Accepting Personality Test Feedback:

A Review of the Barnum Effect

ADRIAN FURNHAM SANDRA SCHOFIELD

University College of London University of Bath

This article attemptsa comprehensiveand critical reviewof the by-nowfairlyextensive

literature on the Barnum effect--the approval/acceptanceby subjectsof bogusperson-
ality interpretations supposedlyderivedfrom standard tests. Sincethe last major review
eight years ago various methodological extensions have occurred and various rival
hypothesesfor establishedfindings have been proposed. The present reviewis divided
into three major sections: client and clinician characteristics; feedbackstatements and
test format; and implications for personality assessmentand measurement. Nearly 50
studies on the acceptanceof personalityinterpretations are systematicallyreviewedand
criticized.

In 1949 Forer wrote a critical paper questioning the validity of personality inter-
pretations and measuring instruments, posing the problem of the gullibility or sug-
gestibility of subjects when evaluating these feedback statements. He argued that
there was a "fallacy of personal validation," in that because people frequently accept
as correct generalized, vague, bogus descriptions of themselves which have high base-
rate occurrence in the general population, their acceptance of the accuracy of per-
sonality interpretations in general cannot be used to support the validity of an
instrument. Meehl (1956 ), who borrowed the concept from his colleague D.G. Patter-
son, later labeled this the "Barnum effect" (after the famous phrase "There's a sucker
born every minute"), a phenomenon whereby subjects accept personality feedback
as true, whether it is universally valid or trivial, because it is supposedly derived from
personality assessment procedures. Since then researchers have explored various
aspects of the phenomenon and have generally confirmed early findings that which it
is argued, partly explains why people believe horoscopes and other quasi-scientific
personality assessment procedures (graphology, tarot cards) to be true (Tyson, 1982a,
b). However, subsequent research has provided alternative explanations for the
Barnum effect. This review will evaluate the published research including those
studies published before 1977, the date the last major review was written (Snyder,
Shenkel, & Lowery, 1977).

CLIENT (SUBJECTS) AND CLINICIAN (EXPERIMENTER) CHARACTERICS

That people accept "Barnum personality feedback" (i.e., statements used by Forer,
1949) as being true of themselves has been much researched and consistently sup-

Current Psychological Research & Reviews, Summer 1987, vol. 6, no.2, 162-178.
Furnham and Schofield 163

ported (Bachrach & Pattishall, 1960; Carrier, 1963; Dana & Fouke, 1979; Fichter &
Sunerton, 1983; Forer, 1949, 1968; Halperin & Snyder, 1979; Hinrichsen & Bradley,
1974; Ulrich, Strachnik, & Stainton, 1963; Jackson, 1978; Lattal & Lattal, 1967;
Manning, 1968; Synder, 1974a; Snyder & Larsen, 1972; Stachnik & Stachnik, 1980;
Stagner, 1958). However, the question as to why they accept what is, after all, bogus
feedback is not settled (Halperin & Snyder, 1979). In this section the explanations of
gullibility/suggestibility of the client/experimenter, influences of sex differences, per-
sonality factors, the level of sophistication of the client/subject, and the influence of
clinician/experimenter status and prestige, will be reviewed. Each has been put for-
ward as a part explanation for why people accept bogus feedback about themselves.

Sex Differences

Forer's (1949) original study of the acceptance phenomenon found no significant

difference between male and female acceptance of ratings. This lack of significant sex
differences has been supported in subsequent research (Halperin, Snyder, Shenkel, &
Houston, 1976; Snyder, 1974a; Snyder & Shenkel, 1976; Sundberg, 1955). Addi-
tionally, Snyder, Larsen, and Bloom (1976) found that neither the sex of the "diag-
nostician," subject's sex, nor the interaction of the "diagnostician" sex with the
subject's sex showed significant differences. Indeed, Snyder et al. (1977) concluded
that "both sexes are equally susceptible to the Barnum effect" (p. 105).
However, a study by Carrier (1963) did find a relationship between sex and certain
personality characteristics related to suggestibility. Also, Rosen (1975) reported a
significant interaction between the subject's sex and the source of the feedback:
female subjects had higher ratings than males for astrologer feedback, but slightly
lower than males for a psychologist's feedback. Incidentally, Fichter and Sunerton
(1983) did find females more likely to read and believe in horoscope forecasts than
men.
Generally, sex differences have been found to have little effect on rating personality
feedback, which is perhaps surprising given the literature on sex correlates of con-
formity, gullibility etc. It is possible that where the feedback situation involves people
of both sexes (i.e., male clinician giving feedback to female patient or vice versa) sex
differences in accepting feedback may occur. However, what is most likely is that sex
interacts with other personality or situation variables but does not operate as a main
effect (Carrier, 1963; Rosen, 1975).

