AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Potenciano ILUSORIO and Teresa ILUSORIO vs COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, et al.
No. L-20344 / 17 SCRA 25
May 16, 1966
Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Facts:
- Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land located in San Miguel, Bulacan.
Respondents are tenants on the same property.
- Respondents wanted to change their tenancy contract from shared tenancy to
leasehold tenancy. However, petitioners refused, and instituted this case with the
CAR. Their case was based on the unconstitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 1199.
- The CAR rejected the idea, maintaining the constitutionality of the same.
Issue:
- Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. 1199 violates the freedom of contract and
impairs property rights.
o Petitioners used this as the basis of their argument of
unconstitutionality.
- Whether or not the CAR arbitrarily fixed the rentals to be paid by respondents on
the basis of the average harvest for three preceding agricultural years, instead of
determining it from year to year.
o The CAR fixed the rentals to be paid by respondents at 20% of the
average harvest from 1959-60, 1960-61, and 1961-62.
SC: CAR decision AFFIRMED.
- The prohibition against impairing the obligation of contracts is not absolute. They
are restricted to contracts with respect to property, or some object of value, and
confer rights which may be asserted in court. They have no application to statute
relating to public subjects, within the domain of the general legislative powers of
the State, involving public right and welfare of the entire community affected by it.
o They do not prevent proper exercise of police power.
o Such regulations are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety,
morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community.
o Such laws do not impair the right of the landowner to dispose or alienate
his property, nor prohibit him to make such transfer or alienation.
 They only provide that in case of transfer, the tenancy
relationship between landowner and tenant should be
preserved. The purpose of the law is to maintain the tenants
in peaceful possession and cultivation of the land, and afford
them protection against unjustified dismissal.
o R.A. 1199 is a remedial legislation, pursuant to social justice in the
exercise of the police power of the State.
- Section 46 (a) of the same Act, as amended, fixes the consideration for use of
ricelands to be not more than 25% in case of first class land, and 20% in case of
second class land, of the average gross produce, after deducting the amount of
palay used as seed, and the cost of harvesting and threshing of the past three normal
harvests.
o First class lands are those that yield more than 40 cavans per hectare.
o Second class lands are those that yield 40 cavans or less per hectare.
o Both are computed upon the normal average harvest of the past three
preceding years.
Lucia DE LA PAZ vs COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS and Marcos Papag
No. L-21488 / 25 SCRA 479
October 14, 1968
Petition for Certiorari of a Decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Facts:
- Respondent Papag was the tenant of herein petitioner De La Paz. The former sent
the latter a letter informing her of his desire to change their tenancy relation to
leasehold. Said letter was received by petitioner.
- However, instead of agreeing to the proposal, petitioner filed a petition before the
CAR, praying that the court cause confrontation of the parties for arbitration.
Respondent prayed to dismiss the petition on the ground that it had been filed only
to delay the change sought by him.
- While the case was pending before the CAR, petitioner filed another case before the
same court and against the same tenant, this time to eject respondent tenant on
the ground that he had deliberately failed to deliver her share of the rice crop.
- After a stipulation of facts, the parties agreed that the main issues to be tackled are:
o Constitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 1199.
o Rentals shall be determined by evidence submitted.
CAR: Both cases DISMISSED against the tenant.
- The CAR set the tenancy relation to leasehold.
- Rentals were set as follows:
o Palagad crop, at 13.5 cavans of palay.
o Panahon crop, at 18 cavans of palay.
o Both to be paid within 10 days from threshing.
- Petitioner appealed.
Issue: Whether or not Section 46(a) of R.A. 1199, in computing the normal average harvest
for the 3 preceding agricultural years, means only calendar years.
SC: CAR decision AFFIRMED.
- Calendar Years vs Agricultural Years:
o If the law means “calendar years”, then all crops produced in one
calendar year have to be added together, and the average of three of
such years is the measure of productivity.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
o If the law means “agricultural years”, then every crop represents one
year, and the average of three such crops should be used as basis to
determine productivity.
- The CAR acted correctly to avoid any inequity when it sent the computation for rent
for each crop.
o The consideration declared by law, under Section 46(a), as rentals for the
use of ricelands is computed on the bases of the past three normal
harvests, without any qualification.
o Such average of three normal harvests, or three agricultural years, is the
bases for computing rental.
o Since respondent produces two crops a year (the latter being invariably
bigger), it is only fair that separate rentals be fixed for each crop.
o A fixed rental for both crops would be disadvantageous:
 To the tenant at harvest time of the palagad crop, where
produce is lesser.
 To the landowner at harvest time of the panahon crop, where
produce is bigger.
- If improvements were introduced on the farm by the landowner which increase
productivity, he may demand for an increase in the rental proportionate to the
increase in production resulting from such improvements.
Cayetano DE BORJA vs COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, et al.
No. L-24398
Cayetano DE BORJA vs Hon. Jose Santos, et al.
No. L-27478 / 79 SCRA 557
October 25, 1977
Petitions for Review of the Decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Facts:
- Private respondents herein are shared tenants of petitioner de Borja on several
parcels of land located in San Miguel, Bulacan, and Gapan Nueva Ecija.
- Private respondents informed petitioner of their desire to change their relationship
from shared tenancy to leasehold. Petitioner opposed such conversion.
- Respondents filed an action against petitioner with the CAR, asking the court to:
o Uphold the change of tenancy system.
o Order a reliquidation of harvests from agricultural year 1959-1960, up to
the agricultural year 1963-1964.
- An issue raised was the efficacy of the shared tenancy contract, since the period for
the same was left blank in the contracts.
CAR: Partial decision in favor of respondents.
- The CAR declared that the tenancy relationship between the parties shall be the
leasehold system effective the next agricultural year (1964-65).
- In the interim, respondents moved to order the threshing and temporary liquidation
of harvests. But upon finding that said harvests were already threshed, the CAR
ordered a temporary liquidation of net produce.
o Liquidation of net produce: harvests from gross produce, less seeds used
and fees for reaping and threshing.
- Two years later, a similar order was issued, this time including costs of irrigation.
- Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari, seeking to annul the CAR orders
deducting costs of irrigation from gross harvests. He likewise assailed the
constitutionality of Section 14 of R.A. 1199
- Petitioner likewise argues that since the contract does not provide for the efficacy
of the share tenancy contracts, it shall have force and effect for as long as
respondents shall remain his tenants, meaning they will remain as tenants until
either death, dismissal by court, or voluntary surrender of the landholding.
Issue: Whether or not the stipulation as to the period between the parties is limited and
effective to only one agricultural year.
- Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Sec. 14 of R.A. 1199 (its constitutionality
was upheld).
SC: CAR decision PARTIALLY AFFIRMED.
- Section 6 of Act 4054 contemplates two situations:
o One where the parties expressly stipulate the duration of the contract,
in which Sec. 6 allows (the contract shall last in accordance with the
stipulation of the parties).
o One where the parties omit to stipulate the same, in which Sec. 6 states
that the contract shall be understood to last only during one agricultural
year.
- Petitioner argues that since there was no stipulation as to the period, the duration
of the contract is indefinite, and will last as long as the respondents remain his
tenants.
o If such argument is upheld, then respondents’ right to seek the change
of relationship from one of share tenancy to leasehold, a right explicitly
secured to them by Sec. 14, is rendered nugatory.
o This argument contravenes the very spirit and purpose of Section 14,
which gives respondents the right of choice and determination of the
system that will control and govern their relationship with petitioner.
o Respondents also averred that it was petitioner’s intent to leave the
same blank, leaving it susceptible to several interpretations.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Spouses ENDAYA, et al. vs COURT OF APPEALS and Pedro Fideli
G.R. No. 88113 / 215 SCRA 109
October 23, 1992
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- Spouses Trinidad owned a piece of land located in Malvar, Batangas. Said land was
devoted to production of rice and corn. Private respondent Fidel has been
cultivating this land as tenant under a 50-50 share agreement.
- A lease contract was executed between the spouses and one Cassanova, where the
latter was obliged to pay P400 per hectare per annum, and gave him authority to
oversee the planting of crops. Respondent signed this lease contract as one of the
witnesses.
- The same lease contract was renewed, but the rental was raised to P600. The same
was signed by respondent as witness.
- During the duration of both lease contracts, respondent continued to cultivate the
land, and shared equally with Cassanova.
- The spouses eventually sold the land to petitioners for P26,000.00. The sale was
registered, and a TCT was duly issued.
- Respondent continued to farm the land, despite petitioners’ demand for him to
vacate the land. Respondent then filed a complaint with the RTC-Tanauan, praying
that he be declared an agricultural tenant of the petitioners.
RTC-Tanauan: Ruled in favor of PETITIONERS.
- The lower court ruled that respondent is not an agricultural lessee.
CA: RTC decision REVERSED.
- The CA ruled that respondent is an agricultural lessee.
- Upon review to the SC, petitioner argued that when the original landowners entered
into a lease contract with Cassanova, the relationship between the former and
respondent was terminated. The landowner cannot have a civil law lease with one
party and an agricultural leasehold agreement with another over the same land.
Issue: Whether or not the lease contract terminated the tenancy relationship between the
spouses and respondent.
SC: CA decision AFFIRMED.
- The fact that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract and gave the lessee
the authority to oversee the farming did not cause the extinguishment of the
agricultural leasehold relation, since it is not among the causes provided for by law.
o Sec. 10, R.A. 3844, as amended by R.A. 6839, explains that the
agricultural leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by mere
expiration of term, nor by sale, alienation, or transfer of legal possession
of the landholding.
o Transactions involving agricultural land over which an agricultural
leasehold subsists resulting in change of ownership will not terminate
the rights of the agricultural lessee. He is given protection by law by
making such rights enforceable against the transferee, or the
landowner’s successor-in-interest.
- The execution of a lease agreement did not terminate respondent’s status as an
agricultural lessee.
o The fact that he signed both agreements did not mean he waived his
rights as such.
o In fact, it was his right to know about the same, since he had to deal with
a new person instead of with the original owners as he used to.
- Petitioners argue that respondent cannot be an agricultural lessee of their land since
the latter did not secure their permission to cultivate the same.
o While agricultural tenancy is not created where consent of the true and
lawful owners is absent, this principle only applies to a situation where
an untenanted farm land is cultivated without the owner’s knowledge,
or against his will.
o In the present case, petitioners were successors-in-interest to a
tenanted land, where consent was already given by the original owners.
The same binds petitioners who stepped into the original landowner’s
shoes, acquiring not only their rights, but also their obligations.
Trinidad GABRIEL vs Eusebio PANGILINAN
G.R. No. L-27797
August 26, 1974
Appeal from the Decision of the CFI-Pampanga.
Facts:
- Petitioner filed a complaint in the CFI-Pampanga against respondent, alleging that
she is the owner of a fishpond over which she entered into an oral contract of lease
with respondent on a year to year basis. Rentals were pegged at P1,200.00 plus real
estate taxes.
- Desiring to develop and cultivate the fishpond herself, she notified respondent that
she was terminating the contract. However, upon respondent’s request the lease
contract was extended for another year.
- Petitioner demanded again the surrender of the property, but was ignored. Hence,
the filing of the present case.
- Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the CFI had no
jurisdiction over the case, which he argues should have been filed with the Court of
Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship
between the parties. However, this motion was denied.
- Defendant alleged that the fishpond was originally leased to him by petitioner’s
father, for as long as defendant wanted, upon the condition that he would convert
a major portion into a fishpond.
CFI-Pampanga: It has jurisdiction over the case.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
- No tenancy relationship exists between the parties, since the lease contract is
manifestly a civil lease governed by the Civil Code, not by R.A. 1199.
Issue: Whether or not there was a tenancy relationship between the parties.
SC: CFI decision AFFIRMED.
- In order that a leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act may exist, the
following requisites must concur:
o Land worked by tenant is agricultural land.
 There is no doubt that the fishpond is agricultural land, as it
is considered by R.A. 1199 as such. But this fact alone does
not make respondent a leasehold tenant.
o Land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with
members of his immediate farm household.
 The question of whether such a big parcel of land (17
hectares) is susceptible of being worked by the respondent’s
family was not raised.
o Land must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with aid of
labor from members of his immediate household.
 Records of the case show that respondent eventually became
ill and incapacitated. Records further show that not even the
members of respondent’s immediate farm household worked
the land in question. Laborers instead worked on the
property.
o Land belongs to another.
o Use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in
money or in produce or in both.
- CFI-Pampanga was correct, therefore, when it assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Antonio EVANGELISTA y Lising vs COURT OF APPEALS, Luz Castaneda, and Heirs of Benedicto
Sanchez
G.R. No. L-37736 / 158 SCRA 41
February 23, 1988
Petitioner for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- Private respondents own a parcel of land with an area of 5 hectares, situated at
Lugam, Malolos, Bulacan.
- Petitioner filed a complaint for reinstatement, with damages, in the Court of
Agrarian Relations in Bulacan, against Sanchez and Felipe Domingo. Petitioner
claimed that he was the tenant of Sanchez, until he was illegally ejected from the
land when Sanchez informed him to fix the amount of rental in accordance to R.A.
No. 3844.
- Private respondents denied the forcible eviction, and claimed that petitioner
occupied the land as lessee under a civil lease contract. They anchored their defense
on 3 written contracts executed by Sanchez and petitioner.
o Under the “Kasulatang Option”, the land was leased to petitioner for
P2000.00, with Sanchez having the option to renew the lease.
o Under the “Kasulatan ng Buwisan 6”, petitioner was to pay 100 cavans
of rice as rent. Said contract also expressly stated that petitioner was not
to be considered a tenant of the land, and that Sanchez would not have
any share in the produce. Petitioner also paid a deposit of P2,500.00, to
be returned after the expiration of the contract.
o “Kasulatan ng Buwisan 7” contained the same terms and conditions as
the previous “Kasulatan ng Buwisan 6”, except that the period of the
contract was for one agricultural year, and rent for the use of landholding
was reduced to 90 cavans of rice. Petitioner also paid P2,250.00 deposit,
to be returned after expiration of the contract.
- Respondents then executed “Kasulatan ng Buwisan 8”, this time with one Felipe
Domingo.
CAR: Petitioner was illegally ejected.
- The CAR considered petitioner as an agricultural lessee, and ordered Felipe
Domingo to surrender possession of the land to petitioner.
CA: CAR order REVERSED.
- When petitioner first took possession of the property, it was by virtue of a lease
contract, admittedly, was given to him.
- The two most important conditions of a lease agreement was the deposit paid by
petitioner and the stipulation that Sanchez will not have any share in the produce.
- Petitioner’s own witness admitted that petitioner used to hire plowers, harrowers,
planters, and farm laborers.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is an agricultural lessee under R.A. 3844.
SC: CA decision AFFIRMED.
- A share tenant under R.A. 1199, or an agricultural tenant under R.A. 38444, is
entitled to security of tenure over the landholding he works at, and not even the
expiration of any term fixed in the leasehold contract will cause the lessee’s
ejectment from the same. On the other hand, under a civil lease contract, the lessee
does not enjoy security of tenure, and can be ejected from the land after expiration
of the term.
- Petitioner cannot be considered a tenant.
o Based on the evidence on record, the salient characteristic which would
make the relationship between petitioner and Sanchez one of
agricultural leasehold, is absent in this case, which is personal cultivation
by the petitioner. Petitioner’s own witnesses admitted this fact.
o The fact that contracts of lease signed by the parties did not stipulate
that the land holding should be cultivated by petitioner indicates intent
to establish only a civil lease relationship.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Jose MATIENZO vs Martin SERVIDAD
G.R. No. L-28135 / 107 SCRA 276
September 10, 1981
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- Defendant Servidad is the owner of an agricultural land located in Sipocot, Camarins
Sur.
- On April 16, 1961, plaintiff Matienzo executed an instrument handwritten in the
dialect of the locality of defendant’s wife, Feliza, stating that:
o Plaintiff and his spouse are instituted as head-overseer of the land of
defendant and his spouse, and whoever resides in the premises will obey
the head-overseers, as authorized by the defendant.
o Plaintiff is allowed to build his house thereon and plant coconuts without
being compensated nor sharing with the defendant.
- The parties entered into another agreement on January 1, 1963 regarding copra
making and upland planting, stating that:
o Plaintiff and his wife are made “caretakers” of the land.
o Plaintiff was to receive 1/3 of the copra as payment.
- On January 30, 1964, defendant wrote letters to plaintiff ordering him not to
interfere with the plants since they had no agreement for that year.
- Plaintiff sought the help of the Office of the Agrarian Counsel in Naga City, but
efforts to settle the case amicably failed.
- Plaintiff then brought an action against defendant for illegal ejectment with the
Court of Agrarian Relations, asking that he be paid reasonable compensation for his
improvements on the land, as well as actual and moral damages.
Court of Agrarian Relations: Complaint DISMISSED.
- The CAR dismissed the case for lack of merit. A subsequent motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
- Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter certified the case to the
High Court.
Issue: Whether or not plaintiff was instituted as overseer by the defendant.
SC: Petition DISMISSED.
- It is clear from the evidence that plaintiff was made an overseer of defendant, not
a tenant.
o The basic element of sharing in agricultural tenancy was absent. Under
the agreement, plaintiff “will share no percentage for the land”, and “all
those coconuts that we are to plant no share will be taken for the land.”
o The 1/3 share plaintiff received from copra-making constituted
payments for processing of copra. He was likewise paid for clearing the
coconuts.
- It is clear that absent a sharing agreement, no tenancy relationship ever existed
between the parties.
o What transpired was that plaintiff was made overseer of a piece of land,
to supervise applications for loans from those residing therein, was
allowed to build his own house upon the same land, and plant specified
plants without being compensated. He was also free to clear and plant
the land as long as he wished. He had no sharing agreement with
defendant, nor was he obligated to pay any price certain to, nor share
the produce with, the latter.
o Even though they were eventually considered “caretakers”, defendant
still did not share in the produce of plaintiff’s plants.
Yolanda CABALLES vs DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Hon. Heherson Alvarez and
Bienvenido Abajon
G.R. No. 78214 / 168 SCRA 247
December 5, 198
Petition for Certiorari to Review the Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Facts:
- In 1975, respondent Abajon constructed his house on a portion of land owned by
one Andrea Millenes. He paid monthly rentals for the same. The latter also allowed
respondent to plant on a portion of land, agreeing to a 50-50 share in the produce.
- In 1978, Spouses Caballes acquired a landholding from the same Andrea Millenes.
The wife, Yolanda, is the petitioner herein. The land acquired by the spouses
covered the portion upon which Abajon’s house was erected.
- The spouses informed respondent that they would be erecting a poultry near his
house, and advised him to transfer his dwelling. Respondent counter-offered to pay
rentals instead to them, but this was not accepted.
- Soon after, the spouses asked respondent to vacate the premises, saying that they
needed the property. Respondent, however, refused to leave.
- A criminal case for malicious mischief was instituted by petitioner after alleging that
respondent, after being reprimanded by her, cut down the banana plants on the
property, the same plants planted by respondent.
- The trial court referred the case to the Regional Office of the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform, now the Department of Agrarian Reform, for a preliminary determination
of relationship between the parties.
DAR Regional Office: Respondent is a tenant of the petitioners.
- The DAR explained that since the respondent was a tenant, the case was filed to
patently harass and/or reject the same, which was prohibited by law.
DAR: Regional Office certification REVERSED.
- The case was deemed proper for trial since the land involved is a residential lot
consisting only of 60 square meters whereon the house of the accused is
constructed and within the industrial zone of the town.
- Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
DAR: Previous certification REVERSED.
- The DAR, under its new Minister, reversed its previous certification, and deemed
the case not proper for trial, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between
the parties.
- During a summary investigation, Andrea Millenes testified that respondent did give
her 50% share of the produce. Respondent further testified that the petitioner also
received the same 50% share of the bananas.
Issue: Whether or not respondent can be considered a ‘tenant’.
- Whether or not the DAR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in holding respondent as an agricultural tenant.
SC: DAR order set aside. Criminal Case DISMISSED.
- RA 3844 defines an economic family-size farm as “an area of farm land that permits
efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an
income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family’s
needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education, with possible allowance for
payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb
yearly fluctuations in income.
o Respondent occupied only a miniscule portion of the 500-sq meter lot:
60 square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and corn cannot
by any stretch of imagination be considered an economic family-size
farm.
o Respondent himself admitted that he did not depend on the products of
the land since it was too small, and that he took carpentry jobs on the
side.
- The DAR was misled to believe, and eventually rule, that a tenancy relationship
existed between respondent and Millares. By operation of RA 3844 (Sec 10), the
new owners, herein petitioner, were subrogated to the rights and substituted to the
obligations of the Millares.
o The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
 The parties are the landowner and the tenant.
 The subject is agricultural land.
 There is consent.
 The purpose is agricultural production.
 There is personal cultivation.
 There is sharing of harvests.
- All aforementioned requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship.
o The fact that a landowner would accept some of the produce of his land
from someone who plants crops thereon was not unusual.
 In fact, it was a typical and laudable provinciano trait of
sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for
favor received.
 This, however, does not create a tenancy relationship.
 The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a
tenancy relationship.
o Agricultural production was absent in the arrangement, it can be
concluded that respondent was not a tenant of petitioner.
- Private respondent cannot be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting
the banana trees.
o As an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the
trees, he owns said crops.
o Respondent cannot be charged with malicious mischief when one of the
elements of such crime is damage deliberately caused to the property of
another.
 Respondent merely cut down his own plantings.
Graciano BERNAS vs COURT OF APPEALS and Natividad Bito-On Deita
G.R. No. 85041 / 225 SCRA 119
August 5, 1993
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- Respondent owns several parcels of land located in Panay, Capiz. She entrusted the
lots by way of “dugo” to her brother, Benigno. The latter used the fruits of the lands
to defray the cost of financing his children’s schooling in Manila.
- Benigno worked the land together with petitioner Bernas, where Benigno first
provided for the expenses while Bernas worked the land. After the harvest, both
deducted said expenses and divided the balance of the harvest. Respondent had no
part in the arrangement as she was not privy to the same.
- Benigno eventually returned the lots to respondent when all his children had
finished schooling. Respondent and her husband then sought to take over the lots,
but petitioner refused to relinquish the property.
- Respondent then filed an action with the RTC for recovery of possession, ownership,
and injunction with damages.
RTC: Petition DISMISSED.
- The trial court held in favor of petitioner Bernas, ruling that he was a leasehold
tenant under RA 119, and an agricultural leasehold lessee under RA 3844, having
been designated as such by Benigno. As such, his tenurial rights cannot be disturbed
save for causes provided for by law.
CA: RTC decision REVERSED.
- The CA ruled that the agreement between respondent and her brother was actually
a contract of commodatum. Hence, Benigno, being the bailee, could neither lend
nor lease the properties loaned, to a third person, since commodatum is personal
in character.
- Bernas, then, had no better right than Benigno who admittedly was entrusted with
the property only for a limited period.
- Respondent not being privy to the contract between Benigno and Bernas, she
cannot be expected nor be bond to honor the same.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Issue: Whether or not the agricultural leasehold established by Benigno is binding upon
respondent.
SC: Petition GRANTED. CA decision REVERSED.
- RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389, is the governing law in this case, not the
provisions of the Civil Code.
o Leasehold tenancy was defined as one of the systems of agricultural
tenancy.
- There was a leasehold tenancy present in this case, not commodatum.
o Respondent granted possession of the properties by reason of her
liberality. Benigno, then, became the legal possessor of the property,
and had authority and capacity to enter into an agricultural leasehold
relation with petitioner Bernas, which now makes him an agricultural
lessee.
 Being an agricultural lessee, petitioner was vested by law with
rights accruing thereto, including the right to continue
working the landholding until such lease is legally
extinguished, and the right to be protected in his tenure.
- Respondent did not raise substantial issues that could have been also resolved by
the Court:
o Whether or not petitioner really is an agricultural lessee of respondent.
o Whether or not respondent intend to validly terminate petitioner’s
agricultural leasehold.
o Whether or not petitioner planted crops and used the land in a manner
contrary to what was agreed upon between respondent and her brother.
 The alleged conversion of the land to riceland was necessary
for the land to produce more and meet the needs of Benigno.
 Benigno did not even object to the improper use, if such was
the case. In any case, Benigno did not have any agreement
with respondent on how to use the land anyway.
 In any case, respondent cannot raise the same issue. It was
Benigno who had an agricultural leasehold agreement with
petitioner, not respondent.
o Whether or not respondent authorized her brother Benigno to install an
agricultural lessee.
 Benigno, as the legal possessor, could install an agricultural
lessee. Nothing in the law requires that the civil law lessee,
usufructuary, or legal possessor have prior authorization
from the landowner.
