Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. vs. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al.

,
G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226120 & 226294, November 8,
2016

Facts:

The issue aroused during the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential
Elections wherein then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte (who subsequently won the
elections) publicly announced that he would allow the burial former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani ("LNMB").

This decision was met by several oppositions, however on August 7, 2016,

Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to AFP Chief of
Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani. The memo is an instruction
for the planning and the preparations to facilitate the ceremonial and security
during the burial,thus, On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez
issued a directive to the Philippine Army on the Funeral Honors and Service for
President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the
Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and

directive violated the Constitution and domestic and international laws?

RULING and RATIO:

The Supreme Court had denied the petitions.

Political question

In the excercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Administrative
Code of 1987 to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of
the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine
purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that
it shall promote national healing and forgiveness.

Locus standi

Petitioners had failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct and
personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. Petitioners
cannot also file as taxpayers. They merely claim illegal disbursement of public
funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB by
either express or implied provision of the Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.
Petitioners Saguisag, et al., as members of the Bar, failed to disclose the direct or
potential injury which they may suffer as a result of the act complained of. Their
interest in this case is too general and the petitioners also failed to prove that the
case is of transcendental importance
Substantive issues

I. the President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with

the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.

Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision

considering that a law should be passed by the Congress to clearly define and
effectuate the principle embodied therein.

Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the Cons
titution is also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional duty of
educational institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and nationalism and
respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on
sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos' ill-gotten
wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is no direct or indirect
prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB. The second sentence of Sec. 17 of
Art. VII is likewise not violated by public respondents. Being the Chief Executive,
the President represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are
enforced by the officials and employees of his or her department. Under the
Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and
proper steps" to carry into execution the law.

II. The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.

The LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in PD
105

P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208
predated P.D. No. 105, the LNMB was not expressly included in the national
shrines enumerated in the latter. The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly
covered in the catchall phrase "and others which may be proclaimed in the future
as National Shrines" is erroneous because: (1) Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to
P.D. No. 105; (2) Following the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem
generis, 138 the LNMB is not a site "of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or
death of great and eminent leaders of the nation,"; and (3) Since its establishment,
the LNMB has been a military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a

self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory
implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992
Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he
is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his
predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed
judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his
mandate.
Albert Wilson Vs. The Honorable Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, et al.;
G.R. No. 189220; December 7, 2016

REYES, J.:

FACTS
This case sprung out of the incarceration and subsequent acquittal of Wilson for
the crime of rape which was the subject of the Court’s ruling in GR. No. 135915
entitled People of the Philippines v. Wilson.

Proceedings in G.R. No. 135915

On September 16, 1996, Wilson, a British national, was accused and charged
with the crime of consummated rape by a 12-year-old girl, the daughter of his
Filipina live-in partner. Wilson was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 171 and was imposed the death penalty. Wilson filed with the Committee,
pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Optional Protocol, a case against the
Republic of the Philippines (RP) for violations of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) specifically: Article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3;
Articles 6; 7; 9; 10, paragraphs 1 and 2; and Article 14, paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 and
6. The Court reversed the ruling of the RTC.

The Present Case

Wilson was released from detention the day after the acquittal. He immediately
left the Philippines for the United Kingdom (UK). Upon his return in the UK,
Wilson sought compensation from the Board of Claims (BOC) of the Department
of Justice (DOJ)] as one who was unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but
released by virtue of an acquittal. Wilson was awarded P14,000.00 as
compensation. On February 21, 2001, Wilson was informed of the BoC-DOJ
award and that he had to claim the compensation in person in the Philippines.
Wilson moved for reconsideration arguing that under R.A. No. 7309, he was
entitled to P40,000.00.Wilson applied for and was denied a tourist visa to travel to
the Philippines due to his presence in the watch list attributed to his overstaying
and his previous conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude The BoC-DOJ,
thereafter, issued Resolution No. 2001-25 dated August 24, 2001 granting Wilson
an additional award of P26,000.00 in addition to the initial amount of P14,000.00
bringing the total award to P40,000.00.

