People v. Martinez et al.

G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010

FACTS: On September 2, 2006 at around 1245 PM, PO1 Bernard Azarden was on duty at the Police
Community Precinct along Arellano St., Dagupan City when a concerned citizen reported that a pot
session was underway in the house of accused Rafael Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan
City. PO1 Azardan, PO1 Alejandro dela Cruz and members of Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT) proceeded to aforesaid house. Upon inquiry from people in the area, the house of
Gonzales was located. As the team entered the house, accused Orlando Doria was arrested while
coming out. Inside the house were Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, and Rezin Martinez.
Seized from the accused were open plastic sachets (containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled
used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum foil. The accused were arrested and brought to
police station, seized items were sent to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory. All
accused, except for Doria, were found positive for methylamphetamine HCL.

On February 13, 2008, RTC found Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, Rezin Martinez and Rafael
Gonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt under Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165
and sentenced each to life imprisonment and fined PHP 500,000 plus cost of suit.

The CA supported the findings of the lower court.

ISSUE: Were the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING: No, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt because (1) evidence against the accused are inadmissible and (2) even if the evidence
were admissible, the chain of custody was not duly established .

The evidence is inadmissible because of the illegal arrest, search and seizure. Searches and
seizures without a warrant are valid in (1) incidence of lawful arrest, (2) “plain view” search of
evidence, (3) moving vehicle search, (4) consented search, (5) customs search, (6) stop and frisk,
(7)exigent and emergency cases. Under Rule 113, Sec. 5 of RRCP warrantless arrest can only be
done in in flagrante cases, hot pursuit cases, and fugitive cases. The arrest of the accused-
appellants were based solely on the report of a concerned citizen, no surveillance of the place
was conducted. Under Rule 113, fugitive case does not apply. In flagrante and hot pursuit case
may apply only upon probable cause, which means actual belief or reasonable ground of
suspicion. It is reasonable ground of suspicion when suspicion of a person to be arrested is
probably guilty of the offense based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances. In case
at bar, this is not the case since the entire arrest was based on uncorroborated statement of a
concerned citizen.

The chain of custody as outlined in Sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165 was not observed as no proper
inventory, photographing, was done in the presence of the accused nor were there
representatives from the media, the DOJ and any popularly elected official present, although in
warrantless seizures, marking and photographing of evidence may be done at the nearest police
station.

Court sets aside and reverses the decision of the CA dated August 7, 2009, acquits the accused
and orders their immediate release.
PEOPLE VS MARIANO

Facts:

Acting on an informant’s tip, a buy-bust team was formed composed of SPO1 Goñez,
the team leader, with PO1 Olleres as the poseur-buyer, and police back-ups, PO3 Razo,
and a certain PO1 Pabrigas, and an unidentified member of the PDEA. SPO1 Goñez
produced the marked money consisting of one (1) One Thousand Peso bill and six (6)
One Hundred Peso bills. PO1 Olleres placed his initials on the marked bills. On 17 October
2004, the team conducted a buy-bust operation in the house of a certain Gerry Angustia.
PO1 Olleres, PO3 Razo and the asset proceeded to the target house and they witnessed
an ongoing pot session. They looked for "Galog" and they were introduced to Godofredo.
They asked Godofredo if they can "score." Godofredo immediately left the house and
went to a street at the back of the house. He returned carrying two (2) sachets of shabu,
which he handed to PO1 Ollares. In exchange, PO1 Olleres paid him the One Thousand
Peso marked bill. Allan also offered PO3 Razo two (2) more sachets of shabu. The latter
asked for the Six Hundred Peso marked bills from PO1 Olleres and handed them to Allan
as payment for the shabu. After these exchanges, they requested appellants for an
actual test of shabu. Godofredo provided them with a tooter and aluminum foil. While
they were testing said shabu, they declared an arrest.

An Affidavit of Arrest was prepared and signed by PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo.11 PO1
Olleres also prepared a receipt of the property seized containing his and appellants’
signatures. The buy-bust team marked the plastic sachets containing shabu at the crime
scene and PO1 Olleres brought the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory. They also
took photographs of the items confiscated and of appellants.

Police Inspector Josephine Macura Clemen, a forensic chemist, found that the specimen
submitted to her was Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu.

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports the convictions of the appellants. It justifies
the legality of the warrantless arrest of appellants as they were caught in flagrante
delicto. Moreover, the OSG avers that appellants are estopped from questioning the
legality of their arrest having raised them only on appeal.

Held:

We deny the appeal.

Appellants were charged and convicted of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the elements necessary for the
prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the
object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court
of evidence of corpus delicti.

All these elements were duly established by the prosecution. Appellants were caught in
flagrante delicto selling shabu during a buy-bust operation conducted by the buy-bust
team. The poseur-buyer, PO1 Olleres, positively testified that the sale took place and that
appellants sold the shabu

The result of the laboratory examination confirmed the presence of methamphetamine

hydrochloride on the white crystalline substances inside the four (4) plastic sachets
confiscated from appellants. The marked money was presented in evidence. Thus, the
delivery of the illicit drug to PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo and the receipt by appellants of
the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction.

