Vda. de Ouano vs.
Republic
G.R. NO. 168770, 9 FEBRUARY 2011
FACTS:
1. In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAA’s predecessor agency pursued a program to expand the Lahug Airport in
Cebu City.
2. As an assurance from the government, there is a promise of reconveyance or repurchase of said property so long as Lahug ceases its
operation or transfer its operation to Mactan – Cebu Airport.
3. Some owners refused to sell, and that the Civil Aeronautics Administration filed a complaint for the expropriation of said properties
for the expansion of the Lahug Airport.
4. The trial court then declared said properties to be used upon the expansion of said projects and order for just compensation to the
land owners, at the same time directed the latter to transfer certificate or ownership or title in the name of the plaintiff.
5. At the end of 1991, Lahug Airport completely ceased its operation while the Mactan-Cebu airport opened to accommodate incoming
and outgoing commercial flights.
6. This then prompted the land owners to demand for the reconveynace of said properties being expropriated by the trial court under
the power of eminent domain. Hence these two consolidated cases arise.
7. In G.R. No. 168812 MCIAA is hereby ordered by court to reconvey said properties to the land owners plus attorney’s fee and cost of
suit, while in G.R. No. 168770, the RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners Oaunos and against the MCIAA for the reconveynace o f their
properties but was appealed by the latter and the earlier decision was reversed, the case went up to the CA but the CA affirmed the
reversed decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
 Should MCIAA reconvey the lands to petitioners? YES
HELD:
The notion that the government via expropriation proceedings acquires unrestricted ownership over or a fee simple title to the covered land is
no longer tenable. Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by way of an
unconditional purchase and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In
that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is really no occasion to apply the “fee simple concept” if the transfer is
conditional.
The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose. Once the
purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion subject of course to the
return at the very least of the just compensation received.
In expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will. The mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly
followed such that the state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be
specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the complaint.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of “usefulness, utility, or
advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public].” If the genuine public necessity—the very reason or condition as it were—
allowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the government’s
retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use very much
different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the
state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that
citizen’s own private gain, is offensive to our laws.
The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases and in the process dishonor the ju dgment of
expropriation. A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it
should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if the
latter so desires.
Hence, equity and justice demand the reconveyance by MCIAA of the litigated lands in question to the Ouanos and Inocians. In the same
token, justice and fair play also dictate that the Ouanos and Inocian return to MCIAA what they received as just compensation for the
expropriation of their respective properties plus legal interest to be computed from default, which in this case should run from the time MCIAA
complies with the reconveyance obligation.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY
G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011
BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
 Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation), NPC
undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao. The project included
the construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric
plants.[2]
 1997: Respondents sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the
payment of just compensation
 Allegations: that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the
operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land
 that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent; that the presence of the
tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land
 NPC’s Answer: the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which a
mere legal easement on their land was established; that their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already
prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous
easement, any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years
 RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs finding that an underground tunnel was constructed therein
 Ordered NPC to pay P113,532,500.00 as actual damages or just compensation
 NPC to pay rental fees
 the RTC issued a supplemental decision stating that respondents’ land or properties are condemned in favor of defendant National
Power Corporation, upon payment of the aforesaid sum
 the Heirs of Macabangkit filed an urgent motion for execution of judgment pending appeal. [9]
 The RTC granted the motion and issued a writ of execution
 NPC assailed such decision by filing a writ by petition for certiorari in the CA
 CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC
Rationale:
 the testimonies of NPCs witness Gregorio Enterone and of the respondents witness Engr. Pete Sacedon, the topographic
survey map, the sketch map, and the ocular inspection report sufficiently established the existence of the underground
tunnel traversing the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit
 Section 3(i) of R.A. No. 6395, being silent about tunnels, did not apply to the present case
 Contention of NPC: the CA should have applied Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, which provided a period of only five years from
the date of the construction within which the affected landowner could bring a claim against it; and that even if Republic Act No.
6395 should be inapplicable, the action of the Heirs of Macabangkit had already prescribed due to the underground tunnel being
susceptible to acquisitive prescription after the lapse of 10 years pursuant to Article 620 of the Civil Code due to its being a
continuous and apparent legal easement under Article 634 of the Civil Code.
 National Power Corporation (NPC) seeks the review on certiorari of the decision of the CA
ISSUE: WON NPC is liable for payment of just compensation?
RULING: Yes.
1. Factual findings of the RTC are binding since it was affirmed by the RTC
 the evidence on the tunnel was substantial, for the significance of the topographic survey map and the sketch map (as
indicative of the extent and presence of the tunnel construction) to the question on the existence of the tunnel was
strong
 These two (2) pieces of documentary evidence readily point the extent and presence of the tunnel construction coming
from the power cavern near the small man-made lake which is the inlet and approach tunnel, or at a distance of about
two (2) kilometers away from the land of the plaintiffs-appellees, and then traversing the entire and the whole length of
the plaintiffs-appellees property, and the outlet channel of the tunnel is another small man-made lake
 The ocular inspection done by the RTC actually confirmed the existence of the tunnel
2. Five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 does not apply to claims for just compensation
 prescription did not bar the present action to recover just compensation
 Section 3(i) includes no limitation except those enumerated after the term works. Accordingly, the
term works is considered as embracing all kinds of constructions, facilities, and other developments that
can enable or help NPC to meet its objectives of developing hydraulic power expressly provided under
paragraph (g) of Section 3.[23] The CAs restrictive construal of Section 3(i) as exclusive of tunnels was
obviously unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to development works easily discoverable or on
the surface of the earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels
 the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an
action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case
 validity of their TCT No. RT-11603. RTC rendered an order in favour of the private respondents. A subsequent petition for certiorari was denied in
JUST COMPENSATION (inverse condemnation) DAMAGES the appellate court. Hence, this petition.
has the objective to recover the value of seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through
property taken in fact by the governmental damages, which may be actual, moral, ISSUE:
defendant, even though no formal exercise of nominal, temperate, liquidated, or CAN THE COURT IN THE SAME EXPROPRIATION PROCEEDING BE GIVEN AUTHORITY TO ADJUDICATE ON THE OWNERSHIP OF A
the power of eminent domain has been exemplary PROPERTY?
attempted by the taking agency.
Just compensation is the full and fair When a right is exercised in a manner not HELD:
equivalent of the property taken from its conformable with the norms enshrined in YES. petitioner may be allowed to present evidence to assert its ownership over the subject property, but for the sole purpose of determining
owner by the expropriator. The measure is not Article 19[28] and like provisions on human who is entitled to just compensation. That the court is empowered to entertain the conflicting claims of ownership of the condemned or sought
the takers gain, but the owner’s loss. The relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise to be condemned property and adjudge the rightful owner thereof, in the same expropriation case, is evident from Section 9 of the Revised Rule
word just is used to intensify the meaning of results to the damage of another, a legal 69, which provide inter alia that “court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation X X X or the benefit of the persons adjudged in the
the word compensation in order to convey the wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is same proceeding to be entitled thereto.” (Emphasis Supplied).