 More notably, respondent did not expressly prohibit Benigno
from doing the same.
 Even if there was such a prohibition, it would only apply to
Benigno.
 A tenant is a person who by himself and/or with help from his
immediate household cultivates the land belonging to
another. As far as Bernas is concerned, that “another” is
Benigno, not Natividad.
o Whether or not a judicial declaration is required for an agricultural
leasehold to exist.
 It is incorrect for an agricultural leasehold relationship to exist
by operation of law when there is a concurrence of an
agricultural lessor and agricultural lessee.
 From the moment Benigno, the legal possessor, granted the
cultivation and use of landholding in exchange for a sharing
in the harvest, an agricultural relationship emerged between
them by operation of law.
o Whether or not Bernas’ tenure lasted during the duration of Benigno’s
possession only.
 Secs. 7, 10, and 36 all state that Bernas’ rights cannot be
prejudiced when Benigno returned possession of the land to
Natividad.
 The grounds for ejectment of an agricultural lessee are
exclusive, and no other ground can justify termination of the
lease.
Victor VALENCIA vs COURT OF APPEALS,e t al.
G.R. No. 122363 / 401 SCRA 666
April 29, 2003
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- Petitioner acquired a 2 parcels of land, one of which initially had a tenant. Said
tenant terminated the tenancy relationship voluntarily via a public instrument.
Actual physical possession of the property then reverted back to petitioner.
- Petitioner then entered into a 10-year civil law lease over both parcels of land with
one Henson. Before the same expired, and apparently without objection from
Henson, petitioner leased the properties for 5 years to Fr. Andres Flores. The second
lease was subject to a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering the land
without petitioner’s written consent. This included installing a leasehold tenant.
- Prior to Fr. Flores’ lease, there was no such prohibition on Henson’s lease. Henson
instituted private respondent Crescenciano Frias and Marciano Frias to work on the
property.
- During the lease of Fr. Flores, he designated private respondent Francisco Obang as
overseer, and, along with the Frias’, instituted other private respondents to cultivate
the land. They all shared their produce with Fr. Flores.
- When the lease agreement with Valencia and Fr. Flores expired, petitioner
demanded that private respondents vacate the premises. Respondents refused, and
continued to occupy and cultivate the land.
- 1976: Petitioner then filed a protest with the Minister of Agrarian Reform.
Meanwhile, without petitioner’s consent, respondents applied for Certificates of
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Land Transfer (CLTs) under P.D. No. 27, claiming they were bona fide tenants of the
property. Said CLTs were issued by the DAR.
- Upon issuance of the CLTs, petitioner filed a second protest, and requested an
investigation and subsequent cancellation of the same.
- Sometime after, petitioner and one private respondent, Catalino Mantac, entered
into a leasehold contract undertaking to have a profit-sharing agreement. No other
respondent entered into any agreement or tenancy contract.
- Upon investigation of the DAR, 12 years after the first letter of protest,
recommended that the CLTs issued be cancelled. However, the DAR Regional Office
still dismissed petitioner’s protest, and held in favor of respondents.
- Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President. Executive Secretary Guingona,
Jr., affirmed the order of the DAR, with modification that the area acquired by
petitioner as homestead be excluded from the coverage of P.D. No. 27.
CA: Case DISMISSED.
- The CA ruled that his petition was filed out of time, and that he should have filed a
petition for review instead, within 15 days from receipt of the order of the DAR
Secretary.
- Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Issue: Whether or not a contract of civil law lease prohibit a lessee from employing a tenant
on the land subject matter of the lease.
SC: Petition GRANTED. CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
- Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844, as amended, does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee
to employ a tenant without consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so
specifically authorized.
o The right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of the landowner,
except as may be provided by law.
o Nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a civil law lessee of a landholding is
automatically authorized to install a tenant thereon.
o A different interpretation would result in a situation where a person who
wants to be a tenant asks a third person to become a lessee of the
landowner. The tenant then would have a better right over the property
than the landowner himself.
o Moreover, Sec. 6 of R.A. 3844, in relation to Sec. 8 of R.A. 1199, simply
states who are the parties to an existing contract of agricultural tenancy.
It does not state those who furnish the landholding, either as owner, civil
law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, are automatically authorized
to employ a tenant. This presupposes that the civil lease agreement may
be restrictive.
o Not even the owner himself is free to install a tenant, as when his
ownership or possession is encumbered or subject to a lien or condition
prohibiting the same.
o Tenancy relationship has been held to be of a personal character.
- Under express provision of Art. 1649 of the Civil Code, the lessee cannot assign the
lease without consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
o In this case, not only was there no stipulation to the contrary, but the
lessee was expressly prohibited from subleasing the land, which includes
installing a leasehold tenant, since the right to do so is an attribute of
ownership.
o A civil law lease can prohibit a lessee from employing a tenant on the
land.
- The fact that petitioner never extended the term of the lease shows that he
precisely wanted to recover the property upon expiration of the contract, except
from Mantac with whom he already entered into a tenancy contract.
- A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove the
existence of the elements of tenancy (Matienzo vs Servidad).
o Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of
tenure.
o Allegations that an agricultural tenant tilled the land does not make the
case an agrarian dispute.
o The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists
is intent.
o All the requisites must concur to create a tenancy relationship.
- The prohibition against subleasing the property, as between petitioner and Fr.
Flores, must be upheld.
o There is no tenurial security for private respondents, except for private
respondent Mantac.
o Due to this, and with exception to Mantac, all other private respondents
are not entitled to CLTs, and are considered unlawful occupants of the
property, and are ordered to immediately vacate the property.
Note (Caballes vs DAR):
- The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:
o The parties are the landowner and the tenant.
o The subject is agricultural land.
o There is consent.
o The purpose is agricultural production.
o There is personal cultivation.
o There is sharing of harvests.
Reyes v. Joson
G.R. No 143111
June 7, 2007
Facts:
In 1963, Hilarion Caragay hired herein petitioner Loreto Reyes, as caretaker/watcher of a
fishpond somewhere in Balanga, Bataan. Caragay had been leasing the fishpond from its owner,
Aguirre. In 1973, Caragay’s lease contract expired, and the son of the now-deceased Apolonio
Aguirre leashed the fishpond to Joson from 1973 to 1982. Joson was appointed as the
administrator of the fishpond.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
As administrator, Joson leased the property to Malibiran for five (5) years, and Reyes signed
the contract in his capacity as ‘bantay palaisdaan.’ Upon expiration of Malibiran’s lease, the
possession of the fishpond reverted to Joson. In 1989, former lessee Caragay re-entered the
fishpond and harvested the contents with the assistance of Reyes, who was under the
impression that a new lease contract had been executed between Joson and Caragay.
Caragay then refused to vacate the premises.
MTC Bataan: Joson filed a complaint for forcible entry. A compromise agreement was later
entered, stating that Caragay and all persons working under him were to vacate the premises.
However, they failed to do so, forcing the MTC to issue a writ of exection.
RTC Bataan: Reyes filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for a temporary restraining order
against spouses Joson. The RTC initially granted a TRO that enjoined the implementation of the
writ of execution, but subsequently dismissed the petition for injunction.
This was due to the failure of the petitioner to file before the DAR pursuant to Section 50 of RA
6657, which divested the RTC of jurisdiction to try cases featuring disputes over Agrarian
Reform matters.
MTC issued an alias writ of execution for forcible entry, which resulted in the ejectment of
Reyes from the fishpond.
PARAD: Reyes filed a complaint for maintenance of peaceful possession, claiming that he was
an agricultural tenant, entitled to security of tenure, and that he was hired as a ‘bantay kasama’
or a caretaker-industrial partner, and that his status had ripened into a bona fide tenant by
operation of law after his service of fourteen years.
PARAD granted Reyes’ petition, finding that he was a lawful tenant entitled to peaceful
occupation of the property.
DARAB affirmed the judgment of PARAD.
CA: The Court of Appeals reversed DARAB’s decision, stating that Reyes had been hired by
Caragay, not Joson, initially. Furthermore, during the successive leasehold agreements, Reyes
held himself as a ‘bantay palaisdaan,’ which ran contrary to his claims that he already regarded
himself as a tenant of Joson. Reyes also failed to prove his alleged sharing of the produce with
any of the lessees or holders of the property, which is one of the essential requisites of tenancy.
Issues: W/N petitioner Reyes is an agricultural tenant, and therefore, entitled to security of
tenure.
Held: No, he is not.
The essential requisites to establish a tenancy relationship are: 1) that the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship
is agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the
purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared
between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
All of the elements must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship. It is clear in this case
that the consent on the part of the landowner to a tenancy arrangement is clearly absent. Joson
had only been holding onto the property as administrator. The owner, Aguirre, was never
shown to have consented to a tenancy arrangement with Reyes. There was no intent on
Aguirre’s part to enter into a tenancy agreement with petitioner Reyes.
Mere occupation and cultivation of agricultural land does not automatically convert a tiller or
worker into an agricultural tenant. Owing to the lack of evidence proving Reyes’ claim of being
a tenant of the subject fishpond, the petition must be denied.
Tiongson v. CA
G.R. No. L-62626
July 18, 1984
Facts:
Sometime in 1946, the late Severino Manotok donated and transferred a 34-hectare lot in
Quezon City, to his eight children and 2 grandchildren. At that time, no tenants or any other
persons were occupying the lot. Subsequently, however, Teodoro Macaya pled with the
Manotoks that he be allowed to live on the property in order to guard the property and prevent
the entry of squatters.
Manotok allowed Macaya to stay in the property as a guard, subject to conditions. It was
stipulated orally that Macaya would leave the property any time that the owners needed or
wanted to take over the administration of the property. Furthermore, Macaya may only raise
animals and plant crops for personal needs, and that he was only allowed to use 3 hectares of
the entire property. It was required that the owners would have no responsibility or liability for
those actions.
The Manotoks subsequently organized themselves into a corporation engaged in real estate
known as Manotok Realty, Inc.
Macaya did not pay any rentals as he was not required to do so for his occupancy. However,
the corporation noted the increase in taxes over the property, and asked for a remittance of
ten (10) cavans of palay every year to defray the costs. This was subsequently increased to
twenty (20) cavans.
Due to difficulties, Macaya requested for a year’s rest in 1967, claiming that the palay had dried
up. He also requested that he be allowed to contribute 10 cavans of rice in subsequent years.
The corporation said that he might as well not deliver anymore.
On January 31, 1974, Manotok Realty executed a unilateral deed of conveyance of the property
to Patricia Tiongson, and the Manotok siblings. The Manotoks informed Macaya that he needed
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
to vacate the property so that they may construct their houses. Macaya initially agreed to do
so after he harvested his planted rice, but did not vacate even after. A second demand to vacate
was made, but was ignored by Macaya, who brought the matter to the Department of Agrarian
Reforms.
Court of Agrarian Relations: Faced with the threat that his house was going to be bulldozed,
Macaya filed an action for peaceful possession, injunction, and damages with preliminary
injunction. CAR ruled in favor of herein petitioners.
CA: Aggrieved, Macaya raised the issue to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the CAR, finding
that there was a landowner-tenant relationship between the Manotoks and Macaya.
Issues: W/N a tenancy relationship existed between Macaya and the Manotoks.
Held: No, it did not exist.
The essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: 1) the parties are the landholder and the
tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural
production; and 5) there is consideration.
All these requisites are necessary in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties.
In this case, however, one must look at the property in question. The 34 hectare lot is NOT
classified as agricultural land.
Evidence indicates that the tax declarations of the real property and the annual receipts of the
taxes paid have always classified the lot as ‘residential.’ The Court of Appeals erroneously ruled
that due to the small portion of the property over which palay may be planted, that the same
should be considered as agricultural. That is not the case. The City Engineer of Quezon City even
certified that the property falls within the category of ‘Residential I Zone.’
Furthermore, no landholder-tenant relationship existed between the Manotoks and Macaya,
as they have not agreed as to the contributions of certain items of productions with regard to
expenses in the cultivation of the property. Furthermore, there was no consent regarding the
tenancy contract.
There being no intention to devote the property for agriculture, the fourth requisite is
absolutely absent in this case. The produce had not been divided between the landowners and
the alleged tenant, thus, negating any claims that the requisite of consideration was complied
with.
Hilario v. IAC
G.R. No. 70736
March 16, 1987
Facts:
Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations alleging that
he had been in continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of land in Bulacan since
1955. Baltazar also alleged that in 1980, spouses Hilario began to threaten him into desisting
from entering and cultivating a portion of the property, and that the spouses committed acts
which violated his security of tenure.
Baltazar, claimed that he was a tenant of Vda de Balagatas by virtue of a kasunduan, and that
he built his house and planted produce which was shared between himself and Balagtas, and
later, Pengzon. It was only on 1980 that he came to know that the property was already owned
by the Hilarios.
Petitioner spouses, on the other hand, claimed that they acquired the property after it had
been foreclosed by PNB and was sold.
CAR: The Court of Agrarian Relations determined that Baltazar was not a tenant, and that the
property in question was not an agricultural landholding, but rather, a plain ‘bakuran.’
CA: The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, remanded the case to the lower courts. The lower
courts, however, ruled against Baltazar.
IAC: Baltazar appealed to the IAC, which reversed the CAR’s decision, stating that herein private
respondent was entitled to security of tenure as a leasehold tenant.
Issues: W/N the IAC erred in disturbing the findings of the decision of the CAR in the case at
hand.
Held: Yes, it erred.
Baltazar claimed that he was working on the land pursuant to a kasunduan between himself
and Balagtas. It was also clear that when Balagtas died and she was succeeded by Corazaon
Pengson, that no new contract was executed. He, however, claimed that the old contract
continued in effect.
This is untenable. Pengson claimed that Baltazar never fully explained the situation to her, and
that he was living on a separate property, and that he never paid rent for his stay in her lot. She
also claimed that she did not receive any share from the produce, and that she would have not
received the same as she was aware that the lot had been purchased by the spouses Hilario.
Mere cultivation by Baltazar does not confer upon him any legal right to work the land as
tenant. Furthermore, the plot of land was inside a poblacion, which is presumed to be
residential or commercial or non-agricultural in nature unless there is clearly preponderant
evidence to it being agricultural. Furthermore, there was no proof of sharing of the harvest.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Bonifacio v. Dizon
G.R. No. 79416
September 5, 1989
Facts:
CAR: Olimpio Bonifacio filed a complaint for ejectment of private respondent San Miguel from
his agricultural land in Bulacan. He relied on the ground of personal cultivation under Section
36 (1) of R.A. 3844. This was granted by the judge.
CA: San Miguel appealed to the Court of Appeals, which modified the judgment and ordered
Bonifacio to pay her P1,376. The other aspects of the case were affirmed.
Bonifacio died during the pendency of the petition elevating the case to the Supreme Court.
The Court denied San Miguel’s petition.
Subsequently, Rosalina Bonifacio, the surviving wife, and Olivio’s children moved for the
execution of the CAR decision before the RTC of Bulacan. A writ of execution was issued, and
while San Miguel complied with it for the most part, he refused to vacate a portion of the
property.
San Miguel moved to quash the writ of execution. The petitioners moved for the issuance of a
writ of demolition and an order declaring San Miguel in contempt of court for allegedly re-
entering the property.
RTC ruled that the motion for demolition was null and void.
Petitioners assailed this decision in the Court of Appeals, which was certified to the Supreme
Court.
Issues: W/N the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
decision could no longer be executed as the action is purely personal, and that the death of
Olivio precluded his heirs from moving on the same.
Held: Yes, he committed a grave abuse of discretion.
Although this is an agrarian case for ejectment of an agricultural lessee, this does not operate
to bar the general rule that ejectment cases survives the death of a party.
Much of the problem lies in the term "personal cultivation" by which the ground for ejectment
under Section 36 (1) of R.A. 3844 was loosely referred. As it is, the term gave the impression
that the ejectment of an agricultural lessee was allowed only if and when the landowner-lessor
and no other opted to cultivate the landholding; thereby giving use to a bigger misconception
that the right of cultivation pertained exclusively to the landowner-lessor, and therefore his
personal right alone.
This is not the case. The term "personal cultivation" cannot be given a restricted connotation
to mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In either case, the right extends
to the members of the lessor's or lessee's immediate family members.
Petitioners are not only the heirs and successors-in-interest, but the immediate family
members of the deceased landowner-lessor as well. The right to cultivate the landholding
asserted in the CAR casenot being a purely personal right of the deceased landowner-lessor,
the same was transmitted to petitioners as heirs and successors-in-interest. Petitioners are
entitled to the enforcement of the judgment.
Zamoras vs Su, Jr.
Issue: WON Victoriano Zamoras was an employee or tenant of Roque Su, Jr.
Facts:
Zamoras was hired by Su as overseerof his coconut land
Zamoras was charged with the task of having the land titled in Su’s name and of assigning
portions to be worked by tenants, supervising the cleaning, planting, care and cultivation of the
land, harvesting of coconuts and selling of the copra.
Su paid Zamoras a salary of P2,40/ month plus 1/3 of the proceeds of the sales of copra which
occurs every 2 months, the other 1/3 of the proceeds went to the tenants and the other to Su
In May 1981, Su informed Zamoras in writting that he obtained a loan from Anita Hortellano
and had authorized her to harvest the coconuts from his property
On May 29, 1981, Su sent a letter to Zamoras informing him that he’s being temporarily laid-
off until he could obtain a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines to pay Anita.
Zamoras was no longer allowed to work as an overseer of the said property, without his
consent, Anita harvested the coconuts w/o giving him his 1/3 sahre of the corpa sales.
Zamoranos filed for illegal dismissal with the NLRC and Court of Agarian Relation
Ruling:
SC ruled that Zamoranos was an employee and not a tenant of Roque Su, Jr.
SC stated that for one to be a tenant of a property, the 6 essenatial requisites should be present
namely:
Parties are the landlord and tenant
Subject is the agricultural holding
There is consent between the parties
Purpose is agricultural production
There is personal cultivation by the tenant
There is sharing of harvest between landlord and tenant
SC ruled that the element of personal cultivation of the land, or with aid of his farm household
is absent for Zamoras did not cultivate any part of Su’s plantation either by himself or with the
help of his household. He was hired as a mere overseer. Thus their relationship is indicative of
an employer-employee relationship
*** Since Zamoranos is an employee and not a tenant of Su, it is the NLRC and not the Court of
Agrarian Relation who has jurisdiction to try and deceide on the said case.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Oarde vs CA
Issue: WON Oarde are the tenant-tillers of the land in question.
Facts:
Zacharias Oarde testified that he began tilling the land in question on April 29,1964 when he
got married to the Precentation Molar, daughter of Francisco Molar.
Gregorio Magnaye, employee of Bureau of Lands testified that in preparing the summary lists
of tenants-tillers, they conducted a barrio assembly, they arrived at the conclusion that certain
persons were tilling certain properties owned by other persons based on the listings by the DAR
technicians.
They gathered the tenants together with the barangay officials and interviewed them if they’re
the ones cultivating the property.
Based on their survey, Zacharias was tilling 2 lots
Precentacion Molar alleged that she is a tenant-lessee of the land in question, she allaged that
she stated tilling the land inv1965, she caused the land to be worked on “pakyaw” basis, hiring
different persons for different work, she also stated that she does not till the land.
Zacharias Oarde, who testified on behalf of Precentacion, she began to till the land in 1968,
that she was not married and she only hired labourers to till the land, Oarde manifested that it
was Francisco Molatr who distributed to his children the land they are farming. Precentacion
hired labourers to prepare and plant the land and does NOT actually till the land.
TC and CA held that Oarde and Precentacion Molar were not lawful tenants Sps. Wilfredo, Sps.
Rogelio and Vilmar Molar (respondents)
Ruling:
SC affirmed TC and CA decision that petitioners are not lawful tenant-tiller of the land ion
question.
SC ruled that the 6 essential requisites must be present. In this case, the element of personal
cultivation was absent.
TC and CA found that Precision Molar did not personally cultivated the land, nor did her
immediate family or farm household, instead, she hired other people to do all phases of farm
work, even Zacharias testified that she merely paid labourers to perform such task
Cornes vs Leal Realty Centrum Co., Inc.
Issue: WON there was tenancy relation that existed between the parties.
Facts:
In the 1st complaint filed by Rodlfo Cornes, et. al (pet) against Leal (res), Petitioners alleged that
they had been farmers and full-pledged tenants for more than 30 year of an agricultural
landholding which was previously owned and registered in the name of Josefina Omaña
The said property consists of at least 21 hectares and is principally devoted to rice and sugar.
The said property was covered by RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarain Reform Law of 1988), but
Josefina sold the said property to Leal Realty in contravention of the law.
Leal Realty then converted a portion of the property into a memorial park.
Leal Realty were aware of the tenancy relationship between Josefina and petitioners, Leal
Realty then purportedly negotiated with petitioners to renounce their tenancy right under
(CARL) in exchange for a compensation package as a form of disturbance compensation.
Leal Realty failed to comply with the terms and conditions by admitting their inability to pay
the balance in the compensation package drawn between them and advised petitioners to
continue working on the subject property and to continue to appropriate for themselves the
fruits until the complete payment has been made.
Petitioners allaged that they were threatened to be ousted and evicted by Leal Realty,
Petitioners sought for injuctiuon and prayed for the declaration of the property as subject to
compulsory coverage of the CARL and their entitlement to the right and privileges, as well as
payment for damages.
On the 2nd and 3rd compliant filed by petitioners against respondents, Petitioners allaged that
respondents violated RA 6657, by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale to Sps. Tugadi and Sps.
Alcazaren w/o proper conversion of the lot from agricultural to non-agricultural, they also
contented that respondents w/o proper authority caused the subdivision of the subject
property into smaller lots.
Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favour of Respondents, PA found that there was
no tenancy relationship that existed between the parties, that there was no convincing
evidence to establish to prove the tenancy arrangement other that petitioners’ self serving
declaration.
PA, basing on the statements of Jacinto Cornes (father and predecessor-in-intrest of petitioners
Cornes) declared that he was a hired labourer
Pablo Cornes, Francisco Gadiano, Domingo Pagarigan and Juanito Robles (other predecessor-
in-interest) were also found to have worked as hired hands.
PA ruled that Rodolfo merely derived the relationship from their predecessors-in-interest who
were hired workers. The fact that petitioners were seen working on the subject property did
not raise an assumption of the existence of a tenancy relationship.
Dept of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) reversed PA decision by ruling that
petitioners are bona fide tenants of the subject property.
DARAb held that the right to security of tenure does not only apply to bona fide tenants but
also to actual tillers of the land, DARAB declared that there was an implied tenancy between
the parties by ruling that petitioners were on the subject property for more than 30 years
CA reversed DABAR decision and affirmed PA decision by ruling that for a tenancy relationship
to exist, the 6 requirements must be present.
CA held that the fact that petitioners had worked on the subject property does not give rise to
the existence of a tenancy relationship, CA also stated that the compensation agreement
package petitioners entered with Leal Realty must be respected.
Ruling:
SC ruled that there was indeed no tenancy relationship between the parties as the element of
consent was missing.
SC then defined a tenant as persons who in themselves and with the aid available from within
their immediate farm household, cultivate the land belonging to or possessed by another, with
the latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under
the sahre tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in
produce or money or both under the lease-hold tenancy system.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
SC stated that petitioners came upon such tenancy based on self serving tetstimony of Cornes
that his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property for more than 30 years
and had engaged in a 50-50 sharing scheme with Josefina.
SC stated that self-serving testimonies are inadequate.
Jeremias vs Estate of the Late Irene P. Mariano.
Issue: WON there was tenancy relationship between the parties
Facts:
Irene Mariano is a wodow who owned 2 parcels of land with an area of 270,203 sqm which was
divided into 2 areas (TCT 6886 and TCT 6887)
TCT 6886 had an area of 209,422 sqm while TCT 6887 had an area of 60,781 sqm
The said TCTs were placed under the Opearation Land Transfer program pursuant to PD 27
The tenated portion of the land were subdivided among identified tenat-beneficiaries and a
subdivision plan was made
On june 26, 1988, Irene died intestate and was succeeded by her 2 children, Jose and Erlinda.
Helen Mariano, wife of Jose Mariano drafted an unsigned letter dated May 14, 1989, instituting
Ruben Viñas as a tenant on Lot 25 and 48 under TCT 6886 despite the fact that estate remained
unpartitioned and still under intestate proceedings.
In 1991, Danilo Mariano was appointed as administrator of the respondent estate.
In April 14, 1991, Danilo, as administrator filed before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAd), 2 separate complaints for ejecment against Leopoldo and Ruben.