Godofredo was further charged and convicted of illegal possession of drug

paraphernalia. The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus
and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II, Republic Act
No. 9165 are: (1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or
other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,
ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and (2) such possession is
not authorized by law.24

The prosecution has convincingly established that Godofredo was in possession of drug
paraphernalia such as aluminum foil, aluminum tooter and lighter, all of which were
offered in evidence.25 The corresponding receipt and inventory of the seized shabu and
other drug paraphernalia were likewise presented in evidence.26 Police Superintendent
Leonidas Diaz Castillo attested to the veracity of the contents of these documents.27

While both appellants admitted their presence in the scene of the crime, they both
denied the existence of a buy-bust operation.

The defense of denial, like alibi, has been viewed by the court with disfavor for it can just
as easily be concocted. Denial in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence
because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular
performance of their official duties. Bare denials of appellants cannot prevail over the
positive testimonies of the three police officers. Moreover, there is no evidence of any
improper motive on the part of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust
operation to falsely testify against appellants.28

Appellants’ insistence on the illegality of their warrantless arrest equally lacks merit.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court allows a warrantless arrest under any of the
following circumstances:

Sec 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful – A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In the instant case, the warrantless arrest was effected under the first mode or aptly
termed as in flagrante delicto. PO1 Olleres and PO3 Razo personally witnessed and were
in fact participants to the buy-bust operation. After laboratory examination, the white
crystalline substances placed inside the four (4) separate plastic sachets were found
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. Under these
circumstances, it is beyond doubt that appellants were arrested in flagrante delicto while
committing a crime, in full view of the arresting team.

Anent the absence of counsel during the execution of an inventory receipt, we agree
with the conclusion of the appellate court that notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the
inventory receipt, the prosecution has sufficiently proven the guilt of appellants, thus:

Admittedly, it is settled that the signature of the accused in the "Receipt of Property
Seized" is inadmissible in evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel.
The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his interest and
a tacit admission of the crime charged. However, while it is true that appellants signed
receipt of the property seized unassisted by counsel, this only renders inadmissible the
receipt itself.1âwphi1
In fact, in the case at bar, the evidentiary value of the Receipt of Property Seized is
irrelevant in light of the ample evidence proving appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution was able to prove that a valid buy-bust operation was
conducted to entrap appellants. The testimony of the poseur-buyer clearly established
that the sale of shabu by appellant was consummated. The corpus delicti, which is the
shabu, was presented in court and confirmed by the other members of the buy-bust
team. They acknowledged that they were the same drugs placed in four (4) plastic
sachets seized from appellants.29

In fine, it has been established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellants sold
shabu. Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalty of life imprisonment
to death and fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P1,000,000.00 shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including
any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved.
Hence, the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly imposed the penalty
of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00. As to Godofredo who was further
convicted of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, Section 12, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 imposes the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon any person, who unless authorized by law, shall possess
or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and any other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body.

Based on the foregoing rules, we also affirm the imposition of penalties by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 9 November 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03343 which, in turn, affirmed the Decision dated 5
March 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Sorsogon City, in Criminal Cases Nos.
04-706, 04-707, and 04-708, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
 MA. GRACIA HAO AND DANNY HAO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 183345 Septembe 17, 2014

Facts : Manuel Dy Awiten (Dy), claimed that as a longtime client of Asiatrust Bank (where Ngo
was the manager) and because of their good business relationship, he took Ngo’s advice to
deposit his money in an investment that will give a higher rate of return. Ngo introduced Dy to
Gracia Hao (Hao) (petitioner), who presented herself as an officer of various reputable companies
and an incorporator of State Resources Development Corporation where subsequently DY
invested.

Dy’s initial investment was P10M. He received the promised interest from is investment. Thus,
convincing him to invest more. He invested almost P100M. The additional investments were given
through checks. Gracio Hao also issued several checks representing Dy’s earnings. These
checks were subsequently dishonored.

Dy seek Ngo’s help to recover the amount. Ngo promised, however, Dy subsequently discovered
that the former already resigned from the bank. This time, Dy confronted Gracia. Dy learned that
his money was invested in the realty business of Gracia Hao’s realty business.

Dy filed a complaint with the public prosecutor. The public prosecutor filed an information for
syndicated estafa.

Warrant of arrest were subsequently issued against the Hao’s and other accused Hao filed a
motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest. They invoked lack of probable
cause and the pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ.

RTC denied the petitioner’s twin motion.

CA affirmed the RTC’s decision with regard to the twin motion. However, the CA opined that the
information shows only probable cause for simple estafa only.

Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the arraignment shall be deferred because of the pendency of the petition
for review with the DOJ

Held: NO. Under Section 11(c), Rule 116of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended
if there is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or the
Office of the President. However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days
counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November 21, 2003.
Since this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment should be
suspended indefinitely.

We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an
unqualified right. In Spouses Trinidad v. Ang, we explained that while the pendency of a petition
for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of the
arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign
the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
 As the trial court found in its February 26, 2004 order, the DOJ's delay in resolving the petitioners'
petition for review had already exceeded 60 days. Since the suspension of the petitioners'
arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the petitioners' motion to
suspend completely lacks any legal basis.