Personality Factors

Several studies have considered the influences of personality factors on the

Barnum effect (Forer, 1968). Carrier (1963), using certain measures from the Ed-
wards Personal Schedule (EPPS), found that the suggestibility of students was related
to achievement, deference, and introception among male subjects, and related to
abasement, introception, and endurance among females. However, he pointed out
164 Current Psychological Research & Reviews /Summer 1987

that these relationships may be a result of the particular situation within which the
test was carried out and may not generalize to other studies.
Later Mosher (1965) used the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability (M-C SD) scale
to measure approval-seeking behavior and vulnerable self-esteem, as it was thought
to relate to gaining approval from the psychologist by accepting bogus feedback. His
findings revealed that high scoring subjects on the M-C SD scale were more likely to
accept favorable but significantly less likely to accept unfavorable fake personality
interpretations than were the low scoring subjects. Thus, high scorers are likely only
to accept feedback when it does not threaten their self-esteem. Snyder and Larsen
(1972) also found that subjects with a high need for social approval did not neces-
sarily accept the feedback, and that high external locus of control correlated
positively with acceptance. Later Orpen and Jamotte (1975) found that all three of
the personality factors that they used played a relatively significant role in determin-
ing acceptance. That is authoritarians, those with high need for approval and those
with external locus of control, tend to be more accepting of the feedback than those
low on authoritarianism, with low need for approval or internal locus of control.
Fichter and Sunerton (1983) did not replicate this finding with locus of control but
did find neuroticism correlated with both reading frequency and belief in horo-
scopes.
Another study by Snyder and Clair (1977) looked at the effects of insecurity on the
acceptance of personality interpretations, both as a trait and as a situational manip-
ulation. The major finding of this study was that the higher the insecurity of the
subject, the greater the acceptance of feedback.
The fact that various personality factors do significantly affect the acceptance has
implications for both the clinical and research psychologist. As Snyder and Clair
(1977) pointed out, people seeking psychological help are often insecure, worried and
anxious, and more likely to accept both accurate or inaccurate feedback. This has,
therefore, both ethical and experimental implications--particularly the use of cli-
ents' feedback to validate measures.
Overall, however, more work needs to be done on personality correlates of the
Barnum effect. A very limited number of personality variables have been considered
and others may be relevant. Further, it is not certain to what extent subjects with
various personalities or needs report acceptance without actually truly believing or
internalizing it. Certainly more sensitive measures of acceptance and different types
of feedback (bogus, accurate) need to be examined as they relate to different (non-
tautological) and salient individual differences.

Gullibility~Suggestibility of the Client~Subject

The Barnum effect can essentially be reduced to two main causes; that is either the
suggestibility of the subject or the inadequacy of the psychological tests. It should be
pointed out that suggestibility is not usually classified as a personality variable since
it is neither stable over time nor consistent across situations. Furthermore, it may be
seen as purely tautological to say that suggestible people accept bogus feedback as
Furnham and Schofield 165

that may be the definition of suggestibility. Forer (1949) argued that his data clearly
showed that his subjects had been suggestible and subsequent research has supported
this finding (Dies, 1972; Lattal & Lattal, 1967). Indeed, both Orpen and Jamotte
(1975) and Snyder and Larsen (1972) have argued that subjects' acceptance of per-
sonality feedback should never be used as the major or even as a supportive criterion
of validity of the psychologist and his/her tests, because of the "gullibility effect"
(Orpen & Jamotte, 1975, p. 147).
However, others have concluded that there is no simple profile which can be put
forward to define the typical suggestible or gullible subject (Snyder et al., 1977). In
fact Carrier (1963) argued that the suggestibility of students was not necessarily a
general trait but a result of the classroom situation (experimental demands). Sim-
ilarly Dana and Graham (1976) point out that research using college students is
particularly problematic since they may prove to be especially "gullible" because
they trust the researchers' motives in good faith and see honoring the professional
status of the experimenter as important. That is, both because of their age and their
relationship with the experimenter, researcher or teacher, college students probably
make bad subjects for studies in this area.
Hampson, Gilmour, and Harris (1978) argue that the fact that subjects accept
personality feedback as highly accurate is not necessarily an indication of sug-
gestibility but provides support for an alternative hypothesis, namely that subjects
perceive the statements correctly as being accurate descriptions of most people,
including themselves. Indeed, in their study using astrological statements, they
found that subjects could clearly distinguish true from false items, that they did not
gullibly accept universal statements, and that they readily attribute astrological state-
ments to others.
In a similar vein, Greene (1977, 1978) has argued that students can correctly assess
trivial and generalized interpretations if asked to make these judgments. He found
(Greene, 1977) that students realized that universal statements did not refer to them
uniquely, and he concludes that students' acceptance of generalized personality inter-
pretations may not be as ubiquitous as previously thought. However, a number of
criticisms of Greene's (1977) research have been made by Snyder, Handelsman, and
Endelman (1978). They have argued that not only were there methodological limita-
tions (i.e., within subject designs that subsequently lead to subject scepticism) to
Greene's (1977) study but that consistently, research has proved that supposed
uniqueness of feedback to an individual has an important positive effect on subject
acceptance of feedback (Snyder, 1974a; Snyder, et al., 1976; Snyder & Larsen, 1972;
Snyder & Shenkel, 1976). This criticism was rejected by Greene (1978) who argued:
"It makes little sense to ask students whether generalized interpretations are accu-
rate. The imperative question is whether students can recognize that generalized
interpretations are trivial because they can be applied to anyone" (p. 1496).
A later study by Harris and Greene (1984) tested the ability of students to discrimi-
nate between actual, trivial, and inaccurate feedback and found them to be able to
discriminate reliably between the three types of feedback on the dimensions of
uniqueness, usefulness, accuracy, and source of new information. Hence, they c o n -
166 Current Psychological Research & Reviews /Summer 1987