Danilo stated that Leopoldo planted various agricultural products on lots 1B3D, 1B3E, 1B3H and
1B3Q covered by TCT 6887 without his knowledge and consent. Danilo further alleged that
Leopoldo was not a tenant of Irene, It was his Father, Santiago Jeremias who was Irene’s tenant.
Leopoldo denied that he unlawfully entered the said property (1B3D, 1B3E, 1B3H and 1B3Q),
he claimed that he cultivated and farmed the land upon the permission and tolerance of Irene,
he also averred that as the son on Santiago, he has lawfully acquired the right to cultivate said
lots by virtue of succession.
On the case against Ruben, Danilo alleged that Ruben cultivated the land covered by TCT 6886
without his knowledge and consent.
Danilo answered that his cultivation of the area was pursuant to the hand-written letter of
Helen Mariano instituting him as a tenat of the said lots
PARAd ruled in favour of Danilo and ordered Leopoldo and Ruben to vacate the said land.
PARAd ruled that Leopoldo’s right to succeed his father as a tenant covered only specific lots
(1B3F, 1B3G and 1B3R), since Leopoldo failed to show evidence that he obtained the consent
of the owner to till lots 1B3D, 1B3E, 1B3H and 1B3Q, his occupation on the said lots was illegal.
PARAd ruled in the case of Ruben that the alleged institution of Ruben was enough proof that
he was authorized to cultivate lots 25 and 48 based on the following factors:
1st, the letter of authority did not state that Ruben was authorized to specifically till lots 25 and
48.
2nd, the letter contained a provision stating that Ruben will vacate the premise should the
landowner will need the land
Lastly, PARAd believed that the subject lots were not covered by PD 27
DARAB ruled in favour of Leopoldo and Ruben, DARAb belived that all the lots of the estate
covered under TCTs 6886 and 6887 were tenanted.
DARAB also stated that the said land exceeded tha 24 hectares limit under PD 27
CA revered DARAB decision and ruled in favour of respondent
Ruling:
SC ruled in favour of PARAd by ruling that there was no tenancy relationship between the
parties.
SC stated on the case of Leopoldo is a tenant on 3 lots (1B3F, 1B3G and 1B3R) by being a
successor of his father, however, there is no evidence showing that he was also a designated
tenant of lots 13BD, 1B3E, 13BH and 1B3Q, evidently his rights only embraces the 3 lots his
father cultivated.
On the case of Ruben, SC stated that an unsigned written letter could not be appreciated as
proof that he was authorized to cultivate on the lots 25 and 48.
Respondent, through administrator Danilo was able to present public documents which was
signed and approved
TCT 6886 and 6887 which are public documents stated that the lots occupied by Ruben and
Leopoldo are untenanted which was classified by the Bureu of Lands.
Ceneze vs Ramos
Issue: WON theres tenancy relationship between the parties
Facts:
Welfredo Ceneze filed an action for declaration as bona fide tenant-lessee of 2 parcels of
agricultural land owned by Feliciana Ramos with an area of 12,000 hectares.
Ceneze alleged that his father, Julian Ceneze, Jr. transferred to him his tenurial rights over the
land with the consent and approval of Ramos, and that since then, he has been in actual and
peaceful possession of the land until Ramos forcibly entered and cultivated the land for the
purpose of dispossessing him of his rights as a tenant in April 12, 1991.
Ramos denied that a tenancy relationship existed between her and ceneza, she alleged that
she never instituted Ceneze as a tenant in any of her land. She manifested that Weldredo had
never been in possession of the land, she admitted that it was Julian Sr. who was the tenant of
the said land until he migrated to the US in 1985, She allowed Julian’s wife, to cultivate the land
until she migrated to the US in 1988, she later allowed Welfredo to cultivate the land until he
also migrated in the US in 1991 without informing her.
Ramos then, after Welfrdo’s departure, took possession of the land, cultivated it and
appropriated for herself the harvest, she reported on the Municispal Agrarian Reform Office
(MACO) the abandonment of the land by Julian Sr, his wife and Welfredo.
Provincial Adjudicator redered a decision in favour of Ceneza.
PA based its decision on the following documents:
Certification issued by the Baranagay Agrarian Reform Commission (BARC)
Affidavit executed by Julian Sr., stating that he is transferring his rights to Weldfredo
Joint Affidavit of the other tenants attesting that Welfredo was a tenant of the land since 1988
and that they helped in the harvesting of palay products and delivering to respondent her share
of the harvest.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
DARAb affirmed PA decision
CA reversed PA and DARAB decision
Ruling:
SC sustained CA decision
SC ruled that for a tenancy relationship to be present, all the 6 elements should be present,
namely:
Parties are the landowner and tenants
Subject is agricultural land
There is consent by the landowner
Purpose is agricultural production
There is personal cultivation, and
There is sharing of the harvest
Absence of one element does not make and occupant a de jure tenant.
Sc stated that the certificate of the BARC is merely preliminary or provisional in character and
does not bind the judiciary
SC also ruled that the certificate and the affidavits (which were not notarized) do not show the
elements of consent of the landowner and sharing of harvests
[G.R. No. 135999. April 19, 2002]
MILESTONE REALTY and CO., INC. and WILLIAM L. PEREZ vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA
RAZON PEA and RAYMUNDO EUGENIO
Facts:
Spouses Alfonso Olympia and Carolina Zacarias and Spouses Claro Zacarias and Cristina Lorenzo
were the co-owners of an agricultural land identified as Lot 616 of the Malinta Estate. Said lot
has an area of 23,703 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 26019,
located at Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Bulacan, now
Valenzuela City. Eventually, Carolina became the owner of the property by virtue of a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement executed on October 17, 1976 by the heirs of Alfonso
Anacleto Pea who was a tenant of the property and a holder of a Certificate of Agricultural
Leasehold issued on February 23, 1982, had a house constructed on the lot. He had several
children on the first marriage, among whom are Emilio Pea and Celia Segovia, who also had
their houses constructed on the property.
On February 4, 1986, Anacleto, who was already 78 years old and a widower, married Delia
Razon, then only 29 years old.
On February 17, 1990, Anacleto died intestate and was survived by Delia and his children in his
first marriage, including Emilio. Emilio and Delia, the latter with the help of respondent
Raymundo Eugenio, her son in law, continued tilling and cultivating the property.
On January 22, 1992, Emilio signed a handwritten declaration that he was the tenant in the
land and he was returning the landholding to Carolina Zacarias in consideration of the sum of
P1,500,000 as disturbance compensation. After receipt of the money, he executed a Katibayang
Paglilipat ng Pagmamayari.
Petitioners, William Perez, Joseph Lim, Willy Lim, Winston Lim, Edgar Lim, and Jaime Lim
established Milestone as incorporators, in order to acquire and develop the aforesaid property
and the adjacent parcel, Lot No. 617 of the Malinta Estate.
On July 30, 1992, Carolina Zacarias executed a deed of sale transfering the Lot No. 616 to
petitioner Milestone for P7,110,000. TCT No. 26019 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No.
25433 was issued in the name of Milestone. Milestone also acquired the adjoining lots, Lot
Nos. 616 and 617 of the Malinta Estate with a total area of three (3) hectares. Development of
the property then commenced.
On October 13, 1992, Delia Razon Pea and Raymundo Eugenio filed a complaint against to
declare as null and void the sale by Carolina to Perez and by the latter to Milestone, and to
recognize and respect the tenancy of private respondents Delia and Raymundo.
On July 28, 1993, the PARAD rendered a decision dismissing the complaint
Delia Razon Pea and Raymundo Eugenio appealed from the PARADs decision to the DARAB.
On September 5, 1995, the DARAB reversed the decision of PARAD. Court of Appeals affirmed
the DARAB decision.
Petitioners Milestone Realty & Co., Inc. (Milestone for brevity) and William Perez then sought
the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not Delia Razon Pea has a right of first priority over Emilio Pea in succeeding to
the tenancy rights of Anacleto over the subject landholding.
Held:
SEC. 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the Parties.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the
leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the
landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one month from such death or
permanent incapacity, from among the following:
(a)the surviving spouse;
(b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity;
or (c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age:
Provided, That in case the death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs
during the agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the end of that agricultural year:
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural lessor fails to exercise his choice within
the periods herein provided, the priority shall be in accordance with the order herein
established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall bind his
legal heirs.
The Court stated that agricultural leasehold relationship is not extinguished by the death or
incapacity of the parties. In case the agricultural lessee dies or is incapacitated, the leasehold
relation shall continue between the agricultural lessor and any of the legal heirs of the
agricultural lessee who can cultivate the landholding personally, in the order of preference
provided under Section 9 of Republic Act 3844, as chosen by the lessor within one month from
such death or permanent incapacity.
In applying Section 9 of Republic Act 3844, it is undeniable that respondent Delia Razon Pea,
the surviving spouse of the original tenant, Anacleto Pea, is the first in the order of preference
to succeed to the tenancy rights of her husband because the lessor, Carolina Zacarias, failed
to exercise her right of choice within the one month period from the time of Anacletos death.
Petitioners cannot find succor in the declarations of Emilio Pea and the affidavit of Carolina
Zacarias, stating that Emilio succeeded to the tenancy rights of Anacleto.
In the first place, Carolinas affidavit and her Answer filed before the PARAD were both executed
in 1992, or almost two years after the death of Anacleto on February 17,
1990, way beyond the one month period provided for in Section 9 of Republic Act 3844.
Secondly, as found by the DARAB, a scrutiny of Carolinas declaration will show that she never
categorically averred that she made her choice
within the one (1) month period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
in is AFFIRMED in so far as it recognizes Delia Razon Pea as the successor of Anacleto Pea as the
tenant, thereby allowing her to exercise her right of redemption over the land within the
prescribed period granted by law.
G.R. No. L-19760
April 30, 1964
MARCELO VILLAVIZA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUDGE TOMAS PANGANIBAN, ET AL.,
respondents.
Review of the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Cabanatuan City, in its Case No. 2088-
NE-60
Facts:
The lower court found that Villaviza, et. al. were tenants since 1944 in a riceland situated in
Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, and owned by Domingo Fajardo. Fajardo gave out the land for lease (civil
lease) to the petitioner, Quirino Capalad, starting with the crop year 1955-56. The said lessee,
in June, 1955, plowed the land by machinery, and installed, as his tenants, his above-named
co-petitioners in this Court, so that when the Villaviza, et. al went back to their respective
landholdings to prepare them for planting they found the land already cultivated. The
respondents-tenants demanded their re-instatement, but every time they did, which they did
yearly until the present suit was filed, Quirino Capalad promised, but never fulfilled, to reinstate
them for the agricultural year following said demands.
Villaviza, et. al were ousted from their landholdings in June, 1955, and they filed the present
action on 31 March 1960.
Issue: Whether or not he period of limitation had not expired
Held:
The Court stated that a tenant's right to be respected in his tenure under Republic Act 1199, as
amended, is an obligation of the landholder created by law and an action for violation thereof
prescribes in ten years under No. 2 of Article 1144 of the Civil Code. The respondents were
ousted from their landholdings in June, 1955, and they filed the present action on 31 March
1960; therefore, the period of limitation had not expired.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the respondents-tenants are guilty of laches for having
unnecessarily delayed the filing of the case, because the delay was attributed to Capalad's
promises to reinstate them.
The decision under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners
RUPA vs CA
Facts:
On March 26, 1981, herein petitioner Gerardo Rupa filed an action for redemption with
damages against Magin Salipot before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Tenth Regional
District, Branch IV, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, claiming that he was the agricultural share tenant for
more than 20 years of a parcel of coconut land formerly owned by Vicente Lim and Patrocinia
Yu Lim; that since he assumed tenancy over the questioned property, he was the one watching,
taking care of and cleaning the coconut plantation; he also gathers coconuts every three
months and processes them into copra which he shares with the Lim spouses under a 50-50%
sharing basis; that aside from being a share tenant, he is also the overseer of four parcels of
coconut land situated in the sitios of Minuswang and Comunal, Armenia, Uson, Masbate also
owned by the Lim spouses; that the Lim spouses, however, sold the property to herein
respondent Magin Salipot without any prior written or verbal notice to the petitioner in the
sum of P5,000.00 sometime in January 1981
On February 16, 1981, petitioner came to know about the sale of the property to the
respondent when he was informed in writing by the former landowner, and wanting to buy the
property for himself, petitioner sought the assistance of the local office of Agrarian Reform at
Masbate, Masbate, but no agreement was reached; that the petitioner manifesting his
willingness to redeem the questioned property in the same amount of P5,000.00 bought by
respondent, deposited the amount with the trial court (Annex “B,”—Petition). Petitioner, thus,
prayed for judgment authorizing his right of redemption over the property including his shares
of the harvest, damages and expenses arising herein.
Magin Salipot filed his answer denying petitioner’s allegation of tenancy over the questioned
property and claimed that petitioner was hired every now and then to oversee the copra-
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
making of the laborers of spouses Lim, with remuneration based on the weight of copra
produced
In his affirmative and special defenses, respondent claimed that he bought the registered
parcel of land from the spouses Lim who in turn bought the same from the original registered
owner Diego Prieto, who was issued OCT-1853, and since both deeds of sale, one executed by
Diego Prieto in favor of the Lim spouses and the second, by the Lim spouses to herein
respondent, have not yet been registered or legally conveyed to respondent, the action for
redemption filed by the petitioner against respondent is pre-mature; that petitioner had never
been a tenant of spouses Lim over the land in question; that the right of redemption had
already been lost by laches or non-use
Regional Trial Court of Masbate (which had taken over the Court of Agrarian Relations pursuant
to BP 129) rendered a decision dated July 17, 1985, dismissing the complaint on the ground
that RUPA was not a tenant of the subject property, thus, not entitled to exercise the right of
redemption over the same.
SALIPOT manifested that he was adopting the memorandum filed with the court a quo, while
no memorandum was received from RUPA.5 The decision of the trial court was affirmed in
toto by the CA - Plaintiff RUPA, during the proceedings in the Criminal Case, admitted that he
was the overseer and the administrator of five (5) parcels of land, one of which is this land in
question, owned by the Lim spouses in Armenia, Uson Masbate.
The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact, may be given in evidence against
him (Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court). At the time the plaintiff-appellant admitted
that he was the administrator of Vicente Lim, he had already instituted the action for
redemption with damages against Magin Salipot, wherein he alleged that he was the share-
tenant of the Lim spouses. Knowing fully well that his right of legal redemption is based on his
status as share-tenant, he still admitted, six months later, in Crim. Case 532-U, that he was the
administrator of five (5) parcels of land owned by the Lim spouses in Armenia, Uson, Masbate.
His admission, which is clearly adverse to his own interest, constitutes an admission receivable
against him
Aside from his own admission that he was the administrator of the Lim spouses, there is no
clear and positive proof that Gerardo Rupa performed the duties of a tenant in personally tilling
and cultivating the land which he allegedly tenanted.
Prosecution witnesses Pablito Arnilla and Antonieta Rongasan admitted that they were the
hired laborers of Gerardo Rupa in tilling the land in question (Under R.A. 1199, a share tenant
must personally till the land, possibly with the aid of the immediate farm household). The
aforenamed witnesses may not have been aware of the implication in admitting that they were
the hired laborers of Gerardo Rupa.
As to Gerardo Rupa’s claim of tenancy, Republic Act 1199, which governs the relations between
landholders and tenants of coconut lands, defines a tenant as a person who, himself and with
the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to,
or possessed by another with the latter’s consent for purposes of production and sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system (Sec. 5[a], RA 1199). A person
who does not work or till the land is not a tenant
Ratio:
The Court agreed with the contentions of private respondent SALIPOT. The CA committed
reversible error in relying mainly on statements made in a decision in another case, and,
secondarily on the certificate of the Municipal Treasurer as basis for establishing the status of
petitioner as share-tenant in the subject land.
A careful examination of the record reveals that, indeed, both the trial court, and the appellate
court overlooked and disregarded the overwhelming evidence in favor of RUPA and instead
relied mainly on the statements made in the decision in another case.
A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging
to or possessed by another, with the latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the
produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a
price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both under the leasehold tenancy
system. Briefly stated, for this relationship to exist, it is necessary that:
The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
The subject is agricultural land;
The purpose is agricultural production;
There is consent;
There is personal cultivation; and
There is sharing of harvests.
Upon proof of the existence of the tenancy relationship, RUPA could avail of the benefits
afforded by RA 3844,11 as amended, particularly, Section 12 thereof which reads:
“SEC. 12. Lessee’s right of redemption.In case the landholding is sold to a third person without
the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at
a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That the entire landholding sold must he
redeemed: Provided, further, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall
be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him.
The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the
registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption.”
As correctly pointed out by the CA, this right of redemption is validly exercised upon compliance
with the following requirements: a) the redemptioner must be an agricultural lessee or share
tenant; b) the land must have been sold by the owner to a third party without prior written
notice of the sale given to the lessee or lessees and the DAR in accordance with sec. 11, RA
3844, as amended; c) only the area cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed; d)
the right of redemption must be exercised within 180 days from notice; and e) there must be
an actual tender or valid consignation of the entire amount which is the reasonable price of the
land sought to be redeemed.12
However, as aforesaid, the CA failed to take into account the other material evidence on record
to arrive at its finding that RUPA was not a tenant-farmer.
The decision dated March 11, 1985 relied upon by the CA stemmed from Criminal Case No.
532-U for Malicious Mischief which was instituted upon a complaint filed by RUPA against one
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Mariano Luzong who happens to be the son-in-law of SALIPOT. According to RUPA, Mariano
Luzong destroyed the banana and cassava plants in his farm in Armenia, Uson, Masbate. It was
stated in the decision that RUPA “claimed that he is the administrator of the five parcels of land
owned by Patrocinio Lim in Armenia, Uson, Masbate”;13 and that the “prosecution witnesses,
Pablito Arnilla, and Antonieta Bongasan, the alleged eyewitnesses to the destruction of the
banana plants and cassava plants admitted being hired laborers of Gerardo Rupa in tilling the
latter’s farm.”
It is believed that the statements in the said decision are not sufficient basis to overcome the
rights of RUPA as provided in the Constitution and agrarian statutes and upheld by this Court.
The essence of agricultural tenancy lies in the establishment of owner-cultivatorship and the
economic fam-ily-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture, and as a consequence, divert
landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development.
The above statements in the Criminal case should not have been relied upon by the CA to
conclusively disprove the tenancy relationship.
Said statement was apparently made to prove RUPA’s standing to file the complaint and to
prove how he could have witnessed the destruction made by said person. Second, in claiming
that he was administrator of the property, RUPA, a farmer of limited education must have used
the word “administrator”—in a loose sense to mean one taking care of a certain piece of
property by clearing and planting on the same. As aptly pointed out by counsel for RUPA during
the trial, with no objection from the counsel of SALIPOT, “under common usage in the locality,
the term administrator is used interchangeably with tenancy.”
Third, the CA did not bother to explain its finding on the “inherent incompatibility”—between
being a tenant-farmer and an administrator or overseer. According to RUPA, he was tenant of
one parcel of land belonging to the Lim spouses and administrator or overseer of the other four
parcels of land owned by the said spouses. SALIPOT and his witnesses had interchangeably
claimed RUPA to be an overseer and a copra agent or copra buyer. As overseer, he may have
been receiving a fixed salary. As tenant under our legal definition, he may have been sharing
the harvests with the landowner. This may well lead a person to find an incompatibility
between the two. However, one could in fact be overseer of a parcel of land, supervising the
laborers therein and receiving a fixed salary for one’s services, and at the same time, act as
tenant farmer in another landholding.
Fourth, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they were “hired laborers”—should
not have been given significant weight by the CA. The rule is well-settled that the rights of a
person cannot be prejudiced by the declaration, act or omission of another, except as provided
by the Rules of Court in cases of admission by a co-partner, agent, conspirator and privies. The
said witnesses do not come under any of these exceptions.1
As regards the certificate issued by the Office of the Treasurer to the effect that RUPA was a
copra buyer from May 19, 1978 to October 10, 1979, we find that this does not necessarily rule
out RUPA’s claim that he was tenant-farmer since 1962. RUPA has satisfactorily explained that
“pursuing two or three lines of work is nothing new. In coconut lands, harvest seasons come
far and in between, and the tenant can always engage in the business of copra-buying in the
interim.”18 Moreover, the dates indicated therein cover only a short period of time as against
RUPA’s claim that he was tenant from 1963 until his ejectment sometime in 1981.
The Court is therefore constrained to overturn the appealed judgment insofar as it ruled that
the records do not establish RUPA’S status as an agricultural tenant.
G.R. No. L-26255
June 30, 1969
PABLO BASBAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. RUFINO ENTENA, FLAVIANO TIBAY and ANGELINA
ENTENA (Spouses), and R. M. RESURRECCION as acting Registrar of Deeds of the Province of
Laguna, defendants-appellees.
Facts:
That plaintiff Pablo Basbas (tenant) is the leasehold tenant of a 1-½ hectare parcel of riceland,
known as Lot No. 1520 of the Sta. Rosa Estate Subdivision, located at Barrio Dila, Sta. Rosa,
Laguna, formerly owned by defendant Rufino Entena and presently owned by spouses Flaviano
Tibay and Angelina Entena, his co-defendants.
On April 11, 1964, defendant Rufino Entena executed a deed of sale of the aforementioned lot
in favor of defendant spouses Flaviano Tibay and Angelina Entena
On May 25, 1964, defendant Rufino Entena sent a letter, that the landholding was being put up
for sale at P13,000.00 per hectare and the tenant being given 90 days within which to
communicate his intention to purchase the same: otherwise, the land would be offered to
other Basbas replied to the landholder on June 4, 1964, accepting the latter's offer to sell the
land, although disagreeing to the quoted price. The tenant (Basbas) in the same letter informed
the landholder that he was enlisting the aid of the government in purchasing the land, as
allowed by law.
In a reply on June 22, 1964, the Acting Officer in Charge of the Land Authority, informed the
tenant that his petition was already being processed and definite action thereon will be taken
as soon as the Land Bank shall have been fully organized but the defendants have not been
given copy or otherwise informed.
On April 11, 1964, A sworn affidavit was executed by the spouses Rufino Entena and Aniceta
Carapatan, attesting to the alleged fact that the tenant, Pablo Basbas, was fully notified of the
sale of their land 90 days before said conveyance, and that the tenant had refused, or failed to
exercise, the right of pre-emption granted him under the Agricultural Land Reform Code. The
submission of this affidavit enabled the registration on May 26, 1964 of the deed of sale in favor
of vendees Flaviano Tibay and Angelina Entena.
Based upon the facts, the Agrarian Court dismissed the case, reasoning that as the plaintiff
failed to make tender of payment and consignation of the purchase price the landowner cannot
be compelled to sell the property to him. Basbas then sought an appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not tender of payment and judicial consignation of the purchase price are
necessary before a tenant-lessee may avail himself of the right of pre-emption or of
redemption.
Ratio:
The Court ruled that tender of payment is necessary. Granting that sections 11 and 12 are
operative, yet in Torres de Conejero, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21812, April 29, 1966,
16 SCRA 775, the Court ruled that the timely exercise of the right of legal redemption requires
either tender of the price or valid consignation thereof.
Furthermore, the Court stated that in relation to redemption (and pre-emption) under sections
11 and 12 of the Land Reform Act, both under said law and under Article 1620 of the Civil Code,
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
the right of legal redemption must be exercised within specified time limits: and the statutory
periods would be rendered meaningless and of easy evasion unless the redemptioner is
required to make an actual tender in good faith of what he believed to be the reasonable price
of the land sought to be redeemed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order granting the motion to dismiss the complaint is affirmed. No
costs.
G.R. No. 169472
January 20, 2009
FRANCISCO LANDICHO, FEDERICO LANDICHO AND BUENAVENTURA LANDICHO, vs. FELIX
SIA, Respondent.
Facts:
The instant case involves three parcels of agricultural land located in Barangay Mateona,
Tayabas, Quezon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 135953 - Lot No. 9297, TCT
No. 135952 - Lot No. 9856, and TCT No. 135929 - Lot No. 9895, with an aggregate area of
approximately 27,287 square meters.
The subject parcels of land were originally owned by Loreanne Z. Aragon, Alberto Z. Aragon, Jr.,
and Alberto Z. Aragon III (Aragons).
The agricultural land was tenanted by the late Arcadio Landicho from 1949 until his
death in 19727after which his tenancy rights were succeeded by his son, petitioner Francisco
Landicho.
The other petitioners, Buenaventura Landicho, Francisco Landicho’s son, and
Federico Landicho, Francisco’s brother, helped him cultivate the land.
On January 31, 1976, Francisco Landicho voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights over the
three parcels of land to Eloisa Zolota, married to Alberto Aragon, through a notarized
"Kasulatan sa Pagsasauli ng Gawaing Palayan" (1976 Kasulatan), for a consideration of
PhP1,000.00.
