Cambe vs.

Office of the Ombudsman Case Digest

Richard A. Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Senator Ramon "Bong"
Revilla, Jr. Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr.
Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Richard A. Cambe Vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et al./John Raymund De Asis Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et
al./Ronald John Lim Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Janet Lim Napoles Vs.
Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Mario L. Relampagos, et al. Vs. Sandiganbayan
and People of the Philippines
G.R. Nos. 212014-15/G.R. Nos. 212427-28/G.R. Nos. 212694-95/G.R. Nos. 213477-
78/G.R. Nos. 213532-33/G.R. Nos. 213536-37/G.R. Nos. 218744-59. December 6,
2016

Facts
Before this Court are consolidated petitions filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong"
Revilla, Jr. (Sen. Revilla), Richard A. Cambe (Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or
Janet Napoles), John Raymund De Asis (De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim), which
commonly assail the Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014 and the Joint Order dated
June 4, 2014 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-13-0316 and
OMB-C-C-13-0395 finding probable cause to indict them, along with several others, for
the crimes of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 in relation to Section 1 ( d)
(1 ), (2), and ( 6) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7080, as amended (one [1] count) and/or of
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 30195 (sixteen [16] counts).

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the
illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PD.AF) of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010, in the total amount of
P517,000,000.00.

As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator -in this
case, Sen. Revilla -with the former giving an offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in
exchange for a "commission" or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the
PDAF. Upon their agreement on the conditions of the PDAF acquisition, including the
project for which the PDAF will be utilized, the corresponding Implemeting Agencies (IA)
tasked to implement the same, and the legislator's "commission" or "kickback" ranging
from 40-60% of either the project cost or the amount stated in the Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO), the legislator would then write a letter addressed to the Senate
President for the immediate release of his PDAF, who in tum, will endorse such request
to the DBM for the release of the SARO. By this time, the initial advance portion of the
"commission" would be remitted by Napoles to the legislator. Upon release of the SARO,
Napoles would then direct her staff -including whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina
Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas) -to prepare PDAF documents containing, inter
alia, the preferred JLN-controlled NGO that will be used as a "conduit" for the
implementation of the project, the project proposals of the identified NGO, and the
endorsement letters to be signed by the legislator and/or his staff, all for the approval of
the legislator; and would remit the remaining portion or balance of the "commission" of
the legislator, which is usually delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis.

Once the documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to the IA which would
handle the preparation of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the
legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. Thereafter, the DBM would release the
Notice of Cash Allowance (NCA) to the IA concerned, the head/official of which, in tum,
would expedite the transaction and release of the corresponding check representing the
PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten percent (10%) share in the project cost.
Among those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit them to the bank
accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De Asis. Once the funds are in
the account of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the
withdrawal thereof. Upon withdrawal of the said funds by Napoles's staff, the latter would
bring the proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for accounting. Napoles would then
decide how much will be left in the office and how much will be brought to her residence
in Taguig City. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the
money to Napoles's residence. Finally, to liquidate the disbursements, Napoles and her
staff would manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries, liquidation reports, inspection
reports, project activity reports, and similar documents that would make it appear that
the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact, they were not since they
were actually inexistent or, in other words, "ghost" projects. Under this modus operandi,
Sen. Revilla, with the help of petitioners, among others, allegedly funneled his PDAF
amounting to around P517,000,000.00 to the JLN-controlled NGOs and, in return,
received "commissions" or "kickbacks" amounting to at least P224,512,500.00.

In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending
that: (a) his and Cambe's signatures in the PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the
utilization of his PDAF had "always been regular and above-board."; (c) his involvement
in the release of his PDAF is limited; and (d) there is "no credible proof" to show that he
committed said illegal acts and that conspiracy exists between him and all the other
persons involved in the PDAF scam.

Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and
Supplemental Counter-Affidavit dated March 12, 2014, maintaining that: (a) his
signatures in the PDAF documents were all forgeries; and (b) he did not receive any
money from Sen. Revilla's PDAF nor connive with any of the alleged co-conspirators to
acquire ill-gotten wealth.

In a Joint Resolution68 dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the
Ombudsman found probable cause to indict, among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla,
Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners
(along with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3
(e) of RA 3019.

Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe,
Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder, considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public
officer at the time material to the charges; ( b) with the help of his co-accused, who are
public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired
HI-gotten wealth through their intricate modus operandi as described above; and ( c)
such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00, way more than the
threshold amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder..

Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order
which denied his motion to suspend proceedings, arguing that the COA's issuance of an
Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal complaints
against him.
Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014
Joint Order of the Ombudsman finding probable cause against him for the crimes
charged. Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding
his defense of forgery, and further contends that in the absence of other competent
testimony, the Ombudsman cannot consider the whistle blowers' testimonies who
purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant to the res inter alias
acta rule.

Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution
and June 4, 2014 Joint Order finding probable cause against her for Plunder and for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Essentially, she argues that the complaints did not
establish the specific acts of the crimes she supposedly committed. She likewise
contends that since she is not a public officer, she cannot be subjected to prosecution by
the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan. Napoles's

Issues:
1. Whether the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition
precedent to the filing of the criminal complaints.
2. Whether the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against all
petitioners are correct.

Rulings
1. No. The Court disagrees. The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and
Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA's audit is clearly separate and distinct from the
criminal aspect covering the charges of Plunder and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019 against them. Hence, the incidents related to it should have no effect on the filing
of the latter.

2. Yes, there is probable cause against the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the
crimes they were charged.
Probable Cause against Revilla.
The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence
on record. At the forefront are the PDAF documents, consisting of the written
endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF
funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that made possible the
processing of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and
the chosen NGO. All these documents -even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla
-directly implicate him for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued
under the authority of his Office as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. In Belgica
v. Ochoa (Belgica), this Court observed that "the defining feature of all forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-
enactment phases of project implementation. At its core, legislators -may it be through
project lists, prior consultations or program menus -have been consistently accorded
post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations." It is through this mechanism that individual
legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire expenditure of
the PDAF allocated to their offices throughout the years.
Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented
were forged, it must be emphasized that "the findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the
issue of forgery) should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by
the reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely
upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine
signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who
must conduct an independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a
reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. Accordingly, Sen. Revilla's evidence of
forgery, including the findings of his purported handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores
(Azores) and Forensic Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, (Pagui) cannot be
readily credited at this stage of the proceedings.

It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the
veracity of Sen. Revilla's signatures on the PDAF documents. As explicitly stated in the
March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution: "[a]t all evei;its, the Special Panel members, after a
prima facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned signatures appearing in
the PDAF documents and the original signatures of [Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their
respective counter-affidavits, opine that both sets of signatures, which bear the same
style and flourish, were written by one and the same hands. Findings of fact by the
Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence, as in
this case.

The testimonies of the whistleblowers -which the prosecution submitted before the
Ombudsman -are, in fact, the most integral evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they
provide a detailed account on the inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen.
Revilla was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all the Senators, only the
Offices ' of Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen. Enrile ), and Sen. Jinggoy:
Estrada (Sen. Estrada) were explicitly implicated to have dealt with in the plunder of their
PDAF. Also, it is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal
knowledge of the conspiracy since they were employees of JLN Corporation -the
epicenter of the entire PDAF operation -and in their respective capacities, were
individually tasked by to prepare the pertinent documents, liquidate the financial
transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with the DBM, and/or facilitate the
withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs' accounts.

In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alias acta were to apply
during preliminary investigation, the treatment of the whistleblowers' statements as
hearsay is bound by the exception on independently relevant statements. "Under the
doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact
that such statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and
the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. Undoubtedly, the
testimonies of the whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the involvement of
Sen. Revilla and his co-accused in the present controversy, considering their respective
participations in the entire PDAF scam.

Probable Cause against Cambe.

The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-
95 assailing the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against him. is no dispute that
Ca:mbe was Sen. Revilla's trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff. By such authority, he
also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen. Revilla's office, including the
allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe' s signatures explicitly appear on several PDAF
documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds
allocated for certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs. Cambe was personally
identified by the whistleblowers to have received PDAF money for himself and for Sen.
Revilla.

In simple terms, Cambe allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles.
For the same reasons above-discussed, there should be 'no valid objection against the
appreciation of the PDAF documents and whistle blowers' testimonies as evidence to
establish probable cause against Cambe at this stage of the proceedings. He also has
no right to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits .of his co-respondents.

Probable Cause against Napoles.

Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in
the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she
was tagged as the mastermind of the PDAF scam.

Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistleblowers'
testimonies, the accounts of the IA officials, and the COA report, as well as the field
verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there lies probable
cause against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie
established that she, in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla, Cambe, and other personalities,
was significantly involved in the afore-described modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's
PDAF amounting to at least P50,000,000.00 in "kickbacks." In the same manner, there is
probable cause against Napoles for violations of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, as it is
ostensible that their conspiracy to,illegally divert PDAF Funds to "ghost" projects caused
undue prejudice to the government. That a private individual, such as Napoles, could not
be charged for Plunder and violations of Section 3 ( e) of RA 3019 because the
offenders in those crimes are public officers is a complete misconception. It has been
long-settled that while the primary offender in the aforesaid crimes are public
officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to
have conspired with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the
fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. In this
case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the
pillaging of Sen. Revilla's PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her as a co-
conspirator for the aforementioned crimes.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The findings of probable
cause against all petitioners are hereby AFFIRMED and the Sandiganbayan, as trial
court, is DIRECTED to commence/continue with the necessary proceedings in these
cases with deliberate dispatch.

