas in the second
complaint Chuan Hup was already included. The POEA ruled
that the second complaint was merely an afterthought, and that
it was a product of a pre-conceived mind considering the interval
of time from the issuance of the order of dismissal in the previous
case and the institution of the second complaint. We do not think
so. On the contrary, the Court holds that the delay was due to
PSTSI's failure to make good its promise to assist the petitioner
in recovering the death benefits of her husband. We see no other
reason thereby. Hence, even if the second action was filed
beyond the three (3) year reglementary period as provided by
law for such claims, We cannot buy PSTSI's argument that the
claim is already barred. The blame for the delay, if any, can only
be attributed to PSTSI.
On the other hand, PSTSI argues that it cannot be held
responsible on the ground that the aforesaid affidavit of
undertaking with Chua Hup is applicable only to those members
of the crew recruited by PSTSI in the Philippines for and in behalf
of its principal Chuan Hup and that since Principe was directly
hired by Chuan Hup, PSTSI cannot be held responsible as it has
no privity of contract with those personnel recruited in
Singapore.
The argument is untenable. This is the first time PSTSI raised
this defense when it had all the chance to do so below.
Moreover, if PSTSI honestly believed it had no privity of contract
with Principe who was directly recruited by Chuan Hup, then
there is no reason why it entered into a compromise agreement
with herein petitioner. From the very start, it should have asked
for the dismissal of the case against it on the ground of lack of
cause of action, but it did not do so. What is obvious is that
Principe was actually recruited by PSTSI and that he signed the
employment contract with the principal Chuan Hup. Thus,
private respondents stand jointly and severally liable for the
claim of petitioner.
Anent the argument that the Philippine courts are without
jurisdiction over the subject matter as jurisdiction was, by
agreement of the parties, vested in the courts of the Republic of
Singapore, it is well-settled that an agreement to deprive a court
of jurisdiction conferred on it by law is void and of no legal effect.
16 In this jurisdiction labor cases, are within the competence of
the National Labor Relations Commission.
With respect to petitioner's monetary claim, since the parties
agreed that the laws of Singapore shall govern their relationship
and that any dispute arising from the contract shall be resolved
by the law of that country, then the petitioner is entitled to death
benefits equivalent to 36 months salary of her husband. 17 As
the wage of deceased Abelardo Principe was S$2,800.00 a
month, then petitioner is entitled to a total of S$100,800.00.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is granted.
The resolution of the NLRC dated September 25,1987 is hereby
set aside and another decision is hereby rendered ordering
private respondents PSTSI and Chuan Hup Agencies, Pte. Ltd.
to jointly and severally pay petitioner the sum of S$100,800. 00
in its equivalent in Philippine pesos. This decision is immediately
executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Actg. C.J., Cruz, Griñ;o-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO
B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-
COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty.
GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT
INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL
BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14 December 5, 1994
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. and/or ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32 December 5, 1994
ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDER CORPORATION and
BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO
B. EVANGELISTA, ROMEO PATAG, RIZALINO REYES,
IGNACIO DE VERA, SOLOMON B. REYES, JOSE M. ABAN,
EMIGDIO N. ABARQUEZ, ANTONIO ACUPAN, ROMEO
ACUPAN, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRE, WILFREDO D.
ALIGADO, MARTIN AMISTAD, JR., ROLANDO B. AMUL,
AMORSOLO ANADING, ANTONIO T. ANGLO, VICENTE
ARLITA, HERBERT AYO, SILVERIO BALATAZO, ALFREDO
BALOBO, FALCONERO BANAAG, RAMON BARBOSA,
FELIX BARCENA, FERNANDO BAS, MARIO BATACLAN,
ROBERTO S. BATICA, ENRICO BELEN, ARISTEO BICOL,
LARRY C. BICOL, PETRONILLO BISCOCHO, FELIX M.
BOBIER, DIONISIO BOBONGO, BAYANI S. BRACAMANTE,
PABLITO BUSTILLO, GUILLERMO CABEZAS, BIENVENIDO
CADALIN, RODOLFO CAGATAN, AMANTE CAILAO,
IRENEO CANDOR, JOSE CASTILLO, MANUEL CASTILLO,
REMAR CASTROJERES, REYNALDO CAYAS, ROMEO
CECILIO, TEODULO CREUS, BAYANI DAYRIT, RICARDO
DAYRIT, ERNESTO T. DELA CRUZ, FRANCISCO DE
GUZMAN, ONOFRE DE RAMA, IGNACIO DE VERA,
MODESTO DIZON, REYNALDO DIZON, ANTONIO S.
DOMINGUEZ, GILBERT EBRADA, RICARDO EBRADA,
ANTONIO EJERCITO, JR., EDUARTE ERIDAO, ELADIO
ESCOTOTO, JOHN ESGUERRA, EDUARDO ESPIRITU,
ERNESTO ESPIRITU, RODOLFO ESPIRITU, NESTOR M.
ESTEVA, BENJAMIN ESTRADA, VALERIO EVANGELISTA,
OLIGARIO FRANCISCO, JESUS GABAWAN, ROLANDO
GARCIA, ANGEL GUDA, PACITO HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO
HILARIO, HENRY L. JACOB, HONESTO JARDINIANO,
ANTONIO JOCSON, GERARDO LACSAMANA, EFREN U.
LIRIO LORETO LONTOC, ISRAEL LORENZO, ALEJANDRO
LORINO, JOSE MABALAY, HERMIE MARANAN,
LEOVIGILDO MARCIAL, NOEL MARTINEZ, DANTE
MATREO, LUCIANO MELENDEZ, RENATO MELO, FRANCIS
MEDIODIA, JOSE C. MILANES, RAYMUNDO C. MILAY,
CRESENCIANO MIRANDA, ILDEFONSO C. MOLINA,
ARMANDO B. MONDEJAR RESURRECCION D.
NAZARENO, JUAN OLINDO, FRANCISCO R. OLIVARES,
PEDRO ORBISTA, JR., RICARDO ORDONEZ, ERNIE
PANCHO, JOSE PANCHO, GORGONIO P. PARALA,
MODESTO PINPIN, JUANITO PAREA, ROMEO I. PATAG,
FRANCISCO PINPIN, LEONARDO POBLETE, JAIME
POLLOS, DOMINGO PONDALIS, EUGENIO RAMIREZ,
LUCIEN M. RESPALL, GAUDENCIO RETANAN, JR., TOMAS
B. RETENER, ALVIN C. REYES, RIZALINO REYES,
SOLOMON B. REYES, VIRGILIO G. RICAZA, RODELIO
RIETA, JR., BENITO RIVERA, JR., BERNARDO J.
ROBILLOS, PABLO A. ROBLES, JOSE ROBLEZA, QUIRINO
RONQUILLO, AVELINO M. ROQUE, MENANDRO L. SABINO,
PEDRO SALGATAR, EDGARDO SALONGA, NUMERIANO
SAN MATEO, FELIZARDO DE LOS SANTOS, JR., GABRIEL
SANTOS, JUANITO SANTOS, PAQUITO SOLANTE,
CONRADO A. SOLIS, JR., RODOLFO SULTAN, ISAIAS
TALACTAC, WILLIAM TARUC, MENANDRO TEMPROSA,
BIENVENIDO S. TOLENTINO, BENEDICTO TORRES,
MAXIMIANO TORRES, FRANCISCO G. TRIAS, SERGIO A.
URSOLINO, ROGELIO VALDEZ, LEGORIO E. VERGARA,
DELFIN VICTORIA, GILBERT VICTORIA, HERNANE
VICTORIANO, FRANCISCO VILLAFLORES, DOMINGO
VILLAHERMOSA, ROLANDO VILLALOBOS, ANTONIO
VILLAUZ, DANILO VILLANUEVA, ROGELIO VILLANUEVA,
ANGEL VILLARBA, JUANITO VILLARINO, FRANCISCO
ZARA, ROGELIO AALAGOS, NICANOR B. ABAD, ANDRES
ABANES, REYNALDO ABANES, EDUARDO ABANTE, JOSE
ABARRO, JOSEFINO ABARRO, CELSO S. ABELANIO,
HERMINIO ABELLA, MIGUEL ABESTANO, RODRIGO G.
ABUBO, JOSE B. ABUSTAN, DANTE ACERES, REYNALDO
S. ACOJIDO, LEOWILIN ACTA, EUGENIO C. ACUEZA,
EDUARDO ACUPAN, REYNALDO ACUPAN, SOLANO
ACUPAN, MANUEL P. ADANA, FLORENTINO R. AGNE,
QUITERIO R. AGUDO, MANUEL P. AGUINALDO, DANTE
AGUIRRE, HERMINIO AGUIRRE, GONZALO ALBERTO, JR.,
CONRADO ALCANTARA, LAMBERTO Q. ALCANTARA,
MARIANITO J. ALCANTARA, BENCIO ALDOVER, EULALIO
V. ALEJANDRO, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRO, EDUARDO L.
ALEJANDRO, MAXIMINO ALEJANDRO, ALBERTO
ALMENAR, ARNALDO ALONZO, AMADO ALORIA, CAMILO
ALVAREZ, MANUEL C. ALVAREZ, BENJAMIN R.
AMBROCIO, CARLOS AMORES, BERNARD P. ANCHETA,
TIMOTEO O. ANCHETA, JEOFREY ANI, ELINO P.
ANTILLON, ARMANDRO B. ANTIPONO, LARRY T.
ANTONIO, ANTONIO APILADO, ARTURO P. APILADO,
FRANCISCO APOLINARIO, BARTOLOME M. AQUINO,
ISIDRO AQUINO, PASTOR AQUINO, ROSENDO M. AQUINO,
ROBERTO ARANGORIN, BENJAMIN O. ARATEA, ARTURO
V. ARAULLO, PRUDENCIO ARAULLO, ALEXANDER
ARCAIRA, FRANCISCO ARCIAGA, JOSE AREVALO,
JUANTO AREVALO, RAMON AREVALO, RODOLFO
AREVALO, EULALIO ARGUELLES, WILFREDO P. ARICA,
JOSE M. ADESILLO, ANTONIO ASUNCION, ARTEMIO M.
ASUNCION, EDGARDO ASUNCION, REXY M. ASUNCION,
VICENTE AURELIO, ANGEL AUSTRIA, RICARDO P.
AVERILLA, JR., VIRGILIO AVILA, BARTOLOME AXALAN,
ALFREDO BABILONIA, FELIMON BACAL, JOSE L. BACANI,
ROMULO R. BALBIERAN, VICENTE BALBIERAN,
RODOLFO BALITBIT, TEODORO Y. BALOBO, DANILO O.
BARBA, BERNARDO BARRO, JUAN A. BASILAN,
CEFERINO BATITIS, VIVENCIO C. BAUAN, GAUDENCIO S.
BAUTISTA, LEONARDO BAUTISTA, JOSE D. BAUTISTA,
ROSTICO BAUTISTA, RUPERTO B. BAUTISTA, TEODORO
S. BAUTISTA, VIRGILIO BAUTISTA, JESUS R. BAYA,
WINIEFREDO BAYACAL, WINIEFREDO BEBIT, BEN G.
BELIR, ERIC B. BELTRAN, EMELIANO BENALES, JR.,
RAUL BENITEZ, PERFECTO BENSAN, IRENEO BERGONIO,
ISABELO BERMUDEZ, ROLANDO I. BERMUDEZ, DANILO
BERON, BENJAMIN BERSAMIN, ANGELITO BICOL,
ANSELMO BICOL, CELESTINO BICOL, JR., FRANCISCO
BICOL, ROGELIO BICOL, ROMULO L. BICOL, ROGELIO
BILLIONES, TEOFILO N. BITO, FERNANDO BLANCO,
AUGUSTO BONDOC, DOMINGO BONDOC, PEPE S. BOOC,
JAMES R. BORJA, WILFREDO BRACEROS, ANGELES C.
BRECINO, EURECLYDON G. BRIONES, AMADO BRUGE,
PABLITO BUDILLO, ARCHIMEDES BUENAVENTURA,
BASILIO BUENAVENTURA, GUILLERMO BUENCONSEJO,
ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE, VIRGILIO BUTIONG, JR.,
HONESTO P. CABALLA, DELFIN CABALLERO,
BENEDICTO CABANIGAN, MOISES CABATAY,
HERMANELI CABRERA, PEDRO CAGATAN, JOVEN C.
CAGAYAT, ROGELIO L. CALAGOS, REYNALDO V.
CALDEJON, OSCAR C. CALDERON, NESTOR D. CALLEJA,
RENATO R. CALMA, NELSON T. CAMACHO, SANTOS T.
CAMACHO, ROBERTO CAMANA, FLORANTE C. CAMANAG
EDGARDO M. CANDA, SEVERINO CANTOS, EPIFANIO A.
CAPONPON, ELIAS D. CARILLO, JR., ARMANDO
CARREON, MENANDRO M. CASTAÑEDA, BENIGNO A.
CASTILLO, CORNELIO L. CASTILLO, JOSEPH B.
CASTILLO, ANSELMO CASTILLO, JOAQUIN CASTILLO,
PABLO L. CASTILLO, ROMEO P. CASTILLO, SESINANDO
CATIBOG, DANILO CASTRO, PRUDENCIO A. CASTRO,
RAMO CASTRO, JR., ROMEO A. DE CASTRO, JAIME B.
CATLI, DURANA D. CEFERINO, RODOLFO B. CELIS,
HERMINIGILDO CEREZO, VICTORIANO CELESTINO,
BENJAMIN CHAN, ANTONIO C. CHUA, VIVENCIO B.
CIABAL, RODRIGO CLARETE, AUGUSTO COLOMA,
TURIANO CONCEPCION, TERESITO CONSTANTINO,
ARMANDO CORALES, RENATO C. CORCUERA, APOLINAR
CORONADO, ABELARDO CORONEL, FELIX CORONEL,
JR., LEONARDO CORPUZ, JESUS M. CORRALES, CESAR
CORTEMPRATO, FRANCISCO O. CORVERA, FRANCISCO
COSTALES, SR., CELEDONIO CREDITO, ALBERTO A.
CREUS, ANACLETO V. CRUZ, DOMINGO DELA CRUZ,
AMELIANO DELA CRUZ, JR., PANCHITO CRUZ,
REYNALDO B. DELA CRUZ, ROBERTO P. CRUZ, TEODORO
S. CRUZ, ZOSIMO DELA CRUZ, DIONISIO A. CUARESMA,
FELIMON CUIZON, FERMIN DAGONDON, RICHARD
DAGUINSIN, CRISANTO A. DATAY, NICASIO
DANTINGUINOO, JOSE DATOON, EDUARDO DAVID,
ENRICO T. DAVID, FAVIO DAVID, VICTORIANO S. DAVID,
EDGARDO N. DAYACAP, JOSELITO T. DELOSO,
CELERINO DE GUZMAN, ROMULO DE GUZMAN,
LIBERATO DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE LEON, JOSELITO L. DE
LUMBAN, NAPOLEON S. DE LUNA, RICARDO DE RAMA,
GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO, ALBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSE
DELA CRUZ, LEONARDO DELOS REYES, ERNESTO F.
DIATA, EDUARDO A. DIAZ, FELIX DIAZ, MELCHOR DIAZ,
NICANOR S. DIAZ, GERARDO C. DIGA, CLEMENTE
DIMATULAC, ROLANDO DIONISIO, PHILIPP G. DISMAYA,
BENJAMIN DOCTOLERO, ALBERTO STO. DOMINGO,
BENJAMIN E. DOZA, BENJAMIN DUPA, DANILO C. DURAN,
GREGORIO D. DURAN, RENATO A. EDUARTE,
GODOFREDO E. EISMA, ARDON B. ELLO, UBED B. ELLO,
JOSEFINO ENANO, REYNALDO ENCARNACION,
EDGARDO ENGUANCIO, ELIAS EQUIPANO, FELIZARDO
ESCARMOSA, MIGUEL ESCARMOSA, ARMANDO
ESCOBAR, ROMEO T. ESCUYOS, ANGELITO ESPIRITU,
