PEOPLE VS.

LARRAÑAGA kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to
G.R. Nos. 138874-75. February 3, 2004 Appellee: People of the Philippines
Appellants: Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan,
Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, Davidson Rusia, James Anthony Uy, James
Andrew Uy Per curiam decision
FACTS: On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong
failed to come home on the expected time. Two days after, a young woman
was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was
raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck
were covered with masking tape and attached to her left wrist was a
handcuff. The woman was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months,
accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and admitted before the police having
participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants
Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño,
Ariel Balansag, James Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators
in the crime. Rusia provided the following before the trial court: 1) That at
10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and told
him to ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larrañaga, James
Anthony and James Andrew who were in a red car. Josman stopped the
white car in front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and
Jacqueline were standing and forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped their
mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly. 2) That after stopping by a
safe house, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal where
they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former.
They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving the red car at the South
Bus Terminal. 3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they
drank and had a pot session. Later, they started to rape Marijoy inside the
vehicle, and thereafter raped Jaqueline. 4) That Josman instructed Rowen
and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the ravine. The
claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as an
accused and became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never
found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of
suffer the penalties of two (2) reclusion perpetua. The appellants assailed
the said decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there
was conspiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old
when the crimes were committed.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was conspiracy. 2) Whether or not the trial court
erred in characterizing the crime. 3) Whether or not the trial court erred
imposing the correct penalty.
HELD:
1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which
the offense was perpetrated, or may be inferred from the acts of the
accused themselves, when such point to a joint design and community of
interest. The
appellants’ actions showed that they had the same objective to kidnap and
detain the Chiong sisters. The Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that
the appellants indeed conspired in the commission of the crimes charged.
2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or
more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special complex
crime. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of
R.A. 7659, provides that in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention, or is raped or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed. Thus, the resulting crime will change
from complex crime to special complex crime. In the present case, the
victims were raped and subjected to dehumanizing acts. Thus, the Court
held that all the appellants were guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in the case
where Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal
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detention in the case of Jacqueline. 3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal PEOPLE VS IGNACIO CUPINO
Code provides that by reason of minority, the imposable penalty to the
offender is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. James Anthony
was only 16 years old when the crimes were committed. As penalty for the
special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape is death, the correct penalty to be imposed should be
reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping
and serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree
lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him
should be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum. With regard to the rest of the appellants, the statutory penalty
as provided above should be imposed. Therefore, trial court erred in merely
imposing “two (2) reclusion perpetua”.

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PEOPLE VS. FACTAO HELD:

G.R. No. 125966. January 13, 2004
FACTS: Appellants Juan Factao, Albert Labroda, and Tirso Servidad were
found guilty of muder for killing Fernando Sardoma by inflicting gunshot
wound on the vital part of the his body. Evidence for the prosecution
presented the following:
1) In the evening of August 23, 1991, Vicente Manolos, who was then in a
kamalig near the seashore with Eduardo Sardoma, Rolando Nierves, Noel
Serrano, and Fernando Sardoma, felt the urge to defecate. As he relieved
himself outside beside the boat, he saw Factao, armed with a garand rifle,
and Labroda approach the hut. Factao then aimed his gun at a hole in the
hut’s bamboo wall and fired.
2) That same night, Jose Manuel Sermona saw Factao, Labroda, and
Servidad walking towards the kamalig of the victim and witnessed the
shooting.
Yes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. There was
no direct evidence to show that Factao and Labroda agreed to commit the
crime. Nonetheless, their acts immediately before and after the shooting
evince a commonality in design sufficient to make them co-principals to the
killing. The testimonies of the witnesses adequately established conspiracy
between Factao and Labroda.
However, the Servidad’s participation in the crime was not established. The
mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a
co-conspirator. The prosecution failed to offer evidence that Servidad
performed any act from which his conspiracy to the crime may be deduced.
Thus, he was acquitted.

