The MILITARY BALANCE 2010

PressArundel
Statement
House, London
3 February 2010
remarks by
Dr John Chipman
Director-General and Chief Executive
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

INTRODUCTION the Sichuan earthquake. Meanwhile the Chinese navy’s

Welcome to the launch of the 2010 The Military Balance. aim to develop an effective anti-access capacity towards
Joining me to answer your questions today are: James the US led to a tense confrontation between a US naval
Hackett, Editor of The Military Balance, Alex Nicoll, Director survey ship and Chinese government and fishing vessels
of Editorial, Nigel Inkster, Director for Transnational operating near Hainan Island. Defining ways in which the
Threats and Political Risk; Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow two navies might acceptably operate in areas near to China
for Non-Proliferation, Oksana Antonenko, Senior Fellow would be a good subject for the military to military talks
for Russia and Eurasia; Christopher Langton, Senior between the US and China that unfortunately can easily be
Fellow for Armed Conflict and Defence Diplomacy; Dana placed in jeopardy when the countries find themselves in a
Allin, Editor of Survival and Senior Fellow for US Foreign political dispute, especially over Taiwan.
Policy and Transatlantic Affairs; Rahul Roy Chaudhury, Western countries are for their part assessing how
Senior Fellow for South Asia; Toby Dodge, Consulting recent conflict should affect the way they shape their
Senior Fellow for the Middle East and Bastian Giegerich, armed forces. The US QDR emphasises the stabilisation
Research Fellow for European Security. and reconstruction roles that have been such prominent
We publish this year as the United States releases its features of recent military activity while arguing that
Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR), the United Kingdom assured access to sea, air, space and cyberspace is
begins to consider its own Strategic Defence Review with a continuing vital mission for US forces. The QDR
a Green Paper, NATO prepares to intensify work on a new acknowledges the asymmetric techniques likely to be used
Strategic Concept to be approved at a summit later this by US enemies and thinking in the UK in anticipation
year, Russia presses its case for a new European security of the defence and security review also emphasises that
order and Australia continues to advance its ideas for an future styles of conflict may be different.
Asia-Pacific Community. There is much debate on the
question of the global balance of power moving eastward
and on how the nature of violent conflict is changing. This
year we again have produced a chart of conflict that draws
attention to factors that may lead to twenty-first century
conflict: population growth, urbanisation, migration,
extremism, climate and food security and disease among
them.
We also examine carefully the military modernisation
plans of several countries and notably the way in which
the Chinese armed forces are preparing for ‘diversified
missions.’ This term is used by the PLA to refer to
expanded non-traditional security responsibilities such
as helping to safeguard the country’s increasingly global
economic and energy interests, adopting more pro-
active anti-terrorist and anti-separatist strategies and
participating in long-range multilateral anti-piracy escort
duties. Special emphasis has been placed by China on
disaster relief since 2008 when the PLA was evidently
caught unprepared to deal effectively with the result of

Embargo: Not for publication or quotation in any form before 10:30 BST on 3 february 2010
 Press Launch
THe MILITARY BALANCE 2010 Arundel House, London
3 february 2010
Page 2 of 4