EDUARDO S. ESPIRITU, REYNALDO ESPIRITU, ROLANDO
ESPIRITU, JULIAN ESPREGANTE, IGMIDIO ESTANISLAO,
ERNESTO M. ESTEBAN, MELANIO R. ESTRO, ERNESTO M.
ESTEVA, CONRADO ESTUAR, CLYDE ESTUYE, ELISEO
FAJARDO, PORFIRIO FALQUEZA, WILFREDO P.
FAUSTINO, EMILIO E. FERNANDEZ, ARTEMIO FERRER,
MISAEL M. FIGURACION, ARMANDO F. FLORES,
BENJAMIN FLORES, EDGARDO C. FLORES,
BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO, MANUEL S. FRANCISCO,
ROLANDO FRANCISCO, VALERIANO FRANCISCO,
RODOLFO GABAWAN, ESMERALDO GAHUTAN, CESAR C.
GALANG, SANTIAGO N. GALOSO, GABRIEL GAMBOA,
BERNARDO GANDAMON, JUAN GANZON, ANDRES
GARCIA, JR., ARMANDO M. GARCIA, EUGENIO GARCIA,
MARCELO L. GARCIA, PATRICIO L. GARCIA, JR.,
PONCIANO G. GARCIA, PONCIANO G. GARCIA, JR.,
RAFAEL P. GARCIA, ROBERTO S. GARCIA, OSIAS G.
GAROFIL, RAYMUNDO C. GARON, ROLANDO G. GATELA,
AVELINO GAYETA, RAYMUNDO GERON, PLACIDO
GONZALES, RUPERTO H. GONZALES, ROGELIO D.
GUANIO, MARTIN V. GUERRERO, JR., ALEXIS GUNO,
RICARDO L. GUNO, FRANCISCO GUPIT, DENNIS J.
GUTIERREZ, IGNACIO B. GUTIERREZ, ANGELITO DE
GUZMAN, JR., CESAR H. HABANA, RAUL G. HERNANDEZ,
REYNALDO HERNANDEZ, JOVENIANO D. HILADO, JUSTO
HILAPO, ROSTITO HINAHON, FELICISIMO HINGADA,
EDUARDO HIPOLITO, RAUL L. IGNACIO, MANUEL L.
ILAGAN, RENATO L. ILAGAN, CONRADO A. INSIONG,
GRACIANO G. ISLA, ARNEL L. JACOB, OSCAR J.
JAPITENGA, CIRILO HICBAN, MAXIMIANO HONRADES,
GENEROSO IGNACIO, FELIPE ILAGAN, EXPEDITO N.
JACOB, MARIO JASMIN, BIENVENIDO JAVIER, ROMEO M.
JAVIER, PRIMO DE JESUS, REYNALDO DE JESUS,
CARLOS A. JIMENEZ, DANILO E. JIMENEZ, PEDRO C.
JOAQUIN, FELIPE W. JOCSON, FELINO M. JOCSON,
PEDRO N. JOCSON, VALENTINO S. JOCSON, PEDRO B.
JOLOYA, ESTEBAN P. JOSE, JR., RAUL JOSE, RICARDO
SAN JOSE, GERTRUDO KABIGTING, EDUARDO S.
KOLIMLIM, SR., LAURO J. LABAY, EMMANUEL C.
LABELLA, EDGARDO B. LACERONA, JOSE B. LACSON,
MARIO J. LADINES, RUFINO LAGAC, RODRIGO
LAGANAPAN, EFREN M. LAMADRID, GUADENCIO
LATANAN, VIRGILIO LATAYAN, EMILIANO LATOJA,
WENCESLAO LAUREL, ALFREDO LAXAMANA, DANIEL R.
LAZARO, ANTONIO C. LEANO, ARTURO S. LEGASPI,
BENITO DE LEMOS, JR., PEDRO G. DE LEON, MANOLITO
C. LILOC, GERARDO LIMUACO, ERNESTO S. LISING,
RENATO LISING, WILFREDO S. LISING, CRISPULO
LONTOC, PEDRO M. LOPERA, ROGELIO LOPERA,
CARLITO M. LOPEZ, CLODY LOPEZ, GARLITO LOPEZ,
GEORGE F. LOPEZ, VIRGILIO M. LOPEZ, BERNARDITO G.
LOREJA, DOMINGO B. LORICO, DOMINGO LOYOLA,
DANTE LUAGE, ANTONIO M. LUALHATI, EMMANUEL
LUALHATI, JR., LEONIDEZ C. LUALHATI, SEBASTIAN
LUALHATI, FRANCISCO LUBAT, ARMANDO LUCERO,
JOSELITO L. DE LUMBAN, THOMAS VICENTE O. LUNA,
NOLI MACALADLAD, ALFREDO MACALINO, RICARDO
MACALINO, ARTURO V. MACARAIG, ERNESTO V.
MACARAIG, RODOLFO V. MACARAIG, BENJAMIN
MACATANGAY, HERMOGENES MACATANGAY, RODEL
MACATANGAY, ROMULO MACATANGAY, OSIAS Q.
MADLANGBAYAN, NICOLAS P. MADRID, EDELBERTO G.
MAGAT, EFREN C. MAGBANUA, BENJAMIN MAGBUHAT,
ALFREDO C. MAGCALENG, ANTONIO MAGNAYE,
ALFONSO MAGPANTAY, RICARDO C. MAGPANTAY,
SIMEON M. MAGPANTAY, ARMANDO M. MAGSINO,
MACARIO S. MAGSINO, ANTONIO MAGTIBAY, VICTOR V.
MAGTIBAY, GERONIMO MAHILUM, MANUEL MALONZO,
RICARDO MAMADIS, RODOLFO MANA, BERNARDO A.
MANALILI, MANUEL MANALILI, ANGELO MANALO,
AGUILES L. MANALO, LEOPOLDO MANGAHAS, BAYANI
MANIGBAS, ROLANDO C. MANIMTIM, DANIEL
MANONSON, ERNESTO F. MANUEL, EDUARDO MANZANO,
RICARDO N. MAPA, RAMON MAPILE, ROBERTO C.
MARANA, NEMESIO MARASIGAN, WENCESLAO
MARASIGAN, LEONARDO MARCELO, HENRY F. MARIANO,
JOEL MARIDABLE, SANTOS E. MARINO, NARCISO A.
MARQUEZ, RICARDO MARTINEZ, DIEGO MASICAMPO,
AURELIO MATABERDE, RENATO MATILLA, VICTORIANO
MATILLA, VIRGILIO MEDEL, LOLITO M. MELECIO,
BENIGNO MELENDEZ, RENER J. MEMIJE, REYNALDO F.
MEMIJE, RODEL MEMIJE, AVELINO MENDOZA, JR.,
CLARO MENDOZA, TIMOTEO MENDOZA, GREGORIO
MERCADO, ERNANI DELA MERCED, RICARDO MERCENA,
NEMESIO METRELLO, RODEL MEMIJE, GASPAR MINIMO,
BENJAMIN MIRANDA, FELIXBERTO D. MISA, CLAUDIO A.
MODESTO, JR., OSCAR MONDEDO, GENEROSO MONTON,
RENATO MORADA, RICARDO MORADA, RODOLFO
MORADA, ROLANDO M. MORALES, FEDERICO M.
MORENO, VICTORINO A. MORTEL, JR., ESPIRITU A.
MUNOZ, IGNACIO MUNOZ, ILDEFONSO MUNOZ, ROGELIO
MUNOZ, ERNESTO NAPALAN, MARCELO A. NARCIZO,
REYNALDO NATALIA, FERNANDO C. NAVARETTE,
PACIFICO D. NAVARRO, FLORANTE NAZARENO, RIZAL B.
NAZARIO, JOSUE NEGRITE, ALFREDO NEPUMUCENO,
HERBERT G. NG, FLORENCIO NICOLAS, ERNESTO C.
NINON, AVELINO NUQUI, NEMESIO D. OBA, DANILO
OCAMPO, EDGARDO OCAMPO, RODRIGO E. OCAMPO,
ANTONIO B. OCCIANO, REYNALDO P. OCSON, BENJAMIN
ODESA, ANGEL OLASO, FRANCISCO OLIGARIO, ZOSIMO
OLIMBO, BENJAMIN V. ORALLO, ROMEO S. ORIGINES,
DANILO R. ORTANEZ, WILFREDO OSIAS, VIRGILIO PA-A,
DAVID PAALAN, JESUS N. PACHECO, ALFONSO L.
PADILLA, DANILO PAGSANJAN, NUMERIANO
PAGSISIHAN, RICARDO T. PAGUIO, EMILIO PAKINGAN,
LEANDRO PALABRICA, QUINCIANO PALO, JOSE
PAMATIAN, GONZALO PAN, PORFIRIO PAN, BIENVENIDO
PANGAN, ERNESTO PANGAN, FRANCISCO V. PASIA,
EDILBERTO PASIMIO, JR., JOSE V. PASION, ANGELITO M.
PENA, DIONISIO PENDRAS, HERMINIO PERALTA,
REYNALDO M. PERALTA, ANTONIO PEREZ, ANTOLIANO
E. PEREZ, JUAN PEREZ, LEON PEREZ, ROMEO E. PEREZ,
ROMULO PEREZ, WILLIAM PEREZ, FERNANDO G. PERINO,
FLORENTINO DEL PILAR, DELMAR F. PINEDA, SALVADOR
PINEDA, ELIZALDE PINPIN, WILFREDO PINPIN, ARTURO
POBLETE, DOMINADOR R. PRIELA, BUENAVENTURA
PRUDENTE, CARMELITO PRUDENTE, DANTE PUEYO,
REYNALDO Q. PUEYO, RODOLFO O. PULIDO, ALEJANDRO
PUNIO, FEDERICO QUIMAN, ALFREDO L. QUINTO, ROMEO
QUINTOS, EDUARDO W. RACABO, RICARDO C. DE RAMA,
RICARDO L. DE RAMA, ROLANDO DE RAMA, FERNANDO
A. RAMIREZ, LITO S. RAMIREZ, RICARDO G. RAMIREZ,
RODOLFO V. RAMIREZ, ALBERTO RAMOS, ANSELMO C.
RAMOS, TOBIAS RAMOS, WILLARFREDO RAYMUNDO,
REYNALDO RAQUEDAN, MANUEL F. RAVELAS,
WILFREDO D. RAYMUNDO, ERNESTO E. RECOLASO,
ALBERTO REDAZA, ARTHUR REJUSO, TORIBIO M.
RELLAMA, JAIME RELLOSA, EUGENIO A. REMOQUILLO,
GERARDO RENTOZA, REDENTOR C. REY, ALFREDO S.
REYES, AMABLE S. REYES, BENEDICTO R. REYES,
GREGORIO B. REYES, JOSE A. REYES, JOSE C. REYES,
ROMULO M. REYES, SERGIO REYES, ERNESTO F. RICO,
FERNANDO M. RICO, EMMANUEL RIETA, RICARDO RIETA,
LEO B. ROBLES, RUBEN ROBLES, RODOLFO ROBLEZA,
RODRIGO ROBLEZA, EDUARDO ROCABO, ANTONIO R.
RODRIGUEZ, BERNARDO RODRIGUEZ, ELIGIO
RODRIGUEZ, ALMONTE ROMEO, ELIAS RONQUILLO,
ELISE RONQUILLO, LUIS VAL B. RONQUILLO, REYNOSO
P. RONQUILLO, RODOLFO RONQUILLO, ANGEL
ROSALES, RAMON ROSALES, ALBERTO DEL ROSARIO,
GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO, TEODORICO DEL ROSARIO,
VIRGILIO L. ROSARIO, CARLITO SALVADOR, JOSE
SAMPARADA, ERNESTO SAN PEDRO, ADRIANO V.
SANCHA, GERONIMO M. SANCHA, ARTEMIO B. SANCHEZ,
NICASIO SANCHEZ, APOLONIO P. SANTIAGO, JOSELITO
S. SANTIAGO, SERGIO SANTIAGO, EDILBERTO C.
SANTOS, EFREN S. SANTOS, RENATO D. SANTOS,
MIGUEL SAPUYOT, ALEX S. SERQUINA, DOMINADOR P.
SERRA, ROMEO SIDRO, AMADO M. SILANG, FAUSTINO D.
SILANG, RODOLFO B. DE SILOS, ANICETO G. SILVA,
EDGARDO M. SILVA, ROLANDO C. SILVERTO, ARTHUR B.
SIMBAHON, DOMINGO SOLANO, JOSELITO C. SOLANTE,
CARLITO SOLIS, CONRADO SOLIS, III, EDGARDO SOLIS,
ERNESTO SOLIS, ISAGANI M. SOLIS, EDUARDO L. SOTTO,
ERNESTO G. STA. MARIA, VICENTE G. STELLA, FELIMON
SUPANG, PETER TANGUINOO, MAXIMINO TALIBSAO,
FELICISMO P. TALUSIK, FERMIN TARUC, JR., LEVY S.
TEMPLO, RODOLFO S. TIAMSON, LEONILO TIPOSO,
ARNEL TOLENTINO, MARIO M. TOLENTINO, FELIPE
TORRALBA, JOVITO V. TORRES, LEONARDO DE TORRES,
GAVINO U. TUAZON, AUGUSTO B. TUNGUIA, FRANCISCO
UMALI, SIMPLICIO UNIDA, WILFREDO V. UNTALAN,
ANTONIO VALDERAMA, RAMON VALDERAMA, NILO
VALENCIANO, EDGARDO C. VASQUEZ, ELPIDIO
VELASQUEZ, NESTOR DE VERA, WILFREDO D. VERA,
BIENVENIDO VERGARA, ALFREDO VERGARA, RAMON R.
VERZOSA, FELICITO P. VICMUNDO, ALFREDO
VICTORIANO, TEOFILO P. VIDALLO, SABINO N. VIERNEZ,
JESUS J. VILLA, JOVEN VILLABLANCO, EDGARDO G.
VILLAFLORES, CEFERINO VILLAGERA, ALEX
VILLAHERMOZA, DANILO A. VILLANUEVA, ELITO
VILLANUEVA, LEONARDO M. VILLANUEVA, MANUEL R.
VILLANUEVA, NEPTHALI VILLAR, JOSE V. VILLAREAL,
FELICISIMO VILLARINO, RAFAEL VILLAROMAN, CARLOS
VILLENA, FERDINAND VIVO, ROBERTO YABUT, VICENTE
YNGENTE, AND ORO C. ZUNIGA, respondents.
Gerardo A. Del Mundo and Associates for petitioners.
Romulo, Mabanta, Sayoc, Buenaventura, De los Angeles Law
Offices for BRII/AIBC.
Florante M. De Castro for private respondents in 105029-32.
QUIASON, J.:
The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M.
Cadalin, et. al. v. Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration's Administrator, et. al.," was filed under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to modify the Resolution dated September
2, 1991 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in POEA Cases Nos.
L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and
L-86-05-460; (2) to render a new decision: (i)
declaring private respondents as in default;
(ii) declaring the said labor cases as a class
suit; (iii) ordering Asia International Builders
Corporation (AIBC) and Brown and Root
International Inc. (BRII) to pay the claims of
the 1,767 claimants in said labor cases; (iv)
declaring Atty. Florante M. de Castro guilty of
forum-shopping; and (v) dismissing POEA
Case No. L-86-05-460; and
(3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24,
1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for
reconsideration of its Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-288).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M.
Cadalin, et. al., v. Hon. National Labor Relations Commission,
et. al.," was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
 (1) to reverse the Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases
Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-799
and
L-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied the three-
year prescriptive period under the Labor Code
of the Philippines instead of the ten-year
prescriptive period under the Civil Code of the
Philippines; and (ii) denied the
"three-hour daily average" formula in the
computation of petitioners' overtime pay; and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24,
1992 of NLRC, denying the motion for
reconsideration of its Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-220).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 105029-32, entitled "Asia International
Builders Corporation, et. al., v. National Labor Relations
Commission, et. al." was filed under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases
Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779
and
L-86-05-460, insofar as it granted the claims
of 149 claimants; and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 21,
1992 of NLRC insofar as it denied the motions
for reconsideration of AIBC and BRII (Rollo,
pp. 2-59; 61-230).
The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which
modified the decision of POEA in four labor cases: (1) awarded
monetary benefits only to 149 claimants and (2) directed Labor
Arbiter Fatima J. Franco to conduct hearings and to receive
evidence on the claims dismissed by the POEA for lack of
substantial evidence or proof of employment.
Consolidation of Cases
G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raffled to the
Third Division while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raffled to the
Second Division. In the Resolution dated July 26, 1993, the
Second Division referred G.R. Nos. 104911-14 to the Third
Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 895).
In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division
granted the motion filed in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 for the
consolidation of said cases with G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-
