ANG TIBAY VS CIR
Facts:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates AngTibay, a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of
his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU)
questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the
said employees laid off were members of NLU while no
members of the rival labor union National Workers
Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a
company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting
NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where
Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme
Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU.
The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the CIR has the power to decide the present
case?
Held:
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative
than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is
not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially
passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and
deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as
will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or
quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes
between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and
expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the
relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with,
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1).
It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention,
arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or
agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or
tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such
industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by
the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the
controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing
and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and
proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public
interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute
and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the
parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable
agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.)
When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall
investigate and study all industries established in a
designated locality, with a view to determinating the
necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry
or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or
a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or
tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may
appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial
disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that
purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to
determine specific controversies between labor and capital
industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling
of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from
the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
SPOUSES DACUDAO VS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Facts:
The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso
Delos Angeles and his associates in the Legacy Group of
Companies (Legacy Group) after the petitioners were
defrauded in the Legacy Group's "buy back agreement" that
earned them check payments that were dishonoured.
Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary issued Department Order 182
which directs all prosecutors in the country to forward all
cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his
associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate
action except cases filed in CDO. Because of such DOJ orders,
the complaint of petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat
of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses
Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus assailing to the respondent Secretary of justice
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the department Order and
the Memorandum, which according to the violated their right
to due process, right to equal protection of the law and right
to speedy disposition of the cases. The petitioners opined
that orders were unconstitutional or exempting from
coverage cases already filed and pending at the Prosecutor’s
Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They contended that the
assailed issuances should cover only future cases against
Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not those already being investigated.
They maintained that DO 182 was issued in violation of the
prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.
Issue:
Whether or the issuance of DO No. 182 is valid?
Held:
Yes. Administrative regulations enacted by administrative
agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to
respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a
statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in
the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of
law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and
legality until they are set aside with finality in an appropriate
case by a competent court.15
DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84
that the Secretary of Justice had promulgated to govern the
performance of the mandate of the DOJ to "administer the
criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted
processes thereof"16 as expressed in Republic Act No. 10071
(Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I,
Title III and Section 1, Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of
Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the
questioned issuances, it became incumbent upon petitioners
to prove their unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by
showing that the Administrative Code of 1987 did not
authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by
demonstrating that DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws. They
did not do so. They must further show that the performance
of the DOJ’s functions under the Administrative Code of 1987
and other pertinent laws did not call for the impositions laid
down by the assailed issuances. That was not true here, for
DO No 182 did not deprive petitioners in any degree of their
right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done against them
by the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were designed to
assist petitioners and others like them expedite the
prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all those
responsible for the wrong through the creation of the special
panel of state prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in order
to conduct a nationwide and comprehensive preliminary
investigation and prosecution of the cases. Thereby, the
Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively
against petitioners.
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ
Facts:
The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1
issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the
National Telecommunications Commission.
Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services
involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain
specified lines that were reduced by order of herein
respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to
be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to Executive Order
No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said
order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was
exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service
Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to
Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner
was placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of
respondent NTC including all its facilities and services and the
fixing of rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196,
respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite
certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its
facilities and the services it renders, as well as the
corresponding authority to charge rates therefor.
Issue:
Whether or Not E.O. 546 is invalid
Held:
Yes. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is
Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides:
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and
hearing the Commission shall have power, upon proper notice
and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of
this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned
and saving provisions to the contrary:
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall
be imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public
service; ...
There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision
does not apply to respondent NTC, there being no limiting,
excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive
Orders Nos. 546 and 196.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has
no authority to make such order without first giving
petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or
permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made
upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the
commission's own motion as in the present case. That such a
hearing is required is evident in respondents' order of
September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted
PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to continue operating
its existing facilities, to render the services it presently offers,
and to charge the rates as reduced by them "under the
condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and the final
consideration of the merit of this application, the Commission
may modify, revise or amend the rates ..." 12
While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing
respondents may have other sources of information or data,
still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act
solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on
knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which
is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner
was given no opportunity to controvert.
Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made
effective on a specified date. It becomes a final legislative act
as to the period during which it has to remain in force
pending the final determination of the case. 13An order of
respondent NTC prescribing reduced rates, even for a
temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even
confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low,
since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during the
prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final insofar
as the revenue during the period covered by the order is
concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the order
requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will unduly
deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a
declaration of its nullity becomes inductible, which brings us
to the issue on substantive due process.
