1

Russel vs. Vestil, 304 SCRA 738; GR No. 119347, March 17, 1999
(Civil Procedures – Jurisdiction; Civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation)
Facts: Petitioners discovered a public document, which is a declaration of heirs and deed of
confirmation of a previous oral agreement, of partition, affecting the land executed by and among
the respondents whereby respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion
of petitioners who are entitled thereto as legal heirs also.
Petitioners filed a complaint, denominated “DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND
PARTITION” against defendants with the RTC claiming that the document was false and
perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the
property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the
document be declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the land among all the
heirs.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which
under section 33 (3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the RTC has jurisdiction over
the case since the action is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the
contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the nature of the civil case.
Held: Yes. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, the Supreme Court ruled that:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or
in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in
question. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to
the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is
axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined
by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether
the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein.
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If
it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim.
But, where the primary issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, such are actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence
cognizable by the RTCs.
********
Facts:
Payoyo and Novaline, Inc., through its president, Villena, entered into a contract for the delivery
and installation of kitchen cabinets in Payoyo's residence. The cabinets were to be delivered within
90 days from downpayment of 50% of the purchase price. Payoyo paid the downpayment. Another
contract was entered into for the delivery of home appliances and Villena also paid the 50%
downpayment. Despite demand, Villena failed to install the kitchen cabinets and deliver the
appliances.
Payoyo filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages against Villena. Villena
posits that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint since it is mainly for recovery of a sum
of money in the amount of P184,821.50 which is below the jurisdictional amount set for RTCs.
Payoyo, on the other hand, contends that the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint as the
allegations therein show that it is actually a case for rescission of the contracts. The recovery of a
sum of money is merely a necessary consequence of the cancellation of the contracts.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Held:
Yes. In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it is primarily for
the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the
jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.

Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are the
VILLENA V PAYOYO allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
 2
The complaint, albeit entitled as one for collection of a sum of money with damages, is one
incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, one within the RTC's jurisdiction. The allegations therein
show that it is actually for breach of contract. A case for breach of contract is a cause of action
either for specific performance or rescission of contracts. An action for rescission of contract, as
a counterpart of an action for specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and
therefore falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. The averments in the complaint show that Payoyo
sought the cancellation of the contracts and refund of the downpayments since Villena failed to
comply with the obligation to deliver the appliances and install the kitchen cabinets subject of the
contracts. While the respondent prayed for the refund, this is just incidental to the main action,
which is the rescission or cancellation of the contracts. (Villena vs. Payoyo, G.R. No. 163021,
April 27, 2007)
CEFERINA DE UNGRIA vs. CA
G.R. No. 165777 July 25, 2011
FACTS:
Private filed with the RTC of GenSan a Complaint for ownership, possession and damages, and
alternative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities, and/or for recovery
of Rosario's conjugal share with damages or redemption of the subject land against petitioner
Ceferina de Ungria and defendants. The documents they sought to annul are (1) the Deed of
Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon allegedly executed by Fernando
in favor of Eugenio de Ungria, petitioner's father; and (2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment executed
by Eugenio in favor of petitioner.
Ceferina filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the court has no jurisdiction over the case for failure
of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. Ceferina filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC denied. On the omnibus motion regarding filing fees,
the plaintiffs asserted in its motion that they are charging defendant actual and compensatory
damages such as are proved during the hearing of this case. So also are attorneys fees and moral
damages, all to be proved during the hearing of this case. Since there was no hearing yet, they
are not in a position to determine how much is to be charged. At any rate, if after hearing the Clerk
of Court determine that the filing fees is still insufficient, considering the total amount of the claim,
the Clerk of Court should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require
the private respondent to pay the same. From this Order, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration and clarification on whether plaintiffs should be allowed to continue prosecuting
the case as indigent litigants. RTC again denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction for the nullification of the Orders by the RTC.
The CA dismissed the petition. The CA found that SC Circular No. 7 would not apply where the
amount of damages or value of the property was immaterial; that the Circular could be applied
only in cases where the amount claimed or the value of the personal property was determinative
of the court's jurisdiction. The CA found that respondents had paid the corresponding docket fees
upon the filing of the complaint, thus, the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the
failure to state the amount of damages claimed in the body of the complaint or in the prayer thereof.
The CA found that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it denied petitioner's motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
DISMISS DESPITE RESPONDENTS' NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES.
RULING:
Respondents' complaint was filed in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129.
The first cause of action involves the issue of recovery of possession and interest of the parties
over the subject land which is a real action. Respondents alleged that the assessed value of the
subject land was P12,780.00. Thus, since it is a real action with an assessed value of less
thanP20,000.00, the case would fall under the jurisdiction of the MTC. Notably, however,
respondents in the same Complaint filed alternative causes of action assailing the validity of the
Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest executed by Fernando in favor of petitioner's father.
Respondents also sought for the reconveyance to respondent Rosario of the undivided one-half
portion of the subject land as conjugal owner thereof in case the Deed of Transfer of Rights and
Interest will be upheld as valid; and/or for redemption of the subject land. Clearly, this is a case of
joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of possession of, or any
interest in the real property under contention, but includes an action to annul contracts and
reconveyance which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and, thus, properly within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA VS. LINDO
G.R. No. 208232, March 10, 2014
Facts:
Alfredo R. Bautista (Bautista), petitioner’s predecessor, inherited in 1983 a free-patent land
located in Davao Oriental and covered by OCT No. (1572) P-6144.A few years later, he
subdivided the property and sold it to several vendees, herein respondents, via a notarized deed
of absolute sale dated May 30, 1991. Two months later, OCT No.(1572) P-6144 was canceled
and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in favor of the vendees.
On August 1994, Bautista filed a complaint for repurchase against respondents before the RTC,
anchoring his cause of action on Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. (CA) 141, otherwise
known as the “Public Land Act,” which reads:
“SECTION 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead
 3

provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.” Facts:

During the pendency of the action, Bautista died and was substituted by petitioner, Efipania. Hilario filed a complaint with the RTC against Salvador alleging that they were the co-owners of
Respondents, Sps. Lindo entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners, whereby they the parcel of land where Salvador constructed his house without their knowledge and refused to
agree to cede to Epifania 3,230 sq.m..portion of the property as well as to waive, abandon, vacate despite their demands.
surrender, and withdraw all claims and counterclaims against each other. RTC approve the
compromise agreement on January 2011. Salvodor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He contended
that the complaint did not state the assessed value of the property, which determines the
Other respondents, filed a Motion to Dismissed on February 2013 alleging lack of jurisdiction of jurisdiction of the court.
the RTC on the ground that the complaint failed to state the value of the property sought to be
recovered and alleges that the total value of the properties in issue is only P16,500 pesos. RTC Hilario maintained that the RTC had jurisdiction since their action was an accion reinvindicatoria,
ruled in favor of the respondent dismissing the case. an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject
property, exclusive jurisdiction fell within the said court. Also, in their opposition to Salvador's
Issue: motion to dismiss, they mentioned the increase in the assessed value of the land in the amount of
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the motion for the dismissal of the case on the ground P3.5 million. Moreover, they maintained that their action was also one for damages exceeding
of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. P20,000.00, over which the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction.

Ratio: Issue:

Yes. Jurisdiction of courts is granted by the Constitution and pertinent laws. Jurisdiction of RTCs, Whether or not the action filed by Hilario was an accion reinvindicatoria.
as may be relevant to the instant petition, is provided in Sec. 19 of BP 129.
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Hilario.
Issue:
Whether the action filed by petitioners is one involving title to or possession of real property or Held:
any interest therein or one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The action filed by Hilario did not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They prayed that
Ratio: Salvador vacate the property and restore possession to them. Hence, it was an accion publiciana,
The Court rules that the complaint to redeem a land subject of a free patent is a civil action or one for the recovery of possession of the real property. It was not an aaccion reinvindicatoria
incapable of pecuniary estimation. or a suit for the recovery of possession over the real property as owner.

It is a well-settled rule that jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought. In this regard, the Court, in Russell v. Vestil,
wrote that "in determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim
is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts
or in the RTCs would depend on the amount of the claim." But where the basic issue is
something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction is determined by
the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in
effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the
claims asserted therein.
The complaint did not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property. Absent
any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it could not thus be
determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the action.
The law also explicitly excluded from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand
for interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs.

Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the
Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384 (April 29, 2005) Case Digest decision of the RTC, were null and void.
Ownership > Ownership in General > Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership > Actions hILARIO ANOTHER DIGEST
Available to Owner > Recovery of Real Property > Accion Publiciana and Accion Reinvindicatoria
 4
Petitioners herein are co-owners of a parcel of land located in Romblon. In 1996, they filed a
complaint with the RTC of Romblon against herein, respondent, alleging that as co-owners, they
are entitled to possession of the lot, and that respondent constructed his house thereon without
their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands to do so. They prayed for
the private respondent to vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them. The
complaint, however, failed to allege the assessed value of the land. Nevertheless, petitioners were
able to present during the trial the most recent tax declaration, which shows that the assessed
value of the property was Php 5,950.00.
