•

MAJ. G[N(UR!I~ UEMAY

INCENDIARY
OPERA T'IONS
-
. .' -.
{ .:' . <::. w·- ."
 HEADQUARTERS XXI
OFFICE OF THE
I<lan~~od9
10. .•
~..,
~tt...t1... l!8 M . •
APO <34, c/o
San Francisco,

SUSJEC7: Analysis of Incendi~r Phase of Oper&tions,

9-19 M.rch 1945
TO: Coa~~nding General

The a~t&cheQ report, prepared by the DC/S,

Oper"" tions, is 5ubmi ...ted for your approval.

;(Ly"~
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

APPROVED:
-/
/"C(~.
'r" {/"r / //fC:<.
,t' ;.- r

CURTIS E. LeMAY /
Major General, USA
Commanding.

1
......................................................................................................................................

•
ANALYSIS OF INCENDIA~ PHASE
OF OP~~TIONS AGAINST
JAPANESE URBAN AREAS

XXI BO!EEil CO~~.lAND

9-10 March - Mission #40 - Tokyo

11-12 March - Mission #41 - Nagoya I

13-14 March - Mission 1142- - Osaka

16-17 !Iarch - Mission 1/43 - Kobe

18-19 I.larch - Mission ff44 - Nagoya II

.........................................................................................................................

2
A - Scope end Purpose of Report

The purpose of this report is to give an integrated

picture of a whole phase of air operations, characterized
by low level incendiary night attacks against urban targets.
This type of operation marked a novel employment of B-29
aircraft, calling for different ta~tical concepts from those
which had proved successful in the European theater and had
become the standard for heavy hombardment in the American
Air Forces.
Time and perspective will be required to assess the full
implications of the incendiary experiment. This command is
not in a position to judge whether the methods employed here
will have a lasting effect upon the future of aeriul war-
fare. They have proved sufficiently successful to ~arran~
furl.her stuciy and additioncl experimentation. This analysis
is an attempt to ~re3ent the lessons learned so far und to
suggest the modificatlons in technique which seem advisable
in fUl.ure operations of this ~ind.

It. is not intendeci to present in this report vital sta-

tistics or any facts not relevant to the tactical considera-
tions involved) \'7hich can be learned from the indiviciual
Consolidated Mission Reports for e~ch mission. Any value
which this type of analyt;is may have rests in the presen-
t~tion of the entire phase of operations as a whule.

B - The Problem

On 24 NOVGmber 1944 ~he XXI Bomber Command carried out

its first large-s~ale attack against the Japanese homeland.
Between then and 9 March 1945 over t,lenty nissions were flown
against Japan, representing a total of £037 sorties. In
some of these attacks incendiary bombp were used in com-
bination with HE bombs; on three strikes incendiaries alone
were employed. In the main, how'ever, the entire stage of
operations prior to 9 March was patterned on the conventional
~~erican Air Forces doctrine of daylight high altitude pre-
cieion bombing in formation.

The re3ults were unsatisfactory. To the XXI Somber

Co~~d were assigned nine (later raised to eleven) high
~rl0rlty targets. In 2(000 sorties not one of these was
aest:oyed. One (Aka~hi) was damaged so as to stop pro-
ouctlon for a few we~ks. Three others sUtitained enough
dam~ge (~O-30%) to interfere with produc~ion. One of the
~ost importunt - Musdshino - suffered 4% damage as the
r~sult of 835 sort~es and '.::.]27 tons of bombs. (These
flgures represent alrcruft airborne and tons lifted against
357. Actually only 141 aircraft bombed the primary drop-
ping 345 tons.) ,

3
 This was the total record of damage inflicted on
enemy targets in four months of B-29 narrare. The
balance sheet of res~ts obtained and losses ~uffere~
clearly showed the need for a radical change ~n tact1cS.

In examining the reasons for the lack of success it

is apparent that Jap.s.n's best defense against our tactics
has baen the weather. Even in the so-calleo good ~aather
months of December, Jan~try, and ebruury only u fraction
of the attacks could be c~rried out by vi~ual bombing·
illethOQS. In December only 1S9 out of 415 sortie&, or 45%,
permitt~d vi~ual bo~bingJ in Jan~r~ 180 out of 473, or
)C%, and in Februa.r:r 1j7 out of 7~4J 0:11:)' a mere 19% of
the sortie~ flOYD. BQ5eti on the fragmcnt~ry ~e~ther 10fo1'-
!lb.tion aVi;iilable to tni-.. cOln;nand there '-!ere c..ppraximate1y
fiVG days in each of the months of December, January, and
Februa.r;y- ',;hi,,;h would h...ve permit.tee high altitude visual
operations ovar the ro~agoya ar~a. During these
month~, beror,,; night tukeoff was fensib1a, turget time
over Japan '!!.Eo:, limited to the period be'tv!cen 1400 <ind 1600
hours. But in order to take ddvantage of these days it wa~

R~ll-P~Rl~Y Bm TAK'~' ,
1WI"O VEL. TIME OF Ml~lf lij j,
\1& UI~!(TiOM O.11/IUlQCLOUUI ~I

, ,

nece~5~Y to have ac~ur~te ndvence 1euther information

Due to th~ a.i~ficulty of obtaining promp't. ",-eather service
<
fr~~ the cruc~al ar~as ~e~t ana northwest of the JdWancs~
oa1~~n~ o~ forecu~ters experienced great difficulty in
pred1ct1ng t uvorable bombing ,1f;!a'ther ':Vi th sui"ficiern.:. ctC-
curac~ or fur enough in advance to make use o~ it .

. Eve~ if good Yieather preITai1ed over the ti.trget OUI:

Sh1Ps~oJ.ten ~ad to penetr6.te severe fronts on the Ion
over~{d.~er f11ght frolll the Marian6.s '.lith the result th~t
form~t~ons were scattured dOd that many crevs missed the
briefed
h landfall
. by n considernDle d'st"nce
. . . c;. •
I n v~e.i
. af
~ e sl~nae~ fuel reserve on high altitude missions errors
~~ navlgat10n ~ere oftun impossible to corr~ct ~nd th
a~rcraft ~crd . to Ie~urn early or bomb a targetdof
opportunity. In many CU::.B5 'Jeather cunC1itivns p~l;:!vented
lli.;.vig<.otors from t<::.k.ing 8. drift reading or ce~ebtl.a~ f.,h~ts.
;:md forced them to rely on rudlir as their lJ£.ln Ij.ilV:l.gl:it~Qmll
aid. .At the &ltitudes flo..n l the AN/APQ-13 "'4;:; often inop-
Brative and signals were too '"eek to permit &ccurnte
identification. An ~dded ob~tacle to n&vigcliion NaB the
fact that Japanese-held iGlands on route could not bB used
<~b Ch0Ck points for fc~ar of alerting the enemy rad<::lr early
,'Jarning ~ystelil.

The greatesT. difficulty 'j:hich \'.'E:e::.ther cond.it.ions imposed

on our flier~ ·,V8.S the -:!ind. over JaDe.n at h.:'gh ""ltitudes.
',lind::: of "'::00 knois &nd l:lOre '::ere encountered i:.t jO,U00 feet.
ht ",ucb ~."lnd velocitiz6 drift. ''1-:'5 Jifficult to currect, and
tne bomb rt.ll1 had to be pla.nned uir0ctly QUim ';ind or up·.vine.
I\.gw.in .... t ,1..... OO-knot. ·.'I"ind <...n up dnd rilll .'/O.:.~ not l'ec.:."iule.l at
~.llgc.!t.ly lower ,'inc. velocities th0 u,r> line:. run .:c..~ extrcm;,;ly
h.:...z...:.rCJou~ ;::...; iT. eXiJOSed the ships to :tC~ur.::.tc cintialrcraft
fire. On Ci. dc,:rn:'lnd run grClund ~1)cGd8 in exce;-;t; of 500
~;l ...).h. Ilcre oft.en enCOl..U"Ltered. go,~:l.;lng t.cible::; emu. computers
.,.-e1'e nO"L Oe.::ilgnea to nL~ndle ..,uch speed.s flor [;~Q thE: bombar-
ni0r:;, been tr~ined to cop~ .,it.h the.n. The high "lind made it
i:llpGs.sinle fur "::1'e\,'8 to e:.t tt:mpt cot second p.... .,,:, tot tr.e target
if the f1.rst rW1 fullcld, &..nJ often ~Jrev~nted them from
Cltt[;.~king th8 t3.rg~t at all if an error in l1ilvig<:tion
brought "them in G.o''ll1<"ind. from the target.

These d.ifficultie: ':mre not in~uper'_i.Dl<1; Gome cre'NS \,ere

<~bleto nit the target consistlJntly but they ';;ere un excep-
tion, proving that more th.an averuge training and unusual
ability were needed to cope ,7ith the condition:, encounterea.
A comprehensive lead cre',V tra.ining IJrogram ',~as in;;;titutud
in an effort to discover and traL~ su~h superior leaaers.'

The expected further deterioration of ~eather in the

coming month;;; rna)' T!lake it impossible even for exceptionallJ'
ir~:.1.ned cre"!s to hit the targat frem higr. altitude. Visual
bO::lbing ~{ill be t!1e exception rather than the rule:. Even
greuter reliance must be pl..1ced on rddar b(){'Jhing than has
be~l"'. d(ln(~ in th8 p!:st, out in viev! c>f th<.l um;a tisfactory
lJ'zrformanGe of tne AN/APQ-lj at high ~tlt.itude~ 1J.nd the lack
of r.:.c.ar opcr~tors qUi1lified to 'ikwt the ~or.d.iti('<Ils encoun-
tered it is doubtful that r~aar bomLing can be r~lied upon
j

to i~n()ck out. inland ~intJuint tFlrgets fror,} high al t.iT.ude&.

;mct[Jer re5ult of h"ign ...It.i:Lude fl;r.'.:it.ion .3.ttacK3 "Thich

,~: ....
teglrming c\.: _!I<_k.J ltt>elf f~.)lt in th~ nigh ""burt rete ;m.~>
inc (;Ui:,ul<...tive strt:.ln on r.len dnd .;(:ui1Jment. Long forr.U:it.ion
fl.ights. contributed gr.eatly· to' cpe,.,,· f'atigue and' .shortened
engine"life, e:;~)eci!.J.lly ,\n.::n couplbo ,.it.h the str<..in on
engincls ciue to high ~lt.i~ude oper~tion.
 It Vi';':: agl,lim.t thiS bdckground th~t the dl::lcioion 'laS rei:l.ched
earl~' in March, LO launch G. :;eries of 10'.1 lLwel incendiary night
.J.t{.ack~ dgain",1. J<.>.panese urOfln Clrc/;".s, These operations were not
conceivcu as lc~ror rctlds against the aivilian population. The
Ju}l'ina::,e econor:!y de.pGnds heuvily on ho!ne lndu::;tries ci::l.rried olJ'.. in
citie:., or s~ttlem0nt8 close to mc:.jor fiictory clreas. By de3troying
tnese feeder indu5tries the flO\i of vital p<:rts could be cur-
tdilen 4nd ~roduction disorg~nized. A gener~l confl&gration in a
city like Tokyo or Nagoya mi~lt have the further a~vantage of
spreading to 50;;:e of the priority 1jarget~ locdted in those &re<:.s,
m~king it unnecessary to Knock them out Qy $e~~rote Jinpoint at-
tacks.

Incendi!.ry o~erations agc.dnst urban targets had been planned

for some time, cnd several trials employing incenriiary bombs hb.d
been made. On ~ome attacks a mixed loaU of HE and IE bomb& ~as
used, with indifferent results. On three mis~ion~, prior to 9
March, incer.a.iaries ::llone had been Uf3ed. Tha result 'fluS unsatis-
factory, partly b~cau5a the ballistic characteristics of incen-
diary clusters rendBred them inaccurate ~hen dropped from high
~l titudes in strong '.7ind~ partly because imm.fficient force '!wo
&vailable for a major strike against a large urbun area. By the
beginning of March the 3l3th' Wing had joined the 73rd Wing ~s a
fully operative Ui"lit. In order to attain the necessary concentrG.-
tion over tILe tc:.rget it 'Ii",-;:) deciaed to dispc.tch E..lsG the rec-·
ently arrived tt·:o groups of the .314th rang .',he clr.d only· f10:.'!11 one
m<.1jor mission again&1.. ttle enemy since "(,11e11' a:'rival. The com-
bin~a force tot<:.:.lled 1:10rc tnan .300 aircraft ',lnicn N",S con:.n.cered
b:.l.ffi-:ient to dchieve the objectlVJ.

