DIVISION

[GR No. 200577, Aug 17, 2016 ]

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. CAROLINA P. JUEN +

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

FACTS:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision dated July 8, 2011 and Resolution dated February 10, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 100240, setting aside the Resolution No. 061183 dated July
12, 2006 and Resolution No. 071209 dated June 22, 2007 of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). The Resolutions of the CSC affirmed the CSC Regional Office V's (CSCRO V) Order
dated January 16, 2004, finding Carolina P. Juen (respondent), Budget Officer I, Municipality of
Placer, Masbate, guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.

Based on a letter-complaint, the respondent was investigated by the GSCRO V for allegedly
having paid another person take the Civil Service Professional Examination (CSPE) given on
December 20, 1996 on her behalf. The respondent denied the allegation.

However, after preliminary investigation, the CSCRO V found that there existed a prima
facie case for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service against the respondent. It found that, after a comparison of the respondent's picture
submitted in the Personal Data Sheet and with the picture of the person who took the exam as
found in the Picture Seat Plan, the respondent was not the one who actually took the examination
but caused somebody to take the exam on her behalf. The respondent was, thus, formally charged
with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
directed to submit an answer within 72 hours from receipt of the formal charge.

In her Answer, the respondent reiterated that she personally took the CSPE on December 20,
1996 and denied that she paid someone else to take the examination for her. She stated that she
was never given the chance to examine the documents which constituted the charge against her.

Initial hearing for the case was set on September 4, 2003 at the CSCRO V, Rawis, Legaspi City.

When the case was called on September 5, 2003, only the prosecution appeared. It was allowed
to present its evidence ex-parte and, thereafter, rested its case. At the same hearing, the
respondent was directed to present their evidence on November 15, 2003 and was warned that
failure to do so at the appointed day and time shall constitute as a waiver. The respondent failed
to present her evidence on November 15, 2003.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

RULING:

While, as a general rule, the Court has held that the death of the respondent does not preclude a
finding of administrative liability, it is not without exception. The Court stated in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Dechavez that from a strictly legal point of view and as held in a long line of
cases, jurisdiction, once it attaches, cannot be defeated by the acts of the respondent, save only
where death intervenes and the action does not survive.

The Court has, in a long line of cases, stated that due process in administrative proceedings
requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the respondents' right to a
hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit supporting evidence, must be
observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some
basis to support itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered
on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own
consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the
views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that the
respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration and appeal is not a substitute to deprive the
[respondent] of her right to due process. The opportunity to adduce evidence is essential in the
administrative process, as decisions must be rendered on the evidence presented, either in the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.

Since the case against the respondent was dismissed by the CA on the lack of due process, the
Court finds it proper to dismiss the present administrative case against the deceased under the
circumstances since she can no longer defend herself.

Wherefore, the petition is denied. The Decision dated July 8, 2011 and Resolution dated
February 10, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100240 are affirmed.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 182604, September 27, 2016

DR. ROLANDO B. MANGUNE, DR. RENE A. ARCE AND EMMA E. TAÑAFRANCA,

IN THEIR RESPECTIVE PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND AS ATTORNEYS-IN-FACT
FOR AND IN BEHALF OF DR. VIRGINIA M. AGUILAS, ROLANDO R. ANATALIO,
DR. LEA M. DE LEON-ASI, CATALINO N. ATANACIO, JR., JULIANA M.
BATALLER, MA. LUISA B. CAÑEZA, LILIAN C. CANILAO, RANIEL S. CAPADA,
FLORENDO A. DAYUS, JENNIFER D. PAGULAYAN, BIENVENIDO C. DE VILLA,
JOSE A. DELOS REYES, CYNTHIA A. DIAZ, ANNA LEAH D. DIPATUAN,
MADELAINE M. ESTOCAPIO, DR. MARIA SONIA YEE-FESTIN, MARIO E.
FLORENDO, RUEL E. FORTUNADO, NATIVIDAD A. GAMIAO, IRMA Q. ANDAL,
CHARITO C. LAZAM, AGNES R. LOVINDINO, EVELYN M. MABAG, RECHILDA B.
MACAFE, ZENAIDA M. MADIANGKIT, ANGELICA T. MALAZARTE, DOMINGO P.
MANAY, DR. EDGAR ORVEN M. MORTEL, SATURNINO E. QUIBAN, MARITES J.
RAMOS, DR. MELINDA S.L. A. RAZALAN, BAITONGGAL L. SAUDAGAL, DR.
JOHN ALBERT V. TABLIZO, JULIETA T. TERANIA, ANNIE B. TRINIDAD, JUDY T.
AVNER, DR. ROMEO F. UY, AVELONA A. VEA, MINVILUZ G. VERA CRUZ,
PEÑAFLOR M. VILLAFLOR, JR., AND DR. LEOPOLDO P. SISON, JR., ALL OF
TAGUIG-PATEROS DISTRICT HOSPITAL, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE SECRETARY
EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
HONORABLE SECRETARY FRANCISCO DUQUE III, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE CITY GOVERNMENT
OF TAGUIG AS REPRESENTED BY ITS MAYOR, HONORABLE SIGFRIDO R.
TINGA, AND THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT OF PATEROS, AS REPRESENTED
BY ITS MAYOR, HONORABLE ROSENDO CAPCO, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