As a final note, we observe that the resolution of this case had long been delayed because of the
petitioners' refusal to submit to the trial court's jurisdiction and their erroneous invocation of the
Rules in their favor. As there is probable cause for the petitioners' commission of a crime, their
arrest and arraignment should now ensue so that this case may properly proceed to trial, where
the merits of both the parties' evidence and allegations may be weighed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition and AFFIRM WITH
MODIFICATION the February 28, 2006 decision and June 13, 2008 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 86289. We hereby order that petitioners Ma. Gracia Hao and Danny
Hao be charged for simple estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
and be arraigned for this charge. The warrants of arrest issued stand.

2. WON a valid warrant of arrest is issued

YES. To be valid, the warrants must have been issued after compliance with the requirement that
probable cause be personally determined by the judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked
to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused.In doing so, he need
not conduct a hearing; he only needs to personally review the prosecutor's initial determination
and see if it is supported by substantial evidence.

The records showed that Judge Marquez made a personal determination of the existence of
probable cause to support the issuance of the warrants. The petitioners, in fact, did not present
any evidence to controvert this. As the trial court ruled in its February 26, 2004 order:

The non-arrest of all the accused or their refusal to surrender practically resulted in the suspension
of arraignment exceeding the sixty (60) days counted from the filing of co-accused De Joya’s
motions, which may be considered a petition for review, and that of co-accused Spouses Hao’s
own petition for review. This is not to mention the delay in the resolution by the Department of
Justice. On the other hand, co-accused DeJoya’s motion to determine probable cause and co-
accused Spouses Hao’s motion to lift warrant of arrest have been rendered moot and academic
with the issuance of warrants of arrest by this presiding judge after his personal examination of
the facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty
of the crime that in fact happened.30 [Emphasis ours]

Under this situation, we conclude that Judge Marquez did not arbitrarily issue the warrants of
arrest against the petitioners. As stated by him, the warrants were only issued after his personal
evaluation of the factual circumstances that led him to believe that there was probable cause to
apprehend the petitioners for their commission of a criminal offense.
CARAM VS SEGUI (G.R. NO. 193652 AUGUST 5, 2014)
Caram vs Segui
G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

Facts: Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano
Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of
marriage. During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun
and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation for having a second
illegitimate son. On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial MedicalCenter,
Marikina City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina
voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

Issue: Whether or not writ of Amparo is the proper remedy available to the Petitioner.

Held: No. Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter
up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption,
clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and
contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered
a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is
a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life,
liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
PEOPLE VS VILLAREAL

Facts:

December 25, 2006 at around 11:30 in the morning, (PO3 de Leon) was driving his motorcycle along 5th
Avenue, he saw appellant from a distance of about 8 to 10 meters, holding and scrutinizing in his hand a
plastic sachet of shabu. PO3 de Leon, a member of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs-Special Operation Unit
in Caloocan City, alighted from his motorcycle and approached the appellant whom he recognized as
someone he had previously arrested for illegal drug possession.

Appellant tried to escape but was quickly apprehended. Despite appellant’s attempts to resist arrest, PO3
de Leon was able to board appellant onto his motorcycle and confiscate the plastic sachet of shabu in his
possession. PO3 de Leon brought appellant to the 9th Avenue Police Station to fix his handcuffs, and then
they proceeded to the SAID-SOU office where PO3 de Leon marked the seized plastic sachet with "RZL/NV
12-25-06," representing his and appellant’s initials and the date of the arrest.

Subsequently, PO3 de Leon turned over the marked evidence as well as the person of appellant to the
investigator, (PO2 Hipolito) who, in turn, executed an acknowledgment receipt and prepared a letter
request for the laboratory examination of the seized substance. PO2 Hipolito personally delivered the
request and the confiscated item to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, which were
received by Police Senior Inspector Albert Arturo (PSI Arturo), the forensic chemist.
Upon qualitative examination, the plastic sachet, which contained 0.03 gram of white crystalline
substance, tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

Issue:
whether the CA erred in affirming in toto the RTC’s Decision convicting appellant of the offense charged.

Held:

The appeal is meritorious.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lays down the basic rules on lawful
warrantless arrests, either by a peace officer or a private person, as follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

xxx

For the warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to operate, two elements must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.19 On the other hand, paragraph (b) of Section 5 requires for its
application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.20

In both instances, the officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
absolutely required. Under paragraph (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime while under paragraph
(b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed.

In sustaining appellant’s conviction in this case, the appellate court ratiocinated that this was a clear case
of an "in flagrante delicto warrantless arrest" under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as above-quoted.

The Court disagrees.

A punctilious assessment of the factual backdrop of this case shows that there could have been no lawful
warrantless arrest. A portion of PO3 de Leon’s testimony on direct examination in court is revelatory:

On the basis of the foregoing testimony, the Court finds it inconceivable how PO3 de Leon, even with his
presumably perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy, from a distance of about
8 to 10 meters and while simultaneously driving a motorcycle, a negligible and minuscule amount of
powdery substance (0.03 gram) inside the plastic sachet allegedly held by appellant. That he had
previously effected numerous arrests, all involving shabu, is insufficient to create a conclusion that what
he purportedly saw in appellant’s hands was indeed shabu.