On November 11, 2003, the Committee found that the allegations falling under
Article 14, paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 6 of the ICCPR were inadmissible.

On September 9, 2009, Wilson filed the present petition for mandamus. He

argues that by virtue of the doctrine of transformation, the RP is in breach of an
international obligation since any View issued by the Committee constitutes part of
international law and that the RP is obligated to enforce the same. The RP, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argues that the petition is without merit
and that Wilson was not able to prove that there is any national law giving life to
the ICCPR and Optional Protocol in order for it to have force and effect in our
jurisdiction as required under Article 2(2) of the ICCPR.
ISSUES
Whether or not mamdamus should be granted therefore, the RP should compensate
Wilson.
RULING The petition is without merit.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus is a writ issued to

compel a tribunal to perform an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station, and where there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Yuvienco v. Hon. Canonoy,
etc., et al., and several times reiterated thereafter, the Court held that a purely
ministerial duty must exist and a clear legal right must be established by the
petitioner for mandamus to lie.

There is No Clear and Complete Legal Right

In the case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v.

Health Sec. Duque III stated that a treaty is transformed into domestic law
through a constitutional mechanism. The Court explained:

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the
sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.
The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method
applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law
is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Treaties become part
of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII,
Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that “[n]o treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of. all the members of the Senate.” Thus,
treaties or conventional international law must go through a process
prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal
law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.

There must be an act more than ratification to make a treaty applicable in our
jurisdiction. What was ratified were the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol,
nowhere in the instrument does it say that the View of the Committee forms part of
the treaty.

Any View issued by the Committee only displays “important characteristics of a

judicial decision” and are not per se decisions which may be enforced outright.
These Views, therefore, are mere recommendations to guide the State it is issued
against.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.

 G.R. No. 211269, June 15, 2016

RUBEN E. TIU, Petitioner, v. HON. NATIVIDAD G. DIZON, ACTING

CHAIRPERSON OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, HON.
FRANKLIN JESUS BUCAYU, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, HON. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, Respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
On June 16, 2000, petitioner and two others were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, of
selling, delivering, and giving away to a poseur-buyer 1,977 grams
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, they were sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of P10,000,000.00 each. On March 24,
2009, the Board of Pardons and Parole (BPP) issued Resolution No. 022-3-09
recommending the grant of executive clemency to petitioner, among many others.
On June 3, 2010, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) granted him
"conditional pardon without parole conditions,". The petitioner was informed that
the records of his case were referred back to the BPP. Respondent Natividad G.
Dizon, Chairman of the BPP, that: (a) petitioner's Certificate of Conditional Pardon
without Parole Conditions was not signed by PGMA; (b) consequently, the
documents relative to petitioner's case were returned to the BPP; and lastly,(c) the
BPP had resolved to defer action thereon pending the compliance for executive
clemency.

President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III had signed into law Republic Act
No. (RA) 10592 which increased the Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) of
qualified inmates. Thus, on July 27, 2013, petitioner's carpeta was returned to the
Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City for the re-computation of his time
served. On July 7, 2014, petitioner filed the instant Amended Petition for Habeas
Corpus, insisting on the efficacy and enforceability of his conditional pardon
without parole conditions, which allegedly necessitates his release from prison. He
argues that, since he was granted a "colonist status" by then Director of Corrections
Gaudencio S. Pangilinan (Director of Corrections Pangilinan) as contained in
Correction's Order No. 015-5-2012, his sentence was automatically reduced to
thirty (30) years pursuant to Section 7 (b), Chapter 3, Part II, Book I of the Bureau
of Corrections Operating Manual(BuCor-OM). He also cites sections
5 and 7 of Act No. 2489 which provide for automatic modification of sentence
from life imprisonment to thirty (30) years for prisoners receiving and retaining the
classification of penal colonists or trusties. He claims that his colonist status was
"regularly awarded" by the Director of Corrections whose authority to so classify
him as such is derived from Section 6, Chapter 3, Part II, Book I of the BuCor-
OM. Lastly, petitioner invokes Section 5 of RA 10592, which provides that the
time allowances for good conduct once granted shall not be revoked.
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
argues that a prisoner serving a sentence of life imprisonment receiving and
retaining classification as a penal colonist will automatically have his sentence
modified to only "when receiving the executive approval for this
classification”..