'lhe perioC: prior to tne ~oril(,in0a ope...~ation::; &cheduled in

c:ooruination ;ii1,}j the nuval striKe dgtiin:o>t OkinJ.".la '.!u.s cho::;en u':'
the ti:n~ in ,.hich to fly thf-) inc'3llCli~ry mi~sions. Since the
fir",t. of the Okina~"J oper.s..tlon.; ";<"5 scneduled for .:::.3 Murch, only
a li .... tle OVGr bro .ieek~~ '''urI,) u.vdilab.ie in which to hit the four
target3 chocen: the ci~ie~ of Tokyo, Nagoya, O~ak& ~ ~obe.
The ,s,tri:-:Gs vera scheduled. Jith b. ~l1ini:Jlll1:l tice interval b8t::een
missions. An important con5ider~tion ~uB the desire to complete
the er.tire LJh.:1se of operations bf)forE: the enemy coula cievelop
dd'en8es to. mc':!t our new tfJ.ct~c::;. The first mission against
Tokyo ',16.3 3~heduled for 9 March und .:;ubsequent striKes were to
bs delivered every other d~y.

The decision was made to utt~ck from low ultitu~e3 --

bet~';een 5000 and 8000 feet. In order to l:rlinirulz.t:: losses the
,&t~acke ~ere to be m~de at night, by individual ~hips; carry-
ing mo::xbnnn louds of incendiary DQmbs. Tile entire f;taff of
the cOl!U'1&nd a"'laited ':dth considerable ",uspense thE: :o:-e~ult of
this radical departure from the tnldition<:.Ll doctrin0 of stra-
,teelC bombardment.
 c - The Executlo

The mi~sioG ~l~ for this series of operations is lnsep~­

rable frow it~ execution, since modifications in the plan
~ere ~hde from mis~ion to mission. The two ii11 be discu5sed
toget!1er in the following pages. In place of a chronological
report of the attacks it is considered prefer~ble to discuss
the outst.:...nding features of the entire phase point by point
to pre~erv~ the essenti&l unity of these operations.
~.:~~" .,.~:>:.~~~ ~
.....f....t •
1. TIAUNG ~::l···j·!
~""" ,".
a. Night Attack 2IiY.. ......
=e ...J·Ui~e,r l......-t
,·.;tY.!iR' T't' ~'.:"
\~". .,.-:~{?::t"';.';~ . ;:()"~~t"~·
The decision to strike at n.iihf\1~S "an essential
feature of the plan, to afford protection against enemy
fight-.;r:;, and &ntiaircraft. The Ja.panese r:.ight fighter force
""'as kmr:m to be weak and ":as not believed to be u serious
d~nger. But los:;,es from flak ~ere expected to be $ubstantial.
530 oltt..cl\.ing At night it ".'las hoped to minimize tha~e 105ses
::.inca enell\)' r:ldar gun laying devices "!ere thought to be com-
}kl.r__ t.lv::!'l; inefficlent c..nd heCi~' AA guns v.'051d thu!.> have to
dL~xmd on ~e!i.rchlights for effective fir3 control .

•1eut~ter considerationf' ul:.>o :.ere in [ ....vor of night

:~t.t.~e!\::.. Heav:r rc..in,~ 71th 10:1 vblbility nnd s'tl"ong ....inds were
. ~eginning to bt:: cxpzrieneeCt .It. the MariG.nas hoses ..:.nd it "NUS
im~rt~nt to ~ccomplish L~ :e~st the landing, dnd if pos5ible
the t. ......... aoff l: :L . . "ell, in d....j-light. Weut.lkr over the LL..rget 1.'1&8
believ=u to D~ s~igntly better ~t night, ~t least during the
... pring, d I.E to the j)re::.~nce of 1011 cloud forms of & tYl-le ,;hieh
tend to d~cr~~se in amount at night.

From the st~nd~oint of nu.vig~tion, nigh't flight offered

one distinct udvd.ntag~ in that Loran sky ":/l:::Lveti Cdme in ;'1e11
over tho ~ntir0 route to Japan una. permitted lar~rii'all5 to be
plotted more hccurately. Lor&.n reception in daytime has
iJroved grdclt.ly inferior to night reception.
I

b.

Thcugh the deciSion had been made to attack the t.irgct

at nigHt there "YCitl _considerable latitude in choosing te.keoff
and landing ti~e. Several faetor~ had to be con~idered.
dit.n u g~o~s ;~ight of ~round 1~7JOOO 1bs &t tak~off it ~as
desirable to ~cneciule takeoff in d~ylibht. On the other hand J

7
it 1'1;;"$ even more important. to accomplish as much of the
return journey as :)ossible in'daylight "Co «void ditchings '7 t
night and to permit damag8d all~craft ~o lanu in daylight, 1f
,',cather ~lt the b~st2s should prove unfavorable. In vievl of
th9 length of the micsions (approxim1:l.tE:ly f'tfteen hours on
the average) it waG n~cedsnry to arrive Dot <l compromise ~1hil:h
is reflected in the time tl;:;.ble below:

Mission 'Takeoff Lc:nding

(First - La;t) (First Aircx'uft)

TJ,(),G 091735 to l)'j.:.OlO 100'710

.NAWYA I 111710 to 111951 1"U'145
GSA1~.{ 1j1716 <0 1}1?,6 IM)6.39
KOBE 161939 to 16«05 170939
NAGUYA II 1319~5 to 18.156 190846

NCTE: TL~le.;: 5ho;':0 <ire K-time.

Tne timing ,'UlS complicated by the fb.ct t.hat tci.~eoff

for \.he ,mt-ire force consumed ,.. .e11 OV!lr two hours. The 73rd
5nd 313th Wing;; could t .... keoi'f simultaneously from their <::!.d-
Joining bases 6.t Saipan and Tini&n for arrival ::.t the same
target hQur. Tt"le 7jrd Wing, with the greate.st l'iurnbel' of air-
planes participQting (ap~rox~n~tely 150) required e minimum
of one hour ~nd fifteen minute~ to b~ airborne from two run-
..-;-ays.Stragglol',s and takeoff mishaps inc reused thh; on three
mi~sions by another thirty ~inutes. The 3l3th Wing, ~ith ap-
proximately 100 airplanes participating took about the same
time to be airborne as the 7Jrd Wing. 'I'inian a18.o hag. ti"lO
rum!.:lys but only one ';.as fully operational, the other had not
been completed. If the J14th ~ing w&s scheutUed for simulta-
neous target arrival it had to start takeoff forty minutes
before the other ·./ ings to allow fOI' the gre!.lter distance from
Gu~m, bringing the total takeoff time to two hOlli's _md u half.

If te:..rget time \,rc:.s ~t:.lggered by schedul ing the 73rd

or jlJ~h ~ing ~c takeoff before the other, thirty to forty
minuto3 ~Q.u. to he &ddec. to totcil takeoff. tima for one ·nne;,
'..l.gc.,i!l bringing the t0l;aJ. to t'10 .1Ours and It half.

Thu::. tdK60J.:f gene-rally ;.;trctc:hed .into the nighl. u.nCI part

of." tho :J.l.rc:ruft had. to thkeoff after dark, .'li1..11 'the excep-
t.l.on of t.r.~
l..hird lIIi~)Sion on '.V(,ich trJkeoff ·"·.. . s com,.)ro~b0d in-
",0 t,:o how'~ a.nd ten ;ninutc1::J, allo"ing lfiO::it of the· ahips to
beco:ne all' berne in o.c.ylight. This is illllstr.:i'Led on 'Lhe fol-
lo.,'ing )ctga.
"K'TIM5 ,,, 20 4 'l
l

No'i<yo
:·t;.,~ ~ .. ...
11135
120/0
-...- T"It,-~/'s
Wff"
~ 0710 - IZ'n I

r
tNAG'OYA I

-. l ..;; .'.
r
;0 SAI<A
!'t".1o-' ~ ...,..