Absent any other circumstance upon which to anchor a lawful arrest, no other overt act could be properly
attributed to appellant as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 de Leon that he (appellant) had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, for the acts per se of walking along the
street and examining something in one’s hands cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact,
even if appellant had been exhibiting unusual or strange acts, or at the very least appeared suspicious,
the same would not have been sufficient in order for PO3 de Leon to effect a lawful warrantless arrest
under paragraph (a) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Neither has it been established that the rigorous conditions set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5, Rule
113 have been complied with, i.e., that an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting
officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the appellant had committed it.

The factual circumstances of the case failed to show that PO3 de Leon had personal knowledge that a
crime had been indisputably committed by the appellant. It is not enough that PO3 de Leon had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant had just committed a crime; a crime must in fact have been
committed first, which does not obtain in this case.

Without the overt act that would pin liability against appellant, it is therefore clear that PO3 de Leon was
merely impelled to apprehend appellant on account of the latter’s previous charge22 for the same
offense. The CA stressed this point when it said:

It is common for drugs, being illegal in nature, to be concealed from view.1âwphi1 PO3 Renato de Leon
saw appellant holding and scrutinizing a piece of plastic wrapper containing a white powderly substance.
PO3 Renato de Leon was quite familiar with appellant, having arrested him twice before for the same
illegal possession of drug. It was not just a hollow suspicion. The third time around, PO3 de Leon had
reasonably assumed that the piece of plastic wrapper appellant was holding and scrutinizing also
contained shabu as he had personal knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal
record. He would have been irresponsible to just ‘wait and see’ and give appellant a chance to scamper
away. For his part, appellant being, in fact, in possession of illegal drug, sensing trouble from an equally
familiar face of authority, ran away. Luckily, however, PO3 de Leon caught up with him through the aid of
a tricycle driver. Appellant’s act of running away, indeed, validated PO3 de Leon’s reasonable suspicion
that appellant was actually in possession of illegal drug. x x x23

However, a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy
the exacting requirements provided under Section 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a lawful warrantless
arrest. "Personal knowledge" of the arresting officer that a crime had in fact just been committed is
required. To interpret "personal knowledge" as referring to a person’s reputation or past criminal citations
would create a dangerous precedent and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers
to effect warrantless arrests based solely on knowledge of a person’s previous criminal infractions,
rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites laid out under Section 5.

It was therefore error on the part of the CA to rule on the validity of appellant’s arrest based on "personal
knowledge of facts regarding appellant’s person and past criminal record," as this is unquestionably not
what "personal knowledge" under the law contemplates, which must be strictly construed.24

Furthermore, appellant’s act of darting away when PO3 de Leon approached him should not be construed
against him. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one’s
consciousness of guilt.25 It is not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances,26 for even in
high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to
officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being wrongfully apprehended as a guilty
party.27 Thus, appellant’s attempt to run away from PO3 de Leon is susceptible of various explanations;
it could easily have meant guilt just as it could likewise signify innocence.

In fine, appellant’s acts of walking along the street and holding something in his hands, even if they
appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous criminal charge for the same offense, are not by
themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to justify
a warrantless arrest under Section 5 above-quoted. "Probable cause" has been understood to mean a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.28
Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested,29 which clearly do not obtain in appellant’s case.

Thus, while it is true that the legality of an arrest depends upon the reasonable discretion of the officer
or functionary to whom the law at the moment leaves the decision to characterize the nature of the act
or deed of the person for the urgent purpose of suspending his liberty,30 it cannot be arbitrarily or
capriciously exercised without unduly compromising a citizen’s constitutionally-guaranteed right to
liberty. As the Court succinctly explained in the case of People v. Tudtud:31

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his
liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations
when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot
liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases
specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so
often violated and so deserving of full protection.

Consequently, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the shabu purportedly seized from appellant is
rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated
shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, appellant must be acquitted and exonerated from
all criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31320 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Appellant Nazareno Villareal y Lualhati is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the offense charged
and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is warranted by
some other cause or ground.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE v. COLLADOSCRA 698 v. 628Facts:
PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses Marcelino and Myra were
engaged in selling shabu. Afterrecording the report in the police blotter, PO2 Noble relayed the
information to his superior, P/Insp. Castillo, who in turn ordered the

conduct of a surveillance operation. PO2 Noble, et al., conducted surveillance on the couple’s
residence. A buy

-bust operation team

was thereafter formed, and the team proceeded to Marcelino’s and Myra’s residen

ce. Upon reaching the target area, the assetintroduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular
buyer of shabu. During the negotiation regarding the price, Marcelino then took fromhis pocket a
small metal container from which he brought out a small plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance and gave thesame to PO2 Noble. While PO2 Noble was inspecting its
contents, he noticed smoke coming from a table inside the house of thecouple around which
were seven persons. When PO2 Noble gave the pre-arranged signal, the backup team rushed
to the scene.The appellate court found the warrantless arrest of the appellants to be lawful
considering that they were caught in the act ofcommitting a crime.