clude "students can appropriately assess the validity of their pesonality feedback and
they are not as gullible as researchers may have thought" (p. 183). Bayne (1980) also
provides support for this argument and points out that one should distinguish be-
tween differential and general accuracy rather than using subject suggestibility as an
explanation for the Barnum effect.
Another similar line of argument has been put forward by Layne (1978, 1979). He
disputes the fact that subjects are suggestible because they accept bogus feedback and
argues that Barnum feedback is often more accurate and socially desirable than real
feedback. In fact he argued that the Barnum effect reflects subject's rationality rather
than their suggestibility (Layne, 1979). Further studies along this line (Layne & Ally,
1980; Layne & Michels, 1979) provide support for these arguments. For instance, in
using the established Eysenck Personality Inventory, Layne and Ally (1980) found
that the more accurate the feedback, the more highly it was accepted, yet contrary to
prediction, they did find that individual differences in persuasibility did influence
feedback acceptance. The work by Layne (1978, 1979) is important because it focuses
more clearly on the nature and accuracy of the feedback. It suggests that although
suggestibility or persuasibility may be an important factor in determining how the
client accepts bogus feedback, this interacts with the type of feedback supplied.

Client~Subject Naivetk, Maturity, and Soph&tication

The fact that a large number of the subjects used in the Barnum effect experiments
have been students has led to questions concerning subject sophistication or exper-
tise (Dana & Graham, 1976). That is, the homogeneity (in terms of age, education,
etc.) and (relative) immaturity of college students, combined with the experimental
effects of the paradigm (experimenter effects), makes them a particularly nonrepre-
sentative group from which to generalize findings.
Forer (1949) originally found no significant relationship between acceptance of
feedback and age or occupational background of subjects. Similarly, Stagner (1958)
found that the level of acceptance of Barnum statements was the same for college
students, industrial supervisors, and personal managers, suggesting age and experi-
ence were not important determinants of bogus feedback acceptance. However, it
should be pointed out that age and occupational status are not necessarily syn-
onymous with "sophistication," that both may be confounded.
Other researchers, however, have suggested that the level of subject naivet6 and
sophistication may be important (Orpen & Jamotte, 1975) Bachrach and Patishall
(1960) reported that students were more likely than psychiatric residents to accept
personality feedback. Greene (1977) found that more sophisticated (senior class vs.
sophomore and junior class) students were less likely to be impressed by generalized
interpretations, a result further reinforced by Greene, Harris, and Macon (1979)
when they found that senior and graduate students were better at selecting their
actual profiles from their inverted (opposite) profiles than sophomore (undergradu-
ate) students.
Schroeder and Lesyk (1976) carried out a study actually comparing the ability of
Furnham and Schofield 167

clinical psychology Ph.D. candidates on a personality assessment course and naive

(introductory psychology undergraduates)judges in discriminating between genuine
and Barnum assessment statements. They found that both groups were able to
discriminate between genuine and Barnum statements. This apparently contradic-
tory finding may be explained by the fact that the judges were rating statements
about others and that they are only poor at discriminating feedback when they are
judging statements in which they are personally involved (i.e., about themselves).
However, they did find "expert" judges were better at discriminating between gen-
uine and Barnum statements on the dimensions of information and usefulness but
not social desirability and typicalness. They argue: "Questions of test consumers also
are better represented by judgments of information value and usefulness than more
global judgments of goodness or accuracy of report. This more appropriate pro-
cedure has produced results which suggest that psychological assessments are more
sophisticated than implied in previous research. Personality assessments may have
been unfairly maligned by previous research on Barnum reports" (p. 474).
Snyder et al. (1977) have also pointed out that the "sophistication effect" may be
reduced because people are likely to be situationally insecure in the experimental
setting and thus may suffer a lack of self-esteem and competence. That is, experi-
mental and experimenter effects (evaluation apprehension, experimenter expectan-
cies, demand characteristics) may be more important determinants of personality
feedback than sophistication itself.
Sophistication or naivet6 are not psychological concepts and are difficult to opera-
tionalize. It may or may not co-occur with age, education, occupational status,
training in psychology, etc. Once again there is risk of tautology, for if one could
measure "sophistication" one aspect of that definition would presumably be the
ability to distinguish bogus from accurate feedback on oneself. Nevertheless, the
question has important practical implications for those involved in all forms of
therapy. Yet Snyder et al. (1977) have argued that ethical problems prevent studies of
client sophistication and the Barnum effect in a clinical population (Halperin &
Snyder, 1979). Furthermore, it could be argued as Delaney and Woodyard (1974) do,
that receiving feedback (from horoscopes) may lead to a self-fulfilling prophesy in
that people (particularly those who are relatively unsophisticated) tend to respond
(to personality inventories) in terms of what they know of themselves from other
"bogus" feedback. Of course, reading or knowing astrological descriptions (horo-
scopes) may effect the way one behaves or fills out a personality inventory so produc-
ing self-fullfilling prophesies (Tyson, 1982a).