.' i. <"." •••

r•

During the period of our incendiar;t,' <...ttacks the

b:- ttle for I,VQ Jima -i.-do.:;' still in progress. The Marines had
alreudy .'on po~s~ss1on of the t\'TO o.irfields, but for the
first tr~~o mi~sions only the southern airfield ~as avail-
G.ble if n~eded in an emergency. A number cf 3-.::95 l<::.nded
t.here, in ;:,pite of the short run~:~YJ in preference 1..0 ditch-
ing. In view of tl18 dl.fficulties of lending a cri})pl~j r:.hip
on i... :..\.r<=.og't.l field ""it.h c.. short ruo',/C.tJ' ~nd ~:(tr-em.ely limited
fQ,·::~li;..ies it. /7i::l5 decidea "to pO<:itpone the takEoff tilDe for
the Jd.:>t t. '0 l'li:..~ions by ... out t.:c hours. Thi~ forced all clir-
:r..._ ft 1.0 tc.n.eof:;.' at dark but brought them over I.'iO in Qc.ylight
in :::iJ.3~ of Ct.n emergen.:;)! lunding there. Thi.::i i~ ;;;ho~'n 1n cnb.rt
above. It 1.$ lii~ely tilat in fut.ur~ mist-ient> of thi::> LYPc the
~~~tfier conaitions at ~he Mari~nss b~se~ ~d ~he faci1i1.1cs
aV~~lJu~z at l~o 1111 gov~rn th~ ~iming of Ldk~off. Until
~lie 1':0 airfl-ela i.:. improved., lind 'ih~n bue. ilelo.ther ~revai15
in 'We M:rl.en...3, every effort li11 De EIiJ.de to schedule day-
11ghL return flights even if requiring u night takeoff.
 c. Time Uver Target

In analyzing ~hc re&ulLS of ~~~ five in~endiary ~issions

it De~am~ Q~par~nt ~het concentr~tion of the force ov~r the
target in the sr.ortust possible timo was an im,!Jortant fuetor.
Ej~ ~;.... turatl.ng the enemy aefen&e:; the ~fforts of fire fighters
.,xe nal,lpered, r~<iar directors for anti~.urcra.ft gun:;; and ::;earch-
llgnt::. LJE:~om.J confused, and :;G.p&l·ate fire:3 are merged into ;:,.
ger..,3r""l conl'lagr:.:.t..Lon.

Un t.ne first mission dgc..in~;t. Tok:\'Q thE. importan:::e of this

f<oct fit:."" uot fully app.c:i!ciated. It ,1013 eX,!Ject.:!a that ~he bulk
0':- the l\ircr"..ft ·.vould get. over the target in ca"Qut as f.luch time
I
~~ ,db required for a ~ing1e ~lng to takeoff, ~ince the first
uircr~f"t or ull three wing5 had b~en scheauled to ~ass h ~heore­
ticill point off Selipan I::l.t th" s~me mOi!J.€mt. Actu.::.l1y it too~ the
479 uircruft .hich reuched the primary tdrget slightly lo~ger,
or 't'ro hour~ [.00 fifty-tl"..ree minutlJs, to drop thl;;'lir bcmbs, al-
~houg~ ~~8 aircruft passed over the target ln the fir~t two hours.
The SUCCdf)::; of this first ati~·.ck diverted attention from the fact
'th~tJ ~s ~ rule J Q closer concentrQtion may be raquirea.

ConsoquentlYJ no attempt was nade to increase the con-

centratio2L on the next attacK, against Nagoya. In fc.ct, the
tactical plan for that mission aisregarded concentration in favor
of d. ne·,] experimen~ ",hich fa.iled completely. Reports from obser-
vers on the 'T¢lkJ'o attack had stres~ed thut crerlS We1"6 in many
cases dropping bombs all. areas 'lhere fires hRd nlreb.dy been star-
tad. In order to avoid this apparent riastc of tonn~ge it was
decided to ~cnd half of our force -- the 3ljth an~ 3l4th Wings
-- l.n"Co NagoYQ ahe!:td of the rest. The theory ·:lliS thut the first
force rfouJ,d start firee in the area and that the second force --
til..: ?Jrd 'fling -- \'l'ould come in approximat.ely ::u::. hour loiter to
crop their oo~bs in those section~ vf the t~rget are~ :hich hud
bGen mi~b~u ~y the fir~t force.

CO.1~)Qr.Ja
'i-ch 15.6 s"';. ~I!l. ,).(:.:,t,.. ::"'-j'..:l.4 Gil '1oicyc ,.tt<~..;:\:,
..11...; .'1~;"'. _t..n .
. jJ.-:·t.i....l f.1.l..li...:, .• ~ on1;,.- .:..0, ",q •. !"i. of Nc:..g-
~
c'y.... '",r~ bUI'u:<i (,.uL Tn.; t.:o forces sent. against. N!.g0'y6. took
,,:hr~~ r,our::, t.c.. drop t.bair t,(j';lbs, oJx-lct1y :;.,., long a::. on tht:l
Tok"'Yo <-;t.rit<e, out 'the concentrar.ion uiffered consider&tl1y. Over
T<;00 't:le bulk of l.he force cr()~~ed in "tile fir::,t t,.;o n(Jur~ (d~%)
.J~ila strc..gglers r;,ccounted for the third hour. On t.he NCigoya mi.,-
610n c..1'i105'(, h&..lf the p1eme~ arrivea c.ver ~he ~i:1I'get in ~he third
hour, ~ith ~ n~jor portion of the other half cro",sing in ~h~ first
hour, and sir.'lgglers f~lling in the hOlli" b.;:t'.'leen. Thi:..; respite
bEft,\7.3en the concentratl0116 at the begirming und end cf the' eriod
enabled f~re fig?ters .to control fires started by the first tJ group,
£..nd practlcull;y- tJ.c.i.lvea th.;! task for th(;m.

As soon ""IJr:. this \'11':""; l'.;c.lized, anci the eXJ)criment ,lll"oved

to h'lve been d :~llure, plan3 for th~ third ~is5ion (O~aku) ~ere
cb..nged to provlde simultaneous arrival at tne ~arg~t as had been
 ET
done on the Tokyo J!IL,,~ion. S"trngglers and weather o.:ondit.ions
s.ccoillltecl for 'Lhe fact t.hatl,he entire force of £74 snips took
three hours and tNenty-eight minutes to cross the target, and
that onl;y 70% reached there in the fir~t two hours.

By the time the fourth mission (Kobe) uas run the im-
portance of concentration in time was better dj)}lreciated as more

OSAKA A
, 2 KIl.

\-
. -.- '.--'_ ..
~ -~.. _.

inforJilation on the preceeding missions Wb.S k::oming in. The former

method of cont.rolling concentration by scheduling take off was
realized to be ine"deqw...te. The ',;rings ',vere therefore given a
required time over the target (U400K - 0515K), instead of a
take-off hour and were encouraged to work out their o~n take-
off time. This proved ~ difficult problem to solve as only metro
winds ·,/ere availb.ble to compute the flight time required and
allovlances had to be made for wind variations. Nevertheless,
the three wings were over the target vii th 306 aircruft in slight-
ly over two hours, providing the best concentrat~on of any of the
four missions, though/the scheduled time over the target was ex-
ceeded by forty-five minutes.

On the last missioi.. (Nagoya Ii) the same method .....as used.
The ·'lings ~·fere again giver. a target time (0400K - 05l5K) but did
not achieve the concentration obtained on the previous strike, as
i3 ::;ho'.!n in the photo on the follo·'ling page. The force of 490
1)1an8':' req uired t·,70 hours and forty-four ::J.inutes ovet the primary
t....rget, .11th a concentrl).tion of .!.5d Ciircraft in the first two hours.

11
 In analyzing these missions afterwards it was agreed by
the wings as "ell as by the bomber command that neither of the
two methods assured satisfactory concentration over the target.
No solution of the problem has as yet been found. A suggestion
was made to prescribe take-off time as well as a controlled air-
speed to assure simultaneous ~rrival over the target. In view
of the unsatisfactory calibration of instruments and the dif-
ficulties of flying a controlled airspeed on such a long
flight this plan is not considered feasible.

T
L -"-__ ~....l-

..... _... _. __ . ---_._-------------'

 Another po~sibility ~oulQ be to schedule departure time
from ~ control ~oint necrer to Japan, such as I~o Jima. Arrival
over Iwo .::ould bd controlled by increa.:-.ing air5~eed or fly ing r..
dogleg; on the comp&r~tive~ short flight between Iwo bnd the
Jap.:ll103Se i:1::1inlQnd the f'or~e ..,ould not get strung out E.S it doe::,
over the muco longer ro~t03 from the Marianas. Although this
method ~"ould increi1&e fuel consumption and reduce the bomb load,
it :i11 be consiacred, along ~ith other possibilities, ~1 plan-
ning future iucendi!...ry attacks. A comparison of the five raids
froTa the ste.ndpoint of effective concentrution is pre;:,ented in
this chart:

ITIME OYER.
TAI<IJEir

TOkYO
279 A/c

NAGOYA 1
2.85 Ale

'-+..+.-
:... +- 31%
OSAKA '+0
274 Ale :+

kOBE
306 Ale _
t

NAGOYA 1f
290 "Ie '

+4 = 10 '8_•• ')1;; over tL..rgoJt.

¢:t = PL.. u!:.; UV·..:I't<:.rget in iir::..t t'"O hours.
D = nem...in.lllg nU'llber of pleo.ncs over t ....r~et.
 4. ALII1UDE

rne cn~nge ~n &ltitude from bet 'een ~5000 ~nd 3v,UOV feet
i.O c..et. ·een 5UJu c...nd lO,uOU feet \'1:..5 C I"ddical aejJ&rture from
~t,.. na.... rd h~c...vy bO"lbardment t.i.;.ctic~. It proved to be the one
f~<:ture ..bich holas out greater prolJise for the fu"tllI'e thi;.n any
obber tingle 1'... c1.or learned on the incendiury c.a.ttac\{s. The main
ad\'""ntagcls vere the increo.ried bomb lOGd, greater bombing accu-
ri::lcy, l~Je inten:..e ··1100s, bet.ter r.:.de..r returns, less ::;;train on
'the ....lirp1<...ne l:.nd equ1.pment. i'/hdt IH:"o not been expected was the
I
, rel&tiv~ ineffectivcn~ss of Japanese antiuircraft at the alti-
tudes chosen. Variations of the t~ctics e~ployed may be neces-
s~y ~£ a future protection ~guin~t. fla~ but if that oanger is
/
eliminated or cont.rolled 'th_'r<... s~eIll::; to be little rel::.50n for
confining Ollr future operutions to high altitude attacks. The
three '::ing conunanaers echoed the statea of'inion among the com-
bat crE::WS in urging that low a1 titude missions be retained in
the future.

J.lf61/ ALTI TUOE 1//6# Al TlTI/OE lOW ALTITI/OE' lOW MTITI/OE

FORMATlO,", , SING-LE A/<: FORMATlOil' ~/N6lE Ale

roe doove ctU:1r1. sho·cls graphically the relutive l.n:.:rease

1n oo~b lo&d mdde possible by decreasing the ul~itude from
.,.5000 to be"L';een 500U and lO,UvO feet. ./-is a matter of fact,
'Lhe increb.se in bomb loa.a could h&ve been achieved by lowering
th~ <..lcitoJde to aruwhere bet. veen 5CJOO and 15UOO feet "'lithout
materi<..lly affecting the 104a carriea. In ~lanr.ing the mission~
no miniwum ~o~b load w~s pre~cribed as it Ha5 f~lt thut wing
~d group staffs shoula adJust the Domt load to the cdys.bili-
ties of the cre·vs. On th"" _v,.;rago, Ij,~OO poW1ds of bombs ';ere
airborne during this perl.od. M~rv ships exceeded this averGge
and could h&ve carried even more, as loading 5p.1ce rather than
'.'laight .taS often the li-miting factor.

An importsnt factor in 1017 Q.l titude operation, frolo the

flight engineering standpoint, ~as thGt nearly the entire ~is­
sion could be flown at crui£ing po','<er, thus aading to the oper-
ation~l life of the engines and cl::.using fe~er aborts. As
mentioned in ot-her sections of this report, 10';' l~vel operation
IIl&ce for b~tter functionillg of equipment all around. At high
 41titude radar often b~come~ ino~rutive, bomb bay doors stick ,
<.oDd otner ~·qUipmel'1t IlUilfunction:: occur.

1"1;: Lr as NGilther is concerned opercJtion ~t lo-.,e.r r.ltitude

i;j b~n~fh.ed tilui.nly by t.he ~Ds~nce of th~ unuSLi.c.o.lly high :linda
cn~ount ~l'ed ..t alti.tude. Though 10\.' level ~1nds ure more w.ri-
~ l'J. .. .:.nd l!tOL'':;: uif! h:J.l t to forec"':'fit, th'3;Y- r<oorcly excued. 60
knot., ... nc. -lI"€: gen.:=rc:.l.ly tet'''ean 10 ~nd 40 knotb, ;Vith loaer
ln~ v~lo~i~i~b n~vig~tioncl e~rOl'b ~re Ib5~ ~erious ~na are
c ~ ... i~r to .;.o~re,;::t. N...vigdtion is further im,-"ll"ov<~:C1 by t.he bel,,-
t~r r' ...QJr return~ obt~.ineCJ. cit lO-l"i~r u.ltituQe~. Un the other
l!.. nc., l~ing .;:onctitl.on:::. 'nu,:;t be ~;':'tJe~~ed all the northern ~rt of
tae routa ..:.t <...ltituaa::. :::~b'clen 5'JUO und 10,OOu feet during the
,'int.~r ::;C'd-;.-..on J .... ne. .. iJl re<;uir~ ,:'!odificd.tions i.n }Jld-T.ning and
SCi.3Cl.Ullng tll03 mi::,::.iun.

lOW IIlTITUOE AHACK

•
• ,EQuaO
ME.CHANICAL

•
I
NAlF~(nOWS '~\.
(FEwelZ.
,ABORTS
if";'~,,:.
"t.:/-i...".
P£WiE/Z ~:
,Of«') •'{ ~,;~".
.... ».~.

Thd lncr..:::[..;;;e in tJo!:lbing Z!fficLncy ffio:oe pos;.;ible by t.he

ch«ngc in a.ltitude to 5UVO feet. expressuE ltself in m~ny dlf-
i'~rent .:..ys. The effect of &llal.."1g error::. c:.nd inaccwQ.cies of
tna bom~~lght decreaties ~ith ~ltitudeJ ~nd bo~u dis~er::.ion is
le:.. ... ened, t.lluS r~3c!.uclng the si7,e of the 1o~b patt~rn cnd in-
,:raLJing its accw'"cy. The inf1uol1ce of b;;llistic wind >'ihich
-nu...,t he :'(; :konea. ,Ii'(,h cit )U J v0U feet Cdn 0'-' aibr.:::gu:r:·ded lit the
10-t::r ... lti"a(,~c .. T:le ct1unce~ of finding Vh:ll.:J.l bo:noing conc.i-
\;,LOD:.. ""re ..:on~iQar.... oly ililprOVCo. due ',,0 the c.bsence of middle
c:.Da nigh cloud ltlyer~;. The f1.lct t.bo.t .1ind ve1ocitie~ <it J.O'.ler
l:.h.ituQ~~ dre tHhin t.he normdl ro.cge iJ.a.tce:; it po~:::.it:le to
choo ..:El c..n .:..:..:h of G.t'(,.lC;'~ o"t.her t.hc.n tte up'lina or do;rr.-'ind
~l)prab.ch ~nt1 per:ai"l... s c: v""rlLtion if! .:pprou~h to r..:onfu::;~ enemy
defen~e~. This ?Oint 1s of conslo.er~b1~ i:nport.i.ince uS e..lmost
<ill .J.t t:...cks agalnst Jllpc:tn hereiofor'J h<.::.u to be olo.rmeti on the
~3.me <::xi. for the bO:Jo rtlll J ,rJrev<,l.iling •• inns cl.t' high alt.itude
ceing generc...ll:,.' from a;7e~t.erly a.irBl:tion ........ tl i::. tiae of the
ye~r. This fact ~u~t h~ve o~~n of as~ist~nc~ to Ja~nese unti-
uircr...:.ft defen.;es. An CVe:11 more imflort::tni:l i:.dVant4ge to be
ootb.ined fro'U vt.rying ti16 C1Xib of attacl~ 1:. the gre/:;,t.er lL.ti-
tuoe in choo~ing u SuitaLl~ IP. Succes~ in r~dar tombing ae-
p~nd~ on ... clearly identifi~ble r~dar IP ~10 offset radar AP.
The axiti of attack should be determined by the locl:ltion of
t.he&e points in relJ.tion to the r4PI. At high b.ltitude, how-
ever, the axis of att~ck cannot be selected at ~ill since it
mu~t approximate the wind direction I and consequently inferior
Ipt s or offset Apls are often selected simply because there are
no other on the predeterrnini3d axis. A further adv.s.~age in
boobing at lo~~r altitudes is the clear definition of signals
on the radar scope. At high altitude the AN/APQ-lj often goes
out of commission completely, or the returns are so ~eak as to
J;!&ke Idellt ificution impossible. Cre"Js partici~ting in the
