INJUNCTION

Banco de Oro v. Republic

[G.R. No. 198756. January 13, 2015]
LEONEN, J.:
FACTS:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued BIR Ruling No. 370-20111
(2011 BIR Ruling), declaring that the PEACe Bonds being deposit substitutes
are subject to the 20% final withholding tax. Pursuant to this ruling, the
Secretary of Finance directed the Bureau of Treasury to withhold a 20% final
tax from the face value of the PEACe Bonds.
Petitioners and petitioners-intervenors, namely, RCBC, RCBC Capital,
and CODE-NGO argue that The 2011 BIR Ruling is ultra vires. Petitioners filed
a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and/or mandamus (with urgent
application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction).
This court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) “enjoining the
implementation of BIR Ruling No. 370-2011 against the [PEACe Bonds,].
Public respondents explained that “the implementation of [BIR Ruling No. 370-
2011], which has already been performed.” Respondents further aver that
“the . . . TRO has already become moot.”
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Respondents’ withholding of the 20% final withholding
tax was violative of the TRO?

2. Whether or not Respondents’ retention of the amounts withheld is a

defiance of the temporary restraining order?
RULING:
I.
Respondents’ withholding of the 20% final withholding tax was justified.
Under the Rules of Court, court orders are required to be “served upon
the parties affected.”
Publication of news reports in the print and broadcast media, as well as
on the internet, is not a recognized mode of service of pleadings, court orders,
or processes. Moreover, the news reports cited by petitioners were posted
minutes before the close of office hours or late in the evening of October 18,
2011, and they did not give the exact contents of the temporary restraining
order.
“[O]ne cannot be punished for violating an injunction or an order for an
injunction unless it is shown that such injunction or order was served on him
personally or that he had notice of the issuance or making of such injunction
or order.”
II.
Respondents’ continued failure to release to petitioners the amount
corresponding to the 20% final withholding tax in order that it may be placed
in escrow as directed by this court constitutes a defiance of this court’s
temporary restraining order.
The temporary restraining order is not moot. The acts sought to be
enjoined are not fait accompli. For an act to be considered fait accompli, the
act must have already been fully accomplished.
The temporary restraining order enjoins the entire implementation of
the 2011 BIR Ruling that constitutes both the withholding and remittance of
the 20% final withholding tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Even though
the Bureau of Treasury had already withheld the 20% final withholding tax
when it received the temporary restraining order, it had yet to remit the
monies it withheld to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
Yuk Ling Ong v. Co
[G.R. No. 206653. February 25, 2015]
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Yuk Ling Ong (petitioner), a British-Hong Kong national, and
respondent Benjamin Co (respondent), a Filipino citizen, were married.
Petitioner received a subpoena from the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) directing her to appear before the said agency because her
permanent residence visa was being subjected to cancellation proceedings.
Reportedly, her marriage with respondent was nullified by the court.
 Documents showed that on April 26, 2001, respondent filed a petition
for declaration of nullity. Respondent stated that petitioner’s address was 600
Elcano St., Binondo, Manila.
Respondent filed another petition for declaration of nullity. Respondent
indicated that petitioner’s address was 23 Sta. Rosa Street, Unit B-2 Manresa
Garden Homes, Quezon City. The RTC issued summons. In his Server’s
Return, process server Rodolfo Torres, Jr. stated that substituted service of
summons with the copy of the petition was effected after several futile
attempts to serve the same personally.
The RTC rendered a decision finding respondent’s marriage with
petitioner as void ab initio.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Trial Court validly acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the facts proven by the petitioner constitute extrinsic
fraud within the purview of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:
There is no right more cherished than the right of every litigant to be
given an opportunity to be heard. This right begins at the very moment that
summons is served on the defendant. If the server falls short of the rigorous
requirements for substituted service of summons, then the Court has no other
option but to strike down a void judgment.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of
summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. If the defendant
does not voluntarily appear in court, jurisdiction can be acquired by personal
or substituted service of summons as laid out under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule
14 of the Rules of Court. The landmark case of Manotoc v. CA (Manotoc)
thoroughly discussed the rigorous requirements of a substituted service of
summons.
The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts
undertaken by the process server to personally serve the summons on
petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons was
effected after several futile attempts to serve the same personally. The
server’s return did not describe in detail the person who received the
summons, on behalf of petitioner. It did not expound on the competence of
the security officer to receive the summons.
 Given that the meticulous requirements in Manotoc were not met, the
decision in the Civil Case must be declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner because there was an invalid substituted service
of summons.

SPECIAL CIVIC ACTION

CERTIORARI
Phil. Tourism Authority v. Phil. Golf
[G.R. No. 176628. March 19, 2012]
BRION, J.:
FACTS:
PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is
to bolster and promote tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors,
Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion
Projects (PAR 60-66). Since AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course
aspect of the project, it entered into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF,
a duly organized domestic corporation, to build the golf course.
PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA for the construction of the
golf course. Despite the RTCs liberality of granting two successive motions for
extension of time, PTA failed to answer the complaint. Hence, the RTC
rendered a judgment of default.
PHILGOLF filed a motion for execution pending appeal with the RTC. The
RTC granted the motion and a writ of execution pending appeal was issued
against PTA. PTA filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for granting the motion for execution
pending appeal. PTA withdrew its appeal of the RTC decision and, instead,
filed a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
The CA dismissed the petition for annulment of judgment for lack of merit.
PTA questions this CA action in the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is the
proper remedy.
RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
 A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper only when
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only available
in cases when a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. It is not a mode of appeal, and cannot also be made as a substitute for
appeal. It will not lie in cases where other remedies are available under the
law.
In sum, PTA had the remedy of appealing the RTC decision to the CA
and, thereafter, to us. Under the circumstances, we find no adequate reason
to justify the elevation of this case to the CA and then to us, under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.

FORECLOSURE
Dela Pea v. Avila
[G.R. No. 187490. February 8, 2012]
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
The suit concerns a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, together
with the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina City and previously
registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Pea (Antonia), married to
Antegono A. Dela Pea (Antegono). Antonia obtained from A.C. Aguila & Sons,
Co. (Aguila) a loan in the sum of P250,000.00 which, pursuant to the
Promissory Note the former executed in favor of the latter. On the very same
day, Antonia also executed in favor of Aguila a notarized Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the property, for the purpose of securing the payment of said
loan obligation.
Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale over the property
in favor of respondent Gemma Remilyn C. Avila (Gemma). Gemma also
constituted a real estate mortgage over said parcel in favor of respondent Far
East Bank and Trust Company [now Bank of the Philippine Islands] (FEBTC-
BPI), to secure a loan facility. Gemma loans from Visayas Avenue Branch of
the FEBTC-BPI, in the aggregate sum of P1,200,000.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding (FEBTC-BPI) a
mortgagee/purchaser in bad faith.
RULING:
Since foreclosure of the mortgage is but the necessary consequence of
non-payment of the mortgage debt, FEBTC-BPI was, likewise, acting well
within its rights as mortgagee when it foreclosed the real estate mortgage on
the property upon Gemma’s failure to pay the loans secured thereby. The
mortgage predated Antonia’s filing of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the
Register of Deeds of Marikina and the annotation of a Notice of Lis Pendens.
The mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfilment of the obligation
for whose security it was constituted. When the principal obligation is not paid
when due, the mortgagee consequently has the right to foreclose the
mortgage, sell the property, and apply the proceeds of the sale to the
satisfaction of the unpaid loan.