Civpro

, March 3, 2010]
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical

exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be
shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotica By By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that
the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. [Pure foods v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 78591, March 21, 1989]
The Court of Appeals can review the finding of facts of the NLRC and the
evidence of the parties to determine whether the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in finding that no employer-employee relationship existed
between petitioner and respondent. [Lirio v. Genovia, G.R. No. 169757,
November 23, 2011]
Independent Civil Actions
A. Civil Liability Arising from a Criminal Offense (ex-Delicto) (Art 29 and

Art 30, Civil Code)
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the

ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown
that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. [Pure foods v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 78591, March 21, 1989]
November 23, 2011]
A. Civil Liability Arising from a Criminal Offense (ex-Delicto) (Art 29 and

Art 30, Civil Code)
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the

ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such lly.
[Pure foods v. NLRC, G.R. No. 78591, March 21, 1989]
November 23, 2011]
A. Civil Liability Arising from a Criminal Offense (ex-

Delicto) (Art 29 and Art 30, Civil Code)
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted

on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon

reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of
any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil

liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove
the act complained of.
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on

the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal offense; hence,
its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this
reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the
criminal offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is
instituted prior to or subsequent to the filing of the criminal
action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of
the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is
extinguished when the court hearing the criminal action declares
that ‘the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist’. [ see Lim vs. Kou Co Ping, G.R. Nos. 175256
and 179160, August 23, 2012]
An acquittal of the accused predicated on the conclusion 'that the

guilt of the defendant has not been satisfactorily established,' is
equivalent to one on reasonable doubt and does not preclude a
suit to enforce the civil liability for the same act or omission
under Article 29 of the new Civil Code. [see Mendoza vs
Alacala, G.R. No. L-14305, August 29, 1961]
If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an

acquittal, the offended party or private complainant may file a
motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal
therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is
concerned. In so doing, the private complainant or offended party
need not secure the conformity of the public prosecutor. If the
court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private
complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for
certiorari or mandamus,if grave abuse amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction is shown and the aggrieved party has no right
of appeal or given an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. [see Mobilia Products, Inc. vs. Hajime Umezawa, G.R.
No. 149357, March 4, 2005]
When the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is
instituted with the criminal action, whether by choice of private
complainant (i.e., no reservation is made or no prior filing of a
separate civil action) or as required by the law or rules, the case
will be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor. The civil action cannot proceed independently of the
criminal case. This includes subsequent proceedings on the
criminal action such as an appeal. Consequently, if the state
pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial
court acquitting the accused and private complainant/s failed to
reserve the right to institute a separate civil action,the civil
liability ex delicto that is inherently attached to the offense is
likewise appealed. The appeal of the civil liability ex delicto is
impliedly instituted with the petition for certiorari assailing the
acquittal of the accused. Private complainant cannot anymore
pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without violating
the doctrine of non-forum shopping. [see Garcia vs. Ferro
Chemicals, Inc. G.R. No. 172505, October 1, 2014]
B. Civil Liability Not arising from a Criminal Offense (Art 31

in relation to Art 32, 33, 34, 2176, 2177 Civil Code)
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
(1) Culpa Contractual
Art 31 of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based, not on the
act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but to one
based on an obligation arising from other sources, such as law or
contract.
To illustrate, a passenger of a common carrier vehicle was injured

while being transported to his destination due to the reckless
negligence of the driver in operating the vehicle. The injured
passenger will have cause to bring criminal charges against the
driver for criminal negligence. In such event, civil liability (ex-
declicto) may also be recovered because every person who is
criminally liable is also civilly liable. (Art 100, Revised Penal Code)
This notwithstanding, the injured passenger may bring a separate

and independent civil action for damages against the common
carrier, not on the basis of the criminal negligence of the driver,
but on the basis of breach of contractual liability of the common
carrier due to its failure to carry safely the passenger to their
place of destination. The action for civil liability arising from
contract (culpa contractual) may be instituted and prosecuted
independently of, and regardless of the result of, the criminal
action against the driver (culpa criminal). [see Bernaldes, Sr.
vs Bohol Land Transportation, Inc. G.R. No. L-18193,
February 27, 1963]
(2) Culpa Aquiliana (Quasi-delict)
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the

preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
Art 31 of the Civil Code also refers to actions for damages based
on tort or quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Article 2176.
Consequently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict may lie
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two. Moreover, the
civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. [see Elcano vs Hill, G.R. No. L-
24803, May, 26, 1977]
(3) Violation of Constitutional Rights (Art 32)
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,

who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any
manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages
(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is
taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies
for purposes not contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition
the government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's
self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced
by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession,
except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the

defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the
aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate
and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such
civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a
preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages

may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge

unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal
Code or other penal statute.
A public officer who directly or indirectly violates the

constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages
under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so
tainted with malice or bad faith. [see Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 119398, July 2, 1999; Lim vs Ponce de
Leon, G.R. No. L-22554, August 29, 1975]
Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly,
as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression, joint
tortfeasors. [see Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
119398, July 2, 1999 in relation to Aberca vs Ver, G.R. No.
L-69866, April 15, 1988]
(4) Defamation, Fraud, Physical Injuries (Art 33)
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil

action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
As a rule, after a criminal action has been commenced, a civil

action arising from the same offense shall be suspended until
final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.
However, by way of exception, Article 33 provides for instances
where the injured party need not wait for the conclusion of the
criminal action in order to proceed with the civil action.
Specifically, in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages may simultaneously and separately be
filed by the injured party which shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and would only require a preponderance
of evidence.
When the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal case,
to be filed separately and to proceed independently even during
the pendency of the latter case, the intention is patent to make
the court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect
whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be so because
the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike
other offenses not mentioned, that they may be made the subject
of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability of
their respective juridical cause or basis of action. [ see Salta vs
De Veyra, G.R. No. L-37733 September 30, 1982]
The term "physical injuries" used in article 33 of the Civil Code
includes homicide. [Dyogi vs Yatco, G.R. No. L-9623, January
22, 1957]. Consequently, even while a criminal case for
homicide is still pending, a separate civil action for damages (on
the ground of physical injuries resulting in death) under Art 33
may still be proceeded upon. Such civil action shall likewise not
be subordinate to the outcome of the criminal proceeding, such
that even if the defendant is acquitted, the civil action may still
prosper, since liability is not based on civil liability ex delicto but
based on a separate provision of law, i.e. Art 33 of the Civil Code.
In contrast, however, where the offense charged is reckless

imprudence resulting in homicide, there is no independent civil
action for damages that may be instituted in connection with said
offense. Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence comes under the general rule that the acquittal of the
defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based
upon the same criminal act. [see Corpus vs Paje, G.R. No. L-
26737, July 31, 1969]
An acquittal from a charge for violation of the Anti-Graft and

Corrupt Practices Act would not be a bar to civil action based on
the same fraudulent acts for which the criminal action was filed.[
see Salta vs De Veyra, G.R. No. L-37733 September 30,
1982]
Note: Article 33 speaks of a situation where an act which

constitutes a crime gives rise to two modes of recovering civil
liability: (a) civil liability ex delicto under Art 100 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Art 29, Civil Code and (b) civil liability
under Art 33 of the Civil Code, but only for those acts constituting
defamation, fraud and physical injuries. Under the first mode, the
action to recover civil liability is suspended until the final outcome
of the criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is likewise
extinguished upon the acquittal of the defendant on the ground
that ‘the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist’. Under the second mode, the civil action need not
await nor depend on the outcome of the criminal action since it
may proceed independently of the latter. However, under Art
2177 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the defendant.
(5) Failure or Refusal to Render Aid by a Peace Officer (Art

34)
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force

refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case
of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily
liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be
subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and
a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
C. No Need to Reserve Independent Civil Action
Section 3, Rule 111 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure (as amended last December 1, 2000) reads:
Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. — In

the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action. (3a)
The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the requirement of

reserving independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed
separately from criminal ones. Thus, the civil actions referred to
in Articles 32, 33,34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain
separate, distinct and independent of any criminal prosecution
based on the same act.
The consequences of such revision and omission are:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code
need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are
not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil

action arising from the crime charged does not extinguish the
right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover

more than once for the same act or omission.
Thus, deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil

liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex
delicto), but not those liabilities from quasi-delicts, contracts or
quasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately,
the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains,
and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the
prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action in order to
protect such remaining civil interest therein. By the same token,
the offended party may appeal a judgment in a criminal case
acquitting the accused on reasonable doubt, but only in regard to
the civil liability ex delicto. [see Neplum, Inc. vs Orbeso,
G.R. No. 141986, July 11, 2002]
Related Reference(s)
 Mendoza vs. Alcala 112 Phil 929 or 2 SCRA 1032

G.R. No. L-14305 | 1961-08-29
 Nicasio Bernaldes, Sr. vs. Bohol Land Transportation, Inc. 117 Phil. 288 or
7 SCRA 276
G.R. No. L-18193 | 1963-02-27
 Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje 28 SCRA 1062
G.R. No. L-26737 | 1969-07-31
 Delfin Lim vs. Ponce De Leon
G.R. No. L-22554 | 1975-08-29
 Elcano and Elcano vs Hill and Hill 77 SCRA 98
G.R. No. L-24803 | 1977-05-26
 Salta, Alicia V. vs. Jesus de Veyra
G.R. No. L-37733 | 1982-09-30
 Rogelio Aberca vs. Fabian Ver 160 SCRA 590
G.R. No. L-69866 | 1988-04-15
 Eduardo M. Cojuangco Jr., Petitioner Vs. Court Of Appeals, The Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office And Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., Respondents.
G.R. No. 119398 | 1999-07-02
 Neplum, Inc. vs Evelyn V. Orbeso.
G.R. No. 141986 | 2002-07-11
 Mobilia Products, Inc. vs Hajime Umezawa
G.R. No. 149357 | 2005-03-04
 Lily Lim vs. Kou Co Ping a.k.a. Charlie Co/Kou Co Ping a.k.a. Charlie Co
vs. Lili Lim
G.R. Nos. 175256 and 179160 | 2012-08-23
 Garcia vs. Ferro Chemicals, Inc.
G.R. No. 172505 | 2014-10-01
 Dyogi vs Yatco 100 Phil 1095
G.R. No. L-9623 | 1957-01-22
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence
After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant
may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff
has shown no right to relief. [Sec. 1, Rule 33, Rules of Court] Res judicata is not a
ground for demurrer to evidence, since grounds for res judicata present themselves
even before the presentation of evidence. It should be then that the defense of res
judicata should be invoked as a ground for dismissal. [Republic v. Tuvera, G.R.
No. 148246, January 16, 2007]
Effect of denial of motion

He shall have the right to present evidence. [Sec. 1, Rule 33, Rules of Court]
However, this does not apply if the motion for demurrer to evidence is denied in an
election case. [Gementiza v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 140884, March 6, 2001]
The court should then set the date for the reception of the defendant’s evidence in
chief, and not grant the relief demanded by the plaintiff. [Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120334, January 20, 1998]
An order denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory, and is, therefore, not

appealable. Nevertheless, in case of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, it may be the subject of a petition for certiorari. [Katigbak v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140183, July 10, 2003]
Effect if motion is granted but order of dismissal is reversed on appeal
He shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. [Sec. 1, Rule 33,
Rules of Court; Republic v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 148246, January 16, 2007] The
Court of Appeals should then render judgment based on the evidence submitted by
the petitioner. [Radiowealth Finance Corp. v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, July
6, 2000; Consolidated Bank and Trust Co. v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., G.R.
No. 143338, July 29, 2005]
Northwestern Airlines, Inc vs. CA, et al.
G.R. No. 120334 | 1998-01-20
GELACIO P. GEMENTIZA vs COMELEC and VICTORIO R. SUAYBAGUIO,