22

Thus, the CA affirmed the conviction of Marcelino and Myra for violation of Section 5 of RA
9165 (sale ofdangerous drugs), as well as the conviction of Marcelino for violation of Section 11
of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs).It therefore affirmed with modification the
ruling of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not there were irregularities in the arrest of the appellant-spouses?

Held:

No, the arrest was valid.Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in flagrante delicto. For this
type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites mustconcur: "(1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or
isattempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer." A commonexample of an arrest in flagrante delicto is one made
after conducting a buy-bust operation.The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante
delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.The arrest was effected
after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu
and Ranada ofhaving in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia.Moreover, assuming
that irregularities indeed attended the arrest of appellants, they can no longer question the
validity thereofas there is no showing that they objected to the same before their arraignment.
Neither did they take steps to quash the Informations onsuch ground. They only raised this
issue upon their appeal to the appellate court. By this omission, any objections on the legality of
theirarrest are deemed to have been waived by them. Anent their claim of unreasonable search
and seizure, it is true that under the Constitution, "a search and consequent seizuremust be
carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence
obtained therefrom shall beinadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." This proscription,
however, admits of exceptions, one of which is a warrantless searchincidental to a lawful
arrest.The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
"[a] person lawfully arrested may besearched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without asearch warrant."
The factual milieu of this case clearly shows that the search was made after appellants were
lawfully arrested

ANTIQUERA VS PEOPLE

Facts: Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the accused George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza
Cruz with illegal ·possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The prosecution evidence shows that at around
4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1 Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania,
and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol on David Street,
Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.

Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the men
came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding
an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and
an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the
house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz. 4

While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table. It
contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline
substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and
brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further
investigation and testing

RTC rendered a Decision8 that found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) rendered a Decision affirming in full the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether CA erred in finding accused Antiquera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they saw him and Cruz in the act of possessing drug
paraphernalia?

HELD: YES.

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the
crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
 But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.

1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David
Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give
chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running
after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they
heard no cry for help from it.

2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood.
Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.

Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera
without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that
resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly
found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure

The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his
conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during the illegal warrantless arrest

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. OLIVER RENATO EDAÑO

G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014, 729 SCRA 255

FACTS: On the evening of August 6, 2002, member of Drug Enforcement Group together with a female
informant went to the parking area of McDonalds to conduct an entrapment operation.

Edaño arrived at around 7:00 p.m. on board a space wagon. The informant approached Edaño and talked
to him inside the vehicle.

Afterwards, the informant waived at PO3 Corbe who then approached Edaño. The latter went out of the
vehicle and ran away.

PO3 Corbe was able to grab Edaño, causing the latter to fell on the ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a “knot-
tied” transparent plastic bag from Edaño’s right hand.

ISSUES: Whether the search and seizure that followed warrantless arrest is valid.

HELD: NO, the warrantless arrest of Edaño was not valid. Consequently, the search and seizure that
followed the warrantless arrest was likewise not valid.

In this case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed
to Edaño to rouse suspicion in the mind of the police that he had just committed, was actually committing
or was attempting to commit a crime in their presence.

Informant and Edaño were just talking to each other, there was no exchange of money and drugs as the
police approached the car.

Edaño is entitled to acquittal since the shabu purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence for
being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.

Pestilos vs. Generoso

G.R. No. 182601

November 10, 2014

Facts:

On February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the
petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station to
report the incident. Acting on this report, the Desk Officer dispatched policemen to go to the scene of
the crime and to render assistance. The policemen arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour
after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to
the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to
go to the Police Station for investigation. The petitioners went with the police officers.

At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty.
Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. The petitioners were
indicted for attempted murder.

The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that
they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the
police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also
claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper,
and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112
of the Rules of Court.

RTC denied the motion. The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari. They attributed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the
RTC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.

CA dismissed the petition.

Issue:

Were the petitioners validly arrested without a warrant?

Ruling:

For purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present
petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has
the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) Did the arresting officer have personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? And 3) based on these
facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would
a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was
committed by the petitioners?

From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances upon which they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a
warrantless arrest against the petitioners.

The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of
his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after
the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the
petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his
mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their
participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what
transpired.

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime
until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers
had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These
circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of
the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within
their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

Personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision,
does not require actual presence at the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that
evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in this case) and the police officer has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be
arrested has recently committed the crime.
Villanueva v. People

GR No. 199042. 17 November 2014

Facts

Petitioner Danilo Villanueva was charged with a violation of Section 11, Article 2 of RA 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for having in his possession 0.63 grams of shabu. The
prosecution states that 4 witnesses testified that a complaint was filed by Brian Resco against Danilo for
allegedly shooting the former. Police officers then proceeded to the house of Villanueva and informed
him about the Complaint, thereafter inviting him to the police station. He was subjected to a body
search and in the process was found to have shabu in his left pocket. According to Danilo, meanwhile,
he was at home watching tv when the police officers invited him to go with them to the police station.
Informed that he had been identified as responsible for shooting Resco, Danilo was then frisked and
detained at the police station. RTC: Danilo is guilty. CA: affirmed.

