PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA), Petitioner

Versus
COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND REYNALDO A. VILLAR, CHAIRMAN,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent
G.R. No. 189767, July 3, 2012

FACTS OF THE CASE

The PEZA Board of Director were granted per diems by PEZA for every attendance
in a board meeting. On September 13, 2007, the PEZA Auditor Corazon V. Espao
issued Notice of Disallowance to ex officio members of the PEZA Board.
On October 31, 2007, the Deputy Director General for Finance and Administration of
PEZA moved to reconsider the subject Notices of Disallowance (NDs) and prayed
that the concerned ex officio members be allowed to retain the per diems already
received as they received them in good faith. In a letter dated November 16, 2007,
PEZA Auditor Espao denied the motion for reconsideration. She stated that the
PEZA Management continued paying the per diems even after they were duly
notified through said NDs that such was in violation of the Constitution as explained
in the Civil Liberties Union case. By letter dated January 4, 2008, PEZA Director
General Lilia B. De Lima appealed the denial of their motion for reconsideration to
the Office of the Cluster Director, COA. De Lima reiterated their claim of good faith
contending that the Del Callar case had yet to be decided with finality when the
subject per diems were disbursed. In a 2nd Indorsement dated March 17, 2008, the
COA Cluster Director, Ma. Cristina Dizon-Dimagiba, denied PEZAs appeal. She
ruled that PEZAs claim of good faith cannot be given merit because in several other
instances previous payments of per diems have been disallowed. On April 30, 2008,
PEZA filed a petition for review before the COA to assail the denial of its appeal by
the Office of the Cluster Director. PEZA reiterated the same arguments it raised in
its appeal. On September 15, 2009, the COA rendered the assailed decision denying
PEZAs petition for review.

ISSUES
Does the PEZA have legal basis in granting per diems to the ex officio members of
its Board? And if there is no legal basis, was there good faith in PEZAs grant and
the ex officio members receipt of the per diems?

COURT RULING
It bears stressing that the Civil Liberties Union case was promulgated in 1991, or a
decade before the subject disallowed payments of per diems for the period starting
2001 were made by PEZA. Thus, even if the Bitonio case was only promulgated in
2004 when part of the disallowed payments have already been made, PEZA should
have been guided by the Civil Liberties Union case and acted with caution. It would
have been more prudent for PEZA, if it honestly believed that there is a clear legal
basis for the per diems and there was a chance that this Court might rule in their
favor while the Bitonio case was pending, to withhold payment of the per diem
instead of paying them. PEZAs actual knowledge that the disbursements are being
questioned by virtue of the notices of disallowance issued to them by the COA and
knowledge of the pronouncements of the Court in the Civil Liberties Union case and
in other cases where ex officio members in several government agencies were
prohibited from receiving additional compensation, militate against its claim of good
faith.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the present petition is DISMISSED. The
assailed COA Decision No. 2009-081 dated September 15, 2009 is AFFIRMED and
UPHELD.

NO COSTS.
 H. SOHRIA PASAGI DIAMBRANG, Petitioner
Versus
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND H. HAMIM SARIP
PATAD, Respondent
G.R. No. 201809, October 11, 2016
FACTS OF THE CASE
Petitioner H. Sohria Pasagi Diambrang (Diambrang) and respondent H. Hamim
Sarip Patad (Patad) were candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Kaludan,
Nunungan, Lanao del Norte in the 25 October 2010 Barangay Elections. Patad
obtained 183 votes while Diambrang obtained 78 votes. However, the Barangay
Board of Canvassers (BBOC) proclaimed Diambrang as the duly elected Punong
Barangay based on the assumption that Patad was disqualified for being a fugitive
from justice. Patad filed a petition to annul Diambrang’s proclamation. On 11
August 2011, the COMELEC Second Division annulled Diambrang’s proclamation.
On 30 January 2012, the COMELEC En Banc annulled the proclamation of
Diambrang and ordered the first ranked Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Kaludan to
succeed as the new Punong Barangay.

ISSUES
Whether Diambrang can be proclaimed as the elected Punong Barangay in view of
Patad’s disqualification.