JR.
G.R. No. 140884 | 2001-03-06
Teodoro K. Katigbak And Bienvenido E. Merelos Vs. The Sandiganbayan And

PEOPLE
G.R. No. 140183 | 2003-07-10
Republic vs. J. C. Tuvera, et al.
G.R. No. 148246 | 2007-02-16
SendDownload
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Post-judgment remedies; Appeals in general
Generally, the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of

judgment on the merits is appeal, even if the error or one of the
errors ascribed is lack of jurisdiction, or the exercise of power in
excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion. [Association of
Integrated Security Force of Bislig-ALU v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 140150, August 22, 2005] The right to appeal is not
part of due process but is a mere statutory privilege that must be
exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
law. [Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services v. NLRC, G.R. No.
128395, December 29, 1998; Cu-Unjieng v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 139596, January 24, 2006; United Field
Sea Watchman and Checkers Agency v. Requillo, G.R. No.
143527, December 6, 2006; Beatingo v. Gasis, G.R. No.
179641, February 9, 2011; Yu v. Samson-Tatad, G.R. No.
170979, February 9, 2011]
Appeal cannot exist with certiorari

The existence and availability of the right to appeal proscribes
resort to certiorari. One remedy necessarily cancels out the other.
One of the requirements for certiorari is that there should be no
appeal available. [Manacop v. Equitable-PCI Bank, G.R. Nos.
162814-17, August 25, 2005]
When appeals may be taken
An appeal may be taken from judgments or final orders that
completely dispose of the case. [Sec. 1, Rule 41, Rules of
Court]
Record on appeal versus notice of appeal

An appeal is made by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. In special
proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals
where the law or the Rules of Court so require, a record on
appeal is required. [Sec. 2[a], Rule 41, Rules of Court]
Judgments or orders not appealable

No appeal may be taken from:

o An order denying a petition for relief or any similar
motion seeking relief from judgment;
o An interlocutory order;
o An order disallowing or dismissing appeal;
o An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by
consent, confession or compromise on the ground of
fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating
consent;
o An order of execution;
o A judgment or final order for or against one or more of
several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims,
cross-claims, and third-party complaints, while the
main case is pending, unless the court allows appeal
therefrom; and
o An order dismissing an action without prejudice. [Sec.
1, Rule 41, Rules of Court]
The remedy of the parties is to file a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65. [Sec. 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court;
Trust International Paper Corporation v. Pelaez, G.R. No.
164871, August 22, 2006]
An order denying a motion for reconsideration or new trial is the

proper subject of an appeal. [A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC] However,
the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration for an order
dismissing the action without prejudice is not appealable, the
proper remedy being a special civil action for certiorari. [Makati
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 167403, August 6,
2008]
Party cannot change theory on appeal

A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of
the issue in the case. When a party deliberately adopts a certain
theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court
below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal,
because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse
party. [Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant
Pagbilao Corporation, G.R. No. 159593, October 12, 2006]
This rule also applies to criminal cases. [People v. Mamaril,
G.R. No. 171980, October 6, 2010]
Appellate court can only entertain issues raised in the

lower court
Moreover, a question that was never raised in the courts below
cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time on appeal without
offending basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process.
[Canada v. All Commodities Marketing Corporation, G.R.
No. 146141, October 17, 2008; Bank of Commerce v.
Serrano, G.R. No. 151895, February 16, 2005; Philippine
National Oil Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109976,
April 26, 2005] Issues raised for the first time on appeal and
not raised in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by
estoppel. [Imani v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company,
G.R. No. 187023, November 17, 2010]
Exceptions:

o In cases of lack of jurisdiction
o Where the lower court committed a plain error
o Where there are jurisprudential developments affecting
the issues
o When the issues raised present a matter of public
policy [Baluyot v. Poblete, G.R. No. 144435,
February 6, 2007; Pineda v. Heirs of Guevara,
G.R. No. 143188, February 14, 2007]
When errors not raised on appeal may be considered

As a general rule, errors not raised in the assignment of errors
shall not be considered by the appellate court. [Sec. 8, Rule 51,
Rules of Court] However, there are certain exceptions to this
rule, as when the error:

o Affects the jurisdiction over the subject matter;
o Affects the validity of the judgment appealed from;
o Affects the validity of the proceedings;
o Is closely related to or dependent on an assigned error
and properly argued in the brief;
o Is a plain and clerical one
[Sec. 8, Rule 51, Rules of Court; see also Heirs of Doronio v.

Heirs of Doronio, G.R. No. 169454, December 27, 2007; Dy
v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-68544, October 27, 1986; Comilang v.
Burcena, G.R. No. 146853, February 13, 2006; Spouses
Romulo v. Spouses Layug, G.R. No. 151217, September 8,
2006]
Further, the Court of Appeals is imbued with sufficient authority
and discretion to review matters, not otherwise assigned as
errors on appeal, if it finds that the consideration is necessary in
arriving at a complete and just resolution of the case or to serve
the interests of justice or to void dispensing piecemeal justice.
[Asian Terminals, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 158458, December
19, 2007]
Payment of docket fee

Payment of the docket fee within the prescribed period is
mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such
payment, the appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be
appealed from becomes final and executor. [Regalado v. Go,
G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007] Thus, payment of docket
fees and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both
mandatory and jurisdictional, non-compliance with which is fatal
to an appeal. Non-payment of the appellate court docket and
other lawful fees within the reglementary period is a ground for
the dismissal of an appeal. [Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 139596, January 24, 2006]
Dismissal due to non-payment of docket fees remains

discretionary upon the courts, and such power should be used in
accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play and with great
deal of circumspection considering all attendant circumstances.
[Republic v. Spouses Luriz, G.R. No. 158992, January 26,
2007; Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142021,
November 29, 2000]
Grounds for dismissal of an appeal

The Court of Appeals may dismiss an appeal on its own motion or
on that of the appellee on the following grounds:

o Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that
the appeal was taken within the period fixed by the
Rules of court;
o Failure to file the notice of appeal or the record on
appeal within the period prescribed by the rules of
Court;
o Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other
lawful fees as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 40 and Sec. 4,
Rule 41;
o Unauthorized alterations, omissions, or additions in the
approved record on appeal;
o Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required
number of copies of his brief or memorandum within
the time provided
o Absence of specific assignment of errors in the
appellant’s brief, or of page references to the record as
required in Sec. 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of
Rule 44;
o Failure of the appellant tot take the necessary steps for
the correction or completion of the record within the
time limited by the court in its order;
o Failure of the appellant to appear at the preliminary
conference under Rule 48 or to comply with orders,
circulars, or directives of the court without justifiable
cause; and
o The fact that the order or judgment appealed from is
not appealable
[Sec. 1, Rule 51, Rules of Court]
The Supreme Court may dismiss an appeal motu proprio or on

motion, based on the following grounds:

o Failure to take the appeal within the reglementary
period;
o Lack of merit in the petition;
o Failure to pay the requisite docket fee and other lawful
fees or to make a deposit for costs;
o Failure to comply with the requirements regarding
proof of service and contents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition;
o Failure to comply with any circular, directive or order of
the Supreme Court without justifiable cause;
o Error in choice or mode of appeal; and
o The fact that the case is not appealable to the Supreme
Court
[Sec. 5, Rule 56, Rules of Court]
A litigant’s failure to furnish his opponent with a copy of his

appeal brief does not suffice to warrant the dismissal of the
appeal. All that is needed is for the court to order the litigant to
furnish his opponent with a copy of his brief [Tiangco v. Bank of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 153998, October 6, 2010]
The appellate court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss

the appeal. [Tiangco v. Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No.
153998, October 6, 2010; The Government of the Kingdom
of Belgium v. Court of Appeals, , G.R. No. 164150, April 14,
2008]
In case the appellant files the appellant’s brief late, the court has
the power to still allow the appeal if the lapse is for a reasonable
period. The court should also take into consideration the
following:

o Circumstances obtaining warrant the court’s liberality;
o Strong considerations of equity justify an exception to
the procedural rule in the interest of substantial justice;
o No material injury has been suffered by the appellee by
the delay;
o No contention that the appellee’s cause was prejudiced
o No motion to dismiss was filed
[The Government of the Kingdom of Belgium v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 164150, April 14, 2008]
Mistake of counsel
Mistake of counsel is not an adequate excuse for the court to
exercise indulgence except where:

o The reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives
the client of due process of law; or
o Application of the rule will result in outright deprivation
of the client’s liberty or property; or
o The interests of justice so require
[Beatingo v. Gasis, G.R. No. 179641, February 9, 2011]
L.C. Dy, etal. Vs. Nat'l Labor Rel. Comm. Etal.

G.R. No. L-68544 | 1986-10-27
 Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc. vs NLRC, et al
G.R. No. 128395 | 1998-12-29
 Sps Buenaflor vs Ca, Sm United Rural Bank Of Panay Islands, Inc.
G.R. No. 142021 | 2000-11-29
 Bank Of Commerce vs. Teresita S. Serrano
G.R. No. 151895 | 2005-02-16
 Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) vs. Court of Appeals 457 SCRA 32
G.R. No. 109976 | 2005-04-26
 Association of Integrated Security Force of Bislig, vs. Honorable Court of
Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 140150 | 2005-08-22
 Charles Cu-Unjieng vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 139596 | 2006-01-24
 Salvador Comilang vs. Francisco Burcena, et al
G.R. No. 146853 | 2006-02-13
 Spouses Cesar R. Romulo and Nenita S. Romulo vs. Spouses Moises P.
Layug, Jr., and Felisarin Layug.
G.R. No. 151217 | 2006-09-08
 Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation
(Formerly Southern Energy Quezon, Inc.)
G.R. No. 159593 | 2006-10-12
 United Field Sea Watchman and Checkers Agency, et al. vs. Willie Requillo,
et al.
G.R. No. 143527 | 2006-12-06
 RP vs. Sps. J. & A. Luriz
G.R. No. 158992 | 2007-01-26
 G. Baluyut vs. E. Poblete, et al
G.R. No. 144435 | 2007-02-06
 Ma. Concepcion L. Regalado vs. A. S. Go
G.R. No. 167988 | 2007-02-06
 F. Pineda vs. Heirs of E. Guevara, et al
G.R. No. 143188 | 2007-02-14
 Asian Terminals, Inc., et al. vs. NLRC, et al.
G.R. No. 158458 | 2007-12-19
 The Heirs of Marcelino Doronio vs. Heirs of Doronio
G.R. No. 169454 | 2007-12-27
 The Government of Kingdom of Belgium Vs. Hon Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 164150 | 2008-04-14
 Makati Insurance Co. Inc Vs. Hon. Wilfredo D. Reyes, et al.
G.R. No. 167403 | 2008-08-06
 Ernesto P. Canada etc. Vs. All Commodities Marketing Corporation
G.R. No. 146141 | 2008-10-17
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. OLIVE RUBIO MAMARIL,
Accused-Appeellant.
G.R. No. 171980 | 2010-10-06
 JORGE L. TIANGCO, THE HEIRS OF ENRIQUE L. TIANGCO, GLORIA T.
BATUNGBACAL, NARCISO L. TIANGCO and SILVINO L. TIANGCO, Petitioners,
vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 153998 | 2010-10-06
 Evangeline D. Imani vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company
G.R. No. 187023 | 2010-11-17
 Dolorita C. Beatingo vs. Lilia Bu Gasis
G.R. No. 179641 | 2011-02-09
 Judith Yu vs. Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad
G.R. No. 170979 | 2011-02-09
2017 MyLegalWhiz ©. All rights reserved.
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Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Modes of discovery; Interrogatories to Parties
Interrogatories to Parties
By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer
has been served, any party desiring to elicit material and relevant facts from any
adverse parties shall file and serve upon the latter written interrogatories. [Sec. 1,
Rule 25, Rules of Court] No party may, without leave of court, serve more than
one set of interrogatories to be answered by the same party. [Sec. 4, Rule 25, Rules
of Court]
Within one day from receipt of the complaint, not only must summons be prepared
but an order requiring the parties to avail of interrogatories under Rule 25 and
request for admission under Rule 26 must also be issued. Nevertheless, the parties
may use depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rules 27 and 29
within five days from the filing of the answer, at their discretion. [A.M. No. 03-1-
09-SC]
These shall be answered by:
the party served
any officer competent to testify if the party is a public or private corporation,