incen~iary utt~cks ~ommcntea that these were the first mis-
~ion,~ on ":ihich they had beel able to rec:.d the scope a~ clearly
C.ci I... m:..p.

A~ yet ~~ h&~
been i~po8slble to measura quanti~&tively
t.ne ~,!lprovenent in bomLing <i~curacy obtained by lo"sering the
.:....lLit'uc.e. Un~il c.tt.:>.ck.:. using HE bo:nb::;. (.ave been .'!lade at 10'7
~l'tJ.tLlQ~:; ,..uo. t.hB t,o!nb hitd plotted, an:,' co:u 1)<irisons of bOr.Jb-
ing .l:'::':UI':.icy .~r.:: ,Purely theoretical. On theoretical grounds,
.... ~on:..~der&[jl.; im')rovament c...n be expected from the dt::cre.... 6e
~n _1 titua.e. The ~ 11:ni ted e.xp9rience gs.ined on tt"t'3 incendia..ry
c.ttack~ points in the seme d~rection.

In o:::hoo: ing the ~)lanne. l~itudes shown in ~hart belo'.1,

it ··~d" rCCoI_l:ized thht enemY antiaircraft ;';oulJ constitute a

f!,LTITUO€ """#tt"ssz'on
IN
I_F_££_T
__ TO~.Y_O__
NI>._6gYA I OS;~K_A_-,K~~BE_ _
NA-,6RYAn
11
8000 ......... , .. , , .. . ,_ ,. .... '-

,,

7000
{'
73 ; ' ..
..........\~ ....

6000 ......................

31 ,,
"1' . ',:'i-
~ooo . .

'&N05 INPICATE HIGIJEST.f- LOWEST * IN GA(IJ WiNG-.

 Qerious d~nger. Though
medium ~; ~as t~lieved
to be G n~gligible fac-
tor at altitudes ~round
8,OOU feet its effect-
iv~ne~s ~ould increase
~ith th3 10TIering of
altitud~ to clpprox- ALT.
irn~t~ly 5,000 ft.
On the .\"hole,
the .:tltitudes
flo."I1 -:1ould

··········································..··..1
PR06ABIUT{ o~ HITS :
VA~I.S '"V.~SHY WITH:
T~~ CUBE OF TME ;
5\..AIoJ'T" 12AI'4&E. ~

.................................... .:.

E_rr·..ige oc.lloons at. the altitudes pLmncd ':Iere

'..;on'::'J.(;lered, c..nd it..v".:, de:::iood 'th<>.t. t.hey did not const.i-
~u~e h
:,~r~ou~ ri~k. A~ & ~t~zr of fdct, ver~y fe~ b~l­
J.oun~ '1ere :.:.ightcu on ~i:eijC mlBDion,j. Reconnb.issE.nce
.;-:-e·l:; repor1..eci sighting b:rrr.:i.ge b.alloons ut. ultitudes
:Ihi~r: tliey ?btim'-J.ted to be C;.XOund 50UO feet, but in view
of the i"ucr. tnat re:::onnHi:,s....nc~ shipf::i fl;r e:-..t ~round
;l,OUO feet, the l'(;por:t0d Gltitude \"I'.i.S bl.:!lidvQQ (:xce::;sive.
The nor,nG.l ':i::iXimU!:: runge for otlrr&g'1 balloons is esti:nuted
to be 4UUJ feet, ~nd altho~h ~~~ G~rmins are b31i~ved 1.0
have o... llocn;:, ',11th a r~nge of b.::> much 'Ul:> 6000 r~et, such
r,~ng~s ·.mulu hardly be fea:;;iblo in the citrong ';linds en-
countar~d over Japan.

Fro:n the stcmdpoint of enemy .::·ig!-n.. c.... defense the

chL-ng'J in altitude appears to be in~igllificaut. The J!iP-
CJJ1ese hJ.ve ah/<J.ys had aJilple ·vi:l.rning of our attacks, ~nd
in vie,~- of the climbing speed .::..nd maneuven:blliLy of' .r;-
eQ11l' interceptors ~t altitude lit.tlt: protection could be
guinad from fighters by attacking a.t '::5,000 or 30,000 ft.
 3.
A,.other i~lpor"tount deviation [ralil conventional bom~drd­
!:J.ent tactics ',,'[10 the decision to attack individually :Lnstcad
of in forma tion. Once it h<.1d been decided to·t01:lb £l. t 10',:;
<:..ltitude, <ind to schedulE: missions at uight for protection
against flak end fighters, the decision to k.lttack by indi-
vidual pl::..nes was inevitable. Formation flying at night in
th,~ B-29, even ~'!ith [ormation and rwming lights, is not
operationally feasibJe.
Al~ong the adv{.lntages and disadvantages ;'!hieh this deci-
sion presented, an Qut:;;tanding factor "a3 the increase in
bomb load. Chart belou compares the pos~ible load for indi-
vidual and fOrl.l~.tion attacks lind ::;hO;,5 wha.t the effectiveness
of our force, in terms of bomb lOad is increased :mb~tdntial­
ly -'lhen for~(lation fl:r~ .g i5 abandoned.

HIGH ALT. HIGH ALT. LOW ALT. LOW ALT.

FOR.~ip:llON SINGLE A/c FOR~,1A'IION SINGLEAlC
.,
.,5% I 65% 65% 100%
I, MAXUJlUM

Tht:: r.I~tnoj of ind:, <_.lual Cittacks reprebents <::. depar-

ture from th(:; leHd erai1 principle ';,'hich hao beCOl.'J.tl. a ca1'-
uinal fe2.tu~ce of the t1'a1ning in thi5 tn8otcr, as ;-;ell as
of cO,.lbat crew trb.ining in the United States. As pointed
out in Part B of this report, conditions hud. forced us to
r~ly almost entirely on leau crews, in the pa~t the~efore
the poor re3ultp obtained by the average crew augurea bad-
ly for the incendldFJ attacks on ~hich each crew ~as on
its OWIl, a.nd could not cotmt on a lea6er to do the naviga-
tlon and mal~e the bomb run for them. That the results
'!Iere so l:J.Uch better than expected nlc.y be explc:.ined by the
I fact that objectives were located along the coast line Rnd
tile most simple and direct radtlr approaches to the target
areas were selected.

Navig..tion was on the i.'hole r:luch better than it had

been on formation flights. 91% of all aircraft airborne
on the five incendiary ;nissions reached t1J~ primary target,
I
;;'S cOMpared '.'lith 36% on the last five high altitude strikes,
and as ~ompared "ith the average of 44% fo~ all missions
prior "to th~ incendiar;~r ph[tse. In purt, thi:3 :;<::.5 due to the
b.lJ~en;.;e of 3trong ··Tind~, to better .i...oran anu rudcir reception·
hnd to toe pCGsibility of getting celestial fixes. These
r....dvomt.:..get> of 10';'1 J.-dv01 night l)pen: tion contributed to the
,

I
 S E'C

improvelG.enr. in naviga.tion, tiS old the fact. that on the pra-

viout> high l • .l titude miosion::, formation::. g8n~r8.l1y brolw up
after' lc...nd's end G.nc1 negotHl.ted the re"(,urn journ0y indivi-
d~ll), often at night, thus acq iring 0xperi~nca in nevi-
g_t..iOI1 ::i.e. night. Also clo1ntl'ibut.ing to th<:: increl:l.sec1 peI'-
cem......ge of t.ircraft ci.i~borne reaching the IJrimury target 'das
the reduced number of <.tbort::; due to meL:hanic.:..l ,nulfunctions.
Sut none of ~h~se fa~tor& fully ~xplnin5 the surprisingly
gooo re~ul t 0n tne incendiary .strilCas.

further irive::.tigCl.tiol1 may well prove that the .::.veri.ige

c,re'" is mora efficient i..' hcn al1o·:.'ca. initiatIve and made
res~onsible for sllcpess or fdilure, than if following u
leader. Tlii~ i'<oula 'be in keeplng ','lith our n<ol.tional psy-
cholugy. It hud often been noted that ,:ing c!'.:ms were in-
<;;.1- tenti ve at bri,~fings .:l.nd did not .show L1J.uch concern for
the (mcces::; of a mh.:sion ',;h1..:h they f~l t they could affect
very little. The remedy 1n the pust has been 'to \.mlist
ere':, interest ana purtieipation by giving aD mar\)' of tham
as possible lead ere?: tr'aining. Individual att<:>.cks seem
to hHve a~coraplished the :J<:tme r~sul t .~Ol'e effectively.

,The p':::l'foIT:l<Jnce of ,{:tng crews on formation attacks

brougnt out anotl~r factor ~hich points in the same di-
rection . . V{h~n formatiQns '.>;ere f"reed to penetrate a
front on the route to Japnn, the planas '.'18re often dis-
persed end forced to continuc; the flight individually. On
su~h occasions m.vigation by inJiv::,ulh.<.l plcmes 'Nh5 gener-
1.11y poor. The concl m>ion s,Jems inevitable th6. t many
',ling ship m:.vigutors, in spite of strict inst.ructions and
careful bl'i~ring, neglected. to keel' trC>.cJ~ of the routE;:
..nd in:..teiid relied. on th;;;: 1Gi?d navig""tor, {lith the result
th..:;.t they could not. ~i,.:;{ up rrhery they .:era ..:uodenly thrO'.'ffi
on tbeil' OTn. Simil-:irJ.;., bOl:lbine perfoI'J.w.nea ',.hen L.iad
pi.""nes aborted or ~'rh~n ding bOl!lbardier~ ','IeI'd forced to
ho'nh indivi'll.l.d.lly, ·,/:;:'S far ~Jelo?1 tht;; standard ".bleh thE:ir
ganerr..l proficiency \i'ould. huve indicated.

Though indiv.ldue.l night ~ttacks 3rt:: a spur to res-

pon~ible and competeu~ crew~ they also provide conceal-
ment for tho::.e ';1[.0:::8 ::io1c concern is to return to be:..se
1:..5 qUickly as' possU,le. i\ number of crews took advan-
tage of thiG f...let b~" turning off '7611 before reaching
the target and "jithout having !nade <.. proper bomb run
over it. ~vidence of this can be 508n in the great
nunber of 1!shorts\t -- and c..l'J~o::;t no Hovers 1t -- sho';m
in the target aSSessment photographs of the Nagoya. ana
TGk~ro strikes on the foll.,ing page.

19
 •
~

TOKYO

On the tokyo attack

the shorts paradoxi-
cally contributed to
the l00d result hy
hitting tho dock
area which had not.
been part of t.Ile •
I' ~ p
briel"eel target area 0
,
bJ:t can'ta1ned many .'
'f1ta.J. instelhtions.
un aagoya attack,
the
" ""•., 0
•
noweftr, t.be Shorts ' \, ~
"

-.....t-
were scattered over
a Wide area and could J ~
..
1-
•• .. ,,
be extinguished ba-
rare doing much dam.- Q1a •
age. Ul ail proha-
bi11~ many erews •
, . .#' .. ' Q

aropped tneir pay

loadS into toe .a~r8
I aJ
<J.. 4j
~
t a..
•
•
or tlagaya Jj8J". . , •
l' •
-

... .!~.. .
.
.-:.
. . -,
.
..
',a)_
. ~ .. . '
. ."
. .
20
 Thi~ suggests the
for a careful unalysis of n~ed
indlvlau~l crd~ performuncp.. In the case of incendi&ry
night ~isslons this e~ be done only oy an~ly~ing SCOye
photo~ tiud n~viga1jorsI logs. The ";'d.ngs themselves sug-
gested t.hu. t this ana~· sis be .~de by their staffs ....no the
rcsul'ts turneci over to the co~d for conso1:J.dution r;:nd
study. steps have been taken to expedite the shi~adnt
of much needed scope cameras to peroit installc.lt10ns in
every p] ane.

Another disadvantcge of tee individual attack

m~thod, and one more difficult to correct, i3 the fact
that proper concentration in time and ~pa~e over the t~r­
get is extremely difficult to achieve when cireruft operate
indi vidue.lly.

Jl.S !:lentioned earlier, individual uttr..cks Elre

nece~cary in-night operation::., regardless of the advc:.ntRges
or ai;:,advc.nt&ges of this lllethed. But, thc;)o" hc.:..ve also brought
ho:tJ la::.sons 7hich ,till bo:) com;idered in future mcdific.:..-
~~on~ of our Lacties. Though it m~y not prove oe~irable
to aL\'d':l\. b-;>' indiv~dU<.. ,.ircraft, ex~apt on. nig:lt raission::;,
h. m...y be: 7l::?11 'LO give wor.:: ancourageillCnt to indivlC.u:..l
inil.i~L~ve ~rrd re50urcef~ne~~ l::?v~n en form~tion att~eks.
rai~ could be done by senuing ~~~l~r fcrees ug~in~l. pin-
~int targets -- ~ sir~le ~ing, or I~r1j of U 3ing, aepend-
ing on th~ tonnu.ge nccessu.r)' to ae::;t.re:>' the te.rget -- and
r£::.~rving muximu;j effort str~Kes b,}' tnt::: mcle bonber com-
m.end for ineenci~ry d'tt....cks aguinst large urbun l.l.reas.
~ 010 YOU /-Ill ~

fC~~~ T~~A~~~ tJ:

~
., ,-". "'. ~ Ii\\ \'!r-.-d!"" _-1'.\.?' 4'M~' \} ,
.
'-t..
%
. , /);
r~ • / 1.:.,
'~-
~,-;'
=" '1 ""\'-.
~\\,._ . '--c,-. ~',; ...../.7 ,;. /"~
f~~
i _\;,.
~fJ..!
" .,,',; "l}-v......
"",'A~""" •
~
A~ ~'" ' . , t ~ ..:":'i~:-.;" ;.',.,r - ,
..~.,.-.:::r

, ,Ii • ~,' '" ~ 1f~i~\ ~ ,~fa

~i"
, . . . '-;";:: ~ f?:;'!.~;;· :~~:
~~ J'.,\: .. ~_ .~ /y,. .. . -'l>~!:.~';" ·.·f· .1.'
l..f(:;{f,,~';'-.ij.~·';f::,:':;'::~ . ;},~f~~'...i;.. ··, "'.t,,-,>-
J"!;.~;.., ? .• :'.l/'::.:.. . .~.~...:., , . . . ;..::,.. ~.O:::.,'f· ~ ,
.~J~::
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.
.,'·,·~'F:-r~tl{;~~~.~~{i~:~·. ~~~·~}~~, ,..
In those smaller utt:lcks in './hieh the single sqw..dron
.;cilld be 'tha tactic...l unit, greeter flcxibilit,y ··;ould
be provided, ere "is could mo.k~ several pasz~::. a.t the
t~rge~, ~nd the individual cre~ members wcula ia~nt,ify
theJ~elves far ~ore with the ~uccass or f~~lur~ at tne
mi:=".:>ion.

Af ~ outgroNtr c r the experi~nce guthcred on

....jlc incom.~~~ry (,;,ttacktl ... ..;..;.rl;ful s'tuciy ;'11.11 ('.J mnda of
thc<.e ne'· to.Cl.iCal pc~sitEitics ...nO the diffErent
ttleori~., ~il1 be tc5Led ,m actu<:Ll COJlO1.J.t.
 4. BO:,IDING PRODLEMS AUD RESULTS

The bombing resu1t~ in terms of target dreu de~troyed,

as 3ho~n on p~ge 3~, i1lustrcte the ext~nt to 'mich results
v<:irieC1 on the five incClndiary mis:..iom:. (m the Tokyo attack
15.8 square Iniles '",ere burned out, ~s cot1par,ed ·.vith only
,~.05 square milp.s on 'the first Nage."ya attd.ci~. On both ois-
sions ':'PiJroxirnatel~.. the .:.,(~me for"::8, the ::3a~e bomb lo<...d ::..nd
the sa@G type .01' Domb 1ere used. In ~TI effoTt to explain
l.f.L a.i<:.crept:.nc)' a careful uncl.l:r:>is of the fiv{~ atta-cks 'las
l1k.de) ,,'lith speei&l e!J1[.lha~i::;; on (;8r1:.1:I.in f~.0tor;; ;'Ihich ,Jere
l:..2lieved t,o I)C I!k..inly responsible f'or the: SUCC.J::'S or failure
of the ....ttacks. The~c !\.. ct.orb c:re listc.:d below, though not
nace~s<lrlly in the orucr of tlleir l.'!l;?ortcJ,nce:

;. c... P<.1.tterr: Density (The distributlon uf'tombs from

a single ~ircr~ft)
b. Area Den~ity (The distribution of ln~ividu~l
bomb pattern;" over the tClrgot drea)
c. Ty~e of Bomb
Q. Concentration (Nurnbe::- of <...il'craft b::.Hnbing the
targelo in b. given tLn>-.l)
e. Surface Wind
f. Precipittit ion (R.:J.in or :mow fa.lling en the tdr-
• get either in the 48 hours.
o preceding or shortly after the
• attack)

.............................., ,.- .

Since ull th..:se ib.ctors <ire interrela·tei t.hcir relative

~oniribution to ~,e fin~l result i£ diff~cult to isolat~. In
t.his ocction of thG l'f:port cnly t.he Huin point::> '.lill be dis-
CUi.>~ed, but furthe!' det&ils c::.n bo founa ii.1 a to~hnical study
 S Eo eRE T

on this subject issued by the Operations Analysis Section,

XXI Bomber Com.'Tl~ndJ whi:h (IUS served as source material for
the following aiscussion.

a. Pattern Density ------~

-~

) G'AOIIt'LlIST€"K EXPLODES
AT 2500 rT.
REl.€4.f//liG
38 M"64J /NeE",·801l.18S'
Wf.JJCf..! FALl IN ,.4'
RAIVtJ/}M PATTe-eN.

Ri:SVI riNG r,tJ,TTERN

OF ONE >tICf( Ak IA/ITJ.{
AN INT£RMlOM,fTER ::€r-
TI.+'6 01= So Fl: COVGRS
~~~~_. 020 SQ. ""'LE'S.
- - . - - -......._ _~ ",4'