COURT RULING
The electorate's awareness of the candidate's disqualification is not a prerequisite for
the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying
circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate's disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed
second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in
the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates.

Clearly, the prevailing ruling is that if the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio,
the candidate is not considered a candidate from the very beginning even if his
certificate of candidacy was cancelled after the elections.

Patad's disqualification arose from his being a fugitive from justice. It does not
matter that the disqualification case against him was finally decided by the
COMELEC En Banc only on 14 November 2011. Patad's certificate of candidacy
was void ab initio. As such, Diambrang, being the first-placer among the qualified
candidates, should have been proclaimed as the dulyelected Punong Barangay of
Barangay Kaludan, Nunungan, Lanao del Norte. However, due to supervening
events as we previously discussed, Diambrang can no longer hold office.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for being moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE M. ROY III, Petitioner

Versus

CHAIRPERSON TERESITA HERBOSA,THE SECURITIES AND

EXCHANGE COMMISSION, AND PHILILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.
 WILSON C. GAMBOA, JR., DANIEL V. CARTAGENA, JOHN WARREN
P. GABINETE, ANTONIO V. PESINA, JR., MODESTO MARTIN Y.
MAMON III, AND GERARDO C. EREBAREN, Petitioners-in-Intervention,

PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., Respondent-in-Intervention,

SHAREHOLDERS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,

INC., Respondent-in-Intervention

G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioners file a special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court seeking to annul Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 2013 (SEC-MC
No. 8) issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for allegedly being
in violation of the Court's Decision (GamboaDecision) and Resolution
(Gamboa Resolution) in Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Teves, G.R. No. 176579,
respectively promulgated on June 28, 2011, and October 9, 2012, which
jurisprudentially established the proper interpretation of Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution.

ISSUES
1. Whether the SEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing SEC-MC No. 8 in
light of the Gamboa Decision and Gamboa Resolution.

2.Whether the SEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that PLDT is
compliant with the constitutional limitation on foreign ownership.

COURT RULING
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court rules that SEC-MC No. 8 is not contrary
to the Court's definition and interpretation of the term "capital". Accordingly, the
petitions must be denied for failing to show grave abuse of discretion in the issuance
of SEC-MC No. 8.

Ultimately, the key to nationalism is in the individual. Particularly for a public utility
corporation or association, whether stock or non-stock, it starts with the Filipino
shareholder or member who, together with other Filipino shareholders or members
wielding 60% voting power, elects the Filipino director who, in turn, together with
other Filipino directors comprising a majority of the board of directors or trustees,
appoints and employs the all-Filipino management team. This is what is envisioned
by the Constitution to assure effective control by Filipinos. If the safeguards, which
are already stringent, fail, i.e., a public utility corporation whose voting stocks are
beneficially owned by Filipinos, the majority of its directors are Filipinos, and all its
managing officers are Filipinos, is proalien (or worse, dummies), then that is not the
fault or failure of the Constitution. It is the breakdown of nationalism in each of the
Filipino shareholders, Filipino directors and Filipino officers of that corporation. No
Constitution, no decision of the Court, no legislation, no matter how ultra-
nationalistic
they are, can guarantee nationalism.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DENIES the Petition and

Petition-in-Intervention.
SO ORDERED.

HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, HON.