The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because of the failure
to allege the value of the land. The motion was denied.
Respondent then filed an Answer, traversing the material allegations of the complaint, contending
that petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the conjugal
property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision, holding that
the action was one for the recovery of ownership and possession of real property, and that “absent
any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, the MTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the action” (citing Sec. 33 of R.A. No. 7691). The CA then ordered the refiling of
the case in the proper court.
ISSUES: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action
HELD: NO. Petitioner argues that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion
reivindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, regardless of the assessed
value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court. This argument is
without merit.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined
by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. […] In the case at
bar, the complaint does not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject
of the complaint. The court cannot take judicial
notice of the assessed or market value of land. The Court noted that during the trial, the petitioners
adduced in evidence at ax de c l a r a t ion, showing that the assessed value of the property in
1991 was Php5,950.00. The petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax
declaration containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their complaint in 1996.
Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996,
the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, since the case
involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of less than Php20,000.00.
As the Court of Appeals had held:
“The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria [sic] is, as RA 7691
discloses, the assessed value of the property in question.
For properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds
Php20,000.00, and the MTC, if the value is Php20,000.00 or below. An assessed value can have
reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is contained in
the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and presented
by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them that the property was
worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely no evidence for this, is irrelevant in
the light of the fact that there is an assessed value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that
should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is Php5,950.00.
The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of
Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court
a quo. 24”
In an obiter, the Court discussed the nature of an accion publiciana, thus:
“The action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of
the real property subject matter thereof. It does
not involve a claim of ownership over the property. An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which has
for its object the recovery of possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of
ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana
is one for the recovery of pos session of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment
suit filed after the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding
of possession of the realty. […]”
The Supreme Court finally held that all proceedings before the RTC, including the RTC decision,
are null and void, since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners.
Criticism of the ponencia: The discussion about the distinction between an
 5
accion reivindicatoria and an accion publiciana is inappropriate. The issue to be resolved by the
court is: which court has jurisdiction, the MTC or the RTC? It is immaterial whether the case is one
for accion reivindicatoria or accion publiciana; only one court will have exclusive jurisdiction. I
submit that what should have been discussed in the obiter is that if the claim of co-ownership by
the defendant is true, may a plaintiff co-owner then file an action in ejectment against another co-
owner?
Dr. Tolentino is of the opinion that a co-owner may bring such an action against another co-owner
who takes exclusive possession of and asset ownership in himself alone. The effect of the action
will be to obtain recognition of the co-ownership.
The defendant co-owner, however, cannot be excluded from possession because as co-owner,
he also has the right to possess.
San Pedro vs Asdala
593 SCRA 397
Facts:
Private respondents filed with the MeTC of Q.C. a complaint against petitioners and Wood
Crest Residents Assoc., Inc., for accion reivindicatoria, quieting of title and damages, with prayer
for preliminary injunction. Private respondents alleged that subject property located in Batasan
Hills, Quezon City, with an assessed value of P32,100.00, was titled in the name of spouses
Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio; but petitioners, with malice and evident bad faith, claimed that
they were the owners of a parcel of land that encompasses and covers subject property. Private
respondents had allegedly been prevented from entering, possessing and using subject property.
It was further alleged in the Complaint that petitioners' Transfer Certificate of Title over their alleged
property was spurious. Private respondents then prayed that they be declared the sole and
absolute owners of the subject property; that petitioners be ordered to surrender possession of
subject property to them; that petitioners and Wood Crest and/or its members be ordered to pay
actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees.
Petitioners, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Metc had no jurisdiction, as
the subject of litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The MeTC then issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, ruling that, under Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, the MeTC had exclusive original jurisdiction over actions
involving title to or possession of real property of small value. Their motion for reconsideration
was also denied.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC which was also dismissed.
Petitioners then filed with the CA another petition for certiorari. The CA dismissed the
petition holding that certiorari was not available to petitioners as they should have availed
themselves the remedy of appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTV had jurisdiction over
private respondent’s complaint for accion reivindicatoria.
Held:
Yes they did.
To put the matter to rest, the Court reiterates the ruling in Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha,
Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso, to wit:
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of or for cancellation of
title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that
involve “title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein.”
“Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is
one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of
B.P. 129, or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two
classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, which expanded
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses
and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which
involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P.
129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real
property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded
dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."
 6
Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had jurisdiction over private
respondents' complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria.
MASLAG V MONZON
FACTS: In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint7 for reconveyance of real property with declaration
of nullity of original certificate of title (OCT) against respondents Elizabeth Monzon, William
Geston and the Registry of Deeds of La Trinidad, Benguet.
After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over
petitioner’s property, that cause the respondent to appeal to the RTC of La Trinidad.
October 22, 2003, declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over petitioner’s cause of action.
Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.
On May 4, 2004, Judge Diaz De Rivera issued a Resolution reversing the MTC Decision. to turn
over the possession of the 4,415 square meter land she presently occupies to [Monzon]. This
case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings to determine whether [Maslag] is
entitled to the remedies afforded by law to a builder in good faith for the improvements she
constructed thereon.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal15 from the RTC’s May 4, 2004 Resolution and prayed that the
MTC Decision be adopted.
Respondents moved to dismiss petitioner’s ordinary appeal for being the improper remedy. They
asserted that the proper mode of appeal is a Petition for Review under Rule 42 because the
RTC rendered its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its appellate jurisdiction.
September 22, 2006, The CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal cited the earlier October 22, 2003
Order of the RTC declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over the case. A perusal of the May 4,
2004 Resolution of the RTC, which is the subject matter of the appeal, clearly reveals that it took
cognizance of the MTC case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
ISSUE: W o N the CA was correct in dismissing petitioner’s appeal.
HELD: YES, the CA is correct in affirming RTC decision.
Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive
jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the
subject property.28 Pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129,29 as amended by
Republic Act (RA) No. 7691.
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where x x x the
assessed value of the property exceeds Fifty thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
— Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00)
Judge Cabato, erred in applying Section 19(1) of BP 129 in determining which court has
jurisdiction over the case and in pronouncing that the MTC is divested of original and exclusive
jurisdiction.In the mistaken choice of their remedy, they can blame no one but themselves.
Petition is denied for lack of merit.
Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing Corp.
Facts:Cyborg Leasing Corp filed before the MTC of Manila a case captioned "Damages withprayer for a writ
Replevin" against Conpac and Movers. It was alleged that pursuant toa lease agreement, Cyborg had
delivered one forklift to Conpac. The lease agreementstipulated a monthly rental of P11,000.00 for the use
of the equipment. Conpac failedand refused to pay the stipulated rentals. Petitioner took control of the
operations ofConpac and seized all the cargoes and equipment in ludi g the subject porklift.Petitioner ignored
Cyborg's demand for the return to it of the equipment and the formaldisclaimer of ownership made by Conpac. A Writ
of Replevin was issued.Petitioner was served with a copy of the summons and the latter filed a motion todismiss the
case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the of MTC sincethe complaint had asked
for the actual market value of the equipment, actual damage,,exemplary damages and atty's fees.
MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.Cyborg filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injuction againstMTC Judge, COnpac and Movers before the RTC f Manila. RTC
granted Cyborg'sapplication for premininary injunction. Petitiner assails the decision of RTC. Hence this petition
 7
Issue: WON, MTC has jurisdiction over the complaint?
Held: NOMTC's jurisdiction over the action filed by Cyborg is the concern of the case.
The jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action must be determined by theaverments in the
complaints and the character of the relief sought. The complaint filedby Cyborg with the MTC prayed for the return of
the Nissan Forklift to it as the owner orin the alternative for the payment of 150T plus damages, amount of unpaid
lease andatty's fees.It would be incorrect to argue that the actual damages in the form of unpaid rentalswere just
in incident of the action for the return of the forklift considering that privaterespondent specifically sought
in the complaint not only seizure of the forklift frompetitioner Movers but also payment of unpaid and
outstanding rentals. MTC's dismissing the complaint was properly decreed, Petition for review is granted
Mangaliag v. Pastoral
Facts: Respondent Serquina filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against petitioners
Mangaliag and Solano. This complaint alleges that the Serquina and his co-passengers sustained
serious injuries and permanent deformities from the collision of their tricycle with the petitioners’
dump truck and the gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence of the petitioners in driving
the dump truck. Respondents seek damages in the form of medical expenses amounting to
P71,392.00. Respondents also claim P500,000.00 by way of moral damages, as a further result
of his hospitalization, lost income of P25,000.00 or the nominal damages, and attorney’s fees.
Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim. After pre-trial conference, trial on the merits
ensued. After the respondent rested his case, petitioners testified in their defense. Subsequently,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
They alleged that since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392.00, falls within
the jurisdiction of MTC. Petitioners maintain that the court’s jurisdiction should be based
exclusively on the amount of actual damages, excluding therefrom the amounts claimed as moral,
exemplary, nominal damages and attorney’s fee, etc.
The respondent opposed the motion saying that since the claim for damages is the main action,
the totality of the damages sought to be recovered should be considered in determining
jurisdiction. He relied on Administrative Circular No. 09-94 which provides that “in cases where the
claim for damages is the main cause of action. . . the amount of such claim shall be considered
in determining the jurisdiction of the court” Also, the petitioners’ defense of lack of jurisdiction has
already been barred by estoppel and laches. He contends that after actively taking part in the trial
proceedings and presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would be unfair and legally improper
for petitioners to seek the dismissal of the case.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. Petitioners filed an MR which was denied. Subsequently, they
filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.
Issues: (1) Whether petitioners are barred from raising the defense of the RTC’s lack of
jurisdiction? NO
(2) Whether it is the amount of P71,392.00 as medical expenses, excluding moral, nominal
damages and attorney’s fees, which determines jurisdiction, hence it is MTC which has
jurisdiction? NO
Ruling:
(1) On the matter of estoppel and laches: In the present case, no judgment has yet been
rendered by the RTC. As a matter of fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged
jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence,
finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control the
present controversy. What happened in the Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction
did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been elevated to
the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches. But in this case,
there is no laches. Thus, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Petitioners are not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
(2) On the issue which of the amounts is determinative of jurisdiction: The well-
entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not
the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. In the present
case, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent seeks to recover not
only his medical expenses, lost income but also damages for physical suffering and mental
anguish due to permanent facial deformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular
accident. Viewed as an action for quasi-delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview
of Article 2219 (2), which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict
causing physical injuries.
 8
Private respondent’s claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be considered as merely
incidental to or a consequence of the claim for actual damages. It is a separate and distinct cause
of action or an independent actionable tort. It springs from the right of a person to the physical
integrity of his or her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and
assessable. Hence, the demand for moral damages must be considered as a separate cause of
action, independent of the claim for actual damages and must be included in determining the
jurisdictional amount.
If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the court’s jurisdiction in a case of quasi-delict causing physical
injuries would only be based on the claim for actual damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC,
it can only award moral damages in an amount within its jurisdictional limitations, a situation not
intended by the framers of the law.
(3) (Not really an issue raised by the respondent himself, but was nonetheless
discussed by the SC) On the issue whether a direct recourse by petition for certiorari to the
SC from the order of RTC: Generally a direct recourse to this Court is highly improper, for it
violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Although this
Court, the RTCs and the CA have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a court of last resort, and
must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and
immemorial tradition.
Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as
cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary
remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to
cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the
trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on
the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot
be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict
application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the
appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.
In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving the interpretation and
application of paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94. This legal question and in order
to avoid further delay are compelling enough reasons to allow petitioners’ invocation of this Court’s
jurisdiction in the first instance.
(Maybe it is important to note that the petition for certiorari was filed from the denial of the RTC of
the petitioners’ motion to dismiss. There is no final adjudication yet as to the complaint for
damages.)
MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ROBERT H. CULLEN, Respondent.
Facts:
Respondent (Cullen) purchased from Meridien Land Holding, Inc. (MLHI) condominium Unit No.
1201 of the petitioner. Old title was later cancelled and new title (CCT 64218) was issued in
respondent’s name. On 19 September 2002, petitioner (MPMCC) demanded from Cullen
payment for unpaid association dues and assessments claiming a carry-over of MLHI. Cullen
refused claiming they are being religiously paid. Consequently, Cullen was prevented from
exercising his right to vote and be voted during election of MPMCC’s BOD. When MLHI clarified
that his dues had already been settled and upon MPMCC’s failure to explain why is such, he
filed a Complaint for Damages against MPMCC in RTC Makati, acting as a regular court.
MPMCC and MLHI moved to dismiss mainly on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. On 9
September 2009, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the action falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of HLURB and that the issues raised are intra-corporate between the
corporation and
member.
On appeal, the CA reversed RTC decision holding that the
controversy is an ordinary civil action for damages within the jurisdiction of regular courts. When
motions for
reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed the present
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the controversy is an intra-corporate, not
an ordinary action.
2. Whether or not RTC acting as a special commercial court,
not RTC acting as a regular court, and not HLURB, has
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Ruling:
YES. Petition is Granted. CA Decision is Reversed.
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
 9
determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in
an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction
would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of
the defendant.18 Also illuminating is the Court’s
pronouncement in Go v. Distinction Properties Development
and Construction, Inc.:19
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The nature of an action, as
well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based
on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested
by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all
or some of the claims asserted therein. x x x20
Based on the allegations made by respondent in his complaint,
does the controversy involve intra-corporate issues as would
fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special
commercial court or an ordinary action for damages within the
jurisdiction of regular courts?
In determining whether a dispute constitutes an
intra-corporate controversy, the Court uses two tests, namely,
the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test.21
An intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of
the following relationships: (1) between the corporation,
partnership or association and the public; (2) between the
corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar
as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3)
between the corporation, partnership or association and its
stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4) among
the stockholders, partners or associates themselves.22 Thus,
under the relationship test, the existence of any of the above
intra-corporate relations makes the case intra-corporate.23
Under the nature of the controversy test, "the controversy
must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship, but must as well pertain to the enforcement of
the parties’ correlative rights and obligations under the
Corporation Code and the internal and intra-corporate
regulatory rules of the corporation."24 In other words,
jurisdiction should be determined by considering both the
relationship of the parties as well as the nature of the question
involved.25
Applying the two tests, we find and so hold that the case
involves intra-corporate controversy. It obviously arose from
the intra-corporate relations between the parties, and the
questions involved pertain to their rights and obligations
under the Corporation Code and matters relating to the
regulation of the corporation.26
Admittedly, petitioner is a condominium corporation duly
organized and existing under Philippine laws, charged with the
management of the Medical Plaza Makati. Respondent, on the
other hand, is the registered owner of Unit No. 1201 and is
thus a stockholder/member of the condominium corporation.
Clearly, there is an intra-corporate relationship between the
corporation and a stockholder/member.
The nature of the action is determined by the body rather than
the title of the complaint. Though denominated as an action
for damages, an examination of the allegations made by
respondent in his complaint shows that the case principally
dwells on the propriety of the assessment made by petitioner
against respondent as well as the validity of petitioner’s act in
preventing respondent from participating in the election of the
corporation’s Board of Directors. Respondent contested the
alleged unpaid dues and assessments demanded by
petitioner.
The issue is not novel. The nature of an action involving any
dispute as to the validity of the assessment of association dues
has been settled by the Court in Chateau de Baie
Condominium Corporation v. Moreno.27 In that case,
respondents therein filed a complaint for intra-corporate
dispute against the petitioner therein to question how it
calculated the dues assessed against them, and to ask an
accounting of association dues. Petitioner, however, moved
for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction alleging that since the complaint was against the
owner/developer of a condominium whose condominium
project was registered with and licensed by the HLURB, the
latter has the exclusive jurisdiction. In sustaining the denial of
the motion to dismiss, the Court held that the dispute as to the
validity of the assessments is purely an intra-corporate matter
between petitioner and respondent and is thus within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special
commercial court. More so in this case as respondent
repeatedly questioned his characterization as a delinquent
member and, consequently, petitioner’s decision to bar him
from exercising his rights to vote and be voted for. These
issues are clearly corporate and the demand for damages is
just incidental. Being corporate in nature, the issues should be
threshed out before the RTC sitting as a special commercial
court. The issues on damages can still be resolved in the same
 10
special commercial court just like a regular RTC which is still
competent to tackle civil law issues incidental to
intra-corporate disputes filed before it.28
Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 902-A enumerates the
cases over which the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) exercises exclusive jurisdiction:
To be sure, RA 4726 or the Condominium Act was enacted to
specifically govern a condominium. Said law sanctions the
creation of the condominium corporation which is especially
formed for the purpose of holding title to the common area, in
which the holders of separate interests shall automatically be
members or shareholders, to the exclusion of others, in
proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective
units.34 The rights and obligations of the condominium unit
owners and the condominium corporation are set forth in the
above Act.
Clearly, condominium corporations are not covered by the
amendment. Thus, the intra-corporate dispute between
petitioner and respondent is still within the jurisdiction of the
RTC sitting as a special commercial court and not the HLURB.