EASTERN TELECOM VS ICC
Facts:
Taking advantage of the opportunities brought about by the
passage of these laws, several IGF operators applied for
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity CPCN to
install, operate and maintain local exchange carrier services in
certain areas. Respondent International Communication
Corporation, now known as Bayan Telecommunications
Corporation or Bayantel, applied for and was given by the
NTC a Provisional Authority (PA ) on March 3,1995, to install,
operate and provide local exchange service in Quezon City,
Malabon and Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the entire Bicol
region. Meanwhile, petitioner Telecommunications
Technologies Philippines, Inc. (TTPI), as an affiliate of
petitioner Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
(ETPI),was granted by the NTC a PA on September 25, 1996,
to install, operate and maintain a local exchangeservice in the
Provinces of Batanes, Cagayan Valley, Isabela, Kalinga-
Apayao, Nueva Vizcaya, Ifugao,Quirino, the cities of Manila
and Caloocan, and the Municipality of Navotas, Metro
Manila.It appears, however, that before TTPI was able to fully
accomplish its rollout obligation, ICC applied for and was
given a PA by the NTC on November 10, 1997, to install,
operate and maintain a local exchange service in Manila and
Navotas, two areas which were already covered by TTPI
under its PA dated September 25, 1996. Aggrieved,
petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals with application for a temporary restraining order
and a writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 46047, arguing that the NTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in granting a provisional authority to respondent
ICC to operate in areas already assigned to TTPI. On April 30,
1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review
on the ground that the NTC did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion in granting the PA to TTPI. It sustained the NTC's
finding that ICC is "legally and financially competent and its
network plan technically feasible." The Court of Appeals also
ruled that there was no violation of the equal protection
clause because the PA granted to ICC and TTPI were given
under different situations and there is no point of comparison
between the two.
Issue:
Whether or not the order of the NTC granting a PA to
Respondent to operate LEC services in Manila and Navotas
which are areas already assigned to petitioner TTPI under a
prior and subsisting PA is valid
Held:
Yes. The power of the NTC to grant a provisional authority has
long been settled. As the regulatory agency of the national
government with jurisdiction over all telecommunications
entities, it is clothed with authority and given ample
discretion to grant a provisional permit or authority. [11] It also
has the authority to issue Certificates of Public Convenience
and Necessity (CPCN) for the installation, operation, and
maintenance of communications facilities and services, radio
communications systems, telephone and telegraph systems,
including the authority to determine the areas of operations
of applicants for telecommunications services.[12] In this
regard, the NTC is clothed with sufficient discretion to act on
matters solely within its competence.[13]
In granting ICC the PA to operate a local exchange carrier
service in the Manila and Navotas areas, the NTC took into
consideration ICCs financial and technical resources and
found them to be adequate. The NTC also noted ICCs
performance in complying with its rollout obligations under
the previous PA granted to it, thus:
With the proven track record of herein applicant as one of the
pacesetters in carrying out its landlines commitment in its
assigned areas, applicant can best respond to public demand
for faster installation of telephone lines in Manila and
Navotas.
The grant of this application is, therefore, a fitting recognition
that should be accorded to any deserving applicant, such as
herein applicant ICC whose remarkable performance in terms
of public service as mandated by Executive Order 109 and
Republic Act No. 7925 has persuaded this Commission to affix
the stamp of its approval.[14]
The Court will not interfere with these findings of the NTC, as
these are matters that are addressed to its sound discretion,
being the government agency entrusted with the regulation
of activities coming under its special and technical
forte.[15] Moreover, the exercise of administrative discretion is
a policy decision and a matter that can best be discharged by
the government agency concerned, and not by the courts.[16]
Petitioner insists compliance with the service area scheme
(SAS) mandated by DOTC Dept. Circular No. 91-260, to wit:
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) shall
define the boundaries of local exchange areas, and shall
henceforth authorize only one franchised Local Exchange
Carrier (LEC) to provide LEC service within such areas.
The Court is not persuaded. Said department circular was
issued by the DOTC in 1991, before the advent of E.O. No.
109 and R.A. No. 7925. When E.O. No. 109 was promulgated
in 1993, and R.A. No. 7925 enacted in 1995, the service area
scheme was noticeably omitted therefrom. Instead, E.O. No.
109 and R.A. No. 7925 adopted a policy of healthy
competition among the local exchange carrier service
providers.
The need to formulate new policies is dictated by
evolving goals and demands in telecommunications services.
Thus, E.O. No. 109 acknowledges that there is a need to
promulgate new policy directives to meet the targets of
Government through the National Telecommunications
Development Plan (NTDP) of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), specifically: (1)
to ensure the orderly development of the
telecommunications sector through the provision of service
to all areas of the country; (2) to satisfy the unserviced
demand for telephones; and (3) to provide healthy
competition among authorized service providers. Likewise,
one of the national policies and objectives of R.A. No. 7925 is
to foster the improvement and expansion of
telecommunications services in the country through a healthy
competitive environment, in which telecommunications
carriers are free to make business decisions and to interact
with one another in providing telecommunications services,
with the end in view of encouraging their financial viability
while maintaining affordable rates.[17]
Recently, in Pilipino Telephone Corporation vs.