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the held responsible In fact, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming ownership of the properties to be expropriated would
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, not preclude the commencement of the action nor prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such
full, and ample eventuality, that the entity exercising the right of eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true ownership of the property cannot
Basis: Constitution statutory enactments be ascertained or specified with accuracy.
arises from the exercise by the State of its emanates from the transgression of a right
power of eminent domain against private If at all, this situation is akin to ejectment cases in which a court is temporarily authorized to determine ownership, if only to determine who is
property for public use entitled to possession. This is not conclusive, and it remains open to challenge through proper actions. The consequences of Sec. 9, Rule 67
cannot be avoided, as they are due to the intimate relationship of the issue of ownership with the claim for the expropriation payment.
 Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel, NPC should have first moved to acquire the land
from the Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary tender to purchase or through formal expropriation
proceedings. In either case, NPC would have been liable to pay to the owners the fair market value of the
land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395 expressly requires NPC to pay the fair market value of such Title: Sy v Local Government of QC
property at the time of the taking GR No. 202690
3. The construction constitutes taking of the land as to entitle the owners to just compensation Date: June 5, 2013
 there was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe, J.
dispossessed.
 It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical Parties:
taking or appropriation.[36] Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, petitioner: Henry L. Sy
or occupancy but may still amount to a taking respondent: Local Government of Quezon City
 As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land
 Just compensation was based on the valuation of the OIC of the City Assessors Office who testified that, within that Facts:
area, that area is classified as industrial and residential. That plaintiffs land is adjacent to many subdivisions and that is November 7, 1996, the City through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, filed a complaint for expropriation with the RTC in order to acquire a 1,000 sq.
within the industrial classification. He also issued a certificate stating that the appraised value of plaintiffs land ranges m. parcel of land, owned and registered under the name of Henry Sy, which was intended to be used as a site for several government activities.
fromP400.00 to P500.00 per square meter March 18,1997, pursuant to Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), the City deposited the amount pf P241,090 with the Office
 the fixing of just compensation must be based on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the of the Clerk of Court, representing 15% of the fair market value of the subject property based on its tax declaration. Sy did not question the right
complaint, instead of reckoning from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395 to expropriate the property but only the amount of just compensation. The RTC tasked 3 commissioners to determine the proper amount of just
 Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or compensation. It was decided by 2 of them that it should be P5, 500 per sq. m. to be computed from the date of the filing of the expropriation
when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross complaint (November 7, 1996). On the other hand, 1 said that the amount should be P13,500 per sq. m.
unfairness already caused to the owners by NPCs entering without the intention of formally expropriating The RTC ruled that just compensation should be P5, 500 per sq. m. It also didn’t award damages and back rentals in favor of Sy. For equity
the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit considerations, 6% legal interest was awarded computed from the date of the filing of the expropriation until full payment of just compensation.
 NPCs entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling with the modification that the City should pay Sy the amount of P200, 000 as exemplary damages (because the
the inverse condemnation proceedings City took the property without even initiating expropriation proceedings) and attorney’s fees equivalent to 1% of the total amount due. Sy was
denied payment for back rentals and damages for shelved plans of utilization.
Both Sy and the City’s motion for reconsiderations were denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in upholding the amount of just compensation, its grant of 6% legal interest, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees-PARTLY
Ratio:
Republic VS Hon. Samson- Tatad
G.R. No. 187677 April 17, 2013 Rate of legal interest and time of accrual:
Ponente: Sereno, CJ. The correct legal interest is 12% owing to the nature of the City’s obligation as an effective forbearance. It was held in Republic v. CA that “the
debt incurred by the government on account of the taking of the property subject of an expropriation constitutes and effective forbearance
FACTS: which therefore, warrants the application of the 12% legal interest.” Also, legal interest should accrue from the time of the “taking” of the
On 13 July 2001, petitioner, represented by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), filed a Complaint against several property in 1986 (when the property was already used as a Barangay day care and office) and not from the filing of the complaint for
defendants, including private respondents, for the expropriation of several parcels of land affected by the construction of t he EDSA-Quezon expropriation on November 7, 1996. The lack of proper authorization, i.e. resolution to effect expropriation, did not affect the character of the
Avenue Flyover. During the pendency of the proceedings, petitioner received a letter dated from the reporting that the subject property was City’s taking of the subject property in 1986. There is “taking’ when the owner is actually deprived of the use of his property thus, the legal
government land. Petitioner was therefore prompted to file an Amended Complaint seeking to limit the coverage of the area conforming to the character of the City’s action as one of “taking” did not change.
findings, and thereafter filed a Manifestation and Motion to have the subject property declared or considered of uncertain ownership or subject Because of such irregularity in the actual “taking” and filing of the expropriation proceedings, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees should be
to conflicting claims. RTC inter alia admitted the Amended Complaint and declared the property a subject of conflicting claims. Private awarded to the landowner for equity purposes. MIAA v. Rodriguez states that “these are wanton and irresponsible acts which should be
respondents interposed objections, saying that petitioner was barred from presenting the evidence, as it constituted a collateral attack on the suppressed and corrected. Hence the award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees is in order.”
With regard to the amount of just compensation, the P5, 500 per sq. m. cannot be sustained. This was derived from documents that were issued
in 1996. Valuation should be based as of the time of the taking which was in 1986. Thus, the case should be remanded to the RTC for proper
assessment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The CA decision is SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the RTC.
Secretary of DPWH vs Heracleo
Case Digest GR 179334 Apr 21 2015
Facts:
Spouses “Heracleo” are the co-owners of a land which is among the private properties traversed by MacArthur Highway in Bulacan, a
government project undertaken sometime in 1940. The taking was taken without the requisite expropriation proceedings and without their
consent.
In 1994, Heracleo demanded the payment of the fair market value of the property. The DPWH offered to pay 0.70 centavos per sqm., as
recommended by the appraiser committee of Bulacan. Unsatisfied, Heracleo filed a complaint for recovery of possession with damages.
Favorable decisions were rendered by the RTC and the CA, with valuation of P 1,500 per sqm and 6% interest per annum from the time of filing of
the until full payment. The SC Division reversed the CA ruling and held that computation should be based at the time the property was taken in
1940, which is 0.70 per sqm. But because of the contrasting opinions of the members of the Division and transcendental importance of the issue,
the case was referred to the En Banc for resolution.
Issue 1: W/N the taking of private property without due process should be nullified
No. The government’s failure to initiate the necessary expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot simply invalidate the State’s
exercise of its eminent domain power, given that the property subject of expropriation is indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy
imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise of lack of due
process would certainly diminish or weaken one of the State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of which is to serve the greater good.
Thus, the non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left to the
landowner is the right of compensation.
Issue 2: W/N compensation is based on the market value of the property at the time of taking
Yes. While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to receive an outdated valuation, the long-established rule is that the fair equivalent
of a property should be computed not at the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because the purpose of ‘just compensation’ is not
to reward the owner for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. The owner should be compensated only for what he
actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the property at the time it is taken.