partnership, or association [Sec. 1, Rule 25, Rules of Court]
Unlike written interrogatories under Rule 23, written interrogatories under Rule 25
are directed only to parties to a case.
Answer to interrogatories
The interrogatories shall be answered fully in writing, and shall be signed and
sworn to by the person making them. [Sec. 2, Rule 25, Rules of Court]
Duty of party served with interrogatories
Such party shall file and serve a copy of the answers on the party submitting the
interrogatories within 15 days after service thereof. The court may extend or
shorten the time upon motion and for good cause shown. [Sec. 2, Rule 25, Rules of
Court]
Objections to interrogatories
Objections to any interrogatories may be presented to the court within 10 days after
service thereof, with notice as in case of a motion. Answers shall be deferred until
the objections are resolved, which shall be at as early a time as is possible. [Sec. 3,
Rule 25, Rules of Court]
Scope and use of interrogatories
They may relate to any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject of
the pending action, whether relating to the claim or defense of any other party,
including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of relevant facts. [Sec. 5, Rule 25, Rules of Court] The inquiry
can only extend to what is relevant and material to the issue. [Gerochi v. Dept. of
Energy, G.R. No. 159796, April 5, 2005]
Answers to the interrogatories may be used against any party who took part or had
notice of the interrogatory, in accordance with any of the following provisions:
any answer to an interrogatory may be used by any party for the purpose of
contradicting or impeaching the testimony of the party who answered the
interrogatory as a witness;
the answer to an interrogatory of party or of any one who at the time of answering
such interrogatory was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private
corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse
party for any purpose;
if only part of the answer to an interrogatory is offered in evidence by a party, the

adverse party may require him to introduce all of it which is relevant to the part
introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts. [Sec. 5, Rule 25, Rules of
Court]
Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories
A party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the
adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending
appeal, unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent
a failure of justice. [Sec. 6, Rule 25, Rules of Court]
The complaint may be dismissed for non-suit if the plaintiff refuses to answer
interrogatories served upon him, unless he can justify such failure or refusal.
[Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 156605, August 28, 2007]
Denial of written interrogatory interlocutory in nature
A trial court order denying the written interrogatory is interlocutory, and the proper
remedy is to appeal the adverse judgment, incorporating therein the grounds for
assailing the interlocutory order. However, when the order disallowing the written
interrogatory is patently erroneous, resort to certiorari is warranted. [Ong v. Mazo,
G.R. No. 145542, June 4, 2004]
Ong vs Mazo
G.R. No. 145542 | 2004-06-04
Gerochi vs. Department of Energy
G.R. No. 159796 | 2007-07-17
Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan [DECISION]
G.R. No. 156605 | 2007-08-28
[2/2] Edward T. Marcelo, et al. Vs. Sandiganbayan, et al
G.R. No. 156605 | 2007-08-28

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Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Motions ; Motion to Dismiss
Not a responsive pleading

A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading and its filing
does not preclude the exercise of the plaintiff’s right to amend his
complaint. [Paeste v. Jaurige, G.R. No. L-5711, December
29, 1953; Republic v. Ilao, G.R. No. L-16667, January 30,
1962; Remington Industrial Sales v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 133657, May 29, 2002]
Not encouraged
Currently, the Supreme Court discourages the filing of a motion
to dismiss, and instead encourages filing an answer to the
complaint, alleging therein the grounds for a motion to dismiss.
This restraint in filing a motion to dismiss is contained in the
summons, which shall be issued within one day from receipt of
the complaint. [A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC]
If no motion to dismiss has been filed, any of the grounds for

dismissal provided for in Rule 16 may be pleaded as an
affirmative defense in the answer. The court, at its discretion,
may conduct a preliminary hearing thereon as if a motion to
dismiss has been filed. [Sec. 6, Rule 16, Rules of Court] If the
court then dismisses the complaint (under Sec. 6), it shall be
without prejudice to the prosecution of a counterclaim pleaded in
the answer in the same or separate action. [Sec. 6, Rule 16,
Rules of Court]
Grounds for a Motion to Dismiss [Sec. 1, Rule 16]


o Lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
o Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim
o Improper venue
o Lack of legal capacity to sue of the plaintiff
o That there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause
o That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment
or by the statute of limitations
o That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of
action
o That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s
pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or
otherwise extinguished
o That the claim on which the action is founded is
unenforceable under the statute of frauds
o That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not
been complied with
Laches may be considered as a ground for motion to dismiss

under Sec. 1(h) of Rule 16, since an abandoned or otherwise
extinguished claim is broad enough to fall under laches. However,
since laches is factual in nature, it must be proved by the party
claiming the same in a hearing specially set to hear such motion
to dismiss. [Pineda v. Heirs of Guevara, G.R. No. 143188,
February 14, 2007]
Time for filing a Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss must be filed within the time for filing the
answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim. It must be
filed before filing such answer. [Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of
Court]
Generally, a motion to dismiss filed after an answer has been

filed is considered filed out of time. [Phil-Ville v. Javier, G.R.
No. 147738, December 13, 2005]
Exception to the general rule: When it may be filed even
after answer has been filed
A motion to dismiss filed even after the answer has been served
or filed will not be considered filed out of time if it is based on any
of the following grounds:

o Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
o Litis pendentia (another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause)
o Res judicata (action is barred by prior judgment)
o Action is barred by the statute of limitations [Sec. 1,
If such grounds are apparent from the pleadings or the evidence

on record, the court may dismiss the case motu proprio. [Heirs
of Valientes v. Ramas, G.R. No. 157852, December 15,
2010]
These grounds are also considered exceptions to the omnibus

motion rule. Thus, all other grounds available at the time the
motion to dismiss was filed must be included therein; otherwise,
they are deemed waived. [Sec. 8, Rule 15, Rules of Court]
Contents, form, hearing, and resolution

The content and form of a motion to dismiss shall follow the
general contents and form of other motions. Thus, it must state
the relief sought (the dismissal of the action) together with the
grounds upon which it is based. It must be accompanied by
supporting affidavits and papers if it is necessary to prove the
facts alleged therein. [Sec. 3, Rule 15, Rules of Court]
It must be set for hearing by the applicant [Sec. 4, Rule 15,
Rules of Court] and should contain a notice of hearing
addressed to all parties concerned. [Sec. 5, Rule 15, Rules of
Court] Notice to the other party is mandatory, and absence of
such would render the motion defective (pro forma). [Jehan
Shipping Corp. v. National Food Authority, G.R. No.
159750, December 14, 2005] A trial-type hearing is
mandated, wherein the parties are allowed to present evidence
and argue their respective positions before the court. [Capiral v.
Robles, G.R. No. 173628, November 16, 2011]
At the hearing, the parties shall submit their arguments on the

questions of law and their evidence on the questions of fact
involved, except those not available at that time. If the case goes
to trial, the evidence presented during the hearing shall
automatically be part of the evidence of the party presenting the
same. [Sec. 3, Rule 16, Rules of Court]
After the hearing, the court may either: a) dismiss the action or
claim (i.e., approve the motion); b) deny the motion; or c) order
the amendment of the pleading. [Sec. 3, Rule 16, Rules of
Court] If the motion is denied, the movant shall file his answer
within the balance of the period prescribed by Rule 11 to which
he was entitled at the time of serving his motion. However, this
period shall not be less than five days, in any event. It shall be
computed from the time he receives the notice of denial of the
motion. [Sec. 4, Rule 16, Rules of Court] He may raise the
same ground he raised in the denied motion to dismiss in the
answer. [Sps. Rasdas v. Sps. Villa, G.R. No. 157605,
December 13, 2005]
If the motion is denied, it is an interlocutory order which cannot

be appealed. However, as long as it is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it may be
subject to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. [Lu Ym v.
Nabua, G.R. No. 161309, February 23, 2005]
If the pleading is ordered to be amended, he shall file his answer

within the period prescribed by Rule 11, counted from the service
of the amended pleading, unless the court provides a longer
period. [Sec. 4, Rule 16, Rules of Court]
If the ground relied upon is dubitable, the court should not defer
the resolution of the motion. And in every case, the resolution
shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. [Sec. 3,
Hypothetical admissions
A motion to dismiss contains hypothetical admissions as to the
truth of the factual allegations in the complaint. [Peltan Dev’t
Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 117029, March 19, 1997; Cuarto v. De
Luna, G.R. No. L-23279, January 31, 1968] However, these
only apply to those factual allegations sufficiently pleaded and the
material allegations in the complaint. It does not apply to mere
charges of fraud, allegations of legal conclusions or erroneous
statements of law, inferences from facts not stated, matters of
evidence, or irrelevant matters. [De Dios v. Bristol
Laboratories, G.R. No. L-25530, January 29, 1974]
Effect of dismissal
An order granting a motion to dismiss shall bar the refilling of the
same action or claim, except if based on the ff. grounds:

o Res judicata
o Prescription
o Paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished
claim or demand
o Unenforceability under the statute of frauds [Sec. 5,
Such dismissal of the complaint and granting of the motion to
dismiss is subject to appeal. [Sec. 5, Rule 16, Rules of Court]
 Pedro Paeste And Felix Carpio vs. Rustico Jaurigue 094 Phil 179
G.R. No. L-5711 | 1953-12-29
 Republic Of The Phil. Vs. Melquiades G. Ilao, Et Al.114 Phil. 65
G.R. No. L-16667 | 1962-01-30
 Alejandra Cuarto vs. Estelita De Luna, Et Al.
G.R. No. L-23279 | 1968-01-31
 de Dios, et al. vs. Bristol Laboratories (Phil.), Inc., et al.
G.R. No. L-25530 | 1974-01-29
 Peltan Development, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 117029 | 1997-03-19
 Remington Industrial Sales Corporation vs The CA And British Steel (Asia),
Ltd.
G.R. No. 133657 | 2002-05-29
 Douglas Lu Ym vs. Gertrudes Nabua, et al
G.R. No. 161309 | 2005-02-23
 Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation, et al. vs. Mercedes Javier,
et al
G.R. No. 147738 | 2005-12-13
 Sps. Enriqueta Rasdas and Tomas Rasdas, et al. vs. Jaime Estenor
G.R. No. 157605 | 2005-12-13
 F. Pineda vs. Heirs of E. Guevara, et al
G.R. No. 143188 | 2007-02-14
 Heirs of Valientes vs. Ramas
G.R. No. 157852 | 2010-12-15
 SEVERINO S. CAPIRAL, Petitioner, vs. SIMEONA CAPIRAL ROBLES and
VICENTE CAPIRAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 173628 | 2011-11-16
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Labor Law; Labor Relations; Procedure and Jurisdiction; Court of Appeals
The Supreme Court has ruled that judicial review of decisions of the NLRC may
be sought via a petition for certiorari before the CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court; and under Section 4 thereof, petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from
notice of the assailed order or resolution within which to file the petition. Hence, in
cases where a petition for certiorari is filed after the expiration of the 10-day period
under the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure but within the 60-day period under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, the CA can grant the petition and modify, nullify and
reverse a decision or resolution of the NLRC [St. Martin Funeral Home v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998]
Errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of jurisdiction, are not within the
province of a special civil action for certiorari, which is merely confined to issues
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. [Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v.
Villamater, G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010]
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of

judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the
discretion was exercised arbitrarily or despotically. [Pure foods v. NLRC, G.R. No.
78591, March 21, 1989]
discretion in finding that no employer-employee relationship existed between
petitioner and respondent. [Lirio v. Genovia, G.R. No. 169757, November 23,
2011]
Pure Foods Corp. vs. Nat'l Labor Rel. Comm. Etal.
G.R. No. 78591 | 1989-03-21
St. Martin Funeral Home vs NLRC 295 SCRA 494
G.R. No. 130866 | 1998-09-16
Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. and World Marine Panama, S.A. Vs. Catalino U.
Villamater, et al.
G.R. No. 179169 | 2010-03-03
Lirio vs. Genovia
G.R. No. 169757 | 2011-11-23
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Labor Law; Labor Relations; Procedure and Jurisdiction; National Labor

