Creation of Autonomous Regional Bodies 9. Hence this petitions c/p/m assailing the law’s constitutionality.
196271 – Kida vs Senate 10. Subsequently, Anak Mindanao Party-List, Minority Rights Forum Philippines, Inc.
Brion, J
Constitutionality of RA10153 synchronizing elections in ARMM with regular national and
local elections is assailed.
FACTS
1. 2011, RA No. 10153 An Act Providing for the Synchronization of the Elections in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) with the National and
Local Elections and for Other Purposes was enacted.
1. reset the ARMM elections from the 8th of August 2011, to the second
Monday of May 2013 and every three (3) years thereafter, to coincide
with the country’s regular national and local elections.
2. granted the President the power to appoint (OICs) for the Office of the
Regional Governor, the Regional Vice-Governor, and the Members of
the Regional Legislative Assembly, who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May
2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
2. The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras.
3. 1989, Congress acted through RA 6734 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic
Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
1. A plebiscite was held on November 6, 1990 as required by Section
18(2), Article X of RA No. 6734, thus fully establishing the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The initially assenting provinces
were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-tawi. RA No. 6734
scheduled the first regular elections for the regional officials of the
ARMM on a date not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its
ratification.
4. RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic
Act No. 6734,)
1. further refinement of ARMM structure and reset the regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001.
5. 2001, RA No. 9140
1. reset the first regular elections originally scheduled under RA No. 9054,
to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite to ratify RA No.
9054 to not later than August 15, 2001.
6. RA No. 9054 was ratified in a plebiscite held on August 14, 2001.
1. The province of Basilan and Marawi City voted to join ARMM on the
same date.
7. RA No. 9333
1. reset the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005,
and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
2. Unlike RA No. 6734 and RA No. 9054, it was not ratified in a plebiscite.
3. the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8,
2011. C
4. June 11, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted,
8. With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its
preparations for the ARMM elections.
and Bangsamoro Solidarity Movement intervened
11. The Arguments
1. Petitioners: assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153
assert that these laws amend RA No. 9054 and thus, have to comply
with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements prescribed
under Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become
effective.
2. RA No. 10153 UNC:
1. failure to comply with the three-reading requirement of
Section 26(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
2. violations of the right of suffrage of the people of ARMM,
3. failure to adhere to the elective and representative character
of the executive and legislative departments of the ARMM.
4. the grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to
undertake the functions of the elective ARMM officials
1. they also argue that the power of appointment also
gave the President the power of control over the
ARMM, in complete violation of Section 16, Article X
of the Constitution.
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. Synchronization as a recognized constitutional mandate
1. OSG: Constitution mandates synchronization, and in support of this
position, cites Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions)
of the 1987 Constitution
2. SC: Yes, while the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress
has to synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards
this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions-
3. Objective: synchronize the holding of all future elections whether
national or local to once every three years. This intention finds full
support in the discussions during the Constitutional Commission
deliberations.
4. Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a local election
based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.- Understood in
its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily
serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or
minor political subdivision.
1. Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of governor,
vice-governor and regional assembly representatives
obviously fall within this classification, since they pertain to the
elected officials who will serve within the limited region of
ARMM.
5. From the perspective of the Constitution, autonomous regions are
considered one of the forms of local governments, as evident from
Article X of the Constitution entitled Local Government. Autonomous
regions are established and discussed under Sections 15 to 21 of this
Article the article wholly devoted to Local Government.
6. That an autonomous region is considered a form of local government is
also reflected in Section 1, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
1
 Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
2. The Presidents Certification on the Urgency of RA No. 10153
1. Pets: 3-readings req not followed
2. SC: Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance: The presidential certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in
Art. VI, Section 26 qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can
become a law: [i] the bill has passed three readings on separate days
and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days
before it is finally approved.
3. Here, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national
and local elections\
4. Certification of the Pres and Congress acceptance- absent GAOD, the
SC will not interfere..
5. In any case, despite the Presidents certification, the two-fold purpose
that underlies the requirement for three readings on separate days of
every bill must always be observed to enable our legislators and other
parties interested in pending bills to intelligently respond to them.
Specifically, the purpose with respect to Members of Congress is: (1) to
inform the legislators of the matters they shall vote on and (2) to give
them notice that a measure is in progress through the enactment
process.- MET here.
3. RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 are not amendments to RA No. 9054
1. Pets assail RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 has also been challenged
because they did not comply with Sections 1 and 3, Article XVII of RA
No. 9054 in amending this law. Section 1. Consistent with the
provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be reamended or
revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds
(2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate voting separately.nSection 3. Any amendment to or revision of
this Organic Act shall become effective only when approved by a
majority of the vote cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose, which
shall be held not earlier than sixty (60) days or later than ninety (90)
days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
2. SC: No,
1. neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No.
9054.
2. RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM
elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections.
3. need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of the
subsequent ARMM regular elections, these subsequent laws cannot be
considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not change or
revise any provision in RA9054.
4. Supermajority voting requirement unconstitutional for giving RA No. 9054 the
character of an irrepealable law
1. SC: even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact
amend RA No. 9054, the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement
required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be struck
down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by
requiring more than what the Constitution demands.
5. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite
requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
1. SC: Section 18, Article X of the Constitution plainly states that The
creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
the majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite
called for the purpose. With these wordings as standard, we interpret
the requirement to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the
Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous
regions i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution
which Congress must provide for in the Organic Act require ratification
through a plebiscite. These amendments to the Organic Act are those
that relate to: (a) the basic structure of the regional government; (b) the
regions judicial system, i.e., the special courts with personal, family,
and property law jurisdiction; and, (c) the grant and extent of the
legislative powers constitutionally conceded to the regional government
under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
2. SC: The date of the ARMM elections does not fall under any of the
matters that the Constitution specifically mandated Congress to provide
for in the Organic Act. Therefore, even assuming that the supermajority
votes and the plebiscite requirements are valid, any change in the date
of elections cannot be construed as a substantial amendment of the
Organic Act that would require compliance with these requirements.
6. The synchronization issue
1. SC: As we discussed above, synchronization of national and local
elections is a constitutional mandate that Congress must provide for
and this synchronization must include the ARMM elections.
2. 3 options : (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in
office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section 7(1), Article VII of RA
No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume
office;[ (2) to hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of
those elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office; or (3) to authorize the President to appoint
OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in
the synchronized elections assume office.
7. The Constitutionality of RA No. 1015 and SC: Basic Underlying Premises
1. the extent of the powers of Congress to legislate: Sections 15 to 21 of
Article X of the Constitution constitute express limitations on legislative
power as they define autonomy, its requirements and its parameters,
thus limiting what is otherwise the unlimited power of Congress to
legislate on the governance of the autonomous region.
1. Section 17, Article X, all powers and functions not granted by
this Constitution or by law to the autonomous regions shall be
vested in the National Government.
2. the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they
now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio[45] in the
relationship between the national and the regional
governments.
2. the constitutional mandate for the synchronization of elections: both
autonomy and the synchronization of national and local elections are
recognized and established constitutional mandates, with one being as
compelling as the other. If their compelling force differs at all, the
2
 difference is in their coverage; synchronization operates on and affects
the whole country, while regional autonomy as the term suggests
directly carries a narrower regional effect although its national effect
cannot be discounted. Problem: interim measures
3. the concept of autonomy as recognized and established under the 1987
Constitution.
8. Holdover Option is Unconstitutional, violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
1. Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they
cannot extend their term through a holdover. primacy of the
Constitution
2. Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there
had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No.
9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of holdover can
only apply as an available option where no express or implied
legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where such
contrary intent is evident- RA 10153
9. The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections
1. The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature,
as evident from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the
Constitution. Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. Section
4. xxx Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of
May. Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for xxx the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials
2. SC: These provisions support the conclusion that no elections may be
held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President,
Members of Congress and local officials, except when so provided by
another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to whom
Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to
ascertain or fill in the details in the execution of that power.
3. Court cannot rule on the wisdom of the law, it cannot compel
COMELEC to call for special elections. Furthermore, the
constitutional power of the COMELEC, in contrast with the power
of Congress to call for, and to set the date of, elections, is limited
to enforcing and administering all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election. Statutorily, COMELEC has no power to
call for the holding of special elections unless pursuant to a specific
statutory grant. True, Congress did grant, via Sections 5 and 6 of BP
881, COMELEC with the power to postpone elections to another date.
However, this power is limited to, and can only be exercised within, the
specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. As in Section
5 of BP 881, Section 6 addresses instances where the elections do not
occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen
circumstances.