ISAF/OEF-A 6 Polish 21st Podhale Rifles Bde 13 UK 11th Light Brigade Estimated troop
7 1st Royal Australian Regiment 14 USMC 2nd MEB (7th RCT) contributions of
1 RC-Capital
Battle Group NATO–ISAF nations
Italian 186th Para Regt 15 RC-West
8 Dutch 11th Air Aslt Brigade Albania 250
French 2nd For Leg Inf Regt Italian 183rd Para Regt
Turkish Battle Group 9 Romanian 2nd Mtn Bde Australia (AUS) 1,350
Italian 187th Para Regt
Austria 4
2 French 3rd Marine Inf Regt 10 Canadian 1st PPCLI Inf Battle Spanish Bn
Group Azerbaijan 90
3 US 4th IBCT/4th Inf Div 16 RC-North
Belgium 530
4 US 3rd IBCT/10th Mtn Div 11 US 5th SBCT/2nd Inf Div German 1st Jäger Regt
Bosnia-
5 US 4th AB IBCT/25th Inf Div 12 Danish Battle Group Herzegovina 10
Regional Command North
ANA G 2/205th Bde Bulgaria 460
∼5,700
Canada (CAN) 2,830
A 111th Capital Div H 1/205th Bde
Croatia 290
+ 2/201st Bde I 3/205th Bde GER Czech Republic (CZE) 480
B 1/201st Bde J 4/205th Bde KUNDUZ GER Faizabad Denmark (DNK) 690
SWE Kunduz
C 3/201st Bde K 2/207th Bde JOWZJAN Mazar-e Sharif TAKHAR BADAKSHAN Estonia (EST) 150
N
D 1/203rd Bde L 1/207th Bde M 16 Finland 165
E 3/203rd Bde M 1/209th Bde FARYAB France (FRA) 3,095
BALKH NURISTAN
HUN FYROM 165
F 2/203rd Bde N 2/209th Bde SAMANGAN Pul-e Kumri PANJSHER
US Georgia 1
NOR
US Nuristan KUNAR Germany (GER) 4,365
Maimanah BAGHLAN
Regional Command West Panjsher Greece 145
SAR-E PUL US LAGHMAN US
∼4,400 Bagram
KAPISA Asadabad Hungary (HUN) 360
2 US
Iceland 2 (civilian)
PARWAN Mehtar Lam
BAMIYAN 1 A
ESP BADGHIS NZL 3 C Ireland 7
Qal’eh-Now Wardak TUR KABUL Jalalabad US Italy (ITA) 2,795
Bamiyan
WARDAK CZE LOGAR NANGARHAR Jordan 7
LTU
Chaghcharan 4 B PAKTIA Latvia 175
ITA L 15 KHOST
Logar Lithuania (LTU) 250
Herat US Khost
DAIKONDI 6 E 5 D US Luxembourg 8
GHOR POL/US Gardez
Ghazni Netherlands (NLD) 2,160
HERAT F
GHAZNI New Zealand (NZL) 300
Sharan ISAF Kabul
URUZGAN HQ ISAF (4 star) Norway 480
US Poland (POL) 1,910
Tarin Kowt ZABUL IJC (3 star)
7 J 8 PAKTIKA Portugal 145
FARAH US Regional Command Romania 990
US NLD/AUS
9 G Capital – Kabul Singapore 9
Farah K Qalat
∼6,130 Slovakia 245
10 Slovenia 130
12
11 H
13 I Kandahar Spain 1,000
Lashkar Gah Sweden 430
CAN
UK/DNK/EST Turkey (TUR) 720
Regional Command East Ukraine 10
NIMRUZ 14
KANDAHAR ∼18,300 United Arab Emirates 25
HELMAND
UK 9,000
US 34,800
Regional Command South US (OEF) 31,129
ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team
∼36,500 US Total (rounded)
and troop nationality (see above for key)
102,155
Source: NATO, IISS. Information as of October 2009
© IISS

The IISS agrees with the growing consensus that future foundation for a better understanding of cyber-warfare. In
state on state conflict may be characterised by the use time, future editions of The Military Balance may even have
of so-called asymmetric techniques. Chief among these to assess capabilities in this area.
may be the use of cyber-warfare to disable a country’s
infrastructure, meddle with the integrity of another Afghanistan
country’s internal military data, try to confuse its financial For the moment, most minds are concentrated on whether
transactions or to accomplish any number of other the efforts of the London conference on Afghanistan
possibly crippling aims. Despite evidence of cyber attacks can lead to a negotiated peace in the country. While the
in recent political conflicts, there is little appreciation military surge is taking place, it is now more overtly
internationally of how properly to assess cyber-conflict. recognised that reconciliation with ‘reconcilable’ Taliban
We are now, in relation to the problem of cyber-warfare, is an important element of the overarching strategy and
at the same stage of intellectual development as we were that integration of Taliban who accept the current political
in the 1950s in relation to possible nuclear war. The IISS dispensation is a necessary goal.
is determined through its own research programme to That said, the Afghan insurgency is complex. There are
create the intellectual architecture needed to understand far more insurgents than ISAF or Afghan security forces
better the problem of cyber-warfare. When is an attack can ever kill. The relationships that some groups have
to be recognised? What is legitimate defence? Is there a with al-Qaeda or AQ affiliates are highly differentiated.
doctrine of pre-emption applicable to the risk of cyber This suggests that judging what level of residual Taliban
attacks? Can cyber-attacks be deterred? Is there a method presence or influence is tolerable even from a narrow
of arms control that could be applied to cyber-capabilities? counter-terrorist perspective is very difficult. Moreover,
What international law can be brought to bear to regulate effectively sealing the border with Pakistan across
the risks? These questions have no ready answer. The IISS which Taliban fighters have been able to pass relatively
will, during this year, convene a number of workshops and unhindered, requires a form of collaboration with Pakistan
publish an Adelphi book addressing these issues to lay the not yet achieved. Even were a policy of reconciliation to