DANILO S. CRUZ, HON. BENJAMIN T. POZON, HON. SALVADOR V.
TIMBANG, JR., AND THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
(IBP), Petitioners
Versus
HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, HON. MICHAEL
FREDERICK L. MUSNGI, HON. MA. GERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG,
HON. DANILO S. SANDOVAL, HON. WILHELMINA B. JORGE-WAGAN,
HON. ROSANA FE ROMERO-MAGLAYA, HON. MERIANTHE PACITA
M. ZURAEK, HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, AND HON. VICTORIA C.
FERNANDEZ-BERNARDO, Respondent
G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016
FACTS OF THE CASE
The Petitioners file a Quo Warranto under Rule 66 and Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 with Application for Issuance of Injunctive Writs filed by petitioners
Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo (Aguinaldo) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Muntinlupa City, Branch 207; Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra (Alhambra) of RTC,
Manila, Branch 53; Judge Danilo S. Cruz (D. Cruz) of RTC, Pasig City, Branch 152;
Judge Benjamin T. Pozon (Pozon) of RTC, Makati City, Branch 139; Judge Salvador
V. Timbang, Jr. (Timbang) of RTC, Las Piñas City, Branch 253; and the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondents former President Benigno Simeon
C. Aquino III (Aquino), Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa (Ochoa),
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Michael Frederick L. Musngi (Musngi),
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Ma. Geraldine Faith A. Econg (Econg), Atty.
Danilo S. Sandoval (Sandoval), Atty. Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan (Jorge-Wagan),
Atty. Rosana Fe Romero-Maglaya (Romero Maglaya), Atty. Merianthe Pacita M.
Zuraek (Zuraek), Atty. Elmo M. Alameda (Alameda), and Atty. Victoria C.
Fernandez-Bernardo (Fernandez-Bernardo). The Petition assails President Aquino's
appointment of respondents Musngi and Econg as Associate Justices of the
Sandiganbayan.

ISSUES
1. Whether President Aquino violated Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution and gravely abused his discretionary power to appoint members
of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the
nominees for each specific vacant position of Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice.

2. Whether the appointment of respondents Musngi and Econg as

Sandiganbayan Associate Justices are valid.

COURT RULING
President Aquino did not violate the Constitution or commit grave abuse of
discretion in disregarding the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for
the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice.

Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the Members of the
Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from
a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy.”

The appointment process for the Judiciary seems simple enough if there is only one
vacancy to consider at a time. The power of the President to appoint members of the
Judiciary is beyond question, subject to the limitation that the President can only
appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by the JBC for every
vacancy. However, the controversy in this case arose because by virtue of Republic
Act No. 10660, creating two new divisions of the Sandiganbayan with three
members each, there were six simultaneous vacancies for Associate Justice of said
collegiate court; and that the JBC submitted six separate shortlists for the vacancies
for the 16th to the 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DISMISSES the instant Petition

for Quo Warranto and Certiorari and Prohibition for lack of merit. The
Court DECLARES the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar
Council UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the appointments of respondents Associate
Justices Michael Frederick L. Musngi and Geraldine Faith A. Econg, together with
the four other newly-appointed Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan, as VALID.
The Court further DENIES the Motion for Intervention of the Judicial and Bar
Council in the present Petition, but ORDERS the Clerk of Court En Banc to docket
as a separate administrative matter the new rules and practices of the Judicial and
Bar Council which the Court took cognizance of in the preceding discussion as Item
No.2: the deletion or non-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of the
Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the
removal of incumbent Senior Associate Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants
of the Judicial and Bar Council, referred to in pages 35 to 40 of this Decision. The
Court finally DIRECTS the Judicial and Bar Council to file its comment on
said Item Nos. 2 and 3 within thirty (30) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ROSARIO R. ESCAÑO, CHIEF JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER, HUMAN

RESOURCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCE
SERVICES, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, Complainant,

Versus
ADRIAN P. MANAOIS, HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT OFFICER
III, HUMAN RESOURCE DIVISION, COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, Respondent.

A.M. No. 16-02-01-CTA, November 15, 2016

FACTS OF THE CASE

Complainant Ma. Rosario R. Escaño (Escaño) initiated an administrative case
against respondent Adrian P. Manaois (Manaois) dated February 25, 2015 for
grossly disrespectful behavior, discourtesy in the course of official duties, gross
insubordination, knowingly making false statements against co-employees, being
notoriously undesirable, neglect in the performance of duty, failure to act promptly
on letters and requests, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

ISSUES
1. Whether the power to discipline justices, judges and court employees
is constitutionally vested in the Supreme Court.

