Ethics Compiled

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Legal Ethics Case Digest

Judge Philip Aguinaldo
3AA, A.Y. 2011-2012
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES V. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ..................................................................... 1
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEÑA V. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO....................................................1
GEORGE C. SOLATAN V. ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES AND JOSE C. CAMANO.....................2
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF
LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT.................................................................................................................................. 3
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED “RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF
LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT”................................................................................................................................ 4
TERESITA D. SANTECO V. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE........................................................................ 6
ATTY. JOSABETH B. ALONSO AND SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN V. ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA,

JR................................................................................................................................................................ 7
CARLOS REYES V. ATTY. JEREMIAS R.VITAN.................................................................................. 8
LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA VS. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE..................................................9
JUAN PABLO P. BONDOC V. JUDGE DIVINA LUZ P. AQUINO-SIMBULAN...............................10
MANUEL C. YUHICO V. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ....................................................................13
OFELIA R. SOMOSOT V. ATTY. GERADO F. LARA........................................................................14
HEIRS OF BOBADILLA V. JAIME CASTILLO.................................................................................. 15
RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R.-SP NO.

103692 [ANTONIO ROSETE, ET AL. V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ET
AL.].......................................................................................................................................................... 16
LETTER OF CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF

IBP DUES............................................................................................................................................... 16
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RODANTE D. MARCOLETA V. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA AND ROMEO A. BRAWNER.....17
ERLINDA R. TAROG V. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT................................................................19
SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION V. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS.................23
RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT OF THE BOOKS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO.....24
ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO V. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA.................................................24
BENILDA M. MADDELA V. ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO........................................25
XERXES A. ABADIANO v. SPOUSES JESUS AND LOLITA MARTIR......................................................27

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ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES v. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ

A.C. No. 6691, 27 April 2007, THIRD DIVISION (Austria-Martinez, J.)
Atty. Briones is the Special Administrator of the Estate of Luz J. Henson while Atty. Jacinto D.
Jimenez is the counsel for the Heirs of Henson. After the probate proceedings, the RTC issued an order
directing Jimenez to deliver the residue of the estate to the Heirs in proportion to their shares. Atty
Briones refused to deliver the estate.
Consequently, Atty. Jimenez and the Heirs filed a criminal complaint and executed an affidavit
against Atty Briones for resisting and seriously disobeying the RTC Order. Atty. Briones filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Jimenez for forum shopping and violation of Canons 19 and 12 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent claims that he acted in good faith and in fact, did not
violate Rule 19.01 because he assisted the Heirs in filing the criminal complaint against herein
complainant after the latter ignored the demand letters sent to him; and that a lawyer owes his client the
exercise of utmost prudence and capability.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty Jimenez violated Canons 19 and 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD: A lawyer must represent his client with zeal, however, the performance of
his duties towards his clients must be within the bounds of law.
The Court agrees with the OBC that respondent is not guilty of forum shopping. Records show
that respondent, as counsel for the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson, filed a special civil action docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing the Order of March 12, 2002 appointing the accounting firm of Alba,
Romeo and Co. as auditor; and, a regular appeal docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71488 assailing the Order of
April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment of commission to complainant. It is evident that there is
identity of parties but different causes of action and reliefs sought. Hence, respondent is not guilty of
forum shopping
There is sufficient ground in support of complainant’s claim that respondent violated Rule 19.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Considering that complainant did not reply to the demand
letters, respondent opted to file said criminal complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the
lawful order of the court.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his client with
zeal. However, the same Canon provides that a lawyer’s performance of his duties towards his client must
be within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client. Canon 15, Rule 15.07 also
obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients compliance with the laws and the principle of fairness. To
permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients
is to defeat one of the purposes of the state – the administration of justice. While lawyers owe their entire
devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they should not forget
that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.
FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEÑA v. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO

A.C. No. 7298, 25 June 2007, SECOND DIVISION (Velasco, Jr., J.)
Aparicio is legal counsel for Hufana in an illegal dismissal case filed with the NLRC against Pena.
Pena is president of MOF company. Aparicio sought the payment of separation pay to his client. Pena
rejected the demand and sent notice to Hufana to return to work. Aparicio, in a reply letter to Pena,
reiterated the claim of his client.
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In his letter Apparicio also made threats saying that if the claims were not paid they would file
multiple criminal charges for tax evasion, falsification and the cellation of Pena’s business license.
Because of this Pena filed the administrative proceeding against Aparicio with the IBP for violation of
Canon 19, specifically rule 19.01. IBP dismissed the complaint because Pena failed to file his position
paper and certification against forum shopping. Aparicio filed an MR reiterating his claim for damages
against Pena (defamation) in the amount of 400M.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the dismissal of the IBP for foreign shopping constitutes a bar in the
Administrative proceedings
2) Whether or not Atty Aparicio violated Canon 19
HELD: A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
1) The rule requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading,
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure—which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible. At any rate, complainant's subsequent compliance with the requirement cured the supposed
defect in the original complaint.
2) Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall represent his
client with zeal within the bounds of the law," reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer's duty is not to
his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and
his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.In particular, Rule
19.01 commands that a "lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding." Under this Rule, a lawyer should not
file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases against the adversaries of his client
designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the
lawyer's client.
Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or

opposition in the public prints,…obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from
making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice." In
common parlance and in general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the
exaction of money either for the performance of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an
influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by operating on the fears or the credulity, or by
promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the crime of the victim.
Through his letter, he threatened complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they
propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as
multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to
operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also
amount to blackmail.
GEORGE C. SOLATAN v. ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES and JOSE C. CAMANO

A.C. No. 6504, 9 August 2005, SECOND DIVISION (Tinga, J.)
Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty. Oscar Inocentes. The Oscar Inocentes
and Associates Law Office was retained by spouses Genito, owners of an apartment complex when the
Genito Apartments were placed under sequestration by the PCGG. They represented the spouses Genito
before the PCGG and the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment cases against non-paying tenants occupying
the Genito Apartments.
Solatan’s sister was a tenant of the Genito Apartments. She left the apartment to Solatan and
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other members of her family. A complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed against her
and a decision was rendered in a judgment by default ordering her to vacate the premises. Solatan was
occupying said apartment when he learned of the judgment. He informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to
arrange the execution of a new lease contract by virtue of which he would be the new lessee of the
apartment. Atty. Inocentes referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment cases
against tenants of the Genito Apartments.
During the meeting with Atty. Camano, an verbal agreement was made in which complainant
agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his sister, including awarded attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
Complainant issued a check in the name of Atty. Camano representing half of the attorney’s fees.
Complainant failed to make any other payment. The sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano
enforced the writ of execution and levied the properties found in the subject apartment. Complainant
renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed to release the levied properties and allow complainant to remain at
the apartment. Acting on Atty. Camano’s advice, complainant presented an affidavit of ownership to the
sheriff who released the levied items. However, a gas stove was not returned to the complainant but was
kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments where he was temporarily staying.
Complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Camano and Atty.
Inocentes. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to suspend Atty. Camano from the practice of law for 1
year and to reprimand Atty. Inocentes for exercising command responsibility.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Atty. Camano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
2) Whether or not Atty. Inocentes violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: All lawyers must observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their
clients.
An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal representative for a person without being
retained. No employment relation was offered or accepted in the instant case.
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires all lawyers to observe loyalty in all
transactions and dealings with their clients. Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party
with an interest conflicting with that of his client may be held guilty of disloyalty. However, the advice
given by Atty. Camano in the context where the complainant was the rightful owner of the incorrectly
levied properties was in consonance with his duty as an officer of the court. It should not be construed as
being in conflict with the interest of the spouses Genito as they have no interest over the properties. The
act of informing complainant that his properties would be returned upon showing proof of his ownership
may hint at infidelity to his clients but lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal.
2. Atty. Inocentes’ failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters under the charge of his
law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. As name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked
with the responsibility to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm should act in
conformity to the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Camano on the latter’s dealings with
complainant. This is the linchpin of his supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and liability by virtue
thereof. Partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities are legally responsible to exert
ordinary diligence in apprising themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by persons over
which they are exercising supervisory authority and in exerting necessary efforts to foreclose violations of
the Code of Professional Responsibility by persons under their charge.
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RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, June 7, 2011, EN BANC (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
Last March 8, 2011 on A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, the Supreme Court reminded University of the
Philippines (UP) law professors Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza and 35 other faculty members
of the UP College of Law, as well as admonishing Dean Marvic Leonen for vio, “Restoring Integrity,” a
scathing manifesto calling for SC Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo’s resignation for the latter’s
alleged plagiarism on his decision on the case of Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230)
promulgated last April 28, 2010.
Consequently, Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Catindig and Laforteza and a
manifestation filed by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Prof. Theodore O. Te, relying on the ground that
the proceeding, while docketed as an administrative matter, is premised on a finding of indirect contempt
and that they were not accorded due process under indirect contempt proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not SC erred in finding that the respondents are in breach of their ethical obligations
for having issued the restoring integrity statement
HELD: Contumacious speech and/or behaviour directed against the Court on the
part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in
the discretion of the Court.
The petition was denied for No substantial arguments to warrant a reconsideration of the
Decision dated March 8, 2011 nor to justify the grant of the reliefs prayed for in their motion. The
Manifestation, apart from being an expression of support for Professors Catindig and Laforteza’s motion
for reconsideration, did not raise any new matter nor pray for any affirmative relief, the Court resolves to
merely note the same.
Contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial officer, if committed by a