~- /"'~-.....
gener~l confl~gration before the fire fignters have had
time to put them out. The bomos of a ~ingle ship, whether
it carries 10-, 15- or 20,000 lbs, must ~roduce a single fire
covering an area corresponding to the bomb load. With a full
bomb load of 17,000 l'os of M--69 bombs, the area burned. out by
a single ship should be around 16 c;.cres. Using tne M--69 bomb,
a density of .3 tons p<::_' ucre, yielding an estima;ted 7Cf1, dam-
age is con~idered ideal. Although this was the p&tteI~ den-
sity, and the type of bomb used on both the Tokyo and Osaka.
attacks, the latter ~&5 not nearly as 5~cessful as the former.
This result ~ee~G to bear out the theoretical assumption ~hQt
"lith t.be M--69 bomb a pattern densit;y of .3 tons per acre is a
prerequisiti -- but not a gUhrantee -- of success.

Pat~ern density i~ controlled by the intervalometer

:Jett.ing. On the Tokyo attaCK the interve.lometer Nas set for
50 feet on the ground. After hearing the stories of returning
cre 75, the liU i )rassion gained ground that bombs had been wasted
b~ droJping too close together. This ~as erroneously ascribed
to excessive ~attern density, partly because our limited ex-
perience with in-::endiaries ,'las responsible for some .::onfusion
reg~lrciing the relative effect of pattern density and area C1t!n-
sit.y, pd.rtly becel. use e'Tid~nce in the form of dam1ig~ assessment
photos ·.. ;::..5 not aveilub.. . ..: in time. As 0. result the intervalo-
• raeter setting ,','Elt, ch<lngeo for the next attack (Nagoya I) from
5U to lOG feet, thus h~.lving the pattern density. The unsat-
isfactory resUlt of·the first N«goya ~ission, along with other
evidence, proved that the puttern den~ity should not have been
de.:.:redsed, bnd for t.he ~u(;ceeding mission:;; 'the int ervalo::lOtel'
"7..... 5 :.gZli.,n ~et. for 50 f.:.et, yielding .... pattern density of .J
ton~ per d~re :ith tae ~-69, ond .45 ~ons ~ith t.he ~-5U bombs.