NTC,[18] the Court had occasion to rule on a case akin to the
present dispute, involving the same respondent ICC, and the
Pilipino Telephone Corporation (Piltel). In the Piltel case, ICC
applied for a provisional authority to operate a local exchange
service in areas already covered by Piltel, which includes
Misamis Occidental, Zamboanga del Sur, Davao del Sur, South
Cotabato and Saranggani. Piltel opposed ICCs application but
the NTC denied it, and granted ICCs application. The Court of
Appeals dismissed Piltels petition for review, and
on certiorari before this Court, we affirmed the dismissal. The
Court found that the NTC did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the ICC a provisional authority to
operate in areas covered by Piltel. We held:
We will not disturb the factual findings of the NTC on the
technical and financial capability of the ICC to undertake the
proposed project. We generally accord great weight and even
finality to factual findings of administrative bodies such as the
NTC, if substantial evidence supports the findings as in this
case. The exception to this rule is when the administrative
agency arbitrarily disregarded evidence before it or
misapprehended evidence to such an extent as to compel a
contrary conclusion had it properly appreciated the evidence.
PILTEL gravely failed to show that this exception applies to
the instant case. Moreover, the exercise of administrative
discretion, such as the issuance of a PA, is a policy decision
and a matter that the NTC can best discharge, not the courts.
PPC VS CA
Facts:
De Guzman was charged for dishonesty and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest as Postal Inspector at the
Postal Services Office and eventually was relieved from his
post
Since the Postal Services Office was then a line-agency of the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC),
the charge against De Guzman was forwarded to the
Investigation Security and Law Enforcement Staff (ISLES).
However, the ISLES, through a Memorandum, Director Reyes
recommended that De Guzman be exonerated from the
charges against him due to lack of merit. The said
recommendation was later approved by DOTC Asst. Secretary
Jardiniano.
RA 7354 or the Postal Service Act of 1992, was passed.
Pursuant thereto, the Postal Services Office under the DOTC
was abolished, and all its powers, duties, and rights were
transferred to the PPC.Likewise, officials and employees of
the Postal Services Office were absorbed by the PPC.
Subsequently, De Guzman, who had by then become Chief
Postal Service Officer, was formally charged and later on
found guilty byPPC, for the same acts of dishonesty, gross
violation of regulations, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, and the Anti-graft law thereby
dismissing him from service.
He filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. A
second MR was filed which was resolved in his favour
although he was found guilty of the charges, since the
complainant was the PPC, which had its own charter and was
no longer under the DOTC. Thus, the ISLES Memorandum
which endorsed his exoneration and dismissal of the
complaints against him was merely recommendatory. As
such, the filing of the formal charge was an obvious rejection
of said recommendation.
De Guzmans motion for reconsideration was denied initially
but the motion was, at the same time, considered as an
appeal to the PPC Board of Directors. Thus, in a Resolution
dated May 10, 2005, PG Rama pointed out that, being the
third MR filed by De Guzman, the same was in gross violation
of the rules of procedure recognized by the PPC, as well as of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which both allowed only
one (1) such motion to be entertained.It was further held
thatresjudicatawas unavailing as the decision exonerating De
Guzman was ―only a ruling after a fact-finding investigation.
Hence, the same could not be considered as a dismissal on
the merits but rather, a dismissal made by an investigative
body which was not clothed with judicial or quasi-judicial
power.
Meanwhile, before the issuance of the Resolution dated May
10, 2005, De Guzman elevated his case on March 12, 2005 to
the CA via a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus.
OnJune 10, 2005, De Guzman appealedthe Resolution dated
May 10, 2005 before the PPC Board. Almost a year later, the
Board issued a Resolution denying the appeal and affirming
with finality his dismissal from service. The motion for
reconsideration subsequently filed was likewise denied.
OnApril 4, 2006, the CA reversed the PPC Resolutions. It held
that the revival of the case against De Guzman constituted
grave abuse of discretion considering the clear and
unequivocal content of the Memorandum duly signed by
Asec. Jardiniano that the complaint against De Guzman was
already dismissed.
Aggrieved, PPC moved for reconsideration which was,
however, denied hence, the instant petition.
Meanwhile, on July 26, 2006, De Guzman filed an appeal of
the PPC Boards Resolutions with the CSCwhich was, however,
dismissed.
Issue:
Whether De Guzman unjustifiably failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to him
Held:
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their
responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective
competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if
afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide
the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed
in its forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and
convenience prevent the courts from entertaining cases
proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence,
premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to
the cause of action of the petitioner.38PPC claims that De
Guzman failed to subscribe to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies since he opted to file a premature
certiorari case before the CA instead of filing an appeal with
the PPC Board, or of an appeal to the CSC, which are
adequate remedies under the law.39
The Court agrees with PPC’s submission.
Under Section 21(d) of RA7354, the removal by the
Postmaster General of PPC officials and employees below the
rank of Assistant Postmaster General may be appealed to the
Board of the PPC, viz.:
Sec.21.Powers and Functions of the Postmaster General. — as
the Chief Executive Officer, the Postmaster General shall have
the following powers and functions:
(d) to appoint, promote, assign, reassign, transfer and remove
personnel below the ranks of Assistant Postmaster General:
Provided, That in the case of removal of officials and
employees, the same may be appealed to the Board;
This remedy of appeal to the Board is reiterated in Section
2(a), Rule II of the Disciplinary Rules and Procedures of the
PPC, which provides further that the decision of the Board is,
in turn, appeal able to the CSC, viz.:
Section2. DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION. – (a) The Board of
Directors shall decide upon appeal the decision of the
Postmaster General removing officials and employees from
the service. (R.A. 7354, Sec. 21 (d)). The decision of the Board
of Directors is appeal able to the Civil Service Commission. It
is well-established that the CSC has jurisdiction over all
employees of government branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, including government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters, and, as
such, is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil
service.40 The PPC, created under RA7354, is a government-
owned and controlled corporation with an original charter.