Clinical~Experimenter Status (Source Prestige)

A further factor explored by researchers is whether the status of the test admin-
istrator (clinician or experimenter) influences acceptance of feedback. Both Ulrich et
al. (1963) and Snyder and Larsen (1972) found no significant difference between
subjects' rating feedback given by either a professional psychologist or another stu-
dent. Furthermore, they (Snyder & Larsen, 1972) found no differences in the accep-
168 Current Psychological Research & Reviews / Summer 1987

tance of interpretations when subjects were told that the test scorer was either a
computer or a person, suggesting the acceptance phenomenon is reasonably inde-
pendent of the test administrator or scorer.
Dmitruk, Collins and Clinger (1973) similarly reported that subjects were equally
willing to accept negative feedback from both psychologist (high prestige) and stu-
dent (low prestige) administrators, though the study has been criticized (Halperin et
al., 1976; Snyder & Shenkel, 1976). A later study by Collins, Dmitruk, and Ranney
(1977) found that, contrary to the former finding, positive feedback was more ac-
cepted than negative feedback from psychologists (high prestige administrators).
Thus, if the source of feedback is negative the science, technology, and status of
psychology can easily be threatened.
Rosen (1975) reported that although psychologists received a significantly higher
rating in terms of source prestige than astrologers, both sources were rated equally
high in terms of providing "valid" personality feedback. Snyder et al. (1976) also
reported that subjects' faith in assessment procedures and diagnostician skill in-
creased significantly after receiving feedback. Thus, not only does it seem that faith
is placed in the diagnostician regardless of status but this faith is increased after
(preferably positive) feedback.
Differential acceptance of feedback as a function of source status has, however,
been found by Halperin et al. (1976). They examined the effects of administrator
status (low, moderate, and high) and favorability of feedback and found the low
status administrator received lower acceptance, especially in the case of unfavorable
feedback. This finding was supported to some extent by Snyder and Shenkel (1976)
who looked at effects of favorability, modality of communication, and relevance of
interpretation on attitudes toward tests and administrators. They found that subjects'
faith in the tests and the administrator's skill increased significantly after receiving
feedback but that they showed more faith in the test and diagnostician skill when
favorable feedback was given. Thus, the interaction of feedback favorability with
source status may be important, particularly when negative feedback is involved.
The results from the five client/subject vs. clinician/experimenter variables (sex,
personality, gullibility, "sophistication," and status/source prestige) have offered
equivocal results. This may be due to the fact that with regard to the acceptance of
personality feedback these differences are less important than experimental/situa-
tional variables, or else that the most relevant individual differences (i.e., self-con-
cept, neuroticism, intelligence) have not been examined. However, what this review
does tend to suggest is that it is the interaction between individual differences, type
(accuracy) of feedback, and situational/experiment variables that determines accep-
tance of feedback rather than simple individual difference main effects.

NATURE OF THE FEEDBACK AND THE TEST SITUATION

Studies on the feedback of the Barnum effect have looked at factors such as the
universal validity of feedback statements, their triviality, favorability, base-rate ac-
Furnham and Schofield 169

curacy, the uniqueness of interpretation, while the actual assessment procedures and
test situation have also come under close inspection.

Generality of Feedback

Forer (1949) argued that a universally valid statement is one that applies to nearly
all the population, and therefore although true of the individual, does not reveal
anything specific about her/him. Subsequent research has confirmed that the
Barnum statements are of little use in terms of defining an individual's personality
(Bachrach & Pattishall, 1960; Manning, 1968; Marks & Seeman, 1962).
That subjects felt that Barnum statements were accurate descriptions of their
personality has been explained by the very vague, ambiguous, and general nature of
the statements themselves (Snyder et al., 1977). However, a rather different, but
related, question has also been asked: could subjects judge between genuine and false
personality descriptions of themselves? That is, if given accurate, honest feedback
from properly constructed and validated personality questionnaires, could subjects
distinguish between their actual profile and an inaccurate description from another
(possibly very different) individual and/or a simply bogus, but very flattering, pro-
file? Sundberg (1955), in an early study using the MMPI, found that they could not
pick out their own genuine personality descriptions better than may be expected by
chance. Similarly, Dies (1972) reported that even when an "objective, non-
pathologically-oriented, and comprehensive framework" (p. 49) was provided, stu-
dents were still unable to pick out their genuine feedback from the false bogus
feedback. In fact, Merrens and Richards (1970) reported a preference for generalized
feedback over actual feedback in terms of their perceived accuracy and specificity.
However, more recent research has thrown into doubt the above conclusions.
Greene (1977, 1978) has argued that generalized interpretations are accurate, al-
though trivial, descriptions of all subjects, and therefore to ask a subject to rate the
accuracy of such a statement inevitably leads to confirmation as the statements are
generally superficially accurate. That is, whether the subjects believe these state-
ments to be unique or not, the essential question is whether students/clients can
assess the triviality of these statements if asked to do so.
Many studies have looked at how the perception of the uniqueness of the feedback
(i.e., specifically applicable to the subject/client) affects its acceptance. Ulrich et al.
(1963) found that their subjects were unaware that the feedback which they rated as
accurate for themselves was also accurate for others. Studies by Snyder (Snyder,
1974a, b; Snyder & Larsen, 1972) reported that subjects who were told that the
feedback was specifically derived for them accepted the feedback as significantly
more accurate than subjects who were told that the feedback was "generally true of
people." Snyder and Shenkel (1976) later found that favorability was linked to rele-
vance of feedback whereby subjects who received favorable feedback considered it to
be far more true of themselves than of others.
A related problem is that of base-rate accuracy of feedback statements. It has been
argued that by definition Barnum statements must have a high base-rate accuracy
170 Current Psychological Research & Reviews /Summer 1987