Issue 3: W/N the principle of equity should be applied in this case
No. The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its express terms,
interpretation being called for only when such literal application is impossible. To entertain other formula for computing just compensation,
contrary to those established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of economic policies – a matter which this Court has
no competence to take cognizance of. Equity and equitable principles only come into full play when a gap exists in the law and jurisprudence.
Velasco Dissent:
The State’s power of eminent domain is not absolute; the Constitution is clear that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property
without due process of law. As such, failure of the government to institute the necessary proceedings should lead to failure of taking an
individual’s property. In this case, since the property was already taken, the complainants must be equitably compensated for the loss thereof.
For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the land should be determined from the time the property owners filed the initiatory
complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold otherwise would validate the State’s act as one of expropriation in spite of procedural infirmities
which, in turn, would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To continue condoning such acts would be licensing the government to continue
dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking private property.
G.R. No. 147257 July 31, 2013
SPOUSES JESUS DYCOCO and JOELA E. DYCOCO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NELLY SIAPNOSANCHEZ and INOCENCIO BERMA, 1 Respondents.LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questions, for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the
Resolution2 dated June 2, 2000 of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal of petitioner-spouses Jesus and Joela Dycoco in CA-G.R. SP No.
58504, and the Resolution3 dated January 10, 2001 denying reconsideration.
On November 23, 1994, petitioner-spouses filed a complaint for ejectment, cancellation of certificates of land transfer, damages and injunction
against private respondents Nelly Siapno-Sanchez and Inocencio Berma in the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Albay. Eusebio Siapno, Rogelio Siapno, Felix Sepato, Sr., Leonora Talagtag and Pablo Bonde, Sr. were also
named respondents in the complaint.4
In their complaint, petitioner-spouses alleged that they are the absolute and registered owners of Lot No. 216, a 38,157 sq.m.-parcel of land
situated at Bonbon, Libon, Albay, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. VH-5187 of the Register of Deeds of Albay. According to them,
the respondents named in the complaint took advantage of the liberality of petitioner-spouses, entered the subject property, successfully
registered themselves as tenants for agrarian reform purposes, and occupied and cultivated the property to the prejudice of petitioner-spouses.
Said respondents deprived petitioner-spouses of the enjoyment and possession of the property without paying petitioner-spouses or the Land
Bank the rentals due thereon. Moreover, in violation of agrarian reform laws, said respondents subleased their respective landholdings to other
persons.5
Petitioner-spouses reiterated these matters in their position paper. 6
All seven respondents named in the complaint were summoned but only Bonde and Rogelio submitted their answer and position paper. 7 Bonde
and Rogelio showed that they already own their portions of the property through Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27.
Pursuant to the said law, petitioner-spouses executed deeds of transfer in their favor which resulted in the issuance to them of emancipation
patents and, subsequently, OCT No. E-2333 and OCT No. E-2334, respectively.8
Thereafter, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision dated June 27, 1995 finding private respondents "not worthy to become beneficiaries"
under Presidential Decree No. 27.9 The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding for the complainants, respondents Nelly Siapno-Sanchez, Leonora Talagtag and Inocencio Berma are hereby adjudged not
worthy to become beneficiaries under PD 27; hence, judgment is hereby issued:
1. Ordering the ejectment of Nelly Siapno-Sanchez, Leonora Talagtag, and Inocencio Berma from their respective tillage;
2. Ordering Rogelio Siapno and Pablo Bonde, Sr. to comply with their obligation under the Deeds of Transfer in their favor;
3. Ordering the dismissal of the case against Eusebio Siapno, for lack of evidence; and
4. Ordering the respondents under paragraph 1 to pay complainants jointly and severally nominal damages in the amount of
₱10,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00. 10
On motion of petitioner-spouses, the Provincial Adjudicator issued a writ of execution dated November 22, 1995 ordering, among others, the
ejectment of private respondents from their respective tillage. 11 Subsequently, petitioner-spouses filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of
Execution and to Cite Respondents in Contempt, claiming that private respondents returned to the subject property although they have already
been ordered ejected.12 Private respondents filed a Motion to Quash or Suspend Implementation of the Writ of Execution. They explained that
they are already the owners of their respective portions of the property in question by virtue of the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential
Decree No. 27. According to private respondents, petitioner-spouses executed deeds of transfer in their favor which resulted to the issuance to
them of emancipation patents and, afterwards, OCT No. E-2332 in the name of private respondent Siapno-Sanchez and OCT Nos. E-2335 and E-
2336 in the name of private respondent Berma. Private respondents further asserted that the decision ordering their ejectment from their tillage
is not yet executory as they have filed a notice of appeal on August 29, 1996. 13
Petitioner-spouses submitted their Comments on/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend Implementation of Writ of Execution and Notice
of Appeal Filed by Respondents dated September 16, 1996 and Supplemental Comments [on]/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend
Implementation of Writ of Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents dated October 3, 1996 where they countered private
respondents’ motion by arguing that both the motion to quash and the notice of appeal were filed beyond the prescribed period.14
In an order dated October 16, 1996, the Provincial Adjudicator found that the copy of the decision dated June 27, 1995 was sent by registered
mail to and, on July 10, 1995, received by Crispina Berma Penaranda, daughter of private respondent Berma, who resided in a different barangay.
Still, the Provincial Adjudicator ruled that private respondent Berma was bound by his daughter’s receipt and the decision is already final and
executory as against him. Thus, with respect to him, the notice of appeal was filed out of time. On the other hand, there was no showing that
private respondent Siapno-Sanchez has been served a copy of the decision before she procured a copy of it from the Office of the Provincial
Adjudicator on August 26, 1996. Hence, as regards her, the notice of appeal was filed on time. Therefore, the Provincial Adjudicator denied the
Motion to Quash or Suspend Implementation of the Writ of Execution with respect to private respondent Berma, and approved and granted the
same motion with respect to private respondent Siapno-Sanchez.15
Private respondent Berma moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied. 16 Nevertheless, he joined the appeal memorandum filed by
private respondent Siapno-Sanchez in the DARAB.17 On the other hand, petitioner-spouses filed a Counter-Memorandum With Motion to Dismiss
Appeal dated February 9, 1997, reiterating that private respondents’ appeal was filed out of time. 18
In a decision dated March 20, 2000,19 the DARAB found that both private respondents were beneficiaries of Presidential Decree No. 27 and that
they are no longer tenants but owners of their respective portions of the property as evidenced by OCT No. E-2332 in the name of private
respondent Siapno-Sanchez and OCT Nos. E-2335 and E-2336 in the name of private respondent Berma. Ejectment would therefore not lie as
against them as landholdings covered by the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 do not revert to the original owner. Thus,
the DARAB reversed and set aside the decision dated June 27, 1995 in so far as private respondents were concerned. The immediate
reinstatement of private respondents to their respective landholdings was ordered, as well as their restoration to their original status as owner-
beneficiaries of the landholdings awarded to them pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. 20
Petitioner-spouses received a copy of the DARAB decision on April 3, 2000 and had until April 18, 2000 to file an appeal. They filed a motion in
the Court of Appeals praying for an extension of 30 days within which to file their intended petition. 21 The Court of Appeals granted them an
extension of 15 days, with warning that no further extension will be given. 22 Thus, petitioner-spouses had until May 3, 2000 to file their petition.