ISSUE:
whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should be issued in favor of petitioner

RULING
NO. Well-settled is the rule that the writ will not issue where the person in
whose behalf the writ is sought is in the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
of record. He failed to show, however, that his further incarceration is no longer
lawful and that he is entitled to relief under a writ of habeas corpus.
It is undisputed, that no individual pardon papers were issued in petitioner's favour,
thereby rendering the grant of executive clemency to him as incomplete and
ineffective

The wording of the law is such that the act of classification as a penal
colonist or trustie is separate from and necessarily precedes the act of
approval by the Executive. Under Section 6, Chapter 3, Part II, Book I of the
BuCor-OM the Director of Corrections may, upon the recommendation of the
Classification Boardof the Bureau of Corrections, classify an inmate as a colonist.
It is crucial, however, that the prisoner not only receives, but retains such
classification, because the grant of a colonist status may, for cause, be revoked at
any time by the Superintendent with the approval of the Director of Corrections.

the reduction of a prisoner's sentence is a partial pardon,and our

Constitution reposes in the President the power and the exclusive prerogative to
extend the same. The 1987 Constitution, specifically under Section 19, Article
VII thereof, provides that the President possesses the power to grant pardons,
along with other acts of executive clemency. He shall also have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

It has long been recognized that the exercise of the pardoning power,
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, demands
the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power.
Stated otherwise, since the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution to act in
person, he may not delegate the authority to pardon prisoners under the doctrine of
qualified political agency, which "essentially postulates that the heads of the
various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the
actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed
the acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts."
 A.M. No. MTJ-16-1869, July 27, 2016

MARIE CHRISTINE D. BANCIL, Complainant, v. HONORABLE

RONALDO B. REYES, PRESIDING JUDGE OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT OF SAN JUAN CITY, BRANCH 58, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is an administrative complaint filed by Marie Christine D. Bancil

(Bancil) against Judge Ronaldo B. Reyes (Judge Reyes), Presiding Judge of
Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan City, Branch 58, for Gross Inefficiency and
Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision/Order.

FACTS

This administrative complaint stems from Criminal Case No. 86928, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Edward Randolph Krieger" which was pending
before Judge Reyes in Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court, San Juan City. Bancil
was the private complainant in the said criminal case for violation of Article 97 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 7394 or the Consumer Act of the Philippines.

On 29 August 2012, Krieger filed an Omnibus Motion for (1) judicial

determination of probable cause and (2) suspension of proceedings. On 19
September 2012, Krieger filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings in view of his
intention to file a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.
On 7 February 2013, or almost five months from the filing of Krieger's Motion to
Defer Proceedings, Bancil filed a Motion to Set Case for Trial with Entry of
Appearance.This was not acted upon by Judge Reyes. Given the inaction of Judge
Reyes, on 25 October 2013, Bancil filed a motion to set the case for arraignment.
Despite the two motions filed by Bancil, Judge Reyes failed to act on the case.
Even the Omnibus Motion filed by Krieger remained not acted upon by Judge
Reyes.

Bancil filed an administrative complaint dated 30 June 2014 against Judge

Reyes for Gross Inefficiency and Undue Delay in Rendering a Decision/Order.
Bancil argued that Judge Reyes failed to comply with Section 15(1), Article VIII
of the Constitution, which provides that all cases or matters filed must be decided
or resolved by the lower courts within three months from the date of submission.
Moreover, Bancil alleged that Judge Reyes violated Section 6, Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as Judge Reyes failed to choose among the
three options given to a judge upon the filing of an Information - (1) dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) if he or
she finds probable cause, issue a warrant of arrest; and (3) in case of doubt as to
the existence of probable cause, order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
Mdthin five days from notice, the issue to be resolved by the court within 30 days
from the filing of the Information. Further, Bancil alleged that there was a violation
of Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conductwhich provides that judges shall
perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently,
fairly, and with reasonable promptness

On 10 October 2014, Judge Reyes filed his Comment to the administrative

complaint, explaining that the delay was due to plain oversight and not through
inefficiency. He attributed the delay to the big number of cases regularly coming
in, including small claims cases which are required to be acted upon within 24
hours, and the conduct of Judicial Dispute Resolution, which is mandated in almost
all cases.