(Collins et al., 1977; Merren & Richards, 1970; Mosher, 1965; O'Dell, 1972; Snyder et
al., 1978; Snyder & Shenkel, 1976; Sundberg, 1955; Weisberg, 1970). This was also
implied by Greene (1978, 1977). However, research by Baucom and Greene (1979)
has questioned this assumption when examining the base-rate accuracy of a typical
set of statements used in previous research. Only 7 out of 12 typically used state-
ments were rated as being universally appropriate among all students; thus, they
argue that the base-rate accuracy of these statements is not actually very high. They
also found that the students were accurate in estimating how other students would
answer the statements, suggesting that the students were well aware of the (poor)
accuracy of generalized personality feedback.
Indeed it has been suggested by some researchers (Bayne, 1980; O'Dell, 1972) that
the way to discover the reason for the Barnum effect is through discerning mean-
ingful ways of measuring how people differ from others in distinguishing between
differential and general accuracy of feedback. More recently a study by Harris and
Greene (1984) reported clear evidence that students could discern relevant aspects of
feedback, perceiving trivial (Barnum-type) feedback as significantly less unique but
more accurate than actual (test-derived CPI results) or inaccurate (inverse scores
from the CPI) feedback. Further actual feedback was perceived as providing more
useful information than trivial feedback. Thus, it seems that if asked the appropriate
question subjects can distinguish between general vs. specific, (unique) and accurate
vs. inaccurate personality feedback.

Favorability of Feedback

There is an extensive literature on personality psychology on the "Pollyanna prin-

ciple," which suggests that there is a universal human tendency to use or accept
positive words or feedback more frequently, diversely, and facilely than negative
words or feedback. Sundberg (1955) found that, according to the evaluations of two
judges, there were five times as many favorable as unfavorable statements in the
highly accepted interpretations and twice as many unfavorable statements in the low
accepted interpretations.
Mosher (1965) found, as predicted, that subjects' acceptance of feedback was
positively influenced by the level of favorability, possibly because unfavorable feed-
back posed a threat to those with vulnerable self-esteem. Weisberg (1970) also found
that favorably worded feedback was generally preferred when fake feedback was
given in a favorable, unfavorable, or neutral form. Subsequent research has generally
confirmed this finding (Collins et al., 1977; Snyder & Clair, 1977; Snyder & Shenkel,
1976).
A notably different result was found, however, in a study by Dmitruk et al. (1973)
where negative evaluations were accepted as well as positive evaluations. Other re-
search rejected their findings, however, (Halperin et al., 1976; Snyder & Shenkel,
1976) and a later study by Collins et al. (1977) reported contrary results suggesting
that this finding is unreliable.
Halperin et al. (1976) examined the interaction of favorability with source status
Furnham and Schofield 171

and concluded that for negative feedback, status is very important. They argue that
unfavorable feedback is far more likely to be accepted from high status assessors and
conclude that as such, high status individuals must bear special responsibility be-
cause of the potential impact of their feedback. However, Collins et al. (1977) re-
ported a downgrading of psychologists and their tests by subjects in a study where
they were given negative feedback. Similarly, Snyder and Shenkel (1976) found sub-
jects' faith in the diagnostician and his/her tests increased only after receiving favora-
ble feedback.
To some extent favorability of feedback is linked to its base-rate accuracy. Layne
(1978, 1979) argues that Barnum feedback is more accurate and socially desirable
than real feedback. Furthermore, Snyder and Shenkel (1976) suggest that differential
acceptance that has been attributed to levels of favorability may reflect the fact that
positive feedback has a higher base-rate accuracy. When they analyzed their results of
higher acceptance of favorable interpretation by controlling base-rate accuracy re-
lated to favorability, no significant acceptance effects were obtained, suggesting sub-
jects may have been responding to the more true of the two personality descriptions
(which happened to be more positive). Snyder et al. (1977) argue that this raises
serious questions about previous Barnum research that has analyzed favorable feed-
back without considering the possibly confounding effect of base-rate accuracy.
Finally, the interaction of relevance of feedback and favorability has been consid-
ered. Snyder and Shenkel (1976) found that subjects tended to see favorable feedback
as less true to people in general than of themselves and unfavorable feedback as being
no less true of others than themselves. This finding was confirmed by Baillargeon
and Danis (1984).
Therefore, it seems that favorable feedback leads to higher acceptance than
unfavorable feedback, but this may be due to higher base-rate accuracy of positive
feedback, actor vs. observer, attribution errors, or the fact that in some cases the
positive feedback was actually more true for the subjects.