Issue

Whether Villanueva violated Sec. 11 of RA 9165 despite the illegality of the arrest and the lapses
on the part of the police officers in the handling of the confiscated drug

Held

No. Petitioner acquitted, lower court decision set aside.

Ruling

Accused-appellant was arrested without a warrant. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, lays down the basic rules on lawful warrantless arrests either by a peace officer or a
private person. Nevertheless, records reveal that accused-appellant never objected to the irregularity of
his arrest before his arraignment. He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. He actively participated in
the trial of the case. Thus, he is considered as one who had properly and voluntarily submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived his right to question the validity of his arrest.

Records have established that both the arrest and the search were made without a warrant.
While the accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is not deemed to
have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search. Consent must also be voluntary in
order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific,
intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. In this case, petitioner was merely
ordered to take out the contents of his pocket.

Having been obtained through an unlawful search, the seized item is thus inadmissible in
evidence against accused-appellant. Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the “fruit of the
poisonous tree.” Hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III,
Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution: “Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.” Without the seized item, therefore, the
conviction of accused- appellant cannot be sustained.

PEOPLE V. PEÑAFLORIDA CASE DIGEST

G.R. No. 175604 : April 10, 2008

Petitioners: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondent: SALVADOR PEÑAFLORIDA, JR., Y CLIDORO
Ponente: TINGA, J.

Facts:

On or about the 7th day of June, 1994, in the afternoon thereat, at Barangay Huyon-huyon,
Municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, Salvador Peñaflorida, with intent to sell, possess and
to deliver with the use of a bicycle, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, control and custody, one bundle estimated to be one (1) kilo more or less, of dried marijuana
leaves (Indian Hemp) without the necessary license, permit or authority to sell, administer, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug from a competent officer as
required by law.

On 26 October 1998, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of transporting a prohibited drug, a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425,
otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

Appellant admitted that he was about to convey from one place to another the package, which
contained marijuana, to a certain Jimmy Gonzales. The appellant, however, denies any knowledge that the
package in his possession contained marijuana.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
custody of dried marijuana leaves

Held:

The trial court rejected the contention of the appellant, noting that it was impossible for appellant
not to be aware of the contents of the package because "marijuana has a distinct sweet and unmistakable
aroma x x x which would have alarmed him."
 The appellate court went on to declare that being mala prohibita, one commits the crime under
R.A. No. 6425 by mere possession of a prohibited drug without legal authority. Intent, motive or knowledge
thereof is not necessary.

Appellant, in the main, asserts that he did not freely and consciously possess marijuana. In criminal
cases involving prohibited drugs, there can be no conviction unless the prosecution shows that the accused
knowingly possessed the prohibited articles in his person, or that animus possidendi is shown to be present
together with his possession or control of such article. Animus possidendi is only prima facie. It is subject
to contrary proof and may be rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise power and
control over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the
possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi.

Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot penetrate the mind
of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary.
Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into
consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.
Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case.

Appellant failed to satisfactorily establish his lack of knowledge of possession in the instant case.
First, the marijuana was found in the bicycle he himself was driving. Second, the police officers first readily
saw in plain view the edges of the marijuana leaves jutting out of the package. Third, it is incredulous that
appellant did not ask Obias what the package contained when the latter requested him to do the delivery
errand since the package was wrapped in a newspaper and weighed almost one kilogram.

Finally, it is very hard for the court to accept the claim of the accused Peñaflorida that he does not
know that the thing wrapped in a newspaper which Boyet Obias, now dead, requested the accused
Peñaflorida, would deliver to a certain Jimmy Gonzales whose present whereabouts is not known, was a
marijuana. Its odor is different especially from tobacco. This was observed by the court during the trial of
the case, everytime the wrapper containing the subject marijuana with a volume of 928 grams is brought to
court its odor is noticeable. For the accused Peñaflorida, not to notice it is hard to believe. Rightly so,
because marijuana has a distinct sweet and unmistakable aroma very different from (and not nauseating)
unlike tobacco. This aroma would have alarmed him.

CASE DIGEST: PEOPL E VS .

SE MBRANO
10:04 PM

G.R. No. 185848

People Vs. Michael Castro Sembrano
August 16, 2010

Facts:
In a buy-bust operation and after a follow up search, Accused Appellant was arrested and
charged with the violation of Section 5 (illegal sale) and Section 11, Article II (illegal
possession) of R.A. 9165. He was then found guilty by the lower courts.

Accused-appellant appealed the lower court’s ruling, contending that the arrest made on him
was illegal and thus the alleged evidence seized during such warrantless arrest shouldn’t
have been admitted (‘fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine”). He further averred that he had
been framed by the police officers.

Ruling:
The court held that the arrest made was legal. Appellant was arrested during an entrapment
operation where he was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu. When an arrest is made
during an entrapment operation, it is not required that a warrant be secured in line with the
provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court allowing warrantless
arrests.