The doctrine laid down by the Court in Chateau de Baie
Condominium Corporation v. Moreno35 which in turn cited
Wack Wack Condominium Corporation, et al v. CA36 is still a
good law.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the
Court of Appeals Decision. XXX The Complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58, which is not a
special commercial court, XXX is ordered DISMISSED for
lack of jurisdiction. Let the case be REMANDED to the
Executive Judge of the RTC Makati City for re-raffle
purposes among the designated special commercial
courts.
-
MANOLO P. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his capacityas Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents. (G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004)
Facts:The petitioner, owner/proprietor of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng
Corporation,allegedly sold or offers the sale of garment product using the trademark ³Caterpillar´
to the prejudice of Caterpillar, Inc., private respondent in this case. The respondent filed the case
withthe RTC. The petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense
chargedcontending that the case should be filed with the MTC because violation of unfair
competition is penalized with imprisonment not exceeding 6 years under RA 7691.
Issue:Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual
propertyrights?
Ruling of the Court: The SC held that under Section 163 of the IPC, actions for unfair competition
shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. The law
contemplated in Section 163 of IPC is RA 166 otherwise known as the Trademark Law. Section
27 of theTrademark Law provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks,
unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description or representation, is lodged
with theCourt of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). Since RA 7691 is a general law and
IPC inrelation to Trademark Law is a special law, the latter shall prevail. Actions for unfair
competition therefore should be filed with the RTC.
Summary:
Samson is the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. He was charged with a criminal complaint for unfair
competition with the Quezon City RTC because he sells imitations of Caterpillar products, to the
damage and prejudice of respondent Caterpillar Inc. He filed a motion to suspend arraignment
because of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in another civil case. This was
denied by the trial court. Next, he also filed a motion to quash information alleging that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over him. The Supreme Court ruled against him. In criminal/civil cases involving
infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false
description or representation, is lodged with the RTC, as provided under RA 166 or the Old
Trademark Law. Note that at this time, the IPC was already enacted. However, the IPC did not
repeal the provisions involving jurisdiction, hence, RA 166 as regards jurisdiction is still good
law. Further, there can be no prejudicial question involved in this case. It is important to note that
under unfair competition,
fraud
is the common element. Also, an independent civil action may be filed under Art. 33 of the Civil
Code for fraud. Being an independent civil action, there can be no prejudicial question.
Facts:
Samson is the registered owner of ITTI Shoes. He was charged with two informations for unfair
competition under the Intellectual Property Code (IPC). The following are the pertinent portions of
the informations:
Samson is the owner of ITTI Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufacturing Corporation.
It is located at Robinson’s Galleria, EDSA cor. Ortigas Avenue, QC.
Sometime in November 1999, Samson unlawfully distributed/sold Caterpillar products(footwear,
garments, clothing, bags, accessories) which are closely identical/colorable imitations of the
authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would
cause confusion, mistake or deception on the part of the buying public to the damage and
prejudice of CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner of the following
internationally: “CATERPILLAR”, “CAT”,“CATERPILLAR & DESIGN”, “CAT AND DESIGN”,
“WALKING MACHINES” and “TRACK TYPE TRACTOR & DESIGN.”
 11
Samson filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings because of the existence
of an alleged prejudicial question involved in another case (Civ Case No. Q-00-41446) involving
unfair competition pending in the same RTC branch, as well as a petition for review with the Sec.
of Justice assailing the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution.
RTC denied this.
He then filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction
over the offense.
He contended that since under Section 170 of the IPC, the penalty of imprisonment forunfair
competition does not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Courts and
not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No. 7691.
RTC also denied this.
Hence, this petition.
Issues/Held:
(IMPT) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases for violation of intellectual property
rights?
RTC. Samson is wrong.
Was there a prejudicial question involved in this case as claimed by the accused?
– intellectual property rights under the IPC, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11-SC dated February
NO. Judge correctly dismissed the motion to suspend arraignment.
Whether the pendency of the petition for review with the SOJ on the finding of probable cause for
unfair competition shall suspend the proceedings
– Petitioner also cites the case of Mirpuri in arguing that RA 166 was already repealed totally by the
NO.
Ratio
Jurisdiction Issue
Under Section 170 of the IPC, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the criminal penalty for
infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false
description or representation, is imprisonment from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty
Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand Pesos,
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal and civil) under
Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with
appropriate jurisdiction
under existing laws.
The existing law referred to here is Sec. 27 of RA 166 (The OLD Trademark Law)
It provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition,
false designation of origin and false description or representation, is lodged with the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
Now, Samson is claiming that RA 166 is already repealed by the IPC. However, this is not
so, because:
The repealing clause of the IPC reads that “all acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more
particularly RA 166 (and goes on to cite other laws), are hereby repealed).
The use of the phrases “parts of Acts” and “inconsistent herewith” only means that the repeal
pertains only to provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with the IPC.
Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with Section 163 of R.A. No.
8293.
O
Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights with
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would have expressly stated so under Section163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between a general law
and a special law, the latter must prevail.
In this case, the IPC and RA 166 are special laws conferring jurisdiction over violationsof
intellectual property rights to the RTC.
It should prevail over RA No 7691 (as cited by Samson) which is a general law.
Hence, jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is properlylodged with the
Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is imprisonment of lessthan 6 years, or from 2 to
5 years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations of
19, 2002designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual Property Courts.
On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a Resolution consolidating jurisdiction to hearand
decide Intellectual Property Code and Securities and Exchange Commission cases inspecific
Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Commercial Courts.
IPC. However, such argument has no merit because there is no categorical ruling that violation of
IP rights is lodged with the MTC. Also, the mere passing remark in that case was merely
a backgrounderto the enactment of the IPC and cannot
be construed as a pronouncement in cases for violation of intellectual property rights.
Prejudicial Question Issue
Samson failed to substantiate his allegations of prejudicial question.
In any case, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according tolaw,
proceed independently of each other.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under
Section168 of the IPC is fraud
Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation,
fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
 12
Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as admitted by private respondent also relate to unfair
competition, is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not
operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar.
Petition for Review Issue
According to the Rules, while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of
the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of
60days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
Hence, after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny
the motion to defer arraignment.
In this case, Samson failed to substantiate his allegations/failed to discharge the burden of proving
that he was entitled to a suspension of his arraignment.
His pleadings and annexes do not show the date of filing of the petition of review with the SOJ.
14. In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus
15. MADRIÑAN vs. MADRIÑAN
GR No. 159374
July 12, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were married on July 7,
1993.Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter. After a bitter quarrel on May 18,
2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode and took their three sons with him to Albay and
subsequently to Laguna.
Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch things up between her and
petitioner but failed. She then brought the matter to the Lupong Tagapamayapa in their Barangay,
but this too proved futile. Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of the three sons in
the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioner’s act of leaving the conjugal dwelling and going to
Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their children and deprived them of their
mother’s care. She prayed that petitioner be ordered to appear and produce their sons before the
court and to explain why they should not be returned to her custody.
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take
custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk, frequently went home late at night
or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of her time at a beer house and neglected her
duties as a mother. He claimed that, after their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was respondent
who left, taking their daughter with her. It was only then that he went to Laguna where he worked
as a tricycle driver. He also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under
Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997”) family courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002 but was driven
out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an alcoholic, gambler and drug addict.
Petitioner’s alcoholism and drug addiction impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit
acts of violence against her and their children. The situation was aggravated by the fact that their
home was adjacent to that of her in-laws who frequently meddled in their personal problems.
On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take
cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent was
entitled to the custody of the two younger sons who were at that time aged six and four,
respectively, subject to the visitation rights of petitioner. With respect to eldest son who was then
eight years old, the court ruled that his custody should be determined by the proper family court in
a special proceeding on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA had jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus as jurisdiction
over the case is lodged in the Family Courts under R.A. 8369.
HELD:
RA 8369 did not divest the CA and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus
cases involving custody of minors. The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke
the jurisdiction of the CA and the SC to issue said writ. Said law should be read in harmony with
the provisions of RA 7092 (expanding the jurisdiction of the CA) and BP 129 (the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980) — that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the
SC in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue. This is in fact affirmed
by Administrative Circular 03-03-04-SC, dated April 22, 2004.
In this case, after petitioner moved out of their residence on May 18, 2002, he twice transferred
his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions. By giving the family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases will result in an iniquitous situation leaving individuals like
the respondent without legal recourse in obtaining custody of her children. Individuals who do not
know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek
redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of RA 8369.