3) Eduardo Sardoma, upon hearing the explosion immediately went outside,

met Servidad and espied Factao and Labroda running from the scene.

Factao and Labrado claimed that at the time of the incident they were
celebrating the latter’s birthday and learned about the tragedy only the
following day. On the other hand, Servidad claimed that he was with
Barangay Captain Faustino Nierves that evening, who then instructed him to
investigate when they heard an explosion from the direction of the
seashore.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was conspiracy.

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LI VS. PEOPLE

Facts: One morning in April 1993, street brawl ensued between Christopher
Arugay and his neighbor, Kingstone Li. Arugay sustained multiple stab
wounds causing his death while Li sustained hack wounds on the head and
contusions. Two different versions of the incident were presented.
According to the first version, Arugay was watching the television with his
sisters Cristy and Baby Jane and Tan, boyfriend of Baby Jane, when they
heard a noise caused by Li and Sangalang who were then bathing naked
outside their house. Enraged, Arugay went outside and confronted the two
which eventually ended up with Li striking Arugay with a baseball bat on the
head and later stabbing him with a knife. Sangalang was also seen stabbing
the victim at least once with a knife. The second version, offered by Li
however presented that Li was watching the television with a friend when
Arugay and his girlfriend hurled objects and kicked the gate of his house.
Upon seeing that Arugay has gotten himself two kitchen knives, Li armed
himself with a baseball bat. Li managed to evade Arugay’s thrusts and
successfully hit him with the bat on the shoulder with which Arugay ran
back to his house and emerged carrying a bolo. Arugay tried to hit Li with
the bolo but Li raised his right hand to protect himself but Arugay was able
to hit him on his right temple, right wrist, and right shoulder. Li passed out.
Sangalang was also present when the incident started. Arugay died of
multiple stab wounds while Li was brought to the hospital. RTC charged Li
with homicide and ruled the existence of conspiracy although concluded
that it was Sangalang, and not Li, who stabbed Arugay. Court of Appeals
affirmed RTC’s decision but opined that since it has not been established
which wound was inflicted by either one of them, they should both be held
liable and each one is guilty of homicide, whether or not a conspiracy exists.

Issue: Whether or not there was conspiracy between Li and Sangalang. If

there is not, what acts are imputable to Li.