ISSUES
Whether judge Reyes is guilty of undue delay in the speedy disposition of cases.

RULING

Yes. The Constitution expressly provides that all lower courts should decide or
resolve cases or matters within three months from the date of
submission. Accordingly, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct
As a frontline official of the Judiciary, a trial judge should at all times act with
efficiency and probity. He is duty-bound not only to be faithful to the law, but also
to maintain professional competence. The pursuit of excellence ought always to be
his guiding principle. Such dedication is the least that he can do to sustain the trust
and confidence that the public have reposed in him and the institution he
represents. To further impress upon judges such mandate, the Court has issued
guidelines (Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999) that would
insure the speedy disposition of cases and has therein reminded judges to
scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution. Ha

We have also been consistent in holding that the delay of a judge of a lower court
in resolving motions and incidents within the reglementary period as prescribed by
the Constitution is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. In this case,
Judge Reyes failed to act, within the prescribed period, on the case and the motions
filed by both Bancil and Krieger. Necessarily, an administrative sanction is in
order.

Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering
a decision or order is considered a less serious offense which is punishable by:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
(1) nor more than three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00. 24

WHEREFORE, we find Judge Ronaldo B. Reyes, Presiding Judge of

Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan City, Branch 58, GUILTY of Undue Delay
in Rendering an Order and impose on him a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000). He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act
in the future shall merit a more severe sanction.
 Rebecca Fullido Vs. Gino Grilli; G.R. No. 215014; February 29, 2016
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Grilli, an Italian national, met Fullido in Bohol and courted her. In 1995,
Grilli decided to build a residential house where he and Fullido would stay
whenever he would be vacationing in the country. Grilli financially assisted
Fullido in procuring a lot located in Biking I, Dauis, Bohol, from her parents which
was registered in her name under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 30626.
On the said property, they constructed a house, which was funded by Grilli. Upon
completion, they maintained a common-law relationship and lived there whenever
Grilli was on vacation in the Philippines twice a year. In 1998, Grilli and Fullido
executed a contract of lease, a memorandum of agreement (MOA) and a special
power of attorney (SPA), to define their respective rights over the house and lot.

The lease contract stipulated, among others, that Grilli as the lessee, would
rent the lot, registered in the name of Fullido, for a period of fifty (50) years, to be
automatically renewed for another fifty (50) years upon its expiration in the
amount of P10,000.00 for the whole term of the lease contract; and that Fullido as
the lessor, was prohibited from selling, donating, or encumbering the said lot
without the written consent of Grilli. The pertinent provisions of the lease contract
over the house and lot are as follows: The said lease contract was duly registered in
the Register of Deeds of Bohol. The MOA, on the other hand, stated, among
others, that Grilli paid for the purchase price of the house and lot; that ownership
of the house and lot was to reside with him; and that should the common-law
relationship be terminated, Fullido could only sell the house and lot to whomever
Grilli so desired. Lastly, the SPA allowed Grilli to administer, manage, and
transfer the house and lot on behalf of Fullido. Initially, their relationship was
harmonious, but it turned sour after 16 years of living together. Both charged each
other with infidelity. They could not agree who should leave the common property,
and Grilli sent formal letters to Fullido demanding that she vacate the property, but
these were unheeded. On September 8, 2010, Grilli filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction against Fullido before
the MCTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 244.