Assessment of Device Procedures and Test Situation

The actual effect of the particular assessment device (questionnaire, projective

techniques) procedures and the test situation and format has quite naturally been
researched within the context of the Barnum effect.
A study by Richards and Merrens (1971) used three different personality assess-
ment techniques (Bernreurer, life history questionnaire, and abbreviated Rorschach)
that were used supposedly to derive the Barnum statements which were subsequently
rated by subjects in terms of accuracy, depth, and efficiency. He found that the
Rorschach test tended to be seen as producing feedback of greater depth than the
other tests and argued that this could be due to the more ambiguous and less straight-
forward nature of this test (adding some "symbolic" or "deep underlying" meaning
to its feedback). He also noted that this test has been popularized by the media and
hence the subjects may be responding to the test's reputation. This obviously has
important implications for the Barnum effect since it implies that the test's format,
172 Current Psychological Research & Reviews/Summer 1987

fame, and feedback clarity are as much important as its validity and reliability in
terms of providing feedback acceptable to a subject or client.
A similar methodology was used by Snyder (1974a) who looked at the effect of
giving personality feedback based on a projective test, an interview, an objective test,
or information "generally true of people" He found that the projective test achieved
the highest acceptance, followed by the interview, the objective test, and lastly the
"generally true of people" category. He suggests that tests which "mysteriously"
reveal "true personality" could explain the lower acceptance of objective test feed-
back that may be more familiar (or at least have higher face validity) to the subject
and therefore be more transparent or fakeable.
However, a later study by Snyder, Larsen, and Bloom (1976) did not find support
for this speculation of"mystery" causing greater acceptance. In order to test Snyder's
(1974a) hypothesis they asked the subjects how much contact they had had with the
assessment procedures and how well they understood the way it worked. They found
no correlation between subject contact and understanding of the procedures and
their subsequent acceptance of feedback.
Snyder et al. (1976) also looked at differential acceptance of assessment procedures
using psychological, graphological, and astrological techniques and statements
which are "generally true of people." Their major finding was that there was no
difference in the acceptance of feedback derived from the first three procedures but
that the "generally true of people" feedback was significantly less accepted. Thus, it
would seem that as long as the feedback is allegedly specific to the individual, the
type of assessment device has little effect.
Other research into the influence of assessment device procedures and conditions
of testing has also been carried out. O'Dell (1972) compared the effectiveness of
computer feedback, Barnum feedback, and "prosecuting attorney" feedback (high
base-rate statements saturated with clinical jargon), and found that the Barnum
feedback was seen as most accurate and prosecuting attorney as least accurate.
However, Snyder and Larsen (1972) found no differences in acceptance when the
subject was told that the test scorer was either a person or a computer. This finding
was supported by Orpen and Jamotte (1975) who again used a computer, a psycho-
logist, and a student, and found no differential acceptance. Furthermore, Weinberger
and Bradley (1980) found that a subject's acceptance of feedback was not affected by
the type of test or the assessment device employed. Recently Baillargeon and Danis
(1984) who investigated the effects of assessment devices of computer and human
origin on subject's acceptance of favorable and unfavorable feedback reported that
there was no evidence of such interaction. This lack of effect of test conditioning has
also been supported by other reseach. Lattal and Lattal (1967), for example, reported
that a critical lecture on the personality test used in their study failed to affect
acceptance levels. Snyder and Shenkel (1976) also reported no differential effect on
acceptance of the form of delivery of feedback, whether oral or written.
However, Merrens and Richards (1973), when investigating the effect of length of
the assessment devices on acceptance, did find a significant effect. They presented
subjects with generalized personality interpretations based on personality invento-
Furnham and Schofield 173

ries that differed in length, and found that the shorter inventory was seen as more
efficient than the other two longer forms.
Nevertheless, it would seem that the main body of research indicates a general lack
of effect of test-type on the Barnum effect. However, situational effects may be more
important. Carrier (1963) has suggested that the "classroom situation" employed in
his study may influence acceptance levels. This argument has also been forwarded by
Dana and Graham (1976). Indeed a study by Snyder and Clair (1977) demonstrated
that situational insecurity, as well as trait insecurity, led to greater acceptance of
diagnostician feedback. Thus the test situation may play a very significant role in the
Barnum effect. The interaction of test situation, with the source status of the clinical
may also be significant, as suggested in the "Clinician Status and Source Prestige"
section, above; for example, in the case of student subjects, faith in their psychologist
professors who carry out the tests, and the very fact that the setting is an educational
one where these very professors are also often the people who assess and mark
students' work, is likely to lead to acceptance of feedback presented by these pro-
fessors (Dana & Graham, 1976). However, considerably more research needs to be
done on specific situational variables (testing in groups vs. alone) and experimenter
effects on acceptance of feedback.
Thus, although it can be concluded from the research that the actual assessment
device procedures and test conditions or format may not have a significant effect,
critical features in the actual test situation may be extremely significant in explaining
the Barnum effect.
A critical review of the literature in this field therefore indicates that the effect of
the nature of the feedback statements and the test situation are the most important
factors in predicting the acceptance of personality feedback. Indeed, favorability of
feedback seems to be very influential on the acceptance phenomenon. Recent re-
search on the universality of statements, the perceived uniqueness of these state-
ments for the individual, and the base-rate accuracy of these statements has cast
doubt on the previous research which led Snyder et al. (1977) to conclude that
feedback which was of a general and favorable nature with a high base-rate accuracy
and which was presented as being unique to the individual would elicit the accep-
tance phenomenon (albeit that it was bogus). However, the actual test situation does
seem to be significant in eliciting the Barnum effect. Together with aforementioned
research which suggests subjects can discriminate the nature of Barnum feedback
(correct, incorrect, bogus) if asked the right questions (e.g., Greene, 1977, 1978), it
may be that the testing situations or conditions are the most significant factor in the
explanation of the Barnum effect.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT AND MEASUREMENT