Thus, being an employee of the PPC, De Guzman should have,
after availing of the remedy of appeal before the PPC Board,
sought further recourse before the CSC. Records, however,
disclose that while De Guzman filed on June 10, 2005 a notice
of appeal41 to the PPC Board and subsequently appealed the
latter’s ruling to the CSC on July 26, 2006, the sewere all after
he challenged the PPC Resolution dated November 23, 2004
(wherein he was adjudged guilty of the charges against him
and consequently dismissed from the service) in a petition
for certiorari and mandamus before the CA(docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 88891). That the subject of De Guzman’s appeal
to the Board was not the Resolution dated November 23,
2004 but the Resolution dated May 10, 2005 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the first - mentioned resolution
is of no moment. In Alma Jose v. Javellana,42 the Court ruled
that an appeal from an order denying a motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment is effectively an
appeal from the final order or judgment itself.43 Thus, finding
no cogent explanation on De Guzman’s end or any justifiable
reason for his premature resort to a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before the CA, the Court holds that he failed to
adhere to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
which should have warranted the dismissal of said petition
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN VS RODRIGUEZ
Facts:
On 26 August 2003, the Ombudsman in Visayas received a
complaint[4] for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct in office, and neglect of duty against Rolson
Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario,
Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. On 1 September 2003,
the sangguniang bayan of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental,
through vice-mayor Jose G. Yulo, received a similar
complaint[5] against Rodriguez for abuse of authority,
dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of
duty.
In its 8 September 2003 notice,[6] the municipal vice-mayor
required Rodriguez to submit his answer within 15 days from
receipt of the notice. On 23 September 2003, Rodriguez filed
a motion to dismiss[7] the case filed in the sangguniang
bayan on the ground that the allegations in the complaint
were without factual basis and did not constitute any
violation of law. In a compliance[8] dated 22 October 2003,
Rodriguez alleged complainants violated the rule against
forum shopping.
Meanwhile, in its 10 September 2003 order,[9] the
Ombudsman required Rodriguez to file his answer. Rodriguez
filed on 24 October 2003 a motion to dismiss[10] the case filed
in the Ombudsman on the grounds of litis pendentia and
forum shopping. He alleged that the sangguniang bayan had
already acquired jurisdiction over his person as early as 8
September 2003.
The municipal vice-mayor set the case for hearing on 3
October 2003.[11] Since complainants had no counsel, the
hearing was reset to a later date. When the case was called
again for hearing, complainants counsel manifested that
complainants would like to withdraw the administrative
complaint filed in the sangguniang bayan. On 29 October
2003, complainants filed a motion[12] to withdraw the
complaint lodged in the sangguniang bayan on the ground
that they wanted to prioritize the complaint filed in the
Ombudsman. Rodriguez filed a comment[13] praying that the
complaint be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping, not
on the ground complainants stated. In their
opposition,[14]complainants admitted they violated the rule
against forum shopping and claimed they filed the complaint
in the sangguniang bayan without the assistance of counsel.
In his 4 November 2003 Resolution,[15] the municipal vice-
mayor dismissed the case filed in the sangguniang bayan.
In its 29 January 2004 order,[16] the Ombudsman directed
both parties to file their respective verified position papers.
Rodriguez moved for reconsideration of the order citing the
pendency of his motion to dismiss.[17] In its 11 March 2004
order,[18] the Ombudsman stated that a motion to dismiss
was a prohibited pleading under Section 5 (g) Rule III of
Administrative Order No. 17. The Ombudsman reiterated its
order for Rodriguez to file his position paper.
In his position paper, Rodriguez insisted that the sangguniang
bayan still continued to exercise jurisdiction over the
complaint filed against him. He claimed he had not received
any resolution or decision dismissing the complaint filed in
the sangguniang bayan. In reply,[19] complainants maintained
there was no more complaint pending in the sangguniang
bayan since the latter had granted their motion to withdraw
the complaint. In a rejoinder,[20] Rodriguez averred that
the sangguniang bayan resolution dismissing the case filed
against him was not valid because only the vice-mayor signed
it.
In its 21 September 2004 Decision,[21] the Ombudsman found
Rodriguez guilty of dishonesty and oppression. It imposed on
Rodriguez the penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits, disqualification to hold public office,
and forfeiture of civil service eligibilities. Rodriguez filed a
motion for reconsideration.[22] In its 12 January 2005
Order,[23] the Ombudsman denied the motion for
reconsideration. In its 8 March 2005 Order,[24] the
Ombudsman directed the mayor of Binalbagan, Negros
Occidental to implement the penalty of dismissal against
Rodriguez.