b. Ared Densitr
n~ m~ntionec before, pattern density controls the
~preud of fire fro~ the bo~bs of only a single ship_ To
~~~ura destruction of the target these ~tterns must be spread
even~y over the entire ~r~u, thus permitting the individual

f~res vturt~Q by e~ch.eh~p to merge into a general confl~gra­

tlon. Ho'.Y tv <1CCOmpllsh such coverage I'!hen C1ttucks are made
tr.l indiviciuf:l.l uircruft. is CoL tactical problem ~vhich haS not
.yet. bven fully solved.
 An attempted method of solving it was to divide the
t<irge1. . . . rea into three ,-',:," four parts I ,vitil <ill aiming point
in each, ~nd to assign a dng or part of' Cl. 'l1ing to each MPI.
Tho points chosen as AP's \~re cl~arly id~ntifiable features
preferably ~t the intersections of artificial or nntural fire
breaks so as to start siI:1ul'tc:.neous fires in several fire divi-
~ions. The AP's were 4,000 to 6,000 feet apart, on the theory
that approxL'Ylately 50% of the bombs from each wing tlOul,d fall
within So ~,000-feet circle dttawn around the AP, and that the
misse~ scattered outside these circles would overlap those from
~djaccnt AP's ~hich ~ould giva & uniform bomb density through-
out the target area thus producing a general conflatration.

This theory seems to have proved fund~entally sound,

although its effectiveness was marred by faulty execution. At
first the staff was concerned since it "las felt that the me~hod
desctibed might result in overbombing of some portions of the
areas and underbombing 0f others, unless proper dispersion were
as~ured b.Y visual corre~~ion. Eefore the To~'o attack bombar-
diers -ere briefed to makcl ~ lomb run using an offset AP but
to make vis~l adju5tments so as to distribute the Dombs around
~he MPI'~. The bulk of the cre~s attucking Tokyo found the
t~rgeL cloud-free and con~equently the ltiter &rrivals ~ho
ob...erved :n",ny firee i.l.lre6.dy burnl.ng in the (irea did not Hli::.ke
controlled bOlilO runs m.ing the AP but t.rieci t.o hit we 11black
c.re..." .; ere fire:) had not yet Deen start~d.

The success of that attack !;l.gain obscured the fact

1.hu.t. ::.ome of the features of the J:lis~ion plan hud been urong,
....no th...t. U,e good. resu.~·t ~ad been obt.ained in 3lJite of, and
not. ~c~use of t.hem. These fund~ent.ally unsound principles
:;ere t.h~refore ret~in~ci in the Nagoy"" attack ...nd addit.ional
e"~rors .rere committed. It Nill be rememC'ered that 'the Nagoya
\
~tt~ck ~cts m~de in two ~aves, the first ~ave con3isting of the
)ljth <ind 314th Wings, <ind the second of the '73rd i'Jing. On this
mission ~ha bomburdier~ Nere explicitly instructed to place
thair bombs visually in the vicinity of the AP's so as to cover
the entire turget r:.rea. As a result of t.h.is beiefing, and of
the fc::.ct th6.t the attdck was split into two pru..:::.es, only a small
number of ..ere"vs in the first \'/ave made a cont.rolled bomb run
over thE'! aiming point, while the majoritJ-' attempted to scatter
their bombs visuully over the area. It is believed that the
coaplete disregard for the preacribed aiDing points ~as a cri-
tical factor in Lccounting for the failure 3hich is illustrated
in the target photo on the folloaing page.

P.CRET
•v

-, •
'. .
.
•
,•"

"\ ~ KEY
<::::') OE:STROYEO-~ GOYA CIT
flIIJ OlD ~GE £l44IoIIGE •ASSESSMEN

;.
X
(()(Xl)
00
FIRES StAFlTEtl
TARGET NUoW8ERS
AHftOlIoTlON NUMBf"
RE'J:T ~':'
CCWIDENTIAL
FIGURE 4
 TM tb1z<l atr1lta (O..kaj . . . . .cheduled before the
t1Dal results or the prerlouB mission were av&1lable, but

&!ter ."Uicie"t nide"ce bod bee" provided by ob.e.....er. to rai.e

doubte reprding the tactic• •mploy.d. All attempt was th.refore
l18de to reproduce the eondltiona which had prevailed on the
Tokyo ~tr1ke. erewa were warned to concentrate their bombs in
the target area, but no specific method for assuring this Was
prescribed. The general idea prevalent among the swr was 8tlll
that of .preading tha bomb. ov.r the targ.t &rea vi.ually,
through what 10 ••••"tially a bit and iii•• method, and to
confine the co"trolled boab run over the targ.t to the fir.t
• tew crews who aerYed, in effect, &s a marker force. l'he damage
&aS888M1lt photo shows that the QaBka raid was successf'ul. In
the laat anal7.ia it i. believed that .eather was one of the
 . - . ---
. . .
:J.l~'~~:~;~"
. '.' ..:'
.: ....
~ '

controllin& factors. This target was hidden by a low deck of

cloudS' which averaged 8/10 coverage. Visual "DOIDblng was moetly
1II.posslble. Crews were rorced by weather conditions to release
on ~adar after performini a controlled run using the offset aiming
point. Osaka 181, therefore, the first example of bad weather
being uaed to good advantage.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT REPORT NO 23

~IolAGL1!t KOllE CITY
~.
1IO~ _ STI'l"I([ a: 4 q;B "945

F160R£ 6
."
Not until the fourth mission (Kobe) was it realized
that visual distribution methods, which are 1n fundamental
contradiction to the principles behind the selection of aiming
points, were largely responsible for the failures of previous
attacks. It is no'W recognized that all bombardiers must make
a controlled bomb run over the AP in order to produce the
required concentration and the planned dispersion of bombs.
Accordingly, .11 bombardiers on ~he Kobe mission were instruc-
ted to make a controllp.d radar bomb run over the target before
making visual corrections, and to apply such corrections only
to their sightIng on the AP, and not for the purpose of
spreading the bombs visually. The results of the Kobe mission
were inconclusive. The extent of damage accomplished, if ex-
pressed as a percentage of the target area attacked, was satis-
factory, but in terms ot· 'tJl6 tons or ineendtaries carried the
area destroyed was disappointing. The Kobe raid illustrates
the point that the geographical shape of the target ares is often
as important as the size in determining the posi tiOD of the AP' s.
The axis of attEck was selected in deference tc two considera-
tions, first, that the errors in deflection would exceed the
errors in range wbere the OAP was relatively close to MPI's and
second, that the most satisfsctory IP and OAP dictated an approach
tram the south. Again execution rather than plan contributed
to the failure to achieve complete success. The isolated fires
to the southeast and northwest of the APts testify to the
deviation from plan probably caused by navigation errors in
SOllIe cases and reluctance to penetrate thermals in other cases •

. _-
.... -----,--~ ........
 In future incendiaIJr oper::..tions t.he uxis of attack
ctnc.i th~ OAP ':lUl be selected "1;.0 prof::" t lJ;}" the lessons le&rn~d
on Lhes€; ut'ta:::k~. It hes been proved thtlt "he uispersion of
comb~ "round t.he APls i3 not ... r~nuom distrlllur.ion, and t.hcit
'tha oi~s depends u~on ~a~- v~riaole6. Of t.hese the mo~t
i~por~ant &~y: t.ha di~tance from t.he OAP t.o 'the MPI, the
rela'tion~hip bet "/een the direction of the "dna .:lnd the axis
of <1.t.t.dck, Lhe time over the te.rget <.md the prospect of
thermal~. TLe reluct£:.ncd of cre'v~ to penetrate therml:l.l~ and
~noke i~ established. Everf effort. is ffi&de in 'the plhnr.ing
to oovidte this necessity. When the b~~s is in range, it is
almo::.t inv<..riC1bly on tho lI~hortn side. ~nen 'the bias i::; de-
flection it frequently developes th\t the course bet,reen IP,
OAP and tAPI was difficult froi:! a nb.vigation stt..:.nopoint.,

Another factor to be given c4reful study in future

!U.i::.sions of this type i~ the size of the target. tlro;u. In
order ~o achieve proper arda cen~ity, the t~rget urea should
be computed by multiplying tho pa~tern censitl expected fro~
a single ship (16 acre:::i if the M-69 bomb l:.o.na .:.. full bomb loal.!
of 17,000 pO\.U1ds peL' ship is used) by the number of aircraft
eXpdcted to reach the primary t~rget, less an appropriate
safety fecter, and adjustment for varying to~b loads. The
numc..cr of AP I s to' be'isel~ctedr\1'it.B±n~ this are&. ~':ill depE:nd
on t.he siz~ of the force. The principles governing the loca-
tion of AP's ~ithin ~he targat area nave alr~&dy been mentioned.

A t:erious difficul ty in trying to I;..nal;)'"ze the probler.l

of ~rea den5ity as illuLtruted by the five missions i~ the lack
of eviden.:e regi1.rding t.he nU::lLer of pl<1ne~ ',rhiell actually drop-
~j :rleir bo~b5 in 'the target tlrea. As :nom.ioned before, st~ps
h~v; oeen t~k~n r.o provide ::.~ope c~meras and to &~sure careful
~nu.lysi::, OJ' t.he ling ,;t...ffs of individuul ere'", performance on
fULure ~ttaC~5. Un~il tkus l~ done 0ur conclusien~ must remain
Lent,_tive .;ince 'Ie h..... ve no reli,;.bl~ eVid~nce on t~ bomb ton-
n. g~ ,'hi.::n c_us~d the de.st!'uction sho.-m in Lhe tl:.rget pho'to::.;.

:::. 'Ii" pe of BOib

BuE..cci on re.sulL5 as ';ell as 'theory (See Report ".14,

O.f\.S" XXI Bomber Cu!!lm....nci), the M-69 seeTll~ the In.Ol:>"'C efficient
bomb \.0 W,H) for in~CnC1ill.l.~.r d1 tacks ug... inst urban ure~5. The
M-50, thougn slightly le~~ efrec~ive th~n the M-69, can uchicve
comj.N.r".tole dac,-:ge ~ince its better 10C1d. c~rrying ct~aru.cteris­
tic::; permit a grbatcr !~Ltern dens~ty to be pl~ced on the tar-
gel. 1Jy the ;,ame force. Theoretic~l)yJ 1,he r,~-47 i::, f>Ol.r less
e!fective th:..n Gcither dna its load c~rI'ying characteristics,
tnough better than those of the M-69 ure inferior to t.he M-S0.
Ho,1ever, no eonclu:.i·..a evidence i::. ~.v6.ilablc regC1raing the
effectivcne35 of th~ M-47 ;;hen used preaoiilin:J.tely. Thi;:;; cue5-
tieD ~a~~ot be ans~ered until furt. er experience i::. at ha~d.

<9
 ,

d. Concentration
A successful incendiary attack not only requires
concentration in space over the tsrget (pattern density aDd
area deusltJ), but al80 concentration in time. 'rhe importance
ot this latter factor was mentioned earlier in this report.
AS pointed out, concentration on the successful TOkyo raid was
left to chance. In planning for the Nagoye mission a tactical
experiment was attempted which did not succeed but brought
ho.e a valuable lesson. By splitting the force into two parts
and scheduling them over the target 80 as to provide a lull
• prior to arrival of the second torce, the tire fighters were
able to deal .ith each of the two attacke: separately and con-
sequently could bring the fires under control more easily.
1 he failure of th18 mission helped to emphasize the Deed tor
0

greater concentration and tor & corresponding change in tactic'

on future att.a.cks.
e. Surface Wind

Ground wind at the target seems to be of considerable

iaportance in assuring the success of an incendiary strike.
In the TOkyO attack, the only one where a strong surface wind
was encountered, the spread of fire was materially assisted by

the wind. Tbis tsrget photo shows clearly the spread of fire
be70nd the target area in the direction of the wind. It is
likely tbet without a helping wind the damaged area may well
have been a third les8. £Yen in subsequent attacks where only
l1cbt or no w1.Dds were present, the spread of fire beyond the
target area was always observed to be in the direction of the
wind.
 Aside from increasing the area of d~muge, a strong
surface wind helps to speed up the ~erging of fires into a
general conflagration and thbs to saturate fire-fighting
equipment.

In spite of clear evidence that the wind was an im-

?ortant factor in the ;uccess of the Tokyo attack it is dif-
ficult to determine whether similar success could be obtained
in the future without n surface wind. other factors, such as
pattern density, area density, concentration in time and space
could probabl~' produce s.n equally gooe result, but s:.lrface
wind can be relied upon to compensate for insufficient concen-
tration or uneven cover~ge of the area. Whenever possible, it
seems desirable to 91an incendiary missions so as to get the
benefit of surface winds.

f. Precipitation.
In the early stages c; pla~ning the incendiary attacks
it VIas believed that rain or sno\" occuring prior to, or shortly
after, an attack would interfere with the success of the mission.'
These fears ~ere not borne out. Consideretle rain or snow had
occurred l8 hours before the Tokyo attack and must have im-
pregnated the roofs with moisture. Nevertheless, the fires took
hold and spreed rapidly. On the first Nagoya attack no precip-
itation had taken place for ~0Ur days and the city had had an
extensive c~y spell. Never~neless the restllt was extremely
disappointing.

Again, the Osake attack r.hich, next to Tokyo, was the

~ost s~ccessful of the five incendiary missions, was followed
approximately 12 hours later ty precipitatiml, ~ithout substan-
tial ~ffect on the fires ~lready started th~re.

Contrary to expectation, the evidence seems to indi-

cate that normal rain or snow, either prior to or after an
incendiary at~ack, has no appreciable effect on its s~ccess.
 Bombing results on the five missions are compared in
Chart below which also shows ftve of the six factors which
are beli6ved to have a direct bearing on that result. The
sixth, area density, is one of the most importcnt but cannot
be expressed num~ricclly in the absence of information as to
where each Cr6TI dropped its bombs. A glance at the chart
suggests that no single factor can be identified as the one
ele~ent responsil1c for success or failure of sn incendiary
attack. All contri~ute to it in varying defreesj th~y are .
mutuall)' sup~orting and, to 8. certe.in extent, one can be sub-
stituted for the other. In en ideal mission they would all
be represp.nted, but an attack neeo not fail for lack of a sur-
•• face wind if that lack is compensated for by higher concen-
tration in time and space. Conversely, a strong surface wind
would compem:ate for a lov!er concentration, provided that :::uc.:h
concentration does not fall below e certain point. Future