member of the Bar, subject the offender to disciplinary proceedings under the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prescribes that lawyers observe and promote due respect for the courts. In such
disciplinary cases, the sanctions are not penal but administrative such as, disbarment, suspension,
reprimand or admonition. Contumacious speech and/or behaviour directed against the Court on the part
of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the
Court.
When the Court initiates contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
for intemperate and discourteous language and behaviour directed at the courts, the evil sought to be
prevented is the same – the degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of justice.
Verily, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative case against a respondent lawyer, the mere
citation or discussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case of jurisprudence involving
contempt proceedings does not transform the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt.
Had this Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of court, which is punishable by imprisonment or
fine, this Court would have initiated contempt proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Court.
RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED “RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT”
A.M. NO. 10-10-4-SC, 8 MARCH 2011, EN BANC (Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
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SC Justice Mariano Del Castillo rendered a decision in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R.
No. 162230). Counsels Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty.
Bagares) for Vinuya, et al. (the “Malaya Lolas”), filed a supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, on the
ground that, inter alia, charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of
the Vinuya decision and a twisting of the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia was made
to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition. Works allegedly plagiarized in
the Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article “A Fiduciary Theory
of Jus Cogens;” (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International
Law; and (3) Mark Ellis’ article “Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime. Such
supplemental motion for reconsideration appeared on internet sites.
Thereafter, a statement entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University
of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme
Court” was submitted by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leone to the Court through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
The statement basically conveys that the plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v Executive Secretary
is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and
professional competence expected of the Supreme Court. (See attachment for complete text of the
statement). The SC Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc. The high court said the
UP law professors’ statement was evidently intended to “discredit” its April 28 decision on the Vinuya et
al. v the Executive Secretary et al. case. It claimed that the law faculty wanted to “undermine the court’s
honesty, integrity and competence in addressing” the motion for reconsideration of 70 “comfort women.”
Accordingly, the Court directed the 37 UP law faculty-signatories to show cause, within ten (10)
days from receipt why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 11
and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents should be disciplined as Members of the Bar under the Code of
Professional Responsibility
HELD: All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good
fidelity towards the courts.
The administrative matter is decided by reminding the Thirty-five UP professors of their duty as
officers of the court while Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen was admonished to be more mindful of his duty, as
a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and
honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to
be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
and legal processes.
RULE 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 – A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not
been proved.
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Rule 10.03 – A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted
to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the
administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured
only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice , within the context, in
other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic freedom.
Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common Compliance that
their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to “participate in the development of the
legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the
administration of justice” under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that
they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect
to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the
Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason
that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students
exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions
thereof.
The Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court,
particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and
the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were still both sub
judice or pending final disposition of the Court.
TERESITA D. SANTECO v. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE

A.C. 5834, 22 February 2011, EN BANC (Per Curiam)
An administrative complaint was filed by Teresita D. Santeco against respondent Atty. Luna B.
Avance for mishandling Civil Case No. 97-275, which was filed before the RTC of Makati City. The result
of such administrative complaint was the suspension of Avance from the practice of law for five years and
ordered to return P3,900 to her client after she was found guilty of gross misconduct for abandoning her
client in bad faith and persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her without any
explanation for doing so.
However, while still suspended, Avance appeared in three cases as “Atty. Liezl Tanglao” as stated
in a letter-report of Judge Consuelo Amog-Bocar, presiding Judge of the RTC of Iba, Zambales. In a
resolution, the Court ordered Avance to comment on said letter-report. However, she failed to do so. The
Court then reiterated its order. Again, despite receipt of the two resolutions, she still failed to comply.
Thus, the Court issued a resolution finding Avance guilty of indirect contempt and ordering her to
pay a fine amounting to P30,000. It also sternly warned her that a repetition of the same or similar
infractions will be dealt with more severely. Despite due notice, she failed to pay the fine.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action or inaction of Atty. Avance is a ground for her disbarment
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HELD: A lawyer who willfully disobeys the lawful order of the court deserves the
ultimate penalty of disbarment.
It held that “respondent’s conduct evidently fell short of what is expected of her as an officer of
the court as she obviously possesses a habit of defying this Court’s orders. She willfully disobeyed this
Court when she continued her law practice despite the five-year suspension order against her and even
misrepresented herself to be another person in order to evade said penalty. Thereafter, when she was
twice ordered to comment on her continued law practice while still suspended, nothing was heard from
her despite receipt of two Resolutions form this Court. Neither did she pay the P30,000 fine imposed in
the Resolution.
In repeatedly disobeying this Court’s orders, respondent proved herself unworthy of membership
in the Philippine Bar. Worse, she remains indifferent to the need to reform herself. Clearly, she is unfit to
discharge the duties of an officer of the court and deserves the ultimate penalty of disbarment.
ATTY. JOSABETH B. ALONSO and SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN v. ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA,

JR.
A.C. No. 8481, 3 August 2010, EN BANC (Peralta, J.)
Jennifer Ebanen filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier Philippines in the NLRC.
The labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier, stating that Ebanen voluntarily resigned. Ebanen appealed to
the NLRC which only affirmed the appealed decision. Ebanen then filed for reconsideration but was
denied. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court. The Court’s Resolution has already become final
and executory; thus, a corresponding Entry of Judgment has been issued dismissing the petition and
holding that there was no illegal dismissal.
However, despite the judgment, Ebanen through Atty. Relamida, Jr. filed a second complaint for
illegal dismissal based on the same cause of action of constructive dismissal against Servier. Thus, Servier,
thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint addressed to the then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., praying that
respondents be disciplinary sanctioned for violation of the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.
Respondents admitted the filing of the second complaint against Servier. However, they opined that the
dismissal did not amount to res judicata, since the decision was null and void for lack of due process since
the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the production of vital documents filed by the
complainant was ignored by the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of forum shopping and res judicata thus violating Canon 12
of the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of
truth and the administration of justice.
During the IBP hearing, it was manifested that Ebanen is not a lawyer but the daughter of Atty.
Aurelio the senior partner in a law firm where Atty. Relamida is employed as associate lawyer. The latter
then reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had no choice but to represent the
latter.
Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her right to due process due to the denial of
her motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He then argued that the decision of the Labor
Arbiter was null and void; thus, there was no res judicata. He maintained that he did not violate the
lawyer’s oath by serving the interest of his client. The IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Relamida, Jr. be
suspended for 6 months for violating the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.
The Supreme Court agrees to this finding. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not
at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. The filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse
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of the court’s processes and improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court.
Needless to state, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously
delays the execution of a final and executory judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation of his duties as an attorney to act with
all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to him to be just and are
consistent with truth and honor.
The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res
judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to
exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By
his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s
mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."
CARLOS REYES v. ATTY. JEREMIAS R.VITAN

A.C. No. 5835, 18 August 2010, EN BANC (Nachura, J.)
Four (4) administrative cases were filed against Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan, in each of which he was
found guilty and meted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. All the four cases against him
involved grave issues of dishonesty and deceit. Recidivism or habitual delinquency was patent. The 4
offenses deserved disbarment as a final penalty. Yet, the Court contented itself with mere suspensions.
In the first case, A.C. No. 6441, (Violeta R. Tahaw v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on
October 21, 2004, Atty. Vitan was suspended for six (6)months, effective immediately upon receipt of the
Decision. He was further ordered to return the amount of P30,000 to complainant for legal services he
did not render. The records disclose that respondent received the Decision on November 12, 2004 and the
period of suspension would have ended on May 12, 2005.
In A.C. No. 5835, (Carlos B. Reyes v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on April 15, 2005,
Atty. Vitan was suspended for six (6) months; and ordered to pay complainant P17,000.00 with interest of
12% per annum from the date of the promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall have been
returned. Per records, the Court’s decision was received by him on May 13, 2005, and his suspension
would have ended on November 13, 2005.
In A.C. No. 6955 (Mar Yuson v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan), promulgated on July 27, 2006,
respondent was found liable for his failure to pay a just debt in the amount of P100,000.00. Upon
investigation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) imposed the penalty of Suspension for two (2)
years. This was modified by the Court after finding that there was partial payment of the loan, and the
penalty was reduced to six (6) months suspension with warning, effective upon receipt of the Decision. In
a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent moved for the reconsideration of the decision, asserting
that there was full payment of the loan. The motion was denied in the Resolution dated March 6, 2007.
In the decision in the fourth case, A.C. No. 6051, (Celia Arroyo-Pesidio v. Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan),
promulgated on April 2, 2007, respondent was found to have failed to render the legal services sought
after he had received the amount of P100,000, and was once again, suspended for one (1) year, with stern
warning. The Decision was received on April 18, 2007, so the suspension period should have lapsed on
April 18, 2008.
In a Report dated February 23, 2010, the OBC noted that respondent has been repeatedly
suspended from the practice of law, for an aggregate period of 30 months or 2 ½ years. Accordingly,
respondent should have served the orders of suspension successively pursuant to the Court’s resolution in
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1857, entitled “Gabriel de la Paz v. Judge Santos B. Adiong,” where the Court clearly
stated that “in case of two or more suspensions, the same shall be served successively by the erring
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respondent.” It is, therefore, incumbent upon respondent to show to the Court that he has desisted from
the practice of law for a period of at least 2 ½ years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension can be lifted
HELD:
The Court, in the recent case of Ligaya Maniago v. Atty. Lourdes I. De Dios, issued the guidelines on the
lifting of orders of suspension, and has advised strict observance thereof. However, the Court will not
hesitate to withhold the privilege of the practice of law if it is shown that respondent, as an officer of the
Court, is still not worthy of the trust and confidence of his clients and of the public.
Thus, applying the guidelines in Maniago, the Court Resolved to GRANT Respondent’s Petition for
Reinstatement, effective upon his submission to the Court of a Sworn Statement attesting to the fact:
1) that he has completely served the four (4) suspensions imposed on him
successively;
2) that he had desisted from the practice of law, and has not appeared as counsel in
any court during the periods of suspension, as follows:
(a) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 5835 from May 13, 2005 to
November 13, 2005;
(b) One (1) year suspension in A.C. No. 6051 from April 18, 2007 to April 18,
2008;
(c) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6441 from November 12, 2004 to
May 12, 2005; and
(d) Six (6) months suspension in A.C. No. 6955 from date of receipt of the
Resolution dated March 6, 2007 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision dated July 27, 2006.
3) that he has returned the sums of money to the complainants as ordered by the
Court in the following cases, attaching proofs thereof:
(a) In A.C. No. 5835 – the sum of P17,000 with interest of 12% per annum
from the date of promulgation of the Decision until the full amount shall have
been returned; and
(b) In A.C. No. 6441 – the amount of P30,000.
Atty. Jeremias R. Vitan is further directed to FURNISH copies of the Sworn Statement to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and Executive Judge(s), as mandated in Maniago.
LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE

A.C. No. 6258, 24 August 2010, EN BANC (Per Curiam)
Atty Bernabe applied for consideration of the disbarment complaint filed by Luzviminda R.
Lustestica (complainant) against Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe (respondent) for notarizing a falsified or forged
Deed of Donation of real property despite the non-appearance of the donors, Benvenuto H. Lustestica
(complainant's father) and his first wife, Cornelia P. Rivero, both of whom were already dead at the time
of execution of the said document.
Atty Bernabe admitted the fact of death of Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero,
considering their death certificates attached to the complaint. The respondent claimed, however, that he
had no knowledge that the real Benvenuto H. Lustestica and Cornelia P. Rivero were already dead at the
time he notarized the Deed of Donation. 2 cralaw He also claimed that he exerted efforts to ascertain the
identities of the persons who appeared before him and represented themselves as the donors under the
Deed of Donation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent committed a falsehood in violation of his oath as a lawyer and his
duties as Notary Public
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HELD:
We cannot overemphasize the important role a notary public performs. In Gonzales v. Ramos, we
stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive
public interest. The notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by
law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe
with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties; otherwise, the public’s
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
The records undeniably show the gross negligence exhibited by the respondent in discharging his
duties as a notary public. He failed to ascertain the identities of the affiants before him and failed to
comply with the most basic function that a notary public must do, i.e., to require the parties’ presentation
of their residence certificates or any other document to prove their identities. Given the respondent’s
admission in his pleading that the donors were already dead when he notarized the Deed of Donation, we
have no doubt that he failed in his duty to ascertain the identities of the persons who appeared before him
as donors in the Deed of Donation.
Under the circumstances, we find that the respondent should be made liable not only as a notary
public but also as a lawyer. He not only violated the Notarial Law (Public Act No. 2103), but also Canon 1
and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 (Old Notarial Law) states:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law
of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.
The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging
the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if
he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.
JUAN PABLO P. BONDOC v. JUDGE DIVINA LUZ P. AQUINO-SIMBULAN

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2204, 26 October 2009
Former representative of Pampanga Juan Pablo P. Bondoc (Bondoc) charged Judge Divina Luz P.
Aquino-Simbulan (Simbulan) with partiality, gross ignorance of the law, and gross misconduct in the
handling of the criminal cases for violation of R.A. 3019 and falsification of public documents against
Spouses Salvador and Flordeliz Totaan (accused).
Bondoc alleged that Judge Simbulan, after having issued an order suspending the accused
pendent lite, asked the lawyers of the parties “to approach the bench and suggested that the cases be
settled because she did not want the accused to be administratively suspended”. That at the continuation
of the pre-trial, Judge Simbulan asked the accused to choose a date and promised to accommodate the
accused in order to effect a speedy trial in view of their suspension. Bondoc also alleged that on the same
day, Judge Simbulan directed Atty. Lanee Cui-David (Lanee) to be prepared for the hearing of the cases
since accused had been suspended upon motion of Private Prosecutor Stephen David (Stephen), Atty.
Lanee’s husband and co-counsel for Bondoc in the criminal cases. It was also averred that Judge
Simbulan never carried out the suspension order against the accused and that despite Atty. Lanee’s
explanation that Atty. Militante (Ombudsman Investigator) refused to testify on the ground that the
substance of her testimony is covered by official documents, Judge Simbulan issued an order requiring
Atty. Militante to explain why she should not be cited in contempt for failure to follow lawful orders of the
court. In the supplemental complaint, Bondoc charged Judge Simbulan with conduct unbecoming of a
judge for her denial of private prosecutor’s motion foe her inhibition.
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Judge Simbulan, in her Comment, stated that she did not fast track the resolution of the case but
it was her habit to act fast on all cases before her. She also denied the charge of partiality for her failure to
act on the suspension claiming that it was private prosecutor’s duty to file a motion to cite responsible
heads of government agencies for indirect contempt for their failure to implement the lawful orders of the
court. Judge Simbulan also explained that her persistence in requiring Atty. Militante’s appearance was
due to the misunderstanding between Atty. Militante and the private prosecutors, therefore, she wants to
find out the truth.
In Bondoc’s Opposition to the Comment, it was stated that Judge Simbulan refused to answer the
serious charges of partiality, abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming of a judge. In Judge’s Simbulan’s
rejoinder, she requested that Bondoc be made to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt of
court, and Attys. Stephen and Lanee to show cause why they should not be administratively sanctioned as
members of the bar and officers of the court.
The complaint against Judge Simbulan was dismissed, hence, OCA recommended that Attys.
Stephen and Lanee be cited for indirect contempt since the complaint against Judge Simbulan could not
have been filed without the active prodding and instigation of the lawyers and that private prosecutors
were the primary sources of the allegations contained therein which Bondoc did not personally witness.
HELD: Lawyers have the duty not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.
Attys. Stephen and Lanee David crossed the line of accepted and protected conduct as members of
the bar and as officers of the court in the filing of the administrative complaint against the respondent. As
the OCA noted, while the complaint was filed in the name of former Representative Juan Pablo P. Bondoc,
he never really appeared in court and could not have woven the tale of unfair treatment in the complaint
which spoke of intricate courtroom proceedings. The complainant thus relied primarily on the
information relayed to him by his lawyers for the particulars of the complaint. More to the point, the two
lawyers can reasonably be considered to have authored the allegations in their client’s complaint.
Nothing is inherently wrong with the complainant’s dependence on Attys. Stephen and Lanee
David for the substance of the complaint. Nonetheless, as officers of the court, counsels are expected to be
as truthful and as objective as possible in providing information to their client regarding developments in
the courtroom. Needless to say, they owe candor, fairness and good faith to the court. In these regards,
Attys. Stephen and Lanee David proved to be wanting.
From the pre-trial records quoted below, we find sufficient justification for the conclusion that the
information Attys. Stephen and Lanee David supplied their client was patently misleading and slanted “to
cover up their gross shortcomings as lawyers,” as the respondent aptly put it. On four occasions, private
prosecutors never appeared before the court prepared. No proof was presented to corroborate the charge
that the respondent sought to have the criminal cases settled; neither was there a showing that the
respondent fast tracked the cases to favor the accused.
The defense of Attys. Stephen and Lanee David that what they did “is just a consequence of their
commitment to their client” can hardly exculpate them. A client’s cause does not permit an attorney to
cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective that since they are
administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many
suppose, but to the administration of justice. As a lawyer, he is an officer of the court with the duty to
uphold its dignity and authority and not promote distrust in the administration of justice.
ALFREDO B. ROA, vs. ATTY. JUAN R. MORENO

A.C. No. 8382, 21 April 2010, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)
Atty. Juan R. Moreno sold to Roa a parcel of land to Alfredo B. Roa and paid Atty. Moreno
P70,000 in cash as full payment for the lot. Atty. Moreno did not issue a deed of sale instead he issued a
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temporary receipt and a Certificate of Land Occupancy. Atty. Moreno assured Roa that he could use the
lot from then on.
Roa learned that the Certificate of Land Occupancy could not be registered in the Register of
Deeds. When Roa went to see Atty. Moreno, the latter admitted that the real owner of the lot was a certain
Rubio. He also said there was a pending legal controversy over the lot. Thereafter, Roa sent a letter to
Atty. Moreno demanding the return of the P70,000 paid for the lot.
Roa then filed a criminal case against Atty. Moreno. MTC rendered a decision convicting Atty.
Moreno of the crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
On appeal, the RTC, for lack of evidence establishing Atty. Moreno’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
acquitted Atty. Moreno.
Roa filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) an Affidavit-Complaint against Atty.
Moreno. The IBP found Atty. Moreno guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended to suspend Atty. Moreno from the practice of law for three months and
ordered him to return the amount of P70,000. The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Moreno should be disciplined and ordered to return the amount of money
paid for the sale
HELD: Atty. Moreno’s refusal to return to Roa the money paid for the lot is
unbecoming a member of the bar and an officer of the court. By his conduct, Atty. Moreno
failed to live up to the strict standard of professionalism required by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Atty. Moreno’s credibility is highly questionable. Records show that he even issued a bogus
Certificate of Land Occupancy to Roa whose only fault was that he did not know better. The Certificate of
Land Occupancy has all the badges of intent to defraud. It purports to be issued by the "Office of the
General Overseer." It contains a verification by the "Lead, Record Department" that the lot plan
"conforms with the record on file." It is even printed on parchment paper strikingly similar to a certificate
of title. To the unlettered, it can easily pass off as a document evidencing title. True enough, Roa actually
tried, but failed, to register the Certificate of Land Occupancy in the Register of Deeds. Roa readily parted
with P70,000 because of the false assurance afforded by the sham certificate.
The innocent public who deal in good faith with the likes of Atty. Moreno are not without recourse
in law. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states "A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, xxx." Further, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct."
Conduct, as used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties.
A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The
test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
In the present case, Atty. Moreno acted in his private capacity. He misrepresented that he owned
the lot he sold to Roa. He refused to return the amount paid by Roa. As a final blow, he denied having any
transaction with Roa. It is crystal-clear in the mind of the Court that he fell short of his duty under Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who continue to
display unassailable character. Thus, lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, not
just in their dealings with their clients but also in their dealings with the public at large, and a violation of
the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and even disbarment.
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Atty. Moreno’s refusal to return to Roa the money paid for the lot is unbecoming a member of the
bar and an officer of the court. By his conduct, Atty. Moreno failed to live up to the strict standard of
professionalism required by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Moreno’s acts violated the trust
and respect Roa reposed in him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. However, the penalty
of three-month suspension recommended by the IBP is insufficient to atone for Atty. Moreno’s
misconduct in this case.
Supreme Court did not sustain the IBP’s recommendation ordering Atty. Moreno to return the
money paid by Roa. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of
the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The court's only concern is the
determination of Atty. Moreno’s administrative liability.
MANUEL C. YUHICO v. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ

A.C. No. 8391, 23 November 2010, EN BANC (Per Curiam)
Atty. Fred Gutierrez asked for a cash loan of P30,000.00 from Manuel Yuhico. Gutierrez then
claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical expenses of his mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico
immediately handed the money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon, since he was
expecting to collect his attorney's fees from a Japanese client.
Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a loan, in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly to pay the
medical expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued to Gutierrez a check
amounting to P60,000.00. Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his two loans totalling to P90,000.00
"within a short time."
Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his loans. Gutierrez failed to pay and in a text message he asked for
an extension of time to pay. Later, thru a text message, Gutierrez attempted to borrow money from Yuhico
again. Gutierrez claimed that his daughter needed P70,000.00 to pay the fees required to take the
licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his debts
within a month. However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead, he
demanded from Gutierrez the payment of his debts.
Gutierrez then sent another text message to Yuhico and requested him to give him another week
to pay his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment. Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter to Gutierrez
to pay his debts, but to no avail. Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against Gutierrez before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer on the complaint
against him. In a Resolution, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts and ordered
him to return the amount of P90,000.00 to Yuhico, with interest until full payment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts and likewise guilty of gross
misconduct
HELD: Lawyers must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations
Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be
sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of
justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.
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They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the instant case, there is no question as to Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he
contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can he justify his act
of non-payment of debt by his dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not have contracted loans which
are beyond his financial capacity to pay.
Likewise, it cannot be overlooked Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and

misrepresentations for the purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of paying them. Records
show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making promises of paying his debts, yet repeatedly failing to
deliver. The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously
giving excuses without actually making good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his
acts demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as
professionals and as officers of the court.
Supreme Court also noted that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, the Court had already disbarred
Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just debts and issuance of
bouncing checks. In view of the foregoing, while the court agrees with the findings of the IBP, it cannot,
however, adopt its recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez
had already been previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out, the court does not have double or
multiple disbarments in its laws or jurisprudence. Neither do it have a law mandating a minimum 5-year
requirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of
disbarment, court cannot disbar him anew.
OFELIA R. SOMOSOT v. ATTY. GERADO F. LARA

A.C. No. 7024, 30 January 2009, SECOND DIVISION (Brion, J.)
In support of her complaint for disbarment, the complainant alleged that she retained the services
of the respondent as her counsel in a collection case filed by Golden Collection Marketing Corporation
against her and other co-defendants. Her defense was that it was the corporation who actually owed her
P800,000.00. She claimed that she had the evidence to prove this defense at the trial. The respondent
agreed to handle the case and duly entered his appearance as counsel after securing his acceptance fee.
She alleged, however, that after filing the Answer to the Complaint, the respondent failed to fully
inform her of further developments in the case. She only heard about the case when there was already a
decision against her and her co-defendants. She even belatedly learned that the respondent had sought his
discharge as counsel without her knowledge and consent. Contrary to the respondent's claim that he could
no longer locate her, she claimed that the respondent knew all along where she lived and could have easily
contacted her had he been in good faith. Execution of the court's decision followed, resulting in the sale of
her house and lot at public auction despite her efforts to reverse the judgment with the help of another
lawyer. Thereafter, a third party to whom her property had been mortgaged sued her. She found the
respondent's excuse - that he could not contact her because she had changed her office address - to be
unsatisfactory. She accused the respondent of miserably failing to comply with his oath as a lawyer and to
discharge his duty of ably representing her.
Respondent denied that he failed to exercise the diligence required of him as counsel. The
respondent contended that he had good reasons not to continue as the complainant's counsel. He
reasoned out that under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may withdraw from a case upon
a good cause such as when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the lawyer's services, or fails to
comply with the terms of the retainer agreement, or when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public
office. Two of these possible causes applied to his situation; he was appointed legal consultant at the BOI
requiring full-time work and the complainant had failed to pay his legal fees to him amounting to
P27,000.00. He filed the formal notice of withdrawal without the conformity of the complainant because
he could not locate her.
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ISSUE: Whether or not respondent failed to serve his client diligently
HELD:
We find that the respondent deserves to be sanctioned for having fallen short of the standards
required of him as defense counsel. He violated the basic rule, expressed under Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." While it
may be said that the respondent did not completely abandon the case, his handling of the complainant's
defense left much to be desired.
The complainant was never informed the development of the case and the omission eventually led
to the grant of the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which in turn led to the decision
against the defendants. The respondent failed to precisely allege in his submissions how he tried to
contact the defendant on or about the time the interrogatories and request for admission were pending. It
appears that he really had not; by his own admission, his attempt to contact the complainant came in
December 2001 and only to inform her of his government appointment and to collect his billings. It was
only after the discovery of the closure of the defendant's office did the respondent try to contact the
complainant and her husband by cellular phone, but they could not be reached.
Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure should not be a reason not to inform the client
of an important development, or worse, to withhold vital information from her. The respondent failed to
provide details on the developments that led to the adverse rulings on the interrogatories/admissions and
the judgment on the pleadings.
On the matter of the respondent's withdrawal from the case, the respondent might have had valid
reasons to withdraw and terminate his relationship with his client. As the respondent now states, he could
withdraw under paragraphs (e) and (f) of the Code of Professional Responsibility - i.e., deliberate failure
of the client to pay the fees for the services, or failure to comply with the retainer agreement, or
appointment or election to public office. However, he does not appear to have cited these reasons before
the trial court. Instead, he merely filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance, citing his client's unknown
location and failure to communicate as reasons for his client's lack of express consent to his withdrawal. It
is undisputed that the trial court denied the respondent's notice of withdrawal; thus, he remained as
counsel of record burdened with all the responsibilities that his representation carried.
What lightens the impact of the respondent's mishandling of the case is the complainant's own
failings as a client. The non-payment of fees is a factor that we cannot simply disregard. As a rule, law
practice is not a pro bono proposition and a lawyer's sensitivity and concern for unpaid fees are
understandable; lawyers incur expenses in running their practice and generally depend, too, on their law
practice income for their living expenses. Likewise, the respondent's appointment as a consultant should
be considered although it is a matter that none of the parties have fully examined. Both the non-payment
of fees and the appoint to a public office, however, were not reasons properly presented before the trial
court through a motion that informed the court of all the surrounding circumstances of the desired
withdrawal. Instead, another reason was given by way of a mere notice lacking the client's express
consent. Thus, the court's denial of the desired withdrawal was not totally unexpected.
However, we cannot also disbar the respondent as the complainant demands in light of the
complainant's own contributory faults. Disbarment is an ultimate remedy in the professional world, no
less serious and weighty as the power to impose reclusion perpetua in criminal cases; in both, recovery
from the penalty - although not totally impossible - is extremely difficult to attain. Thus, we must at all
times act with caution and due consideration, taking into account not only the interests of the immediate
parties, but the interest of the public, the bar and the administration of justice as well.
WILSON CHAM v. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA

A.C. No. 7494, 27 June 2008, THIRD DIVISION (Chico-Nazario, J.)
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A disbarment complaint was filed by Wilson Cham against respondent Atty. Eva Paita-Moya, who
he alleged committed deceit in occupying a leased apartment unit and, thereafter, vacating the same
without paying the rentals due. Respondent entered into a Contract of Lease with Greenville Realty and
Development Corp. (GRDC), represented by complainant as its President and General Manager, involving
a residential apartment unit owned by GRDC located at No. 61-C Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, for a
consideration of P8,000.00 per month for a term of one year.
Upon the expiration of said lease contract, respondent informed the complainant that she would
no longer renew the same but requested an extension of her stay at the apartment unit until 30 June 2000
with a commitment that she would be paying the monthly rental during the extension period.
Complainant approved such request but increased the rental rate to P8,650.00 per month. Respondent
stayed in said premises for several months without paying any rent and even failing to pay her electric
bills. A report reached complainant's office that respondent had secretly vacated the apartment unit,
bringing along with her the door keys. Also, respondent did not heed complainant's repeated written
demands for payment of her obligations despite due receipt of the same, compelling complainant to file
the present Complaint.
Respondent alleged that she had religiously paid her monthly rentals and had not vacated the
apartment unit surreptitiously. She also averred that she transferred to another place because she was
given notice by the complainant to vacate the premises to give way for the repair and renovation of the
same, but which never happened until presently. Respondent actually wanted to ask that complainant to
account for her deposit for the apartment unit, but she could not do so since she did not know
complainant's address or contact number. For the same reason, she could not turn over to the
complainant the door keys to the vacated apartment unit.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: Lawyers must promptly pay their financial obligations.
A review of the records would reveal that respondent is, indeed, guilty of willful failure to pay just
debt. Complainant is able to fully substantiate that respondent has existing obligations that she failed to
settle. Respondent did not expressly deny receipt of letters of demand in her Answer to the Complaint.
Having failed to rebut the foregoing allegations, she must be deemed to have admitted them.
A receipt is a written and signed acknowledgment that money or goods have been delivered. In
the instant case, the respondent failed to discharge the burden of proving payment, for she was unable to
produce receipts or any other proof of payment. It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully
failed to pay her just debts. It is thus evident to this Court that respondent willfully failed to pay her just
debts.
Having incurred just debts, respondent had the moral duty and legal responsibility to settle them
when they became due. Respondent should have complied with just contractual obligations, and acted
fairly and adhered to high ethical standards to preserve the court's integrity, since she is an employee
thereof. Indeed, when respondent backtracked on her duty to pay her debts, such act already constituted a
ground for administrative sanction. Respondent left the apartment unit without settling her unpaid
obligations, and without the complainant's knowledge and consent. Respondent's abandonment of the
leased premises to avoid her obligations for the rent and electricity bills constitutes deceitful conduct
violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Canon I and Rule 1.01 thereof, which
explicitly state:
"CANON 1- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
"Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial obligations. Their
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conduct must always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any
professional or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor -- or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.
HEIRS OF BOBADILLA v. JAIME CASTILLO

G.R. No. 165771, 29 June 2007, SECOND DIVISION (CARPIO MORALES, J.)
For over 20 years, Antonio Bobadilla, Maria Del Mundo and Ernesto, Danilo, Policarpio, have
been leasing portions of a 348 square meter parcel of land located at Gen. Luna Street in Caloocan City on
a verbal agreement from owner Virginia Rayo. After August 1991, Rayo offered to sell the land to
Bobadilla. Rayo gave Bobadilla two months to decide whether to purchase the land. Having heard
nothing from Bobadilla after two months, Rayo sold the parcel of land to Jaime Castillo.
Castillo required Bobadilla, Del Mundo and the Serranos to vacate the land after failing to heed
his previous demands to pay a monthly rental of P10 per square meter. Bobadilla instituted a complaint at
the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) to annul the sale between Rayo and Castillo based on fraud
and bad faith. Bobadilla asserted the right of first refusal of their predecessor-in-interest under
Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as the Urban Land Reform Act. As the decree is not self-
executing, Proclamation No. 1967 was issued identifying 244 specific sites in Metropolitan Manila as
Areas for Priority Development (APD) and Urban Land Reform Zones (ULRZ).
HELD: Lawyers must exercise utmost care and complete candor in the preparation
of pleadings.
This Court observes the perfunctory manner by which Castillo complied with this Courts
Resolution requiring him to comment on the petition. In his terse comment incorporated in his
Compliance, he pithily averred in one sweeping paragraph that the allegations contained in the petition
are all rehash or reiterations of the issues and arguments already passed upon by the appellate court. With
such lackadaisical outlook, Castillo blinded himself with what appeared to be gross misrepresentation
foisted by Bobadilla, which would have otherwise put him on guard.
At this juncture, it is apropos to firmly remind lawyers of their duties, as officers of the court, to
exercise utmost care and complete candor in the preparation of pleadings and to lay before the court the
pertinent facts with methodical and meticulous attention, without any suppression, obscuration,
misrepresentation or distortion thereof.
RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R.-SP

NO. 103692 [ANTONIO ROSETE, ET AL. V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
ET AL.]
A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, 9 September 2008, EN BANC (PER CURIAM)
LETTER OF CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF

IBP DUES
B.M. 1370, 9 May 2005, EN BANC (Chico-Nazario, J.)
Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. (Arevalo) sought exemption from payment of IBP dues as alleged
unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He claims that after having been admitted to the bar on
1961 he worked for the Civil Service Commission from 1962 to 1986. Subsequently, he migrated to the
United States and until his retirement in 2003. He maintains that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the
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years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice
of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was
working in the USA.
The IBP submitted its comment stating: that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual
practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to
be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as
determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in
Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP
members has been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the
policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of
the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It
maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by
respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted
that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad,
so that his membership in the IBP could have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have
been stopped.
In his reply, Atty. Arevalo contends that the Policy of Non-Exemption would indubitably be
oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income derived from
his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would constitute
deprivation of property right without due process of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not an inactive member of the Bar may be compelled to pay his IBP dues
HELD: Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one of which
is the payment of membership dues - failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished
from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity
to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national
body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee
for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar.
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non
to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. Moreover, there is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine Bar - which power
required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed,
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration.
The compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as one's membership in the IBP
remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in. IBP in its
comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members
under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, Atty.
Arevalo is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
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Atty. Arevalo also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. As a final note, it
must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, one of which
is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the
gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
RODANTE D. MARCOLETA v. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA AND ROMEO A. BRAWNER

A.C. No. 7732, 30 March 2009, SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
Atty. Marcoleta filed a complaint for disbarment against Comelec Commissioners Atty. Borra and
Atty. Brawner for violating Canons 1 (1.01, 1.02 and 1.03) and 3 (3.01, 3.02, 3.05 and 3.06) of the Code of
Judicial Conduct
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man's cause.
Canon 3 - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH
IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
Rule 3.01.— A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
Rule 3.02.— In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable
law unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of criticism.
Rule 3.05.– A judge shall dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.
Rule 3.06.— While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time or clear up some obscurity,
property intervene in the presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be borne in mind
that undue interference may prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of
truth.
and Canons 4, 5, 6 and 17 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Additionally, complainant charges respondents
of violating Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.
During the 2007 National and Local Elections, the warring factions of complainant and Diogenes
S. Osabel (Osabel) each filed a separate list of nominees for the party-list group Alagad. With Alagad
winning a seat in the House of Representatives, the two protagonists contested the right to represent the
party. By Omnibus Resolution of July 18, 2007, the dispute was resolved by the Comelec’s First Division
in favor of Osabel. Commissioner Borra wrote the ponencia while Commissioner Brawner concurred. The
dispute was elevated to the Comelec En Banc which, by Resolution of November 6, 2007, reversed the
First Division Resolution and reinstated the certificate of nomination of complainant’s group. For failing
to muster the required majority voting, however, the Comelec ordered the re-hearing of the controversy.
Notwithstanding the conduct of a re-hearing, the necessary majority vote could not still be obtained. The
Comelec’s First Division’s Omnibus Resolution was eventually affirmed.
Respondent Brawner, in his Answer dated April 2, 2008, asserted in the main that “the remedy of
complainant is not to file a complaint for disbarment, but to file an appeal before [the Supreme Court] via
[p]etition for [c]ertiorari,” and that being members of a constitutional body enjoying presumption of
regularity in the performance of their functions, he and co-respondent Borra “are supposed to be
insulated from a disbarment complaint for being impeachable officers.”
In his Comment, respondent Borra contended that the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canons of Judicial
Ethics could be made to apply to him and his co-respondent, they not being members of the judiciary; and
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that since they performed quasi-judicial functions as well as administrative duties, they were bound by the
Comelec’s own set of internal rules and procedure over and above a Code of Conduct that prescribed the
norms and standards of behavior to be observed by the officials and employees of the Comelec, a
constitutional body.
Respondent Borra further contended that present complaint was premature as “the validity and legality of
the resolutions are still subject to review;” and that the complaint was meant to “harass [him] and punish
him for exercising his judgment on the case filed before him.” The Court took notice that respondent
Borra had retired from the Comelec on February 2, 2008 while respondent Brawner passed away on May
29, 2008. As regards respondent Brawner then, the present case was already moot.
ISSUE: Whether or not complaint for disbarment is the proper remedy and not appeal
HELD: An impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred

without first being impeached.
At the outset, the Court, guided by its pronouncements in previous cases, has laid down the rule
that an impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being
impeached. As an impeachable officer who is at the same time a member of the Bar, respondent Borra
must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment before he may be held to
answer administratively for his supposed errant resolutions and actions.
The Court thus found respondent Borra’s contention that the grounds-bases of the disbarment complaint,
fastened on supposed errors of judgment or grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts, were
proper for an appeal, hence, complainant’s remedy was judicial, not administrative.
The Court stated that the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary applied only to courts
of law, of which the Comelec was not, hence, sanctions pertaining to violations thereof were made
exclusively applicable to judges and justices in the judiciary, not to quasi-judicial officers like the Comelec
chairman and members, who have their own codes of conduct to steer them. Even if the Court were to
gauge the assailed actions of respondent Borra under the Code of Professional Responsibility, no specific
incidents and sufficient evidence can be gathered to show that respondent did engage in dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct in his capacity as a lawyer. It bears reiteration that the acts particularized in
the complaint pertain to respondent Borra’s duties as a Comelec commissioner.
As for the release of retirement benefits to respondent Borra, there was nothing irregular
therewith, the same being in line with Memorandum Circular No. 10 (series of 1995) of the Office of the
Ombudsman reading:
x x x a person retiring from the government service, whether optional or compulsory, needs only to
present a certification from this Office whether or not he has a pending criminal or administrative case
with it. In the event the certification presented states that the prospective retiree has a pending case, the
responsibility of determining whether to release his retirement benefits, as well as the imposition of
necessary safeguards to ensure restitution thereof in the event the retiree is found guilty, rests upon and
shall be left to the sound discretion of the head of the department, office or agency concerned.
ERLINDA R. TAROG v. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT

A.C. No. 8253 (Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1067), 15 March 2011, EN BANC (Per Curiam)
The Tarogs engaged the services of Atty. Ricafort as their attorney on accountregarding their
bank-foreclosed property located in the Bicol Region. Atty. Ricafort required the Tarogs to pay P7,000.00
as filing fee, which they gave to him. He explained the importance of depositing P65,000.00 in court to
counter the P60,000.00 deposited by Antonio Tee, the buyer of the foreclosed property.
After some time, the Tarogs visited Atty. Ricafort to verify the status of the consignation. Atty.
Ricafort informed them that he had not deposited the amount (in check) in court, but in his own account.
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He promised to return the money, plus interest. Despite several inquiries about when the amount would
be returned, however, the Tarogs received mere assurances from Atty. Ricafort that the money was in
good hands.
The Tarogs furthered delivered P15,000.00 to Atty. Ricafort for making a memorandum, but he
did not file the memorandum. When it became apparent to the Tarogs that Atty. Ricafort would not make
good his promise of returning the P65,000.00, plus interest, Arnulfo demanded by his letter dated
December 3, 2002 that Atty. Ricafort return the P65,000.00, plus interest, and the P15,000.00 paid for
the filing of the memorandum. Yet, they did not receive any reply from Atty. Ricafort.
In his defense, Atty. Ricafort denied that the P65,000.00 was intended to be deposited in court,
insisting that the amount was payment for his legal services under a "package deal.” Findings of the IBP
Commissioner: Atty. Romulo L. Ricafort be DISBARRED and be ordered to return the amount of P65,000
and P15,000 which he got from his client. Commissioner Reyes concluded that Atty. Ricafort violated
Canon 15, and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
taking advantage of the vulnerability of his clients and by being dishonest in his dealings with them by
refusing to return the amount of P65,000.00 to them.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted the Resolution resolving to return the matter to
Commissioner Reyes for a clarification of whether or not there was evidence to support the claim that the
P65,000.00 had been in payment of attorney's fees and other expenses. Commissioner Reyes issued a
second Report and Recommendation, in which he declared that Atty. Ricafort did not present any retainer
agreement or receipt to prove that the amount of P65,000.00 had been part of his attorney's fees; that
Atty. Ricafort had willfully ignored the demand of Arnulfo by not replying to the demand letter; that,
instead, Atty. Ricafort had insisted that the househelp who had received the demand letter had not given
it to him; and that in his (Commissioner Reyes) presence, Atty. Ricafort had also promised to the
complainant that he would settle his liability, but Atty. Ricafort did not make good his promise despite
several resettings to allow him to settle his obligation.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Reyes and recommended the disbarment of Atty. Ricafort and the order for him to return
the amounts of P65,000.00 and P15,000.00 to Erlinda.
Atty. Ricafort moved for reconsideration, maintaining that a retainer agreement was immaterial
because he had affirmed having received the P65,000.00 and having issued a receipt for the amount; that
he had not kept the receipt because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued
without duplicate as it behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt” and considering that the Tarogs
had produced a photocopy of the receipt he had issued for the P30,000.00 in connection with their
appeal, it followed that a similar receipt for attorney's fees had been made at the time when the case had
been about to be filed in the RTC.
Acting on Atty. Ricafort's motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors downgraded
the penalty from disbarment to indefinite suspension. Atty. Ricafort filed a second motion for
reconsideration, assailing the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors for violating Section 12, Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court requiring the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to be in writing and to clearly
and distinctly state the facts and reasons on which the decision was based. Hence, the administrative case
is now before the Court for resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ricafort may be disbarred based on the grounds mentioned
HELD:
SC affirmed the findings of the Commissioner Reyes, because they were supported by substantial
evidence. However, SC imposed the penalty of disbarment instead of the recommended penalty of
indefinite suspension considering that Atty. Ricafort committed a very serious offense that was
aggravated by his having been previously administratively sanctioned for a similar offense on the occasion
of which he was warned against committing a similar offense.
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Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that

Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
Atty. Ricafort explained that he had no copies of the receipts for the P65,000.00 and P15,000.00
issued to the Tarogs because "the practice of lawyers in most instances is that receipt is issued without
duplicate as it behooves upon the client to demand for a receipt." But such explanation does not persuade
the Court. Ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and imperative for him to issue
receipts, even if not demanded, and to keep copies of the receipts for his own records. He was all too
aware that he was accountable for the moneys entrusted to him by the clients, and that his only means of
ensuring accountability was by issuing and keeping receipts.
Atty. Ricafort's acts and actuations constituted serious breach of his fiduciary duties as an
attorney. Undoubtedly, Atty. Ricafort was required to hold in trust any money and property of his clients
that came into his possession, and he needed to be always mindful of the trust and confidence his clients
reposed in him.Thus, having obtained the funds from the Tarogs in the course of his professional
employment, he had the obligation to deliver such funds to his clients (a) when they became due, or (b)
upon demand.
Furthermore, Rule 16.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, imposes on an attorney the
positive obligation to keep all funds of his client separate and apart from his own and from those of others
kept by him, to wit:
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those of others kept by him.
Atty. Ricafort's plain abuse of the confidence reposed in him by his clients rendered him liable for
violation of Canon 16, particularly Rule 16.01, supra, and Canon 17, all of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.
His acts and actuations constituted a gross violation of general morality and of professional ethics
that impaired public confidence in the legal profession and deserved punishment.
Conrado G. Fernandez vs. Atty. Maria Angelica P. De Ramos-Villalon

A.C. No. 7084,
Fernandez was the respondent in a Civil case in which Palacios sought to nullify the Deed of
donation he purportedly executed in favor of Fernandez. Atty. Villalon was Palacios’ counsel at the early
part of that case until she withdrew after her appointment as prosecutor of QC.
In that civil case, Palacios alleged that he was the owner of a lot in Brgy. San Lorenzo, Makati City
and he became aware that his lot was being eyed by a land-grabbing syndicate by pretending to be him
and filing a Petition for Reconstitution of Lost Owner’s Duplicate Original Copy of his title. Palacios seek
the help of Fernandez and they eventually succeeded.
Palacios visited the Village administrator of the San Lorenzo Village Association and bumped into
Mrs. Lirio who expressed her interest in Palacios’ property. She heard that it was being sold by Fernandez.
Palacios was shocked and upon investigation he discovered that Fernandez had falsified a Deed of
donation that he (Palacios) purportedly executed in favor of Fernandez. The deed was duly registered and
the TCT in Palacios’ name was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in Fernandez’ name. Palacios then
employed the services of Atty. Villalon to file a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of
Donation.
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In his Answer, Fernandez claimed that the transfer of title in his name was proper on account of a
Deed of Absolute Sale and it was Palacios who falsified the Deed of Donation to cheat the government in
paying lower taxes (donor’s tax instead of capital gains tax) and in order to have a ground for the
annulment of the new TCT issued in favor of him and to recover the property.
Fernandez filed a complaint for DISBARMENT against Atty. Villalon for violation of
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or mispresent the contents of a paper,
the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as
a fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
Rule 1.01, Rule 7.03, Rule 10.01, Rule 10.02 and Rule 10.03 if the Canons of Professional
Responsibility in the ff. grounds:
1. suppressed and excluded in the Original and Amended Complaint her knowledge about the
existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 12, 2005;
2. used the fake and spurious Deed of Donation to deceive the court into trying Civil Case No. 05-
1071, the action for the annulment of TCT No. 220869, despite her knowledge of the existence of the Deed
of Absolute Sale;
3. committed misrepresentations as follows: to verify whether the attached Deed of Absolute Sale
was properly notarized, the respondent Villalon personally inquired before the notarial section of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City thru a letter-request, whether a record of the deed existed in
the said office; in the letter-request, the respondent misrepresented that there was already a pending case
in the RTC of Makati before November 9, 2005;
4. refused to receive the complainant’s Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim so that she could
file on behalf of her client an Amended Complaint without leave of court and without presenting the Deed
of Absolute Sale;
5. induced her witness Agnes Heredia (Heredia) to sign a false Affidavit by telling her that it
would only be for purposes of compelling Fernandez to pay additional sums to her client; however, Atty.
Villalon used it as evidence to frame the complainant Fernandez for her own personal gain;
6. only submitted the Deed of Donation for signature examination and certification by the NBI
and intentionally failed to submit the Deed of Absolute Sale
The Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation. Commissioner Funa of the IBP
recommended dismissal the case stating that Atty.Villalon did not commit any act for which she should be
disciplined or administratively sanctioned.
With regard to the first & second ground, Commissioner agrees with Atty. Villalon’s argument
that only the client’s opeative facts and not other evidentiary facts need to be included in the Complaint. It
is correct for the respondent to argue that said Deed of Sale was a matter of defense which defendant can
freely point out to the trial judge through his own pleading. It cannot be said that respondent suppressed
it when in fact the existence of the document is known to everyone else especially the opposing party.
With regard to the third ground, assuming a misrepresentation was committed, such act does not
attain a degree of materiality or gravity so as to attribute evil malice on the part of the respondent. The
intent remains which is to obtain relevant information. Besides a civil complaint was in fact filed the very
next day the letter was sent.
As to the fourth ground, such has not been factually substantiated. Fernandez filed a Petition for
Review in the SC alleging that Commissioner Funa committed a grave abuse of discretion in
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recommending the dismissal of the disbarment case and in failing to resolve one of the matters regarding
the affidavit of Heredia.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Villalon can be disbarred on such grounds
HELD: A lawyer has the duty to be truthful in all his dealings, however, such duty
does not require that a lawyer advance matters of defense on behalf of the client’s
opponent.
A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has a duty to be truthful in all his dealings. However, this duty
does not require that the lawyer advance matters of defense on behalf of his or her client’s opponent. A
lawyer is his or her client’s advocate; while duty-bound to utter no falsehood, an advocate is not obliged to
build the case for his or her client’s opponent. Assuming arguendo that the respondent knew of the
presence of the Deed of Absolute Sale, its existence, is, indeed a matter of defense for Fernandez.
SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS

A.C. No. 5580, 15 June 2005, EN BANC (Per Curiam)
Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos (Romanillos) represented San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc.
(SJHAI) before the Human Settlements Regulation Commission (HSRC) in a case against Durano and
Corp., Inc. (DCI). The suit was for violation of the Subdivision and Condominium Buyer’s Protection Act
(PD 957). SJHAI alleged that a certain lot was designated as a school site in the subdivision plan that DCI
submitted to the Bureau of Lands, but no school was ever built, and in fact, the subject lot was sold by DCI
to spouses Ramon and Beatriz Durano.
While Atty. Robert B. Romanillos (Romanillos) was still counsel for San Jose Homeowners
Association, Inc. (SJHAI), he represented Myrna and Antonio Montealegre in requesting for SJHAI’s
conformity to construct a school building in the subject lot, to be purchased from the spouses Durano.
This request was denied, and Romanillos applied for clearance before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) in behalf of the Montealegres. It was at this point that SJHAI terminated his
services as counsel, and got another lawyer.
When Romanillos acted as counsel for Lydia Durano-Rodriguez against SJHAI, the latter filed a
disbarment case against him. Upon investigation, it was found and recommended that Romanillos failed
to observe candor and fairness in dealing with his clients, representing the Montealegres against SJHAI
even when he served as Board Member and counsel of the latter, and even served as counsel for DCI in a
suit against SJHAI. Romanillos got off with an admonition but continued to act as DCI’s counsel in the
latter case, which prompted SJHAI to file a second disbarment case, concerning such representation, and
adding that Romanillos has been using the title “Judge” in his advertisements.
ISSUE: Whether or not Romanillos is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD: Lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law.
It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondent’s continued

representation of Lydia Durano-Rodriguez. The lack of opposition does not mean tacit consent. As long as
the lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two (2) or more opposing clients, he is guilty of violating
his oath. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates that a lawyer shall
not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure.
Incidentally, it is also misleading for respondent to insist that he was exonerated in A.C. No. 4783.
We agree with the IBP that respondent’s continued use of the title "Judge" violated Rules 1.01 and
3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in deceitful conduct
and from using any misleading statement or claim regarding qualifications or legal services. The quasi-
judicial notice he posted in the billboards referring to himself as a judge is deceiving. It was a clear
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3AA, A.Y. 2011-2012
attempt to mislead the public into believing that the order was issued in his capacity as a judge when he
was dishonorably stripped of the privilege.
Roomanillos did not honorably retire from the judiciary. He resigned from being a judge during
the pendency of Zarate v. Judge Romanillos, where he was eventually found guilty of grave and serious
misconduct and would have been dismissed from the service had he not resigned. In that case, respondent
was found guilty of illegal solicitation and receipt of P10,000.00 from a party litigant. The penalty
imposed upon him in said case included forfeiture of all leave and retirement benefits and privileges to
which he may be entitled with prejudice to reinstatement and/or reemployment in any branch or
instrumentality of government, including government-owned or controlled agencies or corporations.
Certainly, the use of the title ‘Judge’ is one of such privileges.
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character.
Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in
order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession.
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such
statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, "of all classes and professions, lawyers are
most sacredly bound to uphold the law," it is imperative that they live by the law. Accordingly, lawyers
who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no place in the legal profession.
RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT OF THE BOOKS OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO
A.M. No. P-06-2177, 19 April 2007, FIRST DIVISION (Corona, J.)
During an audit of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the books of accounts of Atty.
Raquel G. Kho (Kho), former clerk of court of the RTC in Eastern Samar, it was found that there was a
shortage of money in the General Fund, the Sheriff’s General Fund, the Fiduciary Fund, and the Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund. According to Kho, he was not able to deposit the money immediately
with the Land Bank since there was no branch thereof in their locality. He said that it had been his
practice to keep the money in the court’s safety vault.
In addition to such shortages, it was found that Kho and his common-law wife had been in the
practice of lending out the money the former receives in his capacity as clerk of court. They would then
earn interest on the money loaned out. It was also found that some of the money had been kept in the
vault for more than year, in clear violation of the OCA Circular in 1993.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kho has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
HELD:
Public office is a public trust. Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from the justices and
judges to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Not only
must their conduct at all times be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be
beyond suspicion.
A clerk of court, aside from being the custodian of the court’s funds, revenues, property and
premises, is also entrusted with the primary responsibility of correctly and effectively implementing
regulations regarding fiduciary funds. Safekeeping of funds and collections is essential to an orderly
administration of justice and no protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the
circulars designed to promote full accountability for government funds. Clerks of court have always been
reminded of their duty to immediately deposit the various funds received by them to the authorized
government depositories for they are not supposed to keep funds in their custody.
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3AA, A.Y. 2011-2012
The failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross misconduct. It
diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary. Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense,
carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even if committed for the first time. However,
Kho showed remorse by immediately restituting the cash shortages and complying with the directives of
the audit team. And considering that this is his first offense, we find that the penalty of P10,000 fine is
sufficient.
Moreover, his misconduct reflects on his fitness as a member of the bar. His malfeasance prima
facie contravenes Canon 1, Rule 1.01of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Hence, he should explain
why no further disciplinary sanction should be imposed on him.
ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO V. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA

A.C. No. 6296, 22 November 2005, THIRD DIVISION (Garcia, J.)
Atty. Evelyn Magno (Magno) had a disagreement with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos (inos) over a
landscaping contract they had entered into. In order to set things right, Magno addressed a letter, styled
“Sumbong” to Bonifacio Alcantara (Alcantara), their barangay captain. During the
conciliation/confrontation proceedings, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (Jacoba) appeared for Inos, on the
strength of a Special Power of Attorney, together with Inos’ son, Lorenzito. When Magno objected to
Jacoba’s appearance, the latter said that she was there not as counsel, but only as attorney-in-fact.
However, Jacoba, according to Magno’s evidence, acted as counsel during the proceedings,
asserting her procedural know-how into every stage thereof, which made the proceedings drag on longer
than normal. It was because of these numerous instances that Magno charged Jacoba with willful
violation of the Local Government Code and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility
HELD:
Jacoba alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of the Punong
Barangay, instead of before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong Barangay Bonifacio
Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation panel known as pangkat. Prescinding
from this premise, she submits that the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to assist a client in
katarungan pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her appearance was not
as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.
The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement in the LGC is to enable the lupon to
secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues, the exception being in cases where
minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to
conciliate and settle their disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling
assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues. Worse still, the
participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to
prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.
The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was not,
to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not apply
since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter
proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote
her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she
addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs the
Lupong Tagapamayapa.
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Given the above perspective, the Supreme Court joins the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in
its determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC.
However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless,
respondent’s conduct tended to undermine the laudable purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system.
What compounded matters was when respondent repeatedly ignored complainant’s protestation against
her continued appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.
BENILDA M. MADDELA v. ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO

A.C. No. 6491, 31 January 2005, FIRST DIVISION (Davide, CJ, J.)
A disbarment case was filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) by herein
complainant Benilda M. Maddela (Maddela) against Atty. Rosalie Dallong-Galicinao (Atty. Galicinao) for
“acts unbecoming a public servant and a lawyer, grave misconduct and slander”.
Maddela averred that she loaned an amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) from Atty.
Galicinao. In November 2001, since part of the loan remained unpaid, Atty. Galicinao went to Maddela's
office and took the latter’s cash gift check amounting to Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) in her absence
and without her knowledge. There, Atty. Galicinao 'uttered unsavory and humiliating words' against her.
On other occasions, Atty. Galicinao collected from Maddela an amount equivalent to one-half of the face
value of the checks she received as benefit from the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 10 December 2002, the respondent went again to the office of the complainant and
demanded one-half of the value of the check representing a cash gift of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000).
Maddela refused, reasoning that it was a cash gift, not a JDF check and, therefore, not covered by their
agreement. Maddela's refusal to part with the amount angered Atty. Galicinao, prompting the latter to
raise her voice, utter 'unsavory remarks' against Maddela, and banged her fist on top of the Maddela's
table, causing the glass top of the table to break.
To further support her bid for the disbarment of Atty. Galiciano, Maddela, through the affidavit of
a certain Mr. Rilloraza, alleged that Atty. Galicinao is also guilty of notarizing documents outside the area
of her commission. Maddela claimed that although Atty. Galicinao was not yet a lawyer, she was issued a
notarial commission and even notarized certain documents outside of her commission.
Maddela likewise alleged that despite the death of Atty. Galicinao’s husband, Atty. Galicinao
continued to receive and encash for at least (3) three months checks corresponding to her husband's
salaries as Ex-OfficioSheriff of the Office of the Clerk of Court of Nueva Vizcaya. Maddela even pointed
out that Atty. Galicinao continued to claim the higher allowable deductions as a married individual
despite the death of her husband.
Atty. Galiciano denied the allegations but with respect to the documents that she notarized
outside of her notarial commission, she reasoned that she did such for her relatives and she did not derive
any income from the transactions . In 2004, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala submitted her
report and recommendation. She stated that Atty. Galicinao was able to prove that she was not the
creditor of the Maddela and that Atty. Galicinao did not claim her husband's salary and avail herself of the
higher allowable tax deductions even after his death. However, she will be suspended for six (6) months
for the acts of notarizing outside the area of her notarial commission and obtaining the JDF checks of the
complainant from the cash clerk in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 27-2001.
On 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-227 in CBD
No. 03-1060, annulling and setting aside Commissioner Maala's recommendation; dismissing the
administrative complaint against Atty. Galicinao with respect to the charge of violating a Supreme Court
Circular for collecting a loan for which she acted as a guarantor; and imposing upon the respondent the
penalty of reprimand for her act of notarizing documents outside the area where she was commissioned as
a notary public. The said ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court with a modification as to the penalty.
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3AA, A.Y. 2011-2012
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Galicinao should be disciplined for having notarized documents outside of
her notarial commission
HELD: Notarization is invested with substantive public interest such that only those
who are qualified may act as notaries public.
We have declared on several occasions, that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or
authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative
offices in general. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of
the authenticity thereof (Nunga v. Viray, A.C. No. 4758, 366 Phil. 155, 160 [1999]).
Thus, we are not satisfied with respondent's explanation that she notarized documents outside of
the area of her notarial commission as a favor to her relatives and for free. Whether the respondent
derived profit from her act of notarizing outside the area of her authority is of no moment. The fact
remains that she notarized outside the area of her commission. Considering, however, that her
misconduct as a notary public was committed while she was not yet a lawyer, she could not be
disciplinarily dealt with as a lawyer. The penalty that should be meted to her should, therefore, be as a
notary public before she was admitted to the Bar. The penalty of fine would be a sufficient sanction.”
XERXES A. ABADIANO v. SPOUSES JESUS AND LOLITA MARTIR