Petitioner-spouses filed the petition by registered mail on May 8, 2000. The petition was denied due course and dismissed by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated June 2, 2000. In its entirety, the said resolution reads:
The petition (for review), filed under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is DENIED DUE COURSE and, as a consequence, DISMISSED, for
late filing, as the petition was filed beyond the extended period of fifteen (15) days granted under Resolution dated May 5, 2000, which
resolution was issued pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 43, as follows:
xxxx
"Sec. 4. Period of appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or
from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be
allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court
of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be
granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days" x x x. 23
Petitioner-spouses moved for reconsideration but it was denied in a resolution dated January 10, 2001.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner-spouses invoke the rule of liberality in the construction of the provisions of the Rules of Court. The petition was filed after the period
granted by the Court of Appeals because, on April 10, 2000, they secured the services of a new counsel who still had to study the voluminous
records. They claim that the petition they filed with the Court of Appeals is supported by compelling reasons. According to petitioner-spouses,
they were deprived of their property without just compensation either from the tenant-beneficiaries or from the government. They were also
deprived of due process when the DARAB took cognizance of private respondents’ appeal although it was filed more than one year after the
decision of the Provincial Adjudicator had become final and executory. In view of the said reasons, the Court of Appeals should have given their
petition due course although it was filed five days after the lapse of the extended period.
Petitioner-spouses are wrong.
Firstly, petitioner-spouses are before this Court with a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which is a wrong remedy.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 24 Contrary to the claim of petitioner-spouses in the opening paragraph of their
petition that there was no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than this petition, the right
recourse was to appeal to this Court in the form of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court
of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary injunction or other
provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional
remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
The Resolutions dated June 2, 2000 and January 1, 2001 of the Court of Appeals were final and appealable judgments. In particular, the
Resolution dated June 2, 2000 denied due course to the petition and dismissed it, while the Resolution dated January 1, 2001 denied the motion
for reconsideration of the former Resolution. The said Resolutions disposed of the appeal of petitioner-spouses in a manner that left nothing
more to be done by the Court of Appeals in respect to the said appeal. Thus, petitioner-spouses should have filed an appeal by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in this Court.
The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to
the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of
discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits
the resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of appeal. 25
The failure of petitioner-spouses to file an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court cannot be remedied by the mere expedient of
conjuring grave abuse of discretion to avail of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In Balayan v. Acorda 26 the Court ruled:
It bears emphasis that the special civil action for certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. The Court has often
reminded members of the bench and bar that this extraordinary action lies only where there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. It cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy,
certiorari not being a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is
grave abuse of discretion. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
Certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence. In
this case, petitioner-spouses received the Resolution dated January 1, 2001 on January 19, 2001 27 and, under the rules,28 had until February 5,
2001 to file an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari in this Court. Petitioner-spouses allowed this period to lapse without filing an
appeal and, instead, filed this petition for certiorari on March 16, 2001. 29
Secondly, petitioner-spouses claim that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their appeal on the ground of late
filing. This is also wrong.
The Court of Appeals granted petitioner-spouses a 15-day extension, within which to file their intended petition. The action of the Court of
Appeals was in accordance with Section 4, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Thus, as the original deadline of petitioner-spouses was April 18, 2000,
they had until May 3, 2000 to file their intended petition. Petitioner-spouses, however, filed the petition on May 8, 2000. Petitioner-spouses even
admit that their petition in the Court of Appeals was filed five days after the extended period. 30 It is therefore clear that the Court of Appeals
simply applied the rules, while petitioner-spouses concededly failed to observe the very same rules. As such, the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of
the petition of petitioner-spouses was discretion duly exercised, not misused or abused.
Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should establish that the
respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.31 This is so because "grave abuse of discretion" is well-defined and not an amorphous concept that may easily be manipulated
to suit one’s purpose. In this connection, Yu v. Judge Reyes-Carpio32 is instructive:
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion
when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the
use of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly
void." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act down for having been
done with grave abuse of discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
In this case, nowhere in the petition did petitioner-spouses show that the issuance of the Resolutions dated June 2, 2000 and January 1, 2001 was
patent and gross that would warrant striking them down through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner-spouses
simply framed the issue in this case as follows:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED BY PETITIONERS AND SUBSEQUENTLY DENYING PETITIONERS’
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.33
They did not, however, address the issue. It is noteworthy that aside from a cursory claim in the opening paragraph and paragraph 25 of the
petition that the Resolutions dated June 2, 2000 and January 1, 2001 of the Court of Appeals were "unjust and arbitrary" and "issued in grave
abuse of judicial discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,"34 petitioner-spouses failed to establish grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Court of Appeals. They have not advanced any argument to show that the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously,
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically by reason of passion and hostility. Thus, they failed in their duty to demonstrate with definiteness the
grave abuse of discretion that would justify the proper availment of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Thirdly, petitioner-spouses make it appear that there are compelling reasons to support their petition -- deprivation of property without just
compensation and denial of due process. The petitioner-spouses, however, belatedly raised these issues and failed to substantiate the same.
There is no question that petitioner-spouses are entitled under the law to receive just compensation for the property taken from them and
transferred to private respondents by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. 35 Due process guarantees that taking of private property by the State
for public use should be with payment of just compensation. 36 Unfortunately, petitioner-spouses themselves did not consider the issue of just
compensation as compelling enough because they did not raise it in the complaint or in the position paper which they filed in the Office of the
Provincial Adjudicator.37 They only claimed just compensation for the first time on appeal, that is, when they filed their petition for review with
the Court of Appeals. The settled rule that issues not raised in the proceedings below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal bursts the
bubble that is the alleged compelling nature of petitioner-spouses’ claim. Petitioner-spouses ask for due process, but fairness and due process
dictate that evidence and issues not presented below cannot be taken up for the first time on appeal. 38
On jurisdictional grounds, petitioner-spouses could not validly present for the first time the issue of nonpayment of just compensation in the
Court of Appeals. Under the law, the DARAB has primary, original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving payments for lands awarded
under Presidential Decree No. 27.39
In any event, the right of petitioner-spouses to payment of just compensation does not include reacquisition of ownership and possession of the
property transferred to private respondents pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. Lands acquired under Presidential Decree No. 27 do not
revert to the landowner.40
The due process claim of petitioner-spouses has no leg to stand on.They have had ample opportunity to defend their interests in due
course.41 Stripped to its basic concept, due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the
opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 42 Petitioner-spouses were
given the chance to sufficiently state their case concerning the timeliness of the notice of appeal filed by private respondents. In particular, they
submitted to the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator their Comments on/Opposition to the Motion to Quash/Suspend Implementation of Writ of
Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents dated September 16, 1996 and Supplemental Comments on/Opposition to the Motion to
Quash/Suspend Implementation of Writ of Execution and Notice of Appeal Filed by Respondents dated October 3, 1996 where they argued that
both the motion to quash and the notice of appeal of private respondents were filed beyond the prescribed period. 43 In the DARAB level,
petitioner-spouses filed a Counter-Memorandum With Motion to Dismiss Appeal dated February 9, 1997 where they again pointed out that the
appeal of private respondents was filed out of time. 44 Thus, petitioner-spouses cannot correctly claim that they were not heard on the
matter.1âwphi1
More importantly, it has already been found that the notice of appeal was filed on time, particularly with respect to private respondent Siapno-
Sanchez.45 To question such finding is to raise a question of fact. However, it is settled that questions of fact cannot be raised in an original action
for certiorari.46 Only established or admitted facts can be considered. 47 In this connection, it has been established that the copy of the Provincial
Adjudicator’s decision dated June 27, 1995 was sent by registered mail to and received by private respondent Berma’s daughter who lived in
another barangay.48 Such receipt by Berma’s daughter cannot be validly considered as service of the Provincial Adjudicator’s decision on Berma.