32, which were assigned to the First Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-30, Rollo, pp. 369-
377, 426-432). In the Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the
First Division granted the motion to consolidate G.R. Nos.
104911-14 with G.R. No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo,
p. 1109; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, p. 1562).
I Order dated October 2, 1984 and an "Urgent Manifestation,"
On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and
Donato B. Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728
other overseas contract workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit
by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising
from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (POEA
Case No. L-84-06-555). The claimants were represented by
Atty. Gerardo del Mundo.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston,
Texas, and is engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic
corporation licensed as a service contractor to recruit, mobilize
and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on behalf
of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the
unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which was
terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the payment of the
interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund,
interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary
differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not
remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the
BIR; penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the
suspension of the license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 13-14).
At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of
the complaint and was given, together with BRII, up to July 5,
1984 to file its answer.
On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of AIBC and
BRII, ordered the claimants to file a bill of particulars within ten
days from receipt of the order and the movants to file their
answers within ten days from receipt of the bill of particulars. The
POEA Administrator also scheduled a pre-trial conference on
July 25, 1984.
On July 13, 1984, the claimants submitted their "Compliance
and Manifestation." On July 23, 1984, AIBC filed a "Motion to
Strike Out of the Records", the "Complaint" and the "Compliance
and Manifestation." On July 25, 1984, the claimants filed their
"Rejoinder and Comments," averring, among other matters, the
failure of AIBC and BRII to file their answers and to attend the
pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984. The claimants alleged that
AIBC and BRII had waived their right to present evidence and
had defaulted by failing to file their answers and to attend the
pre-trial conference.
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the "Motion
to Strike Out of the Records" filed by AIBC but required the
claimants to correct the deficiencies in the complaint pointed out
in the order.
On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to
comply with the Order of October 2, 1984 and filed an "Urgent
Manifestation," praying that the POEA Administrator direct the
parties to submit simultaneously their position papers, after
which the case should be deemed submitted for decision. On
the same day, Atty. Florante de Castro filed another complaint
for the same money claims and benefits in behalf of several
claimants, some of whom were also claimants in POEA Case
No. L-84-06-555 (POEA Case No. 85-10-779).
On October 19, 1984, claimants filed their "Compliance" with the
praying that the POEA direct the parties to submit
simultaneously their position papers after which the case would
be deemed submitted for decision. On the same day, AIBC
asked for time to file its comment on the "Compliance" and
"Urgent Manifestation" of claimants. On November 6, 1984, it
filed a second motion for extension of time to file the comment.
On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC
that its motion for extension of time was granted.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition to the
motions for extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII be
declared in default for failure to file their answers.
On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII filed a "Comment"
praying, among other reliefs, that claimants should be ordered
to amend their complaint.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an
order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers within ten
days from receipt of the order.
On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC
seeking the reversal of the said order of the POEA
Administrator. Claimants opposed the appeal, claiming that it
was dilatory and praying that AIBC and BRII be declared in
default.
On April 2, 1985, the original claimants filed an "Amended
Complaint and/or Position Paper" dated March 24, 1985, adding
new demands: namely, the payment of overtime pay, extra night
work pay, annual leave differential pay, leave indemnity pay,
retirement and savings benefits and their share of forfeitures
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 14-16). On April 15, 1985, the
POEA Administrator directed AIBC to file its answer to the
amended complaint (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 20).
On May 28, 1985, claimants filed an "Urgent Motion for
Summary Judgment." On the same day, the POEA issued an
order directing AIBC and BRII to file their answers to the
"Amended Complaint," otherwise, they would be deemed to
have waived their right to present evidence and the case would
be resolved on the basis of complainant's evidence.
On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a "Motion to Dismiss as
Improper Class Suit and Motion for Bill of Particulars Re:
Amended Complaint dated March 24, 1985." Claimants
opposed the motions.
On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his
directive to AIBC and BRII to file their answers in POEA Case
No. L-84-06-555.
On September 18, 1985, AIBC filed its second appeal to the
NLRC, together with a petition for the issuance of a writ of
injunction. On September 19, 1985, NLRC enjoined the POEA
Administrator from hearing the labor cases and suspended the
period for the filing of the answers of AIBC and BRII.
On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA
Administrator to include additional claimants in the case and to
investigate alleged wrongdoings of BRII, AIBC and their
respective lawyers.
On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants filed
a complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-777) against AIBC and
BRII with the POEA, demanding monetary claims similar to
those subject of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In the same
month, Solomon Reyes also filed his own complaint (POEA
Case No. L-85-10-779) against AIBC and BRII.
On October 17, 1985, the law firm of Florante M. de Castro &
Associates asked for the substitution of the original counsel of
record and the cancellation of the special powers of attorney
given the original counsel.
On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo filed in NLRC a notice
of the claim to enforce attorney's lien.
On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro filed a complaint for money
claims (POEA Case No. 86-05-460) in behalf of 11 claimants
including Bienvenido Cadalin, a claimant in POEA Case No. 84-
06-555.
On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals
filed on February 27, 1985 and September 18, 1985 by AIBC
and BRII.
In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA
Administrator, it is not amiss to mention that two cases were filed
in the Supreme Court by the claimants, namely — G.R. No.
72132 on September 26, 1985 and Administrative Case No.
2858 on March 18, 1986. On May 13, 1987, the Supreme Court
issued a resolution in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing the
POEA Administrator to resolve the issues raised in the motions
and oppositions filed in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-
86-05-460 and to decide the labor cases with deliberate
dispatch.
AIBC also filed a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No.
78489), questioning the Order dated September 4, 1985 of the
POEA Administrator. Said order required BRII and AIBC to
answer the amended complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
In a resolution dated November 9, 1987, we dismissed the
petition by informing AIBC that all its technical objections may
properly be resolved in the hearings before the POEA.
Complaints were also filed before the Ombudsman. The first
was filed on September 22, 1988 by claimant Hermie Arguelles
and 18 co-claimants against the POEA Administrator and
several NLRC Commissioners. The Ombudsman merely
referred the complaint to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment with a request for the early disposition of POEA
Case No. L-84-06-555. The second was filed on April 28, 1989
by claimants Emigdio P. Bautista and Rolando R. Lobeta
charging AIBC and BRII for violation of labor and social
legislations. The third was filed by Jose R. Santos, Maximino N.
Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII of
violations of labor laws.
On January 13, 1987, AIBC filed a motion for reconsideration of
the NLRC Resolution dated December 12, 1986.
On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA
Administrator its motion for suspension of the period for filing an
answer or motion for extension of time to file the same until the
resolution of its motion for reconsideration of the order of the
NLRC dismissing the two appeals. On April 28, 1987, NLRC en
banc denied the motion for reconsideration.
At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to
the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties were given a
period of 15 days from said date within which to submit their
respective position papers. On June 24, 1987 claimants filed
their "Urgent Motion to Strike Out Answer," alleging that the
answer was filed out of time. On June 29, 1987, claimants filed
their "Supplement to Urgent Manifestational Motion" to comply
with the POEA Order of June 19, 1987. On February 24, 1988, are dismissed for having
AIBC and BRII submitted their position paper. On March 4, prescribed;
1988, claimants filed their "Ex-Parte Motion to Expunge from the
Records" the position paper of AIBC and BRII, claiming that it 2. Respondents AIBC and
was filed out of time. Brown & Root are hereby
ordered, jointly and
On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De severally, to pay the 149
Castro filed their memorandum in POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. complainants, identified
On September 6, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted their and listed in Annex "B"
Supplemental Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII filed hereof, the peso
its "Reply to Complainant's Memorandum." On October 26, equivalent, at the time of
1988, claimants submitted their "Ex-Parte Manifestational payment, of the total
Motion and Counter-Supplemental Motion," together with 446 amount in US dollars
individual contracts of employments and service records. On indicated opposite their
October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a "Consolidated Reply." respective names;