Juan Ponce Enrile v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 213455, 11 August 2015.
23
MAY
En Banc

[BRION, J.]

The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Enrile, Jessica
Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before
the Sandiganbayan.

The Information reads:

xxxx

In 2004 to 2010 or thereabout, in the Philippines, and within this Honorable Court’s
jurisdiction, above-named accused JUAN PONCE ENRILE, then a Philippine Senator,
JESSICA LUCILA G. REYES, then Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile’s Office, both public
officers, committing the offense in relation to their respective offices, conspiring with one
another and with JANET LIM NAPOLES, RONALD JOHN LIM, and JOHN RAYMUND
DE ASIS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally amass, accumulate,
and/or acquire ill-gotten wealth amounting to at least ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(Php172,834,500.00) through a combination or series of overt criminal acts, as follows:

by repeatedly receiving from NAPOLES and/or her representatives LIM, DE ASIS, and
others, kickbacks or commissions under the following circumstances: before, during
and/or after the project identification, NAPOLES gave, and ENRILE and/or REYES
received, a percentage of the cost of a project to be funded from ENRILE’S Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF), in consideration of ENRILE’S endorsement,
directly or through REYES, to the appropriate government agencies, of NAPOLES’ non-
government organizations which became the recipients and/or target implementors of
ENRILE’S PDAF projects, which duly-funded projects turned out to be ghosts or
fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her
personal gain;
by taking undue advantage, on several occasions, of their official positions, authority,
relationships, connections, and influence to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense
and to the damage and prejudice, of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the Sandiganbayan. On the same date,
he filed a motion for deferment of arraignment since he was to undergo medical
examination at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).

The Court denied Enrile’s motion for bill of particulars.

ISSUE: Is a Motion to Quash the proper remedy if the information is vague or indefinite
resulting in the serious violation of Enrile’s constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him?

HELD: NO. When allegations in an Information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the
accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.
The purpose of a bill of particulars is to supply vague facts or allegations in the complaint
or information to enable the accused to properly plead and prepare for trial. It
presupposes a valid Information, one that presents all the elements of the crime
charged, albeit under vague terms. Notably, the specifications that a bill of particulars
may supply are only formal amendments to the complaint or Information. Thus, if the
Information is lacking, a court should take a liberal attitude towards its granting and order
the government to file a bill of particulars elaborating on the charges. Doubts should be
resolved in favor of granting the bill to give full meaning to the accused’s Constitutionally
guaranteed rights.

Notably, the government cannot put the accused in the position of disclosing certain
overt acts through the Information and withholding others subsequently discovered, all of
which it intends to prove at the trial. This is the type of surprise a bill of particulars is
designed to avoid. The accused is entitled to the observance of all the rules designated
to bring about a fair verdict. This becomes more relevant in the present case where the
crime charged carries with it the severe penalty of capital punishment and entails the
commission of several predicate criminal acts involving a great number of transactions
spread over a considerable period of time. Notably, conviction for plunder carries with it
the penalty of capital punishment; for this reason, more process is due, not less. When a
person’s life interest – protected by the life, liberty, and property language recognized in
the due process clause – is at stake in the proceeding, all measures must be taken to
ensure the protection of those fundamental rights.

While both the motion to dismiss the Information and the motion for bill of particulars
involved the right of an accused to due process, the enumeration of the details desired in
Enrile’s supplemental opposition to issuance of a warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information and in his motion for bill of particulars are different viewed particularly from
the prism of their respective objectives. In the former, Enrile took the position that the
Information did not state a crime for which he can be convicted; thus, the Information is
void; he alleged a defect of substance. In the latter, he already impliedly admits that the
Information sufficiently alleged a crime but is unclear and lacking in details that would
allow him to properly plead and prepare his defense; he essentially alleged here a defect
of form. Note that in the former, the purpose is to dismiss the Information for its failure to
state the nature and cause of the accusation against Enrile; while the details desired in
the latter (the motion for bill of particulars) are required to be specified in sufficient detail
because the allegations in the Information are vague, indefinite, or in the form of
conclusions and will not allow Enrile to adequately prepare his defense unless
specifications are made.That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in
the Information does not preclude the accused from requesting for more specific details
of the various acts or omissions he is alleged to have committed. The request for details
is precisely the function of a bill of particulars. Hence, while the information may be
sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the
allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly plead and
prepare for trial.