Relations Commission (NLRC)
Jurisdiction
The NLRC exercise two kinds of jurisdiction:
1. Original
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Original
1. Injunction in ordinary Labor disputes to enjoin or restrain

any actual or threatened commission of any or all prohibited
or unlawful acts or to require the performance of a particular
act;
2. Injunction in strikes or lockouts under Article 264;
3. Labor disputes causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
in an industry indispensable to it by the Secretary of Labor.
Appellate
1. All cases decided by the Labor Arbiters;

2. Contempt cases decided by the Labor Arbiters;
3. Cases decided by the DOLE Regional Directors or the duly
authorized hearing officers of the DOLE involving recovery of
wages, simple money claims and other benefits under Article
129. [J. Chan, Bar Reviewer on Labor Law (2012)]
It must be noted that the NLRC does not have original jurisdiction
over cases enumerated in paragraph a of Article 217 and that if a
claim does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction, the
NLRC cannot have appellate jurisdiction thereon. [Pondoc v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 116347, October 3, 1996] The Supreme Court
has ruled that perfection of an appeal within the reglementary
period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure to
do so renders the questioned decision final and executory, thus
depriving the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final
judgment, much less to entertain the appeal. [Asuncion v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 109311, June 17, 1997]
The Commission also has rule making powers, it has been ruled
in one case where pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the
National Labor Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for
extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November
15, 1985 and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out
of time. The Court held that, it is an elementary rule in
administrative law that administrative regulations and policies
enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they
are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled
to great respect. [Rizal Empire Insurance v. NLRC, G.R. No.
73140, May 29, 1987]
Effect of NLRC reversal of Labor Arbiter’s order of
reinstatement
If the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on

appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate
and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period
of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if
the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and
such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee
is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is
entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during
the period. [Garcia v. PAL, G.R. No. 164856, January 20,
2009]
The Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement was immediately

executory. After receipt of the Labor Arbiter’s decision ordering
private respondents’ reinstatement, petitioner has to either re-
admit them to work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate them in the
payroll. Failing to exercise the options in the alternative,
petitioner must pay private respondents’ salaries which
automatically accrued from notice of the Labor Arbiter’s order of
reinstatement until its ultimate reversal of the NLRC. Since
private respondent’s reinstatement pending appeal was effective
only until its reversal by the NLRC on April 28, 1999, they are no
longer entitled to salaries from May 1, 1999 to March 15, 2001,
as ordered by the Labor Arbiter. [Kimberly Clark v. Facundo,
G.R. No. 144885, July 12, 2006]
To clarify, respondents are entitled to their accrued salaries only

from the time petitioner received a copy of Labor Arbiter Gan’s
Decision declaring respondents’ termination illegal and ordering
their reinstatement up to the date of the NLRC Resolution
overturning that of the Labor Arbiter. This is because it is only
during said period that respondents are deemed to have been
illegally dismissed and are entitled to reinstatement pursuant to
Labor Arbiter Gan’s Decision which was the one in effect at that
time. Beyond that period, the NLRC Resolution declaring that
there was no illegal dismissal is already the one prevailing. From
such point, respondents’ salaries did not accrue not only because
there is no more illegal dismissal to speak of but also because
respondents have not yet been actually reinstated and have not
rendered services to petitioner. [ISLRIZ Trading v. Capada,
G.R. No. 168501, January 31, 2011]
Remedies
Can the aggrieved party filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals?

No, the rule is clear, it specifically states that, [T]his Rule shall
not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor
Code of the Philippines. [Rule 43, Rules of Court]
The period or manner of appeal from the NLRC to the CA is

governed by Rule 65. The Court added, that ever since appeals
from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the
legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari
was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions
of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and
in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae
because appeals by certiorari and the original action for certiorari
are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate
courts. The important distinction between them, however, and
with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the
special civil action ofcertiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals [St. Martin
Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 130866, September 16, 1998]
Certified cases
When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely

to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify
the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall
have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or
certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of
assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees
shall immediately return-to-work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may
seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure
compliance. [Article 263 (g), Labor Code of the Philippines]
The NLRC was thereby charged with the task of implementing a

valid return-to-work order of the Secretary of Labor. As the
implementing body, its authority did not include the power to
amend the Secretary's order. Since the Secretary's July 18 order
specifically provided that the dismissed faculty members shall be
readmitted under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior
to the present dispute, the NLRC should have directed the actual
reinstatement of the concerned faculty members. It therefore
erred in granting the alternative remedy of payroll reinstatement
which, as it turned, only resulted in confusion. The remedy of
payroll reinstatement is nowhere to be found in the orders of the
Secretary of Labor and hence it should not have been imposed by
the public respondent NLRC. There is no showing that the facts
called for this type of alternative remedy. [University of Sto.
Tomas v. NLRC, G.R. No. 89920, October 18, 1990]
Article 263(g) is both an extraordinary and a preemptive power to

address an extraordinary situation – a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest. This grant is not
limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that
may have preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the
incidents of the strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may have
taken place. As the term “assume jurisdiction” connotes, the
intent of the law is to give the Labor Secretary full authority to
resolve all matters within the dispute that gave rise to or which
arose out of the strike or lockout; it includes and extends to all
questions and controversies arising from or related to the
dispute, including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive
jurisdiction. [Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa v.
Secretary, G.R. No. 167401, July 5, 2010]
 Rizal Empire Insurance Group vs. Nat'l Labor Rel.

G.R. No. 73140 | 1987-05-29
 University Of Sto. Tomas Vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Et Al.
G.R. No. 89920 | 1990-10-18
 Natividad Pondoc vs NLRC, et al.
G.R. No. 116347 | 1996-10-03
 Zenaida Asuncion vs. Nlrc, et al.
G.R. No. 109311 | 1997-06-17
 St. Martin Funeral Home vs NLRC 295 SCRA 494
G.R. No. 130866 | 1998-09-16
 Juanito A. Garcia, et al. Vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc
G.R. No. 164856 | 2007-08-29
 Juanito A. Garcia, et al. Vs. Philippine Airlines, inc.
G.R. No. 164856 | 2009-01-20
 Juanito A. Garcia, et al. Vs. Philippine Airlines, inc. [SEPARATE OPINION]
G.R. No. 164856 | 2009-01-20
 Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng Tirumph International, et al. Vs.
Secretary of Department of Labor and Employment, et al./Triumph
International (phils.), Inc. Vs. Bagong Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa ng
Triumph International, et al.
G.R. No. 167401 | 2010-07-05
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Requirement of Verification in Pleadings
Requirement for Verification
As a 4, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Court, as amended by A.M.

No. 00-2-10-SC]
Proper Verification
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the

pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of
his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification

based on “information and belief,” or upon “knowledge,
information and belief,” or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading. [Sec 4, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC]
Pleadings that need to be Verified
A. Before the Courts
 Civil complaints or initiatory pleadings asserting claims for

relief (including permissive counter-claims). (See Sec. 5,
Rule 7, Rules of Civil Procedure)
 Statement of Claim for Small Claims Cases, as well as the
Response thereto (See Secs. 5 & 11, Rules of Procedure for
Small Claims Cases)
 Complaint for injunction (See Sec. 4, Rule 58, Rules of Civil
Procedure)
 Application for appointment of receiver (See Sec. 1, Rule 59,
Rules of Civil Procedure )
 Application for support pendente lite (See Sec. 1, Rule 69,
Rules of Civil Procedure)
 Petition for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the answers
thereto, and the answers to any compulsory counter-claim
and cross-claim pleaded in the answer (See Sec. 4, Rule 70,
 Petition for indirect contempt (See Sec. 4, Rule 71, Rules of
Civil Procedure)
 Petition for relief from judgment or order. (See Sec. 3, Rule
38, Rules of Civil Procedure)
 Petition for Review from the RTC to the Supreme Court (See
Sec. 2[c], Rule 41, Rules of Civil Procedure)
 Petition for Review from RTC to Court of Appeals (See Sec.
1, Rule 42, Rules of Civil Procedure)
 Petition for Review under Rule 43, from CTA and other
quasi-judicial agencies to Court of Appeals (See Sec. 5, Rule
43, Rules of Civil Procedure)
 Appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, from Court of Appeals to
Supreme Court (See Sec. 1, Rule 45, Rules of Civil
Procedure)
 Petition for certiorari (special civil action) under Rule 64
(See Sec. 2, Rule 64, Rules of Civil Procedure)
 Petition for certiorari (special civil action) under Rule 65
(See Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules of Civil Procedure)
 Petition for prohibition under Rule 65 (See Sec. 2, Rule 65,
 Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 (See Sec. 3, Rule 65,
 Petition for appointment of guardian (See Sec. 2, Rule 93,
Rules of Court )
 Petition for leave filed by guardian to sell or encumber
property of an estate (See Sec. 1, Rule 95, Rules of Court)
 Petition for declaration of competency of a ward (See Sec. 1,
Rule 97, Rules of Court)
 Petition for habeas corpus (See Sec. 3, Rule 102, Rules of
Court)
 Petition for change of name (See Sec. 2, Rule 103, Rules of
Court)
 Petition for voluntary judicial dissolution of a corporation
(See Sec. 1, Rule 105, Rules of Court ; see also Sec. 119,
Corporation Code)
 Petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 (See Sec. 1, Rule 108, Rules of
Court)
 Petition for correction of a clerical or typographical error in
an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil
register filed with the civil register office pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9048 (See. Sec. 3, R.A. No. 9048)
 Petition for adoption (See Sec. 7, Rule of Adoption)
 Petition for legal separation (See Sec. 2(b)(3), Rule on Legal
Separation)
 Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages (See Sec. 5, Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages)
 Petitions in summary judicial proceedings in the family law
based on Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124,127, 223, 225,
235 & 239 of the Family Code (See Arts. 239, 249 & 253,
Family Code)
 Complaints filed under the Interim Rules of Procedure on
Intra-Corporate Controversies, as well as the Answer
thereto. (See Sec. 3, Rule 2,Interim Rules of Procedure on
Intra-Corporate Controversies)
 All pleadings, motions, oppositions, defenses or claims filed
by any interested party in any proceeding governed by the
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation (2008) (See
Sec. 1, Rule 3, Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation)
 Complaints filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (See Sec. 1,
Rule 6, Revised Rules of Procedure of the Court of Tax
Appeals)
 Petitions for Review filed with the CTA (See Sec. 2, Rule 6,
Revised Rules of Procedure of the Court of Tax Appeals)
 All complaints, compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims’
pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto, filed under
summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts,
and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. (See Sec. 3, Rule 2,
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure)
 A petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo and the return
thereof; and in connection with the amparo proceedings,
motion for an inspection order or for a production order.
(See The Rule on the Writ of Amparo)
 A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data and the
return thereof. (See The Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data)
 Election protests or petitions for quo warranto relating to
elective municipal and barangay officials filed with the
general courts; as well as the answers thereto (See Sec. 7,
Rule 3 and Sec. 1, Rule 4, Rules of Procedure in Election
Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and
Barangay Officials)
B. Before Constitutional Commissions/Quasi-Judicial