 13
Moreover, under, RA 8369, the family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in
custody cases not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued
exclusively by the family courts under said law pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed
of in conjunction with the petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
GARCIA VS DRILON
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection
Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional,
psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by
the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The
trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on
why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no
longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure
to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for
prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said
law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality
was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the
validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust
and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process
clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the
family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows
an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the
complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not raised in the
trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the
Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply
equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did
not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims of violence and
abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the
right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled
that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because violence
is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government
while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds
true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies
is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
22. Tolosa vs NLRC (2008)
G.R. 149578
Facts:
Petitioner was the widow of Capt. Virgilio Tolosa who was hired by Qwana-Kaiun, through its
manning agent, Asia Bulk, to be the master of the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona. His contract
officially began on November 1, 1992, as supported by his contract of employment when he
 14
assumed command of the vessel in Yokohama, Japan. The vessel departed for Long Beach
California, passing by Hawaii in the middle of the voyage. At the time of embarkation, CAPT.
TOLOSA was allegedly shown to be in good health.
During 'channeling activities' upon the vessel's departure from Yokohama sometime on November
6, 1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was drenched with rainwater. The following day, November 7, 1992, he
had a slight fever and in the succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly deteriorated resulting
in his death on November 18, 1992.
When petitioner filed a complaint with the POEA, transferred to the DOLE, NLRC, the Labor Arbiter
ruled in her favor. The NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the labor
commission had no jurisdiction over the subject matter filed by petitioner.
Hence, this appeal.
Summary of Ruling: The Court affirmed the appealed decision. Petitioner's action was recovery
of damages based on a quasi-delict or tort, not adjudication of a labor dispute to which jurisdiction
of labor tribunals is limited. Petitioner is actually suing shipmates Garate and Asis for gross
negligence, and the said shipmates have no employer-employee relations with Capt. Tolosa.
While labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only relief provided by labor laws,
but also damages under the Civil Code, these relief must still be based on an action that has
reasonable causal connection with matters.
Issues and Rulings:
1. Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case (whether the labor arbiter and the NLRC
had jurisdiction over petitioner's action).
Petitioner argues that her cause of action is not predicated on a quasi delict or tort, but on the
failure of private respondents — as employers of her husband (Captain Tolosa) — to provide him
with timely, adequate and competent medical services under Article 161 of the Labor Code:
"ART 161. Assistance of employer. — It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the
necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and
treatment to an injured or sick employee in case of emergency."
Likewise, she contends that Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code vests labor arbiters and the
NLRC with jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in cases arising from employer-employee
relations.
Petitioner also alleges that the "reasonable causal connection" rule should be applied in her favor.
Citing San Miguel Corporation v. Etcuban, she insists that a reasonable causal connection
between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relation confers jurisdiction upon labor
tribunals. She adds that she has satisfied the required conditions: 1) the dispute arose from an
employer-employee relation, considering that the claim was for damages based on the failure of
private respondents to comply with their obligation under Article 161 of the Labor Code; and 2) the
dispute can be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, because the material issue is whether
private respondents complied with their legal obligation to provide timely, adequate and competent
medical services to guarantee Captain Tolosa's occupational safety. We disagree.
We affirm the CA's ruling that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over petitioner's
claim for damages, because that ruling was based on a quasi delict or tort per Article 2176 of the
Civil Code.
REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; LABOR TRIBUNALS; ACTION BASED
ON QUASI DELICT THAT DOES NOT INVOLVE LABOR DISPUTE, NOT INCLUDED - Time and
time again, we have held that the allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the action
and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts. After carefully examining the complaint/position
paper of petitioner, we are convinced that the allegations therein are in the nature of an action
based on a quasi delict or tort. It is evident that she sued Pedro Garate and Mario Asis for gross
negligence.
Petitioner's complaint/position paper refers to and extensively discusses the negligent acts of
shipmates Garate and Asis, who had no employer-employee relation with Captain Tolosa. The
labor arbiter himself classified petitioner's case as "a complaint for damages, blacklisting and
watchlisting (pending inquiry) for gross negligence resulting in the death of complainant's husband,
Capt. Virgilio Tolosa."
We stress that the case does not involve the adjudication of a labor dispute, but the recovery of
damages based on a quasi delict. The jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising
from employer-employee relations, as we ruled in Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani:
"Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters
and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The
jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes
arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the
Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement."
The pivotal question is whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the relief sought by petitioner.
From her paper, it is evident that the primary reliefs she seeks are as follows:
(a) loss of earning capacity denominated therein as "actual damages" or "lost income" and
(b) blacklisting. The loss she claims does not refer to the actual earnings of the deceased, but to
his earning capacity based on a life expectancy of 65 years. This amount is recoverable if the
action is based on a quasi delict as provided for in Article 2206 of the Civil Code, 18 but not in the
Labor Code.
DAMAGES PROVIDED BY THE CIVIL CODE; AWARD PROPER IF RELIEF SOUGHT HAS
CAUSAL RELATIONS WITH LABOR MATTERS - While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC
have jurisdiction to award not only reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by
the Civil Code, these reliefs must still be based on an action that has a reasonable causal
connection with the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.
The central issue is determined essentially from the relief sought in the complaint. In San Miguel
Corporation v. NLRC, this Court held:"It is the character of the principal relief sought that appears
essential in this connection. Where such principal relief is to be granted under labor legislation or
a collective bargaining agreement, the case should fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC, even though a claim for damages might be asserted as an incident to such claim."
 15
The labor arbiter found private respondents to be grossly negligent. He ruled that Captain Tolosa,
who died at age 58, could expect to live up to 65 years and to have an earning capacity of
US$176,400.
LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY; NOT TO BE EQUATED WITH LABOR BENEFITS COGNIZED
IN LABOR DISPUTES - It must be noted that a worker's loss of earning capacity and blacklisting
are not to be equated with wages, overtime compensation or separation pay, and other labor
benefits that are generally cognized in labor disputes. The loss of earning capacity is a relief or
claim resulting from a quasi delict or a similar cause within the realm of civil law.
Claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a reasonable causal connection
with any of the claims provided for in the article in order to be cognizable by the labor arbiter. Only
if there is such a connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be considered as
arising from employer-employee relations. In the present case, petitioner's claim for damages is
not related to any other claim under Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining
agreements.
Petitioner cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the Labor Code, which does not
grant or specify a claim or relief. This provision is only a safety and health standard under Book IV
of the same Code. The enforcement of this labor standard rests with the labor secretary. Thus,
claims for an employer's violation thereof are beyond the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. In other
words, petitioner cannot enforce the labor standard provided for in Article 161 by suing for
damages before the labor arbiter.
REGULAR COURTS HAVE AUTHORITY OVER ACTION FOR DAMAGES PREDICATED ON
QUASI DELICT AND HAS NO CONNECTION WITH LABOR-RELATED CLAIMS - It is not the
NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for damages, in which the
employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in which the cause of action proceeds from
a different source of obligation such as a tort. Since petitioner's claim for damages is predicated
on a quasi delict or tort that has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided
for in Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the
action lies with the regular courts — not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters.
2. Whether or not Evelyn is entitled to the monetary awards granted by the labor arbiter (whether
the monetary award granted by the labor arbiter has already reached finality).
ISSUES NOT RAISED IN COURTS A QUO CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL — Petitioner contends that the labor arbiter's monetary award has already reached
finality, since private respondents were not able to file a timely appeal before the NLRC.
This argument cannot be passed upon in this appeal, because it was not raised in the tribunals a
quo. Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. Thus, points of law, theories, and arguments not brought to the attention of the Court of
Appeals need not — and ordinarily will not — be considered by this Court. Petitioner's allegation
cannot be accepted by this Court on its face; to do so would be tantamount to a denial of
respondents' right to due process.
Furthermore, whether respondents were able to appeal on time is a question of fact that cannot
be entertained in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In general, the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to a review
of errors of law allegedly committed by the court a quo.
23. EVIOTA vs CA Case Digest
FACTS:
Sometime on January 26, 1998, the respondent Standard Chartered Bank and petitioner Eduardo
G. Eviota executed a contract of employment under which the petitioner was employed by the
respondent bank as Compensation and Benefits Manager, VP (M21). Petitioner came up with
many proposals which the bank approved and made preparations of. He was also given privileges
like car, renovation of the office, and even a trip to Singapore at the company’s expense. However,
the petitioner abruptly resigned from the respondent bank barely a month after his employment
and rejoined his former employer. On June 19, 1998, the respondent bank filed a complaint against
the petitioner with the RTC of Makati City for damages brought about his abrupt resignation.
Though petitioner reimbursed part of the amount demanded by Standard, he was not able to pay
it full.
Standard alleged that assuming arguendo that Eviota had the right to terminate his employment
with the Bank for no reason, the manner in and circumstances under which he exercised the same
are clearly abusive and contrary to the rules governing human relations, governed by the Civil
Code.
Further, Standard alleged that petitioner also violated the Labor Code when he terminated his
employment without one (1) notice in advance. This stipulation was also provided in the
employment contract of Eviota with Standard, which would also constitute breach of contract.