The MCTC Ruling In its decision, dated March 31, 2011, the MCTC dismissed
the case after finding that Fullido could not be ejected from their house and lot.
The MCTC opined that she was a co-owner of the house as she contributed to it by
supervising its construction

The RTC Ruling In its decision, dated April 26, 2012, the RTC reversed and set
aside the MCTC decision. The RTC was of the view that Grilli had the exclusive
right to use and possess the house and lot by virtue of the contract of lease
executed by the parties..

The CA Ruling The CA upheld the decision of the RTC emphasizing that in an
ejectment case, the only issue to be resolved would be the physical possession of
the property. The CA was also of the view that as Fullido executed both the MOA
and the contract of lease, which gave Grilli the possession and use of the house and
lot, the same constituted as a judicial admission that it was Grilli who had the
better right of physical possession.

ISSUES

Whether or not the petitioner should be ejected from the house and ownership of
such house should be vested to a foreigner.

RULING

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his
right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. In this case,
Fullido chiefly asserts that Grilli had no right to institute the action for unlawful
detainer because the lease contract and the MOA, which allegedly gave him the
right of possession over the lot, were null and void for violating the Constitution.
Contrary to the findings of the CA, Fullido was not only asserting that the said
contracts were merely voidable, but she was consistently invoking that the
same were completely void.Grilli, on the other hand, contends that Fullido could
not question the validity of the said contracts in the present ejectment suit unless
she instituted a separate action for annulment of contracts. Thus, the Court is
confronted with the issue of whether a contract could be declared void in a
summary action of unlawful detainer.

Under the circumstances of the case, the Court answers in the affirmative.

A void contract cannot be the source of any right; it cannot be utilized in an

ejectment suit. The lease contract and the MOA circumvent the constitutional
restraint against foreign ownership of lands.

Under Section 1 of Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, natural resources shall
not be alienated, except with respect to public agricultural lands and in such cases,
the alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. Concomitantly, Section 5 thereof
states that, save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall
be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. The
prohibition on the transfer of lands to aliens was adopted in the present 1987
Constitution, under Sections 2, 3 and 7 of Article XII thereof. Agricultural
lands, whether public or private, include residential, commercial and industrial
lands. The purpose of prohibiting the transfer of lands to foreigners is to uphold the
conservation of our national patrimony and ensure that agricultural resources
remain in the hands of Filipino citizens.

The prohibition, however, is not limited to the sale of lands to foreigners. It also
covers leases of lands amounting to the transfer of all or substantially all the rights
of dominion. In the landmark case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Lui She
states that “if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a
piece of land by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise
dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the
arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests
himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of the right to
dispose of it — rights which constitute ownership. If this can be done, then the
Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave
peril.

G.R. No. 195975, September 05, 2016

TAINA MANIGQUE-STONE, Petitioner, v. CATTLEYA LAND, INC., AND

SPOUSES TROADIO B. TECSON AND ASUNCION ORTALIZ-
TECSON, Respondents.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The sale of Philippine land to an alien or foreigner, even if titled in the name of
his Filipino spouse, violates the Constitution and is thus, void.

FACTS

Sometime in July 1992, Cattleya Land, Inc. (Cattleya) sent its legal counsel,
Atty. Federico C. Cabilao, Jr. (Atty. Cabilao, Jr.), to Tagbilaran City to investigate
at the Office of the Register of Deeds in that city the status of the properties of
spouses Col. Troadio B. Tecson (Col. Tecson) and Asuncion Tecson (collectively,
Tecson spouses), which Cattleya wanted to purchase.

On August 30, 1993, the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale covering
the subject property. This Deed of Absolute Sale was also entered in the Primary
Book on October 4, 1993, per Entry No. 87549. However, neither the Contract of
Conditional Sale nor the Deed of Absolute Sale could be annotated on the
certificate of title covering the subject property because the then Register of Deeds
of Bohol, Atty. Narciso S. De la Serna (Atty. De la Serna) refused to annotate both
deeds. According to Atty. De la Serna it was improper to do so because of the writ
of attachment that was annotated on the certificate of title of the subject property,
in connection with the said Civil Case No. 3399.