Many applied psychologists in the clinical, educational, and occupational fields

are required to give their clients feedback on variously administered personality
tests. Client reaction to this feedback (acceptance, rejection, fascination, or anger)
may seriously affect the professional relationship and there is, not unnaturally, a
174 Current Psychological Research & Reviews / Summer 1987

certain amount of difficulty in giving clients negative feedback. Thus, many practi-
tioners face the dilemma of giving what they see to be valid and accurate (but
sometimes negative) feedback (from tests, interviews, insights) that may not be ac-
cepted as true (useful, etc.) as opposed to ambiguous, generalized, positive feedback
which clients will accept. Yet as Layne (1978) notes, clinicians should not always
interpret client rejection and criticism of feedback as evidence of the invalidity of
interpretations. "For example, the defensive client's critism of the feedback 'You are
defensive' appears to be evidence of the validity of this descriptor" (p. 96). However,
it may be just as unwise to infer test validity from client rejection as it may be to infer
invalidity from acceptance!
Early studies of Barnum effect suggested that client acceptance was enhanced if
they were gullible, insecure, and unsophisticated, yet dealing with a high status
clinician who delivered brief, ambiguous, positive feedback supposedly specifically
developed for a particular client. This of course explains the popularity of parap-
sychologists (astrologers, graphologists, phrenologists, etc.). If psychologists deliver
lengthy, moderately unambiguous negative feedback to moderately sophisticated
clients, they may well be less well received and their profession and their tests se-
riously challenged.
The question of the usefulness of importance of a client's reaction to personality
feedback is not only important for the professional psychologist, but also for the
researcher. To what extent can a personality researcher rely on reactions to feedback
as a source of test validity? That is, can rejection of personality interpretations be
used to evaluate a test and the theory behind it?
Early research on the Barnum effect, and a considerable amount since, used the
same stimulus material--notably sentences derived from Forer (1949). Dickson and
Kelly (1985) have quite rightly called for new, improved Barnum profiles and studies
done on groups other than students. Stagner (1958) in a study using this material
found 63% of his sample of adult personnel managers believed the feedback given to
them in the first statement wwas "amazingly accurate" while 49% thought the second
statement amazingly accurate. These or similar feedback statements were used in a
great number of the above reviewed studies (e.g., Dmitruk et al., 1973; Lattal &
Lattal, 1967; Snyder & Clair, 1977; Snyder & Larsen, 1972; Ulrich et al., 1963).
Because many studies showed that subjects accepted this bogus, generalized, and
ambiguous feedback as accurate, many tended to agree with Forer (1949) who con-
cluded: "Validation of a test instrument or of a personality sketch by means of
personal validation is a fallacious procedure which presupposes objectivity of self-
evaluation and an understanding of other persons on the part of a client" (p. 122). Yet
recent studies have shown that subjects accurately recognize the triviality and base-
rate accuracy of these statements as Barnum feedback is more accurate and socially
desireable than real feedback (Schroeder & Lesyk, 1976; Layne, 1979).
False extrapolations from experiments done on bogus feedback have often been
made to situations in which real feedback is offered. As Dana and Graham (1976)
have noted: "A conclusion from this research using false feedback is that college
students are gullible, perhaps because they attempt--in good faith--to trust our
Furnham and Schofield 175