Notwithstanding the execution of the 1976 Kasulatan, the petitioners continued cultivating the
subject landholdings until 1987 when another notarized "Kasulatan ng Pagsasauli ng Gawaing
Palayan" (1987 Kasulatan) was executed on July 2, 1987 by Francisco Landicho through which
he surrendered his tenancy rights to the Aragons for a consideration of PhP3,000.00.
On the same day as the execution of the 1987 Kasulatan, the three parcels of land were sold to
respondent Felix L. Sia by the spouses Alberto P. Aragon and Eloisa Zolota Aragon by virtue of
a general power of attorney executed in their favor by their children, the Aragons. A "Deed of
Absolute Sale" was executed, whereby the three parcels of land mentioned above were sold,
transferred and conveyed by way of an absolute sale for and in consideration of PhP50,000.00.
Upon the sale of the subject land to respondent Felix Sia, he converted the same to a residential
subdivision without a DAR Clearance and ejected the petitioners from the subject land.
Aggrieved, the petitioners first sought the assistance of Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC) Chairman Rosalio Cabuyao,who in turn brought the matter to the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Office (PARO) of Quezon.
Petitioners Federico Landicho and Buenaventura Landicho then filed a protest before the DAR
PARO, Legal Division of Lucena City alleging that they are the tenants of the parcels of land
owned by respondent Felix Sia and claimed that they are entitled to a disturbance
compensation. During the mediation conference held at the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office on July 22, 1992, it was admitted by Francisco Landicho that he voluntarily surrendered
his tenancy rights over the subject parcels of land in consideration of PhP3,000.00.
It was held by the DAR Provincial Legal Officer that Francisco Landicho is the legal and bona fide
tenant of the parcels of land but he cannot be awarded disturbance compensation because he
voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights over the said properties twice, through the 1976 and
the 1987 Kasulatan.
In the case of Buenaventura and Federico Landicho, it was found that they are merely farm
helpers of Francisco Landicho and are not entitled to disturbance compensation.
Petitioners Buenaventura and Federico Landicho filed another Protest before the DAR Legal
Division, Region IV, Pasig, Metro Manila. It also dismissed the protest of the petitioners.
DAR Region IV Director Percival C. Dalugdug wrote a letter, dated April 25, 1994, stating that
the results of an investigation that only Francisco Landicho who is the legitimate tenant of the
land owned by the Aragons. However, he surrendered his tenancy rights by virtue of the 1976
and 1987 Kasulatan.
The petitioners allege that they are tenants of the subject land since January 31, 1976 and that
they were unlawfully ejected from the subject land by virtue of the 1976 and 1987 Kasulatan
which they allege to be invalid, since they were executed by Francisco through the insidious
words, undue influence and strategy employed by the Aragons, in connivance with respondent
Sia.
In their Answer dated July 7, 1994, the Aragons recognized only Francisco as their former
tenant until he surrendered his tenancy rights through the 1976 Kasulatan and finally
surrendered the land upon the execution of the 1987 Kasulatan.
After the filing of the parties’ respective position papers, the DAR Provincial Adjudicator of
Region IV rendered a decision on October 24, 1995, in favor of the petitioners. Provincial
Adjudicator Oscar C. Dimacali ruled that against their will, the petitioners were dispossessed of
the land that they have been cultivating.
The Aragons and respondent Sia appealed the foregoing decision to the DARAB, which issued
a decision on September 18, 2000 that affirmed in part the decision of the Provincial
Adjudicator, and deleted the award of disturbance compensation on the basis of the finding
that the petitioners are still bona fide tenants in their respective landholdings. The DARAB
found that a tenancy relationship exists between the petitioners and the Aragons and that
when Felix Sia became the owner of the subject land, he assumed to exercise the rights and
obligations that pertain to the previous owners.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the DARAB and agreed with the ruling of the DAR
PARO and the Region IV DAR Legal Division that only petitioner Francisco Landicho was the
tenant of all of the three lots covered by TCT No. 135953, TCT No. 135952 and TCT No. 135929
and that he voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights upon the execution of the 1987
Kasulatan. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the PARO and the Region IV DAR that Federico
and Buenaventura Landicho were merely farm helpers of Francisco.
Hence, the Landichos sought a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the petitioners are bona fide tenants of the land purchased by the
respondent
2) Whether or not the Agricultural Leasehold Relation is still in effect
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Held:
Decision of CA affirmed against petitioners
1) Whether or not the petitioners are bona fide tenants of the land purchased by the
respondent
The Court noted that in determining the existence of a tenancy relationship between the
petitioners and the respondent, it is necessary to make a distinction between petitioner
Francisco Landicho and petitioners Buenaventura and Federico Landicho.
With respect to Francisco, both the petitioners and the respondent agree that he was
recognized by the Aragons as a bona fide tenant of the subject land when he continued the
cultivation of the land after the death of his father Arcadio in 1972.
The Court noted that a tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199, otherwise
known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philippines, as:
x x x a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another, with the latter's consent
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy
system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or
both, under the leasehold tenancy system.
The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and claims that one is a tenant do
not automatically give rise to security of tenure.
For a tenancy relationship to exist, all of the following essential requisites must be present: (1)
the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3)
there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is
personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties.
In the case at bar, the essential element of consent is absent because the landowners never
recognized petitioners Federico and Buenaventura Landicho as legitimate tenants of the
subject land. The 1976 and the 1987 Kasulatan only mentioned Francisco as the tenant of the
subject parcels of land.
The petitioners cannot rely on their self-serving statements to prove the existence of a tenancy
relationship because independent and concrete evidence, aside from self-serving statements,
is needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvests, or consent of the landowner.
Finally, a tiller or a farmworker does not automatically become an agricultural tenant
recognized under agrarian laws by mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land.
2) Whether or not the Agricultural Leasehold Relation is still in effect
With respect to petitioner Francisco Landicho, the Court of Appeals also correctly held that
although Francisco was the legal tenant of the subject land, he voluntarily surrendered his
tenancy rights when he knowingly and freely executed the 1987 Kasulatan.
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, to
wit:
SECTION 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. — The agricultural leasehold
relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee, written notice of which
shall be served three months in advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee, in the event of death
or permanent incapacity of the lessee.
The petitioners also failed to support their claim that the Aragons took advantage of Francisco’s
old age and illiteracy and employed fraudulent schemes in order to deceive him into signing
the Kasulatan.
It has been held that "[a] person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced
years or by reason of physical infirmities. It is only when such age or infirmities impair the
mental faculties to such extent as to prevent one from properly, intelligently, and fairly
protecting her property rights, is she considered incapacitated."
The petitioners’ contention that the Aragons employed fraud, aside from being
unsubstantiated, is also contrary to the records of the case. Both the 1976 and the 1987
Kasulatan were also written in Tagalog, a language understood by Francisco Landicho. They
were written in an uncomplicated manner and clearly stated that he is returning the land that
he has been cultivating to the landowners because he is already old and could no longer work
on the land. The 1987 Kasulatan also states that the contents of the document were read to
him and that he understands the same.
The 1976 and 1987 Kasulatan are duly notarized and are considered as public documents, were
executed with all the legal formalities of a public document and thus the legal presumption of
validity of the document.
Strong evidence is required to prove a defect of a public instrument, and since such strong and
convincing evidence was not presented in the instant case, the 1976 and the 1987 Kasulatan
are presumed valid.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals under review are
hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.
Francisco ESTOLAS vs Adolfo MABALOT
G.R. No. 133706 / 381 SCRA 702
May 07, 2002
Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- Respondent acquired a Certificate of Land Transfer over a 5k-sq. meter lot located
in Sta. Maria, Pangasinan. He later passed the subject land to petitioner for the
amount of P5.8k and P200 pesos worth of rice via a verbal contract of mortgage.
Petitioner contends, however, that it was a sale.
- DAR officials in the area surveyed the land and issued a TCT covering the land in
favor of petitioner.
- Respondent then filed a complaint before the Baranggay Lupon to redeem the land.
The case was then referred to the DAR regional office.
- Upon investigation, Atty. Peralta of the DAR Regional Office recommended that the
CLT remain in the name of respondent, and that the money loan be returned to
petitioner.
- However, in a letter, petitioner insisted that the land had been sold to him, and
requested the DAR to cancel the CLT.
DAR Regional Office: Order in favor or PETITIONER.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
- After another investigation, regional director Nuesa acted in favor of petitioner,
finding that respondent had abandoned the land.
- Respondent appealed to the DAR Central Office.
DAR Central Office: Regional Office order REVERSED.
- It ordered petitioner to return the land to respondent. Petitioner then appealed to
the Office of the President.
OP: Petitioner’s appeal DISMISSED.
- His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise dismissed.
CA: Ruling in favor of RESPONDENT.
- It said that the land had been acquired by respondent under PD 27, which prohibits
transfer of land acquired under said law except in favor of heirs via hereditary
succession, or in favor of the government through other legal modes.
- There was also no effective abandonment since:
o Respondent tried to redeem it, but failed when petitioner asked for P15k
instead of the original loan.
o Respondent continuously held the CLT covering the land.
o Respondent would not have even brought the action for recovery if he
honestly believed he had already given it up in favor of petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not respondent abandoned the property.
SC: Petition DENIED.
- For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven:
o A clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim, or to desert
a right or property.
o An external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect.
- There must be an actual, not projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or
claim is not vacated or waived.
o Administrative Order No. 2 defines abandonment or neglect as a willful
failure of the agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his farm
household, to cultivate, till, or develop his land to produce any crop, or
to use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a
period of two years.
- In the present case, no such willful failure has been demonstrated. Quite the
contrary, and as correctly opined by the CA, respondent has not abandoned subject
land.
- Even if respondent indeed abandon the land, any transfer of the property may only
be made in favor his heirs or the government.
o Respondent acquired the land under Presidential Decree 27, which
prohibits transfer of land granted to tenant-farmers / farmer-
beneficiaries (in this case, respondent) except in favor of heirs via
hereditary succession, or in favor of the government through other legal
modes.
o Such prohibition was placed to insure their continuous possession and
enjoyment, to achieve a dignified existence for small farmers, and to
make them more independent, self-reliant, and responsible citizens, and
a source of genuine strength in our democratic society.
- Petitioner cannot, by himself, take over a farmer-beneficiary’s landholding.
o The proper procedure for reallocation must be followed to ensure that
there was indeed an abandonment, and that subsequent beneficiary is a
qualified farmer-tenant under the law.
o It is the government who can effect such reallocation. Hence, the land
must first be transferred back in favor of the government.
Verde v. Macapagal
G.R. No. 151342
June 23, 2005
Facts:
One Vicente Macapagal and one Irenea Estralla were the owners of 2.5 hectare parcel of
agricultural land in Bulacan. After their demise, their children, herein petitioners, inherited the
property as pro-indiviso owners of the same. Petitioner Verde is a second-generation leasehold
tenant, having had succeeded his father in tenancy of the same property that the Macapagals
owned.
PARAD: The respondents initiated an action for ejectment against Verde before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, alleging that respondent mortgaged the property to one
dela Cruz without their knowledge or consent. This was upon the condition that dela Cruz
would be the one to work half of said property.
They also claimed that Verde also admitted to the same when confronted, and even asked for
forgiveness from them. He also guaranteed to redeem the mortgage, but failed to do so. Dela
Cruz still farmed the property in 1994. The respondents went on to claim that the act of
mortgaging the property to dela Cruz constituted abandonment, which was a ground for
termination of agricultural leasehold relation under Section 8 of RA 3844. A joint sworn
statement evincing dela Cruz’s actions of farming the land presented by the respondents.
Efforts to reach an amicable settlement before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council failed.
Verde, on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the complaint, claiming that he
only hired the services of dela Cruz and the latter’s carabao during the period. He also upended
sworn statements from two parties that dela Cruz was only hired.
The Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the case for lack of merit, stating that Verde never actually
gave up his tenancy over the subject land absolutely, as he still cultivated half of the property.
There was no showing of intentional abandonment. Motion for reconsideration was denied.
DARAB: Affirmed the PARAD.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
CA: The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the DARAB, stating that Section 24 of RA
1199 prohibits a share-tenant from employing a subtenant to work or furnish labor on the land
subject of a tenancy agreement. Moreover, jurisprudence dictates that there should be
personal cultivation by the tenant or by his immediate farm household or members of the
family of the lessee or other persons who are dependent upon him for support or who usually
help him in his activities.[
Dela Cruz is not a member of Verde’s immediate farm household, nor did he depend on the
same for support. Thus, the requirement of personal cultivation is lacking. Hence this petition.
Issues: W/n the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that petitioner Verde was not personally
cultivating the land, and thus, was properly ejected by the Macapagals?
Held: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred.
Section 166(2) of RA 3844 defines an agricultural lessee as follows:
Sec. 166. Definition of Terms.-
(2) Agricultural lessee means a person who, by himself and with the aid available
from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or
possessed by, another with the latters consent for purposes of production, for a
price certain in money or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil law lessee
as understood in the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee is one of the 6 requisites in
an agricultural lease relationship. The law defines the same as cultivation by the lessee or
lessor in person and/or with the aid of labor from within his immediate
household, i.e., members of the family of the lessee or lessor and other persons who are
dependent upon him for support and who usually help him in his activities.
It is clear that dela Cruz is not a member of Verde’s family. Does the hiring of dela Cruz’s services
and his carabao substantiate the claim that Verde is guilty of abandoning his agricultural lease?
No, it does not. The use of the carabao was only one phase of farm labor that a tenant is
supposed to be rendered.
The fact that a tenant or an agricultural lessee for that matter employs farm laborers to perform
some aspects of farm work does not preclude the existence of an agricultural leasehold
relationship provided an agricultural lessee does not leave the entire process of cultivation in
the hands of hired helpers. A tenant or an agricultural lessee hiring of farm laborers on a
temporary or occasional basis does not negate the existence of the element of personal
cultivation essential in a tenancy or agricultural leasehold relationship.
Verde’s lack of resources to secure a carabao for himself constitutes incapacity under Section
27(2) of RA 3844, which permits the agricultural lessee, in case of illness or temporary
incapacity, to avail himself of the services of laborers, incapacity being any cause or
circumstance which prevents the lessee from fulfilling his contractual and other obligations.
Thus, he may be allowed to hire dela Cruz without prejudice to his tenancy.
Dela Cruz vs Quiazon
FACTS:
 Estela Dizon-Garcia, mother of respondent Amelia G. Quiazon, was the
registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 107576, situated in Sto. Domingo II, Capas, Tarlac. The property was
brought under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.
 On June 8, 1981, Feliciano dela Cruz, a tenant-farmer, was issued CLT No. 0-
036207 over a 3.7200-hectare portion of the said property.
 On March 9, 1992, the heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Admission and Partition with Waiver adjudicating among
themselves all the properties left by both of their parents, except for the
subject property, which was adjudicated solely in favor of respondent.
 On May 15, 1993, respondent filed a Complaint with the Provincial
Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) against
petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz, alleging that in he entered into a leasehold
contract with respondent, by virtue of which he bound himself to deliver 28
cavans of palay as rental. Since 1991, petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz allegedly
failed to deliver the stipulated rental because he had already abandoned the
landholding. For this reason, respondent prayed for his ejectment from the
property and the termination of their tenancy relationship.
 In his Answer, petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz, through petitioner Renato dela
Cruz, alleged that the execution of the leasehold contract was erroneous
considering that a CLT had already been issued in favor of his father. He
contended that by virtue of the CLT, they became the owners of the
landholding, without any obligation to pay rentals to respondent but only to
pay amortizations to the Land Bank of the Philippines. He claimed that they
paid the rentals until 1992, which rentals should now be considered as
advance payments for the land.
 Respondent amended the by alleging that petitioners Ferdinand and Feliciano
dela Cruz were already US immigrants and that petitioner Renato dela Cruz,
the actual tiller of the land, was a usurper because his possession of the land
was without the consent of the landowner. Respondent argued that by
migrating to USA, Feliciano was deemed to have abandoned the landholding,
for which reason his CLT should now be cancelled.
 Petitioners averred that their father was just temporarily out of the country
and that Renato’s possession and cultivation of the land did not need the
consent of the landowner because it was done in aid of their fathers cultivation
of the land.
 On November 8, 1993, petitioners began paying amortizations to the Land
Bank of the Philippines.
 On December 21, 1993, Provincial Adjudicator Romeo B. Bello dismissed the
complaint based on his finding that the landholding had not been abandoned
by Feliciano considering that petitioner Renato dela Cruz, a member of
Felicianos immediate family, was in actual and physical possession thereof.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
 Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Provincial Adjudicator denied
the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and directed the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office of Capas, Tarlac, to determine whether the
amortizations had been fully paid and, if so, to issue an Emancipation Patent.
 Unknown to petitioners, respondent and her siblings, as heirs of Estela Dizon-
Garcia, had filed an Application for Retention before the DAR Regional Office
for Region III, as early as June 1, 1994. The application was granted
on February 8, 1996 stated the following:
1. GRANTING the application for retention of the Heirs of
Estela Dizon-Garcia over a landholding covered by TCT
No. 107576, with a total area of 12.5431, located at Sto.
Domingo, Capas, Tarlac, to be divided among the heirs
as follows:
Rosita Garcia - 3.9641 has.
Buena Garcia - 2.5796 has.
Bella Garcia - 3.0000 has.
Estellita Garcia - 3.0000 has.
2. ORDERING the herein landowners-applicant to maintain
in peaceful possession the tenants of the subject
landholding, namely: Renato dela Cruz, Carlos Aquino
and Francisco Manayang as leaseholders; and
3. DIRECTING the herein landowners-applicant to cause
the segregation of the retained area at their own
expense and to submit report to this Office within thirty
(30) days from receipt hereof.
 In a letter dated April 15, 1996, the heirs of Feliciano dela Cruz prayed for the
setting aside of the said order. DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao treated the
letter as an appeal but was denied in an Order dated May 13, 1997.
 On July 7, 1999, the DARAB finally dismissed respondents and the decision
became final and executory.
 On October 19, 1999, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment, claiming that she just arrived from the U.S.A. on September 10,
1999 and it was only then that she found out about the DARAB Decision. She
purportedly tried to contact her counsel only to discover that he
died. Respondent insisted that petitioners had already abandoned the
landholding and failed to pay the lease and amortization payments the
cancellation of their CLT was justified. She argued that the CLT was rendered
moot by the DARs grant of their application for retention of their property
which included the subject landholding.
 In its Resolution dated February 7, 2001, the DARAB granted the petition for
relief from judgment. The DARAB set aside its July 7, 1999 Decision primarily
based on the DAR Order granting the application for retention, as well as its
finding that Ferdinand and Feliciano dela Cruz abandoned the subject
landholding when they went to the U.S.A.
 On August 7, 2002, the DARAB denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
 On November 27, 2003, the DARAB likewise denied petitioners Ex-
Parte Manifestation with Motion and Comments and Manifestation.
 Petitioners thereafter filed a petition for review with the CA. Pending the
resolution of the appeal, Feliciano dela Cruz passed away.
 On January 19, 2006, the CA denied the petition. On March 21, 2006, the CA
also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: W/N Petitioners have abandoned the landholding.
RULING:
 SC reversed CA rukling and reinstated DARAB July 7, 1999 decision.
 SC agree with petitioners that they have not abandoned the subject
landholding, as in fact they have continuously cultivated the property.
 Abandonment requires
o (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to
desert a right or property; and
o (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried
into effect.
 The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never
returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been
abandoned.
 The immigration of the original farmer-beneficiary to the US did not
necessarily result in the abandonment of the landholding, considering that one
of his sons, petitioner Renato dela Cruz, continued cultivating the
land. Personal cultivation, as required by law, includes cultivation of the land
by the tenant (lessee) himself or with the aid of the immediate farm
household, which refers to the members of the family of the tenant and other
persons who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him
in the agricultural activities.
CLEMENTE DEQUITO V. VICTORIA LLAMAS
G.R. No. L-28090 (SEPT 4, 1975)
FACTS
1. On July 3, 1962, petitioner filed a complaint for "Reliquidation and Damages" (CAR
Case No. 3469) against private respondent Victoria Llamas in the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Branch 1, Bacolod City.
2. Plaintiff Dequito alleged that:
 he was an agricultural share tenant for a period of nine (9) years of a one-
hectare piece of land, and in the crop year 1959-1960, an additional
landholding of one-half (½) hectare was given him by defendant Llamas;
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
 that the produce of the same land was divided 50-50, tenant- plaintiff
furnishing all items of production and his labor, while defendant contributed
only her land;
 that plaintiff cultivated 500 clumps of bamboos planted along his tenancy
landholding on the agreement that plaintiff gets as his share 10% of the gross
sale of said bamboos; and that from crop year 1964, plaintiff was not paid 10%
 that after the crop year 1961-62 defendant dispossessed tenant-plaintiff from
the ½ hectare landholding that for many times plaintiff had demanded from
defendant a change in the illegal sharing basis of 50-50 to 70-30 and his 10%
share of the gross sales of bamboos, but defendant did not heed said
demands;
 that plaintiff obtained cash loans from defendant in the crop year 1961 to
1967, and that he had to pay usurious interests for said loans in the form of
palay;
 that he suffered "mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation", thus entitling him to moral damages;
 The plaintiff prayed that the defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff “short
sharing," due him for 6 years; to order defendant to pay him the cost of 120
cavans of palay representing plaintiff's failure to plant during crop years 1962-
63 to 1966-67; to order defendant to pay plaintiff 10% of the gross sale of
bamboos; to order defendant to return the excess of one (1) cavan of palay as
overpayment of cash loan from crop year 1966-67,1963-64 to 1965-66,1961-
62 to 1962-63, All amount plus "8% legal interest” computed from the time
the amount became due; to order defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as
corrective or exemplary damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages, plus
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees;
3. Defendant Llamas filed a motion to dismiss on the principal ground that plaintiff had
already voluntarily surrendered his landholding to defendant; that he admitted in
his sworn affidavit dated June 1, 1967, "that the liquidation and the sharing basis
was in accordance with law; that all the improvements, rights and interest were sold
by the plaintiff to the defendant in the amount of P700.00"
COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS: The Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed the Petition for
Reliquidation and Damages.
The defendant’s Motion to Dismiss was as held "tenable and meritorious" on the following
grounds: (1) that plaintiff (petitioner Dequito) already voluntarily surrendered his landholding
to the defendant (private respondent Llamas) which is a lawful ground for termination of
tenancy relationship under Sec. 9, of Republic Act No. 1199; (2) that plaintiff Dequito had sworn
under oath in an affidavit that the liquidation and the sharing basis was in accordance with law;
and (3) that all the improvements, rights and interests were sold by the plaintiff to the
defendant in the amount of P700.00.
ISSUE: Did the petitioner voluntarily surrender the landholding to the defendant?
HELD:
The Court was convinced that petitioner never waived any of his rights as a tenant
contrary to law, but rather he declared under oath that the "sharing basis was in accordance
with law", a plain and clear declaration of facts made in a public document.
 Petitioner never questioned the authenticity of his affidavit of June 1, 1967, and did
not for a moment raise any question on the voluntariness of its execution.
 The respondent Court observed the petitioner to be a literate person and one who
could not have been deceived by the contents of the affidavit which was written in
a dialect he knows and understands and it could safely be presumed that when
petitioner signed the sworn statement he knew the meaning and import of all its
contents.
 What clearly appear in the affidavit are admissions or declarations against his own
interest made by the petitioner when he stated under oath.
 Petitioner himself, in his voluntary executed sworn statement, the contents of
which he fully understood, stated as a fact that the sharing basis was in accordance
with law. If petitioner now contends that it was not so, thus reneging on his own
sworn admission of the existence of a fact, then he must have perjured himself
when he voluntarily and knowingly stated under oath that the sharing basis was in
accordance with law. We will not allow such perfidy to prevail because a party to a
litigation must always come to court in good faith and with clean hands.
 If the petitioner miscalculated on the advantages and disadvantages of voluntary
surrender of his landholding for an agreed consideration, he must assume the
consequences of his error. After executing the affidavit voluntarily wherein he
made admissions and declarations against his own interest under the solemnity
of an oath, he cannot be allowed to spurn them and undo what he has done. He
cannot, even "with great repentance, retrieve the body he forsook and now
wishes to live."
 He ought to know that if he has rights to protect as a tenant, the landowner has
also rights under the law. The protective mantle of social justice cannot be utilized
as an instrument to hoodwink courts of justice and undermine the rights of
landowners on the plea of helplessness and heartless exploitation of the tenant
by the landowner. False pretenses cannot arouse the sentiment of charity in a
compassionate society.