Sections 4 and 9, Rule V of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure, which became effective on June 22, 1994, provides:
SECTION 4. Service of Pleadings, Notices and Resolutions. – a) The party filing the pleading shall serve the opposing party with a copy thereof in
the manner provided for in these Rules and proof of such service shall be filed with the records of the case; and
b) Summons, notices and copies of resolutions, orders or decisions shall be served personally as far as practicable, or by registered mail upon the
party himself, his counsel, or his duly authorized representative. However, notice to the counsel is notice to the party himself whether he be a
complainant or petitioner, or a defendant or respondent.
xxxx
SECTION 9. Proof of Completeness of Service. – The return is a prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered mail is
completed upon receipt by the addressee, his counsel, or by the duly authorized representative or agent. (Emphases supplied.)
At that time, private respondent Berma had neither counsel nor duly authorized representative. Therefore, the copy of the Provincial
Adjudicator’s decision should have been served on Berma personally or by registered mail. As it was sent by registered mail to private
respondent Berma as the addressee, service thereof could only have been completed upon receipt by Berma. As it was not received by private
respondent Berma but by his daughter who resided in another barangay, there was no proper and completed service of the Provincial
Adjudicator’s decision on Berma. Thus, with respect to him, the notice of appeal was also filed on time.
Petitioner-spouses primarily anchor this petition on an invocation of the rule on liberality in the construction of procedural rules. However, the
"liberal construction rule" is not a license to disregard procedural requirements. Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only
when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. 49 Petitioner-spouses caused their own predicament when they decided to
change horses in midstream and engaged the services of their present counsel on April 10, 2000 or just a week before the expiration of the
period to appeal in the Court of Appeals, discharging the services of their former counsel who handled the case from the level of the Provincial
Adjudicator to the DARAB. They cannot escape the consequences of a belated appeal caused by the need of their new counsel for more time to
study voluminous records and familiarize himself with the case. Moreover, as shown above, petitioner-spouses not only failed to show any
persuasive reason why they should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules when they filed their petition for review in the Court of
Appeals beyond the prescribed period. They again disregarded the rules in various ways absent any compelling reason when they filed this
petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
HERMANO OIL MANUFACTURING & SUGAR CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
TOLL REGULA TORY BOARD, ENGR. JAIME S. DUMLAO, JR., PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (PNCC) and DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Respondents.
G.R. No. 167290 November 26, 2014
PONENTE: Bersamin
TOPIC: Easement of right of way, due process, equal protection, eminent domain
FACTS:
The petitioner owned a parcel of land located at the right side of the Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX. The parcel of land was bounded by an
access fence along the NLEX. In its letter, the petitioner requested that respondent Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) grant an easement of right of
way, contending that it had been totally deprived of the enjoyment and possession of its property by the access fence that had barred its entry
into and exit from the NLEX. However, the TRB denied the petitioner’s request.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner has the right to demand access to the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) by way of an easement of right of way.  Area being expropriated only covered the portion directly affected by the transmission lines
2. Whether or not the limited access imposed on the petitioner’s property may be considered as a compensable taking due to the exercise of the  Remaining portion of the property was also affected because the transmission line passed through the center of the land, thereby
power of eminent domain. dividing the land into 3 lots
 Presence of the high tension transmission line had rendered the entire property inutile for any future use and capabilities
 NONETHELESS, they tendered no objection provided it would pay just compensation not only for the portion sought to be
HELD:
expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project;
 Their property is an industrial land
First issue: NO  Sought:
o Dismissal of the complaint
o Payment of P1K/sq. m. & attorney’s fees
The putting up of the access fence on the petitioner’s property was in the valid exercise of police power, assailable only upon proof that o To be allowed to nominate their representative to the panel of commissioners to be appointed by the trial court
such putting up unduly violated constitutional limitations like due process and equal protection of the law. In Mirasol v. De partment of Public
Works and Highways, the Court has further noted that: PRE-TRIAL was conducted and the parties stipulated on the location, number of heirs, names of the person upon whom title to the property was
issued, and the ownership & possession of the property.
A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to promote the fastest access to certain destinations, its use, operation, and  RTC directed the parties to submit names of their nominees to sit in the panel of commissions within 10 days from the date of pre-
maintenance require close regulation. Public interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not apply to trial
ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it.
RTC constituted the panel of 3 commissioners.
 2 commissioners submitted a joint report, and found:
Clearly, therefore, the access fence was a reasonable restriction on the petitioner’s property given the location thereof at the right side o property was classified industrial land located within the Industrial 2 Zone
of Sta. Rita Exit of the NLEX. Although some adjacent properties were accorded unrestricted access to the expressway, there was a valid and o although it is used to be an agricultural land, it was reclassified to industrial for appraisal/taxation purposes
reasonable classification for doing so because their owners provided ancillary services to motorists using the NLEX, like gasoline service stations o Reclassification was made on the basis of a certification issued by the Zoning Administrator
and food stores. A classification based on practical convenience and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it may lack  2 commissioners appraised the value @ P550/sq. m.
purely theoretical or scientific uniformity.  3rd commissioner filed a separate report
o Recommended the payment of easement fee of at least 10% of the assessed value indicated in the tax declaration +
Second issue: NO damages + improvements affected + tower occupancy

Parties submitted their OBJECTIONS:

The limited access imposed on the petitioner’s property did not partake of a compensable taking due to the exercise of the po wer  HEIRS - NAPOCOR should compensate them for the entire property at the rate of P550.00/ sq. m. because the the property was
of eminent domain. There is no question that the property was not taken and devoted for public use. Instead, the property was subjected to a already classified as industrial land at the time NAPOCOR entered it
certain restraint, i.e. the access fence, in order to secure the general safety and welfare of the motorists using the NLEX. There being a clear and  NAPOCOR – insisted that the property was classified as agricultural land at the time of its taking, and only seeking an easement of
valid exercise of police power, the petitioner was certainly not entitled to any just compensation. right of way over a portion of the property, not the entire area so, it should only pay 10% of the assessed value of the portion

RTC DECISION:
 Price to be paid – value at the time of taking, which is the date of entry to the property or the date of the filing of the complaint
REPUBLIC OF THE PH, represented by the NAPOCOR v.