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action for damages
of the respondent bank was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under paragraph
4, Article 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. The petitioner averred that the
respondent bank’s claim for damages arose out of or were in connection with his employer-
employee relationship with the respondent bank or some aspect or incident of such
relationship. The respondent bank opposed the motion, claiming that its action for damages was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court. Although its claims for damages incidentally
involved an employer-employee relationship, the said claims are actually predicated on the
petitioner’s acts and omissions which are separately, specifically and distinctly governed by the
New Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
 16
The SC held that the RTC has jurisdiction. Case law has it that the nature of an action and the
subject matter thereof, as well as which court has jurisdiction over the same, are determined by
the material allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for in relation to the law involved.
Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. A money claim by a worker against the employer or
vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a “reasonable causal
connection” between the claim asserted and employee-employer relation. Absent such a link, the
complaint will be cognizable by the regular courts of justice.
Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely
incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of
the Labor Code, as amended, is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee
relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code of the Philippines, other
labor laws or their collective bargaining agreements.
Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217, to
be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the
claims provided for in that article. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can the
claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations.
In this case, the private respondent’s first cause of action for damages is anchored on the
petitioner’s employment of deceit and of making the private respondent believe that he would fulfill
his obligation under the employment contract with assiduousness and earnestness. The petitioner
volte face when, without the requisite thirty-day notice under the contract and the Labor Code of
the Philippines, as amended, he abandoned his office and rejoined his former employer; thus,
forcing the private respondent to hire a replacement. The private respondent was left in a lurch,
and its corporate plans and program in jeopardy and disarray. Moreover, the petitioner took off
with the private respondent’s computer diskette, papers and documents containing confidential
information on employee compensation and other bank matters. On its second cause of action,
the petitioner simply walked away from his employment with the private respondent sans any
written notice, to the prejudice of the private respondent, its banking operations and the conduct
of its business. Anent its third cause of action, the petitioner made false and derogatory
statements that the private respondent reneged on its obligations under their contract of
employment; thus, depicting the private respondent as unworthy of trust.
The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The
other items demanded are not labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance
of in labor disputes, such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The
items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation, intrinsically a
civil dispute.
It is evident that the causes of action of the private respondent against the petitioner do not involve
the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines and other labor laws but the New Civil
Code. Thus, the said causes of action are intrinsically civil. There is no causal relationship
between the causes of action of the private respondent’s causes of action against the petitioner
and their employer-employee relationship. The fact that the private respondent was the erstwhile
employer of the petitioner under an existing employment contract before the latter abandoned his
employment is merely incidental.
Petition is denied.
24. Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. vs. Todaro G.R.
No. 154830 June& 8, 2007
AUSTRIA, MARTINEZ, J.:
The Case:
A petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals and its Resolution denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is
within the jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should be dismissed on the basis
of the doctrine of forum+non+conveniens.
The Facts:
• Antonio D. Todaro (resigned managing director of Betonval Readyconcrete, Inc., a company
engaged in pre5mixed concrete
and concrete aggregate production) was contacted by PIL and asked him if he was available
to join them in connection with
their intention to establish a ready mix concrete plant and other related operations in the
Philippines.
• PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein PIL consented to engage the services of
Todaro as a consultant for two
to three months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready mix concrete
operations should the company
decide to invest in the Philippines.
• PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to comply with its undertaking
to employ Todaro on a permanent basis.
• Todaro filed a complaint for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment against
Pioneer International Limited (PIL),
 17
Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John
G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).
o PIL& – Mother company based in Australia, Cement Aggregate Business
o PPHI 5 PIL’s operating company (on stocks) in the Philippines
o PCPI 5 Undertakes PIL’s business of ready mix concrete, concrete
aggregates and quarrying operations in the Philippines
o McDonald 5 Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL
o Klepzig 5 President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI
• Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC.
• Petitioners contend that since Todaro’s claims for actual, moral and exemplary damages
are solely premised on the alleged breach of employment contract, the present case should be
considered as falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC.
The&Issue: Question of jurisdiction.
The&Ruling:
The complaint was not based on a contract of employment for this was no employer employee
relationship existed between them; it was based on
petitioners' unwarranted breach of their contractual obligation to employ Todaro. It has been
consistently held that where no employer employee relationship exists between the parties and
no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor
statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has
jurisdiction.
MATLING INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL CORP VS COROS
MATLING INDUSTRIAL VS COROS (G.R. NO. 157802 OCTOBER 13, 2010)
Matling Industrial and Commercial Corporation vs Coros
G.R. No. 157802 October 13, 2010
Facts: After his dismissal by Matling as its Vice President for Finance and Administration, the respondent
filed on August 10, 2000 a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal against Matling and some
of its corporate officers (petitioners) in the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The
petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint, raising the ground, among others, that the complaint pertained
to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) due to the controversy being
intracorporate inasmuch as the respondent was a member of Matlings Board of Directors aside from being
its Vice-President for Finance and Administration prior to his termination. The respondent opposed the
petitioners motion to dismiss, insisting that his status as a member of Matlings Board of Directors was
doubtful, considering that he had not been formally elected as such; that he did not own a single share of
stock in Matling, considering that he had been made to sign in blank an undated indorsement of the certificate
of stock he had been given in 1992; that Matling had taken back and retained the certificate of stock in its
custody; and that even assuming that he had been a Director of Matling, he had been removed as the Vice
President for Finance and Administration, not as a Director, a fact that the notice of his termination dated
April 10, 2000 showed. On October 16, 2000, the LA granted the petitioners motion to dismiss, ruling that
the respondent was a corporate officer because he was occupying the position of Vice President for Finance
and Administration and at the same time was a Member of the Board of Directors of Matling; and that,
consequently, his removal was a corporate act of Matling and the controversy resulting from such removal
was under the jurisdiction of the SEC, pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (c) of Presidential Decree No. 902.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is a corporate officer within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
Held: No. As a rule, the illegal dismissal of an officer or other employee of a private employer is properly
cognizable by the LA. This is pursuant to Article 217 (a) 2 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides
as follows:
Article 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission. – (a) Except as otherwise provided
under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within
thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even
in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-
agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates
of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee
relations;
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of
strikes and lockouts; and
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other
claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household
service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P 5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied
with a claim for reinstatement.
(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. (c)
Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those
arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the
Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided
in said agreements.
 18
Where the complaint for illegal dismissal concerns a corporate officer, however, the controversy falls under
the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), because the controversy arises out of
intra-corporate or partnership relations between and among stockholders, members, or associates, or
between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders,
members, or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership, or association and the State
insofar as the controversy concerns their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; or because the
controversy involves the election or appointment of a director, trustee, officer, or manager of such
corporation, partnership, or association. Such controversy, among others, is known as an intra-corporate
dispute.
Effective on August 8, 2000, upon the passage of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The
Securities Regulation Code, the SECs jurisdiction over all intra-corporate disputes was transferred to the
RTC, pursuant to Section 5.2 of RA No. 8799.
Thus, pursuant to the above provision (Section 25 of the Corporation Code), whoever are the corporate
officers enumerated in the by-laws are the exclusive Officers of the corporation and the Board has no
power to create other Offices without amending first the corporate By-laws. However, the Board may
create appointive positions other than the positions of corporate Officers, but the persons occupying such
positions are not considered as corporate officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Corporation
Code and are not empowered to exercise the functions of the corporate Officers, except those functions
lawfully delegated to them. Their functions and duties are to be determined by the Board of
Directors/Trustees.
Moreover, the Board of Directors of Matling could not validly delegate the power to create a corporate
office to the President, in light of Section 25 of the Corporation Code requiring the Board of Directors
itself to elect the corporate officers. Verily, the power to elect the corporate officers was a discretionary
power that the law exclusively vested in the Board of Directors, and could not be delegated to subordinate
officers or agents. The office of Vice President for Finance and Administration created by Matlings
President pursuant to By Law No. V was an ordinary, not a corporate, office.
The criteria for distinguishing between corporate officers who may be ousted from office at will, on one
hand, and ordinary corporate employees who may only be terminated for just cause, on the other hand, do
not depend on the nature of the services performed, but on the manner of creation of the office. In the
respondents case, he was supposedly at once an employee, a stockholder, and a Director of Matling. The
circumstances surrounding his appointment to office must be fully considered to determine whether the
dismissal constituted an intra-corporate controversy or a labor termination dispute. We must also consider
whether his status as Director and stockholder had any relation at all to his appointment and subsequent
dismissal as Vice President for Finance and Administration.
25. LOCSIN v NISSAN LEASE PHILS INC
FACTS: On January 1, 1992, Locsin was elected Executive Vice President and Treasurer
(EVP/Treasurer) of NCLPI. As EVP/Treasurer, his duties and responsibilities included: (1) the
management of the finances of the company; (2) carrying out the directions of the President and/or
the Board of Directors regarding financial management; and (3) the preparation of financial reports
to advise the officers and directors of the financial condition of NCLPI. Locsin held this position for
13 years, having been re-elected every year since 1992, until January 21, 2005, when he was
nominated and elected Chairman of NCLPI’s Board of Directors.