 The matter of loans with alleged usurious interest mentioned in petitioners'
complaint, the same could be the subject matter of a separate action if the claim is
supported by signed memorandum or receipt of the loans as required by Sec. 20 of
Act 3844 and the provisions of the Usury Law.
Petition is dismissed, and the Orders dated July 24, 1967, and September 1, 1967, of the
respondent court dismissing petitioner's complaint are AFFIRMED.
NOTE:
Section 9. Severance of Relationship. - The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the
voluntary surrender of the land by, or the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or
the members of his immediate farm household may continue to work the land until the close
of the agricultural year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, and
the sale or alienation of the land do not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter
case, the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of the former
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
landholder in relation to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heir or heirs shall
likewise assume his rights and obligations.
POLICARPIO NISNISAN AND ERLINDA NISNISAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PACITA
MANCERA, WENCESLAO MANCERA and SILVESTRE POLANCOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 126425
12 August 1998
J. Martinez
Facts:
Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners of a parcel of land denominated as Lot
No. 2510, Cad 275 located at Dolo, Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with an area of 4.9774 hectares,
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (P-11676)-2151. Petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan, son
of Gavino Nisnisan, has been cultivating one hectare of the aforesaid land since 1961.
On April 1, 1976, Gavino Nisnisan and petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan entered into a leasehold
tenancy contract which stipulates a sharing arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest, the bigger
share being given to the latter.
On December 28, 1978, Gavino Nisnisan sold two hectares of their land, including the land
tenanted by petitioners-spouses Policarpio and Erlinda Nisnisan, to private respondents-
spouses Wenceslao Mancera and Pacita H. Mancera.
As a result of the sale, petitioners-spouses were ousted from their landholding. Hence, on
November 24, 1982, petitioners-spouses instituted an action for reinstatement of tenancy
holding against private respondent spouses Wenceslao and Pacita Mancera before the Court
of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in Davao City.
The private respondents Mancera spouses countered that the Nisnisan spouses have no cause
of action, the latter having voluntarily surrendered their landholding.
On June 25, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint ruling that the
petitioners-spouses allegation of tenancy is repudiated by the affidavit executed by Gavino
Nisnisan to the effect that the subject land is not tenanted.
The trial court ratiocinated in this wise: As to the claim of reinstatement by Policarpio Nisnisan,
it appears from the affidavit of Gavino Nisnisan which was executed and filed with the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Davao del Sur, and recorded as Entry No. 117718, per memorandum of
encumbrances of Original Certificate of Title No. (P-11676)-2151 (Exhibit A/5-C) that the said
land is not tenanted
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
Issue: Whether or not petitioners Spouses Policarpio and Erlinda Nisnisan voluntarily
surrendered their tenancy holding.
Ruling: Petition meritorious
The finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners-spouses are not tenants of the subject
land holding is erroneous. While there are annotations in Gavino Nisnisan’s certificate of title
(Entry No. 72086 for Affidavit of Non-Tenancy under Justice Circular No. 31 and Entry No.
117718 for Affidavit of Non-Tenancy executed by Gavino Nisnisan) that the subject land is not
tenanted, said annotations are not conclusive proof of the real relationship between Gavino
Nisnisan and petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan and are not binding upon the court.
Moreover, petitioners-spouses have sufficiently shown that they are the tenants of the spouses
Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan as evidenced by a document entitled Panagsabutan Sa Abang Sa
Yuta (Exhibit D), executed by Gavino Nisnisan and Policarpio Nisnisan on April 1,
1976, acknowledged before the Municipal Trial Court Judge Mariano C. Tupas of Bansalan,
Davao del Sur, and registered before the Municipal Treasurers Office.
The above-quoted document evidences the leasehold tenancy relationship between Gavino
Nisnisan and petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan. It clearly shows that the subject land is agricultural;
that petitioner Policarpio Nisnisan is obligated to cultivate the same by planting rice thereon;
and, that there is sharing of the harvests between the said parties. It is clear that essential
elements of tenancy relationship are present in this case, namely:
1. the parties are the landowner and the tenant
2. the subject matter is agricultural land
3. there is consent
4. the purpose is agricultural production
5. there is personal cultivation by the tenants
6. there is sharing of harvests between parties
Significantly, this documentary evidence of leasehold tenancy relationship was never rebutted
by the private respondents-spouses. Furthermore, this leasehold tenancy contract cannot be
defeated by the aforementioned affidavit of non-tenancy executed by Gavino Nisnisan, which
is obviously self-serving.
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844, voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishing
agricultural leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by
competent evidence. The tenant’s intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed,
much less determined by mere implication.
Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that petitioners-spouses are agricultural lessees
and are therefore entitled to security of tenure as mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act
3844:
Section 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc.- The
agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of
the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the
legal possession of the landholdings, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated
to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
BIENVENIDO T. BUADA ET.AL., petitioners, vs. CEMENT CENTER, INC. respondents.
G.R. No. 180374
22 January 2010
J. Del Castillo
Facts:
Petitioners Bienvenido T. Buada, Isaias B. Quinto, Nemesio Bautista, Orlando T. Bautista, Freddie R. Bautista,
Carlito O. Buada, Gerardo O. Buada, Armando M. Oliva, Rogelio F. Rapajon, and Eugenio F. Flores were
tenant-farmers cultivating three parcels of agricultural land owned by respondent Cement Center, Inc.
On March 13, 1998, respondent filed a Complaint for Confirmation of Voluntary Surrender and Damages
against petitioners with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, Region 1
in Urdaneta City, Pangasinan. It claimed that on June 28, 1995, petitioners entered into a Compromise
Agreement with respondent whereby the former, for and in consideration of the sum of P3,000.00 each,
voluntarily surrendered their respective landholdings. However, despite respondents repeated demands,
petitioners refused to vacate subject landholdings.
In their Answer, petitioners alleged that their consent to the Compromise Agreement was obtained through
fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. They claimed that sometime in 1995, respondent induced them to
sign a Compromise Agreement by representing that the subject landholdings are no longer viable for
agricultural purposes. Petitioners alleged that respondent assured them that they would only apply for the
conversion of the land and that they would have to surrender the land only upon the approval of said
application and that thereafter, they will be paid a disturbance compensation of P3,000.00 each. Petitioners
also claimed that respondent promised to hire them to work on the project that was planned for the
converted land. But, should the application for conversion be denied, petitioners will continue to be tenants
and could later become beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
On March 9, 1999, the Regional Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of the tenant-farmers. The
Regional Adjudicator held that the Compromise Agreement was not enforceable because it violated the
provisions of Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1994.[10] Said administrative order requires the payment
of disturbance compensation which should not be less than five times the average of the annual gross value
of the harvest on their actual landholdings during the last five preceding calendar years.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to DARAB who affirmed the Decision of the Regional Adjudicator, the
DARAB found that respondent failed to prove that petitioners voluntarily surrendered their tenancy rights
over the subject landholdings. It held that since the application for conversion was denied, then the
Compromise Agreement is not a perfected obligation; it is as if the petitioners voluntary surrender never
existed.
Alleging that the DARAB gravely erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing its appeal,
respondent thereafter filed a Petition for Review with the CA. The CA found the appeal meritorious. Alleging
that the DARAB gravely erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing its appeal, respondent
thereafter filed a Petition for Review with the CA.
The CA found the appeal meritorious.
Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in making an inference that the compromise agreement was
not subject to interpretation.
Ruling: The Petition was impressed with merit
It is the policy of the State to promote the Security of Tenure of Farmers over their leasehold.
Republic Act (RA) No. 3844 (1963), otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, declares it to be
the policy of the State to make small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a
source of genuine strength in our democratic society.
As an exception to the security of tenure, under the law, Section 8 of RA 3844 specifically enumerates the
grounds for the extinguishment of agricultural leasehold relations, viz:
Section 8. Extinguishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. The
agricultural leasehold relation established under this Code shall be extinguished by:
(1) Abandonment of the landholding without the knowledge of the
agricultural lessor;
(2) Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee,
written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or
(3) Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the
lessee, in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Compromise Agreement did not constitute the voluntary surrender contemplated by law.
As earlier stated, vital to these contentions is the resolution of the basic issue of whether or not petitioners
as tenants-farmers intended to absolutely and voluntarily surrender their tenancy rights over the subject
landholdings.
In Talavera v. Court of Appeals said case, found that the evidence on record and therein petitioners'
arguments were not enough to overcome the rights of the private respondent as provided in the
Constitution and the agrarian statutes. In this case the [K]asunduan was taken into consideration wherein
the leasehold tenant allegedly surrendered his tenancy rights voluntarily for the sum of P1,000.00, did not
constitute voluntary surrender as contemplated by law, and reinstated the tenant in the landholding.
On the other hand, in Levardo v. Yatco, the Court upheld the waiver of tenancy rights and ruled that:
Based on the evidence on record, respondents paid
Aguido P2,000,000.00 and Hernando P2,417,142.00 as disturbance
compensation. A reading of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay executed by petitioners
show that they gave up their leasehold rights "dahil sa aming kagustuhang umiba
ng hanap buhay ng higit ang pagkikitaan kaysa panakahan." The money given by
respondents as disturbance compensation was indeed advantageous to the
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
families of petitioners, as it would have allowed them to pursue other sources of
livelihood.
A perusal of the subject Compromise Agreement reveals that the parties considered the amount
of P3,000.00 together with the income from a single cropping as comprising the disturbance compensation
package, viz:
4. The aforeindicated income derived from the properties and the
financial assistance of P3,000.00 shall be considered as the disturbance
compensation package in favor of the SECOND PARTY by reason or as a result of
their vacating the premises in accordance with Administrative Order No. 1, Series
of 1990 of the Department of Agrarian Reform. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners, however, assail the disturbance compensation package provided in the Compromise
Agreement as insufficient and contrary to Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 2004. They claim that they
would not have acceded to such a measly amount were it not for the agreement that respondent will hire
them as workers on the planned project on the subject land.
Despite the above contentions of petitioners, respondent failed to present evidence to show that the
disturbance compensation package corresponds with the compensation required by the said Administrative
Order. Neither was there any showing that said disturbance compensation is not less than five times the
average annual gross value of the harvest on petitioner’s actual landholdings during the preceding five
calendar years.
Moreover, it was not shown why petitioners as tenant-farmers would voluntarily give up their sole source
of livelihood. There was likewise no showing that the money was indeed advantageous to petitioner’s
families as to allow them to pursue other sources of livelihood. To stress, tenancy relations cannot be
bargained away except for the strong reasons provided by law which must be convincingly shown by
evidence in line with the State's policy of achieving a dignified existence for the small farmers free from
pernicious institutional restraints and practices.
GARCHITORENA v PANGANIBAN
G.R. No. L-17784 October 30, 1962
FACTS:
Petitioner is the owner and landholder of a farm land of about 138 hectares located
in Camarines Sur. Different portions of this land, with an aggregate area of over 77 hectares,
are held by said thirty-four (34) respondents, as tenants or lessees of the petitioner.
On May 9, 1956, Petitioner commenced this proceedings in the Court of Agrarian Relations,
Sixth Regional District, Naga, with a petition for permission to effect the transfer
aforementioned, or, else, to eject the aforementioned respondents, because petitioner wishes
to convert said portion of about 77 hectares from palay land to pasture land, and because said
respondents had not paid the rentals respectively due from them, aside from having failed to
follow proven farm practices.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. They also did not answer the petition,
hence they were declared in default.
Over seven months later, or on June 27, 1957, two (2) of said respondents moved for the lifting
of the order of default. Subsequently, eleven (11) other respondents filed a similar motion,
which like the first, was granted. After the submission of respondents' answer and subsequent
appropriate proceedings the court rendered a decision annulling the orders lifting the
declaration of default, finding that the tracts of land involved in this case had not been proven
to be within the perimeter recommended by the Bureau of Soil Conservation for conversion
into grazing land, that non-payment of the rentals due to petitioner was not deliberate on the
part of said respondents, apart from the circumstance that the amount of rental charged by
petitioner might be excessive, and, hence, illegal, and that the alleged failure of respondents
to observe proven farm practices had not been established.
ISSUE: Whether the land occupied by said respondents forms part of the area found by the
Bureau of Soil Conservation to be suitable for pasture.
HELD:
It appears from the soil conservation report that the land involved in this case is "characterized
by the presence of stony sections . . . and rock outcrops of boulders and gully formations" and
that its "soil fertility has become actually low . . . because of the loss of the topsoil due to soil
erosion.”
Indeed, the lower court took on its face value the testimony of Atty. Fabricante to the effect
that said land can hardly yield three (3) to five (5) cavans of palay per hectare, thus
corroborating the conclusion, reached in the aforementioned soil conservation report, to the
effect that the land should be "utilized for pasture and not for crops". We are satisfied,
therefore, that the land in question is appropriate for grazing purposes, not for agriculture.
As to the non-payment of rentals, if the non-payment of rentals were due to as poor harvest
owing to an extraordinary event or in unusual act of God, the refusal of respondent Judge, to
order the ejectment of the other respondents upon the ground that their omission was not
deliberate would be justified. However, when said omission takes place for several years and
the land normally has a poor yield, by reason of the condition of its soil, as it is in the case at
bar, said refusal has the effect of authorizing the respondents to hold the land for life, or, at
least, indefinitely, without giving the owner or landowner any share in its produce, thus
virtually depriving him of one of the attributes of ownership, which is the enjoyment of the
possession and use of the thing owned, as well as of the products thereof.
Our Constitution and tenancy laws do not countenance such result. To begin with, the same
amounts to a taking of private property for private use and without compensation.
Secondly, the principle of social justice cannot and should not be so construed as to violate the
elementary principles of justice and bring about a patent injustice.chanro
Thirdly, if the land in dispute is as poor for agricultural purposes as it is, the continuance
thereon of respondents herein would tend to perpetuate their precarious condition, instead of
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
promoting their well-being and economic security, which is the immediate objective of social
justice.
It is to the best interest, therefore, of said respondents that they be transferred to lands that
may offer them and their families a better future.c
The judgement appealed from is reversed and another shall be entered, authorizing petitioner
herein to convert the land in dispute, into a pasture land. Let the record of this case be
remanded to the lower court for determination of the feasibility of transferring respondents
herein to other portions of petitioner's land which are suitable for agricultural purposes and
the adoption of such measures as may be appropriate to carry out the corresponding transfer
or transfers
Felisa FERRER vs Domingo CARGANILLO, Sergio Carganillo, Soledad Agustin and Marcelina
Solis
G.R. No. 170956 / 620 SCRA 493
May 12, 2010
Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Decision of the Court of Appeals.
DARAB Case No. 7862
Facts:
- In her complaint, petitioner alleged that she owned a 6000-sq. meter lot located in
Tayug, Pangasinan, and tenanted by respondent Domingo. She further alleged that
without her knowledge, respondent subleased the land to his brother, Sergio. She
knew of this fact when she visited the place and found Sergio in actual possession
and cultivation of the land.
o Petitioner prayed that the lease tenancy relationship between her and
respondent
- In his answer, respondent denied that he mortgaged his possessory rights to Sergio,
and asserted that he was still in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of
subject property.
- An investigation report by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) legal
officer Estimada that based on the testimony, the cultivation and possession of the
land was subleased by Domingo to Sergio as the former was applying for work
abroad. In fact, Domingo admitted the existence of the sublease.
o Estimada recommended that Domingo and Sergio be ejected from the
subject landholding.
o An affidavit by Clarion was also used to corroborate the Investigation
Report, averring that Domingo mortgaged his tenancy rights over subject
land, and that the latter is presently cultivating said land by virtue of such
mortgage.
PARAD: Decision AGAINST PETITIONER.
- Complainant has the burden of proof to show proof by convincing evidence the
truth of her allegations.
- Petitioner’s evidence was not conclusive. Herein petitioner failed to prove that
there was subleasing or mortgage of the property by respondent.
DARAB: PARAD ruling AFFIRMED.
- Petitioner asserted that the PARAD erred in failing to give credence to the
Investigation Report of the MARO legal officer.
- The PARAD did not consider the sub-lease, but considered that Sergio was merely
helping his brother, as an immediate member of Domingo’s family, to cultivate the
land, and is not in any way prejudicial to petitioner’s interest.
CA: DARAB decision AFFIRMED.
- Petitioner failed to prove with sufficient evidence neither the fact of the sub-leasing
nor the mortgaging of possessory rights to Sergio.
- The document presented by petitioner, denominated as “Katulagan” is merely a
promissory note, which is a proof of indebtedness and not as evidence to prove
mortgage.
Issue: Whether or not the lease tenancy relationship can be terminated.
- Whether or not there was a sub-lease between respondent and his brother.
SC: Petition GRANTED.
- The High Court disagreed with the findings of the lower court and the agencies in
finding that petitioner failed to prove her case.
- Petitioner submitted the following:
o Exhibit 1 – Photocopy of Investigation Report, wherein findings state that
respondent Domingo admitted the fact that he subleased the land to
another, and such is a clear and blatant violation against the landowner
and co-owner for that matter.
o Exhibit 2 – Affidavit of one Clarion stating that she knew of the fact that
respondent mortgaged his tenancy rights to his brother Sergio.
- Meanwhile, respondent submitted the following:
o Exhibit 1 – Sergio’s affidavit, denying that the land was mortgaged to him
by his brother, the respondent.
o Exhibit 2 – Affidavit by one Orina, stating that he was a tenant in the
adjoining land, declaring that he knows respondent Domingo was always
present doing or supervising the activities.
o Exhibit 3 – Sworn statement by one Costales, incumbent Barangay
Agrarian Reform Council Chairman (BARC), attesting that respondent
never violated any agrarian laws.
o Exhibit 4 – Sworn statement issued by one of the kagawads stating the
same fact in Exhibit 3.
- Petitioner sufficiently proved her case.
o The investigation report and affidavit showed that respondent admitted
the sublease to Sergio.
o Petitioner contended that respondent subleased the land to Sergio for
P15k.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
o The Katulagan showed that Domingo was indebted to Sergio for the
amount of P15k.
o The affidavit of Clarion, a resident of the area, corroborated the same
facts.
o Respondent did not affirm nor deny in his answer that an investigation
was conducted, wherein he admitted that he subleased the landholding.
 It is totally against our human nature to just remain reticent
and say nothing in the face of false accusations. Such silence
is almost always construed as implied admission of the truth.
- In view of the sublease, respondent and his brother should be dispossessed of the
land.
o Section 24 (2) of Republic Act No. 3844, it shall be unlawful for a share-
tenant to employ a sub-tenant to furnish labor or any phase of the work
required of him, except in cases of illnesses or any temporary capacity
on his part, in which eventuality the tenant or any member of his
immediate farm household is under obligation to report such illness or
incapacity to the landholder.
o In this case, respondent’s sublease to Sergio is prohibited. Hence they
should be dispossessed of the land.
DARAB Case No. 7863
Facts:
- Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 4,667 sq.
meters. She alleged that the duly instituted lessee of the agricultural land is the late
Isabelo Ramirez, who, during his lifetime, subleased the same land to respondent
Soledad Agustin, without petitioner’s knowledge and consent.
- Petitioner argues that the said act of her now deceased tenant is a ground for
ejectment of Soledad, who is a mere sublessee.
- Soledad filed her answer, wherein she affirmed that Isabelo was the duly instituted
tenant of the land, and upon his death, possessory rights transferred on to his
surviving spouse (not named). She also alleged that the surviving spouse continued
to cultivate the land.
- An investigation report submitted by Estimada, and a corroborating affidavit by one
Gano was attached to petitioner’s position papers on all four cases.
o The report stated that the lawful tenant was indeed Isabelo.
o In the affidavit, Gano said that he knew Isabelo had mortgaged his
tenancy rights and possession to Soledad, and further averred that
Soledad was presently cultivating the land.
- Soledad,, however, submitted the following:
o Her own affidavit wherein she denied that she is petitioner’s tenant, and
contended that the true tenant is her sister-in-law Marina Ramirez, the
widow of Isabelo.
o Affidavit of Marina, who affirmed the same.
o Affidavit of BARC Chairman Costales, who declared that Soledad is not
the registered tenant of the petitioner, nor has Soledad managed the
activities of the land.
o Affidavit of the previously aforementioned Orina, owner of the adjacent
land, who attested that Soledad never became a tenant, tiller, or
manager.
o Affidavit of one Bugayong, incumbent Barangay Kagawad, who stated
that Marina continued tilling the land.
o Leasehold contract (Tulag ti Panagabang ti Talon), stating that the
leasehold held by the deceased Isabelo is now with Marina, his widow.
PARAD: Complaint DISMISSED.
DARAB: Appeal DISMISSED.
CA: DARAB decision AFFIRMED.
Issue: Whether or not there was an existing sub-lease between Isabelo and Soledad.
SC: Petition DENIED.
- Petitioner has not established her claim of sublease.
o The investigation report stated that the lawful tenant was Isabelo and
not Soledad.
o However, the affidavit of Gano stated only the same facts, and that the
same was common knowledge in the barangay.
- The High Court ruled that the evidence presented by petitioner was uncorroborated
and unsubstantial.
DARAB Cases No. 7864 and 7865
Facts:
- In Case No. 7864, petitioner, in representation of landowners Pajarito, Madolora,
and Lagado, alleged that her tenant, Pedro Solis, died and was survived by his wife,
respondent Marcelina. She further alleged that Marcelina took over the cultivation
of the 14k sq. meter landholding without her knowledge and consent, and that
during his lifetime, pedro failed to pay lease rentals for 3 consecutive years (95 to
97).
- In Case No. 7865, petitioner co-owned (with one Irene Aguinaldo) a 6830.5-sq.
meter landholding tenanted by Marcelina, who allegedly has not fully paid the
rental for the use of the land on the third cropping season.
- Both cases are for ejectment against Marcelina.
- Respondent Marcelina, in her answer, specifically denied the allegations of arrears
in lease rentals in the first case. In the second case, however, she admitted that
there were times that the land was planted with palay on third cropping, though
this was not regular. She further averred that if ever the palay yielded produce,
petitioner was given her due share.
PARAD: Both cases DISMISSED.
DARAB: PARAD decision AFFIRMED.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
CA: DARAB decision AFFIRMED.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner sufficiently proved her allegations against respondent.
SC: Petition DENIED.
- As agricultural lessor, petitioner has the burden of proof to show existence of a
lawful cause for ejectment of an agricultural lessee.
- In the first case, petitioner failed to establish her principals’ claim.
o Petitioner failed to establish by sufficient evidence that respondent
failed to pay the lease rentals.
o Respondent, in fact, sufficiently rebutted the allegation when she
presented 5 pieces of evidence, all of which show receipts issued by Irene
Aguinaldo evidencing receipt of their share in the produce of the land.
- In the second case, petitioner also failed to establish her allegation of non-delivery
of her share in the third cropping.
o Respondent sufficiently rebutted the allegation by providing sufficient
evidence to the contrary, which included:
 Receipts by Aguinaldo acknowledging receipts of their shares
in the produce.
 Notice sent to Aguinaldo that, for unreasonably refusing to
accept the shares due them, the same was sold and the
proceeds deposited in the bank.
 Notices of reaping and threshing, to prove that the landowner
was duly notified.
 The name of the bank, and the passbook containing the
deposited amounts.
Zurbano v. Estrella (1989)
FACTS: under a Letter of Instruction dated October 21, 1976, the President directed the then
Secretary, now Minister of Agrarian Reform, to "undertake to place under the Land transfer
Program of the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn
lands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural
lands of more than seven hectares ill aggregate areas or lands used for residential commercial,
industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support
themselves and their families.”
It is the validity of such Letter of Instruction that is assailed in this prohibition proceeding on
the ground that it is class legislation and, therefore, violative of the equal protection guarantee;
that it is "a form of tyrannical imposition by a strong and powerful state" and, as such, violative
of the due process clause; and that it would as applied to petitioners, be a taking of private
property without just compensation.
Petitioners-spouses in this prohibition proceeding alleged that they are the owners of
agricultural lands, with 6 parcels planted to coconuts and 2 parcels of riceland. It is further
alleged that said "coconut lands which are scattered in different barrios are very far from the
poblacion of Labo where petitioners reside which they could not even visit due to the unsettled
peace and order conditions," resulting in their only productive property being the ricelands. On
August 10, 1982, "petitioners received a communication from respondent Director Pejo of the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform, informing them that the processing of the land transfer had been
initiated and requiring them to submit to the Regional Office all the necessary documents
pertinent to their claim" otherwise, the farmer-beneficiaries would be issued the
corresponding emancipation patents. When they asked why a small piece of property of only
1.86 hectares of riceland should be under Presidential Decree No. 27, they were informed that
the text of the letter of Instruction No. 474 calls for the two parcels of ricelands being included
in the Land Transfer Program.