Agencies
 The following pleadings filed before the Commission on

Elections, as well as the answers thereto: protests or
petitions in ordinary actions, special actions, special cases,
special reliefs, provisional remedies, special proceedings,
counter-
Court explained in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No.
L-50054. August 17, 1988]:
Although this Court did not issue any restraining order against the Intermediate
Appellate Court to prevent it from taking any action with regard to its resolutions
.... upon learning of the petition, the appellate court should have refrained from
ruling thereon because its jurisdiction was necessarily limited upon the filing of a
petition for certiorari with this Court questioning the propriety of the issuance of
the above-mentioned resolutions. Due respect for the Supreme Court and
practical and ethical considerations should have prompted the appellate court to
wait for the final determination of the petition before taking cognizance of the
case and trying to render moot exactly what was before this court [underscoring
supplied]
[Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166859, June 26, 2006; see also Joy Mart
Consolidated Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88705, June 11, 1992, 209 SCRA
738]
of a decision of the Labor Arbiter or NLRC which is favorable to an employee, the

Labor Arbiter or the NLRC must exercise extreme prudence and observe judicial
courtesy when the circumstances so warrant.
 Eternal Gardens Memorial Park vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-50054 | 1988-08-17
 Joy Mart Consolidated Corp. vs. Court Of Appeals 209 SCRA 738
G.R. No. 88705 | 1992-06-11
 Zamboanga City Water District Vs. Musib M. Buat, Et Al.
G.R. No. 104389 | 1994-05-27
 Go vs. Judge Abrogar 398 SCRA 166
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1759 | 2003-02-27
 Milagros Panuncillo vs. CAP Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 161305 | 2007-02-09
 Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio ( Minute Resolution)
G.R. No. 194321 | 2010-12-01
 Datu Michael Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines
G.R. No. 196271/196305/197221/197280/197282/197392/197454 | 2012-
02-28
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Sandiganbayan, jurisdiction
Under RA 8249, to determine whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction,

lawyers must look into two (2) criteria, namely:
(i) The nature of the offense and

(ii) The salary grade of the public official.
ORIGINAL EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
a) Direct Bribery under Art. 210 as amended by BP 871, May 29, 1985;
b) Indirect Bribery under Art. 211 as amended by BP 871, May 29, 1985;
c) Qualified Bribery under Art. 211-A as amended by RA 7659, Dec. 13, 1993;
d) Corruption of public officials under Art. 212
where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director

and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 Republic Act No. 6758) specifically including:
a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan, provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial
department heads;
b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panglungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers and other department heads;
c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
d) Philippine Army and Air force colonels, naval captains and all officers of higher
rank;
e) Officers of the PNP while occupying the position of Provincial Director and
those holding the rank of Senior Superintendent or higher;
f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants; officials and the
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor ;
g) President, directors or trustees or managers of government owned or

controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
2) Members of Congress and Officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under

the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989;
3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provision of the

Constitution;
4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
the provision of the Constitution;
5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
IV. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed in relation to their office by the public officials and employees
mentioned above;
V. Civil and Criminal Cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO 1, 2, 14 &
14-A issued in 1986
VI. Petitions for issuance of Writ of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas

corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction; Provided, jurisdiction is not exclusive of the Supreme Court
VII. Petitions for Quo Warranto arising or that may arise in cases filed or that may
be filed under EO 1, 2, 14 & 14- A
VIII. Other offenses, provided the accused belongs to Salary Grade 27 or higher:
a.) Violation of RA 6713 - Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards

b.) Violation of RA 7080 - The Plunder Law
c.) Violation of RA 7659 - The Heinous Crime Law
d.) RA 9160 - Violation of The Anti-Money Laundering Law when committed by a

public officer
e.) PD 46 referred to as the gift-giving decree which makes it punishable for any
official or employee to receive directly or indirectly and for the private person to
give or offer to give any gift, present or other valuable thing on any occasion
including Christmas, when such gift, present or valuable thing is given by reason
of his official position, regardless of whether or not the same is for past favors or
the giver hopes or expects to receive a favor or better treatment in the future
from the public official or employee concerned in the discharge of his official
functions. Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or
entertainment in honor of the official or employee or his immediate relatives.
f.) PD 749 which grants immunity from prosecution to any person who voluntarily
gives information about any violation of Art.210, 211 or 212 of the RPC, RA 3019,
Sec.345 of the NIRC, Sec. 3604 of the Customs and Tariff Code and other
provisions of the said Codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the
public officials concerned and other laws, rules and regulations penalizing graft,
corruption and other forms of official abuse and who willingly testifies against the
public official or employee subject to certain conditions.
It should be noted that private individuals can be sued in cases before the
Sandiganbayan if they are alleged to be in conspiracy with the public officer.
[Ambil, Jr, vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 175457, July 6, 2011]
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Sandiganbayan is vested with Appellate Jurisdiction over final judgments,

resolutions or orders of the RTC whether in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction over crimes and civil cases falling within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but which were committed by public
officers below Salary Grade 27.
Appeal to the Sandiganbayan from a decision of the Regional Trial Court in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by Petition for Review under Rule 42
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [Sec 2, Rule XI, Part III of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan; Villanueva vs People, G.R. No. 188630, February 23,
2011]
 Filomena L. Villanueva vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 188630 | 2011-02-23
 Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan
A.M. No. 02-6-07-SB | 2002-10-01
Office of the Ombudsman, powers and jurisdiction
Creation
There is hereby created the independent Office of the

Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one Overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed. (Article XI, Section 5 of
the 1987 Constitution)
Powers and functions under the Constitution:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act

or omission of any public official, employee, office, or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper,
or inefficient.
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public

official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-
owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform
and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent,
and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties.
3. Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against

a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and

subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish
it with copies relating to contracts or transactions entered into by
hid office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report ant irregularity to the Commission on Audit
for appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for assistance and

information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and
to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,

mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and
make recommendations for their elimination and the observance
of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such powers

or perform such functions or duties as may be provided for by
law. (Article XI, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution)
Powers and functions under the Ombudsman Act of 1989
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of

the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any

person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or

employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and
correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against

a public officer or employee at fault or who neglect to perform an
act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary
authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: provided, that the
refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order
of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure,
or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and

subject to such limitations as it may provide in its rules of
procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to
contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any
irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and

information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and
to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters

mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: provided, that
the Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine
what cases may not be made public: provided, further, that any
publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and
true;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,

mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government, and
make recommendations for their elimination and the observance
of high standards of ethics and efficiency;
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum,

and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the
power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and
under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided
therein;
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or

representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the
effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and
duties herein or hereinafter provided;
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of
ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February 25,
1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.
The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against

high ranking government officials and/or those occupying
supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well
as complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.
(Section 15, Republic Act No. 6770 otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989)
Power of the Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable

by the Sandiganbayan and the Regular Courts
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the

Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or
omission of any public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The law (RA No. 6770) does not make a distinction
between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause
“any illegal act or omission of any public official” is broad enough
to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section 15 (1) giving the
Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and Section 11 (4) granting the Special
Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope
of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to
such cases. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of
the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office
of the Special Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of
the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and
control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute is limited to
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
[George Uy v. Hon. Sandiganbayan et al., G.R. Nos.
105965-70, March 20, 2001](underscoring supplied)
Power of the Ombudsman to take over the investigation

over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 gives the Ombudsman
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and authorizes him to take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases. This power
to take over a case at any time is not given to other investigative
bodies. All this means is that the power of the Ombudsman to
investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not co-
equal with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The
Ombudsman can delegate the power but the delegate cannot
claim equal power. Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general
jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of cases involving
violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general jurisdiction
cannot diminish the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed
against public officers and employees. [Department of Justice,
et al. v. Hon. Liwag, G.R. No. 149311, February 11, 2005]
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan:
The Office of the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over cases

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and in relation thereto, the
power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. [Sections 15
(1) and 11, paragraph 4 (a), RA No. 6770]
To settle jurisdictional issues with the Department of Justice

(DOJ) with regard to Sandiganbayan cases, the DOJ and the
Ombudsman entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on March
29, 2012 whereby it was agreed that for cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction in
the conduct of preliminary investigation and inquest proceedings.
Complaints received by the prosecutors of DOJ that are
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the OMB.
[I(A) OMB-DOJ MOA of March 29, 2012]
Inquest for crimes committed outside NCR may be referred to the

provincial/city prosecutors who are authorized to approve and file
the Information before the respective Clerks of Court of the
Regional Trial Courts pursuant to OMB Administrative Order No.
11-94. (I paragraph 6, OMB-DOJ MOA of March 29, 2012)
Over cases cognizable by regular courts:
It likewise has jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by

public officers and employees. [Section 15 (1), RA No. 6770]
The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the DOJ in the

investigation and prosecution of cases involving public officers
and employees that are outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan such as violation of RA 3019, as amended; RA
1379, as amended; RA 6713; Revised Penal Code, Title VII,
Chapter II, section 2; RA 7080, as amended, and for such other
offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation
to office. (Section 1, Rule II Ombudsman Administrative Order
No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman)
In accordance with the OMB-DOJ MOA, the office where the

complaint is filed shall acquire jurisdiction over the case. OMB
may refer to the prosecutors of the DOJ any complaint filed
before it. (I (A) paragraph 3, OMB-DOJ MOA of March 29,
2012)
An order of reinvestigation for cases where preliminary

investigation was conducted by the OMB but were referred to DOJ
for prosecution shall be undertaken by the OMB. The prosecution
of these cases shall be under the full control of the DOJ
prosecutor. In case of reinvestigation, the same should be
referred to the OMB for disposition/resolution. (I (A) paragraph
5, OMB-DOJ MOA of March 29, 2012)
Concurrent jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman

and the Department of Justice:
Citing the case of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating

Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the authority of
the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers
or employees is concurrent with other government investigating
agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However,
the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any
stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases. In fact, to resolve the issue of
jurisdiction, the two bodies came up with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular
No. 95-001 for the proper guidelines of their respective
prosecutors in the conduct of their investigations. Even in
Sections 2 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure on Preliminary Investigation, effective December 1,
2000, the investigating prosecutor is tasked to forward the record
of the case to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. [Decin v. Tayco, G.R. No. 149991, February 14,
2007]
Over administrative cases:
The Ombudsman likewise has authority to investigate and

prosecute public officers and employees that are administratively
liable. (Section 19, RA No. 6770)
Ombudsman’s jurisdiction over local elective officials
The Constitution has named the Ombudsman and his Deputies as

the protectors of the people who shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees
of the government. To fulfill this mandate, R.A. No. 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, was enacted, giving the Ombudsman or
his Deputies jurisdiction over complaints on all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance against officers or
employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality therefor, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and the disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials, except those who may be
removed only by impeachment or over members of Congress and
the Judiciary. On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7160 or the
Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective
barangay official. Without a doubt, the Office of the Ombudsman
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Quezon City Council over
administrative cases against elective officials such as petitioner.
[Laxina, Sr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R.
No. 153155, September 30, 2005]
Decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman must be raised

to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a
petition for review on certiorari but only from judgments and final
orders of the courts enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Appeals
from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are
now required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule
43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an
appeal to the Supreme Court from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. As a consequence of its
ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be
struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory
philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of
Rule 43.
Direct appeal to the Supreme Court allowed only in cases

of grave abuse of discretion
The Supreme Court qualified Fabian v. Desierto, where it was

declared that Section 27 is unconstitutional since it expanded the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction, without its advice and consent, in
violation of Article VI, Section 30 of the Constitution. Hence, all
appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases may be taken to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. True, the law is
silent on the remedy of an aggrieved party in case the
Ombudsman found sufficient cause to indict him in criminal or
non-administrative cases. The Court cannot supply such
deficiency if none has been provided in the law. It has held that
the right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance
with, the provisions of law. Hence, there must be a law expressly
granting such privilege. As ruled in Fabian, the aggrieved party is
given the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Such right of
appeal is not granted to parties aggrieved by orders and decisions
of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, like finding probable cause
to indict accused persons. However, an aggrieved party is not
without recourse where the finding of the Ombudsman as to the
existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [Tirol v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan Justices Cipriano A. Del Rosario et al., G.R.
No. 135913, November 4, 1999]
Cases Cognizable by the Sandiganbayan:
1. Violations of RA 3019 (Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Law);

2. RA 1379 (Forfeiture of Illegally Acquired Wealth);
3. Crimes by public officers or employees embraced in Ch. II,
Sec.2 Title VII, Bk. II of the RPC (Crimes committed by Public
Officers) namely:
a. Direct Bribery under Art. 210 as amended by BP 871, May

29, 1985;
b. Indirect Bribery under Art. 211 as amended by BP 871, May

29, 1985;
c. Qualified Bribery under Art. 211-A as amended by RA 7659,
Dec. 13, 1993;
d. Corruption of public officials under Art. 212 where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions
in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
4. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of

regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 Republic Act No. 6758) specifically including:
a. Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the

sangguniang panlalawigan, provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers and other provincial department heads;
b. City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panglungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other
department heads;
c. Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of
consul and higher;
d. Philippine Army and Air force colonels, naval captains and all
officers of higher rank;
e. Officers of the PNP while occupying the position of Provincial
Director and those holding the rank of Senior Superintendent or
higher;
f. City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants; officials
and the prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor
g. President, directors or trustees or managers of government
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
5. Members of Congress and Officials thereof classified as
Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Classification Act
of 1989;
6. Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provision
of the Constitution;
7. Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions,
without prejudice to the provision of the Constitution;
8. All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27
and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989.
9. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes committed in relation to their office by the public
officials and employees mentioned above;
10. Civil and Criminal Cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with EO 1, 2, 14 & 14-A issued in 1986.
11. OTHERS provided the accused belongs to SG 27 or higher:
a. Violation of RA 6713 - Code of Conduct and Ethical

Standards
b. Violation of RA 7080 - THE PLUNDER LAW
c. Violation of RA 7659 - The Heinous Crime Law
d. RA 9160 - Violation of The Anti-Money Laundering Law when
committed by a public officer.
e. PD 46 referred to as the gift-giving decree which makes it
punishable for any official or employee to receive directly or
indirectly and for the private person to give or offer to give any
gift, present or other valuable thing on any occasion including
Christmas, when such gift, present or valuable thing is given by
reason of his official position, regardless of whether or not the
same is for past favors or the giver hopes or expects to receive a
favor or better treatment in the future from the public official or
employee concerned in the discharge of his official functions.
Included within the prohibition is the throwing of parties or
entertainment in honor of the official or employee or his
immediate relatives.
f. PD 749 which grants immunity from prosecution to any
person who voluntarily gives information about any violation of
Art.210, 211 or 212 of the RPC, RA 3019, Sec.345 of the NIRC,
Sec. 3604 of the Customs and Tariff Code and other provisions of
the said Codes penalizing abuse or dishonesty on the part of the
public officials concerned and other laws, rules and regulations
penalizing graft, corruption and other forms of official abuse and
who willingly testifies against the public official or employee
subject to certain conditions.
(Section 4, PD 1606, as amended by RA No. 8249)
Administrative Cases cognizable by the Ombudsman:
An administrative complaint may be filed for acts and omissions

which are:
a. contrary to law or regulations;

b. unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
c. inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions
though in accordance with law;
d. based on a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of
facts;
e. in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper
purpose;
f. otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification;
g. due to any delay or refusal to comply with the referral or
directive of the Ombudsman or any of his deputies against the
officer or employee to whom it was addressed; and
h. such other grounds provided for under E.O. 292 and other
applicable laws. (Section 1, Rule III Ombudsman
Administrative Order No. 7 as amended by Administrative
Order No. 17, dated September 7, 2003.)
Who are subject to the disciplining authority of the

Ombudsman:
All public officers, elective and appointive, of the government, its

subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members
of the Cabinet, local governments, GOCCs and their subsidiaries
are subject to the disciplining authority of the Office of the
Ombudsman except those who are Members of Congress, the
Judiciary, and officials removable only by impeachment. However,
for purposes of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, the
said exempted officials may be investigated upon by the
Ombudsman for any serious misconduct in office. (Section 2, Rule
III Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 7)
Rules of Procedure in Criminal Cases cognizable by the

Sandiganbayan and Regular Courts:
1. The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and

shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish
probable cause. They shall be in such manner as there are
respondents, plus 2 copies for the official file. The affidavits shall
be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor, or
government official authorized to administer oath, or in their
absence or unavailability, before a notary public, each of whom
must certify that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits. ( Section 3, Rule 112 Rules on
Criminal Procedure)
2. If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official

reports, the investigating officer shall require the complainant or
supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the
complaints.
3. After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating

officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the
respondents to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence with proof of
service thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file
reply affidavits within ten (10) days after service of the counter-
affidavits.
4. If the respondent does not file a counter-affidavit, the

investigating officer may consider the comment filed by him, if
any, as his answer to the complaint. In any event, the respondent
shall have access to the evidence on record.
5. No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of

jurisdiction. Neither may a motion for a bill of particulars be
entertained. If respondents desires any matter in the
complainant's affidavit to be clarified, the particularization thereof
may be done at the time of clarificatory questioning in the
manner provided in paragraph (f) of this section.
6. If the respondents cannot be served with the order

mentioned in paragraph 6 hereof, or having been served, does
not comply therewith, the complaint shall be deemed submitted
for resolution on the basis of the evidence on the record.
7. If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their

supporting evidences, there are facts material to the case which
the investigating officer may need to be clarified on, he may
conduct a clarificatory hearing during which the parties shall be
afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine or cross-examine the witness being questioned. Where
the appearance of the parties or witnesses is impracticable, the
clarificatory questioning may be conducted in writing, whereby
the questions desired to be asked by the investigating officer or a
party shall be reduced into writing and served on the witness
concerned who shall be required to answer the same in writing
and under oath.
8. Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation, the

investigating officer shall forward the records of the case together
with his resolution to the designated authorities for their
appropriate action thereon.
No information may be filed and no complaint may be dismissed

without the written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, or of
the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases. (Section 1,
Rule II Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 7 or the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman)
The Ombudsman will then take cognizance of the case and

determine probable cause. Thereafter it will issue a resolution.
The parties shall be served with a copy of the resolution as finally
approved by the Ombudsman or by the proper Deputy
Ombudsman. (Section 6, Rule II Ombudsman
Administrative Order No. 7)
The losing party may file only one motion for reconsideration or
reinvestigation within 5 days from notice with the Office of the
Ombudsman or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may
be, with leave of court for those cases where information has
already been filed in court. Note that the filing of the motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the filing of the
corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of
probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion. (Section
7, Rule II Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 7 as
amended by Administrative Order No. 15 dated February
16, 2000)
Rules of Procedure in Administrative Cases:
An administrative case may be initiated by a written complaint

under oath accompanied by affidavits of witnesses and other
evidence in support of the charge. Such complaint shall be
accompanied by a Certificate of Non- Forum Shopping duly
subscribed and sworn to by the complainant or his counsel. An
administrative proceeding may also be ordered by the
Ombudsman or the respective Deputy Ombudsman on his
initiative or on the basis of a complaint originally filed as a
criminal action or a grievance complaint or request for assistance.
(Section 3, Rule III Ombudsman Administrative Order No.
7)
Upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall be evaluated to

determine whether the same may be:
a. dismissed outright for any of the grounds stated under
Section 20 of RA 6770, provided, however, that the dismissal
thereof is not mandatory and shall be discretionary on the part of
the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman concerned;
b. treated as a grievance/request for assistance which may be

referred to the Public Assistance Bureau, this Office, for
appropriate action under Section 2, Rule IV of this Rules;
c. referred to other disciplinary authorities under paragraph 2,

Section 23, RA 6770 for the taking of appropriate administrative
proceedings;
d. referred to the appropriate office/agency or official for the

conduct of further fact-finding investigation; or
e. docketed as an administrative case for the purpose of

administrative adjudication by the Office of the Ombudsman.
7)
If the complaint is docketed as an administrative case, the

respondent shall be furnished with a copy of the affidavits and
other evidence submitted by the complainant, and shall be
ordered to file his counter-affidavits and other evidence in
support of his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
together with proof of service of the same on the complainant
who may file his reply- affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt
of the counter-affidavit of the respondent; (Section 5, Rule III
Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 7)
If the hearing officer finds no sufficient cause to warrant further

proceedings on the basis of the affidavits and other evidence
submitted by the parties, the complaint may be dismissed.
Otherwise, he shall issue an Order (or Orders) for any of the

following purposes:
1. To direct the parties to file, within ten (10) days from receipt
of the Order, their respective verified position papers. The
position papers shall contain only those charges, defenses and
other claims contained in the affidavits and pleadings filed by the
parties. Any additional relevant affidavits and/or documentary
evidence may be attached by the parties to their position papers.
On the basis of the position papers, affidavits and other pleadings
filed, the Hearing Officer may consider the case submitted for
resolution.
2. If the Hearing Officer decides not to consider the case

submitted for resolution after the filing of the position papers,
affidavits and pleadings, to conduct a clarificatory hearing
regarding facts material to the case as appearing in the
respective position papers, affidavits and pleadings filed by the
parties. At this stage, he may, at his discretion and for the
purpose of determining whether there is a need for a formal trial
or hearing, ask clarificatory questions to further elicit facts or
information;
3. In the conduct of clarificatory hearings, the parties shall be

afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right to
examine or crossexamine the party/witness being questioned.
The parties may be allowed to raise clarificatory questions and
elicit answers form the opposing party/witness, which shall be
coursed through the Hearing Officer who shall determine whether
or not the proposed questions are necessary and relevant. In
such cases, the Hearing Officer shall ask the question in such
manner and phrasing as he may deem appropriate.
4. If the Hearing Officer finds no necessity for further

proceedings on the basis of the clarificatory hearings, affidavits,
pleadings and position papers filed by the parties, he shall issue
an Order declaring the case submitted for resolution. The Hearing
Officer may also require the parties to simultaneously submit,
within ten (10) days from receipt of the Order, their Reply
Position Papers. The parties, if new affidavits and/or exhibits are
attached to the other party’s Position Paper, may submit only
rebutting evidence with their Reply Position Papers.
5. If the Hearing Officer finds the need to conduct a formal

investigation on the basis of the clarificatory hearings, pleadings,
affidavits and the position papers filed by the parties, an Order
shall be issued for the purpose. In the same Order, the parties
shall be required to file within ten (10) days from receipt of the
Order their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among
others, the nature of the charge(s) and defenses, proposed
stipulation of facts, a definition of the issues, identification and
marking of exhibits, limitation of witnesses, and such other
matters as would expedite the proceedings. The parties are not
allowed to introduce matters in the pre-trial briefs which are not
covered by the position papers, affidavits and pleadings filed and
served prior to issuance of the Order directing the conduct of a
formal investigation.
6. The conduct of formal proceedings by the Office of the

Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be non-litigious in
nature. Subject to the requirements of due process in
administrative cases, the technicalities of law, procedure and
evidence shall not strictly apply thereto. The Hearing Officer may
avail himself of all reasonable means to ascertain speedily the
facts of the case. He shall take full control of the proceedings,
with proper regard to the right of the parties to due process, and
shall limit the presentation of evidence to matters relevant to the
issue(s) before him and necessary for a just and speedy
disposition of the case.
7. In the conduct of formal administrative investigation, the

Hearing Officer shall set the case for continuous trial. The parties
shall be notified at least ten (10) days before the date of the
initial hearing. Failure of any or both of the parties to appear at
the scheduled hearing(s) is not necessarily a cause for the
dismissal of the complaint. A party who appears may be allowed
to present his evidence in the absence of the adverse party who
was duly notified of the hearing; however, if the absent party is
able to show that there is a valid cause for his absence, he shall
be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witness (es)
presented during his absence. In case of two (2) successive
unjustified non-appearances of any party in the proceedings, it
shall be the option of the party who is present to submit the case
for resolution on the basis of the records of the case and the
evidence so far presented;
8. Only witnesses whose affidavits have been submitted by the

parties and served on the adverse party prior to the issuance of
the Order directing the conduct of a formal investigation may be
allowed to testify at the hearing. The affidavit of any witness shall
constitute his direct testimony, subject to cross-examination, re-
direct examination and re-cross examination. Unless the
testimony of the witness involves newly discovered evidence, the
Hearing Officer may not allow the presentation of witnesses
whose affidavits have not been filed by the parties and served on
the adverse party prior to the issuance of the Order to conduct
formal investigation. If a witness whose testimony involves newly
discovered evidence is allowed to testify, the adverse party shall
have the right to cross-examine such witness and to submit
rebuttal evidence, if any, relevant to said newly discovered
evidence;
9. The parties shall be allowed the assistance of counsel and

the right to the production of evidence thru the compulsory
process of subpoena and subpoena duces tecum; ( Section 5,
Rule III Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 7)
Please note that the following are prohibited pleadings to wit:
1. Motion to dismiss, although any ground justifying the

dismissal of the case may be discussed in the counter-
affidavit/pleadings of the party;
2. Motion for bill of particulars; and
3. Dilatory motions including, but not limited to, motions for

extension of time, for postponement, second motions for
reconsideration and/or re-investigation.
Said pleadings shall be stricken off the records of the case.

7)
Not later than thirty (30) days after the case is declared
submitted for resolution, the Hearing Officer shall submit a
proposed decision containing his findings and recommendation for
the approval of the Ombudsman. Said proposed decision shall be
reviewed by the Directors, Assistant Ombudsmen and Deputy
Ombudsmen concerned. (Section 6, Rule III Ombudsman
With respect to low ranking public officials, the Deputy

Ombudsman concerned shall be the approving authority. Upon
approval, copies thereof shall be served upon the parties and the
head of the office or agency of which the respondent is an official
or employee for his information and compliance with the
appropriate directive contained therein. (Section 6, Rule III
Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 7)
The decision shall be final, executory and unappealable in cases

wherein the respondent is absolved of charge and in cases of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
equivalent to one month salary. In all other cases, the decision
may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for
review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43
of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. (Section 7, Rule III Ombudsman
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.

7)
For officials that have been convicted and imposed with the
penalty of suspension or removal that have appealed and have
won such appeals, they shall be considered as having been
preventively suspended and shall be paid the salary and
emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension
or removal. (Section 7, Rule III Ombudsman Administrative
Order No. 7)
A motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation may be filed

within 10 days from receipt of the decision or order by the party
based on any of the following grounds:
a. New evidence had been discovered which materially affects

the order, directive or decision;
b. Grave errors of facts or laws or serious irregularities have
been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant.
Only one motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation is allowed

and the same must be resolved by the Hearing Officer within 5
days from the date of submission for resolution. (Section 8,
Rule III Ombudsman Administrative Order No. 7)
Rules on Mediation in the Office of the Ombudsman
The Office of the Ombudsman may conduct mediation and

conciliation proceedings on the following cases:
a. Complaints, grievances, or requests for assistance seeking

redress or relief concerning an act or omission of a public official
or employee, office, or agency alleged to be unreasonable, unfair,
oppressive, illegal, unjust, discriminatory, improper or inefficient,
and which does not necessarily amount to a criminal or
administrative offense, as defined under Section 1, Rule IV,
Administrative Order No. 7 of 1990 as amended, of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
b. Light administrative offenses where the penalty imposed by

pertinent laws and Civil Service Rules is reprimand, such as:
1. Borrowing of Money by a Superior Officer from a

Subordinate.
2. Willful Failure to Pay Just Debt.
3. Discourtesy in the Course of Official Duties.
c. The following cases which are covered by the Revised Rules

on Summary Procedure:
1.
Violation of traffic rules and regulations.
2. Violation of rental law.
3. Violation of municipal and city ordinances.
4. Violation of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks
Law)
5. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law
for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six (6)
months or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00),
or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, accessory or
otherwise, or of civil liability arising therefrom.
d. Cases which may be cognizable at the first instance by the

Lupong Tagapamayapa under Section 408, Chapter VII of the
Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7610).
e. Criminal negligence resulting in damage to property.

f. Such other offenses which may be brought by the parties for
mediation, except those which by law may not be compromised.
During the mediation proceedings, only the civil aspect of the

complaint may be compromised although the criminal and
administrative aspect may be discussed to find out whether or
not the complaint was filed due to misunderstanding or
misappreciation of facts. (Section 5, Administrative Order No.
20 series of 2008)
 George Uy vs Sandiganbayan, Ombudsman & Roger C. Berbano, Sr

G.R. Nos. 105965-70 | 1999-08-09
 Victoriano Tirol vs Sandiganbayan Justices
G.R. No. 135913 | 1999-11-04
 George Uy vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 105965-70 | 2001-03-20
 Department of Justice vs. Liwag
G.R. No. 149311 | 2005-02-11
 S. Decin vs. SPO1 M. Tayco, et al.
G.R. No. 149991 | 2007-02-14
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Replevin (Rule 60) (Provisional Remedies)
Replevin is a provisional remedy seeking to recover possession of

personal property during the pendency of any action. [See Section 1,
Rule 60 of the Rules of Court]
Replevin, broadly understood, is both a form of principal remedy

and of a provisional relief. It may refer either to the action itself,
i.e., to regain the possession of personal chattels being
wrongfully detained from the plaintiff by another, or to the
provisional remedy that would allow the plaintiff to retain the
thing during the pendency of the action and hold it pendente lite.
The action is primarily possessory in nature and generally
determines nothing more than the right of possession. Replevin
is so usually described as a mixed action, being partly in rem and
partly in personam-in rem insofar as the recovery of specific
property is concerned, and in personam as regards to damages
involved. As an "action in rem," the gist of the replevin action is
the right of the plaintiff to obtain possession of specific personal
property by reason of his being the owner or of his having a
special interest therein. Consequently, the person in possession
of the property sought to be replevied is ordinarily the proper and
only necessary party defendant, and the plaintiff is not required
to so join as defendants other persons claiming a right on the
property but not in possession thereof. [B.A. Finance v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 102998, July 5, 1996]
Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to

repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or
chattels from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who
wrongfully detains such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit
one having right to possession to recover property in specie from
one who has wrongfully taken or detained the property. The term
may refer either to the action itself, for the recovery of
personalty, or to the provisional remedy traditionally associated
with it, by which possession of the property may be obtained by
the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action [see
Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Astorga, G.R. No. 148132
and G.R. No. 151079 and G.R. No. 151372, January 28,
2008]
When to file for the remedy
A party praying for the recovery of possession of personal

property may apply for an order for the delivery of such property
to him:
(a) At the commencement of the action or
(b) At any time before answer. [Section 1, Rule 60, Rules of

Court]
Facts that must be alleged in the application
The plaintiff/applicant must show, by his own affidavit or that of

some other person who personally knows the facts:
(i) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed,

particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(ii) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party,

alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best of
his knowledge, information, and belief ;
(iii) The actual market value of the property.
[Section 2, Rule 60 Rules of Court]
Rule 60 of the Rules of Court allows an application for the

immediate possession of the property but the plaintiff must show
that he has a good legal basis, i.e., a clear title thereto, for
seeking such interim possession. [B.A. Finance v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 102998, July 5, 1996]
Property which cannot be the subject of replevin
[I]t must be shown that the subject property has not been
(a) ?distrained, (b) taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant
to law,(c) seized under a writ of execution or preliminary
attachment, or (d) placed under custodia legis. [Merlita
Dapadap Vda. De Danao v. Judge Manuel Ginete, A.M. No.
MTJ–03–1474. January 21, 2003; Section 2, Rule 60 Rules
of Court]
Thus, if the property had already been seized by the Bureau of

Customs and had already been set for public auction, then the
provisional remedy of replevin cannot be used to recover the said
property. The forfeiture of seized goods in the Bureau of Customs
is a proceeding against the goods and not against the owner. It is
in the nature of a proceeding in rem, i.e., directed against the res
or imported articles and entails a determination of the legality of
their importation. In this proceeding, it is, in legal contemplation,
the property itself which commits the violation and is treated as
the offender, without reference whatsoever to the character or
conduct of the owner. [Asian Terminals, Inc. vs. Bautista-
Ricafort, G.R. No. 166901, October 27, 2006]
Also, the property subject of the application of for a writ of

replevin are forest products which were taken in violation of
forestry laws, and have already been seized by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), then they can no
longer be the subject of a writ of replevin. Since there was a
violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in
accordance with law, in our view the [properties seized] were
validly deemed in custodia legis. They could not be subject to an
action for replevin. For it is property lawfully taken by virtue of
legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not
otherwise. [Calub v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115634.
April 27, 2000; Dagudag v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-06-
2017, June 19, 2008]
As for properties subject of litigation, they are not by that fact

alone in custodia legis, and thus cannot always be outside the
reach of a writ of replevin. It is true that property held as
evidence in a criminal case cannot be replevied. But the rule
applies only where the property is lawfully held, that is, seized in
accordance with the rule against warrantless searches and
seizures or its accepted exceptions. Only when property is
lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the
custody of the law, and not otherwise. [Superlines v.
Philippine National Construction Company, G.R. No.
169596, March 28, 2007]
Determination of jurisdiction by the court not based on

value of the property to be seized
Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the amount

of the claim alleged in the complaint, not by the value of the
chattel seized in ancillary proceedings.
Petitioners argue that the value of the property seized is in
excess of P200,000 and thus outside the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Court. This argument has no legal and factual
basis. The fundamental claim in the main action against
petitioners, as shown in respondent bank's Complaint, is the
collection of the sum of P190,635.90, an amount that is clearly
within the jurisdiction of the MTC. Although the value of the
vehicle seized pursuant to the Writ of Replevin may have
exceeded P200,000, that fact does not deprive the trial court of
its jurisdiction over the case. [see Fernandez vs The
International Corporate Bank (now Union Bank), G.R. No.
131283, October 7, 1999]
Territorial enforcement of the Writ of Replevin
Petitioners argue that the Writ of Replevin issued by the

Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay could be enforced only
within the confines of Pasay City. Under the Resolution of the
Supreme Court en banc, dated January 11, 1983, providing for
the interim rules and guidelines relative to the implementation of
BP 129, a writ of replevin like the one issued in the present case
may be served anywhere in the Philippines. Specifically, the said
Resolution states:
"3. Writs and processes.
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,

habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may
be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or

a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit
trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the
last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the
regional trial court."
Thus, the Writ of Replevin issued by Judge Paas, which obviously

does not fall under item "a" of the above-cited Rule, may be
validly enforced anywhere in the Philippines. [see Fernandez vs
The International Corporate Bank (now Union Bank), G.R.
No. 131283, October 7, 1999]
Requirement of a Bond
Along with the application stating the above-mentioned facts, the

applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in
double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit
aforementioned.
This bond is for: (a) the return of the property to the adverse
party if such return be adjudged, and for (b) the payment to the
adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant
in the action. [Section 2, Rule 60, Rules of Court]
A replevin bond is simply intended to indemnify the defendant

against any loss that he may suffer by being compelled to
surrender the possession of the disputed property pending the
trial of the action. He cannot recover on the bond as for a
reconversion when he has failed to have the judgment entered
for the return of the property. Nor is the surety liable for payment
of the judgment for damages rendered against the plaintiff on a
counterclaim or punitive damages for fraudulent or wrongful acts
committed by the plaintiffs and unconnected with the defendant's
deprivation of possession by the plaintiff. Indeed, even where the
judgment was that the defendant was entitled to the property,
but no order was made requiring the plaintiff to return it or
assessing damages in default of a return, it was declared that
until judgment was entered that the property should be restored,
there could be no liability on the part of the sureties. [Sapugay
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86792, March 21, 1990]
Issuance of the Writ
Upon the filing of such affidavit and approval of the bond, the
court shall issue an order and the corresponding writ of replevin,
describing the personal property alleged to be wrongfully
detained and requiring the sheriff forthwith to take such property
into his custody. [Section 3, Rule 60, Rules of Court]
Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must serve a copy thereof
on the adverse party, together with a copy of the application,
affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the property, if it be
in the possession of the adverse party, or his agent, and retain it
in his custody. If the property or any part thereof be concealed in
a building or enclosure, the sheriff must demand its delivery, and
if it be not delivered, he must cause the building or enclosure to
be broken open and take the property into his possession. After
the sheriff has take possession of the property as herein
provided, he must keep it in a secure place and shall be
responsible for its delivery to the party entitled thereto upon
receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and keeping
the same. [Section 4, Rule 60, Rules of Court]
Redelivery Bond: Remedy of the Adverse Party
If the adverse party objects to the sufficiency of the applicant's

bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot immediately
require the return of the property. [Section 5, Rule 60, Rules
of Court]
However, if the adverse party does not object, he may still seek
to have the property redelivered to him at any time before the
delivery of the property to the applicant.
He may do this by filing a redelivery bond, which is a bond

executed to the applicant, the amount of which is double the
value of the property as stated in the applicant's affidavit for the
delivery thereof to the applicant. [See Section 5, Rule 60,
Rules of Court]
If a defendant in a replevin action wishes to have the property

taken by the sheriff restored to him, he should within five days
from such taking:
1. Post a counter-bond in double the value of said property,

and
2. Serve plaintiff with a copy of such Counter-bond.
The five-day period is mandatory. Conformably, a defendant in a
replevin suit may demand the return of possession of the
property replevined by filing a redelivery bond executed to the
plaintiff in double the value of the property as stated in the
plaintiff’s affidavit within the period specified in Sections 5 and 6
of Rule 60. [Spouses Bautista vs. Sula, A.M. No. P-04-1920,
August 17, 2007]
Disposition of the Property
If within five (5) days after the taking of the property by the
sheriff, the adverse party does not object to the sufficiency of the
bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon; or if the adverse party
so objects and the court affirms its approval of the applicant's
bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party requires the
return of the property but his bond is objected to and found
insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the
property shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the
property is not delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return
it to the adverse party. [Section 6, Rule 60, Rules of Court]
And, ten (10) days after the taking of the property, the sheriff
must file the order, with his proceedings indorsed thereon, with
the court. [Section 8, Rule 60, Rules of Court]
Third Party Claim

If the property taken is claimed by any person other than the
party against whom the writ of replevin had been issued or his
agent, and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or
right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds therefor, and
serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has
possession of the property and a copy thereof upon the applicant,
the sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property under replevin
or deliver it to the applicant unless the applicant or his agent, on
demand of said sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to
indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less than the
value of the property under replevin as provided in section 2
hereof. In case of disagreement as to such value, the court shall
determine the same. No claim for damages for the taking or
keeping, of the property may be enforced against the bond unless
the action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of the filing of the bond.
The sheriff shall not be liable for damages, for the taking or
keeping of such property, to any such third-party claimant if such
bond shall be filed. Nothing herein contained shall prevent such
claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the
property, or prevent the applicant from claiming damages against
a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious
claim, in the same or a separate action.
When the writ of replevin is issued in favor of the Republic of the

Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such
bond shall not be required, and in case the sheriff is sued for
damages as a result of the replevin, he shall be represented by
the Solicitor General, and if held liable therefor, the actual
damages adjudged by the court shall be paid by the National
Treasurer out of the funds to be appropriated for the
purpose. [Section 7, Rule 60, Rules of Court]
Final Judgment
After trial of the issues the court shall determine who has the
right of possession to and the value of the property and shall
render judgment in the alternative for the delivery thereof to the
party entitled to the same, or for its value in case delivery cannot
be made, and also for such damages as either party may prove,
with costs. [Section 9, Rule 60, Rules of Court]
The amount, if any, to be awarded to any party upon any bond

filed in accordance with the provisions of Rule 60, shall be
claimed, ascertained, and granted under the same procedure as
prescribed in Section 20 of Rule 57. [Section 10, Rule 60,
Rules of Court]
Section 20 of Rule 57 states:
Section 20. Claim for damages on account of improper, irregular

or excessive attachment. - An application for damages on account
of improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed
before the trial or before the trial or before appeal is perfected or
before the judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the
attaching party and his surety or sureties, setting forth the facts
showing his right to damages and the amount thereof. Such
damages may be awarded only after proper hearing and shall be
included in the judgment on the main case.
If the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to the party

against whom the attachment was issued, he must claim
damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an
application in the appellate court, with notice to the party in
whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties,
before the judgment of the appellate court becomes executory.
The appellate court may allow the application to be heard and
decided by the trial court.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom

the attachment was issued from recovering in the same action
the damages awarded to him from any property of the attaching
party not exempt from execution should the bond or deposit
given by the latter be insufficient or fail to fully satisfy the award.
[Section 20, Rule 57, Rules of Court]
Effect of dismissal of the case
The dismissal of the replevin case for failure to prosecute results

in the restoration of the parties’ status prior to litigation, as if no
complaint was filed at all. To let the writ of seizure stand after the
dismissal of the complaint would be adjudging that one party is a
prevailing party, when precisely no decision on the merits had
been rendered. Accordingly, the parties must be reverted to their
status quo ante. The replievied property must thus be restored to
the person having possession thereof prior to the filing of the
case, as if no case was filed at all. [See Advent Capital
Corporation vs. Young, G.R. No. 183018, August 3, 2011]
Recovery from separated employee of car issued under a

company vehicle plan
The RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the [replevin] suit xx

SMART's demand for payment of the market value of the car or,
in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a
civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor
rather than employee-employer relations. As such, the dispute
falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
xxx
The question of whether or not a party has the right of possession
over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse
party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to
require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of
a labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor
Arbiters. xxx The labor dispute [illegal dismissal] involved is not
intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The respective
issues raised in each forum can be resolved independently on the
other. [see Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Astorga, G.R.
No. 148132 and G.R. No. 151079 and G.R. No. 151372,
January 28, 2008 citing Basaya, Jr. vs. Militante, G.R. No.
L-75837, December 11, 1987]
Basaya, Jr. vs. Militante

G.R. No. L-75837 | 1987-12-11
 Marino Sapugay, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 86792 | 1990-03-21
 Ba Finance Corp. vs CA, et al.
G.R. No. 102998 | 1996-07-05
 Fernandez vs The International Corporate Bank (now Union Bank)
G.R. No. 131283 | 1999-10-07
 Calub,etal. vs CA,Babalcon,& Abuganda
G.R. No. 115634 | 2000-04-27
 Asian Terminals, Inc. vs. Hon. Helen Bautista-Ricafort, et al.
G.R. No. 166901 | 2006-10-27
 Sps. Normandy & Ruth Bautista Vs. Ernesto L. Sula etc
A.M. No. P-04-1920 | 2007-08-17
 Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Regina M. Astorga
G.R. No. 148132 and G.R. No. 151079 and G.R. No. 151372 | 2008-01-28
 Rules of Court - Civil Procedure
Rules of Court | 1997-7-1
 Rules of Court - 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Rules of Court | 1997-07-01

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, March 3, 2010]

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical

Independent Civil Actions

A. Civil Liability Arising from a Criminal Offense (ex-Delicto) (Art 29 and

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the

Independent Civil Actions

A. Civil Liability Arising from a Criminal Offense (ex-Delicto) (Art 29 and

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the

Independent Civil Actions

A. Civil Liability Arising from a Criminal Offense (ex-

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon

Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on

An acquittal of the accused predicated on the conclusion 'that the

If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an

B. Civil Liability Not arising from a Criminal Offense (Art 31

(1) Culpa Contractual

To illustrate, a passenger of a common carrier vehicle was injured

This notwithstanding, the injured passenger may bring a separate

(2) Culpa Aquiliana (Quasi-delict)

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the

(3) Violation of Constitutional Rights (Art 32)

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual,

(1) Freedom of religion;

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge

A public officer who directly or indirectly violates the

(4) Defamation, Fraud, Physical Injuries (Art 33)

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil

As a rule, after a criminal action has been commenced, a civil

In contrast, however, where the offense charged is reckless

An acquittal from a charge for violation of the Anti-Graft and

Note: Article 33 speaks of a situation where an act which

(5) Failure or Refusal to Render Aid by a Peace Officer (Art

Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force

C. No Need to Reserve Independent Civil Action

Section 3, Rule 111 of the present Revised Rules of Criminal

Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently. — In

The 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the requirement of

2. The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil

3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover

Thus, deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil

 Mendoza vs. Alcala 112 Phil 929 or 2 SCRA 1032

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Demurrer to Evidence

Effect of denial of motion

An order denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory, and is, therefore, not

Effect if motion is granted but order of dismissal is reversed on appeal

Northwestern Airlines, Inc vs. CA, et al.

G.R. No. 120334 | 1998-01-20

GELACIO P. GEMENTIZA vs COMELEC and VICTORIO R. SUAYBAGUIO,

Teodoro K. Katigbak And Bienvenido E. Merelos Vs. The Sandiganbayan And

G.R. No. 140183 | 2003-07-10

Republic vs. J. C. Tuvera, et al.

G.R. No. 148246 | 2007-02-16

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Post-judgment remedies; Appeals in general

Generally, the remedy to obtain reversal or modification of

Appeal cannot exist with certiorari

Record on appeal versus notice of appeal

Judgments or orders not appealable

An order denying a motion for reconsideration or new trial is the