On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his 3. The awards given by the
decision in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555 and the other POEA to the 19
consolidated cases, which awarded the amount of $824,652.44 complainants classified
in favor of only 324 complainants. and listed in Annex "C"
hereof, who appear to have
On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their "Appeal worked elsewhere than in
Memorandum For Partial Appeal" from the decision of the Bahrain are hereby set
POEA. On the same day, AIBC also filed its motion for aside.
reconsideration and/or appeal in addition to the "Notice of
Appeal" filed earlier on February 6, 1989 by another counsel for 4. All claims other than
AIBC. those indicated in Annex
"B", including those for
On February 17, 1989, claimants filed their "Answer to Appeal," overtime work and
praying for the dismissal of the appeal of AIBC and BRII. favorably granted by the
POEA, are hereby
dismissed for lack of
On March 15, 1989, claimants filed their "Supplement to substantial evidence in
Complainants' Appeal Memorandum," together with their "newly support thereof or are
discovered evidence" consisting of payroll records. beyond the competence of
this Commission to pass
On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their upon.
"Manifestation," stating among other matters that there were
only 728 named claimants. On April 20, 1989, the claimants filed In addition, this Commission, in the exercise
their "Counter-Manifestation," alleging that there were 1,767 of of its powers and authority under Article
them. 218(c) of the Labor Code, as amended by
R.A. 6715, hereby directs Labor Arbiter
On July 27, 1989, claimants filed their "Urgent Motion for Fatima J. Franco of this Commission to
Execution" of the Decision dated January 30, 1989 on the summon parties, conduct hearings and
grounds that BRII had failed to appeal on time and AIBC had not receive evidence, as expeditiously as
posted the supersedeas bond in the amount of $824,652.44. possible, and thereafter submit a written
report to this Commission (First Division) of
On December 23, 1989, claimants filed another motion to the proceedings taken, regarding the claims
resolve the labor cases. of the following:

On August 21, 1990, claimants filed their "Manifestational (a) complainants identified
Motion," praying that all the 1,767 claimants be awarded their and listed in Annex "D"
monetary claims for failure of private respondents to file their attached and made an
answers within the reglamentary period required by law. integral part of this
Resolution, whose claims
were dismissed by the
On September 2, 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution, POEA for lack of proof of
disposing as follows: employment in Bahrain
(these complainants
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the numbering 683, are listed
Decision of the POEA in these consolidated in pages 13 to 23 of the
cases is modified to the extent and in decision of POEA, subject
accordance with the following dispositions: of the appeals) and,

1. The claims of the 94 (b) complainants identified

complainants identified and and listed in Annex "E"
listed in Annex "A" hereof attached and made an
 integral part of this
Resolution, whose awards
decreed by the POEA, to
Our mind, are not
supported by substantial
evidence" (G.R. No.
104776; Rollo, pp. 113-
115; G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
pp. 85-87; G.R. Nos.
105029-31, pp. 120-122).
On November 27, 1991, claimant Amado S. Tolentino and 12
co-claimants, who were former clients of Atty. Del Mundo, filed
a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos.
120741-44). The petition was dismissed in a resolution dated
January 27, 1992.
Three motions for reconsideration of the September 2, 1991
Resolution of the NLRC were filed. The first, by the claimants
represented by Atty. Del Mundo; the second, by the claimants
represented by Atty. De Castro; and the third, by AIBC and BRII.
In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the
motions for reconsideration.
Hence, these petitions filed by the claimants represented by
Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776), the claimants represented
by Atty. De Castro (G.R. Nos. 104911-14) and by AIBC and BRII
(G.R. Nos. 105029-32).
II
Compromise Agreements
Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro
and AIBC and BRII have submitted, from time to time,
compromise agreements for our approval and jointly moved for
the dismissal of their respective petitions insofar as the
claimants-parties to the compromise agreements were
concerned (See Annex A for list of claimants who signed
quitclaims).
Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at
a compromise agreement and the corresponding motions for the
approval of the agreements were filed by the parties and
approved by the Court:
1) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Emigdio Abarquez and 47 co-
claimants dated September 2, 1992 (G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 263-406; G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp.
470-615);
2) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
petitioner Bienvenido Cadalin and 82 co-
petitioners dated September 3, 1992 (G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 364-507);
3) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Jose
M. Aban and 36 co-claimants dated
September 17, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32,
Rollo, pp. 613-722; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 518-626; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp.
407-516);
4) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Antonio T. Anglo and 17 co-
claimants dated October 14, 1992 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 778-843; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 650-713; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 530-590);
5) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Dionisio Bobongo and 6 co-
claimants dated January 15, 1993 (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 813-836; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 629-652);
6) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Valerio A. Evangelista and 4 co-
claimants dated March 10, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 731-746; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
7) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimants Palconeri Banaag and 5 co-
claimants dated March 17, 1993 (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1657-1703; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 655-675);
8) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Benjamin Ambrosio and 15 other co-
claimants dated May 4, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 906-956; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 679-729; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1773-1814);
9) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
Valerio Evangelista and 3 co-claimants dated
May 10, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
1815-1829);
10) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
petitioner Quiterio R. Agudo and 36 co-
claimants dated June 14, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 974-1190; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 748-864; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1066-1183);
11) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Arnaldo J. Alonzo and 19 co-
claimants dated July 22, 1993 (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1173-1235; G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1193-1256; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 896-959);
12) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Ricardo C. Dayrit and 2 co-claimants
dated September 7, 1993 (G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1266-1278; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1243-1254; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 972-984);
13) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
claimant Dante C. Aceres and 37 co-
claimants dated September 8, 1993 (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1257-1375; G.R. Nos.
 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 987-1105; G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1280-1397);
14) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
Vivencio V. Abella and 27 co-claimants dated
January 10, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32,
Rollo, Vol. II);
15) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving
Domingo B. Solano and six co-claimants
dated August 25, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32;
G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14).
III
The facts as found by the NLRC are as follows:
We have taken painstaking efforts to sift over
the more than fifty volumes now comprising
the records of these cases. From the records,
it appears that the complainants-appellants
allege that they were recruited by respondent-
appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign
principal, Brown & Root, on various dates
from 1975 to 1983. They were all deployed at
various projects undertaken by Brown & Root
in several countries in the Middle East, such
as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab Emirates
and Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in
Indonesia and Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas
contract workers by the Philippine
Government, all the individual complainants
signed standard overseas employment
contracts (Records, Vols. 25-32. Hereafter,
reference to the records would be sparingly
made, considering their chaotic arrangement)
with AIBC before their departure from the
Philippines. These overseas employment
contracts invariably contained the following
relevant terms and conditions.
PART B —
(1) Employment Position Classification :——
———————
(Code) :—————————
(2) Company Employment Status :—————
————
(3) Date of Employment to Commence on :—
————————
(4) Basic Working Hours Per Week :————
—————
(5) Basic Working Hours Per Month :————
—————
(6) Basic Hourly Rate :—————————
(7) Overtime Rate Per Hour :———————
——
(8) Projected Period of Service
(Subject to C(1) of this [sic]) :———————
——
Months and/or
Job Completion
xxx xxx xxx
3. HOURS OF WORK AND
COMPENSATION
a) The Employee is employed at the hourly
rate and overtime rate as set out in Part B of
this Document.
b) The hours of work shall be those set forth
by the Employer, and Employer may, at his
sole option, change or adjust such hours as
maybe deemed necessary from time to time.
4. TERMINATION
a) Notwithstanding any other terms and
conditions of this agreement, the Employer
may, at his sole discretion, terminate
employee's service with cause, under this
agreement at any time. If the Employer
terminates the services of the Employee
under this Agreement because of the
completion or termination, or suspension of
the work on which the Employee's services
were being utilized, or because of a reduction
in force due to a decrease in scope of such
work, or by change in the type of construction
of such work. The Employer will be
responsible for his return transportation to his
country of origin. Normally on the most
expeditious air route, economy class
accommodation.
xxx xxx xxx
10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
a) After one (1) year of continuous service
and/or satisfactory completion of contract,
employee shall be entitled to 12-days
vacation leave with pay. This shall be
computed at the basic wage rate. Fractions of
a year's service will be computed on a pro-
rata basis.
b) Sick leave of 15-days shall be granted to
the employee for every year of service for
non-work connected injuries or illness. If the
employee failed to avail of such leave
benefits, the same shall be forfeited at the end
of the year in which said sick leave is granted.
11. BONUS
A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross
income will be accrued and payable only upon
satisfactory completion of this contract.
12. OFFDAY PAY
The seventh day of the week shall be
observed as a day of rest with 8 hours regular
pay. If work is performed on this day, all hours
work shall be paid at the premium rate.
However, this offday pay provision is
applicable only when the laws of the Host
Country require payments for rest day.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of the
individual complainants were deployed, His
Majesty Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of
Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on
June 16, 1976, otherwise known as the
Labour Law for the Private Sector (Records,
Vol. 18). This decree took effect on August 16,
1976. Some of the provisions of Amiri Decree
No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the
complainants-appellants are as follows (italics
supplied only for emphasis):
Art. 79: . . . A worker shall
receive payment for each
extra hour equivalent to his
wage entitlement
increased by a minimum of
twenty-five per centum
thereof for hours worked
during the day; and by a
minimum of fifty per centum
thereof for hours worked
during the night which shall
be deemed to being from
seven o'clock in the
evening until seven o'clock
in the morning. . . .
Art. 80: Friday shall be
deemed to be a weekly day
of rest on full pay.
. . . an employer may
require a worker, with his
consent, to work on his
weekly day of rest if
circumstances so require
and in respect of which an
additional sum equivalent
to 150% of his normal wage
shall be paid to him. . . .
Art. 81: . . . When
conditions of work require
the worker to work on any
official holiday, he shall be
paid an additional sum
equivalent to 150% of his
normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who
has completed one year's
continuous service with his
employer shall be entitled
to leave on full pay for a
period of not less than 21
days for each year
increased to a period not
less than 28 days after five
continuous years of
service.
A worker shall be entitled to
such leave upon a quantum
meruit in respect of the
proportion of his service in
that year.
Art. 107: A contract of
employment made for a
period of indefinite duration
may be terminated by
either party thereto after
giving the other party thirty
days' prior notice before
such termination, in writing,
in respect of monthly paid
workers and fifteen days'
notice in respect of other
workers. The party
terminating a contract
without giving the required
notice shall pay to the other
party compensation
equivalent to the amount of
wages payable to the
worker for the period of
such notice or the
unexpired portion thereof.
Art. 111: . . . the employer
concerned shall pay to
such worker, upon
termination of employment,
a leaving indemnity for the
period of his employment
calculated on the basis of
fifteen days' wages for
each year of the first three
years of service and of one
month's wages for each
year of service thereafter.
Such worker shall be
entitled to payment of
leaving indemnity upon a
quantum meruit in
proportion to the period of
his service completed
within a year.
All the individual
complainants-appellants
have already been
repatriated to the
Philippines at the time of
the filing of these cases
(R.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 59-65).
IV
The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were:
First: — Whether or not complainants are
entitled to the benefits provided by Amiri
Decree No. 23 of Bahrain;
(a) Whether or not the
complainants who have
 worked in Bahrain are jointly are severally liable for the judgment
entitled to the above- awards despite the alleged finding that the
mentioned benefits. former was the employer of the complainants;

(b) Whether or not Art. 44 of (a) Whether or not the

the same Decree (allegedly POEA has acquired
prescribing a more jurisdiction over Brown &
favorable treatment of alien Root;
employees) bars
complainants from (b) Whether or not the
enjoying its benefits. undisputed fact that AIBC
was a licensed construction
Second: — Assuming that Amiri Decree No. contractor precludes a
23 of Bahrain is applicable in these cases, finding that Brown & Root is
whether or not complainants' claim for the liable for complainants
benefits provided therein have prescribed. claims.

Third: — Whether or not the instant cases Sixth: — Whether or not the POEA
qualify as a class suit. Administrator's failure to hold respondents in
default constitutes a reversible error.
Fourth: — Whether or not the proceedings
conducted by the POEA, as well as the Seventh: — Whether or not the POEA
decision that is the subject of these appeals, Administrator erred in dismissing the following
conformed with the requirements of due claims:
process;
a. Unexpired portion of
(a) Whether or not the contract;
respondent-appellant was
denied its right to due b. Interest earnings of
process; Travel and Reserve Fund;

(b) Whether or not the c. Retirement and Savings

admission of evidence by Plan benefits;
the POEA after these
cases were submitted for
decision was valid; d. War Zone bonus or
premium pay of at least
100% of basic pay;
(c) Whether or not the
POEA acquired jurisdiction
over Brown & Root e. Area Differential Pay;
International, Inc.;
f. Accrued interests on all
(d) Whether or not the the unpaid benefits;
judgment awards are
supported by substantial g. Salary differential pay;
evidence;
h. Wage differential pay;
(e) Whether or not the
awards based on the i. Refund of SSS premiums
averages and formula not remitted to SSS;
presented by the
complainants-appellants
are supported by j. Refund of withholding tax
substantial evidence; not remitted to BIR;