FACTS:

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision dated January 2, 2008 (assailed
Decision) and Order dated April 14, 2008 (assailed Order) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 20 in Civil Case No. 07-116531, upholding the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 567 (E.O. No. 567), issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Arroyo) on September 8, 2006.

On July 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7842 (R.A. No. 7842) was enacted establishing, under the
administration and supervision of the Department of Health (DOH), the Taguig-Pateros District
Hospital (TPDH).

On September 8, 2006, President Arroyo issued E.O. No. 567 devolving the administration and
supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig. E.O. No. 567 provided that it was
issued pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. No. 7160), otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (Local Government Code) and the President's continuing authority to
reorganize the offices under the executive department.

Thus, the City of Taguig, through its then Mayor and respondent Hon. Sigfrido R. Tinga (Mayor
Tinga), issued Executive Order No. 053 (E.O. No. 053) dated October 18, 2006 formalizing the
plan for the City of Taguig's take-over of the operations of TPDH. The City of Taguig and the
DOH subsequently entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated October 23, 2006
providing the details of the transition and turn-over of the hospital's operations from the DOH to
the City of Taguig.

The RTC dismissed the petition and held E.O. No. 567 valid and constitutional.

The RTC also ruled that R.A. No. 7842, which established the TPDH, did not prohibit the
devolution of the TPDH's administration and supervision from the DOH to the City of Taguig
because the constitutional provision on local autonomy and provisions of the Local Government
Code on devolution are impliedly written in R.A. No. 7842. Further, the Local Government Code
provides that any doubt must be resolved in favor of devolution.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC denied through the assailed Order.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies; and 2.) Whether
E.O. No. 567 is constitutional.

RULING:

We deny the petition. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must first avail
himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her before he or
she is allowed to seek the intervention of the court. If resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought. As the issue in this case
involves the legality of E.O. No. 567, a purely legal question, the filing of the petition without
exhausting administrative remedies is justified.

Petitioners complain that E.O. No. 567 violated their rights because they were transferred to
other public health facilities without being afforded with the necessary provisions for expenses
relative to their transfer and reassignment, as required by Section 6 of R.A. No. 7305.

Similar to our ruling in Tondo Medical Center Employees Association, we hold that petitioners'
allegations are too general and unsubstantiated by the records for us to pass upon. The persons
affected are not specified; details of their appointments and transfers—such as position, salary
grade, and the date they were appointed—are not given; and the circumstances which attended
the alleged violations are not identified.

Be that as it may, we stress that E.O. No. 567 only lays down the directive to transfer the
administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig. In sum, we find
that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo's issuance of E.O. No. 567.

Wherefore, premises considered, the petition is denied. The January 2, 2008 Decision and April
14, 2008 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 20 in Civil Case No. 07-116531
are hereby affirmed.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 194561, September 14, 2016

DRUGSTORES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. AND NORTHERN

LUZON DRUG CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
DISABILITY AFFAIRS; DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE; BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE; DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT; AND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction which seeks to annul and set aside the
Decision dated July 26, 2010, and the Resolution dated November 19, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 109903. The CA dismissed petitioners' Petition for
Prohibition4 and upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory twenty percent (20%) discount on
the purchase of medicine by persons with disability (PWD).