The contention of frame-up in the case at bar could not be looked upon by the Court with
favor in light of straightforward and positive testimony of poseur-buyer identifying him as the
seller of shabu. Moreover, the accused-appellant failed to prove that there had been ill-motive
on the part of the officers to impute such crimes. Police officers are presumed to have
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.

Court found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) for illegal possession of 0.27 grams of shabu. For
illegal sale of drugs, regardless of quantity, he wassentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00) PESOS;
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No 170180

November 23, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11
of RA 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs) after dried marijuana leaves were found in
his possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on him

Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when one
of the barangay tanods approached him and requested to see the contents of his bags. The
petitioner was then brought by the three tanods to the house of Brgy. Captain Mercado,
who again ordered to have the bag opened. During which, the dried marijuana leaves were
found.

Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal, that his
warrantless arrest was effected unlawfully and the warrantless search that followed was likewise
contrary to law.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant supporting the
arrest and the search.

Held:

The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The accused was acquitted
by reasonable doubt.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions
permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The Court held that none of the circumstances was attendant at the time of the arrest.

The Court also posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.

None of the petitioner’s actuations (i.e. his looking around and alleged fleeing upon approach
of the tanods) is adequate to incite suspicion of criminal activity to validate the warrantless
arrest.

However, the Court’s decision was not only hinged on this premise but also on the fact that
the lower courts failed to establish the veracity of the seized items by virtue of the chain of
custody rule and in view of the contrasting testimonies by the prosecution witnesses.

Failure of the lower courts to satisfy the test of moral certainty, the accused was thus
acquitted.

The Court added that the petitioner’s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not
tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless
search and seizure.

G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.

A confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the
purchase of shabu. Appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora. Having alighted from the bus, appellant was
about to board a tricycle when the team of police authorities approached him and invited him to
the police station. As he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped
therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.5

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A.
9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing,
dangerous drugs.
ISSUE: (1) WON the warrant of arrest was violated.

(2) WON the evidence was admissible in evidence.

RULING: (1) No. “Reliable information” alone is not sufficient probable cause to effect a valid
warrantless arrest. The SC required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal
design.

(2) No. This is an instance of seizure of the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence.

The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.17 Said proscription, however, admits of
exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18

23.) VIVENCIO ROALLO v. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 198389, December 11, 2013

Facts: This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which calls to annul and
set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals where it affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) finding Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes (Roallos) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of sexual
abuse punished under Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610), otherwise known as the
"Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act." Roallos asserted that his arrest
was illegal since the same was effected without any warrant of arrest. He said he was not informed of his rights when
he was arrested nor was he made to undergo any preliminary investigation.
Issue: Whether or not Roallos’ claim that his arrest was illegal for lack of warrant of arrest , non-information of his rights
when he was arrested nor was he made to undergo any preliminary investigation tenable.

Held: Roallos’ claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of arrest and that he
was not afforded a preliminary investigation is untenable.

An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for
the quashal of the information against him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a warrant of
arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before
he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

At the time of arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection to the supposed illegality of his arrest and the
lack of a proper preliminary investigation. He actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Therefore he is
deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.

PEOPLE v. VASQUEZ

G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014

Facts: Initially the case of illegal possession of drugs was raffled but upon motion it was consolidated with the case
of illegal sale of drugs. On arraignment, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The pre-trial conference of
the cases was held, but the same was terminated without the parties entering into any stipulation of facts. During the
trial of the case the prosecution stated the events. There was a confidential informant reported to PO2 Trambulo
about the illegal drug activities. Fajardo form a buy-bust team. It was in the buy-bust operation that Don was arrested.

RTC convicted the appellant of the crimes charged. The RTC gave more credence to the prosecution’s
evidence given that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty on the part of the police officers
was not overcome. On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. Hence this appeal. He
argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. This
occurred despite the fact that the police officers allegedly had ample time to secure a warrant of arrest against him.
Inasmuch as his arrest was illegal, the appellant avers that the evidence obtained as a result thereof was
inadmissible in court.
Issue: Whether the appellant Don may assail the validity of arrest.
Ruling: No.

At the outset, the Court rules that the appellant can no longer assail the validity of his arrest. We reiterated
in People v. Tampis52 that "[a]ny objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the
accused enters his plea on arraignment. Having failed to move for the quashing of the information against them
before their arraignment, appellants are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any irregularity
was cured upon their voluntary submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction."53 Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is
that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust
operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 11354 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the warrantless
arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid.
We held in People v. Cabugatan55 that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches
and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2)
seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an
arrest is considered legitimate [if] effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible
warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped
prisoners. (Citation omitted.) Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his
arrest and the subsequent search upon his person.
Ople Vs Torres

FACTS:

This is a petition raised by Senator Blas Ople to invalidate the Administrative

Order No. 308 or the Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System issued by President Fidel V. Ramos.

The petitioner contends that the implementation of the said A.O. will violate
the rights of the citizens of privacy as guaranteed by the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not A.O. No. 308 violates the right of privacy.

HELD:

Yes.

The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its

identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection.

The right of privacy is guaranteed in several provisions of the Constitution:

"Sections 3 (1), 1, 2, 6, 8 and 17 of the Bill of Rights

"Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law."
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized."
"Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law."
"Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged."

"Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."

The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by
some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and
foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service
and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2)
the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether
these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308.

But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of
A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in
clear and present danger. The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN,
biometrics and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that
the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much
less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses
that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.

The petition is granted and declared the Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" null
and void for being unconstitutional.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS

BOARD

NOTE: This is a consolidated case with (Pimentel v. COMELEC) and (Atty. Laserna v. DDB and PDEA),
regarding the constitutionality of RA 9165(c), (d), (f) and (g); ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act of
2002.

FACTS: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as
follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard
the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods,
the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school’s student handbook and with notice
to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in
the company’s work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any
officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code
and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense having an imposable
penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory
drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)

On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations for the
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 2004 elections. Pimentel
claims that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional
qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates,
a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution,
to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated
qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for
senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or
otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)

In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political
party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another,
the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or
an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provisions.

(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional
for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and
the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection
guarantees.

ISSUE/S:

1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?

2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal
protection clause?

HELD:

1) YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution.

2) The Court held that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL; while paragraphs (f) and (g)
are UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only paragraphs (f) and (g) violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause.

RATIO:

1) Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution (refer to the
aforementioned facts). As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator
or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect.
The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in
its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another
qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.
Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for
non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as
1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in
the following wise: “Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government,
like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as
governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and
confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such
powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative
authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.”

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.
The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions,
such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator
to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a
citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.

2) The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165(c) requiring mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules
and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable,
and equitable requirements. A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only
acceptable, but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a
legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed
by Sec. 36 of RA 9165(d) for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not
exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that
“subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted
intrusion of the individual right to privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or
unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as
simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free
from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way
as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities; and while there has been general agreement as
to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, “translation of the abstract prohibition
against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular
cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that
the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state’s exercise of
police power.

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
“reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. While every officer
and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a
possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that
the employees concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules
and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.” It is to be noted the very reason
RA 9165 was enacted is to safeguard the well-being of the citizens from the deleterious effects of dangerous
drugs.

Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by the Court. Unlike the situation covered by Sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons
accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test
policy and requirement.

The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor’s
office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of persons
charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to
privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.
(EMMA K. LEE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 177861, July13, 2010, ABAD, J.).

The Facts and the Case

Spouses (Lee) and Keh entered the Philippines in the 1930sas immigrants from China. They had 11
children. In 1948, Leebrought from China a young woman (Tiu), as housemaid. Respondent Lee-Keh’s
children believed that Tiu left the household and had a relation with him. Shortly after Keh died in 1989,
the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other children) claimed
that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the (NBI) to
investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report it is not
KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. The NBI found, for example,
that in the hospital records Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly
gave birth to such other children, numbering eight. On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh
children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the (RTC) for the deletion from the certificate
of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the same
with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name. In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the
RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lee’s
presumed mother, to testify in the case. However, later on, the subpoena was quashed by the RTC as it
was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she
being Emma Lee’s stepmother.

CA rendered a decision setting aside the RTC’s Order on the ground that only a subpoena duces tecum,
not a subpoena adtestificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4,
Rule 21 of the Rules of CivilProcedure. The CA also held that Tiu’s advanced age alonedoes not render
her incapable of testifying. The party seekingto quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that
shewould be unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something thatpetitioner Emma Lee failed to do.

ISSUE: Whether or not court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent
Lee-Kehchildren filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that
she is not Keh’s daughter.

HELD: Under Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence “No personmay be compelled to testify
against his parents, other directascendants, children or other direct descendants.”The afore-quoted rule
is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal
cases.

But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of
actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendantsor
descendants.
In Emma Lee vs. Court of Appeals, the person (TIU) who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the
stepmother of petitioner EmmaLee.

The SC declared that the privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct"
ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no
common ancestry by her stepmother . Relative thereto, Article 965 of the New Civil Code provides:
“Thedirect line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those
who descend from him. The latter bindsa person with those from whom he descends.”

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

Meralco v Lim (2010) GR No 184769

J. Carpio-Morales

Facts:

A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative
clerk. She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety.
She complained under the premise that the transfer was a denial of her due process. She wrote a
letter stating that:

“It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or
are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” She added, “instead of the management supposedly
extending favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.” She
asked for deferment thereafter. Since the company didn’t respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data
in the Bulacan RTC due to meralco’s omission of provding her with details about the report of the
letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the
data and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the data.

Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition wasn’t in
order.

Trial court ruled in her favor.

In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home

Issue: Is Habeas Data the right remedy for Lim?

Held: No, petition dismissed

Ratio:

“Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party”

It’s a forum for enforcing one’s right to the truth. Like amparo, habeas data was a response
to killings and enforceddisappearances.

Castillo v Cruz- and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property
or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague
or doubtful.

Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Lim was concerned with her employment,
one that can be solved in the NLRC.

There was no violation of respondent’s right to privacy. Respondent even said that the letters were
mere jokes and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor related due to references to “real
intent of management”.