(f) Whether or not the k. Fringe benefits under B

POEA awarded sums & R's "A Summary of
beyond what the Employee Benefits" (Annex
complainants-appellants "Q" of Amended
prayed for; and, if so, Complaint);
whether or not these
awards are valid. l. Moral and exemplary
damages;
Fifth: — Whether or not the POEA erred in
holding respondents AIBC and Brown & Root
 m. Attorney's fees of at
least ten percent of the
judgment award;
n. Other reliefs, like
suspending and/or
cancelling the license to
recruit of AIBC and the
accreditation of B & R
issued by POEA;
o. Penalty for violations of
Article 34 (prohibited
practices), not excluding
reportorial requirements
thereof.
Eighth: — Whether or not the POEA
Administrator erred in not dismissing POEA
Case No. (L) 86-65-460 on the ground of
multiplicity of suits (G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
Rollo, pp. 25-29, 51-55).
Anent the first issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the
1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and
proof of a foreign law and admitted in evidence a simple copy of
the Bahrain's Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the
Private Sector). NLRC invoked Article 221 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, vesting on the Commission ample discretion to
use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case without regard to the technicalities of law or
procedure. NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the
Amiri Decree No. 23, being more favorable and beneficial to the
workers, should form part of the overseas employment contract
of the complainants.
NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only
to the claimants, who worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards
of the POEA Administrator in favor of the claimants, who worked
elsewhere.
On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for
the filing of the claims of the complainants was three years, as
provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, and
not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23
of 1976.
On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator
that the labor cases cannot be treated as a class suit for the
simple reason that not all the complainants worked in Bahrain
and therefore, the subject matter of the action, the claims arising
from the Bahrain law, is not of common or general interest to all
the complainants.
On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the
cardinal rules of administrative due process: namely, (1) the
failure of the POEA Administrator to consider the evidence
presented by AIBC and BRII; (2) some findings of fact were not
supported by substantial evidence; and (3) some of the evidence
upon which the decision was based were not disclosed to AIBC
and BRII during the hearing.
On the fifth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA
Administrator that BRII and AIBC are solidarily liable for the
claims of the complainants and held that BRII was the actual
employer of the complainants, or at the very least, the indirect
employer, with AIBC as the labor contractor.
NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the
POEA Administrator through the summons served on AIBC, its
local agent.
On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was
correct in denying the Motion to Declare AIBC in default.
On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not
based on the Amiri Decree No. 23, NLRC ruled:
(1) that the POEA Administrator has no
jurisdiction over the claims for refund of the
SSS premiums and refund of withholding
taxes and the claimants should file their
claims for said refund with the appropriate
government agencies;
(2) the claimants failed to establish that they
are entitled to the claims which are not based
on the overseas employment contracts nor
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976;
(3) that the POEA Administrator has no
jurisdiction over claims for moral and
exemplary damages and nonetheless, the
basis for granting said damages was not
established;
(4) that the claims for salaries corresponding
to the unexpired portion of their contract may
be allowed if filed within the three-year
prescriptive period;
(5) that the allegation that complainants were
prematurely repatriated prior to the expiration
of their overseas contract was not
established; and
(6) that the POEA Administrator has no
jurisdiction over the complaint for the
suspension or cancellation of the AIBC's
recruitment license and the cancellation of the
accreditation of BRII.
NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA
Case No. (L) 86-65-460 should have been dismissed on the
ground that the claimants in said case were also claimants in
POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. Instead of dismissing POEA
Case No. (L) 86-65-460, the POEA just resolved the
corresponding claims in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. In other
words, the POEA did not pass upon the same claims twice.
V
G.R. No. 104776
Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari
on the following grounds:
(1) that they were deprived by NLRC and the
POEA of their right to a speedy disposition of
 their cases as guaranteed by Section 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The POEA
Administrator allowed private respondents to
file their answers in two years (on June 19,
1987) after the filing of the original complaint
(on April 2, 1985) and NLRC, in total disregard
of its own rules, affirmed the action of the
POEA Administrator;
(2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator
should have declared AIBC and BRII in
default and should have rendered summary
judgment on the basis of the pleadings and
evidence submitted by claimants;
(3) the NLRC and POEA Administrator erred
in not holding that the labor cases filed by
AIBC and BRII cannot be considered a class
suit;
(4) that the prescriptive period for the filing of
the claims is ten years; and
(5) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator
should have dismissed POEA Case No. L-86-
05-460, the case filed by Atty. Florante de
Castro (Rollo, pp. 31-40).
AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776,
argued:
(1) that they were not responsible for the
delay in the disposition of the labor cases,
considering the great difficulty of getting all
the records of the more than 1,500 claimants,
the piece-meal filing of the complaints and the
addition of hundreds of new claimants by
petitioners;
(2) that considering the number of complaints
and claimants, it was impossible to prepare
the answers within the ten-day period
provided in the NLRC Rules, that when the
motion to declare AIBC in default was filed on
July 19, 1987, said party had already filed its
answer, and that considering the staggering
amount of the claims (more than
US$50,000,000.00) and the complicated
issues raised by the parties, the ten-day rule
to answer was not fair and reasonable;
(3) that the claimants failed to refute NLRC's
finding that
there was no common or general interest in
the subject matter of the controversy — which
was the applicability of the Amiri Decree No.
23. Likewise, the nature of the claims varied,
some being based on salaries pertaining to
the unexpired portion of the contracts while
others being for pure money claims. Each
claimant demanded separate claims peculiar
only to himself and depending upon the
particular circumstances obtaining in his
case;
(4) that the prescriptive period for filing the
claims is that prescribed by Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines (three years)
and not the one prescribed by Article 1144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines (ten years);
and
(5) that they are not concerned with the issue
of whether POEA Case No. L-86-05-460
should be dismissed, this being a private
quarrel between the two labor lawyers (Rollo,
pp. 292-305).
Attorney's Lien
On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to
strike out the joint manifestations and motions of AIBC and BRII
dated September 2 and 11, 1992, claiming that all the claimants
who entered into the compromise agreements subject of said
manifestations and motions were his clients and that Atty.
Florante M. de Castro had no right to represent them in said
agreements. He also claimed that the claimants were paid less
than the award given them by NLRC; that Atty. De Castro
collected additional attorney's fees on top of the 25% which he
was entitled to receive; and that the consent of the claimants to
the compromise agreements and quitclaims were procured by
fraud (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 838-810). In the Resolution
dated November 23, 1992, the Court denied the motion to strike
out the Joint Manifestations and Motions dated September 2 and
11, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 608-609).
On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo filed a "Notice and
Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien," alleging that the claimants
who entered into compromise agreements with AIBC and BRII
with the assistance of Atty. De Castro, had all signed a retainer
agreement with his law firm (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 623-
624; 838-1535).
Contempt of Court
On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was filed by Atty. Del
Mundo to cite Atty. De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt
of court and for violation of Canons 1, 15 and 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The said lawyers allegedly misled
this Court, by making it appear that the claimants who entered
into the compromise agreements were represented by Atty. De
Castro, when in fact they were represented by Atty. Del Mundo
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1560-1614).
On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges
against Atty. De Castro for unethical practices and moved for the
voiding of the quitclaims submitted by some of the claimants.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14
The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition for
certiorari on the grounds that NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it: (1) applied the three-year prescriptive period
under the Labor Code of the Philippines; and (2) it denied the
claimant's formula based on an average overtime pay of three
hours a day (Rollo, pp. 18-22).
The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII
itself during the negotiation for an amicable settlement of their
money claims in Bahrain as shown in the Memorandum dated
April 16, 1983 of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-
22).
BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in
G.R. No. 104776 that the prescriptive period in the Labor Code
of the Philippines, a special law, prevails over that provided in
the Civil Code of the Philippines, a general law.
As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on
the method of computing the overtime pay, BRII and AIBC
claimed that they were not bound by what appeared therein,
because such memorandum was proposed by a subordinate
Bahrain official and there was no showing that it was approved
by the Bahrain Minister of Labor. Likewise, they claimed that the
averaging method was discussed in the course of the
negotiation for the amicable settlement of the dispute and any
offer made by a party therein could not be used as an admission
by him (Rollo, pp. 228-236).
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely
abused its discretion when it: (1) enforced the provisions of the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and not the terms of the
employment contracts; (2) granted claims for holiday, overtime
and leave indemnity pay and other benefits, on evidence
admitted in contravention of petitioner's constitutional right to
due process; and (3) ordered the POEA Administrator to hold
new hearings for the 683 claimants whose claims had been
dismissed for lack of proof by the POEA Administrator or NLRC
itself. Lastly, they allege that assuming that the Amiri Decree No.
23 of 1976 was applicable, NLRC erred when it did not apply the
one-year prescription provided in said law (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
VI
G.R. No. 104776; G.R. Nos. 104911-14; G.R. Nos. 105029-32
All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although
they disagreed as to the time that should be embraced within
the prescriptive period.
To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten
years, applying Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
NLRC believed otherwise, fixing the prescriptive period at three
years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14,
invoking different grounds, insisted that NLRC erred in ruling
that the prescriptive period applicable to the claims was three
years, instead of ten years, as found by the POEA Administrator.
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the
prescriptive period was one year as prescribed by the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 but he deferred to the ruling of NLRC that
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was the
operative law.
The POEA Administrator held the view that:
These money claims (under Article 291 of the
Labor Code) refer to those arising from the
employer's violation of the employee's right as
provided by the Labor Code.
In the instant case, what the respondents
violated are not the rights of the workers as
provided by the Labor Code, but the
provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 issued
in Bahrain, which ipso facto amended the
worker's contracts of employment.
Respondents consciously failed to conform to
these provisions which specifically provide for
the increase of the worker's rate. It was only
after June 30, 1983, four months after the
brown builders brought a suit against B & R in
Bahrain for this same claim, when respondent
AIBC's contracts have undergone
amendments in Bahrain for the new
hires/renewals (Respondent's Exhibit 7).
Hence, premises considered, the applicable
law of prescription to this instant case is
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which provides:
Art. 1144. The following
actions may be brought
within ten years from the
time the cause of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation
created by law;
Thus, herein money claims of the
complainants against the respondents shall
prescribe in ten years from August 16, 1976.
Inasmuch as all claims were filed within the
ten-year prescriptive period, no claim suffered
the infirmity of being prescribed (G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, 89-90).
In overruling the POEA Administrator, and holding that the
prescriptive period is three years as provided in Article 291 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines, the NLRC argued as follows:
The Labor Code provides that "all money
claims arising from employer-employee
relations . . . shall be filed within three years
from the time the cause of action accrued;
otherwise they shall be forever barred" (Art.
291, Labor Code, as amended). This three-
year prescriptive period shall be the one
applied here and which should be reckoned
from the date of repatriation of each individual
complainant, considering the fact that the
case is having (sic) filed in this country. We do
not agree with the POEA Administrator that
this three-year prescriptive period applies
only to money claims specifically recoverable
under the Philippine Labor Code. Article 291
gives no such indication. Likewise, We can
not consider complainants' cause/s of action
to have accrued from a violation of their
employment contracts. There was no
violation; the claims arise from the benefits of
the law of the country where they worked.
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
90-91).
Anent the applicability of the one-year prescriptive period as
provided by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, NLRC opined that
the applicability of said law was one of characterization, i.e.,
whether to characterize the foreign law on prescription or statute
of limitation as "substantive" or "procedural." NLRC cited the
decision in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d.
152, 2d Cir. [1955], where the issue was the applicability of the
Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of New York for
claims arising from said Code. In said case, the claims would
have prescribed under the Panamanian Law but not under the
Statute of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was
not "specifically intended to be substantive," hence, the
prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum should apply.
The Court observed:
. . . And where, as here, we are dealing with a
statute of limitations of a foreign country, and
it is not clear on the face of the statute that its
purpose was to limit the enforceability,
outside as well as within the foreign country
concerned, of the substantive rights to which
the statute pertains, we think that as a
yardstick for determining whether that was the
purpose this test is the most satisfactory one.
It does not lead American courts into the
necessity of examining into the unfamiliar
peculiarities and refinements of different
foreign legal systems. . .
The court further noted:
xxx xxx xxx
Applying that test here it appears to us that
the libelant is entitled to succeed, for the
respondents have failed to satisfy us that the
Panamanian period of limitation in question
was specifically aimed against the particular
rights which the libelant seeks to enforce. The
Panama Labor Code is a statute having broad
objectives, viz: "The present Code regulates
the relations between capital and labor,
placing them on a basis of social justice, so
that, without injuring any of the parties, there
may be guaranteed for labor the necessary
conditions for a normal life and to capital an
equitable return to its investment." In
pursuance of these objectives the Code gives
laborers various rights against their
employers. Article 623 establishes the period
of limitation for all such rights, except certain
ones which are enumerated in Article 621.
And there is nothing in the record to indicate
that the Panamanian legislature gave special
consideration to the impact of Article 623
upon the particular rights sought to be
enforced here, as distinguished from the other
rights to which that Article is also applicable.
Were we confronted with the question of
whether the limitation period of Article 621
(which carves out particular rights to be
governed by a shorter limitation period) is to
be regarded as "substantive" or "procedural"
under the rule of "specifity" we might have a
different case; but here on the surface of
things we appear to be dealing with a "broad,"
and not a "specific," statute of limitations