We DIRECT the People of the Philippines to SUBMIT, within a non-extendible period of

fifteen (15) days from finality of this Decision, with copy furnished to Enrile, a bill of
particulars containing the facts sought that we herein rule to be material and necessary.
The bill of particulars shall specifically contain the following:
The particular overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or series of overt
criminal acts” charged in the Information.
A breakdown of the amounts of the “kickbacks or commissions” allegedly received,
stating how the amount of P172,834,500.00 was arrived at.
A brief description of the ‘identified’ projects where kickbacks or commissions were
received.
The approximate dates of receipt, “in 2004 to 2010 or thereabout,” of the alleged
kickbacks and commissions from the identified projects. At the very least, the
prosecution should state the year when the kickbacks and transactions from the
identified projects were received.
The name of Napoles’ non-government organizations (NGOs) which were the alleged
“recipients and/or target implementors of Enrile’s PDAF projects.”
The government agencies to whom Enrile allegedly endorsed Napoles’ NGOs. The
particular person/s in each government agency who facilitated the transactions need not
be named as a particular.
All particulars prayed for that are not included in the above are hereby denied.

QUIMVEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR 214497

FACTS:
At around 8 o'clock in the evening of [July 18,] 2007, YYY went out of the house
to buy kerosene since there was no electricity. While YYY was away, Quimvel arrived
bringing a vegetable viand from AAA's grandfather. AAA requested Quimvel to stay with
them as she and her siblings were afraid. He agreed and accompanied them. AAA and
her siblings then went to sleep. However, she was awakened when she felt Quimvel's
right leg on top of her body. She likewise sensed Quimvel inserting his right hand inside
her panty. In a trice, she felt Quimvel caressing her private part. She removed his hand.
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11 in Ligao City, Albay, on January 23, 2013,
rendered its Judgment 9 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
W/N he may be convicted only of acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and not in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610

HELD:
YES! The Information charged the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Sec. 5
(b) of RA 7610. It is fundamental that, in criminal prosecutions, every element
constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information before an accused can be
convicted of the crime charged. This is to apprise the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him, which is part and parcel of the rights accorded to an accused
enshrined in Article III, Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
The elements of the offense penalized under Sec. 5 (b) of RA 7610 were sufficiently
alleged in the Information. The allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as one
"exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse." This is anchored on the very
definition of the phrase in Sec. 5 of RA 7610, which encompasses children who indulge
in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.
Correlatively, Sec. 5 (a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child
prostitution wherein the child is abused primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph
(b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected to
other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but
also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct.
The term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to
cover "force and intimidation" as used in the Information. The rule is satisfied when the
crime "is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused,
with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged."
There need not be a third person subjecting the exploited child to other abuse. As
regards paragraph (a), a child may engage in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
regardless of whether or not a "bugaw" is present. It is immaterial whether or not the
accused himself employed the coercion or influence to subdue the will of the child for the
latter to submit to his sexual advances for him to be convicted under paragraph (b). Sec.
5 of RA 7610 even provides that the offense can be committed by "any adult, syndicate
or group," without qualification.

Article 336 of the RPC was never repealed by RA 8353

Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) posits that Art. 336 of
the RPC has allegedly been rendered incomplete and ineffective by RA 8353, otherwise
known as the Anti-Rape law. The good justice brings our attention to Sec. 4 60 of the
special law, which clause expressly repealed Art. 335 of the RPC. And since the second
element of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC is sourced from Art. 335 of
the same code, 61 it is then Justice Leonen's theory that Acts of Lasciviousness ceased
to be a crime under the RPC following Art. 335's express repeal. We respectfully
disagree. The only construction that can be given to the phrase "preceding article" is that
Art. 336 of the RPC now refers to Art. 266-A in the place of the repealed Art. 335. It is,
therefore, erroneous to claim that Acts of Lasciviousness can no longer be prosecuted
under the RPC. The decriminalization of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, as per
Justice Leonen's theory, would not sufficiently be supplanted by RA 7610 and RA 9262,
65 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Law (Anti-
VAWC Law). Under RA 7610, only minors can be considered victims of the enumerated
forms of abuses therein. Meanwhile, the Anti-VAWC law limits the victims of sexual
abuses covered by the RA to a wife, former wife, or any women with whom the offender
has had a dating or sexual relationship, or against her child. 66 Clearly, these laws do
not provide ample protection against sexual offenders who do not discriminate in
selecting their victims. One does not have to be a child before he or she can be
victimized by acts of lasciviousness. Nor does one have to be a woman with an existing
or prior relationship with the offender to fall prey. Anyone can be a victim of another's
lewd design. And if the Court will subscribe to Justice Leonen's position, it will render a
large portion of our demographics (i.e., adult females who had no prior relationship to
the offender, and adult males) vulnerable to sexual abuses.