Rodriguez filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for review
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
In its 8 May 2006 Decision,[25] the Court of Appeals set aside
for lack of jurisdiction the Decision of the Ombudsman and
directed the sangguniang bayan to proceed with the hearing
on the administrative case. The appellate court reasoned that
the sangguniang bayan had acquired primary jurisdiction
over the person of Rodriguez to the exclusion of the
Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has acquired jurisdiction
over the case
Held:
Paragraph 1, Section 13 of Article XI of the Constitution
provides:
Sec. 13. The Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of
any public official, employee, office, or
agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper,
or inefficient.
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, states:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions, and Duties. The
Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public officer or employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it
may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the
investigations of such cases.
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any
act or omission of a public officer or employee applies only in
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable
by regular courts, the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of
government.[27] Republic Act No. 8249, otherwise known as
An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, limits the cases that are cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan to public officials occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade 27 and
higher. The Sandiganbayanhas no jurisdiction over private
respondent who, as punong barangay, is occupying a position
corresponding to salary grade 14 under Republic Act No.
6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.[28]
Under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority
over any elective barangay official, to wit:
SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative
Complaints. A verified complaint against
any erring elective official shall be prepared
as follows:
(c) A complaint against any
elective barangay official shall be filed
before the sangguniang
panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan concerned whose decision shall be
final and executory.
Clearly, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with
the sangguniang bayan over administrative cases against
elective barangay officials occupying positions below salary
grade 27, such as private respondent in this case.
The facts in the present case are analogous to those in Laxina,
Sr. v. Ombudsman,[29] which likewise involved identical
administrative complaints filed in both the Ombudsman and
the sangguniang panlungsod against a punong barangay for
grave misconduct. The Court held therein that the rule
against forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or
proceedings, not to administrative cases.[30] Thus, even if
complainants filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang
bayan identical complaints against private respondent, they
did not violate the rule against forum shopping because their
complaint was in the nature of an administrative case.
In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction
of two or more disciplining authorities, the body in which the
complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of
the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.[31] In this case,
since the complaint was filed first in the Ombudsman, and the
Ombudsman opted to assume jurisdiction over the complaint,
the Ombudsmans exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of
the sangguniang bayanexercising concurrent jurisdiction.
HLC Construction vs EMILY HOMES HOMEOWENERS ASSOC
Facts:
Respondents Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners
Association (EHSHA) and the 150 individual members thereof
filed on October 21, 1998 a civil action for breach of contract,
damages and attorneys fees with the Regional Trial Court of
Davao del Sur, Branch 19, against petitioners, the developers
of low-cost housing units like Emily Homes
Subdivision.Respondents alleged that petitioners used
substandard materials in the construction of their houses, like
coco lumber and termite-infested door jambs. Petitioners
furthermore allegedly did not adhere to the house plan
specifications because the ceiling lines were sagging and
there were deviations from the plumb line of the mullions,
door jams (sic) and concrete columns.[3]Respondents asked
petitioners to repair their defective housing units but
petitioners failed to do so. Respondents had to repair their
defective housing units using their own funds. Hence, they
prayed for actual and moral damages arising from petitioners
breach of the contract plus exemplary damages and attorneys
fees.
On December 11, 1998, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint, claiming that it was the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and not the trial court which had
jurisdiction over the case. They also cited the defective
certification on non-forum shopping which was signed only by
the president of EHSHA and not by all its members; such
defect allegedly warranted the dismissal of the
complaint. The trial court denied petitioners motion to
dismiss on the ground that the case fell within its jurisdiction,
not with the HLURB, and that respondents certificate of non-
forum shopping substantially complied with Rule 7, Section 5
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It also denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not HLURB had jurisdiction over respondent’s
complaint
Held:
Yes. It is the HLURB, not the trial court, which had jurisdiction
over respondents complaint. The HLURB[8] is the government
agency empowered to regulate the real estate trade and
business, having exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases involving:
(a) unsound real estate business practices;
(b) claims involving refunds and any other
claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyers against the
project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman;
(c) and cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lots or
condominium units against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or
salesman.[9]
In this case, respondents complaint was for the
reimbursement of expenses incurred in repairing their
defective housing units constructed by petitioners. Clearly,
the HLURB had jurisdiction to hear it. In the case of Arranza
vs. B.F Homes, Inc.,[10] this Court ruled that:
the HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from
contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer
or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to
comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make
the subdivision a better place to live in.[11]
The fact that the subject matter of the complaint involved
defective housing units did not remove the complaint from
the HLURBs jurisdiction. The delivery of habitable houses was
petitioners responsibility under their contract with
respondents. The trial court should have granted the motion
to dismiss filed by petitioners so that the issues therein could
be expeditiously heard and resolved by the HLURB.
OMBUDSMAN VS VALERA
Facts:
Respondent Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner of
the Bureau of Customs by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
on July 13, 2001. He took his oath of office on August 3, 2001
and assumed his post on August 7, 2001. He is in charge of
the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group.