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Held: No, RTC erred in concluding an implied conspiracy. The facts that Li
and Sangalang were in the same house at the same time; and that they both
armed themselves before going out to meet Arugay are not in themselves
sufficient to establish conspiracy.
Sangalang stabbed Arugay only after petitioner had become unconscious.
Before that point, even as Li struck Arugay with a baseball bat, it was not
proven that Li had asked for, or received, any assistance from Sangalang.
Based on these circumstances, Sangalang and Li had not acted in concert to
commit the offense. After Arugay had struck hack wounds on Li and as Li lay
incapacitated, possibly unconscious, it remained highly doubtful whether he
had any further participation in the brawl. At that point, Sangalang,
emerged and stabbed Arugay to death. In fact, the stabbing of Arugay could
very well be construed as a spur-of-the-moment reaction by Sangalang
upon seeing that his friend Li was struck by Arugay. It cannot be assumed
that Sangalang did what he did with the knowledge or assent of Li, much
more in coordination with each other. It was also proved that Li, already
weak and injured, could possibly inflict fatal stab wounds on Arugay.
Absent any clear showing of conspiracy, Kingstone Li cannot answer for the
crime of Eduardo Sangalang. Petitioner Kingstone Li is ACQUITTED of the
charge of Homicide for lack of evidence beyond reasonable doubt. However,
he is found GUILTY of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES.
ARADILLOS VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: In the afternoon of February 3, 1992, on their way home from work,
petitioners Adonis Aradillos and Albino Galabo were rebuked by Gloria
Alviola when she saw them cutting an uprooted tree, which obstructed their
passage through a bamboo bridge located on the property of the latter’s
husband. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners chased Alviola, and
when they caught up with her near her house, Galabo hit her several times
with a piece of wood and his carpentry bag causing her to fall down.
Thereafter, Aradillos hacked her twice with a carpentry ax, hitting her on
the right side of the head and on the forehead. Conversely, the petitioners
invoke self defense, contending that the Alviola’s injuries were the result of
the struggle for the possession of the ax between her and petitioner
Aradillos. The trial court charged the petitioners with the crime of frustrated
homicide. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed their conviction; thus,
the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the petitioners acted in conspiracy; 2) Whether
or not there was intent to kill on the part of the petitioners.
HELD: 1) No. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
The prosecution failed to present sufficient proof that there was a joint or
simultaneous action between the petitioners. The evidence shows that it
was only Aradillos who struggled with Alviola and that she did not sustain
injuries from the alleged acts of Galabo. Moreover, Galabo’s presence at the
scene of the crime does not imply conspiracy. Nonetheless, it was held that
Aradillos is still liable for less serious physical injuries; 2) No. The intent to
kill is the principal element of attempted or frustrated homicide, or murder.
As such, it must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every
possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor. Considering the
testimonies of the doctors, it appears that the injuries sustained by Alviola
were not so grave so as to sustain the prosecutions claim that the
petitioners acted with the intent to kill. The injuries, in fact, were clear
manifestations that the act was not intentional. For if it were so, Aradillos
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would have exerted such force that Alviola would have suffered more than
what she had sustained.
PEOPLE OF THE R.P. VS. PUGAY
"A Conspiracy exists when two or more people come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it."
"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts;
it is his duty to be cautious, careful and prudent, if not from instinct, then
through fear of incurring punishment."
FACTS: The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing
them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor) as mimimum to
20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda
used to run errands for Pugay and they used to sleep together. On the
evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of
Rosario Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with
several companions arrived (they were drunk), and they started making fun
of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took a can of
gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness)
told Pugay not to do the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a
human torch out of him. They were arrested the same night and barely a
few hours after the incident gave their written statements.
ISSUES OF THE CASE: Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that
murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal responsibilities of the
accused?
There is no: CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree
to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy must be proven
with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to
the existence of a previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if,
at the time of commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose
and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to
the that that the meeting at the scene of the incident was purely
coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun of miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal
responsibility of Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed
against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is liable only
for the act that was committed by him.
**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in
confronting the victim.
Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every
undesirable consequence arising from any act committed by his companions
who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. - GUILTY OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE
SAMSON: Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record
establishing qualifying circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted
the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED to commit so grave a
wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE
HELD: JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.
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PEOPLE V. GENOSA
Facts: Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and
wounded his husband which ultimately led to his death. According to the
appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night
and it was her husband who began the provocation. The appellant said she
was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make
sure she would deliver her baby safely. The appellant testified that during
her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but that
Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said