incendiary attecks must be pla~ned with due regard for ~ll
these fectors: The right type of bomb, proper concentration
in time end space and, if possible, surface winds.

~ TARGET AREA CAlCUIATEO TO 8£ OAMAGEO.

o TAR&ET AREA ACTiJAUY OAMAGED.

TOKYO NAGOYA OIAKA KOBE #AGoYA

/0,000 ..... - --. ..I
- - - ,
]I
.

8,000

6,000

4,000 ,..

2.,000

PATri'./i?I>i[JEflSITY 7;i.4 0.29 0.145 0.29 0.45 0.40

Ajc 80M131NG -;( IIRS Z28 /54 /90 306 258
TYPE OF 80MB M· 69 M-69 M·69 M· 50 M-47
5t!R~A(E WINOS {TRONG t/611T NIL i IGHT LtGi-IT
PRE CfPI TA TION IIEAVV NONE SaG-liT HEAVY NONE'

32
 The ann lysis of yielded valuable
lessons for future incendi&ry operations. \hut may prove more
i~portant still, it has sug€~sted certain t~ctics which can be
applied against pinpoint precision targets.

On all five oissions a number of selected cre.s ~ere used

es a pathfinder force, to mark the tar(et. On the Tokyo st£ike
the first squadrQn in each nin b was provided with M-47 in~en~
diary clusters, with instantaneous nose fuze, for the purpose
of illuminating the AP. In subsequent attacks six to nine
Pathfinder crews in each wing, elsa with M-47 ~ombs*, were
dispatched t~enty minutes uhe~d of the, main force to light up
the target. In the first ~ tree missions this marking of ~he •
target was thought of chiefly as a means of orientation for
, the crews following, to make sure that their bombs would
drop in the turget area. As the necessity of a controlled
bomb run over the AP by all crews gained ground, bombardiers
were instructed to use the fires laid by the marker force for
appl)~ng visu~l corrections to their radar bomb run. As a
corollary to that decision one ~ircraft was detailed to circle
the target area during the attack, to observe the targp.t
marking by the pathfinder force fmd to trb,nsmit over the VHF
channel instr~ctions to the main force reg&rding corrections
to be made on their bomb run. The idea. of using a "master of
ccremonies ll - - pnttc.rned 0 •• t,le master bomber used by the
RAF in connection with target marking -- was tried out in this
theater for the first time on the Osak~ strike. In order to
be most effective, the master bomber must be aele to direct
last minute changes in the attack.

These tentative experiments on the last three missions

suggested a ne~ ~ethod for attacking pinpoint targets at night
from lo~ altitudes. By illuminating the target \lith flares
and marking the AP with marker ~~unition or, failing that,
~ith incendiaries, e prccisio~ attack could be delivered ~ith
HE bombs under visual conditions, or at least with sufficient
visibility to permit corrections to the radar bomb run. Since
none of our high priority targets requires a force as large as
that employed on the incendiary attacks, great~r flexibility
could be provided end a naster bomber or mission commander could
direct the attack on the S"'it. This possibility vIas considered
sufficiently promising to plan a series of operations employing
target illumination methods for HE pinpoint attacks. The results
of these experiments v'ill be ant::lyzed in the next Phase Renort
and will be given a treatment similar to the incendiary oper-
ations covered in the present Report.

* When the supply of T-19 cluster adapters for M-L7 bombs was
exheusted, M-76 incendiary bombs h~d to be substituted.

& .' .' •

,.' ~.","'. 0; •
'... ,~,:, .. ~;;f
, . -. ,,~ 'r'f·
, .0:';> :.: .r
33
 5. ENEMY DEFENSES

e.. Antiaircrr ft

The effectiveness of any bombardment strike depends on

the ratio of d3m~ge inflicted to damage suffered. The success
of the Tokyo mission, no matter how great, might not h&ve
justified continuing this type of attack if (,. sizeable pElrt
of our force had been lost. Fortunctely this ~as not thE:: case,
since the only effective defense which the cnel~ could offer --
flak -- proved ~eak.

~~ring this phase of

TNAC E' 91/1<.'/.0I/r
10000' '
,f;Jj'-'
-
PT
.
operations Lltitudes from
· I 5,000 to 9,000 feet '"erc pre-
: I .
, I : scribed. This decision ~as
9'·EFFECTIVE .J -: rFached after evaluatinf
~ RA N~E ,J!Jr8P ~ severol conflicting consider-
8:~~""t/
,/
. ations. It ~as r~cogniz6d
that the 25 mm is the onlJ
7 .. " .. "1'" . "" ", . Japonese uutomatic wGa~on
which is effective up to
6 ... 1< '" . . ..... ; 7,500 and 8,000 feet. It is
also kno~n that Jap he&vy
5, :~l::' /..~ ~~~~~~.~;l AA is most effective. from
5,000 to 10,000 feet. But
.---'-'-1 ;EIlHc.:
1
· 7 1 Ja;> Army radar gun laying
4, .., (){/N ' equipment had proved to be
· . _.r--.-- ! inferior. In addition, by

')~ ~:D~~.~
proper concentration of air-
craft over the target area
the rcd~r controls (inadequate
at best) could probnhly be
rendered useless. Thus it TIns
concluded th~t Jap AA, both
,! J,.( (6R~Pillc )

/0,000 '
mEdium bnd heLvy,
would be deoendent
upon S/L. Th~refore
it follows thtt, for
,,000' / / ----/
night r~i S~. saturu- I
tion of e~emy defen~es t'
"\,' ,
,,
i~ actually s~turation
of ~nemy secrchlir,hts.
The altitude bracket
from 5,000 to 9,000
\
,,
,
-- ,
,,
-- --
THE:. J.OWEfl 7HE. At f,n,oE., THE L()IIIr:,EIZ AM
A/IlCPAFT /$ WITH/iii RA"'frE •
•
feet promised maximum hombing accuracy and ~lso exploited the
advantages of ~eather and tactical surprise. The first raid
over Tokyo proved that the Japs were unprep&red for us at this
altitude and it was decided to contin.e et the s~me &ltitude
Q~til further developments dictated a change. Actually, the
losses were so low that a cl:. nge seemd inadvisable. In previous
high altitude missions against the Japr.ncse mainland, using a
totel of 1712 sorties as a s&mple, loss end dUm&pe due to
flak Dmounted to ll.L%. For the Tokyo mission the percentage
of aircraft lost or damaged was estimated at 15.2,%, at NaGoya
6.95%, at Osaka 6.8% and at Kobe 3.6%. As usual most of tbe
flak damage was mi~or, except for the TOKJ-o mission, where there
is ~~ incication that the 105s to damage ratio wes greeter
than in previous high eltit~de attacks. Many faqtors con-
tributed to the unsuccessful Jap defense against the lo~
altitude night missions. The most importcnt are weather, smoke
end saturation of AA defense~. It has already been shovm
that, for all intents rnd pc.rposes, the eneuor flas dependent
upon visual tracking. The undercast oondition, which prevailed
to £ome extent on all the missions except Nagoya I, proved
highly beneficial to the attE:cking force. The same \n.s true
of sr.!oke. Both vleather and smoke acted in conjunction ':lith
the variation in altitude and course to render enemy flak in-
effective.

The importance of enemy searchlights in directing anti-

aircraft guns TIes agreed upon by &11 crews. It w~s further
suggested that offensive action should Le taken aglinst se~rch­
lights. At an ~ltitude of around 5,000 feet the crews felt
confident of being able to shoot out searchllghts. Partly for
that reason, amm~nition was carried in some of the turrets on
the later attacks. Several crews reported secrchlights being
turned off after they were attack6d by our ships even if no
hits ~'Tere observed. In fu . . Te missions of this type vnrious
methods of passive defense ~il1 be prescribed. As ~ eounter-
merSlrre against r~dar-controlled lighte, rope will be dropped.
Aguinst sonic-controlled 5earchlights, de synchronization of
engines will be employed. Coordinated fighter sweeps against
urban areas will assist in disorg&nizing the enemy defenses
although actually destruction of S/L and AA cmplace~ents is
not expected. The use of the new jet black camcuflage paint
will add to the enemy's difficulties.

The fpct that enemy antiaircraft depends on visual con-

ditiQns even more than the bombers suggests the possibility
of turning the bad weather ov~r Japan into en advantage for
the attbck. By scheduling missions on days when there is &
low overcast enemy flak would be I'ender6d ineffective, ~hereas
bombing could b~done through the overcest, by radsI'. In the
csse of incendiary attacks ageinst urban areas this method
s~ems particularly promising. As shown in Section L of this
r~~ort, urbsn attacks are made by concentrating on three or

, -
. .t. . r· ' . •
, . ~ .. ' ~:·"!4 :-.• f; ~ ',:
.' ......
:. ··.'"7;,~,·"Jr·· ~ ,•. ,:~1.
'-~.
four aiming points, and trusting to the ra:1dom dispersion of
bombs to cover the area surrounding the aiming point. These
points can be located b;y radar, by using a radar off':.>et AP
and bombing with the back slant-range method or through
stopwatch timing. This method would be equally effective,
on daylight attacks through an overcast, and would have the
additional advantage of permitting .('ormation bombing 5..1' the
greeter accw'scy and protection against enemy fighters r.lade
possible by formation fl;ying is found to outv'eigh the dis-
advantage of a reduc~d bomb land.
In studying the flak damage suffered on these missions it
becomes clear that no definite trend can be established.
The strength of enemy antiaircraft defense is not uniformly
deployed at the different targets, and h~s not been shifted
to accomplish better distribution, even wh(~re the need for
such shiftR is obvious. ~ithout Bny other evidence, it can
only be expected that the overall efficiency of enemy flak
defense against low level rii~1t attacks will improve as it
becomes adjusted to our tactics. Frequent changes in our
t~ctics and the avoidance.of any sterotyped method of attack
are therefore indicated.
So far our bombers have never been a1le to rely on hitting ,
any t&rget by s~rprise. On the incendiary raids the cities
were found well blacked out and there wes every evidence
that the enemy had hsd ample \'iarning of our <,ttack. The
only surprise we cun count on is in the mGthod uf atteck.

~.'1
' t\'')'-_~''';;<''·
~
1.....
-
'>, ••
~".t',
t.~ : ~.,\v.".
,f--I>!}"

-~ ...-- ,~,~-
.. ~' ,J",rd1<qijf
I.;•. r...·
. I' '0 ~ ~"'. ,
~, ,. 0
,.. \\\'
, in" ~ , fL;.'
. ~:;'!. '! ~~
b. Enemy Fighters .....~---: ~ ·~1~f!".\.: ~
.,r,. . \'.
-??...;b....'~.~;~";o~,~\ .
~,,~

It was realized that one of the gT€utest dangers on night

attacks by individual ships ~ould be the possibility of self-
inflicted damage. For this reason it seemed desirarle not
to carry any ammunition on these missions, even though the
psychological effect of sucn a decision upon the crews was
fully a.ppreciated. Before the decision was made, the capabil-
ities of the enemy night fighter organizat'ion y;ere carpfully
surveyed. When it vias found. that there vrere a total of four
night fighter units· in the Japanese hil' Force and that only
two of them were deployed in the Jepnnese homelrnd it see~ed
l), l~ot undue risk to send our ships out without ammu.1").ition.

On the Tolcyo attack Jlot a single rOW1d was carried.

The story of encuunters with enemy ~ircr~ft on this and

subsequent miss~ons is sha~n in the Chart that follows.
 COMPARISON OF FIGHT~R REACTION AND EFFECT--DAY MISSION' AND NIQiT MISSION,

26
2."- 2q 1~ 17** 18** 39 ~O -1:1 L:< I~J 1.1.
MISSION NO. DAY DAY DAY DAY DAY DAY DAY· NIGH'f NIGHT NIGHT NlliHT JI1IGH~
Yission Date ""'7 Jan 4 Feb 10 Feb 15 Feb 19 Fe 25 Feb 4 Mar 9 r.lar 11 Me 13 Mar 16 Mar 18 Ma.·
Target Tokyo Kobe Ota Nagoyu Toky Tokyo Tokyo Tokyo Nagoy Osaka Kobe Nagoya
Approx. Average 5,500 25500 ~7,500 27,500 :n ,Q()( 26,500 27000 7,000 7,500 7,000 7,000 6,000
~ombing Altitude
I
E/A Sighted <75 205 230 91 195 13 10 74 93 115 310 19?
/570 '}8
..,
w E/A At t<.H;ks
~ltio Atks:Sghtd 3.6
984 '<73 330
1.4
166
1.8 2.9
0
.0
0
.0
40
.5
45
.5
37
.} .3
41.
1.3 .4
No. Bo<..9s0verJ.:J.p.w1 63 99 101 105 133 202 182 3G2 ./91 280 310 291
~ B49s Dumga &/0 53.9 13.1 .:,,;C.8 4.7 16.5 .0 .0 .0 ,0 ,0 1.0 .3
DC.3'L.royed IJy E/a
%B.:.9~ Lost. to .0 .0 d.O .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 1.0 .,0
Unkno''m Ca.uses

Vieather Over .7 .7 .3 .;: .8 1.0 1.0 .6 .1 .6 CAVU

thu Target to 1.0 .5
.
* Bonbing ~as in ih~ morning. Bo~bing on all other day missions rrus in the aftdrnoon.
** Na~ strikes ~ere on 16, 17, and ~5 February.
Although the number of enemy fighters sighted, and the number at-
tacking, was substantially lower than on daylight missions it
was felt after the Tokyo attack that it might be desirable to
carry some ammunition. In the course of time the enemy would
have found out thnt ve were carry·ing no ammunition and would
have pressed his fighter atte.cks more closely. Another ref.son
was the wish of some of the group command6rs to try shooting
out enemy searchlights. It was therefore decided to carry
200 rounds of ammunition in the tail turret on the l'lext mission
(Negoye I). Gunners were given strict instructions to open
..fire on enemy aircrr:ft o~lly v;hen fired upon.
On the third mission (Osaka) the experiment vms varied
slightly. The middle and high wings ~ere again provided with
to.il gun e~unition only, hut the low wing was given addi-
tio~al ammunition for the lower forward and aft turrets, ~ith
instructions to the side gunners to fire only at ground tar-
gets or targets at lower altitude. This method proved
successful and was retained on the fourth and fifth misGions.
As the attacks progressed, the effectiveness of the fighter
se~rchlight team improved. Although losses to enernif fighters
were negligible throughout the phase, certain disturbing
developments were noted by our Intelligence. At Kobe, when
the enemy fighter reaction reached its peak for the phase,
it was apparent that the Ja:'1anese had divided the target
area into d~fensive zones. In the flak belt no enemy aircraft
were sighted, but immediately after emerging from the zone
defended by AA our aircraft ~ere SUbjected to fighter attack.
Interrogation of crew members b!'ought .put the pE'-ralyzing
effect of S/r.. While' coned by 5/L the gu.,'1ners were blinded
and consequently unable to put up any defense. FortunQtely
the delicate timing which is a prerequisite to e successful
fifptcr searchlight teem had not been perfected by the Japanese.