On August 20, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman received
the Sworn Complaint dated July 28, 2003 filed by then
Director Eduardo S. Matillano of the Philippine National
Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-
CIDG). In the said sworn complaint, Director Matillano
charged respondent Valera with criminal offenses involving
violation of various provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019,[2] the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP),
Executive Order No. 38,[3] Executive Order No. 298[4] and R.A.
No. 6713[5] as well as administrative offenses of Grave
Misconduct and Serious Irregularity in the Performance of
Duty. Likewise subject of the same sworn complaint was
respondent Valeras brother-in-law Ariel Manongdo for
violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019.
At about the same time as the filing of the complaint against
respondent Valera, Director Matillano also filed charges
against other officials of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) and Bureau of Customs. The Philippine
Daily Inquirer featured a news article on them with the
title More govt execs flunk lifestyle check.[8]
Prior to Director Matillanos sworn complaint, criminal and
administrative charges were also filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman by Atty. Adolfo Casareo against respondent
Valera. The complaint of Atty. Casareo contained similar
allegations as those in the complaint of Director Matillano in
that respondent Valera, without being duly authorized by the
Commissioner of Customs, entered into a compromise
agreement with Steel Asia Manufacturing Corp. in Civil Case
No. 01-102504 to the prejudice of the government.
On March 17, 2004, pursuant to Memorandum OMB-C-C-02-
0568 , petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, in the
administrative case OMB-C-A-0379-J, issued the Order placing
respondent Valera under preventive suspension for six
months without pay. In the said order, petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio found that respondent Valera
entered into the compromise agreement with Steel Asia
Manufacturing Corp. in Civil Case No. 01-102504 without
being duly authorized to do so by the Commissioner of
Customs and without the approval of the Secretary of Finance
in violation of Section 2316[10] of the TCCP.
The petitioners vigorously maintain that no grave abuse of
discretion attended the issuance by petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio of the March 17, 2004 Order placing
respondent Valera under preventive
suspension because the Ombudsman, in directing petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to act in his place and stead
insofar as OMB-C-A-03-0379-J was concerned, fully clothed
the latter with delegated authority to act thereon. Since
under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman may
preventively suspend respondent Valera in the subject
administrative case, it follows that with the delegation of his
authority to petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, he
had full authority to preventively suspend respondent Valera.
Petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio, upon finding that
all the elements for preventive suspension in Section 24 of
R.A. No. 6770 are present, accordingly placed respondent
Valera under preventive suspension for six months without
pay in connection with the subject administrative case.
The petitioners defend the validity of the Ombudsmans
delegation of his authority to petitioner Special Prosecutor
Villa-Ignacio with respect to the administrative case OMB-C-
A-03-0379-J contending that: a) the authority to preventively
suspend is not insusceptible to delegation to an alter ego of
the Ombudsman; b) the petitioner Special Prosecutor
possessed the necessary qualifications and competence to
exercise the delegated functions; c) no law or rule was
violated with the said delegation.[18]
Nothing in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 allegedly prohibits the
delegation by the Ombudsman of his authority to
preventively suspend to his alter ego. The petitioners point
out that under R.A. No. 6770, the Special
Prosecutor, like the Deputy Ombudsmen, heads a major
office in the Office of the Ombudsman;[19] he is appointed in
the same manner as the Deputy Ombudsmen;[20] he shares
the same qualifications[21] and enjoys the same rank and
privilege as the latter.[22] As such, the Special Prosecutor, like
any of the other Deputy Ombudsmen, has the competence
and capability to preventively suspend any officer or
employee under the authority of the Ombudsman.
The petitioners invoke, in particular, Section 11(4)(c) of R.A.
No. 6770:
Sec. 11. Structural Organization.
(4) The Office of the Special
Prosecutor shall, under the supervision and
 control and upon the authority of the
Ombudsman, have the following powers:
(c) To perform such other
duties assigned to it by the
Ombudsman.
By this provision, the Ombudsman may allegedly validly
delegate to the Special Prosecutor such other functions that
he cannot, otherwise, perform by himself and that he (the
Ombudsman) is not obliged to always make such delegation
to the Overall Deputy Ombudsman. In the exercise of quasi-
judicial functions, there is no law which mandates that the
Ombudsman can only inhibit himself in favor of the Deputy
Ombudsmen.
The petitioners assert that the evidence of respondent
Valeras guilt for serious administrative infractions is strong.
According to them, the facts that have so far been established
show that respondent Valera entered into the compromise
agreement with Steel Manufacturing Asia Corp. to unduly
shield and promote its interests and to the prejudice of the
government. It is allegedly suspicious that he (respondent
Valera) simply allowed the said company to redeem the
spurious tax credit certificates with a 30-month staggered
payment when sufficient properties of the said company had
already been attached to satisfy not only the P37 million
principal amount of taxes owed by the said company but the
penalty charges and damages as well. He further unjustifiably
exonerated the said companys officers of any criminal
wrongdoing when they are conclusively liable for the
procurement of these spurious tax credit certificates. Further,
respondent Valera was never authorized by the Customs
Commissioner to enter into such compromise agreement nor
was it approved by the Secretary of Finance as required by
Section 2316 of the TCCP. Neither was it approved by the
President of the Philippines as further required by E.O. No.