On March 24, 1992, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7277, entitled "An Act Providing for the
Rehabilitation, Self-Development and Self-Reliance of Disabled Persons and their Integration
into the Mainstream of Society and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the "Magna Carta
for Disabled Persons," was passed into law.

On April 30, 2007, Republic Act No. 9442 was enacted amending R.A. No. 7277. The Title of
R.A. No. 7277 was amended to read as "Magna Carta for Persons with Disability" and all
references on the law to "disabled persons" were amended to read as "persons with disability"
(PWD). Specifically, R.A. No. 9442 granted the PWDs a twenty (20) percent discount on the
purchase of medicine, and a tax deduction scheme was adopted wherein covered establishments
may deduct the discount granted from gross income based on the net cost of goods sold or
services rendered.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the mandatory twenty percent (20%) discount on the purchase of medicine by
persons with disability (PWD).

RULING:

In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters
within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not
necessary that the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their
relation. Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence,
legislative classification may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal
protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm,
and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.

The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.54 With respect to R.A. No. 9442, its
expressed public policy is the rehabilitation, self-development and self-reliance of PWDs.
Persons with disability form a class separate and distinct from the other citizens of the country.
Indubitably, such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the
law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the PWDs fully satisfy the demands of
equal protection. Thus, Congress may pass a law providing for a different treatment to persons
with disability apart from the other citizens of the country.

Subject to the determination of the courts as to what is a proper exercise of police power using
the due process clause and the equal protection clause as yardsticks, the State may interfere
wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular, a large discretion is necessarily
vested in the legislature to determine, not only what interests of the public require, but what
measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. Thus, We are mindful of the
fundamental criteria in cases of this nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor
of the constitutionality of a statute. The burden of proof is on him who claims that a statute is
unconstitutional. Petitioners failed to discharge such burden of proof.

Wherefore, the petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 26, 2010, and
the Resolution dated November 19, 2010, in CA-G.R. SP No. 109903 are affirmed.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 210200, September 13, 2016

JULIET B. DANO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MARIE KAREN

JOY B. DIGAL, Respondents.
MARIA EMILY D. DAGAANG, Petitioner-Intervenor.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

This petition for certiorari, based on Rules 64 and 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to
annul the following:

(1) The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) First Division Resolution cancelling the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Juliet B. Dano in the election case SPA No. 13-083
(DC); and (2) The COMELEC En Banc Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.

The controversy stemmed from whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in concluding that petitioner, who was then a candidate for Mayor of Sevilla, Bohol in
the elections of May 13, 2013, failed to fulfill the one-year residence requirement laid down by
the Local Government Code (LGC).

FACTS:

Petitioner, who hailed from the Municipality of Sevilla, Province of Bohol (Sevilla) was a
natural-born Filipino. She worked as a nurse in the US and thereafter acquired American
citizenship.

On 2 May 2012, petitioner went to Sevilla to apply for voter's registration. Eight days later, she
went back to the US and stayed there until 28 September 2012. She claims that she went there to
wind up her affairs, particularly to sell her house in Stockton, California, as well as her shares of
stock in various companies.

Upon returning to the Philippines, petitioner executed a Sworn Renunciation of Any and All
Foreign Citizenship on 30 September 2012.

On 4 October 2012, she filed her COC for mayor of Sevilla. She represented herself therein as
one who had been a resident of Sevilla for 1 year and 11 days prior to the elections of 13 May
2013, or from 2 May 2012.
The COMELEC ruled that, it must be stressed in this regard that physical presence and not mere
intent is required to establish domicile which connotes actual, factual and bona fide residence in
a given locality.

The contention of respondent that she registered as a voter after she reacquired her citizenship on
May 2, 2012 or about a month from March 30, 2012 is not enough. Registering as a voter may
indicate the intention to fix a domicile of choice, but, by itself, is not definite enough to evince a
person's intention to abandon his domicile of choice and reacquire his domicile of origin. Such
registration may have been done merely to comply with election law requirement.