On August 5, 2005, a little over seven (7) months after his election as Chairman of the Board, the
NCLPI Board held a special meeting at the Manila Polo Club. One of the items of the agenda was
the election of a new set of officers. Unfortunately, Locsin was neither re-elected Chairman nor
reinstated to his previous position as EVP/Treasurer.
Aggrieved, on June 19, 2007, Locsin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter
against NCLPI and Banson, who was then President of NCLPI.
On July 11, 2007, instead of filing their position paper, NCLPI and Banson filed a Motion to
Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did not have jurisdiction over the case since the
issue of Locsin’s removal as EVP/Treasurer involves an intra-corporate dispute.
On August 16, 2007, Locsin submitted his opposition to the motion to dismiss, maintaining his
position that he is an employee of NCLPI.
On March 10, 2008, Labor Arbiter Concepcion issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss,
holding that her office acquired “jurisdiction to arbitrate and/or decide the instant complaint finding
extant in the case an employer-employee relationship.”
NCLPI, on June 3, 2008, elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. NCLPI raised the issue on whether the Labor Arbiter committed grave
abuse of discretion by denying the Motion to Dismiss and holding that her office had jurisdiction
over the dispute.
On August 28, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s Order denying the Motion
to Dismiss and ruled that Locsin was a corporate officer. The CA concluded that Locsin does not
have any recourse with the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC since the removal of a corporate officer,
whether elected or appointed, is an intra-corporate controversy over which the NLRC has no
jurisdiction. Instead, according to the CA, Locsin’s complaint for “illegal dismissal” should have
been filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), pursuant to Rule 6 of the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies.
 19
Failing to obtain a reconsideration of the CA’s decision, Locsin filed the present petition.
ISSUE: WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction?
HELD: We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The CA correctly ruled that no employer-employee relationship exists between Locsin and Nissan.
Locsin was undeniably Chairman and President, and was elected to these positions by the Nissan
board pursuant to its By-laws. As such, he was a corporate officer, not an employee. The CA
reached this conclusion by relying on the submitted facts and on Presidential Decree 902-A, which
defines corporate officers as “those officers of a corporation who are given that character either
by the Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws.” Likewise, Section 25 of the Corporation
Code provides that corporate officers are the president, secretary, treasurer and such other
officers as may be provided for in the by-laws. Even as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer, Locsin
already acted as a corporate officer because the position of Executive Vice-President/Treasurer
is provided for in Nissan’s By-Laws. Article IV, Section 4 of these By-Laws specifically provides
for this position.
An “office” is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or
stockholders. On the other hand, an “employee” usually occupies no office and generally is
employed not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the
corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee.
In this case, Locsin was elected by the NCLPI Board, in accordance with the Amended By-Laws
of the corporation. Locsin, therefore, at the time of his severance from NCLPI, was the latter’s
corporate officer.
Given Locsin’s status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC, has
jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his relationship with Nissan. The RTC should
exercise jurisdiction based on the following:
Prior to its amendment, Section 5(c) of PD 902-A provided that intra-corporate disputes fall within
the jurisdiction of the SEC. However, after RA8799 took effect, Subsection 5.2, Section 5 of the
said law transferred said jurisdiction to the RTC.
Based on the above jurisdictional considerations, we would be forced to remand the case to the
Labor Arbiter for further proceedings if we were to dismiss the petition outright due to the wrongful
use of Rule 65. We cannot close our eyes, however, to the factual and legal reality, established
by evidence already on record, that Locsin is a corporate officer whose termination of relationship
is outside a labor arbiter’s jurisdiction to rule upon.
Under these circumstances, we have to give precedence to the merits of the case, and primacy to
the element of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and rule on a case and is the threshold
element that must exist before any quasi-judicial officer can act. In the context of the present case,
the Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the termination dispute Locsin brought, and
should not be allowed to continue to act on the case after the absence of jurisdiction has become
obvious, based on the records and the law. In more practical terms, a contrary ruling will only
cause substantial delay and inconvenience as well as unnecessary expenses, to the point of
injustice, to the parties. This conclusion, of course, does not go into the merits of termination of
relationship and is without prejudice to the filing of an intra-corporate dispute on this point before
the appropriate RTC.
The petition is dismissed and the CA decision is affirmed.
DOLORES GAYOSO VS 22 REAL DEVT CORP
27. SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL.,
plaintiffs-appellees, vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIABAGUIO,
defendants,
MANILA SURETY AND FIDELITY CO., INC. (CEBU BRANCH)
bondingcompany and defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968
FACTS:
Spouses Serafin and Felicitas commenced a civil case against spouses Sibonghanoy to recover
from them a sum of P1, 908.00 with legal interest. A writ of attachment was issued by the court
against the defendants’ properties but the same was soon dissolved. After trial, the court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and after the same had become final and executor, the court
issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The writ being unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved
for the issuance of the writ of execution against
the Surety’s bond. Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the
same was issued without summary hearing. This was denied by the RTC. The Surety appealed in
the CA, which was denied. This time, the surety just asked for an extension in order for them to
file the motion for reconsideration. But instead of filing for a motion for reconsideration, it filed a
motion to dismiss saying that by virtue of R.A. 296 which is the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1948, section 88 of which placed within the exclusive original jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil
action where the value of the subject matter does not exceed P2,000.00. The Court of First
 20
Instance therefore has no jurisdiction over the case. The question of jurisdiction was filed by the
Surety only 15 years from the time the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance.
ISSUE: WON THE CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO THE LACK OF
JURISDICTIONHELD:
No. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is
too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court. The rule is that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusive by law as by law and as the lack of
it affect the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised
at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present
cases, a party may be barred by laches from involving this plea for the first time on appeal for the
purpose of annulling everything done
in the case. A party cannot invoke a court’s jurisdiction and later on deny it to escape a
penalty.
28. CALIMLIM vs HON. RAMIREZG.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982
FACTS:
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel
Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled
and a new one issued in the name of the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the
title not being in his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the Court directing
him to surrender the said title. This prompted Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an ex-
parte petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said
petition was granted by the respondent Court and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a
new title in the name of the corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon learning that her
husband's title over the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent
Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the court
dismissed the petition.
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but
the same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then resorted to the filing of a complaint in for the
cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property,
covered by TCT No. 9138, against Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property
from Independent Mercantile Corporation. Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed
to obtain a title over the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated
on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners. Francisco Ramos filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations.
Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by
prior judgment.
Issue: W/N dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment
HELD: No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in LRC
Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the
filing of the subsequent civil case. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown,
among others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the
proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was
rendered. If there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the
judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. This essential element of
the defense of bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case.
The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an apparent invocation
of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land registration court. Reliance was apparently
placed on Section 112 of the Land Registration Act wherein it provides that a Court of First
Instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. As such,
its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action,
such as, questions involving ownership or title to real property.
31. G.R. No. 151821 April 14, 2004
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, as Successor-in-Interest of BPI Investment
Corporation, petitioner,
vs.
ALS MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE: The jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Regulatory Board (HLURB) over
cases enumerated in Section 1 of PD 1344 is exclusive. It has sole jurisdiction in:
a. A complaint of specific performance for the delivery of a certificate of title to a buyer of a
subdivision lot;
b. For claims of refund regardless of whether the sale is perfected or not; and
c. For determining whether there is a perfected sale of contract.
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
decision of the CA.
Facts:
1. "On July 29, 1985, [petitioner] BPI Investment Corporation filed a complaint for a Sum of
Money against ALS Management and Development Corporation, alleging inter alia that
 21
on July 22, 1983, [petitioner] and [respondent] executed at Makati, Metro Manila a Deed
of Sale for one (1) unfurnished condominium unit of the Twin Towers Condominium
located at Ayala Avenue, corner Apartment Ridge Street, Makati, Metro Manila designated
as Unit E-4A comprising of 271 squares [sic] meters more or less, together with parking
stalls identified as G022 and G-63.
2. The Condominium Certificate of Title No. 4800 of the Registry of Deeds for Makati, Metro
Manila was issued after the execution of the said Deed of Sale.
3. [Petitioner] advanced the amount of P26,300.45 for the expenses in causing the issuance
and registration of the Condominium Certificate of Title.
4. Under the penultimate paragraph of the Deed of Sale, it is stipulated that the VENDEE
[respondent] shall pay all the expenses for the preparation and registration of this Deed
of Sale and such other documents as may be necessary for the issuance of the
corresponding Condominium Certificate of Title.
5. After the [petitioner] complied with its obligations under the said Deed of Sale,
[respondent], notwithstanding demands made by [petitioner], failed and refused to pay
[petitioner] its legitimate advances for the expenses mentioned above without any valid,
legal or justifiable reason.