The writ of attachment on the certificate of title to the subject property was,
however, lifted, after the parties in Civil Case No. 3399 reached an amicable
settlement or compromise agreement. Even then, however, Cattleya did not still
succeed in having the aforementioned Deed of Absolute Sale registered, and in
having title to the subject property transferred to its name, because it could not
surrender the owner's copy of TCT No. 17655, which was in possession of the
Tecson spouses. According to Cattleya, the Tecson spouses could not deliver TCT
No. 17655 to it, because according to the Tecson spouses this certificate of title
had been destroyed in a fire which broke out in Sierra Bullones, Bohol. This claim
by the Tecson spouses turned out to be false, however, because Atty. Cabilao, Jr.
came to know, while following up the registration of the August 30, 1993 Deed of
Absolute Sale at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bohol, that the owner's
copy of TCT No. 17655 had in fact been presented by Taina at the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Bohol, along with the Deed of Sale that was executed by the
Tecson spouses, in favor of Taina who is married to a foreigner, covering the
subject property. Cattleya instituted against Taina a civil action for quieting of title
and/or recovery of ownership and cancellation of title with damages.

The RTC of Bohol gave judgment for Cattleya which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE

Is the sale to a a foreigner married to a Filipino spouse volatile of the constitution?

RULING YES.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or

conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.

Given the plain and explicit language of this constitutional mandate, it has been
held that "[a]liens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is
the conservation of the national patrimony."

In the case at bench, Taina herself admitted that it was really Mike who paid with
his own funds the subject lot; hence, Mike was its real purchaser or buyer. More
than that, it bears stressing that if the deed of sale at all proclaimed that she (Taina)
was the purchaser or buyer of the subject property and this subject property was
placed under her name, it was simply because she and Mike wanted to skirt or
circumvent the constitutional prohibition barring or outlawing foreigners or aliens
from acquiring or purchasing lands in the Philippines. Indeed, both the CA and the
RTC exposed and laid bare Taina's posturing and pretense for what these really
are: that in the transaction in question, she was a mere dummy, a spurious stand-in,
for her erstwhile common-law husband, who was not a Filipino then, and never
attempted to become a naturalized Filipino citizen thereafter.

The same absolute constitutional proscription was reiterated anew in the

comparatively recent case of Matthews v. Taylor,

In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find and so hold that Benjamin

has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and
petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring
private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to
be the designated 'vendee' in the Deed of Sale of said property, she
acquired sole ownership there[of]. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin's
claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such
contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor;
no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be
made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property
of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question
the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so
doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect [to]
conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect
controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be
declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest
and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer
or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to
have. (Citation omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016

JOSE M. ROY III, Petitioner, v. CHAIRPERSON TERESITA

HERBOSA,THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, AND
PHILILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.

WILSON C. GAMBOA, JR., DANIEL V. CARTAGENA, JOHN WARREN

P. GABINETE, ANTONIO V. PESINA, JR., MODESTO MARTIN Y.
MAMON III, AND GERARDO C. EREBAREN, Petitioners-in-Intervention,

PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., Respondent-in-Intervention,

SHAREHOLDERS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

INC., Respondent-in-Intervention.

CAGUIOA, J.:

FACTS:

On June 28, 2011, the Court issued the Gamboa Decision, the dispositive
portion that PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term "capital" in
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock
entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to
common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and
non-voting preferred shares). Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and
Exchange Commission is DIRECTED to apply this definition of the term "capital"
in determining the extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.
The Gamboa Decision attained finality. On November 6, 2012, the SEC posted a
Notice in its website inviting the public to attend a public dialogue and to submit
comments on the draft memorandum circular on the guidelines to be followed in
determining compliance with the Filipino ownership requirement in public utilities
under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution pursuant to the Court's directive
in the Gamboa Decision. On April 22, 2013, petitioner Atty. Jose M. Roy III
("Roy") submitted his written comments on the draft guidelines.

On May 20, 2013, the SEC, through respondent Chairperson Teresita J.