10. The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials
1. SC is not empowered to adjust the terms of elective officials. Based on
the Constitution, the power to fix the term of office of elective officials,
which can be exercised only in the case of barangay officials,[67] is
specifically given to Congress.
2. Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when the
Constitution – hold-over is likewise not an option
11. The Presidents Power to Appoint OICs- UPHELD
1. SC: At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in
nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to the exercise of this
power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications
must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.[73] The appointing
power is embodied in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
2. This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President
can appoint. These are:
1. First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors;
other public ministers and consuls; officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval
captain; and other officers whose appointments are vested in
the President in this Constitution;
2. Second, all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
3. Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint; and
4. Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
3. Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No.
10153, it falls under the third group of officials that the President can
appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the
assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
4. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for
the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in
the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. This
power is far different from appointing elective ARMM officials for the
abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials
elected in the May 2013 elections.
5. Admittedly, the grant of the power to the President under other
situations or where the power of appointment would extend beyond the
adjustment period for synchronization would be to foster a government
that is not democratic and republican. For then, the peoples right to
choose the leaders to govern them may be said to be systemically
withdrawn to the point of fostering an undemocratic regime. This is the
grant that would frontally breach the elective and representative
governance requirement of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.
1. But this conclusion would not be true under the very limited
circumstances contemplated in RA No. 10153 where the
period is fixed and, more importantly, the terms of governance
both under Section 18, Article X of the Constitution and RA
No. 9054 will not systemically be touched nor affected at all.
To repeat what has previously been said, RA No. 9054 will
govern unchanged and continuously, with full effect in
accordance with the Constitution, save only for the interim
3
 and temporary measures that synchronization of elections
requires.
6. The adoption of the measures to synchronize, is no different from the
exercise by Congress of the inherent police power of the State, where
one of the essential tests is the reasonableness of the interim measure
taken in light of the given circumstances.
7. Furthermore, the representative character of the chosen leaders need
not necessarily be affected by the appointment of OICs as this
requirement is really a function of the appointment process; only the
elective aspect shall be supplanted by the appointment of OICs. In this
regard, RA No. 10153 significantly seeks to address concerns arising
from the appointments by providing, under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the
assailed law, concrete terms in the Appointment of OIC, the Manner
and Procedure of Appointing OICs, and their Qualifications.
12. Other Constitutional Concerns
1. Pets: set a dangerous precedent of giving the President the power to
cancel elections anywhere in the country, thus allowing him to replace
elective officials with OICs.\
2. SC: No: an across-the-board cancellation of elections is a matter for
Congress, not for the President, to address. It is a power that falls
within the powers of Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Even Congress, as discussed above, is limited in what it can
legislatively undertake with respect to elections.
3. 2 years interim- , it would be reckless to assume that the presence of
an acting ARMM Governor, an acting Vice-Governor and a fully
functioning Regional Legislative Assembly can be done away with even
temporarily. To our mind, the appointment of OICs under the present
circumstances is an absolute necessity.
4. The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to undertake
the functions of the elective members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. As in Menzon, leaving the
positions of ARMM Governor, Vice Governor, and members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years,
would clearly cause disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic
services to the people, in the proper management of the affairs of the
regional government, and in responding to critical developments that
may arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the
exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to
appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.
13. Autonomy in the ARMM
1. Pets: while synchronization may be constitutionally mandated, it cannot
be used to defeat or to impede the autonomy that the Constitution
granted to the ARMM
2. SC: Nope, ut magis valeat quam pereat: that the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and one mandate should not be given
importance over the other except where the primacy of one over the
other is clear
3. Synchronization is an interest that is as constitutionally
entrenched as regional autonomy.
4. Pets: ARMM elections should not be synchronized with the national and
local elections in order to maintain the autonomy of the ARMM and
insulate its own electoral processes from the rough and tumble of
nationwide and local elections.
5. SC: nope, while autonomous regions are granted political autonomy,
the framers of the Constitution never equated autonomy with
independence. The ARMM as a regional entity thus continues to
operate within the larger framework of the State and is still subject to
the national policies set by the national government, save only for those
specific areas reserved by the Constitution for regional autonomous
determination.
6. Interestingly, the framers of the Constitution initially proposed to
remove Section 17 of Article X, believing it to be unnecessary in light of
the enumeration of powers granted to autonomous regions in Section
20, Article X of the Constitution. Upon further reflection, the framers
decided to reinstate the provision in order to make it clear, once and for
all, that these are the limits of the powers of the autonomous
government. Those not enumerated are actually to be exercised by the
national government In Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre: Under the
Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including
autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to
make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local
levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the
smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a
whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated
and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting
for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.