Another development which threatens our future employment

of the B-29 in 1m'; level night attacks is the increased use
of nightfighters. Dfmaee to our eircraft bj 20 nm. shells from
6 0 1 clock lQ.w suggests a N/F flying on course", at t, speed
synchronized with the B-29 above and in front. An examina-
tion of the angle of penetration reveals that the damage
could not be caused by Automatic rrenpon installat ions .on the
ground. Other tactics i:' _tiated during the night attacks in-
cluded use of landing lights to spot B-29's (This happened
at OSaka and Kobe), aircraft dragging catle 500 feet long
(Kobe) and the use of parachute flares dropped from nbOle our
aircraft. All these point tow~rds the dependence of the
enemy on visual aiming. Throughout the ph&se the prev,lence
of attacks from the rear wes reported, except for the second
Nagoya atta~k. The substantially reduced ratio of attacks
00 sightings v;us logical and anticipated.
 6. THE HUMAN ELEIlENT

a. Prior to Incendicry Phese

It is trite to say that mechines can never be more

efficient than the oe:: \,ho oper~~tE:' then, ret this cor:uocnd has
pIeced the B-29 aircraft on a high pedestal of operational
perfection. It is only lOfical that thos~ concerned uith oper-
ational planning should face the issue as to whether or not our
combat crews end ground personnel are capohIe of mcintaining
an opcr~tional c~dence comme~5urate ~tth the functional capa-
bilities of ~ur assigned aircraft. ft~thourh the question is
unans\1crable at t;.his stege of our experience, th6.re are cert~in
significant facts ~nd justifiable conclusions related to the
human ~lemcnts of our op:rations which can he set down at this
time.
During the three a~& one-helf ~onths cf ~ur oper-
ations against the Japenese prior to the MDrch in~endiar3 raids,
so~e ver)- subtle but significant psycholorice1 problems developed
enong our flying personnel. These trends ITere quite apparent to
the flight surgeons Qf the command f.nd were vier:ed .. ith mo1.l.tlting
alarm by all those primarily concerned with the human elem~nts
of our opt:'ratio!ls. As thC' combat creViS reviewed their accumu-
lated experiences for the'months of Decemter, JunAary and Febru-
ary they could discern a minimum of evidence to support confi-
dence in their eirplane. In s?ite of ~n obviously high coef-
ficient of opcrntional ~nd combet experience among our combet
personnel, operational losses, from mechenical failure of the
B-29 nnd technical failure of personnel, persisted in ex~eeding
losses due to enemy action. Not without consider&tle fOLmdation
on fuct, our crews ccc:t.n to fenr thc.'ir own nircrc.ft and our
field orders more than the devices of the: enemy. S~all bomb
loarls 1 nd poor bombing results afforded no compensation nor
~onse of satisfaction commensurate with operational risks.
There wore very fevi cases of lndividu:: 1 break-dovms or n&.nifest

lnd~catlons of person&l 1nad~uacies. This lS believed to be

~ clarion tribute to small unit lecdership and to the maturity
of our individual combat air~en. Very few cases of childish
hysteria werE seen and ineividUGl disintegration from anxiety
 was r~re. A more mnture but nonetheless ominous phenomena
developed. A dull, dutiful "flying of missions" set in with
the quietness of an incipient epidemic. Most crews discerned
their duty end set about performing it, technically, to the
best of their ability, but 'with en emotional tone so hopeless
a~d devoid of lustre thnt our operational efficiency could not
but suffer. A monotonous and determined demand rrose for a
rotation policy. A fixed number of combat missions was termed
<?necessa.ry llsomething to shoot for rl • Symbolically this
tlsomething'to shoot for n was not connected with Yiaging the
war or defeating the enemy but with home, security, and 1'e-
~;ard for the dutiful completion of a t~sk. Only the more
visionary individu~ls were able to maintcin a satisfectory
emotional tone tOTIard the~r combat duties. Such was the pic-
/ ture of the human element ~uring the days ~f tactical pioneer-
ing and at the tcginning of the maximum effort opc<ration 9 March
1945. A ~

~
/',:¥l\~--ii
0""","0
\ I _.
\;
'.
1-' /?iy
Oi".~ ~ . . er '~~~Vr\

b.
*
After Ince!ldiary Phnse ~
'l
,
W' ((
~ ~ .y
~
Long before the completion of this operntion, the
element of h~~on endur~nce had firmly cffixed itself to
the growing list of operational planning factors. Could
personnel n~intain c~dence with the neTI and manifest opera-
tion~l capabilities of the B-29 aircraft? Certain facts re-
lative to this human element and observed during and immedi-
ately after this operation are significant. The phenomenal
success of the new tactics had precipitately salvaeed the
morale and fighting spirit of our crews by providing a degree
of battle success proportionate to the effort expended.
Equally important, especially to the older crews, the B-29 was
established as en efficient and reliable combat aircraft.
Thirty-thr~e crews flew all five missions in the ten-day period.
One hu.'1dred ~nd t\'ienty-§iJc. crews flew four of the five missions
of the attack. At the tL""I1ination of the operation an oc-
casional crew was grounded for fatigue and a very few were
sent to O&hu for rest. Generally speaking our creTIS were
moderately fatigued but in good physical condition and in ~
high stcte of more.le. There Vlrs no increase in the non-effect-
iV8 rate for flying personnel during the operation or for
the period immedictely after. Amczingly the number of cases
of flying personnel disorders due to flying, 'i"hieh had been
 Mcrch fell off sh~rply
Dfter
60
.N"EI.\I CASES Of
VI 50 FLYING PERSONN~L
'" 40 DISORDERS DLiE
~ 30 TO FLYING-
( 20
v
10

There wes definite evidence of th~ cumulptive effec of ner-

vous f~tigue. The older crews of the ?3rd Wing, ~ho hud
twelve or more oissions prior to 9 ~arch were noticeably
nore fntieucd ~ the op€rF.tion and recovered nore slowly
thrn the fresh~r, but less ex~erienced, crews of the 313th
end J14th ~ings. This observation is believed to be of
~'r~mount signific&nce. Ground perscnnel exhibited SEvere
physical exhaustion. Recovery ~cs rc~id. There ~as no in-
crease in sick call r~tes during or cftar this ten-dny period.
,
The Hwnen Element rnd Operational Planning. Con-
clusions Warrpnted by ~Aperience to Date.

(1) Our cc~b~t crews rerct moturely to fctigue end

battle ,stresses. B::'6E:{~ on pest experiencf', C l':'linir:lu.'l'l of
h~steriu r.nd individual disintegratiQ~. from ~lxiety mcy be
anticipated.

(2) Perfor;ne:;ce of crer's to de.te indicates that

they cen be ItfloYffi to death" und that only very small num-
bers will devise llescapc behavior". This places E:: great
moral responsibility on operBtion6l pl~nning p~rsonncl.

(3) Air crews cnn be flown to l' state of ndve-nee

comb~t inefficiency v,ith c. minimum of subject com~,l:)int or
objective «vidence. This pla.ces ~ great technicl.1 respon-
sibility upon the squadron commander-sqU2.dron surgeon t-enm.

(4) Physicr.l exhE..ustion of ground personnel IS

likely to be ~ limiting hR~n element in T~xiwum effort
operations pla~,ed for periods of ten to fourteen days.

(5) Nervous fatigue of comb~t crews with resul-

tant 1055 of combat efficiency is likely to be the limiting
human fuctor in r.lexlmUITI effort opprations in excess of tiour-
teen days.

41
 CONCLUSIONS
L- __ _
~~ .,~

- --- ....
-~--_
 1. HIGH ALTITUDE PRECISION ATTACKS
Precision attacks from 25,000 feet or above agsinst
pinpoint targets are unsuited to operations i~ this theater.
Radr.r operstes inefficiently at high r.ltitude. Weather
conditions -- high wind and poor visibility over the target,
scattering of formations when penetrating fronts on route
interfere with nnvig£:tion, render bombing inaccur&.te and
require highly skilled cre~s.

2. 10. ALTITllDE INCENDIARY NIGHT ATTACKS

a. Incendiary attacks ageinst J~prnese urban areas

have a definite military as well as ['. psychological value,
since destruction of a city destroys home industries TIhich
ere ~ vitnl link in the Japanese wer economy.

b. To be successf-.l., incendiary attacks require n

high concentration of plBhQS over the ta.rget in a short time.

c. Another requirement is concentration in space.

To achieve this, pattern density must be controlled through
the intervalometer setting and h:" selection of the righ~
type of bornh. Area density must be accomplished by insist-
ing that every crero make e controlled bomb run over a desig-
natod AP. The ApTs should be chosen with regard to the prob-
able bomb dispersion ~nd so ~s to permit accurate radar
approach. The location of the AP's end the axis of attack
must be selected with a viet> to probable "shorts".

/ d. Target area to be attackE;d should be scaled to

the size of the force) the bo~b Iced and the requ~red pattern
• density.

e. Advantage should be taken of surfaco v<inds, when-

ever possible. Precipit&tion does not materially affect
results.

f.
To a limited extent the requirements shown under
b - e can be substituted one for the other. If all other
requirements ~re fulfilled an attack need not fail bec~use
one of the factors ~s imperfectly repres~nted.

g. Crews must be car~fully briefed in the theory of

incendiary attacks to assure their cooperation in carrying
out these tactics.

h. Night missions require operation by individual air-

crl-~ ft.
This encourages initiative on the purt'of the indi-
vidual crews ~~d boosts ~oral&) but ~lso sho~s the need for
careful anjlysis of individual crew perforMance through
anslysis of r~der scope photos and navigetors' logs. It
may prove advisable to make sortie creditG toward rotation
dependent on su~cessful pel'formence.
i.Individual attacks mr.ke it more difficult to
achieve p~oper concentretion in time and space. To offset
this it rnny be necesscry to prescribe a departure point neerer
Jn~~n, such as Iwo Jime, end ~o select ~ gre~ter number of
aiming points . 'ithin the tL.rget cree, ,,-1 th c carefully con-
trolled hom~ run over each by a corresponding part of the force.
It also points toward the possi1ility of daylight formation
incendiary attpcks from medium altitude, pro~ided sufficient
tonnage cen be delivered on the t~rget Eree.

j. Antiaircrpft if> the most effective forra of e:~emy

cefense agei~st lo~ level night nttacks. Japcncse heavy p~
guns depend l~rgely on searchlights £nd some mefin3 of dealing
with them oust be: found. Cp.mouflage paint ..... 111 be tested;
fighter escort attacks against searchlights would be desirable;
if no fighters ~re r.veilable, strafing or fr~g bomb attacks s-
{;;sinst sea.rchlight emplaceruents by the 8-29' s themselves may
,Jrove necesse-ry.

k. Enemy fighter reaction was limited but i3 likely

to incrense in the future. Nevertheless, some an~ition
should be carried on night attacks t ut its use must te care-
fully controlled to avoid self-inflicted dumcgc. Barrs.ge
balloons apparently are not n danger at altitudes above 5,000
feet.

As a protection ceainst flak, incendiary night at-

tacks should be flown at the highest altitude at which rnD~imum
tomb loed cen to carried ,"ithout appreciuble decrease in bomb-
ing accuracy. Altitudes bet\"een 10,000 and 15,000 feet may
in general prove better than the 5,000 and 10,000 feet range,
but ~eQthcr considerations must dictpte the ~ctual altitude
chosen.

3. 101' ALTITUDE HE NIGHT A'ITACKS AGAINST PRECISION TARGET

The attempt to use Pathfinder crev/S during the in-

cendiary attacks to mark the AP for the ~in force suggests
use of ll. similar method for precision attacks with HE bombs.
Experimental missions are teing flown by this cow~nd to
test the possibilities of this theory and a full re'Jort vlill
be prepared upon completion. 3ucn attac;~b =equire ~ cC:,.lbina-
tion Lf ~urg~t u~r~ing ~nu ~~rgct i11unir~tlon wh1cn in turn
"ill de":'!....nd <.. nc.re f1 ...xible, :l.nd 'Lh",I'cfvre s~_l1ur force, ",nd
prvi'8r !:w.rkc!" ...::t.lu.'1iti",n <..nd fl.:l.r.:;s. Th..:y .:hould be cu.:t"ried
e;ut by tn.. . :,r,j~.ll-:3::;t f<Jrcl: 'ulich c""n 1~ de; Tn th~ tvnn/..glo::
r.e;-:e.:s.:.r:,' to d¢.;troy th<J t ....~·get.

43
 4. DAYLIGHT INCEN:'T ARY BOMBING THROUGH THE OVERCAS~

By scheduling daylight incendiary missions against Japan

it ~ill be possible to return to formation flying and thus
obtain improv~ddistribution of bombs around the aiming
point. Because smoke and fldme soon obscures the target,
and later the entire area, dnylight incendiary mis:>ions .,ill
be briefed for rad~r runs, although v~sual releases will be
made 'here possi-ble. Forffiution flying and higher altitudes .. ',
·',ill reduce the bo:nb loud due to increased fuel consumpt.ion -

•
out Lhe improved area density ~hich can be expected ~ill ~ore
t.na.n comJ,>en::..ute. Night incendiary mis5ion~ \'Iil1 be cmtinued,
eVE:n t.oough 'the d~.ylig~t incendi....ry technique proves more
v""tbf..:ctory, flGrtly bcci::.usoa the probl:lbility of finding b.d-
v~.nt.a.gzou~ o;.c£>..ther condit.ions impr<?ves at night., and partly
oecdu~C of the ben~ficial effect of variation in tactics .

• 5. GJ~NERAL
I

Pr~liminary ~n~ly~i~ of the implications of the incendiary

phase of oyerations sho,ed that previous evaluations of our
potential sortie effort ~ere lOR. The variety of t~ctics sug-
gested by lo~ altitudu night operation pointed ~o?ard vastly
increased ~ir~raft utilization. Imm~dib.te steps ure being
taken to requisi~ion adequate supplies, aircraft and crews to
parmit ~he maximum employment of our ne~ tactics .

•
...:md as 1.fLctics are perfected and the

•
11

tempo of c.ttack~ steppe.:.::. up, the B-;;:9, in

steadily incriL<"ing numbers, through E~ll Kinds
of ieather, day ~nd nigh~, ~ill be ~triking
WE: heart of the Japanese Empire. 1t

1/..,7., (" t 11""'1

CURTIS E. LeMAY
Major Genera.l, U. S. A.
COrlli!ulnding.