Herbosa, issued SEC-MC No. 8 entitled "Guidelines on Compliance with the
Filipino-Foreign Ownership Requirements Prescribed in the Constitution and/or
Existing Laws by Corporations Engaged in Nationalized and Partly Nationalized
Activities." It was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Business
Mirror on May 22, 2013. On June 10, 2013, petitioner Roy, as a lawyer and
taxpayer, filed the Petition, assailing the validity of SEC-MC No. 8..

ISSUES:
(1) whether the SEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing SEC-MC No. 8 in
light of the Gamboa Decision and Gamboa Resolution, and
(2) whether the SEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that PLDT is compliant
with the constitutional limitation on foreign ownership.

RULING
A. no actual case or controversy and locus standi
Petitioners have failed to show that there IS an actual case or controversy which is
ripe for adjudication. Firstly, unlike in Gamboa, the identity of the public utility
corporation, the capital of which is at issue, is unknown. Secondly, petitioners fail
to allege or show how their hypothetical illustration will directly and adversely
affect them. The Court has previously emphasized that the locus standi requisite is
not met by the expedient invocation of one's citizenship or membership in the bar
who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government
are legally and validly issued as these supposed interests are too general, which are
shared by other groups and by the whole citizenry.

The ratio of the court in the Gamboa Decision and Gamboa Resolution.

The sole issue in the Gamboa case was: "whether the term 'capital' in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to the total common shares only
or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting
preferred shares) of PLDT, a public utility." To which the court directly answered
the Issue and consistently defined the term "capital" as in Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election
of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to
the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non voting
preferred shares. Considering that common shares have voting rights which
translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting
rights, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only
to common shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in
the election of directors, then the term "capital" shall include such preferred shares
because the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is
exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term
"capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of
stock that can vote in the election of directors. The Court adopted the foregoing
definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
in furtherance of "the intent and letter of the Constitution that the 'State shall
develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos' [because a] broad definition unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-
important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the public utility."
For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine
nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full
beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is
essential. Thus, stocks, the voting rights of which have been assigned or transferred
to aliens cannot be considered held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals.

Was the definition of the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution declared for the first time by the Court in the Gamboa Decision
modified in the Gamboa Resolution? The Court is convinced that it was not. the
Court, reiterated that both the Voting Control Test and the Beneficial Ownership
Test must be applied to determine whether a corporation is a "Philippine
national"74 and that a "Philippine national," as defined in the FIA and all its
predecessor statutes, is "a Filipino citizen, or a domestic corporation "at least
sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote," is
owned by Filipino citizens. A domestic corporation is a "Philippine national" only
if at least 60% of its voting stock is owned by Filipino citizens."

G.R. No. 202050, July 25, 2016

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL OIL COMPANY AND PNOC DOCKYARD &

ENGINEERING CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. KEPPEL PHILIPPINES
HOLDINGS, INC., Respondent.

BRION, J.:

FACTS

Almost 40 years ago or on 6 August 1976, the respondent Keppel

Philippines Holdings, Inc. (Keppel) entered into a lease agreement5 (the
agreement) with Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (Lusteveco) covering 11 hectares
of land located in Bauan, Batangas. The lease was for a period of 25 years for a
consideration of P2.1 million. At the option of Lusteveco, the rental fee could be
totally or partially converted into equity shares in Keppel. At the end of the 25-year
Jease period, Keppel was given the "firm and absolute option to purchase8the
land for P4.09 million, provided that it had acquired the necessary
qualification to own land under Philippine laws at the time the option is
exercised. Apparently, when the lease agreement was executed, less than 60% of
Keppel's shareholding was Filipino-owned, hence, it was not constitutionally
qualified to acquire private lands in the country. If, at the end of the 25-year lease
period (or in 2001), Keppel remained unqualified to own private lands, the
agreement provided that the lease would be automatically renewed for another 25
years. When the petitioner Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC) acquired
the land from Lusteveco and took over the rights and obligations under the
agreement, Keppel did not object to the assignment so long as the agreement was
annotated on PNOC's title. On 8 December 2000, Keppel wrote PNOC informing
the latter that at least 60% of its shares were now owned by
Filipinos Consequently, Keppel expressed its readiness to exercise its option to
purchase the land. Keppel reiterated its demand to purchase the land several times,
but on every occasion, PNOC did not favourably respond. To compel PNOC to
comply with the Agreement, Keppel instituted a complaint for specific
performance with the RTC on 26 September 2003 against PNOC. PNOC
countered Keppel's claims by contending that the agreement was illegal for
circumventing the constitutional prohibition against aliens holding lands in the
Philippines. The RTC rendered a decision23in favour of Keppel and ordered
PNOC to execute a deed of absolute sale upon payment by Keppel of the
purchase price Affirming the RTC decision in toto, the CA upheld Keppel's right
to acquire the land..