COURT RULING
The proceedings below were essentially investigative and the hearing committee's
actions were merely recommendatory. The hearing committee did not directly
impose any sanction on Manaois. In fact, it was explicitly stated in the dispositive
portion that the penalty was "subject to the approval of the Supreme Court." 54 The
hearing committee acted within the bounds of its authority, as embodied in Rule II
Section 14 of the CTA EROD, the governing rules on disciplinary cases involving
CTA employees, to wit:

Sec. 14. Referral of the CTA's Formal Investigation Report on the

Administrative cases to the Supreme Court - Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). The CTA's Formal Investigation Report (including
all the records of the administrative case) for the meting out of the proper
penalty(ies), which has already become final, shall be submitted by the CTA
to the Supreme Court, through the OCA, within fifteen (15) days therefrom,
for its approval. The Supreme Court may affirm, reverse or modify the
CTA's Formal Investigation Report.

However, in cases where the CTA's Formal Investigation Report imposes only a
penalty of suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or a fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty (30) days' salary, and have already become final, the same shall be
deemed immediately executory by the CTA without further need of submitting the
aforesaid Formal Investigation Report to the Supreme Court.

In promulgating the CTA EROD, the CTA knew the extent of its disciplinary
authority under OCA Circular No. 30-91. It made the same delineation between light
offenses and grave/less grave offenses as prescribed in the circular. Because the
charges against Manaois involved grave55 and less grave56offenses, the hearing
committee correctly limited itself to conducting an investigation, recommending
penalties, and forwarding the case to this Court for appropriate action. The hearing
committee, therefore, did not usurp the Court's administrative power over the
employees of the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Adrian P. Manaois GUILTY of simple
neglect of duty, discourtesy in the course of official duties, frequent unauthorized
absences, and being notoriously undesirable. Accordingly, he is meted with the
penalty of DISMISSAL from the service with the accessory penalties of cancellation
of his eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from
holding public office, and bar from taking civil service examinations.

SO ORDERED.

HONORABLE ALVIN P. VERGARA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY

MAYOR OF CABANATUAN CITY, AND SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD
OF CABANATUAN CITY, Petitioners
Versus
LOURDES MELENCIO S. GRECIA, REPRESENTED BY RENATO
GRECIA, AND SANDRA MELENCIO IN REPRESENTATION OF MA.
 PAZ SALGADO VDA. DE MELENCIO, CONCHITA MELENCIO,
CRISTINA MELENCIO AND LEONARDO MELENCIO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 185638, August 10, 2016
FACTS OF THE CASE
The subject of this petition is a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-101793, with an area of 7,420 square meters, more or less, situated in
Barangay Barrera, Cabanatuan City, and registered under the name of the
respondents.

Sometime in 1989, the subject land was taken by the Sanggunian for road-right-of-
way and road widening projects. Despite the taking of the subject land and the
completion of the road widening projects, the Sanggunian failed to tender the just
compensation to the respondents. Upon the request of Lourdes,
the Sanggunian created an appraisal committee, composed of City Assessor of
Cabanatuan Lorenza L. Esguerra as Chairman, with City Treasurer Bernardo C.
Pineda and City Engineer Mac Arthur C. Yap as members, to determine the proper
amount of just compensation to be paid by the Sanggunian for the subject land. The
Appraisal Committee then issued Resolution No. 20-S-2001 recommending the
payment
Of P 2,295.00 per sq.m as just compensation.

Thereafter, the Sanggunian issued Resolution No. 148-2000 authorizing Mayor

Vergara to negotiate, acquire, purchase and accept properties needed by
the Sanggunian for its project.

More than four years had lapsed after the signing of the MOA but no payment was
ever made.
In a letter dated November 18, 2005, Mayor Vergara said that
the Sanggunian denied the ratification of the MOA per its Resolution No. 129-2002
on the ground of fiscal restraint or deficit of the Sanggunian. Aggrieved, on
December 29, 2005, the respondents filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC
of Cabanatuan City, which was raffled to Branch 86 and rendered its Order in favor
of the respondents. Undeterred, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES
1. Whether there is propriety in the partial execution of the judgment pending
appeal.
COURT RULING
The taking of the respondents' subject land without the benefit of expropriation
proceedings and without payment of just compensation, clearly resulted in an
"expropriate now, pay later" situation, which the Court abhors. It has been more than
two decades since the petitioners took the subject land without a timely expropriation
proceeding and without the petitioners exerting efforts to negotiate with the
respondents.