motives and to honor our adult and professional attentions in the academic setting as
being in their own best educational interests. Thus, a research area predicted on
Barnum interpretations does not pertain to the matter of feedback of relevant per-
sonality information derived from assessment procedures" (Dana & Graham, 1976,
p. 465). More recent studies have shown that when using real tests subjects are able to
discriminate accurate from inaccurate feedback. Layne (1979) and Layne and Ally
(1980) found the more accurate the descriptor, the more highly it was accepted, while
Schroeder and Lesyk (1976) using the MMPI and asking subjects to make specific
judgments about a statement's informational value, usefulness, social desirability,
and typicalness found judges were able to discriminate betweeen bona fide and
Barnum statements. Similarly Hampson et al. (1978) found subjects can distinguish
true from false personality descriptors yet perceived astrological statements as accu-
rate descriptors of most people including themselves, while Furnham and Henderson
(1983) found people are fairly good at predicting some of their own personality
scores. Most recently Harris and Greene (1984) found students could reliably dis-
criminate the three of feedback (Actual CPI derived; Trivial Barnum type; Inverse
Opposite Actual CPI derived) on the dimensions of uniqueness, usefulness, accuracy
and as a source of new information about themselves. This replicated an earlier
study (Greene et al. 1979) that found much the same result. Yet on one test (the
Personality Research Form) Dies (1972) found subjects were unable to discriminate
between genuine and fictitious personality feedback, and in a more celebrated paper
Sundberg (1955) found that subjects were unable to pick out their own bona fide
personality description at better than the chance level. The apparent contradiction
between these studies may have been due to the methodological differences, par-
ticularly the comparative sophistication and sensitivity of more modern multivariate
measures to older, less sensitive tests.
What is being suggested, therefore, is that it may be invalid to generalize from the
studies using Barnum statements to situations where subjects are given accurate
feedback based on genuine psychometrically valid test results. More recently studies
have challenged various aspects of the typical Barnum statements, particularly their
base-rate accuracy (Greene, Baucom, & Macom, 1980) and favorablility (Halperin et
al., 1976). Furthermore, the methodology of early studies often left much to be
desired--for instance, many experiments (e.g., Ulrich et al., 1963) asked subjects to
"rate the interpretation of your personality according to the following scale: excel-
lent, good, average, poor, very poor" (p. 831). Such a simple rating tells very little of
the criterion used by the subjects--accurate, interesting, insightful, etc.
Since the last major review of this literature (Snyder et al., 1977) which tended to
the view that because so many irrelevant personal and situational factors played a
part in the acceptance of personality interpretations as accurate, feedback accep-
tance could never be a criterion of acceptance, researchers have tended more to the
view that if asked the appropriate questions and given the choice between accurate,
inaccurate, and trivial information subjects (or clients) can detect correct feedback.
Few, if any, argue that personal or feedback acceptance should be the only criterion of
validation, or indeed that it is particularly accurate, but that previous research using
176 Current Psychological Research & Reviews /Summer 1987

Barnum statements does not generalize to actual test feedback. Others have sug-
gested various new avenues of research. Dickson and Kelly (1985) suggest various
situational phenomena such as selective memory effects and hindsight bias as topics
worthy of pursuing as well as more work on the potentially self-fulfilling nature of
personality feedback. Furnham, Borovoy, and Henley (1986) have focused on selec-
tive recall of personality feedback, which indeed suggests it is a potentially powerful
way of examining personality and self-perception. Another is to have subjects delib-
erately fake personality profiles so showing their implicit beliefs about their own or
others personality functioning (Furnham, 1986).
One of the most consistent themes in the whole of psychology is the study of
human errors--be it attributional errors in the causal explanation of one's own or
others' behavior or errors in statistical inference and judgment under uncertainty.
Thus, it has been shown that people tend to attribute the causes of their own behavior
to external/situational causes but that of others to internal causes (actor-observer
differences). It is quite possible that subjects accept feedback about themselves if
attributions are in positive (i.e., positive characteristics attributed to internal fea-
tures; negative characteristics to external features) direction. That is, Barnum state-
ments may simply be emphasizing attribution errors. But it may be that some of
these errors are highly adaptive. Also, work on self-esteem and depression seems to
suggest a stress on positive, rather than negative, self-image as characteristic of"nor-
mal" people and itself adaptive. Thus, social and clinical psychological studies point
to various sources of error in people's attribution for, memory of, and indeed feed-
back acceptance of personality characteristics.
Early research on the Barnum effect seemed to suggest that people also made
serious errors in accepting bogus information about themselves as accurate.
However, later studies using genuine feedback, more sensitive questioning and more
powerful statistics have suggested that people are not as naive as heretofore pre-
sumed. This is not to suggest that the warning for therapists and researchers in the
Barnum Effect literature should be ignored. Nor is it to suggest the personal or
acceptance validation should be used exclusively or primarily as material with which
to validate a theory or measurement tool (Bayne, 1980). However, to reject all feed-
back validation from genuine instruments would seem rash, if not foolish.
Although much of the concern about the Barnum effect has been expressed by
clinical psychologists (most of the early work was published in clinical journals)
because of the pressures on psychotherapists to maintain good relationships with
their clients, most of the research has been with students doing pencil and paper
tests. Snyder and Shenkel (1975) have written that "a comfortable collaborative
illusion emerges, formed between the buyer and the seller of the test results, psycho-
logical advice, astrological reading, or handwriting analysis" (p. 54). This certainly
may be true of the latter three categories, but not of the former. Few, if any, psycho-
metrically devised and assessed psychological tests are validated by feedback or
personal acceptance.
NOTE
Date of acceptance for publication: October 17, 1986. Address for correspondence: Dr. Adrian Furnham, Depart-
ment of Psychology, University College London, 26 Bedford Way, London WC1H OAP, United Kingdom.
Furnham and Schofield 177

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