To reckon the one-year residency period from the date of the Oath of Allegiance, respondent
must show that immediately thereafter, she has taken positive steps to concretely establish her
intention to truly abandon U.S.A. as her domicile of choice. But then, records show that after the
submission of her Application for Registration on May 2, 2012, respondent made frequent trips
in the U.S.A. and it was only upon her return sometime in September 2012 did she execute her
sworn renunciation of allegiance.

ISSUES:

1. Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner had
failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective
officials; and

2. If the cancellation of petitioner's COC is upheld by this Court, whether she should be
succeeded by the qualified candidate with the next highest number of votes or by the
vice-mayor.

RULING:

The court granted the Petition. However, the court dispensed the second issue for being moot in
view of the expiration of the term of office of the winners of the 2013 elections.

The court decided the case upon the basis of the primary issue of whether COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner had failed to prove compliance with the one-
year residency requirement for local elective officials.

It must be noted that COMELEC relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Ceferino and Marie
Karen Joy Digal containing bare allegations that petitioner had never been a resident of Sevilla
since she became an American citizen. However, petitioner sufficiently established that she had
already reacquired her Philippine citizenship when she started residing in Sevilla on 2 May 2012.
The only controverted issue was whether her absence from the locality for four months out of the
1 year and 11 days she had stated in her COC rendered her unable to fulfill the residence
requirement.

COMELEC's grave abuse of discretion lay in its failure to fully appreciate petitioner's evidence
and fully explained absence from Sevilla. Instead, it made a legal conclusion that a candidate
who has been physically absent from a locality for four out of the twelve months preceding the
elections can never fulfill the residence requirement under Section 39 of the LGC. In addition,
COMELEC cancelled petitioner's COC without any prior determination of whether or not she
had intended to deceive or mislead the electorate. This omission also constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

It must be emphasized that the denial of due course to, or the cancellation of, a COC must be
anchored on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that was false. In the
sphere of election laws, a material misrepresentation pertains to a candidate's act done with the
intention to gain an advantage by deceitfully claiming possession of all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications when, in fact, the contrary is true. In Mitra v. Comelec, the
cancellation of the COC was reversed, because the COMELEC "failed to critically consider
whether Mitra deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise
render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan." Absent such finding, We cannot
sustain the cancellation of petitioner's COC.
 National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Antonia Rabie
G.R. No. 210218
August 17, 2016

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the 28 November 2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 131335, dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner
National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR).

ISSUES:

The issues in this case are: (1) whether the trial court still had jurisdiction when it ruled
on the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal; (2) whether there exists good reasons for
the execution of the trial court’s decision pending appeal; and (3) whether the
NAPOCOR’s funds may be garnished or be the subject of execution.

RULING:

The court granted the petition.

Execution pending appeal, also called discretionary execution under Section 2(a), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, is allowed upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.
Section 2 (a), Rule 39 provides:

SEC. 2. Discretionary execution. – (a) Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal.
– On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court while
it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on
appeal, as the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its
discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period
to appeal.

After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in
the appellate court. Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order after due hearing.

In this case, the motion for execution pending appeal was filed by respondents seven days after
their receipt of the trial court’s order denying the motions for reconsideration filed by both
parties. Therefore, the trial court still had jurisdiction when respondents filed their motion for
execution pending appeal.

A mere statement of “good reasons as stated in the motion” does not suffice to justify execution
pending appeal. It is basic that the trial court should make a finding on whether the allegations in
the motion for execution pending appeal constitute good reasons as required in Section 2 of Rule
39. Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting discretionary
execution without stating and explaining clearly the basis therefor. In view of the foregoing, the
Court deems it unnecessary to discuss the issue of garnishment of NAPOCOR’s funds.
 DIVISION

Thomas Begnaen v. Spouses Leo Caligtan & Elma Caligtan +

[GR No. 189852, Aug 17, 2016]

RESOLUTION

SERENO, C.J.:

FACTS:

The case at Bench is an opportunity for us to reaffirm and reemphasize our ruling in Lim v
Gamosa where we struck down as void an administrative rule that expanded the jurisdiction of
the National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP) beyond the boundaries of the Indigenous
Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA). In the process, it likewise behooves us to resolve a question of
concurrent jurisdiction and determine the proper tribunal/body to take cognizance of the instant
dispute.