In sum, the respondents have waited too long before the petitioners fully pay the
amount of the just compensation due them. Since the trial court had already made
the proper determination of the amount of just compensation in accordance with law
and to forestall any further delay in the resolution of this case, it is but proper to
order the petitioners to pay in full the amount of P17,028,900.00 representing the
just compensation of the subject land. Furthermore, the respondents are entitled to
an additional grant of interest, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. In accordance
with existing jurisprudence, the award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P200,000.00 is proper, as well as attorney's fees equivalent to one percent (1%)
Of the total amount due.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 8, 2008 and
the Resolution dated December 5, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
97851 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Honorable Alvin P. Vergara, in
his capacity as Mayor of Cabanatuan City, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cabanatuan are hereby ordered to PAY Lourdes Melencio S. Grecia, represented by
Renato Grecia, and Sandra Melencio, in representation of Ma. Paz Salgado Vda. De
Melencio, Conchita Melencio, Cristina Melencio and Leonardo Melencio the
amount of Seventeen Million Twenty-Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos
(P17,028,900.00) representing the just compensation of the subject land, exemplary
damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), and
attorney's fees equivalent to one percent (1%) of the amount due. Lastly, legal
interest shall be pegged at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, from the time
of judicial demand on December 29, 2005. Thereafter, or beginning July 1, 2013,
until fully paid, just compensation shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum.

SO ORDERED.

SUBIDO PAGENTE CERTEZA MENDOZA AND BINAY LAW

OFFICES, Petitioner
Versus
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
AND THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY
ITS MEMBERS, HON. AMANDO M. TETANGCO, JR., GOVERNOR OF
THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, HON. TERESITA J. HERBOSA,
CHAIRPERSON OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
AND HON. EMMANUEL F. DOOC, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF
THE INSURANCE COMMISSION, Respondents
G.R. No. 216914, December 06, 2016
FACTS OF THE CASE
The Petitioners files a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court the constitutionality of Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9160,
the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended, specifically the Anti-Money
Laundering Council's authority to file with the Court of Appeals (CA) in this case,
an ex-parte application for inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments,
including related accounts based on probable cause.
In 2015, a year before the 2016 presidential elections, reports abounded on the
supposed disproportionate wealth of then Vice President Jejomar Binay and the rest
of his family, some of whom were likewise elected public officers. The Office of the
Ombudsman and the Senate conducted investigations and inquiries thereon
ostensibly based on their respective powers delineated in the Constitution.
From various news reports announcing the inquiry into then Vice President Binay's
bank accounts, including accounts of members of his family, petitioner Subido
Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm (SPCMB) was most concerned with
the article published in the Manila Times on 25 February 2015 entitled "Inspect
Binay Bank Accounts".
The Court of Appeals (CA) has officially issued an order for examination of Vice
President Jejomar Binay's bank accounts.
ISSUES
1. Whether Section 11 is violative of the Constitutional right to privacy
enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the Constitution.
COURT RULING
Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte application and inquiry
by the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive
due process, there being no physical seizure of property involved at that stage. It is
the preliminary and actual seizure of the bank deposits or investments in question
which brings these within reach of the judicial process, specifically a determination
that the seizure violated due process. In fact, Eugenio delineates a bank inquiry order
under Section 11 from a freeze order under Section 10 on both remedies' effect on
the direct objects, i.e. the bank deposits and investments:
On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any
form of physical seizure of property of the account holder. What the bank inquiry
order authorizes is the examination of the particular deposits or investments in
banking institutions or non-bank financial institutions. The monetary instruments or
property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a
physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder's
record of deposits and transactions. Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the
records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or
hidden by the account holder. Said records are in the possession of the bank and
therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the account holder alone as that
would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.
At the stage in which the petition was filed before us, the inquiry into certain bank
deposits and investments by the AMLC still does not contemplate any form of
physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property. From this cite, we proceed to
examine whether Section 11 of the law violates procedural due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160, as
amended, is declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
 ANIANO DESIERTO (SUBSTITUTED BY SIMEON V. MARCELO) AND
MAUCENCIA ORDONEZ, Petitioners
Versus
RUTH EPISTOLA AND RODOLFO GAMIDO, Respondents
G.R. No. 161425, November 23, 2016

FACTS OF THE CASE

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated 16 December
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68508 which reversed the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon's (Ombudsman) finding that respondents are
administratively liable for simple neglect of duty and grave misconduct.