38. Respondent Valera thus committed an act of
misrepresentation when he signed the compromise
agreement under the clause By authority of the
Commissioner.
The petitioners posit that conclusively at the given stage
respondent Valera appeared to have committed Grave
Misconduct and Dishonesty to warrant his preventive
suspension. They also aver that the evidence strongly show
that respondent Valera obtained employment for his brother-
in-law, Ariel Manongdo, with Cactus Cargo Systems, Inc., a
customs brokerage firm whose business principally involves
dealing on a regular basis with the Bureau of Customs, in
contravention of R.A. No. 6713 and R.A. No. 3019.
To refute the appellate courts statement that there was
inordinate delay in the issuance of the March 17, 2004 Order
of preventive suspension, the petitioners explain that the
same was due to, among others, the inhibition of the
Ombudsman from the case, the delay in the transmittal of the
case records and the amount of time that it took petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio to study the recommendation
of the PIAB-A and the divergent recommendation of the
Assistant Ombudsman for Preliminary Investigation,
Adjudication and Monitoring Office (PAMO).
Moreover, even if the PIAB-A recommended against placing
respondent Valera under preventive suspension, petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio was not bound to adopt the
same. With respect to respondent Valeras counter-affidavit,
the petitioners insist that the same failed to rebut the strong
evidence against him; hence, justifying his preventive
suspension.
Respondent ValeRA argues that the power to preventively
suspend any officer or employee under the authority of the
Ombudsman pending investigation is exclusively vested on
the Ombudsman or his Deputy pursuant to Section 24 of R.A.
No. 6770. Since the Special Prosecutor is not named therein
as vested with the said power, then petitioner Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio has no authority to issue a preventive
suspension.
Issue
Whether or not petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio has
the authority to place respondent Valera under preventive
suspension in connection with the administrative case OMB-
C-A-03-0379-J pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Held:
The Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsmen, as they are
expressly named in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, have been
granted the power to preventively suspend as the same
inheres in their mandate under the Constitution:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies,
as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate cases, notify the complainants
of the action taken and the result
thereof.[42]
While R.A. No. 6770 accords the Special Prosecutor the same
rank as that of the Deputy Ombudsmen, Section 24 thereof
expressly grants only to the Ombudsman and the Deputy
Ombudsmen the power to place under preventive suspension
government officials and employees under their authority
pending an administrative investigation.[43]
However, if the Ombudsman delegates his authority to
conduct administrative investigation to the Special Prosecutor
and the latter finds that the preventive suspension of the
public official or employee subject thereof is warranted, the
Special Prosecutor may recommend to the Ombudsman to
place the said public officer or employee under preventive
suspension.
Pertinently, the investigation of OMB-C-A-03-0379-J was
initially conducted by the PIAB-A, a panel composed of two
Special Prosecution Officers III[44] and Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officers II.[45] The said investigating panel
submitted to the Ombudsman the Memorandum dated
November 5, 2003 which contained its initial findings stating
in part thus:
After a careful evaluation of the complaint, it
appears that the evidence of guilt in the case under
review, in the context of Sec. 24, R.A. 6770, are not
strong enough to warrant the imposition of
preventive suspension of respondent Atty. Gil A.
Valera. The evidence on record fall short of the
quantum of evidence necessary to establish the
necessary weight to preventively suspend him.
However, the Investigating Panel finds enough basis
to proceed with the administrative investigation of
this case.[46]
It appears in the signatory page of the said memorandum
that the findings and recommendation therein were reviewed
by the Director[47] of the PIAB-A. Further, the memorandum
was, likewise, reviewed by the Assistant
Ombudsman,[48] Preliminary Investigation, Adjudication and
Monitoring Office (PAMO) with the notation recommending
disapproval. This demonstrates that in the conduct of
administrative investigation, the PIAB-A exercises merely
recommendatory powers particularly with respect to whether
to place the public official or employee subject thereof under
preventive suspension.
Ombudsman Marcelo designated the Special Prosecutor to
conduct the administrative investigation. In the course
thereof, petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio found that
the preventive suspension of respondent Valera was
warranted under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. However, since
under the said provision only the Ombudsman or his Deputy
may exercise the power of preventive suspension, petitioner
Special Prosecutor Villa-
Ignacio could only recommend to the Ombudsman or, in this
case because of the latters inhibition, to the designated
Deputy Ombudsman to place respondent Valera under
preventive suspension.
Stated differently, with respect to the conduct of
administrative investigation, the Special Prosecutors
authority, insofar as preventive suspension is concerned, is
akin to that of the PIAB-A, i.e., recommendatory in nature. It
bears stressing that the power to place a public officer or
employee under preventive suspension pending an
investigation is lodged only with the Ombudsman or the
Deputy Ombudsmen.
Consequently, petitioner Special Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio had
no authority to issue the March 17, 2004 Order placing
respondent Valera under preventive suspension for six
months without pay in connection with the administrative
case OMB-C-A-03-0379-J. The appellate court thus correctly
nullified and set aside the said assailed order.