o There is no evidence as to when NAPOCOR entered so the reference point should be the date of filing – May 5, 1995
HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON and CA
 Gave more weight to the Joint Report of the 2 commissioners
GR No. 165354 12 January 2015
o NOTE: the 2 commissioners who submitted the Joint Report are gov’t EE, while the one who has a separate report is a
By Kylie Dado
private lawyer representing the plaintiff
 Ordered NAPOCOR to pay:
FACTS:
1. Just compen for the whole area (14K sq. m.) @ the rate of P550/sqm
2. Legal rate of interest from May 5 until full payment
NAPOCOR entered a property in Brgy. San Isidro, Batangas
3. Costs of suit
 In order to construct and maintain transmission lines for the 230 KV Mahabang Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission Project
o The heirs owned the propery (14, 257 sq. m.)
CA DECISION: Affirmed but modified the area to be covered – 6,326 sqm
NAPOCOR appealed.
NAPOCOR filed a COMPLAINT in the RTC-Batangas
 Seeking - acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property involving an area of only 6,326 square meters,
During the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings stating that the negotiations were going on with a view of
more or less
amicable settlement.
 Allegation:
 HOWEVER, a year after, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to DISCONTINUE Expropriation Proceedings as:
o It had negotiated w/ the respondents but they failed to reach any agreement
o they failed to reach an agreement
o It was willing to deposit P9,790.00 representing the assessed value of the portion sought to be expropriated
o property is no longer necessary for public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the transmission lines
 Prayer: installed on the heirs’ property
o Issuance of a writ of possession upon deposit to enable it to:
o public purpose ceased to exist
1. Enter and take possession and control of the affected portion of the property
o prayed that the compensation be reduced by the equivalent of the benefit they received from the land during the time
2. Demolish all improvements existing
of its occupation
3. Commence construction of the transmission line project
o Basis in dismissing the proceedings: Metropolitan Water District vs. De Los Angeles, land sought to be expropriated was
4. Appointment of 3 commissioners to determine just compensation
no longer “indispensably necessary” in the maintenance and operation of petitioner’s waterworks system
Heirs’ ANSWER:
ISSUE: W/N THE EXPROPRIATTION PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE DISCONTINUED/DISMISSED PENDING APPEAL
 NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering the property (Entry w/o consent), destroying some fruit trees without
payment, and installing 5 woodpoles for its project SC: YES

Public use is the fundamental basis for the action for expropriation; hence, NAPOCOR’s motion to discontinue the proceedings is warranted and
should be granted.
As discussed in the case of Metropolitan Water District vs. De Los Reyes:
The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent domain, is public use. That being
true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must
necessarily fail and should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the expropriation is for some
public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings.
 It is notable in that case that it was made subject to several conditions in order to address the dispossession of the defendants of
their land, and the inconvenience, annoyance and damages suffered by the defendants on account of the proceedings. Accordingly,
the Court remanded the case to the trial court for the issuance of a writ of possession ordering Metropolitan Water District to
immediately return possession of the land to the defendants, and for the determination of damages in favor of the defenda nts, the
claims for which must be presented within 30 days from the return of the record to the court of origin and notice thereof.
In this case, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the ground that the transmission lines constructed on the
respondents’ property had already been retired.
Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To continue
with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the project would result in the rendition of an invalid
judgment in favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public use.
No board resolution to discontinue the proceedings
Despite the lack of the board resolution, therefore, the Court now considers the documents (such as the Memorandum &Certificate of
Inspection/Accomplishment) attached to NAPOCOR’s Manifestation and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings to be sufficient to
establish that the expropriation sought is no longer for some public purpose.
NAPOCOR’s entry without the owner’s consent
NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners’ consent and without paying just compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit
any amount as required by law prior to its entry.
 It would be unfair for NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the time
of entry until the time of restoration of the possession of the property
Liability of NAPOCOR; Reckoning Point
There is sufficient showing that NAPOCOR entered into and took possession of the property as early as in March 1993 without the benefit of first
filing a petition for eminent domain.
 For all intents and purposes, therefore, March 1993 is the reckoning point of NAPOCOR’s taking of the property, instead of May 5,
1995, the time NAPOCOR filed the petition for expropriation. (Basis: Ansaldo vs. Tantuico)
No just compensation, only damages
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the respondents, there is no need to pay “just
compensation” to them because their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR.
 Instead of full market value, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the disturbance of their property rights from the
time of entry in March 1993 until the time of restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory
damages. (Basis: Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr.)
Basis of damages
Basis would be the actual lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use, including the value of the fruit trees,
plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of the transmission lines
Conversion of the proceedings: Expropriation Proceedings  Action for Damages
Court remands the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, with instruction to enable the parties to fully litigate the action for
damages.
BARANGAY SINDALAN, SAN G.R. No. 150640
FERNANDO, PAMPANGA,
rep. by BARANGAY CAPTAIN
ISMAEL GUTIERREZ, Present:
Petitioner,
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE
MAGTOTO III, and PATRICIA Promulgated:
SINDAYAN,
Respondents. March 22, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Expropriation, if misused or abused, would trench on the property rights of individuals without due process of law.
The Case
For review before the Court in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 are the May 30, 2001 Decision [1] and October 26, 2001
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), reversing and setting aside the August 2, 1990 Order [3] of the San Fernando, Pampanga Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 43. The CA Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the May 30, 2001 Decision and in effect, the
appellate court dismissed petitioners Complaint for eminent domain.
The Facts
On April 8, 1983, pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council, petitioner Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
represented by Barangay Captain Ismael Gutierrez, filed a Complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Jose Magtoto III and
Patricia Sindayan, the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117674-R. The Complaint was docketed as
Civil Case No. 6756 and raffled to the San Fernando, Pampanga RTC, Branch 43. Petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents land
into Barangay Sindalans feeder road. The alleged public purposes sought to be served by the expropriation were stated in BarangayResolution
No. 6, as follows:
WHEREAS, said parcels of land shall be used, when acquired, as a barangay feeder road for the agricultural
and other products of the residents, and just as inlet for their basic needs;
WHEREAS, presently, residents have to take a long circuitous dirt road before they can reach the concrete
provincial road, entailing so much time, effort and money, not to mention possible damage and/or spilage
[sic] on the products consigned to or coming from, the market outside the barangay; and
WHEREAS, said lots, used as outlet or inlet road, shall contribute greatly to the general welfare of the people
residing therein social, cultural and health among other things, beside economic. [4]
Petitioner claimed that respondents property was the most practical and nearest way to the municipal road. Pending the resolution
of the case at the trial court, petitioner deposited an amount equivalent to the fair market value of the property. [5]
On the other hand, respondents stated that they owned the 27,000- square meter property, a portion of which is the subject of this
case. In their Memorandum,[6] they alleged that their lot is adjacent to Davsan II Subdivision privately owned by Dr. Felix David and his wife. Prior
to the filing of the expropriation case, said subdivision was linked to MacArthur Highway through a pathway across the land of a certain Torres
family. Long before the passage of the barangay resolution, the wives of the subdivision owner and the barangay captain, who were known to be
agents of the subdivision, had proposed buying a right-of-way for the subdivision across a portion of respondents property. These prospective
buyers, however, never returned after learning of the price which the respondents ascribed to their property.
Respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property was for private use, that is, for the benefit of the homeowners of
Davsan II Subdivision. They contended that petitioner deliberately omitted the name of Davsan II Subdivision and, instead, stated that the
expropriation was for the benefit of the residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to conceal the fact that the access road being proposed to be built
across the respondents land was to serve a privately owned subdivision and those who would purchase the lots of said subdivision. They also
pointed out that under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, it is the subdivision owner who is obliged to provide a feeder road to the subdivision
residents.[7]
 After trial, the court a quo ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises duly considered, the herein plaintiff is hereby
declared as having a lawful right to take the property hereinabove described and sought to be condemned for
the public purpose or use as aforestated, upon payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date
of the filing of the Complaint in this [sic] expropriation proceedings.
Upon the entry of this Order of Condemnation, let three (3) competent and disinterested persons be
appointed as Commissioners to ascertain and report to the Court the just compensation for the property
condemned.[8]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Upon respondents appeal, the CA held:
We are convinced that it is the duty of the subdivision owner to provide the right of way needed by residents
of Davsan II Subdivision as provided for in Section 29 of P.D. 957. Records show that Purok Paraiso, which is
supposed to benefit from this [sic] expropriation proceedings is in reality Davsan II Subdivision as per the
testimony of Ruben Palo, plaintiffs own witness (TSN, p. 12, December 115, 1986) [sic]. Appellants correctly
stated that:
The act of Bo. Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, in effect relieved the owners of Davsan II
Subdivision of spending their own private funds for acquiring a right of way and constructing
the required access road to the subdivision. It spent public funds for such private purpose and
deprived herein defendants-appellants of their property for an ostensible public purpose x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
Complaint for Eminent Domain is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The Issues
Petitioner imputes errors to the CA for (1) allegedly violating its power of eminent domain, (2) finding that the expropriation of the
property is not for public use but for a privately owned subdivision, (3) finding that there was no payment of just compensat ion, and (4) failing to
accord respect to the findings of the trial court. Stated briefly, the main issue in this case is whether the proposed exercise of the power of
eminent domain would be for a public purpose.
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
In general, eminent domain is defined as the power of the nation or a sovereign state to take, or to authorize the taking of, private property for a
public use without the owners consent, conditioned upon payment of just compensation. [10] It is acknowledged as an inherent political right,
founded on a common necessity and interest of appropriating the property of individual members of the community to the great necessities of
the whole community.[11]
The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional provisions: (1) that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or
property without due process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.
However, there is no precise meaning of public use and the term is susceptible of myriad meanings depending on diverse situations. The limited
meaning attached to public use is use by the public or public employment, that a duty must devolve on the person or corporation holding
property appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public with the use intended, and that there must be a right on the part of the
public, or some portion of it, or some public or quasi-public agency on behalf of the public, to use the property after it is condemned.[12] The
more generally accepted view sees public use as public advantage, convenience, or benefit, and that anything which tends to enlarge the
resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote the productive power of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a section of the
state, or which leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new resources for the employment of capital and labor, [which] contributes to
the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community. [13] In this jurisdiction, public use is defined as whatever is beneficially employed
for the community.[14]
It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise of expropriation cannot depend on the numerical count of those to be served or the
smallness or largeness of the community to be benefited. [15] The number of people is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public
use, provided the use is exercisable in common and is not limited to particular individuals. [16] Thus, the first essential requirement for a valid
exercise of eminent domain is for the expropriator to prove that the expropriation is for a public use. In Municipality of Bian v. Garcia, this Court
explicated that expropriation ends with an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation.[17]
Another vital requisite for a valid condemnation is the payment of just compensation to the property owner. In the recent case of APO Fruits
Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,[18] just compensation has been defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator, and that the gauge for computation is not the takers gain but the owners loss. In order for the payment to be just,
it must be real, substantial, full, and ample. Not only must the payment be fair and correctly determined, but also, the Court in Estate of Salud
Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone stressed that the payment should be made within a reasonable time from the taking of the
property.[19] It succinctly explained that without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just inasmuch as the property owner is
being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of the land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss.Thus, once just compensation is finally determined, the expropriator must immediately pay
the amount to the lot owner. In Reyes v. National Housing Authority, it was ruled that 12% interest per annum shall be imposed on the final
compensation until paid.[20] Thus, any further delay in the payment will result in the imposition of 12% interest per annum. However, in the
recent case of Republic v. Lim, the Court enunciated the rule that where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years
from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property.[21]
Since the individual stands to lose the property by compulsion of the law, the expropriation authority should not further prejudice the owners
rights by delaying payment of just compensation. To obviate any possibility of delay in the payment, the expropriator should already make
available, at the time of the filing of the expropriation complaint, the amount equal to the BIR zonal valuation or the fair market value of the
property per tax declaration whichever is higher.
The delayed payment of just compensation in numerous cases results from lack of funds or the time spent in the determination of the legality of
the expropriation and/or the fair valuation of the property, and could result in dismay, disappointment, bitterness, and even rancor on the part
of the lot owners. It is not uncommon for the expropriator to take possession of the condemned property upon deposit of a small amount equal
to the assessed value of the land per tax declaration and then challenge the valuation fixed by the trial court resulting in an expropriate now, pay
later situation. In the event the expropriating agency questions the reasonability of the compensation fixed by the trial court before the appellate
court, then the latter may, upon motion, use its sound discretion to order the payment to the lot owner of the amount equal to the valuation of
the property, as proposed by the condemnor during the proceedings before the commissioners under Sec. 6, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
subject to the final valuation of the land. This way, the damage and prejudice to the property owner would be considerably pared down.
On due process, it is likewise basic under the Constitution that the property owner must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the
issues of public use and just compensation and to present objections to and claims on them. [22] It is settled that taking of property for a private
use or without just compensation is a deprivation of property without due process of law. [23] Moreover, it has to be emphasized that taking of
private property without filing any complaint before a court of law under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or existing laws is patently felonious,
confiscatory, and unconstitutional. Judicial notice can be taken of some instances wherein some government agencies or corporations
peremptorily took possession of private properties and usurped the owners real rights for their immediate use without first instituting the
required court action. Running roughshod over the property rights of individuals is a clear and gross breach of the constitutional guarantee of
due process, which should not be countenanced in a society where the rule of law holds sway.