ISSUES: Whether the LOI is constitutional
HELD: YES.
The Constitution decrees no less than the emancipation of tenants, and there are safeguards
therein to assure that there be no arbitrariness or injustice in its enforcement. There are,
moreover, built-in safeguards to preclude any unlawful taking of private property.
There is no merit to the contention that Letter of Instruction No. 474 denies equal protection.
The history of land tenancy, especially in Central Luzon, is a dark spot in the social life and
history of the people.
There is no merit to the contention that the Letter of Instruction No. 474 amounts to
deprivation of property without due process of law. All that it provides is that the Secretary
then, now the Minister, of Agrarian Reform, is to take charge of Land Transfer Program
pursuant to the Presidential Decree No. 27. Landholders with tenanted rice/corn lands with
areas of seven hectares or less are included if they own other agricultural lands of more than
seven hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other
urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their
families. There is no departure from constitutional restraints. In language, scheme, and
framework, this Letter of Instruction reveals the plan and purpose to attain the goal envisioned
by the Constitution but with due regard to the landowners affected. There is a saving clause.
They are exempt from its operation if it be shown that from the other lands owned by them of
more than seven hectares in aggregate areas if agricultural, or other areas, whether residential,
commercial, or industrial, or lands devoted to other urban purposes, they are unable to derive
adequate income to support themselves and their families.
Neither is there any merit to the contention that there would be the taking of property for
public use without just compensation. The Constitution itself imposes the duty on the State to
emancipate the tenants from the bondage of the soil.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Castro v. CA (1980)
FACTS: Petitioners Benigno Castro, Fortunato Lagman, Ruperto Garamonte, Arsenio Torres and
Domingo Manalo started cultivating different parcels of land owned by respondent Candido
Baron and which are located at Barrio San Bartolome, Concepcion, Tarlac. Petitioners
Garamonte, Manalo and Torres started working on said landholdings in 1963 while petitioners
Castro and Lagman were employed sometime in 1969 and 1970, respectively.
Petitioners (then plaintiffs), on April 2, 1973, filed their complaint against private respondent
(then defendant) Candido Baron with the Court of Agrarian Relations, Branch III in Tarlac, Tarlac
to nullify their contracts for hired services and to affirm the existence of a tenancy relationship.
On June 21, 1973, defendant (private respondent) filed his answer with counter-claim praying
for the issuance of an interlocutory order immediately restraining the petitioners from
disturbing the peaceful possession, enjoyment and administration of defendant's landholding
and after hearing on the merits, for permanency of said injunction.
On July 15, 1975, the trial court dismissed the petitioners’ complaint and declared them as
more than preponderantly proven to be mere hired laborers of defendant over their respective
farm holdings under administration. It upheld the contracts of hired services being sought to
be annulled for having been voluntarily and intelligently entered into, the validity, legality and
due execution of which from both evidence had been shown to the Court's satisfaction.
The CA upheld the lower court’s decision and held that:
“Plaintiffs testified that they used to sign the contracts they executed 'together' at the place of
defendant and this fact is supported by the contracts they executed all dated May 15, 1972,
which they admitted to have signed. This proves that the contracts were being executed with
their full knowledge and awareness knowing they represented their agreement. There was no
evidence adduced by any or all of the herein plaintiffs that they objected to the terms and
conditions of the contracts they signed, nor of the fact that they were signing from year to year
contracts in name only, and which allegedly were never enforced because the 50-50 sharing
arrangement was followed. it is unthinkable to this Court that a landowner whose land is under
administration and mechanization would ever agree to subvert his own contracts to his
prejudice and actual loss. Evidently, defendant, who had ejected some of the plaintiffs could
not have intended them to become tenants again after they agreed in writing to be mere hired
laborers. The assertions that their written agreements were simulated, pro forma, and
ineffective, are left alone, serious charges which were aired to discredit the contracts sought
to be revoked, for the tenants having been benefitted by their contracts to remain in the
landholding as hired laborers are estopped from impugning their validity. the two-pronged
evidence of plaintiffs all but confirmed their relationship with the defendant, when they motu
propio admitted that their actual relationship was governed not only by the written contracts
of hired of services, but also by their actual practice of 50-50 share tenancy, which had been
abolished years before. The excuses for their share tenancy relationship side-by-side with the
presumption of legality of the contracts for services became lame, and inadmissible and are
hereby considered as vain efforts to show a non-existent relationship which plaintiffs have tried
hard to inject into their testimony which the court cannot accept nor consider for being wanting
in substance, truth and logic. At this point, the Court, sad to state, noticed that plaintiffs soaring
ambitions outstretched their ability to produce in court the necessary evidence material to
their cause.”
In this petition, petitioners allege that they are tenants on a 50-50 sharing basis on the net
palay produce from their respective palay landholdings owned by private respondents; that
pursuant to their verbal arrangement, the landowner merely provides the land and the
expenses for seedling, while petitioners shoulder without reimbursement the expenses for
reaping and all other items for production; that such verbal agreement had been faithfully
observed by both parties up to the agricultural year 1972-73; that they were induced to sign
the written of, hired agricultural workers; that said contracts were never observed nor actually
executed into practice as they actually continued to observed their verbal tenancy agreement
earlier alleged.
Private respondent, upon the other hand, alleges that the lands subject of the action are
absolutely untenanted and are farmed by administration and mechanization; that petitioners
are not tenants, but were mere hired agricultural workers; that it is clearly provided by Pres.
Decree No. 27 that there should be a showing that the action involves tenants; that refuting
petitioners' allegation, injunctions are not proper where those affected are tenants and this
matter again requires a looking into the question of whether or not petitioners are tenants;
that the instant petition is bereft of merit since the lands involved are not embraced within
Operation Land Transfer under Pres. Decree No. 27 which only applies to tenanted lands; that
Pres. Decrees Nos. 316 and 946 apply only to ejectment and harassment cases involving
tenants; that the decrees specify and use only the terms tenant-farmer, tenant-tiller and
tenant; that Pres. Decrees Nos. 27, 316 and 946 should be applied prospectively and the same
are inapplicable to cases in the appellate courts.
ISSUE/S: Whether petitioners are tenants of private respondent on the landholdings they
have been cultivating for years
HELD: NO.
CA was correct. It must be observed that the questioned contracts were executed between
petitioners and private respondent annually, before the start of each agricultural season. In the
case of petitioner Castro, it should be noted that it took him three contracts in a span of three
successive years (1970, 1971 and 1972) before he started questioning said contracts. Inevitably,
the question that comes to mind is: What took him and the others so long'? Certainly, a person
can forget the first incident or experience, perhaps tolerate the second, but will not go through
a third time when he is well aware of the odds.
Time and again, this Court has consistently issued pronouncements upholding the validity and
effectivity of contracts. This Court finds merit in private respondent's contention that for the
lands subject of the action to come under Operation Land Transfer under Pres. Decree No. 27,
there must first be a showing that they are tenanted lands and for the action to come within
the referral provisions of Pres. Decrees Nos. 316 and 946, it must first be established that the
action involves tenants. The aforecited decrees specifically speak of "tenant-farmer",
"sharecrop or lease tenancy", "tenant", and "tenant-tiller ".
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
On petitioners' flimsy claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain their own
appeal and that this case should have been referred to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, private
respondent aptly refuted the same by insisting that Presidential Decrees Nos. 316 and 946
apply only to ejectment and harassment cases involving tenants. It must be borne in mind that
herein petitioners are found to be mere hired farm laborers and this case was instituted to seek
the nullity of subject contracts and declare petitioners as tenants and hence, This is neither an
action for ejectment nor harassment of tenants. The purpose for referral to the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform under the aforesaid decrees is to enable said ministry to determine if the case
is intended to harass tenant-farmers. Oddly enough, the case in the lower court and in the
appellate court were initiated by petitioners themselves and hence, there is no case of
harassment nor ejectment involved. On the contrary, it may even be stated that they have
intended to harass private respondent when they brought "Commander Pusa" to the lower
court and when they wrote a deceptive letter to the President during the lower court
proceedings.
Moreover, petitioners have made the fatal error of invoking the provisions of Presidential
Decrees Nos. 27, 316 and 946; for, this Court has already ruled that said decrees cannot be
applied retroactively and that they can only apply to bona fide tenants.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
Facts:
(Note: Several petitions were filed but I only digested the one related with the topic in Agra) 
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of
rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to
cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied
by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn
shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the
respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have
been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations
implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing
rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned PD No. 27 is constitutional.
Held: YES.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under
martial law has already been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify
or reverse it on that issue. As for the power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131
and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section
4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in
Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. This section
declares:
Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person
may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors
governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced,
terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in
no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three
(3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to
the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of
age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the
farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by
Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally
retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees
or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the
time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead.
LUZ FARMS, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, Respondent.
G.R. No. 86889, December 4, 1990
Facts:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which includes the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and
Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657. Thereafter, the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A. No.
6657 (Commercial Farms).
Luz Farms, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with
others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of
Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657
otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to
it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the
definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity."
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13
— in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilang, Bukidnon,
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such
lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as
compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and above the
compensation they currently receive: Provided, That these individuals or entities
realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon
proper application, determine a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes a profit, an additional ten (10%) of
the net profit after tax shall be distributed to said regular and other farmworkers
within ninety (90) days of the end of the fiscal year . . ."
CONTENTION OF LUZ FARM: Luz Farms contended that it does not seek the nullification of R.A.
6657 in its entirety. In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the decision of this Court in the
case of the Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform affirming the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It, however,
argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution,
in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.
CONTENTION OF DAR SECRETARY: Public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising
is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b)
of R.A. 6657 is proper.
Issue: Whether or not the Implementing Rules and Regulations are constitutional.
Held: NO.
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning
of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-
mandated agrarian reform program of the Government.
There is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657
directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and
implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings)
whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten
percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable
for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32
of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance
therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and void for being unconstitutional.
Central Mindanao University vs. DARAB
G.R. No. 100091
Facts:
Petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural education institution owned and run by the state located
in early 1910, in response to the public demand for and agricultural school in Mindanao.
In 1960’s it was converted into a college with campus in Musuan, and became known as the
CMU. Primarily an agricultural university, the school was the answer to the need for training
people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao.
On January 16, 1958 the late president Carlos P. Garcia, issued Proclamation No. 476,
withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site
which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU.
In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, a livelihood program called “Kilusang Sariling
Sikap Program” under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and
employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this program, the
faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided
technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to
cultivate 4-5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project. The contract prohibits participants
and their hired workers to establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated
land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant
relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees.
Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero,
Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants. Obrique was a Physics
Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the lowland rice project. The other
complainants, who were not members of the faculty or non-academic staff of the CMU, were
hired workers or laborers of the participants in this program.
When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued
the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-Business
Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project.
Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project
was discontinued. As Assistant Director of this agri-business project, Obrique was found guilty
of mishandling the CMU funds and was separated from service by virtue of Executive Order No.
17, the re-organization law of the CMU.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as President, the CMU launched a self-help project called
CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize
and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual
field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff.
Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement 2 among the CMU, the CMU-
Integrated Development Foundation (CMU-IDF) and groups of "seldas" of 5 CMU employees,
the CMU would provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1) calendar year.
The participants agreed not to allow their hired laborers or members of their family to establish
any house or live within the vicinity of the project area and not to use the allocated lot as
collateral for a loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist
as a result of the Agreement.
Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to workers and staff members who
were still employed with the CMU and was not made available to former workers or employees.
In the middle of 1987, to cushion the impart of the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar
cane project on the lives of its former workers, the CMU allowed them to participate in the
CMU-IEP as special participants.
The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose
contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate.
The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar can project,
the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment
by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of, the complaint.
On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents were not
tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB
ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the
CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.
Issue/s: Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for
Declaration of Status of Tenants and coverage of land under CARP.
Held: Petition is meritorious.
We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the
written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the livelihood program called
"Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant
relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in the project).
The CMU did not receive any share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants.
What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land use participant's fee in
consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by the CMU.
In the same paragraph of their complaint, complainants claim that they are landless peasants.
This allegation requires proof and should not be accepted as factually true. Obrique is not a
landless peasant. The facts showed he was Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible
position was separated from the service on account of certain irregularities he committed while
Assistant Director of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the
moment, own no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places
of origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the record to show that they are landless peasants.
The evidence on record establish without doubt that the complainants were originally
authorized or given permission to occupy certain areas of the CMU property for a definite
purpose to carry out certain university projects as part of the CMU's program of activities
pursuant to its avowed purpose of giving training and instruction in agricultural and other
related technologies, using the land and other resources of the institution as a laboratory for
these projects. Their entry into the land of the CMU was with the permission and written
consent of the owner, the CMU, for a limited period and for a specific purpose. After the
expiration of their privilege to occupy and cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay
was unauthorized and their settlement on the CMU's land was without legal authority. A person
entering upon lands of another, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any
title of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with the owner or with one whom he believes
holds title to the land, is a squatter. Squatters cannot enter the land of another surreptitiously
or by stealth, and under the umbrella of the CARP, claim rights to said property as landless
peasants. Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts of
forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and may not avail themselves of
the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. Any such person who knowingly and willfully violates
the above provision of the Act shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion of
the Court. Therefore, private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless
peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.
It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because (1)
It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain; (2) The CMU land reservation is not
in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress; (3) It is private land registered and titled
in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU; (4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of
R.A. 6657 because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for school site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational
purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
ENGRACIA VINZONS-MAGANA, petitioner, 
vs.
HONORABLE CONRADO ESTRELLA IN HIS
CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF AGRARIAN REFORM, SALVADOR PEJO, AS REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
MINISTRY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, and JUANA S. VDA. DE PAITAN, respondents.
FACTS:
Magana is the owner of a parcel of riceland situated in the barrio of Talisay, Camarines Norte.
The said riceland was tenanted by the late Domingo Paitan, husband of private respondent
herein, Juana Vda. de Paitan, under an agricultural leasehold agreement.
On October 20, 1977, Magana filed a petition for the termination of the leasehold agreement
allegedly due to (1) non-payment of rentals; (2) inability and failure of Domingo Paitan to do
the tilling and cultivation of the riceland due to his long illness; and (3) subleasing of the
landholding to third parties.
Presiding Judge of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Judge Juan Llaguno, referred the case to the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform for certification as to whether or not it was
proper for trial in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 316, but said office failed to act upon
the request for certification, for a period of more than three years.
Instead on July 10, 1980, the riceland was placed under the Land Transfer Program by virtue of
Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978, which implemented Letter of Instructions No.
474, which placed all tenanted ricelands with areas of seven hectares or less belonging to
landowners who own agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in aggregate areas under
the Land Transfer Program of the government.
A certificate of Land Transfer was finally awarded in favor of Domingo Paitan. As a consequence
thereof, the rentals were no longer paid to Magana but were deposited instead with the Land
Bank and credited as amortization payments for the riceland. Apparently aggrieved by this turn
of events, Magana took the present recourse.
ISSUE: WON the issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer to Domingo Paitan is invalid and
unconstitutional.
HELD: Yes.
The issuance of Certificate of Land Transfer to Domingo Paitan without first expropriating said
property to pay petitioner landowner the full market value thereof before ceding and
transferring the land to Paitan and/or heirs, is invalid and unconstitutional as it is confiscatory
and violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
The mere issuance of the certificate of land transfer does not vest in the farmer/grantee
ownership of the land described therein. At most, the certificate merely evidences the
government's recognition of the grantee as the party qualified to avail of the statutory
mechanisms for the acquisition of ownership of the land titled by him as provided under
Presidential Decree No. 27. Neither is this recognition permanent nor irrevocable. Thus, failure
on the part of the farmer/grantee to comply with his obligation to pay his lease rentals or
amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner or
agricultural lessor is a ground for forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer.
Should Magana fail to agree on the price of her land as fixed by the DAR, she can bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction. Likewise, failure on the part of the farmer/grantee
to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments for a period of two (2) years is a ground for
forfeiture of his certificate of land transfer.
[G.R. No. 127876. December 17, 1999]
ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DAR REGIONAL DIRECTOR FOR
REGION IV, MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS and
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, respondents.
This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the
validity of the acquisition of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657,
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas,
namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu,
Batangas. Hacienda Palico is 1,024 hectares in area and is registered under Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 985. Hacienda Banilad is 1,050 hectares in area, registered under TCT No. 924
.Hacienda Caylaway is 867.4571 hectares in area and is registered under TCT Nos. T-44662, T-
44663, T-44664 and T-44665.
The events of this case occurred during the incumbency of then President Corazon C. Aquino. In
February 1986, President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 promulgating a Provisional
Constitution. As head of the provisional government, the President exercised legislative power
until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution. In the exercise of this
legislative power, the President signed on July 22, 1987, Proclamation No. 131 instituting a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and Executive Order No. 229 providing the
mechanisms necessary to initially implement the program.
On July 27, 1987, the Congress of the Philippines formally convened and took over legislative
power from the President This Congress passed Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. The Act was signed by the President on June 10, 1988 and
took effect on June 15, 1988.
Before the laws effectivity, on May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary
offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico
and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance
with the CARL.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Hacienda Palico
On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled Invitation to Parties to
petitioner. The Invitation was addressed to Jaime Pimentel, Hda. Administrator, Hda.
Palico. MARO invited petitioner to a conference on October 6, 1989 at the DAR office in
Nasugbu to discuss the results of the DAR investigation of Hacienda Palico, which was
scheduled for compulsory acquisition this year under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
On October 25, 1989, MARO completed three (3) Investigation Reports after investigation and
ocular inspection of the Hacienda. In the first Report, the MARO found that 270 hectares under
Tax Declaration Nos. 465, 466, 468 and 470 were flat and actually occupied and cultivated by
34 tillers of sugarcane. In the second Report, MARO identified as flat approximately 339
hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0234 which also had several actual occupants and tillers of
sugarcane; while in the third Report, the MARO found approximately 75 hectares under Tax
Declaration No. 0354 as flat with 33 actual occupants and tillers also of sugarcane.
On October 27, 1989, a Summary Investigation Report was submitted and signed jointly by the
MARO, representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) and Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP), and by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The Report
recommended that 333.0800 hectares of Hacienda Palico be subject to compulsory acquisition
at a value of P6,807,622.20. The following day, October 28, 1989, two (2) more Summary
Investigation Reports were submitted by the same officers and representatives. They
recommended that 270.0876 hectares and 75.3800 hectares be placed under compulsory
acquisition at a compensation of P8,109,739.00 and P2,188,195.47, respectively.
On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then Department Secretary Miriam D.
Santiago sent a Notice of Acquisition to petitioner. The Notice was addressed as follows:
Roxas y Cia, Limited
Soriano Bldg., Plaza Cervantes
Manila, Metro Manila.
Petitioner was informed that 1,023.999 hectares of its land in Hacienda Palico were subject to
immediate acquisition and distribution by the government under the CARL; that based on the
DARs valuation criteria, the government was offering compensation of P3.4 million for
333.0800 hectares; that whether this offer was to be accepted or rejected, petitioner was to
inform the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) of the DAR; that in case of
petitioners rejection or failure to reply within thirty days, respondent DAR shall conduct
summary administrative proceedings with notice to petitioner to determine just compensation
for the land; that if petitioner accepts respondent DARs offer, or upon deposit of the
compensation with an accessible bank if it rejects the same, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land.
Almost two years later, on September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land
Valuation Manager three (3) separate Memoranda entitled Request to Open Trust Account.
Each Memoranda requested that a trust account representing the valuation of three portions
of Hacienda Palico be opened in favor of the petitioner in view of the latters rejection of its
offered value.
Meanwhile in a letter dated May 4, 1993, petitioner applied with the DAR for conversion of
Haciendas Palico and Banilad from agricultural to non-agricultural lands under the provisions
of the CARL. On July 14, 1993, petitioner sent a letter to the DAR Regional Director reiterating
its request for conversion of the two haciendas.
Despite petitioners application for conversion, respondent DAR proceeded with the acquisition
of the two Haciendas. The LBP trust accounts as compensation for Hacienda Palico were
replaced by respondent DAR with cash and LBP bonds. On October 22, 1993, from the mother
title of TCT No. 985 of the Hacienda, respondent DAR registered Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) No. 6654. On October 30, 1993, CLOAs were distributed to farmer beneficiaries.
Hacienda Banilad
On August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent
a notice to petitioner addressed as follows:
Mr. Jaime Pimentel
Hacienda Administrator
Hacienda Banilad
Nasugbu, Batangas
The MARO informed Pimentel that Hacienda Banilad was subject to compulsory acquisition
under the CARL; that should petitioner wish to avail of the other schemes such as Voluntary
Offer to Sell or Voluntary Land Transfer, respondent DAR was willing to provide assistance
thereto
On September 18, 1989, the MARO sent an Invitation to Parties again to Pimentel inviting the
latter to attend a conference on September 21, 1989 at the MARO Office in Nasugbu to discuss
the results of the MAROs investigation over Hacienda Banilad.
On September 21, 1989, the same day the conference was held, the MARO submitted two (2)
Reports. In his first Report, he found that approximately 709 hectares of land under Tax
Declaration Nos. 0237 and 0236 were flat. On this area were discovered 162 actual occupants
and tillers of sugarcane. In the second Report, it was found that approximately 235 hectares
under Tax Declaration No. 0390 were flat, on which were 92 actual occupants and tillers of
sugarcane.
The results of these Reports were discussed at the conference. Present in the conference were
representatives of the prospective farmer beneficiaries, the BARC, the LBP, and Jaime Pimentel
on behalf of the landowner. After the meeting, on the same day, September 21, 1989, a
Summary Investigation Report was submitted jointly by the MARO, representatives of the
BARC, LBP, and the PARO. They recommended that after ocular inspection of the property,
234.6498 hectares under Tax Declaration No. 0390 be subject to compulsory acquisition and
distribution by CLOA. The following day, September 22, 1989, a second Summary Investigation
was submitted by the same officers. They recommended that 737.2590 hectares under Tax
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Declaration Nos. 0236 and 0237 be likewise placed under compulsory acquisition for
distribution.
On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Department Secretary, sent to
petitioner two (2) separate Notices of Acquisition over Hacienda Banilad. These Notices were
sent on the same day as the Notice of Acquisition over Hacienda Palico. Unlike the Notice over
Hacienda Palico, however, the Notices over Hacienda Banilad were addressed to:
Roxas y Cia. Limited
7th Floor, Cacho-Gonzales Bldg. 101 Aguirre St., Leg.
Makati, Metro Manila.
Respondent DAR offered petitioner compensation of P15,108,995.52 for 729.4190 hectares
and P4,428,496.00 for 234.6498 hectares.
On September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager a
Request to Open Trust Account in petitioners name as compensation for 234.6493 hectares of
Hacienda Banilad. A second Request to Open Trust Account was sent on November 18, 1991
over 723.4130 hectares of said Hacienda.
On December 18, 1991, the LBP certified that the amounts of P4,428,496.40
and P21,234,468.78 in cash and LBP bonds had been earmarked as compensation for
petitioners land in Hacienda Banilad.
On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad.
Hacienda Caylaway
Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6, 1988 before
the effectivity of the CARL. The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571 hectares and is covered
by four titles. On January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director for Region
IV, sent to petitioner two (2) separate Resolutions accepting petitioners voluntary offer to sell
Hacienda Caylaway. The Resolutions were addressed to:
Roxas & Company, Inc.
7th Flr. Cacho- Gonzales Bldg.
Aguirre, Legaspi Village
Makati, M. M.
On September 4, 1990, the DAR Regional Director issued two separate Memoranda to the LBP
Regional Manager requesting for the valuation of the land. On the same day, respondent DAR,
through the Regional Director, sent to petitioner a Notice of Acquisition over 241.6777 hectares
and 533.8180 hectares. Like the Resolutions of Acceptance, the Notice of Acquisition was
addressed to petitioner at its office in Makati, Metro Manila.
Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a
letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The
Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda
Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR
that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.
In a letter dated September 28, 1992, respondent DAR Secretary informed petitioner that a
reclassification of the land would not exempt it from agrarian reform. Respondent Secretary
also denied petitioners withdrawal of the VOS on the ground that withdrawal could only be
based on specific grounds such as unsuitability of the soil for agriculture, or if the slope of the
land is over 18 degrees and that the land is undeveloped.
