TEOFISTO GUINGONA VS NEPTALI GONZALES

HRET’s Composition – Rounding Off

FACTS:

After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3
LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must
have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a
political party) x 12 seats) ÷ Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5
members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-
LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded
off 7.5 to 8 and that Taňada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is
also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of
the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a
member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against
proportional representation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a party’s representation in the CoA.

HELD:

It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on
the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation
of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is
what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the
Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one
half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other party’s fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latter’s representation in the Commission on Appointments to less
than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is
no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the
proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the
LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members
in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator
cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in
order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with
the other party.

VALENTIN Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board

151 SCRA 208 – Political Law – The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill

Delegation of Power – Delegation to Administrative Bodies

FACTS:

In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board”
was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The
said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of
videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has
significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be
recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts
payable to the LGUs.
 In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the
following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the
subject matter of the law.

2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law
allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in
enforcing the said PD.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.

HELD:

No.

1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof” is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to include
the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied
and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of the PD,
which is the regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is
not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one
of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to
legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in
the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree,
the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized
agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].”

BARA LIDASAN VS COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

21 SCRA 496 – Political Law – Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject

FACTS:

Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan however
discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to
RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this
law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton.
Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the
law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory
several barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE:

Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province –
Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”?

HELD:

No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult
to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself
that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to
the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of RA 4790.

VICENTE DE LA CRUZ VS EDGARDO PARAS

Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title – Police Power Not Validly Exercise

FACTS:

Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord.
No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that
the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close
out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with
customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing
declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT
WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a
valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were
deprived of due process.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses
pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD:

The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited,
certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant
with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or
policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end
can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face
is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by
reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance,
Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.

TOBIAS VS ABALOS

FACTS:

Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and
San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong
whether or not they approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said
conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7, 911” voted “no”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4
and 26(1)
HELD:

Applying liberal construction the Supreme Court dismissed the contention of constitutionality
pertaining to Art VI 26(1) saying "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It
should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject."

As to Article VI Sec 5(1), the clause "unless otherwise provided by law" was enforced justifying the act of
the legislature to increase the number of the members of the congress.

Article VI Sec 5 (4) was also overruled as it was the Congress itself which drafted the bill reapportioning
the legislative district.

In view of the foregoing facts, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Demetrio Demetria vs Manuel Alba

148 SCRA 208 – Political Law – Transfer of Funds – Power of the President to Realign Funds

FACTS:

Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit
Manuel Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177
or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of
the said PD. This Section provides that:

“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the
General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.”

Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD:

No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the
heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.

However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the
Constitution. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau,
office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department,
bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the
same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which
said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor
thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the
GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one
department to another here.

GUINGONA V CARAGUE

FACTS:

Petitioner senators question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the
1990 budget which was authorized by PD 81. Petitioners seek that (1) PD 81, PD 1177 (Sec 31), and PD
1967 be declared unconstitutional, and (2) restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990
budget pursuant to said decrees. While respondents contend that the petition involves a political question
(repeal/amendment of said laws)

ISSUE:

Whether or not subject laws has been impliedly repealed by the 1987 Constitution

DECISION: NO.

(1). Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally
fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied
prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.

(2) The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and
conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.

The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is
that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the
Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to enact a
separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the
government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit
standing of the country.

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ

235 SCRA 506 – Political Law – Veto Power – Part of the Legislative Process

Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel “Countrywide Development Fund”

FACTS:

This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president
involving the General Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The
Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund.
PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds but they cannot specify the items as to which
those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of the executive.

In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994,
neither house of congress took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada and Alberto
Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary
Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special
provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in
the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing
Authority (NHA).
ISSUE:

Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.

HELD:

In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF
is constitutional. In the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.

Veto on special provisions

The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs
Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting
that the scheme is already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by
revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor.
Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted
therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered
“inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign
Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.

Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs

The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President vetoed special
provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving
funds was likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in
the National expenditure Program. Tañada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the
veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund Policy” – it avoided double funding and redundancy.

Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance

The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual
obligations. The funds if allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that
this Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is
not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item
shall be expended – 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the
addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be
vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are “appropriate” in the budgetary
sense. The veto herein is then not valid.

Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment

As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall effectively
alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary
to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate
and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions.

Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds

According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by
direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in
Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the
president.

Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s

 Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment of separation
benefits. The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to
the item on the CAFGU’s shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and
R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per reasons provided by the president. Further, if this
provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.

Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc

In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction
prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or appointive
public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically
authorized by law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to
the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization. Tañada
et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal autonomy of
the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the first place,
the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by the President.
The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect
compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders
that the disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at
worse, be treated as superfluities.

Pork Barrel Constitutional

The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local
districts know more about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the
president for that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to
recommend as to where funds should be allocated.