7. In other words, the autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be invoked
to defeat national policies and concerns. Since the synchronization of
elections is not just a regional concern but a national one, the ARMM is
subject to it; the regional autonomy granted to the ARMM cannot be
used to exempt the region from having to act in accordance with a
national policy mandated by no less than the Constitution.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
RA 10153 upheld
MR DENIED
1. Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections
1. The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution
does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and
local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following
provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution
2. The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective
more clearly there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective
officials from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly,
the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the
terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the
importance of this constitutional mandate.
3. Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners’ contention that the ARMM
elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of
4
 synchronization because the ARMM elections were not specifically
mentioned in the above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the Constitution.
1. The ARMM had not yet been officially organized at the time
the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people.
Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide
merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure
through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the
people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be
construed in the light of what actually is a continuing
instrument to govern not only the present but also the
unfolding events of the indefinite future.
2. That the Constitution mentions only the national government
and the local governments, and does not make a distinction
between the local government and the regional government, is
particularly revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the
framers of the Constitution to consider the autonomous regions
not as separate forms of government, but as political units
which, while having more powers and attributes than other local
government units, still remain under the category of local
governments. Since autonomous regions are classified as local
governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous
regions are also considered as local elections.
3. Pets argue that even assuming that the Constitution mandates
the synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections are not
covered by this mandate since they are regional elections and
not local elections.
4. SC:In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule
is verba legis. Applying this principle to determine the scope of
local elections, we refer to the meaning of the word local, as
understood in its ordinary sense. As defined in Websters Third
New International Dictionary Unabridged, local refers to
something that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited
district, often a community or minor political
subdivision. Obviously, the ARMM elections, which are held
within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim
Mindanao, fall within this definition.
5. To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers
than other provinces, cities, or municipalities is not enough
reason to treat the ARMM regional elections differently from the
other local elections. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemus.
2. RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054
1. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule
for only the first ARMM elections
2. From the past legislative actions, we see the clear intention of
Congress to treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM
elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts.
3. Supermajority vote requirement makes RA No. 9054 an irrepealable
law
1. Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, we
have already established that the supermajority vote requirement set
forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is unconstitutional for
violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.
2. in Duarte v. Dade: This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a
particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of
subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon
existing statutes.
4. Unconstitutionality of the holdover provision
1. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials should
be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013
elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which
prohibits regional elective officials from performing their duties in a
holdover capacity.
2. SC: The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
expresses the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set
a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can
occupy their offices.
5. COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections
1. As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section
5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections have
already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be
suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances,
such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances.
2. In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law,
in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of
national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of the
circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.
3. More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next
ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different
election date.
4. Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special
elections, and this Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there is
still the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected
officials in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the May 2013
national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor the
COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an
amendment of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which limits the
term of local officials to three years.
6. President’s authority to appoint OICs.
1. The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in
nature. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad
strokes the extent of this power,
2. The first group of presidential appointments are specified. The
second group of officials the President can appoint are all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint In other words, where there are
offices which have to be filled, but the law does not provide the
process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the power
of the President to fill the office by appointment.
5
 3. The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in
granting the President the power to appoint OICs in elective
positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the
Constitution which merely grants the President the power of
supervision over autonomous regions.
4. SC: There is no incompatibility between the Presidents power of
supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the
power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No.
10153, to appoint OICs.
5. The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to
see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with
law.[31] This is distinguished from the power of control or the power of an
officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for the latter.
6. Pets argue President’s appointment power includes the power to
remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the
appointed OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as
representatives of the President and not of the people.
7. SC: Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners
supposition. The provision states: Appointment of Officers-in-Charge.
The President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions
pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May
2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.
8. SC:Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has
the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly,
the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
7. RA No. 10153 as an interim measure
1. We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election
process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the communitys
choice of leaders. However, we have to keep in mind that the adoption
of this measure is a matter of necessity in order to comply with a mandate
that the Constitution itself has set out for us. Moreover, the
implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim measure
is comparable to the interim measures traditionally practiced when, for
instance, the President appoints officials holding elective offices upon the
creation of new local government units.