PNOC argues that the CA failed to resolve the constitutionality of the

agreement. It contends that the terms of the agreement amounted to a virtual sale of
the land to Keppel who, at the time of the agreement's enactment, was a foreign
corporation and, thus, violated the 1973 Constitution. On the other hand, Keppel
maintains the validity of both the agreement and the option contract it contains. It
opposes the claim that there was "virtual sale" of the land, noting that the option is
subject to the condition that Keppel becomes qualified to own private lands in the
Philippines and that This condition ripened in 2000, when at least 60% of Keppel's
equity became Filipino-owned, meetings the requirements that have been agreed
upon.

ISSUES Whether or not the agreement is constitutional and whether or not

Keppel's equity ownership meets the 60% Filipino-owned capital requirement of
trie Constitution.

RULING

1. The agreement is constitutional.

Preserving the ownership of land, whether public or private, in Filipino

hands is the policy consistently adopted in all three of our constitutions. Under the
Constitutions, no private land shall be transferred, assigned, or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. Consequently, only Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations whose capital is 60% owned by Filipinos citizens, are constitutionally
qualified to own private lands. Upholding this nationalization policy, the Court has
voided not only outright conveyances of land to foreigners, but also arrangements
where the rights of ownership were gradually transferred to foreigners.

The agreement was executed to enable Keppel to use the land for
its shipbuilding and ship repair business. Undoubtedly, the establishment and
operation of a shipyard business involve significant investments. Keppel's
uncontested testimony showed that it incurred P60 million costs solely for
preliminary activities to make the land suitable as a shipyard, and subsequently
introduced improvements worth P177 million. Taking these investments into
account and the nature of the business that Keppel conducts on the land, we find it
reasonable that the agreement's terms provided for an extended duration of the
lease and a restriction on the rights of Lusteveco.

II. Keppel's constitutional right to acquire full title to the land

In Gamboa v. Teves the Court declared that the "legal and beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of
Filipino nationals." the Court decreed that the 60% Filipino ownership
requirement applies separately to each class of shares, whether with or without
voting rights,the same should be applied to the ownership of public and private
lands, since the same proportion of Filipino ownership is required and the same
nationalist policy pervades. The uncontested fact is that, as of November 2000,
Keppel's capital is 60% Filipino-owned. However, there is nothing in the records
showing the nature and composition of Keppel's shareholdings, i.e., whether its
shareholdings are divided into different classes, and 60% of each share class is
legally and beneficially owned by Filipinos - understandably because when Keppel
exercised its option to buy the land in 2000, the Gamboa ruling had not yet been
promulgated. The Court cannot deny Keppel its option to buy the land by
retroactively applying the Gamboa ruling without violating Keppel's vested right.
Thus, Keppel's failure to prove the nature and composition of its shareholdings in
2000 could not prevent it from validly exercising its option to buy the land. In this
case, Keppel must be allowed to prove whether it meets the required Filipino
equity ownership and proportion in accordance with the Gamboa ruling before it
can acquire full title to the land. Thus, the Court AFFIRMS the decision,
and REMANDS the case to the RTC for the determination of whether the
respondent. meets the required Filipino equity ownership and proportion in
accordance with the Court's ruling in Gamboa v. Teves.a