In the case at bar, petitioner harps on eminent domain as an inherent power of sovereignty similar to police power and taxation. As
a basic political unit, its SangguniangBarangay is clothed with the authority to provide barangay roads and other facilities for public use and
welfare. Petitioner relied on the following cases which held a liberal view of the term public use in recognition of the evolving concept of the
power of eminent domain: Sea v. Manila Railroad Co.; Philippine Columbian Association v. Panis; Sumulong v. Guerrero; Province of Camarines
Sur v. Court of Appeals; and Manosca v. Court of Appeals.[24]
Petitioners delegated power to expropriate is not at issue. The legal question in this petition, however, is whether the taking of the
land was for a public purpose or use. In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private property must be for a
public purpose. A corollary issue is whether private property can be taken by law from one person and given to another in the guise of public
purpose.
In this regard, the petition must fail.
Petitioner alleges that there are at least 80 houses in the place and about 400 persons will be benefited with the use of
a barangay road. The trial court believed that the expropriation will not benefit only the residents of the subdivision, but also the residents of
Sitio or Purok Paraiso and the residents of the entire Barangay of Sindalan x x x. [25]The trial court held that the subdivision is covered
by Sitio or Purok Paraiso which is a part or parcel of Barangay Sindalan. However, this finding was not supported by evidence.On the contrary, it
is Sitio Paraiso which is within Davsan II Subdivision based on the testimony of petitioners own witness, Ruben Palo, as follows:
 Atty. Mangiliman: Mr. Palo, you said that you have been residing at Sitio Paraiso since 1973, is this Sitio
Paraiso within the Davson [sic] Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Atty. Mangiliman: And before you purchased that or at the time you purchased it in 1972, I am referring to
the lot where you are now residing, the Davson [sic] Subdivision did not provide for a road linking
from the subdivision to the barrio road, am I correct?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: And despite [sic] of that you purchased a lot inside Davson [sic] Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Did you not demand from the developer of Davson [sic] Subdivision that he should provide
a road linking from the subdivision to the barrio road of Sindalan?
Witness: No, sir, because I know they will provide for the road.
Atty. Mangiliman: And when you said that they will provide for that road, you mean to tell us that it is the
developer of Davson [sic] Subdivision who will provide a road linking from the subdivision to the
barrio road of Sindalan?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Now, Mr. Witness, you will agree with me that the proposed road which will connect from
Davson [sic] Subdivision to the barrio road of Sindalan would benefit mainly the lot buyers and
home owners of Davson [sic] Subdivision?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: And you also agree with me that there is no portion of Davson [sic] Subdivision which is
devoted to the production of agricultural products?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: When the road which is the subject of this case and sought to be expropriated has not yet
been opened and before a Writ of Possession was issued by the Court to place the plaintiff in this
case in possession, the residents of Davson [sic] Subdivision have other way in going to the barrio
road?
Witness: None, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: In that case Mr. Witness, how do you negotiate or go out of the subdivision in going to the
barrio?
Witness: We passed to the lot own [sic] by Mr. Torres which is near the subdivision in going to the barrio
road, sir.
Atty. Mangiliman: Did you not complain to the owner/developer of the subdivision that he should provide for
a road linking to [sic] his subdivision to the barrio road because there is no available exit from the
said subdivision to the barrio road?
Witness: We have been telling that and he was promising that there will be a road, sir. [26]
Firstly, based on the foregoing transcript, the intended feeder road sought to serve the residents of the subdivision only. It has not
been shown that the other residents of Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga will be benefited by the contemplated road to be
constructed on the lot of respondents spouses Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan. While the number of people who use or can use the
property is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use or purpose, the factual milieu of the case reveals that the intended use
of respondents lot is confined solely to the Davsan II Subdivision residents and is not exercisable in common. [27] Worse, the expropriation will
actually benefit the subdivisions owner who will be able to circumvent his commitment to provide road access to the subdivision in conjunction
with his development permit and license to sell from the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and also be relieved of spending his own funds
for a right-of-way. In this factual setting, the Davsan II Subdivision homeowners are able to go to the barrio road by passing through the lot of a
certain Torres family. Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that the expropriation of respondents lot is for the actual benefit of the Davsan II
Subdivision owner, with incidental benefit to the subdivision homeowners.
The intended expropriation of private property for the benefit of a private individual is clearly proscribed by the Constitution,
declaring that it should be for public use or purpose. In Charles River Bridge v. Warren, the limitation on expropriation was underscored, hence:
Although the sovereign power in free government may appropriate all property, public as well as private, for
public purposes, making compensation therefore; yet it has never been understood, at least never in our
republic, that the sovereign power can take the private property of A and give it to B by the right of
eminent domain; or that it can take it at all, except for public purposes; or that it can take it for public
purposes, without the duty and responsibility of ordering compensation for the sacrifice of the private
property of one, for the good of the whole (11 Pet. at 642) (emphasis supplied).[28]
US case law also points out that a member of the public cannot acquire a certain private easement by means of expropriation for
being unconstitutional, because even if every member of the public should acquire the easement, it would remain a bundle of private
easements.[29]
Secondly, a compelling reason for the rejection of the expropriation is expressed in Section 29, PD 957, which provides:
Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road.The owner or developer of a subdivision without access to any existing
public road or street must secure a right of way to a public road or street and such right of way must be
developed and maintained according to the requirement of the government authorities concerned.
Considering that the residents who need a feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision
owner to acquire a right-of-way for them. However, the failure of the subdivision owner to provide an access road does not shift the burden to
petitioner. To deprive respondents of their property instead of compelling the subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the law is
an abuse of the power of eminent domain and is patently illegal. Without doubt, expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of an unlawful
purpose.
Thirdly, public funds can be used only for a public purpose. In this proposed condemnation, government funds would be employed
for the benefit of a private individual without any legal mooring. In criminal law, this would constitute malversation.
Lastly, the facts tend to show that the petitioners proper remedy is to require the Davsan II Subdivision owner to file a complaint for
establishment of the easement of right-of-way under Articles 649 to 656 of the Civil Code. Respondents must be granted the opportunity to show
that their lot is not a servient estate. Plainly, petitioners resort to expropriation is an improper cause of action.
One last word: the power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just compensation. Taking an individuals
private property is a deprivation which can only be justified by a higher goodwhich is public useand can only be counterbalanced by just
compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would also
constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individuals basic right to property as well.
For this reason, courts should be more vigilant in protecting the rights of the property owner and must perform a more thorough
and diligent scrutiny of the alleged public purpose behind the expropriation. Extreme caution is called for in resolving complaints for
condemnation, such that when a serious doubt arises regarding the supposed public use of property, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the
property owner and against the State.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the May 30, 2001 Decision and the October 26, 2001 Resolution of the CA, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.