Despite the denial of the VOS withdrawal of Hacienda Caylaway, on May 11, 1993, petitioner
filed its application for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. On July 14, 1993,
petitioner, through its President, Eduardo Roxas, reiterated its request to withdraw the VOS
over Hacienda Caylaway in light of the following:
1) Certification issued by Conrado I. Gonzales, Officer-in-Charge, Department of Agriculture,
Region 4, 4th Floor, ATI (BA) Bldg., Diliman, Quezon City dated March 1, 1993 stating that the
lands subject of referenced titles are not feasible and economically sound for further
agricultural development.
2) Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas approving the Zoning
Ordinance reclassifying areas covered by the referenced titles to non-agricultural which was
enacted after extensive consultation with government agencies, including [the Department of
Agrarian Reform], and the requisite public hearings.
3) Resolution No. 106 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas dated March 8, 1993
approving the Zoning Ordinance enacted by the Municipality of Nasugbu.
4) Letter dated December 15, 1992 issued by Reynaldo U. Garcia of the Municipal Planning &
Development, Coordinator and Deputized Zoning Administrator addressed to Mrs. Alicia P.
Logarta advising that the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas has no objection to the conversion
of the lands subject of referenced titles to non-agricultural.
On August 24, 1993, petitioner instituted Case No. N-0017-96-46 (BA) with respondent DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying for the cancellation of the CLOAs issued by respondent
DAR in the name of several persons.Petitioner alleged that the Municipality of Nasugbu, where
the haciendas are located, had been declared a tourist zone, that the land is not suitable for
agricultural production, and that the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu had reclassified the land
to non-agricultural.
In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent DARAB held that the case involved the
prejudicial question of whether the property was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this
question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for
determination.
On October 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 32484. It
questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial of due process in
the acquisition of its landholdings.
Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas was denied by the MARO on
November 8, 1993.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Petitioners petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals on April 28, 1994. Petitioner moved
for reconsideration but the motion was denied on January 17, 1997 by respondent court
ISSUE: W/N the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and
in accordance with law
RULING: SC granted the petition in part and the acquisition proceedings over the three
haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due process.
C explained the following:
MODES OF LAND ACQUISITION:
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), provides for
two (2) modes of acquisition of private land: compulsory and voluntary. The procedure for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands is set forth in Section 16 of R.A. 6657,
a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR
shall send its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or
registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and
barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of
the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17,
18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.
b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal
delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the
DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.
c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner
the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of
transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other
muniments of title.
d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary
administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land requiring the
landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just
compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice. After the
expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall
decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in
LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and the farmer
beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a Notice of
Acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property
is located. Within thirty days from receipt of the Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, his
administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the
offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the
government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the execution of the
deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If
the landowner rejects the DARs offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary
administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the
LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation
within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the
case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation. Upon receipt
by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from
the latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a
transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall then be
redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may question the decision of the DAR in
the regular courts for final determination of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to hasten the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Under Section 16 of
the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the
landowners and the beneficiaries.
However, the law is silent on how the identification process must be made. To fill in this gap,
the DAR issued on July 26, 1989 Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989, which set the
operating procedure in the identification of such lands.
OPERATING PROCEDURE:
A. MARO with the assistance of BARC shall:
1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the CARP in his area
of responsibility. The masterlist shall include such information as required under
the attached CARP Masterlist Form which shall include the name of the landowner,
landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number.
2. Prepare a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title (OCT/TCT) or
landholding covered under Phase I and II of the CARP except those for which the
landowners have already filed applications to avail of other modes of land
acquisition. A case folder shall contain the following duly accomplished forms:
a) CARP CA Form 1MARO Investigation Report
b) CARP CA Form 2-- Summary Investigation Report of Findings and Evaluation
c) CARP CA Form 3Applicants Information Sheet
d) CARP CA Form 4Beneficiaries Undertaking
e) CARP CA Form 5Transmittal Report to the PARO
***MARO/ BARC shall certify that all information contained in the above-mentioned
forms have been examined and verified by him and that the same are true and
correct.***
3. Send a Notice of Coverage and a letter of invitation to a conference/
meeting to the landowner covered by the Compulsory Case Acquisition
Folder. Invitations to the said conference/ meeting shall also be sent to the
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC representative(s), the Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP) representative, and other interested parties to
discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property. He shall discuss the
MARO/ BARC investigation report and solicit the views, objection,
agreements or suggestions of the participants thereon. The landowner shall
also be asked to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the meeting shall
be signed by all participants in the conference and shall form an integral part
of the CACF.
4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO).
B. The PARO shall:
1. Ensure that the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his MAROs.
2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of the land
in accordance with A.O. No. 6, Series of 1988. The valuation worksheet and
the related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the PARO
and all the personnel who participated in the accomplishment of these forms.
3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through ocular
inspection and verification of the property. This ocular inspection and
verification shall be mandatory when the computed value exceeds 500,000
per estate.
4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder, together with
the duly accomplished valuation forms and his recommendations, to the
Central Office. The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall be
furnished a copy each of his report.
C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition and
Distribution (BLAD), shall:
1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO, review,
evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property covered by
the case folder. A summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared
and duly certified by the BLAD Director and the personnel directly
participating in the review and final valuation.
2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized
representative, a Notice of Acquisition (CARP CA Form 8) for the subject
property. Serve the Notice to the landowner personally or through registered
mail within three days from its approval. The Notice shall include, among
others, the area subject of compulsory acquisition, and the amount of just
compensation offered by DAR.
3. Should the landowner accept the DARs offered value, the BLAD shall prepare
and submit to the Secretary for approval the Order of Acquisition. However,
in case of rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) shall
conduct a summary administrative hearing to determine just compensation,
in accordance with the procedures provided under Administrative Order No.
13, Series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of the DARABs decision on just
compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for
approval the required Order of Acquisition.
4. Upon the landowners receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or upon
deposit of payment in the designated bank, in case of rejection or non-
response, the Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of
Deeds to issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the property is transferred, the
DAR, through the PARO, shall take possession of the land for redistribution
to qualified beneficiaries.
DAR A. O. No. 12, Series of 1989, from whence the Notice of Coverage first sprung, was
amended in 1990 by DAR A.O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and in 1993 by DAR A.O. No. 1, Series of
1993. The Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to the conference meeting were expanded
and amplified in said amendments.
DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990 entitled Revised Rules Governing the Acquisition of Agricultural
Lands Subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition Pursuant to R. A. 6657,
requires that:
MARO
1. Receives the duly accomplished CARP Form Nos. 1 & 1.1 including supporting
documents.
2. Gathers basic ownership documents listed under 1.a or 1.b above and prepares
corresponding VOCF/ CACF by landowner/ landholding.
3. Notifies/ invites the landowner and representatives of the LBP, DENR, BARC
and prospective beneficiaries of the schedule of ocular inspection of the
property at least one week in advance.
4. MARO/ LAND BANK FIELD OFFICE/ BARC
a) Identify the land and landowner, and determine the suitability for
agriculture and productivity of the land and jointly prepare Field
Investigation Report (CARP Form No. 2), including the Land Use Map of the
property.
b) Interview applicants and assist them in the preparation of the
Application For Potential CARP Beneficiary (CARP Form No.
3).
c) Screen prospective farmer-beneficiaries and for those found qualified,
cause the signing of the respective Application to Purchase
and Farmers Undertaking (CARP Form No. 4).
d) Complete the Field Investigation Report based on the result of the ocular
inspection/ investigation of the property and documents
submitted. See to it that Field Investigation Report is duly
accomplished and signed by all concerned.
5. MARO
a) Assists the DENR Survey Party in the conduct of a boundary/ subdivision
survey delineating areas covered by OLT, retention, subject of
VOS, CA (by phases, if possible), infrastructures, etc.,
whichever is applicable.
b) Sends Notice of Coverage (CARP Form No. 5) to landowner concerned or
his duly authorized representative inviting him for a
conference.
c) Sends Invitation Letter (CARP Form No. 6) for a conference/ public
hearing to prospective farmer-beneficiaries, landowner,
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
representatives of BARC, LBP, DENR, DA, NGOs, farmers
organizations and other interested parties to discuss the
following matters:
Result of Field Investigation, Inputs to valuation, Issues
raised, Comments/ recommendations by all parties
concerned.
d) Prepares Summary of Minutes of the conference/ public hearing to be
guided by CARP Form No. 7.
e) Forwards the completed VOCF/CACF to the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office (PARO) using CARP Form No. 8 (Transmittal Memo to
PARO).
The Compulsory Acquisition of Haciendas Palico and Banilad
DAR claims that it, through MARO Leopoldo C. Lejano, sent a letter of invitation entitled
Invitation to Parties dated September 29, 1989 to petitioner corporation, through Jaime
Pimentel, the administrator of Hacienda Palico. The invitation was received on the same day it
was sent as indicated by a signature and the date received at the bottom left corner of said
invitation. With regard to Hacienda Banilad, respondent DAR claims that Jaime Pimentel,
administrator also of Hacienda Banilad, was notified and sent an invitation to the
conference. Pimentel actually attended the conference on September 21, 1989 and signed the
Minutes of the meeting on behalf of petitioner corporation. The Minutes was also signed by
the representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. No letter of invitation was
sent or conference meeting held with respect to Hacienda Caylaway because it was subject to
a Voluntary Offer to Sell to respondent DAR.
When respondent DAR, through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), sent to the
various parties the Notice of Coverage and invitation to the conference, DAR A. O. No. 12, Series
of 1989 was already in effect more than a month earlier. The Operating Procedure in DAR
Administrative Order No. 12 does not specify how notices or letters of invitation shall be sent
to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, the LBP, the farmer beneficiaries and other
interested parties. The procedure in the sending of these notices is important to comply with
the requisites of due process especially when the owner, as in this case, is a juridical
entity. Petitioner is a domestic corporation, and therefore, has a personality separate and
distinct from its shareholders, officers and employees.
The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is required to be sent to the landowner by
personal delivery or registered mail. Whether the landowner be a natural or juridical person
to whose address the Notice may be sent by personal delivery or registered mail, the law
does not distinguish. The DAR Administrative Orders also do not distinguish. In the
proceedings before the DAR, the distinction between natural and juridical persons in the
sending of notices may be found in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB). Service of pleadings before the DARAB is governed by Section 6, Rule V of the
DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure.
Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against a private domestic corporation before the
DARAB and the regular courts are served on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent
or any of its directors. These persons are those through whom the private domestic corporation
or partnership is capable of action.
Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary, cashier or director of petitioner
corporation. Is he, as administrator of the two Haciendas, considered an agent of the
corporation?
The purpose of all rules for service of process on a corporation is to make it reasonably certain
that the corporation will receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it. Service must
be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation as to make it a
priori supposable that he will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any
legal papers served on him and bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action.
Petitioners evidence does not show the official duties of Jaime Pimentel as administrator of
petitioners haciendas. The evidence does not indicate whether Pimentels duties is so
integrated with the corporation that he would immediately realize his responsibilities and know
what he should do with any legal papers served on him. At the time the notices were sent and
the preliminary conference conducted, petitioners principal place of business was listed in
Cervantes, Manila, and Aguirre St., Makati. Pimentel did not hold office at the principal place
of business of petitioner. Neither did he exercise his functions in Makati. He performed his
official functions and actually resided in the haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, a place over two
hundred kilometers away from Makati.
The Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway
Petitioner was also left in the dark with respect to Hacienda Caylaway, which was the subject
of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS). The VOS in the instant case was made on May 6, 1988, before
the effectivity of R.A. 6657 on June 15, 1988. VOS transactions were first governed by DAR
Administrative Order No. 19, series of 1989, and under this order, all VOS filed before June 15,
1988 shall be heard and processed in accordance with the procedure provided for in Executive
Order No. 229, thus:
III. All VOS transactions which are now pending before the DAR and for which no payment has
been made shall be subject to the notice and hearing requirements provided in Administrative
Order No. 12, Series of 1989, dated 26 July 1989, Section II, Subsection A, paragraph 3.
All VOS filed before 15 June 1988, the date of effectivity of the CARL, shall be heard and
processed in accordance with the procedure provided for in Executive Order No. 229.
Sec. 9. Voluntary Offer to Sell. The government shall purchase all agricultural lands it deems
productive and suitable to farmer cultivation voluntarily offered for sale to it at a valuation
determined in accordance with Section 6. Such transaction shall be exempt from the payment
of capital gains tax and other taxes and fees.
Executive Order 229 does not contain the procedure for the identification of private land as set
forth in DAR A. O. No. 12, Series of 1989. Section 5 of E.O. 229 merely reiterates the procedure
of acquisition in Section 16, R.A. 6657. In other words, the E.O. is silent as to the procedure for
the identification of the land, the notice of coverage and the preliminary conference with the
landowner, representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries.Does this mean that
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
these requirements may be dispensed with regard to VOS filed before June 15, 1988? The
answer is no.
First of all, the same E.O. 229, like Section 16 of the CARL, requires that the land, landowner
and beneficiaries of the land subject to agrarian reform be identified before the notice of
acquisition should be issued. Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale in 1989. The
Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4) titles. In two separate
Resolutions both dated January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director,
formally accepted the VOS over two of these four titles. The land covered by the two titles has
an area of 855.5257 hectares, but only 648.8544 hectares thereof fell within the coverage of
R.A. 6657. Petitioner claims it does not know where these portions are located.
Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land covered
by the four titles were conducted in 1989, and that petitioner, as landowner,
was not denied participation therein. The results of the survey and the land
valuation summary report, however, do not indicate whether notices to
attend the same were actually sent to and received by petitioner or its duly
authorized representative. To reiterate, Executive Order No. 229 does not
lay down the operating procedure, much less the notice requirements,
before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner,
however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process
and is an essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise, at
the very least, his right of retention guaranteed under the CARL.
G.R. No. 165547 January 24, 2007
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by its Secretary, RENE C.
VILLA, Petitioner, vs. SARANGANI AGRICULTURAL CO., INC., ACIL CORPORATION, NICASIO
ALCANTARA and TOMAS ALCANTARA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Respondents are the owners of the lands in question which have been reclassified from
agricultural into non-agricultural uses by virtue of a municipal zoning ordinance, and are
included in the comprehensive land use plan of the Municipality of Alabel.
The Province of Sarangani was created pursuant to Republic Act No. 7228 on March 16, 1992,
composed of seven (7) municipalities, namely, Alabel, Glan, Maasin, Maitum, Malapatan,
Malungon and Kiamba which were segregated from the Province of South Cotabato. Under said
Act, the Municipality of Alabel was made the capital of the new province where the capitol
building and all other national and provincial offices shall be established.
On February 14, 1997, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 97-08 or
"Resolution Adopting and Endorsing the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive Development Plan
(MCDP 1995-2005) of the Municipality of Alabel and Its Land Use Development Plan and Zoning
Ordinance for Adoption and Approval of the Provincial Governor, Honorable Priscilla L.
Chiongbian, Thru The Honorable Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani Province."
On January 30, 1998, pursuant to Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 08, Series of 1997, and to
accelerate the development and urbanization of Alabel, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel
passed Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying lots that were located within the built-up areas,
based on the 1995-2005 Land Use Plan of the municipality, from agricultural to non-agricultural
uses.
On March 2, 1998, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani approved Resolution No. 98-018
or the "Resolution Adopting the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP
1995-2205) and the Land Use Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of
Alabel, Sarangani Per Resolution No. 97-08 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel." A portion of the area involving 376.5424 hectares, however,
was covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657) commercial farms
deferment scheme.
The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning and Development
Council (MPDC) showed that respondents’ properties located at Barangay Maribulan, Alabel
were among those reclassified from agricultural and pasture land to residential, commercial
institutional, light industrial and open space in the 1995-2005 land use plan of Alabel.
On July 2, 1998, respondent Sarangani Agricultural Company, Inc. (SACI) filed an application for
land use conversion of the following parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,005 hectares
Accompanying SACI’s application for conversion were the documents required under the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1997.
Subsequently, a Site Inspection Report was prepared by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) Regional Office (Region XI) and was indorsed to DAR Secretary Horacio R.
Morales, Jr.
On March 16, 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and the Provincial Land Use
Technical Committee (PLUTC) conducted an inspection of the subject properties. In a
Memorandum dated July 9, 1999, the PLUTC recommended that SACI’s application be made
subject to the following conditions: 1) presentation by SACI of its development plan; 2)
submission of the lacking documents; 3) re-survey and segregation of the property according
to use or project in coordination with the DAR Regional Office; and, 4) submission of the
resulting map indicating the technical description of the area per actual use/project attested
by the Regional Director.
Meanwhile, on March 22, 1999, members of the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Association, Inc. (SARBAI) sent a letter-petition to the DAR Secretary oppposing the application
for land use conversion filed by SACI. SARBAI alleged that its members were merely forced to
sign the waiver of rights, considering that the commercial farm deferment period ended on
June 15, 1998. Later, an "Urgent Petition for the Denial of Land Use Conversion Application of
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Banana Commercial Farm of SACI" was filed by SARBAI and was received by the PARC
Secretariat on July 14, 1999.
In the March 30, 2000 deliberation of the PLUTC, the committee agreed to recommend the
disapproval of 158.0672 hectares that had been planted with bananas and coconuts. The
committee noted that said portion of the property was still viable for agriculture, irrigated, with
Notice of Coverage, and under protest or with opposition from SARBAI. It likewise
recommended that the decision as to the rest of the area applied for conversion shall be
deferred subject to the submission of the following within a period of thirty (30) days: 1) a five-
year comprehensive development plan; 2) a survey plan signed by the Regional Technical
Director of Land Management Service and noted by the DAR Regional Director (Region XI); 3)
SACI’s proof of undertaking, which will contain the package of benefits it intends to give to the
affected farm workers except those working in the banana plantation; 4) the concurrence of all
the workers who would be affected by the proposed conversion, which concurrence should be
noted by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) and acknowledged by a notary public.
On its part, SACI contended that 1) its projects were aligned to address the current and
anticipated commercial and residential needs of Sarangani province, and the removal of any
portion of its property included in its comprehensive development plan will affect the viability
of the plan; 2) the banana plantations will be transformed into a socialized housing subdivision
which will be made available to the displaced workers and the other low income earners of
Alabel; 3) the company will construct and install power generation facilities in the entire area;
4) at the time the application for land use conversion was filed, no Notice of Coverage was ever
issued by DAR, and the subsequent issuance of such notice was highly irregular because the
same may be issued only after the final resolution of the application for land use conversion;
and 5) the previous Order of Deferment cannot be a legal barrier to the filing of an application
for land use conversion.
On November 9, 2000, DAR Secretary Horacio R. Morales, Jr. denied SACI’s application for land
use conversion. The pertinent portion of the Order reads:
… The proponent also submitted another DA certification stating that 12 parcels of land (Lot
Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 807, 53, 10, 39 and 806) with an area of 816.7401 hectares, located at
Maribulan, Alabel, Sarangani are part of expansion for urbanizing areas. Though discussed on
several meetings, no decision was made on the application since the applicant was not able to
comply with the documentary requirements and clarify the issues raised by the Committee.
[I]n [the] 30 March 2000 Meeting of the PLUTC, the Committee deliberated again [on] the
subject application and agreed to recommend the disapproval of 158.0672 hectares area
planted to banana[s] and coconuts. The Committee noted that said portion of the property is
still viable for agriculture, irrigated, with Notice of Coverage and with protest or opposition
from SARBAI. The Committee also agreed to request the DAR to determine the metes and
bounds of the area planted to banana[s] and coconuts vis-à-vis areas devoted to other
enterprises. Relative to the rest of the area applied for conversion, the committee deferred its
decision subject to the submission of a 5-year comprehensive development plan, showing
among others, the schedule of development by phase, the specific lots involved and the
corresponding proposed use.
…The Committee acceded to the request of SACI and deferred its recommendation to deny
conversion of that portion of the property planted to banana[s] and coconut[s] pending
submission of a manifesto or SACI’s proof of undertaking that it will compensate farm workers
affected by showing, among others, the schedule of development by phase, the specific lots
involved and the corresponding proposed use [of] the conversion, concurred by the
workers/oppositors, noted by the MARO and duly notarized. The Committee also requested
SACI to submit details of the pomelo farm in Malandag being offered as a replacement farm for
the relocation of the farm workers. SACI was given a 30-day period to submit these documents.
SACI, however, failed to submit the oath of undertaking to pay disturbance compensation to
affected workers being required by the Committee and as provided under DAR Administrative
Order No. 01, Series of 1999. Instead, SACI submitted an undertaking executed by the affected
workers stating that they are amenable to the package of benefits offered by the company.
Nevertheless, those who executed the deed of undertaking did not represent the majority of
the farm workers. Out of the 95 regular banana workers only 45 and eight (8) supervisors
including four (4) workers who were not included in the workers’ master list of SACI executed
a deed of undertaking. As regards the 105-hectare pomelo farm, SACI failed to affirm whether
they are going to pursue their offer. Likewise, DAR Region XI reported that coverage of the
same area is on-going, and a different group of potential beneficiaries have already been
identified. Therefore, it could no longer be offered as a relocation site. Foregoing considered,
the Committee, during its 18 August 2000 Meeting, sustained its earlier recommendation to
deny the conversion of that portion of the property planted to bananas and coconuts.
With regard to the rest. of the area, the Committee deferred its decision subject to the
delineation by the SACI of the total area that they can develop within the allowed five-year
period. Likewise, the PLUTC is requesting the SACI to submit a revised five-year development
plan that will show the schedule of development by phase, by year, and the proposed use for
each parcel of land.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied
by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution, dated September 24, 2004.
Their Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order having been denied,
In a Decision dated June 30, 2003, the Office of the President through dismissed the appeal and
affirmed in toto the challenged DAR Orders. Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was
denied, they filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review raising substantially the same
issues.
On July 19, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the petition
ISSUE: CA ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE JUNE 16, 1998 NOTICE OF COVERAGE WAS
ILLEGAL AS DAR ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS.
RULING:
SC ruled that notice of coverage is not an indispensable requirement before DAR can acquire
the subject lots or commercial farms, which are covered by a deferment period under the
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or R.A. No 6657 upon its effectivity on June 15,
1998. The pertinent provision of the law states:
Sec. 11. Commercial Farming. – Commercial farms, which are private agricultural lands devoted
to saltbeds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetables and cut-flower farms, cacao, coffee and rubber
plantations, shall be subject to immediate compulsory acquisition and distribution after ten
(10) years from the effectivity of this Act. In the case of new farms, the ten-year period shall
begin from the first year of commercial production and operation, as determined by the DAR.
During the ten-year period, the Government shall initiate steps necessary to acquire these
lands, upon payment of just compensation for the land and the improvements thereon,
preferably in favor of organized cooperatives or associations, which shall thereafter manage
the said lands for the workers-beneficiaries. (AS amended by R.A. 7881; Rules and regulations
on the acquisition, valuation compensation and distribution of deferred commercial farms –
DAR AO No. 09, s. 1998)
DAR Administrative Order No.9, Series of 1998, on the Rules and Regulations on the Acquisition,
Valuation, Compensation and Distribution of Deferred Commercial Farms applies to all
commercial farms as defined under Section 11 of R.A. No. 6657:
SEC. 2. Statement of Policies. – The acquisition, valuation, compensation, distribution,
operation and management of deferred commercial farms shall be governed by the following
policies:
(a) All commercial farms whose deferment expired as of June 15, 1998 shall be subject
to immediate acquisition and distribution under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP). Those whose deferments have yet to expire will be
acquired and distributed only upon expiration of their respective deferment period
as originally determined by the Department of Agrarian reform (DAR), or earlier if
the DAR determines that the purpose for which it was deferred no longer exists and
revokes its deferment;
The process of acquisition of these commercial farms by DAR is specifically provided under
Article III, Section 9 of the above administrative order, to wit:
SEC. 9. Procedure for Acquisition.—The acquisition of deferred commercial farms shall be
governed by the following procedures:
(a) Voluntary Offer to Sell/Compulsory Acquisition
1) The Order of Deferment previously issued over the landholding shall
serve, upon expiration of the deferment period of the subject commercial
farm, as the Notice of Coverage, supported by the Compliance Work
Program and Summary of Exceptions (Form A) originally submitted with
the approved deferment application. However, for record purposes, the
landowner shall be served a Notice of Expiration of Deferment (Annex 2)
which shall contain a reminder of his right of retention, should he wish
to exercise the same;
2) In general, the procedure for acquisition shall follow DAR
Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 1998, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1996, entitled "Revised Rules and
Procedures governing the Acquisition of Agricultural Lands subject of
Voluntary offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition Pursuant to Republic
Act No. 6657," subject to certain modifications intended to expedite the
process as provided herein.