Embargo: Not for publication or quotation in any

form before 10:30 BST on wednesday 3 february 2010

THe MILITARY BALANCE 2010
gain traction, ensuring the necessary follow-up so that
reconciled Taliban kept to their new convictions requires
a highly organised policy and efficient institutions. India’s
scepticism about the wisdom of seeking to distinguish
‘bad’ from potentially ‘reconcilable’ Taliban additionally
complicates the picture. It reinforces the view also
endorsed at the London conference that embedding
internal reconciliation in renewed regional cooperation is
necessary.
However great the priority in Afghanistan, political
engagement with Iraq also remains vital so that the gains
achieved in the last two years are sustained and Iraq can
develop as a force for regional stability rather than as a
theatre for regional competition.
Iraq
Any assessment of the current strategic and political
situation in Iraq has to compare events in Baghdad today
with the peak of the instability in January 2007, before
the start of the surge, when 3,500 civilians were killed in
one month. Against this background clear and sustained
progress has been made in creating an efficient security
service and functioning political system. However, Iraq
still faces profound challenges that could hinder further
progress. Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia retains the ability
to launch regular very destructive mass-casualty attacks
against high-profile government targets and the civilian
population in and around Baghdad. These attacks not
only highlight ongoing sectarian tensions but serious
shortcomings in the ability of Iraq’s security services.
Politically, Iraq did carry out a successful provincial
election in January 2009 followed by a comparatively
smooth transition in local councils across the country.
However, the repeated postponement of the national
elections, now scheduled for March 7th, indicates
continuing disagreement amongst the country’s ruling
elite about the system under which they will compete for
power. The exclusion in January of over 500 candidates
for the national elections by the Accountability and Justice
Commission responsible for de-Ba’athification indicates
both the fluidity of the rules governing the electoral process
and the desire of influential actors within the government
to exploit them for political advantage. The final test of
the sustainability of the political and security architecture
built in Iraq since regime change in 2003 will come with the
drawdown of US troops. In August this year the number of
US troops in the country will be reduced from the current
115,000 to 50,000, with plans for their complete removal
by December. An Iraq free of a US military presence will
need to find ordered ways to manage its lingering political
disputes hopefully free also from too many external if
regional influences. How, in particular, local actors can
contain the likely rise of Iran’s influence in domestic
politics will be the key issue for 2011.
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Press Launch
Arundel House, London
3 february 2010
Page 3 of 4
Middle East Arms Sales and Iran
Concerns not just about Iran’s nuclear programme but
also its missile development prompted efforts during 2009
to shore up regional missile-defence capabilities among
the states of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). Most
GCC states remain very concerned about Iran’s regional
ambitions and have quietly sought forms of strategic
reassurance from the United States and are acquiring the
most modern military equipment available. In 2008 the
UAE and Saudi Arabia committed $9.7 billion and $8.7
billion respectively on arms purchases. Public statements
from senior US defence and diplomatic personalities
emphasise the determination to support GCC states.
While diplomatic efforts continue to slow Iran’s presumed
nuclear programme, the elements of a deterrence policy
are being put in place with the broadly willing cooperation
of regional states. This deterrence policy consists largely
in strengthening GCC defences and in reassuring these
countries that the US sees their security as strategically
important, especially if threatened by Iran. Furthermore,
Obama’s revised European missile-defence shield will
more quickly put in place southern-based interceptors to
provide defence against Iran’s growing capabilities.
Unfortunately, Iran has not responded well to Obama’s
engagement strategy. It has rejected the key principles of
the deal that had been tentatively agreed in Geneva on
1 October to swap 70% of Iran’s low-enriched uranium
stockpile for an equivalent amount of research-reactor fuel.
Permutations of the nuclear deal continue to be discussed in
various capitals, but Iran insists that it must retain at every
turn at least one weapon’s worth of enriched uranium, thus
obviating the whole point of the proposed arrangements.
Technical difficulties in any case are perhaps frustrating
the regime’s ambitions. Although Iran’s stockpile of
enriched uranium continues to grow and soon will be
enough for two weapons’ worth when further enriched,
the gas centrifuges are showing signs of deterioration;
more are installed but 1,000 fewer are producing enriched
uranium than was the case last May.
While Obama’s outreach strategy has failed in its
stated objective, it has succeeded in two other ways.
First, by offering a further compromise as he did last
year, the president is better able to persuade allies and
partners on the need for additional sanctions. China
has not yet pronounced itself ready for sanctions, and
Russian support is not certain yet either, but both agreed
on the need for a concerted approach to Iran by the P5
plus Germany. There will, therefore, likely be a further
round of UN sanctions. Second, US outreach strategy
has been conducted in such a way as to permit the Green
Movement to continue to flourish in Iran. While regime
change remains a distant prospect, the survivability of
the opposition is impressive and something outsiders
will not want their policies to kill.
 Press Launch
THe MILITARY BALANCE 2010 Arundel House, London
3 february 2010
Page 4 of 4