6. [Respondent] averred among others that it has just and valid reasons for refusing to pay
[petitioner’s] legal claims.
a. In clear and direct contravention of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957
which provides that ‘No fee except those required for the registration of the deed
of sale in the Registry of Deeds shall be collected for the issuance of such title’,
the [petitioner] has jacked-up or increased the amount of its alleged advances for
the issuance and registration of the Condominium Certificate of Title in the name
of the [respondent], by including therein charges which should not be collected
from buyers of condominium units.
b. "[Respondent] further averred that [petitioner] represented to the [respondent]
that the condominium unit will be delivered completed and ready for occupancy
not later than December 31, 1981. [Respondent] relied solely upon the
descriptions and warranties contained in the aforementioned brochures and other
sales propaganda materials when [respondent] agreed to buy Unit E-4A of the
Twin Tower(s) for the hefty sum of P2,048,900.00 considering that the Twin
Towers was then yet to be built. In contravention of [petitioner’s] warranties and
of good engineering practices, the condominium unit purchased by [respondent]
suffered from the following defects and/or deficiencies:
7. Trial court ruled:
1. Ordering the [respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sum of P26,300.45, with legal interest
from the filing of the complaint up to full payment thereof, representing the amount
spent for the registration of the title to the condominium unit in [respondent’s] name;
2. Ordering [petitioner] to deliver, replace or correct at [petitioner’s] exclusive
expense/cost or appoint a licensed qualified contractor to do the same on its behalf,
the following defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit owned by the [respondent.
3. Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] the following:
a. The sum of P40,000.00 representing reimbursement for expenses incurred
for the materials/labor in installing walls/floor titles in 2 bathrooms and bar
counter cabinet.
b. The sum of P136,608.75, representing unearned income
c. The sum of P27,321.75 per month for a period of twenty-one (21) months
(from May 1985 to January 1987), representing unearned income
8. Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s finding that "while [petitioner] succeeded in
proving its claim against the [respondent] for expenses incurred in the registration of [the
latter’s] title to the condominium unit purchased, x x x for its part [respondent] in turn
succeeded in establishing an even bigger claim under its counterclaim."11
9. Hence, this Petition.12
Issues:
Whether or not the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and not the RTC had
jurisdiction over the respondent’s counterclaim--being one for specific performance (correction of
defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit) and damages? YES!
And, whether or not petitioner could still deny the trial court’s jurisdiction after prceeding with the
trial? NO!
The Petition is partly meritorious.
Held:
Contending that it was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) -- not the RTC --
that had jurisdiction over respondent’s counterclaim, petitioner seeks to nullify the award of the
trial court.
As mandated by PD No. 957, the jurisdiction of the HLURB is encompassing. Hence, we said in
Estate Developers and Investors Corporation v. Sarte:15
"x x x. While PD 957 was designed to meet the need basically to protect lot buyers from the
fraudulent manipulations of unscrupulous subdivision owners, sellers and operators, the ‘exclusive
jurisdiction’ vested in the NHA is broad and general -‘to regulate the real estate trade and business’
in accordance with the provisions of said law."
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the HLURB over cases enumerated in Section 1 of PD No. 1344
is exclusive. Thus, we have ruled that the board has sole jurisdiction in a complaint of specific
performance for the delivery of a certificate of title to a buyer of a subdivision lot; 16 for claims of
refund regardless of whether the sale is perfected or not;17 and for determining whether there is a
perfected contract of sale.18
 22
Clearly then, respondent’s counterclaim -- being one for specific performance (correction of
defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit) and damages -- falls under the jurisdiction of the
HLURB as provided by Section 1 of PD No. 1344.
In the present case, petitioner proceeded with the trial, and only after a judgment unfavorable to it
did it raise the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it may no longer deny the trial court’s jurisdiction, for
estoppel bars it from doing so. This Court cannot countenance the inconsistent postures petitioner
has adopted by attacking the jurisdiction of the regular court to which it has voluntarily submitted. 24
The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of submitting one’s case for decision, and then
accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if it is not.25
We also find petitioner guilty of estoppel by laches for failing to raise the question of jurisdiction
earlier. From the time that respondent filed its counterclaim on November 8, 1985, the former could
have raised such issue, but failed or neglected to do so. It was only upon filing its appellant’s brief 26
with the CA on May 27, 1991, that petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction for
Thus, we struck down the defense of lack of jurisdiction, since the appellant therein failed to raise
the question at an earlier stage. It did so only after an adverse decision had been rendered.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals MODIFIED, as follows:
Hereby DELETED is the requirement on the part of petitioner to (1) deliver storage facilities on the
ground floor; (2) pay P136,608.75 for unearned income for the five-month period that the lease
contract was allegedly suspended; (3) correct the alleged passageway in the balcony; (4) pay
P40,000.00 as reimbursement for completion work done by respondent; (5) pay P27,321.75 per
month for a period of twenty-one months for the alleged unearned income during the period when
the condominium unit remained vacant. Petitioner, however, is ORDERED to pay P51,000 as
temperate damages for the termination of the lease contract because of the defects in the
condominium unit. All other awards are AFFIRMED.
33. [G.R. NO. 154295. July 29, 2005]
METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION and/or ROBINA GOKONGWIE-
PE, Petitioners, v. Johnny Pastorin, Respondent.
FACTS:
Johnny Pastorin (Respondent) was employed by Metromedia Times Corporation
(Petitioner) on 10 December 1990 as a Field Representative/Collector. His task entailed the
periodic collection of receivables from dealers of petitioner's newspapers.
Respondent, because of tardiness was supposedly terminated by the petitioner company, but
because of the timely intervention of the union, the dismissal was not effected.
However, he incurred another infraction when he obtained a loan from a magazine dealer and
when he was not able to pay the loan, he stopped collecting the outstanding dues of the
dealer/creditor. After requiring him to explain, respondent admitted his failure to pay the loan but
gave no definitive explanation for the same.
Thereafter, he was penalized with suspension. He was also not allowed to do field work, and was
transferred to a new position. Despite the completion of his suspension, respondent stopped
reporting for work and sent a letter communicating his refusal to accept the transfer. He then filed
a complaint for constructive dismissal, non-payment of backwages and other money claims with
the labor arbiter.
The complaint was resolved in favor of respondent. Petitioner lodged an appeal with the NLRC,
raising as a ground the lack of jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over respondent’s complaint.
Significally, this issue was not raised by petitioner in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and ruled that the LA has no jurisdiction over the case,
it being a grievance issue properly cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator. However, the CA
reinstated the ruling of the CA. The CA held that the active participation of the party against whom
the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-
judicial body where the action is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning
the court or body’s jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the LA during appeal.
HELD:
The SC held that petitioner is not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the LA
during appeal.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action is a
matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine
has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been
applied to situations which were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional
circumstances involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept
of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had
been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception,
but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time honored principle that the
issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon
whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case
 23

was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred,
on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter of law, and
may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel. However, if the lower court
had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as
that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted,
on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position—that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the
principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend
upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.
the parties arose as Eristingcol, admittedly a member of UVAI, now wishes to be exempt from the
application of the canopy requirement set forth in UVAI’s Construction Rules. ***(E.O. No. 535,
which amended Republic Act No. 580 creating the HIGC, transferred to the HIGC the regulatory
and administrative functions over homeowners’ associations originally vested with the SEC as well
as controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership relations. Thereafter, with Republic
Act No. 8763, the foregoing powers and responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to
homeowners’ associations, were transferred to the HLURB.)

Applying the general rule that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction, petitioner is not
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.

Decision of the CA is set aside.

34. Lourdes Eristngcol vs CA, G.R. No.167702. March 20, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner, owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village, Makati City started constructing
a house on her lot but for alleged violation of its Construction Rules and Regulations, respondent
UVAI, an association of homeowners at Urdaneta Village, imposed on her a penalty of
P400,000.00 and barred her workers and contractors from entering the village and working on her
property. This prompted petitioner to file the subject complaint before the RTC. Respondents filed
a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter arguing that it is the
Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes
involving homeowners associations. Petitioner argues that the subject matter of her complaint is
properly cognizable by the regular courts and need not be filed before a specialized body or
commission.

ISSUE: Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)*** which
has jurisdiction?

HELD: HLURB has jurisdiction. Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in determining which
body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider not only the status or relationship of the
parties, but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. To determine
the nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments of the
complaint or petition and the essence of the relief prayed for. Ostensibly, Eristingcol’s complaint,
designated as one for declaration of nullity, falls within the regular courts’ jurisdiction. However,
we have, on more than one occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not determinative
of the nature of the action. A scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcol’s complaint reveals
that the nature of the question subject of this controversy only superficially delves into the validity
of UVAI’s Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation and
application of UVAI’s by-laws, specifically its construction rules. Essentially, the conflict between