Respondent Ruth Epistola (Epistola), now deceased, was a public school teacher and
class adviser, while Rodolfo Gamido was a Barangay Captain. Respondents are
related.

This case arose from the death of Rustom Ordoñez (Rustom) due to drowning when
he went to the river to gather water lilies for a class project. Rustom was a Grade V
student at Bone North Elementary School in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya. According to
Rustom's classmate, Jhomel Patinio (Jhomel), Rustom, Harold Rafanan, Jayson
Acosta and Rolly Fei Acosta were ordered by their class adviser Epistola to gather
water lilies for the beautification of the school lagoon on 12 March 1999.2 On the
following day, Rustom sought permission from his grandmother Maucencia
Ordoñez (Maucencia) to collect water lilies. Maucencia forbade Rustom from going
but the latter sneaked out of the house and went to the river to gather lilies.

Armed with Jhomel's 22 July 1999 Sworn Statement, Maucencia filed a criminal
complaint on 8 December 1999 against Epistola before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon for reckless imprudence.

On 22 February 2000, Jhomel retracted his previous statement and attested that he
heard Epistola assign Harold, and not Rustom, to gather water lilies. His Affidavit
was sworn before Gamido.
Yet, on 16 June 2000, Jhomel executed another affidavit repudiating his earlier
retraction.

On 12 July 2000, Maucencia filed an administrative complaint against respondents

and five other teachers of Bone North before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon for coercing Jhomel to retracting his statement on Epistola’s complicity
in Rustom’s death.

Jayson executed an affidavit on 22 March 1999 before Barangay Captain Gamido

narrating that he was one of those assigned by Epistola to gather water lilies.

Two days earlier or on 1 October 2000, a purported affidavit from Jhomel made the
following clarifications: that he was made to sign a prepared affidavit on 16 June
2000 in the house of Maucencia; that the same was not explained to him nor did he
appear before the Notary Public; that his statement on 22 February 2000 given at the
principal's office in the presence of Gamido was not obtained by force, intimidation
or threat for it was voluntarily given and even read and explained to him by his
father; and that his 22 July 1999 retraction was also signed in the house of
Maurencia.

However, Jhomel executed an Affidavit dated 22 January 2001 denying that he

executed or signed the 1 October 2000 affidavit. He alleged that his signature
appearing thereon was forged.
On 7 June 2001, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found Epistola
guilty of simple neglect of duty for ordering Rustom to gather water lilies.

On 16 December 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Decision and
Resolution of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman filed a petition for review on 18 February 2004 defending its
factual findings as to the administrative liability of respondents.

Epistola died on 19 December 2006 while Gamido was no longer the Barangay
Captain of Bone North as of 14 March 2003.

With respect to Epistola, the Court issued a Resolution dated 24 August 2009
dismissing the instant petition against her.

ISSUES
1. Whether the Ombudsman had authority to conduct an investigation
over the case that was filed one year after the occurrence of the act complained
of.

COURT RULING
Clearly, Section 20 of R.A. 6770 does not prohibit the Ombudsman from conducting
an administrative investigation after the lapse of one year, reckoned from the time
the alleged act was committed. Without doubt, even if the administrative case was
filed beyond the one (1) year period stated in Section 20(5), the Ombudsman was
well within its discretion to conduct the administrative investigation.
Furthermore, it was settled in the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano that
the administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school
teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the
Department of Education. The fact that a referral to the proper committee would
have been the prudent thing to do does not operate to divest the Ombudsman of its
constitutional power to investigate government employees including public school
teachers.

All told, we reiterate that there is no justiciable controversy in view of the mootness
of the suspension due to
the fact that Gamido is no longer the barangay chairman of Bone North.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED for being moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.