Considering the finding that petitioner Special Prosecutor
Villa-Ignacio had no authority to issue the March 17, 2004
preventive suspension order, the resolution of the issue of
whether or not the evidence of respondent Valeras guilt is
strong to warrant his preventive suspension need not be
passed upon at this point. Anent respondent Valeras alleged
non-compliance with the rule on non-forum shopping when
he filed the petition for certiorari with the appellate court,
suffice it to state that the appellate court correctly
overlooked this procedural lapse. The merits of respondent
Valeras case are special circumstances or compelling reasons
which justified the appellate courts relaxing the rule requiring
certification on non-forum shopping.[49]
CABARRUS VS BERNAS
Facts:
On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed and
administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose
Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code and Code of professional Resposibility. In
his complaint-affidavit [1] dated August 12, 1996, complainant
alleged as follows:
A.That on April 16, 1996, respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr.,
subscribe under oath before Marie Lourdes T. Sia Bernas, a
notary public in Makati City, wife of lawyer jose Antonio
Bernas, a verification and certification of non-forum shopping
which was appended to a complaint for reconveyance of
property and damages, denominated as Civil Case No. 65646,
filed before the Regional Trial Court in National Capital
Region, RTC, which case was raffled to RTC Branch 159 in
Pasig City. A photocopy of said complaint is hereto attached
and marked as Annexex (sic) A, A-1, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6;
B.That as basis for the instant complaint for falsification of
public document, I am hereto quoting verbatim, the test (sic)
of Annex A-6, the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping which states:
Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under oath, depose and states:
He is the plaintiff in this case, and certify that he cause the
preparation of the foregoing pleading, the content of which
are true to his personal knowledge and that he has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the
same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency. If he should
learn that a similar action of (sic) proceeding has been filed or
is pending before the Supreme Court or any other Tribunal
agency, he undertake to report to (sic) that the fact within
Five (5) days from the notice to this notice (sic) to this
Honorable Court. Underscoring supplied.
In his Comment, [2] respondents Jose Antonio Bernas
avers that he has not committed forum shopping because the
criminal action is not an action that involves the same issue as
those in the civil action and both suits can exist without
constituting forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has
not yet been prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized
that forum shopping only exist when identical reliefs are
issued by the same parties in multiple fora.
In his Supplemental Comment,[3] respondent further
contends that neither he or his client Pascual has commenced
any criminal action. Pascual merely requested the NBI to
assist in the investigation or prosecution, and left it to the NBI
to determine whether the filing of an endorsement to the
prosecutor, who would determine probable caused, would be
appropriate. It was only upon request of the NBI the he
assisted Ramon Pascual in drafting an affidavit-complaint for
falsification of public documents against
complainant. Likewise, respondent by counsel reiterates that
the letter transmitted to the NBI cannot constitute an action
or proceeding because the NBIs functions are merely
investigatory and informational in nature. NBI has no
prosecutorial functions or quasi-judicial power and is
incapable of granting relief or remedy. The NBI cannot be an
agency contemplated by the circular.
Issue:
Whether or not the NBI has no prosecutorial functions or
quasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting relief or
remedy
methods of crime investigation and detection in
order to insure greater efficiency in the discharge of
their duties;
(g) To establish and maintain an up-to-date scientific crime
laboratory and to conduct researches inn
furtherance of scientific knowledge in criminal
investigation;
(h) To perform such other related function as the secretary of
Justice may assign from time to time.
Explicitly, the function of the National Bureau of
Investigations are merely investigatory and informational in
nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is
incapable of granting any relief to a party. It cannot even
determine probable cause. It is an investigative agency whose
findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes
investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public
welfare may require. It renders assistance when requested in
the investigation or detection of crimes which precisely what
Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those person
responsible for defrauding his client.
The courts, tribunal and agencies referred to under
Circular No. 28-91, revised Circular No. 28-91 and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with
judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers and those who not
only hear and determine controversies between adverse
parties, but to make binding orders or judgments. As
succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be
among those forums contemplated by the Circular that can
entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief,
declaratory or otherwi

Held:
Section 1. There is hereby created a Bureau of Investigation
under the Department of Justice which shall have the
following functions:
(a) To undertake investigation of crimes and other offenses
against the laws of the Philippines, upon its initiative
and as public interest may require;
(b) To render assistance, whenever properly requested in the
investigation or detection of crimes and other
offenses;
(c) To act as a national clearing house of criminal and other
infromations for the benefit and use of the
prosecuting and law-enforcement entities of the
Philippines, identification records of all person
without criminal convictions, records of identifying
marks, characteristics, and ownership or possession
of all firearms as well as bullets fired therefrom;
(d) To give technical aid to all prosecuting and law-
enforcement officers and entities of the Government
as well as the courts that may request its services;
(e) To extend its services, whenever properly requested in the
investigation of cases of administrative or civil
nature in which the Government is interested;
(f) To undertake the instruction and training of representative
number of city and municipal peace officers at the
request of their respective superiors along effective