G.R. No. 156310, 31 July 2008, THIRD DIVISION (Nachura, J.)
A parcel of land covered by Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 20461 was issued on November 19, 1923
in the name of the spouses Inocentes Bañares and Feliciana Villanueva is the subject of the instant case.
Before the issuance of OCT No. 20461, Inocentes and the heirs of Feliciana Villanueva (who had
predeceased her husband) executed an Agreement of Partition dated June 1, 1922 over said property. The
lot was partitioned and distributed to Demetrio Banares, Ramon and David Abadiano and Amando
Banares. The partition is embodied in a Deed of Partition executed on June 1, 1922 and notarized the
following day by Notary Public Jose Peralta with notarial inscriptions "Reg. No. 64, Pag. 69, Libro III.".
OCT No. 20461 was administratively reconstituted on February 15, 1962 and in lieu thereof OCT
No. RO-8211 (20461) was issued over the same property, still in the name of Inocentes Bañares and
Felicidad Villanueva. On June 14, 1957 Demetrio Bañares sold his share of the lot to his son, Leopoldo.
The same was annotated at the back of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461).
Subsequently, on February 21, 1962, Leopoldo Bañares filed before the Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Negros Occidental an ex-parte petition praying for: first, the confirmation of the Agreement of
Partition, the Conformity executed by David Abadiano, and the Deed of Sale between him and his father;
and second, the cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and, in lieu thereof, the issuance of a new
certificate of title over the property. In an Order dated February 22, 1962, the court ordered the
cancellation of OCT No. RO-8211 (20461) and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of Dr.
Leopoldo Bañares, Amando Bañares, and Ramon and David Abadiano. Pursuant thereto, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31862 was issued by the Register of Deeds for Negros Occidental.
On the other hand, spouses Jesus and Lolita Martir (Spouses Martir) alleged that, prior to the
issuance of TCT No. T-31862, Ramon Abadiano, for himself and on behalf of David Abadiano, had already
sold their rights and interests over the property to Victor Garde. The sale was allegedly evidenced by a
document of sale (Compra Y Venta) dated June 3, 1922 and acknowledged before Notary Public Jose
Peralta and bearing notarial inscription "Doc. No. 64, Pag. No. 60, Book No. III, series of 1922." The sale
was allegedly affirmed by David Abadiano in a document dated September 30, 1939.
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3AA, A.Y. 2011-2012
They further alleged that from the time of the sale, Victor Garde and his heirs were in continuous,
public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the property.
Thus, Spouses Martir filed the Action to Quiet Title and/or Recovery of Possession with Damages
before the then CFI of Negros Occidental. Herein Petitioners denied allegations of Spouses Martir and it
was maintained that the property was never conferred to Victor Garde through a Compra Y Vente. Xerxes
Abadiano intervened in the proceedings before the trial court alleging likewise that his predecessor
Ramon Abadiano never sold their share of the property to Victor Garde. The trial court ruled in favor of
Spouses Martir declaring them as the true and legitimate owners of the property. The Court of Appeals
likewise affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale is a spurious document
HELD:
The Supreme Court, in its decision, discussed the due execution and authenticity of the Compra Y
Venta.
Rule 130, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:
Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole;
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
Respondents attached only a photocopy of the Compra Y Venta to their complaint. According to
respondent Lolita Martir, the original of said document was in the office of the Register of Deeds. They
allegedly tried to obtain a copy from that office but their request was refused. No other evidence but these
bare assertions, however, was presented to prove that the original is indeed in the custody of the Register
of Deeds or that respondents’ due and diligent search for the same was unsuccessful.
The Rule states that when the original document is unavailable, has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
In the case at bar, respondents failed to establish that the offer in evidence of the document was
made in accordance with any of the exceptions allowed under the abovequoted rule, and yet, the trial
court accepted the document as genuine and proceeded to determine its validity based on such
assumption.
The trial court likewise brushed aside the apparent defect that the document presented contained
the same notarial inscription as the Agreement on Partition. Indeed, the Deed of Partition and the
Compra Y Venta, though executed on different days, were notarized on the same day, and both documents
contained the signatures of the same witnesses and the same notarial inscription.
In this case, while it is true that the error in the notarial inscription would not have invalidated
the sale – if indeed it took place – the same error would have meant that the document cannot be treated
as a notarial document and thus, not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The document would be
taken out of the realm of public documents whose genuineness and due execution need not be proved.
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3AA, A.Y. 2011-2012
Accordingly, respondents not having proven the due execution and genuineness of the purported Compra
Y Venta, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioner.

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Legal Ethics Case Digest

ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES V. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ..................................................................... 1

FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEÑA V. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO....................................................1

GEORGE C. SOLATAN V. ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES AND JOSE C. CAMANO.....................2

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED “RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

TERESITA D. SANTECO V. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE........................................................................ 6

ATTY. JOSABETH B. ALONSO AND SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN V. ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA,

CARLOS REYES V. ATTY. JEREMIAS R.VITAN.................................................................................. 8

LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA VS. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE..................................................9

JUAN PABLO P. BONDOC V. JUDGE DIVINA LUZ P. AQUINO-SIMBULAN...............................10

MANUEL C. YUHICO V. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ....................................................................13

OFELIA R. SOMOSOT V. ATTY. GERADO F. LARA........................................................................14

HEIRS OF BOBADILLA V. JAIME CASTILLO.................................................................................. 15

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R.-SP NO.

LETTER OF CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF

RODANTE D. MARCOLETA V. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA AND ROMEO A. BRAWNER.....17

ERLINDA R. TAROG V. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT................................................................19

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION V. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS.................23

ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO V. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA.................................................24

BENILDA M. MADDELA V. ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO........................................25

XERXES A. ABADIANO v. SPOUSES JESUS AND LOLITA MARTIR......................................................27

ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES v. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ

FERNANDO MARTIN O. PEÑA v. ATTY. LOLITO G. APARICIO

Blackmail is "the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation or exposure or

GEORGE C. SOLATAN v. ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES and JOSE C. CAMANO

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

Contumacious speech or conduct directed against a court or judicial officer, if committed by a

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED “RESTORING INTEGRITY: A

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

TERESITA D. SANTECO v. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE

ATTY. JOSABETH B. ALONSO and SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN v. ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA,

CARLOS REYES v. ATTY. JEREMIAS R.VITAN

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension can be lifted

LUZVIMINDA R. LUSTESTICA vs. ATTY. SERGIO E. BERNABE

Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 (Old Notarial Law) states:

JUAN PABLO P. BONDOC v. JUDGE DIVINA LUZ P. AQUINO-SIMBULAN

ALFREDO B. ROA, vs. ATTY. JUAN R. MORENO

MANUEL C. YUHICO v. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ

Likewise, it cannot be overlooked Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and

OFELIA R. SOMOSOT v. ATTY. GERADO F. LARA

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent failed to serve his client diligently

WILSON CHAM v. ATTY. EVA PAITA-MOYA

HELD: Lawyers must promptly pay their financial obligations.

HEIRS OF BOBADILLA v. JAIME CASTILLO

RE: LETTER OF PRESIDING JUSTICE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, JR. ON CA-G.R.-SP

LETTER OF CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF

RODANTE D. MARCOLETA v. RESURRECCION Z. BORRA AND ROMEO A. BRAWNER

HELD: An impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred

ERLINDA R. TAROG v. ATTY. ROMULO L. RICAFORT

Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that

Conrado G. Fernandez vs. Atty. Maria Angelica P. De Ramos-Villalon

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Villalon can be disbarred on such grounds

SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION v. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS

It is inconsequential that petitioner never questioned the propriety of respondent’s continued

ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO V. ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA

BENILDA M. MADDELA v. ATTY. ROSALIE DALLONG-GALICINAO

XERXES A. ABADIANO v. SPOUSES JESUS AND LOLITA MARTIR

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale is a spurious document

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