(G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
92-94).
Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which was applied by
NLRC, refers only to claims "arising from the employer's
violation of the employee's right as provided by the Labor Code."
They assert that their claims are based on the violation of their
employment contracts, as amended by the Amiri Decree No. 23
of 1976 and therefore the claims may be brought within ten years
as provided by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
(Rollo, G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp.
18-21). To bolster their contention, they cite PALEA v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976).
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have
prescribed under the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that
there is in force in the Philippines a "borrowing law," which is
Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where such
kind of law exists, it takes precedence over the common-law
conflicts rule (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 45-46).
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on
prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976
or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing
law.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of
employment shall not be actionable after the
lapse of one year from the date of the expiry
of the contract. (G.R. Nos. 105029-31, Rollo,
p. 226).
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in
the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth,
are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the
action is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of
the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International
Law, 131 [1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws
in the sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or
substantive, depending on the characterization given such a
law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the
American court applied the statute of limitations of New York,
instead of the Panamanian law, after finding that there was no
showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended
to be substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law
even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of the forum on
prescription of actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or
substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the
forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical
effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
substance (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A
"borrowing statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the
foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a
foreign law (Siegel, Conflicts, 183 [1975]). While there are
several kinds of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an
action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued, will not
be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not
run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Conflict of Laws, 152-153
[1938]). Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind.
Said Section provides:
If by the laws of the state or country where the
cause of action arose, the action is barred, it
is also barred in the Philippines Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code
of the Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedures as to which were
inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section
48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of
Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot
be enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application
in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim
obnoxious to the forum's public policy (Canadian Northern
Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct. 402, 64 L. ed.
713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question
would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987
Constitution emphasized that:
The state shall promote social justice in all
phases of national development. (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
In article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987
Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for
all.
Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the
Philippine law, the next question is whether the prescriptive
period governing the filing of the claims is three years, as
provided by the Labor Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision
is Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, which in
pertinent part provides:
Money claims-all money claims arising from
employer-employee relations accruing during
the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within
three (3) years from the time the cause of
action accrued, otherwise they shall be
forever barred.
xxx xxx xxx
The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v.
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976) invoked by the
claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 is inapplicable to the cases at
bench (Rollo, p. 21). The said case involved the correct
computation of overtime pay as provided in the collective
bargaining agreements and not the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why petitioners did not
make any reference as to the computation for overtime work
under the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494)
and instead insisted that work computation provided in the
collective bargaining agreements between the parties be
observed. Since the claim for pay differentials is primarily
anchored on the written contracts between the litigants, the ten-
year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil
Code should govern."
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as
amended by R.A. No. 19933) provides:
Any action to enforce any cause of action
under this Act shall be commenced within
three years after the cause of action accrued
otherwise such action shall be forever barred,
....
The court further explained:
The three-year prescriptive period fixed in the
Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as
amended) will apply, if the claim for
differentials for overtime work is solely based
on said law, and not on a collective bargaining
agreement or any other contract. In the instant
case, the claim for overtime compensation is
not so much because of Commonwealth Act
No. 444, as amended but because the claim
is demandable right of the employees, by
reason of the above-mentioned collective
bargaining agreement.
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the
prescriptive period for filing "actions to enforce any cause of
action under said law." On the other hand, Article 291 of the
Labor Code of the Philippines provides the prescriptive period
for filing "money claims arising from employer-employee
relations." The claims in the cases at bench all arose from the
employer-employee relations, which is broader in scope than
claims arising from a specific law or from the collective
bargaining agreement.
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year
prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines applies only to money claims specifically recoverable
under said Code, does not find support in the plain language of
the provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants in G.R.
Nos. 104911-14 that said Article refers only to claims "arising
from the employer's violation of the employee's right," as
provided by the Labor Code supported by the facial reading of
the provision.
VII
G.R. No. 104776
A. As to the first two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776,
claimants aver: (1) that while their complaints were filed on June
6, 1984 with POEA, the case was decided only on January 30,
1989, a clear denial of their right to a speedy disposition of the
case; and (2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should
have declared AIBC and BRII in default (Rollo, pp.
31-35).
Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.
It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of
cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial
and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any
party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials
who are tasked with the administration of justice.
However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153
(1987), "speedy disposition of cases" is a relative term. Just like
the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial" accorded to the
accused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy disposition of
cases" is a flexible concept. It is consistent with delays and
depends upon the circumstances of each case. What the
Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into
consideration in determining whether or not the right to a
"speedy disposition of cases" has been violated, thus:
In the determination of whether or not the right
to a "speedy trial" has been violated, certain
factors may be considered and balanced
against each other. These are length of delay,
reason for the delay, assertion of the right or
failure to assert it, and prejudice caused by
the delay. The same factors may also be
considered in answering judicial inquiry
whether or not a person officially charged with
the administration of justice has violated the
speedy disposition of cases.
Likewise, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298,
(1991), we held:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a
speedy disposition of a case, like the right to
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are
asked for and secured, or when without cause
or justified motive a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried.
Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served
with a copy of the amended complaint, claimants had been
asking that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure to file
their answers within the ten-day period provided in Section 1,
Rule III of Book VI of the Rules and Regulations of the POEA.
At that time, there was a pending motion of AIBC and BRII to
strike out of the records the amended complaint and the
"Compliance" of claimants to the order of the POEA, requiring
them to submit a bill of particulars.
The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such
that their final disposition in the administrative level after seven
years from their inception, cannot be said to be attended by
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate the
constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the cases of
complainants.
The amended complaint filed on June 6, 1984 involved a total of
1,767 claimants. Said complaint had undergone several
amendments, the first being on April 3, 1985.
The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983.
They were deployed in different areas, one group in and the
other groups outside of, Bahrain. The monetary claims totalling
more than US$65 million according to Atty. Del Mundo, included:
1. Unexpired portion of contract;
2. Interest earnings of Travel and Fund;
3. Retirement and Savings Plan benefit;
4. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least
100% of basic pay;
5. Area Differential pay;
6. Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits;
7. Salary differential pay;
8. Wage Differential pay;
9. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to
Social Security System;
10. Refund of Withholding Tax not remitted to
Bureau of Internal Revenue (B.I.R.);
11. Fringe Benefits under Brown & Root's "A
Summary of Employees Benefits consisting of
43 pages (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);
 12. Moral and Exemplary Damages;
13. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of
amounts;
14. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or
cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC and
issued by the POEA; and
15. Penalty for violation of Article 34
(Prohibited practices) not excluding
reportorial requirements thereof (NLRC
Resolution, September 2, 1991, pp. 18-19;
G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 73-74).
Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient
definiteness and clarity of some facts, the claimants were
ordered to comply with the motion of AIBC for a bill of particulars.
When claimants filed their "Compliance and Manifestation,"
AIBC moved to strike out the complaint from the records for
failure of claimants to submit a proper bill of particulars. While
the POEA Administrator denied the motion to strike out the
complaint, he ordered the claimants "to correct the deficiencies"
pointed out by AIBC.
Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response to the
complaint, the records of employment of the more than 1,700
claimants had to be retrieved from various countries in the
Middle East. Some of the records dated as far back as 1975.
The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA
Administrator were interrupted several times by the various
appeals, first to NLRC and then to the Supreme Court.
Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases
were filed against AIBC and BRII on October 10, 1985 (POEA
Cases Nos.
L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-779). Another complaint was filed on
May 29, 1986 (POEA Case No. L-86-05-460). NLRC, in
exasperation, noted that the exact number of claimants had
never been completely established (Resolution, Sept. 2, 1991,
G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 57). All the three new cases were
consolidated with POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
NLRC blamed the parties and their lawyers for the delay in
terminating the proceedings, thus:
These cases could have been spared the long
and arduous route towards resolution had the
parties and their counsel been more
interested in pursuing the truth and the merits
of the claims rather than exhibiting a fanatical
reliance on technicalities. Parties and counsel
have made these cases a litigation of
emotion. The intransigence of parties and
counsel is remarkable. As late as last month,
this Commission made a last and final attempt
to bring the counsel of all the parties (this
Commission issued a special order directing
respondent Brown & Root's resident agent/s
to appear) to come to a more conciliatory
stance. Even this failed (Rollo,
p. 58).
The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the
delay in the disposition of the cases, to the lament of NLRC,
which complained:
It is very evident from the records that the
protagonists in these consolidated cases
appear to be not only the individual
complainants, on the one hand, and AIBC and
Brown & Root, on the other hand. The two
lawyers for the complainants, Atty. Gerardo
Del Mundo and Atty. Florante De Castro, have
yet to settle the right of representation, each
one persistently claiming to appear in behalf
of most of the complainants. As a result, there
are two appeals by the complainants.
Attempts by this Commission to resolve
counsels' conflicting claims of their respective
authority to represent the complainants prove
futile. The bickerings by these two counsels
are reflected in their pleadings. In the charges
and countercharges of falsification of
documents and signatures, and in the
disbarment proceedings by one against the
other. All these have, to a large extent,
abetted in confounding the issues raised in
these cases, jumble the presentation of
evidence, and even derailed the prospects of
an amicable settlement. It would not be far-
fetched to imagine that both counsel,
unwittingly, perhaps, painted a rainbow for the
complainants, with the proverbial pot of gold
at its end containing more than US$100
million, the aggregate of the claims in these
cases. It is, likewise, not improbable that their
misplaced zeal and exuberance caused them
to throw all caution to the wind in the matter of
elementary rules of procedure and evidence
(Rollo, pp. 58-59).
Adding to the confusion in the proceedings before NLRC, is the
listing of some of the complainants in both petitions filed by the
two lawyers. As noted by NLRC, "the problem created by this
situation is that if one of the two petitions is dismissed, then the
parties and the public respondents would not know which claim
of which petitioner was dismissed and which was not."
B. Claimants insist that all their claims could properly be
consolidated in a "class suit" because "all the named
complainants have similar money claims and similar rights
sought irrespective of whether they worked in Bahrain, United
Arab Emirates or in Abu Dhabi, Libya or in any part of the Middle
East" (Rollo, pp. 35-38).
A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy
is one of common or general interest to many and the parties
are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before
the court (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 12).
While all the claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain
Law, many of the claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of
the claimants were deployed in Indonesia and Malaysia under
different terms and conditions of employment.
NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance
that inasmuch as the first requirement of a class suit is not
present (common or general interest based on the Amiri Decree
of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who
worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to file their claims in a class
suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the
nature of the claims is the same (for employee's benefits), there
is no common question of law or fact. While some claims are
based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never
worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus,
each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in
the claims of the other employees of defendants. The named
claimants have a special or particular interest in specific benefits
completely different from the benefits in which the other named
claimants and those included as members of a "class" are
claiming (Berses v. Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473 [1913]). It appears
that each claimant is only interested in collecting his own claims.
A claimants has no concern in protecting the interests of the
other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them
have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into
separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. A
principle basic to the concept of "class suit" is that plaintiffs
brought on the record must fairly represent and protect the
interests of the others (Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 101 Phil. 590 [1957]). For this matter, the claimants