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104150.
The CA reversed and set aside the Decision and Order rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bontoc, Mountain (Mt.) Province, and reinstated the Resolution of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Bauko, Mt. Province. The case concerns an ancestral land dispute
between members of an Indigenous Cultural Community (ICC), particularly the Kankanaey
Tribe of Mt. Province.

The basic issue is whether or not the CA, in upholding the jurisdiction of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) over the aforementioned dispute, to the exclusion of
regular courts, committed reversible error.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ancestral land dispute between members of an Indigenous Tribes and private
individuals should be vested under the jurisdiction of NCIP.

RULING:

The NCIP Rule purporting to establish the jurisdiction of the NCIP-Regional Hearing Officer as
original and exclusive has been declared VOID for expanding the law.

In its assailed Decision, the CA reversed the RTC and held that jurisdiction properly lies with the
NCIP, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Thus: while admittedly forcible entry cases are
cognizable by the regular courts pursuant to Section 1, rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Court and
B.P. Big. 129; nonetheless, with the passage of the IPRA Law (R.A. 8371), it is our considered
view that the regular courts are divested of their jurisdiction when the parties involved therein
are the ICCs/IPs and the property in question is an ancestral land.

The question as to whether such non-disclosure was willful, deliberate, and ultimately
contumacious, is yet to be addressed in a proper proceeding. But for purposes of the matter
before us, the falsity of such Verification and Certification is further ground to uphold the
MCTC's dismissal of the Complaint, and ultimately, the dismissal of the instant Petition.

As we held in Brown-Araneta v. Araneta" the evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum
shopping is the rendition by two competent tribunals of two separate and contradictory decisions.
Unscrupulous party litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals, may
repeatedly try their luck in several different for until a favorable result is reached. To avoid the
resultant confusion, the Court adheres to the rules against forum shopping, and a breach of these
rules results in the dismissal of the case."

The question as to whether such non-disclosure was willful, deliberate, and ultimately
contumacious, is yet to be addressed in a proper proceeding. But for purposes of the matter
before Us, the falsity of such Verification and Certification is further ground to uphold the
MCTC's dismissal of the Complaint, and ultimately, the dismissal of the instant Petition.

Wherefore, the instant Petition for Review is denied. The Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
104150 is hereby affirmed. The Decision dated 11 March 2008 and the Order dated 29 May
2008, both rendered by the RTC of Bontoc, Mt. Province, are hereby reversed and set aside; and
the Resolution of the MCTC of Bauko, Sabangan, dated 6 August 2007 is reinstated.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016

RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v. SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND MARY

GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Respondents.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Rizalito Y. David (David). He
prays for the nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015
Resolution of public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15.2 The
assailed November 17, 2015 Decision3 dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by David,
which sought to unseat private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for
allegedly not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not being qualified to
hold such office under Article VI, Section 34 of the 1987 Constitution. The assailed December 3,
2015 Resolution5 denied David's Motion for Reconsideration.

Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a foundling whose biological parents are
unknown. As an infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo. Edgardo Militar
found her outside the church on September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m. He later turned her over to
Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar. Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. She was given the name Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar. Local Civil Registrar issued a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling
Certificate stating:

Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE PARISH CHURCHD [sic] OF
JARO, ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND
THE SAID CHILD IS PRESENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS. EMILIANO
MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL STREET, JARO.
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal promulgated the Decision granting the
Petition for Adoption of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces). The Decision
also ordered the change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio
certified that the Decision had become final in a Certificate of Finality.bleslaw

On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received the Decision of the San Juan
Court Municipal Court and noted on Senator Poe's foundling certificate that she was adopted by
Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe.15 This hand-written notation appears on Senator Poe's
foundling certificate:C
hanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe as per Court
Order, Mun. Court, San Juan, Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May 13, 1974,
under Sp. Proc. No. 138.hanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila when she turned 18
years old. The Commission on Elections issued her a Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No.
196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila on December 13, 1986.hanrobleslaw

On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued her a Philippine passport. Her
passport was renewed on April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December 19, 2013,
and March 18, 2014. Having become Senator, she was also issued a Philippine diplomatic
passport on December 19, 2013.chanrobleslaw

Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of the Philippines, Manila, but
eventually went to the United States in 1988 to obtain her college degree. In 1991, she earned a
bachelor's degree in Political Science from Boston College, Chestnut Hill,
Massachusetts.anrobleslaw

On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an
American and Filipino national since birth. The marriage took place in Sanctuario de San Jose
Parish, San Juan, Manila. On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe returned to the United States with her
husband. For some time, she lived with her husband and children in the United States.obleslaw

Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian Daniel (Brian), Hanna MacKenzie
(Hanna), and Jesusa Anika (Anika). Brian was born in the United States on April 16, 1992.
Hanna was born on July 10, 1998, and Anika on June 5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were born
in the Philippines.chanrobleslaw

Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American citizenship on October 18, 2001. She was
subsequently given a United States passport.anrobleslaw

Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for President of the Republic of the
Philippines in the 2004 National Elections. To support her father's candidacy, Senator Poe and
her daughter Hanna returned to the Philippines on April 8, 2004. After the Elections, she
returned to the United States on July 8, 2004. It was during her stay in the Philippines that she
gave birth to her youngest daughter, Anika.chanrobleslaw

Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004 and eventually "slipped into a coma."
Senator Poe returned to the Philippines on December 13, 2004. On December 14, 2004, her
father died. She stayed in the country until February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and to
attend to the settling of his estate.hanrobleslaw

In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United States. She never looked for work again
in the United States.hanrobleslaw

Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005. After consulting her children, they all agreed to
return to the Philippines to support the grieving Susan Roces. In early 2005, they notified Brian
and Hanna's schools Virginia, United States that they would be transferring to the Philippines the
following semester. She came back on May 24, 2005. Her children also arrived in the first half of
2005. However, her husband stayed in the United States to "finish pending projects, and to
arrange for the sale of the family home there."robleslaw

Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue a Tax
Identification Number (TIN) on July 22, 2005.obleslaw

On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Grace Poe-Llamanzares is an adopted in line with the principles of Citizenship in
the Philippines.

RULING:

In contrast, by her admission as a foundling whose parents are unknown, and without presenting
any other evidence to show any substantial tracing of Filipino parentage similar to FPJ, the legal
and factual nuances of respondent's case should be treated differently.
Accordingly, Tecson provides no authoritative jurisprudential anchorage to this case.

Finally, it bears stressing that they jus sanguinis principle of citizenship established in the 1935
Constitution was subsequently carried over and adopted in the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, notwithstanding the existence of any treaty or generally accepted principle
of international law which purportedly evince that foundlings are accorded natural-born
citizenship in the State in which they are found, the same, nonetheless, could not be given effect
as it would contravene the Constitution. To recall, should international law be adopted in this
jurisdiction, it would only form part of the sphere of domestic law.lawred Being relegated to the
same level as domestic laws, they could not modify or alter, much less prevail, over the express
mandate of the Constitution.

Citizenship is not automatically conferred under the international conventions cited but will
entail an affirmative action of the State, by a national law or legislative enactment, so that the
nature of citizenship, if ever acquired pursuant thereto, is citizenship by naturalization. There
must be a law by which citizenship can be acquired. By no means can this citizenship be
considered that of a natural-born character under the principle of jus sanguinis in the Philippine
Constitution.

For all these reasons, I unfortunately depart from the ruling of the majority and perforce submit
that the SET committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring respondent a natural-born citizen.
The majority ruling runs afoul of and even distorts the plain language of the Constitution which
firmly and consistently follows the jus sanguinis principle. In the final analysis, since respondent
has not presented any competent and sufficient evidence to prove her blood relation to a Filipino
parent in these proceedings, she should not be deemed to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, which, thus, renders the instant petition meritorious. Nonetheless, it is important to
point out that respondent is not precluded from later on proving her natural-born citizenship
through such necessary evidence in the appropriate proceeding therefor, considering that a
decision determining natural-born citizenship never becomes final. I reach these conclusions
solely under the peculiar auspices of this case and through nothing but my honest and
conscientious assessment of the facts parallel to the applicable legal principles. As a magistrate
of this High Court, I am impelled to do no less than fulfill my duty to faithfully interpret the laws
and the Constitution, bereft of any politics or controversy, or of any regard to the tides of
popularity or gleam of any personality.

Wherefore, I vote to grant the petition.