that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was
because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The
appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be
suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of
self-defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was found guilty of the
crime of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the
husband was attacked while asleep.
Issues: (1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense; (2) Whether
or not treachery attended the killing.
Held: For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all
the elements of self-defense arising from battered woman syndrome, to
wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and
her intimated partner; (b) The final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the
killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate
and actual – grave harm to the accused based on the history of violence
perpetuated by the former against the latter.
For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating
circumstance because the quarrel or argument that preceded the killing
must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s aggression.
PEOPLE VS. CATBAGAN
FACTS: After receiving complaints about the gunshots coming from the
residence of Danilo Lapidante, who was then was celebrating his birthday,
appellant Carmelo Catbagan, an investigator of the Criminal Investigation
Service, Philippine National Police, went to the latter’s house to verify who
among their group had been firing the Armalite rifle. Suddenly, a piece of
stone was hurled from the direction of the celebrant’s house, hitting
Catbagan. Irritated, he ordered his companion, Zosimo Pavabier, to look for
the one who threw the stone. At that moment, Sgt. Celso Suico of the
Philippine Air Force and of the Presidential Security Group, the one
responsible for firing the shots, approached and extended his hand towards
Catbagan as he introduced himself. Completely ignoring the gesture of the
latter, Catbagan drew out his .9mm automatic pistol and fired successively
at Suico. Ernesto Lacaden, companion of Suico, who was abruptly awakened
as the shots were fired, disembarked from the parked owner-type jeep
where he was sleeping. Unexpectedly, two shots were also fired at him by
Catbagan. Almost simultaneously, Catbagan directed his attention to
Lapidante who was then inside their compound and running towards the
main door of their house upon the prompting of his wife to evade the
assailant. But before he could reach the safety of their abode, two rapid
shots were fired by Catbagan, one of which hit him in the upper part of his
body. As a consequence of the injuries they sustained, Suico and Lapidante
died, whereas Lacaden had to be treated and confined in the hospital. In his
defense, Catbagan argued that he was justified in shooting the victims, as he
was merely defending himself and fulfilling his sworn duties. He claimed
that the victims were rushing and encircling him, Lacaden toting an ice-pick
while Suico drew a gun from his waist and aimed the pistol at him.
Simultaneously, he heard Lapidante shouting, which he believed was asking
for a long gun. Threatened of his safety, he drew his own gun fired at the
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aggressors. He then surrendered himself and his firearms to his superior
officer at the CIDG Office. The lower court, nonetheless, convicted him with
the crime of homicide, murder, and frustrated murder.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the appellant was justified in shooting the victims as a
direct result of his fulfillment of a duty.
2) Whether or not the appellant was entitled to a justifying circumstance of
self-defense.
3) Whether or not the appellant was entitled to a mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
4) Whether or not the characterization of the crimes charged by the trial
court was correct.
HELD: 1) No. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that a
person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office does not incur any criminal liability, provided that the
following requisites must concur: 1) the accused must have acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2)
the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the necessary
consequence of such lawful exercise. In the instant case, the above
mentioned requisites were absent. The appellant was not performing his
duties at the time of the shooting as there was no proof that he had
personal knowledge on who had been firing the Armalite, nor he was there
to effect an arrest. The fatal injuries that he inflicted on the victims were not
a necessary consequence of the performance of his duty as a police officer.
2) No. Article 11 of the RPC provides that anyone who acts in defense of his
person or rights do not incur criminal liability, provided that the following
circumstances concur: 1) unlawful aggression; 2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; and 3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself. In the circumstances
surrounding the shooting of Suico, only a majority of the elements of self-
defense were present. However, he may still be credited with a mitigating
circumstance in accordance with Article 13 of the RPC. With regard to the
circumstances surrounding the shooting of Lapidante and Lacaden, no
unlawful aggression was shown. Thus, the justifying circumstance of self-
defense will not apply.
3) Yes. In order for voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the
following elements must concur: 1) the offender has not been actually
arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and
3) the surrender was voluntary. It is sufficient that that act be spontaneous
and clearly indicative of the intent of the accused to surrender
unconditionally. At the time of his surrender, appellant had not actually
been arrested. He surrendered himself and his firearm to a person in
authority, the chief of the Assistant Directorate for Intelligence of the
Philippine National Police. Finally, the surrender was voluntary and
spontaneous; it thus showed intent to surrender unconditionally to the
authorities. Thus, he was credited with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
4) No. The crimes were not properly characterized except with the case of
Suico. Treachery was alleged in the case, thus qualifying the shooting of
Lapidante and Lacaden as murder and frustrated murder respectively. In
order to establish treachery, the following must be proven: 1) the
employment of such means of execution as would give the person attacked
no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and 2) the deliberate and
conscious adoption of the means of execution. With regard to the shooting
of Lapidante and Lacaden, the Court held that even if the positions of the
victims were vulnerable, there was still no treachery, as the appellant did
not deliberately adopt such mode of attack. His decision to shoot them was
clearly sudden. Thus, in the case of Lapidante, the Court modified the crime
from murder to homicide; while in the case of Lacaden, the crime was
modified from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries.
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