Group Army CHENGDU Military Region RUSSIA

Bomber Div
Military border
Transport Div
Fighter Div National border
K A Z A K H S TA N
� Special Mission SH E N YA NG
Naval Air Div
21st
Fleet HQ
MONGOLIA 16GA
11th
37th
KYRGYZSTAN Ürümqui
34th 39GA
BEIJING
40GA 1st NORTH
LANZHOU 65GA 7th KOREA
2nd
BEIJING
24th 30th
38GA 5th 5th SOUTH
15th KOREA
6th 27GA 12th North Sea
26GA Fleet HQ
47GA
21GA 54GA JINAN
36th 20GA 12GA
26th
19th 4th 10th 6th
� Shanghai
3rd 1GA
13th 28th East Sea
4th 33rd
Lhasa Fleet HQ
NEPAL 13GA
14th 29th
CHENGDU 18th
BHUTAN
NANJING
INDIA 8th
31GA
9th TAIWAN
14GA
BANGLADESH 41GA G U A N G Z H OU
44th
42nd Guangzhou 42GA
2nd
MYANMAR VIETNAM South Sea Fleet HQ

LAOS 8th

9th © IISS

NATO/Russia
For the remainder of 2010, in Europe, much attention will
be focused on the shape ultimately taken by the UK defence
and security review, how it fits with the French White
Paper released last year and more broadly on how NATO’s
Strategic Concept identifies the mix of defence and defence-
diplomatic missions that NATO should adopt. Already it
is clear that NATO enlargement is much further down the
agenda of priorities and that achieving a practical working
relationship with Russia is a more immediate goal. It is
important for example that Russia has become more helpful
to ISAF in facilitating the so-called Northern Distribution
Network, supplying ISAF forces in Afghanistan by rail
from Latvian ports via Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
crossing into Afghanistan at the Uzbek–Afghan border. It is
clear that Russia does not wish the ISAF mission to fail and
recognises the risks for instability in neighbouring Central
Asia if it does. In that context, it makes sense not just to
revive but greatly to reform the NATO–Russia Council and
if possible replace it with a relationship or body that better
meets NATO and Russian needs.
NATO’s strategic concept will have to address the
relationship with Russia more profoundly than ever before.
This is so especially in light of the efforts by President
Medvedev to inspire a debate on a European Security
Treaty, a debate between Russia and key NATO members
that the IISS has in London been also able to facilitate.
While a new treaty is unlikely to be agreed, finding more
forms of practical cooperation with Russia is a priority.
Conclusion
In conclusion, The Military Balance 2010, describes a world
in which many countries still perceive external threats
from both states and non-state actors and are modernising
their militaries accordingly.
Western militaries have to judge against the recent
experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan whether they need
to prepare more for ‘war among the people’, or whether
they can safely abstain from such conflicts in the future.
Early indications are that the priority will be to focus
on capabilities that are ‘adaptable’ to different types
of conflict. In light of severe funding constraints, the
emphasis on partnerships, divisions of labour and alliances
will certainly become important in theory but, as always,
difficult in practice.
The gruelling experience of recent Western military
interventionism suggests that as the operations in Iraq
and eventually Afghanistan wind down, definitions of so-
called ‘wars of choice’ will become wider, and definitions
of ‘wars of necessity’ even narrower. For military planners,
the hope must be that the outside world and politicians
permit the time for armed forces to reconstitute themselves,
and develop doctrines to fight the kinds of conflicts that
are thought both strategically necessary and benefit from
public support. In the meantime, updating the concepts of
deterrence and containment to make them applicable to
current and prospective conflicts and styles of warfare will
be an important duty for strategists, including those at the
IISS.

Embargo: Not for publication or quotation in any

form before 10:30 BST on wednesday 3 february 2010