who worked in Bahrain can not be allowed to sue in a class suit
in a judicial proceeding. The most that can be accorded to them
under the Rules of Court is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in
one complaint (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 6).
The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they
are the exceptions to the condition sine qua non, requiring the
joinder of all indispensable parties.
In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem
if the decision secured is favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem
arises when the decision is adverse to them, in which case the
others who were impleaded by their self-appointed
representatives, would surely claim denial of due process.
C. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA
Administrator and NLRC should have declared Atty. Florante De
Castro guilty of "forum shopping, ambulance chasing activities,
falsification, duplicity and other unprofessional activities" and his
appearances as counsel for some of the claimants as illegal
(Rollo, pp. 38-40).
The Anti-Forum Shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is
intended to put a stop to the practice of some parties of filing
multiple petitions and complaints involving the same issues, with
the result that the courts or agencies have to resolve the same
issues. Said Rule, however, applies only to petitions filed with
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled
"Additional Requirements For Petitions Filed with the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals To Prevent Forum Shopping or
Multiple Filing of Petitioners and Complainants." The first
sentence of the circular expressly states that said circular
applies to an governs the filing of petitions in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals.
While Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the
application of the anti-forum shopping rule to the lower courts
and administrative agencies, said circular took effect only on
April 1, 1994.
POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for
unethical conduct against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and
POEA have no jurisdiction to investigate charges of unethical
conduct of lawyers.
Attorney's Lien
The "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien" dated
December 14, 1992 was filed by Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to
protect his claim for attorney's fees for legal services rendered
in favor of the claimants (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 841-844).
A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be filed with the
court or administrative agency which renders and executes the
money judgment secured by the lawyer for his clients. The
lawyer shall cause written notice thereof to be delivered to his
clients and to the adverse party (Revised Rules of Court, Rule
138, Sec. 37). The statement of the claim for the charging lien
of Atty. Del Mundo should have been filed with the administrative
agency that rendered and executed the judgment.
Contempt of Court
The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty.
Florante De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility should be filed in a separate and
appropriate proceeding.
G.R. No. 104911-14
Claimants charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in not
accepting their formula of "Three Hours Average Daily
Overtime" in computing the overtime payments. They claim that
it was BRII itself which proposed the formula during the
negotiations for the settlement of their claims in Bahrain and
therefore it is in estoppel to disclaim said offer (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of
Bahrain dated April 16, 1983, which in pertinent part states:
After the perusal of the memorandum of the
Vice President and the Area Manager, Middle
East, of Brown & Root Co. and the Summary
of the compensation offered by the Company
to the employees in respect of the difference
of pay of the wages of the overtime and the
difference of vacation leave and the perusal
of the documents attached thereto i.e.,
minutes of the meetings between the
Representative of the employees and the
management of the Company, the complaint
filed by the employees on 14/2/83 where they
have claimed as hereinabove stated, sample
of the Service Contract executed between
one of the employees and the company
through its agent in (sic) Philippines, Asia
International Builders Corporation where it
has been provided for 48 hours of work per
week and an annual leave of 12 days and an
overtime wage of 1 & 1/4 of the normal hourly
wage.
xxx xxx xxx
The Company in its computation reached the
following averages:
A. 1. The average duration of the actual
service of the employee is 35 months for the
Philippino (sic) employees . . . .
 2. The average wage per hour for the
Philippino (sic) employee is US$2.69 . . . .
3. The average hours for the overtime is 3
hours plus in all public holidays and
weekends.
4. Payment of US$8.72 per months (sic) of
service as compensation for the difference of
the wages of the overtime done for each
Philippino (sic) employee . . . (Rollo, p.22).
BRII and AIBC countered: (1) that the Memorandum was not
prepared by them but by a subordinate official in the Bahrain
Department of Labor; (2) that there was no showing that the
Bahrain Minister of Labor had approved said memorandum; and
(3) that the offer was made in the course of the negotiation for
an amicable settlement of the claims and therefore it was not
admissible in evidence to prove that anything is due to the
claimants.
While said document was presented to the POEA without
observing the rule on presenting official documents of a foreign
government as provided in Section 24, Rule 132 of the 1989
Revised Rules on Evidence, it can be admitted in evidence in
proceedings before an administrative body. The opposing
parties have a copy of the said memorandum, and they could
easily verify its authenticity and accuracy.
The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by BRII as
contained in the memorandum is another matter. Under Section
27, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, an offer
to settle a claim is not an admission that anything is due.
Said Rule provides:
Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil
cases, an offer of compromise is not an
admission of any liability, and is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror.
This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering
of the record with unwanted evidence but a statement of public
policy. There is great public interest in having the protagonists
settle their differences amicable before these ripen into litigation.
Every effort must be taken to encourage them to arrive at a
settlement. The submission of offers and counter-offers in the
negotiation table is a step in the right direction. But to bind a
party to his offers, as what claimants would make this Court do,
would defeat the salutary purpose of the Rule.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
A. NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which
provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in the
overseas-employment contracts of the claimants. It was of the
belief that "where the laws of the host country are more
favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host
country shall form part of the overseas employment contract." It
quoted with approval the observation of the POEA Administrator
that ". . . in labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation
of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Rollo, pp. 90-94).
AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and
whimsically when it refused to enforce the overseas-
employment contracts, which became the law of the parties.
They contend that the principle that a law is deemed to be a part
of a contract applies only to provisions of Philippine law in
relation to contracts executed in the Philippines.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by
AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host
country became applicable to said contracts if they offer terms
and conditions more favorable that those stipulated therein. It
was stipulated in said contracts that:
The Employee agrees that while in the employ
of the Employer, he will not engage in any
other business or occupation, nor seek
employment with anyone other than the
Employer; that he shall devote his entire time
and attention and his best energies, and
abilities to the performance of such duties as
may be assigned to him by the Employer; that
he shall at all times be subject to the direction
and control of the Employer; and that the
benefits provided to Employee hereunder are
substituted for and in lieu of all other benefits
provided by any applicable law, provided of
course, that total remuneration and benefits
do not fall below that of the host country
regulation or custom, it being understood that
should applicable laws establish that fringe
benefits, or other such benefits additional to
the compensation herein agreed cannot be
waived, Employee agrees that such
compensation will be adjusted downward so
that the total compensation hereunder, plus
the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent
to the compensation herein agreed (Rollo, pp.
352-353).
The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted
more felicitously. While a part thereof provides that the
compensation to the employee may be "adjusted downward so
that the total computation (thereunder) plus the non-waivable
benefits shall be equivalent to the compensation" therein
agreed, another part of the same provision categorically states
"that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the
host country regulation and custom."
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be
interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it
(Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93
SCRA 257 [1979]).
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or
stipulations in a contract shall not favor the
party who caused the obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion
where there is already a prepared form containing the
stipulations of the employment contract and the employees
merely "take it or leave it." The presumption is that there was an
imposition by one party against the other and that the employees
signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their
bargaining power (Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. v. Songco, 25
SCRA 70 [1968]).
Applying the said legal precepts, we read the overseas-
employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions of
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be
governed (Cheshire, Private International Law, 187 [7th ed.]). In
such a case, the foreign law is adopted as a "system" to regulate
the relations of the parties, including questions of their capacity
to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them,
matters of performance, and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d,
150-161).
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties
may just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall
be deemed incorporated into their contract "as a set of terms."
By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the
contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by
the foreign law. The said law does not operate as a statute but
as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract
(Anton, Private International Law, 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris,
The Conflict of Laws, 702-703, [8th ed.]).
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the
parties (Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts, 16
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1, 21 [1977]). Such party
expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties' own
choice of the applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 151
F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The choice of law must, however,
bear some relationship to the parties or their transaction (Scoles
and Hayes, Conflict of Law 644-647 [1982]). There is no
question that the contracts sought to be enforced by claimants
have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the
services were rendered in that country.
In Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board,
117 SCRA 486 (1982), the "Employment Agreement," between
Norse Management Co. and the late husband of the private
respondent, expressly provided that in the event of illness or
injury to the employee arising out of and in the course of his
employment and not due to his own misconduct, "compensation
shall be paid to employee in accordance with and subject to the
limitation of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic
of the Philippines or the Worker's Insurance Act of registry of the
vessel, whichever is greater." Since the laws of Singapore, the
place of registry of the vessel in which the late husband of
private respondent served at the time of his death, granted a
better compensation package, we applied said foreign law in
preference to the terms of the contract.
The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National
Labor Relations Commission, 135 SCRA 278 (1985), relied
upon by AIBC and BRII is inapposite to the facts of the cases at
bench. The issue in that case was whether the amount of the
death compensation of a Filipino seaman should be determined
under the shipboard employment contract executed in the
Philippines or the Hongkong law. Holding that the shipboard
employment contract was controlling, the court differentiated
said case from Norse Management Co. in that in the latter case
there was an express stipulation in the employment contract that
the foreign law would be applicable if it afforded greater
compensation.
B. AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their
right to due process when said administrative agency granted
Friday-pay differential, holiday-pay differential, annual-leave
differential and leave indemnity pay to the claimants listed in
Annex B of the Resolution. At first, NLRC reversed the resolution
of the POEA Administrator granting these benefits on a finding
that the POEA Administrator failed to consider the evidence
presented by AIBC and BRII, that some findings of fact of the
POEA Administrator were not supported by the evidence, and
that some of the evidence were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII
(Rollo, pp. 35-36; 106-107). But instead of remanding the case
to the POEA Administrator for a new hearing, which means
further delay in the termination of the case, NLRC decided to
pass upon the validity of the claims itself. It is this procedure that
AIBC and BRII complain of as being irregular and a "reversible
error."
They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence
submitted on appeal, the same evidence which NLRC found to
have been "unilaterally submitted by the claimants and not
disclosed to the adverse parties" (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were
submitted to the POEA administrator by the claimants after the
cases were deemed submitted for resolution and which were
taken cognizance of by the POEA Administrator in resolving the
cases. While AIBC and BRII had no opportunity to refute said
evidence of the claimants before the POEA Administrator, they
had all the opportunity to rebut said evidence and to present their
counter-evidence before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC and
BRII themselves were able to present before NLRC additional
evidence which they failed to present before the POEA
Administrator.
Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is
enjoined to "use every and all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without
regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process."
In deciding to resolve the validity of certain claims on the basis
of the evidence of both parties submitted before the POEA
Administrator and NLRC, the latter considered that it was not
expedient to remand the cases to the POEA Administrator for
that would only prolong the already protracted legal
controversies.
Even the Supreme Court has decided appealed cases on the
merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for the
reception of evidence, where the same can be readily
determined from the uncontroverted facts on record
(Development Bank of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 190 SCRA 653 [1990]; Pagdonsalan v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 127 SCRA 463 [1984]).
C. AIBC and BRII charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion
when it ordered the POEA Administrator to hold new hearings
for 683 claimants listed in Annex D of the Resolution dated
September 2, 1991 whose claims had been denied by the POEA
Administrator "for lack of proof" and for 69 claimants listed in
Annex E of the same Resolution, whose claims had been found
by NLRC itself as not "supported by evidence" (Rollo, pp. 41-
45).
NLRC based its ruling on Article 218(c) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, which empowers it "[to] conduct investigation for the
determination of a question, matter or controversy, within its
jurisdiction, . . . ."
It is the posture of AIBC and BRII that NLRC has no authority
under Article 218(c) to remand a case involving claims which
had already been dismissed because such provision
contemplates only situations where there is still a question or
controversy to be resolved (Rollo, pp. 41-42).

A principle well embedded in Administrative Law is that the

technical rules of procedure and evidence do not apply to the
proceedings conducted by administrative agencies (First Asian
Transport & Shipping Agency, Inc. v. Ople, 142 SCRA 542
[1986]; Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219
[1987]). This principle is enshrined in Article 221 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines and is now the bedrock of proceedings
before NLRC.

Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of

procedure and evidence in administrative proceedings, there are
cardinal rules which must be observed by the hearing officers in
order to comply with the due process requirements of the
Constitution. These cardinal rules are collated in Ang Tibay v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).

VIII

The three petitions were filed under Rule 65 of the Revised

Rules of Court on the grounds that NLRC had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing
the questioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, all the three petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.