SC stated that it was unnecessary for petitioner to issue a notice of coverage
to respondents in order to place the properties in question under CARP
coverage. Hence, the contention by respondents that due process was not
duly observed by petitioner must fail. Accordingly, the denial of the
application for conversion must be upheld.
G.R. No. 78517 February 27, 1989
GABINO ALITA, JESUS JULIAN, JR., JESUS JULIAN, SR., PEDRO RICALDE, VICENTE RICALDE and
ROLANDO SALAMAR, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE M.
REYES, PAZ M. REYES and FE M. REYES, respondents.
Facts:
The subject matter of the case consists of two (2) parcels of land, acquired by private
respondents' predecessors-in-interest through homestead patent under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Said lands are situated at Guilinan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del
Sur.
Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners
refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316 and appurtenant regulations
issued by the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (DAR for short), now Department of Agrarian
Reform (MAR for short).
On June 18, 1981, private respondents (then plaintiffs), instituted a complaint against Hon.
Conrado Estrella as then Minister of Agrarian Reform, P.D. Macarambon as Regional Director
of MAR Region IX, and herein petitioners (then defendants) for the declaration of P.D. 27 and
all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as
inapplicable to homestead lands.
Defendants filed their answer with special and affirmative defenses of July 8, 1981.
Subsequently, on July 19, 1982, plaintiffs filed an urgent motion to enjoin the defendants from
declaring the lands in litigation under Operation Land Transfer and from being issued land
transfer certificates to which the defendants filed their opposition dated August 4, 1982.
On November 5, 1982, the Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch XVIII rendered its
decision dismissing the said complaint and the motion to enjoin the defendants was denied.
On January 4, 1983, plaintiffs moved to reconsider the Order of dismissal, to which defendants
filed their opposition on January 10, 1983.
Thus, on April 29, 1986, the Regional Trial Court issued the aforequoted decision prompting
defendants to move for a reconsideration but the same was denied in its Order dated June 6,
1986.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
On appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the same was sustained in its judgment
ISSUE: W/N lands obtained through homestead patent are covered by the Agrarian Reform
under P.D. 27.
RULING: SC ruled in the negative.
SC agrees with the petitioners in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants
from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a
sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice
precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very
purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. Thus,
“The Homestead Act has been enacted for the welfare and protection of the poor. The law gives
a needy citizen a piece of land where he may build a modest house for himself and family and
plant what is necessary for subsistence and for the satisfaction of life's other needs. The right
of the citizens to their homes and to the things necessary for their subsistence is as vital as the
right to life itself. They have a right to live with a certain degree of comfort as become human
beings, and the State which looks after the welfare of the people's happiness is under a duty to
safeguard the satisfaction of this vital right.”
In this regard, the Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the
homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute.
In point is Section 6 of Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which provides:
“Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever
applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural resources,
including lands of public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to
prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to
their ancestral lands.”
Additionally, it is worthy of note that the newly promulgated Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988 or Republic Act No. 6657 likewise contains a proviso supporting the inapplicability
of P.D. 27 to lands covered by homestead patents like those of the property in question,
reading,
Section 6. Retention Limits. ...
... Provided further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still
own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas
as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.'
G.R. No. 133507 February 17, 2000
EUDOSIA DAEZ AND/OR HER HEIRS, REP. BY ADRIANO D. DAEZ, petitioners, 
vs.
THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS MACARIO SORIENTES, APOLONIO MEDIANA, ROGELIO MACATULAD and
MANUEL UMALI, respondents.
FACTS:
Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare Riceland which was being
cultivated by respondents MacarioSoriente, Rogelio Macatulad, ApolonioMediana and Manuel
Umali under a system of share-tenancy.
On May 31, 1981, private respondents signed an affidavit, allegedly under duress, stating that
they are not share tenants but hired laborers. Armed with such document, EudosiaDaez applied
for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as
for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents.
DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order denying EudosiaDaez's application for
exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being
owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares.
DAR Secretary Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding private respondents to be
bonafide tenants of the subject land.
Court of Appeals sustained the order of Secretary Leong. DAR issued Emancipation Patents
(EPs) to private respondents. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).
ISSUE: WON CA ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXEMPTION FROM
AGRARIAN REFORM COVERAGE AND THE RIGHT OF RETENTION OF LANDOWNERS IS ONLY A
MATTER OF SEMANTICS THAT AN ADVERSE DECISION IN THE FORMER WILL FORECLOSE
FURTHER ACTION TO ENFORCE THE LATTER CONSIDERING THAT THEY CONSTITUTE SEPARATE
AND DISTINCT CAUSES OF ACTION AND, THEREFORE, ENFORCEABLE SEPARATELY AND IN
SEQUEL.
HELD: Yes.
Exemption and retention in agrarian reform are two (2) distinct concepts.
P.D. No. 27, which implemented the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program, covers tenanted
rice or corn lands. The requisites for coverage under the OLT program are the following: (1) the
land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; and (2) there must be a system of share-crop or
lease-tenancy obtaining therein. If either requisite is absent, a landowner may apply for
exemption. If either of these requisites is absent, the land is not covered under OLT. Hence, a
landowner need not apply for retention where his ownership over the entire landholding is
intact and undisturbed.
P.D. No. 27 grants each tenant of covered lands a five (5)-hectare lot, or in case the land is
irrigated, a three (3)-hectare lot constituting a family size farm. However, said law allows a
covered landowner to retain not more than seven (7) hectares of his land if his aggregate
landholding does not exceed twenty-four (24) hectares. Otherwise, his entire landholding is
covered without him being entitled to any retention right.
Consequently, a landowner may keep his entire covered landholding if its aggregate size does
not exceed the retention limit of seven (7) hectares. In effect, his land will not be covered at all
by the OLT program although all requisites for coverage are present. LOI No. 474 clarified the
effective coverage of OLT to include tenanted rice or corn lands of seven (7) hectares or less, if
the landowner owns other agricultural lands of more than seven (7) hectares. The term "other
agricultural lands" refers to lands other than tenanted rice or corn lands from which the
landowner derives adequate income to support his family.
Thus, on one hand, exemption from coverage of OLT lies if: (1) the land is not devoted to rice
or corn crops even if it is tenanted; or (2) the land is untenanted even though it is devoted to
rice or corn crops.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
On the other hand, the requisites for the exercise by the landowner of his right of retention are
the following: (1) the land must be devoted to rice or corn crops; (2) there must be a system of
share-crop or lease-tenancy obtaining therein; and (3) the size of the landholding must not
exceed twenty-four (24) hectares, or it could be more than twenty-four (24) hectares provided
that at least seven (7) hectares thereof are covered lands and more than seven (7) hectares of
it consist of "other agricultural lands".
Clearly, then, the requisites for the grant of an application for exemption from coverage of OLT
and those for the grant of an application for the exercise of a landowner's right of retention,
are different.
Hence, it is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention
are one and the same thing. Being distinct remedies, finality of judgment in one does not
preclude the subsequent institution of the other. There was, thus, no procedural impediment
to the application filed by EudosiaDaez for the retention of the subject 4.1865-hectare riceland,
even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became
final and executory.
Santiago vs. Ortiz-Luis (2010)
FACTS
Spouses Juan and Amada Ortiz Luis (SPOUSES) owned 7.1 hectares of tenanted rice lands in
Nueva Ecija. Despite inclusion of the property under the OLT, the SPOUSES transferred the
property via a Deed of Absolute Sale to their children Rosario, Teresita, Simplicio and Antonio.
The children were able to secure a TCT issued under their names.
The children later filed an Application for Retention under P.D. No. 27 before the Department
of Agrarian Reform Regional Office (DARRO) but were denied on the ground that the transfer
was made “after October 21, 1972 which is a clear violation of agrarian laws, rules and
regulations.”
Separately, Amada applied for retention. Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Rogelio M.
Chavez recommended the denial of Amada’s application upon the ground that “an owner of
tenanted rice and corn lands may not retain those lands if he, as of October 21, 1972, owned
more than 24 hectares of tenanted rice or corn lands.” It appears that Spouses Ortiz Luis owned
178.8 hectares, only 88.5 of which were placed under OLT.
In 2000, Amada’s application for retention was granted. The PARO held that her failure to
exercise her retention rights under PD 27 entitled her to the benefit of retention under RA
6657. This was contested by the farmer-beneficiaries who received emancipation patents over
portions of the property, namely Santiago and Gutierrez.
Upon appeal with the DAR, Secretary Pagdanganan upheld the decision of PARO holding that
Amada was entitled to retention. His successor, Sec. Pangadaman however reversed relying on
LOI 474 stating that having established that the landowners own other agricultural lands 7
hectares, they are not entitled to retention under PD 27.
On appeal to the Office of the President (OP), the Order of PAGDANGANAN was upheld granting
Amada retention rights. This decision was upheld by the CA, with the clarification that the
farmer-beneficiaries should still be accorded their rights under RA 6657 Section 6 and DAR
Admin Order No. 05-00.
ISSUE: WON Amada is entitled to retention rights
HELD: NO. SEC. PANGADAMAN’S ORDER IS REINSTATED.
RATIO
The legislative standards are set forth in Section 6 of R.A. 6657, thus:
Section 6. Retention Limits. – Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own, or
retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, xxx but in no case shall
retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares.xxx
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain
to the landowner. Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the
landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein
or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features.
Section 6 implies that the sole requirement in the exercise of retention rights is that the area
chosen by the landowner must be compact or contiguous.
In the recent case of Heirs of Aurelio Reyes v. Garilao, however, the Court held that a
landowner’s retention rights under R.A. 6657 are restricted by the conditions set forth in Letter
of Instruction (LOI) No. which provided the following restrictions to the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform:
"1. You shall undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of the government pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less
belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in
aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes
from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families.”
(underscoring supplied)
DAR Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1978[18] provided for the implementing
guidelines of LOI No. 474:
Tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares or less shall be covered by Operation
Land Transfer if those lands belong to the following landowners:
a.) Landowners who own other agricultural lands of more than seven hectares in
aggregate areas, whether tenanted or not, cultivated or not, and regardless of the income
derived therefrom;
b.) Landowners who own lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes from which they derive an annual gross income of at least five thousand (P5,000.00)
pesos. (underscoring supplied)
In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, the
Court held that landowners who have not yet exercised their retention rights under P.D. No. 27
are entitled to “new retention rights provided for by R.A. No. 6657 . . .” In Heirs of Aurelio
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Reyes v. Garilao, however, the Court held that the limitations under LOI No. 474 still apply to a
landowner who filed an application under R.A. 6657.
Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474 amended P.D. No. 27 by removing “any right of retention
from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares, or lands used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other purpose from which they derive adequate income
to support themselves and their families.”
Section 9 (d) of DAR Administrative Order No. 05, on which the Court of Appeals in part
anchored its ruling, is inconsistent with P.D. No. 27, as amended by LOI No. 474, insofar as it
removed the limitations to a landowner’s retention rights.
Natalia Realty, Inc. and Estate Developer and Investors Corp vs DAR
GR No 103302
August 12, 1993
Facts:
Natalia is the owner of 3 contiguous parcels of land with an area of 120.9793 hectares, 1.3205
hectares and 2.7080 hectares or a total of 125.0078 hectares, which are covered by TCT No.
31527. Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land as townsite areas
to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the
LungsodSilanganTownsite. The Natalia properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as
townsite reservation. Since private landowners were allowed to develop their properties into
low-cost housing subdivisions with the reservation, petitioner EDIC as developer of Natalia
applied for and was granted preliminary approval and location clearances by the Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission, which Natalia thereafter became Antipolo Hills
Subdivision.
On June 15 1988, Ra 6657 went to effect. Respondent issed a Notice of Coverage on the
undeveloped portions of Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia and EDIC immediately registered its
objection to the notice of coverage and requested the cancellation of the Notice of Coverage.
Natalia and EDIC both argued that the properties ceased to be agricultural lands when they
were included in the areas reserved by Presidential Proclamation for the townsite reservation.
DAR then contended that the permits granted were not valid and binding since they did not
comply with t he implementing Standards, Rules and Regulations of PD 957 (The Subdivision
and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), and that there was no valid conversion of the
properties.
Issue: Whether or not lands not classified for agricultural use, as approved by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board and its agencies prior to June 15, 1988 covered by RA 6657.
Ruling: No.
Sec. 4 of RA 6657 provides that CARL shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands. And agricultural lands is referred
to as land devoted to agricultural activity and not classified as mineral, forst, residential,
commercial or industrial land. Thus, the underdeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills
Subdivision cannot be considered as agricultural lands for this land was intended for residential
use. They ceased to be agricultural land by virtue of the Presidential Proclamation No. 1637.
DAR v Sutton
G.R. No. 162070
October 19, 2005
Facts:
The case at bar involves a parcel of land in Masbate, inherited by respondents. This property
was devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to then-
existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to
sell (VOS)the land to DAR in order to avail of certain incentives.
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, RA 6657, also known as the Comprehension Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, too effect, which included farms used for raising livestock, poultry,
and swine.
In the decision of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR(1990), the Supreme Court ruled that lands
devoted to livestock and poultry are not included in the definition of agricultural land, and the
provision for the same in the CARL was deemed unconstitutional.
Responders filed a request to withdraw their VOS, as their landholding was devoted exclusively
to cattle-raising, and thus, exempted from the coverage of CARL. They reiterated the same, but
was ignored by the DAR.
On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993 which provided that only portions
of private agricultural land used for raising livestock as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from
the coverage of CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the
following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal
shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure
for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.
Respondents subsequently wrote to the DAR Secretary and used the Luz Farms doctrine to
justify their exemption from CARL. DAR Secretary Garilao granted the application for
exemption, but imposed the retention limits outlined in A.O. No. 9, and ordered the rest of the
landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. Respondents moved
to reconsider, but such motion was denied.
Office of the President: The Office of the President affirmed the order of the DAR stating that
the A.O does not run counter to Luz Farms, and that it provided the guidelines to determine
whether or not a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising.
CA: The Court of Appeals reversed the DAR decision, stating that it was void for being contrary
to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Convention. It stated that the intention was to exclude
livestock farms from the land reform program of the government.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Issues: W/N A.O. No. 9 is constitutional in prescribing a maximum retention limit for owners
of land devoted to livestock raising.
Held: Yes, it is unconstitutional.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make
rules and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to
regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to them. However, while administrative rules
and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial review.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and
regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the
Constitution.
The rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority
given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the
administrative agency beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions
control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by administrative
agencies and the scope of their regulations.
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution.
The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian
reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia,
all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising.
Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by
the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the
assailed A.O.
Milestone Farms v. Office of the President
G.R. No. 182332
February 23, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Milestone Farms was duly incorporated with the SEC, and among its secondary
purposes are to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and other acts which
are incidental to the same.
Under the new agrarian reform law, RA 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL), the raising of livestock, poultry and swine was included under the ambit of
agricultural acts. However, the Supreme Court ruled subsequently in the case of Luz Farms v.
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, agricultural lands devoted to livestock,
poultry, and/or swine raising were excluded from the CARP.
Petitioner Milestone applied for the exemption of its property in Pinugay, Rizal from the
coverage of the CARL.
The DAR subsequently released A.O. No. 9 which set forth rules and regulations to govern the
exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP
coverage. The property applied for exemption was eventually exempted by DAR Regional
Director Dalugdug.
The Southern Pinugay Farmers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (Pinugay Farmers) represented by
one Balajadia moved for reconsideration, but was denied.
MCTC Rizal: Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and others, which
was granted. (Reversed in RTC, MCTC Decision reinstated in CA and became final and
executory.)
RA 6657 was eventually amended by RA 7881 wherein private agricultural lands devoted to
livestock, poultry, and swine raising were excluded from the coverage of the CARL.
DAR Secretary: Secretary Garilao exempted on 240.9776 hectares as exempted. 75.0646 was
not by applying the animal-and ratio of A.O. No. 9
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Office of the President: DAR Secretary’s decision was upheld.
CA: The Court of Appeals found that, based on the documentary evidence presented, the
property subject of the application for exclusion had more than satisfied the animal-land and
infrastructure-animal ratios under DAR A.O. No. 9.
However, six months earlier, without knowledge of the CA, DAR Secretary Villa issued a
Conversion Order which allowed a portion of the agricultural property into a residential lot
wherein Milestone developed the same as a leisure-residential-commercial estate known as
Palo Alto leisure and Spa Complex.
Several farms filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision on such grounds. The CA
amended the exemption of the subject landholding, and declared that 162.7373 hectares of
the agricultural portion was declared as covered by the CARP.
Motion for Reconsideration denied. Hence this petition.
Issues: W/N the CA erred when it held that lands devote to livestock farming within the
meaning of the Luz Farms and Sutton doctrines are subject to DAR’s continuing verification
as to use,, and on the basis of such verification, may be ordered reverted to agricultural
classification and compulsory acquisition.
Held: No, the CA did not err.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
According to the case of Sutton, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show
a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-
raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are
industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity.
The instant case does not rest on facts parallel to those of Sutton because, in Sutton, the subject
property remained a livestock farm. Petitioner’s admission that, since 2001, it leased another
ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its cause.
Finally, it is established that issues of Exclusion and/or Exemption are characterized as Agrarian
Law Implementation (ALI) cases which are well within the DAR Secretary’s competence and
jurisdiction, as provided for by Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board Rules of Procedure.
Thus, the Supreme Court cannot, without going against the law, arbitrarily strip the DAR
Secretary of his legal mandate to exercise jurisdiction and authority over all ALI cases. To
succumb to petitioner’s contention that when a land is declared exempt from the CARP on the
ground that it is not agricultural as of the time the CARL took effect, the use and disposition of
that land is entirely and forever beyond DARs jurisdiction is dangerous, suggestive of self-
regulation.
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) vs Department of Education, Culture, and Sports
(DECS)
G.R. No. 158228 / 426 SCRA 217
March 23, 2004
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- The late Esteban Jalandoni donated 2 parcels of land (Lot Nos. 2509 and 817-D, total
aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares), both located in Negros Occidental, to
respondent. Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in the name of DECS
under one TCT (No. 167175).
- On July 1985, respondent leased the same to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10
agricultural crop years, from crop year 1984-1985 to 1993-1994. The lease was
subsequently renewed to last up to crop year 2004-2005.
- On June 1993, Eugenio Alpar, along with several others, filed a petition for
Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of
Escalante. They claimed to be permanent and regular farm workers of the lands
leased by DECS.
- After investigation, officer Piosa sent a Notice of Coverage to respondent, stating
that the lands are now covered by CARP. The recommendation was approved by the
DAR Regional Director.
- Respondent sought exception from CARP coverage on the ground that all income
derived from its contract of lease were, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
educational purposes (repairs and renovations of nearby schools).
- Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that the lands subject hereof were not exempt
from CARP since they are not actually, directly, nor exclusively used as school sites
or campuses, and are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corp. To be exempt from
coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived, that must be actually,
directly, and exclusively used for educational purposes.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform: DAR Regional Director decision AFFIRMED.
- Respondent appealed the approval of the regional director to the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, who upheld the approval.
CA: DAR decision REVERSED.
Issue: Whether or not the properties are exempt from the coverage of R.A. No. 6657
(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998).
SC: DAR Secretary decision REINSTATED. CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
- The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as
possible.
o Sec. 4: The program shall over, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including
other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
o More specifically, the following lands are covered:
 All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of
forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress,
taking into account, ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific
limits of the public domain;
 All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits
as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;
 All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or
suitable for agriculture; and
 All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be
raised thereon.
o Sec. 3 defined ‘agricultural land’ as land devoted to agricultural activity
as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land.
o Sec. 10 enumerated which lands are exempted from the CARP,
subsection C of which states:
 Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be
necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses,
including experimental farm stations operated by public or
private schools for educational purposes, shall be exempt
from the coverage of this Act.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
o The words of the law are clear and unambiguous.
- Anent the issue of whether the farmers are qualified beneficiaries, the SC ruled that
they are, contrary to the CA decision saying that they were not.
o Sec. 15 – Registration of Beneficiaries: The DAR, in coordination with the
Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act,
shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are
qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential beneficiaries
shall provide the following data:
 Names and members of their immediate farm household;
 Owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the
length of tenurial relationship;
 Location and area of the land they work;
 Crops planted; and
 Their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages
received.
o In the case at bar, the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee certified
that they were.
- The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice
of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the
underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from
oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its benefit, it is the means towards a viable
livelihood and, ultimately, a decent life. The objective of the State is no less certain:
landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote
social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and
industrialization.
Republic of the Philippines (RP), represented by the Department of Agrarian Reform vs
COURT OF APPEALS (CA) and Green City Estate & Development Corporation
G.R. No. 139592 / 342 SCRA 189
October 05, 2000
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- Private respondent Green City Estate & Development Corp. owned 5 parcels of land,
with a combined area of 112.0577 hectares, located in the Municipality of Jala-Jala,
Rizal Province. It acquired these lands by purchase from one Marcela Borja vda. De
Torres. All were classified as agricultural lands.
- On June 16, 1994, petitioner DAR issued a Notice of Coverage over the same, under
compulsory acquisition pursuant to Chapter II, Sec. 7 of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), or CARL.
o It argued that the properties are not wholly agricultural, and that they lie
mostly within the residential and forest conservation zones of Jala-Jala.
- On July 21, 1994, private respondent filed an application for exemption with the
DAR Regional Office.
DAR Regional Office: Application recommended DENIED.
- It held that private respondent failed to substantiate their allegation that the lands
are part of the municipality’s residential and forest conservation zone, and that
portions of the properties are not irrigated nor irrigable.
o Private respondent submitted a Certification of the Municipal Planning
and Development Coordinator of the Office of the Mayor of Jala-Jala, as
well as a Certification from the National Irrigation Administration.
- Private respondent filed an Amended Petition for Exemption/Exclusion from CARP
Coverage, now alleging that the properties should be exempted since it is within the
residential and forest conservation zones. It submitted certifications from the
HLURB confirming such fact, and an undertaking that it is ready and willing to pay
disturbance compensation, if any.
- It also maintained that the lands had already been classified as agricultural, based
on tax declarations. It argued that lands, once determined by law, may not be varied
or altered by the results of a mere ocular or aerial inspection.
DAR Regional Office: Application STILL DENIED.
- It ruled that:
o The land use plan of Jala-Jala was different from its land use map;
o The certification from the HLURB was not definite and specific;
o The certification from the National Irrigation Authority was not
conclusive on the DAR.
CA: DAR decision REVERSED.
- The CA created a commission composed of 3 members, tasked to conduct an ocular
inspection and survey of the lands, and found in favor of private respondent.
Issue: Whether or not the lands are exempt from CARP.
SC: Petition DENIED.
- The CA was constrained to resort to an ocular inspection of said properties through
the commission it created, considering that the opinion of the DAR conflicted with
the land use map submitted by private respondent. The survey was the judicious
and equitable solution to finally resolve the issue of land classification and
delineation.
o DAR did not object to the creation of a team of commissioners.
o In the absence of any irregularity in the survey and inspection of the
properties, the report of the commissioners deserve full faith and credit,
and no reversible error was made by the CA in relying on such report.
- The commissioners’ report confirmed the fact that the properties were not wholly
agricultural.
o The land apparently consisted of:
 A mountainous area, with an average 28° slope containing
66.5 hectares.
 A level, unirrigated area of 34 hectares, of which 5-6 hectares
are planted to palay.
 A residential area of 8 hectares.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
o Under Sec. 10 of R.A. 6657, all lands with 18% slope or over, except those
already developed, shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.
 The fact that 66.5 hectares had an average slope of 28° slope
makes a clear case that the lands should be exempt.
- There is no law nor jurisprudence that holds that the land classification in the tax
declarations is conclusive and final, nor would proscribe any further inquiry.
o Tax declarations are clearly not the sole basis of the classification of the
land.
o In this case, the ocular inspection conducted by the commission created
by the CA was given more weight than what was stated in the tax
declarations.
G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and HON.
BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines
Sur, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and
EFREN SAN JOAQUIN, respondents.
In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 20551
entitled "Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et al.," this Court is asked to
decide whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to
the prior approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the
agrarian reform program.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur passed
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or
expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm
for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial
government employees.
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon. Luis
R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and
Efren N. San Joaquin.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of the price
offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the
property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount
provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may suffer
in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution No.
129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the
complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i)
denying the motion to dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession
of the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying
the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order
be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to
issue a writ of injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority to
initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P.
Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General stated
that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the
approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
right of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province
of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the
plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power of eminent
domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A.
No. 6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-
agricultural land.
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the
Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform
of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
Issue: Whether or not the power of eminent domain can be curtailed by CARL
Ruling: NO.
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can
exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US
439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the
legislature may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by
the local governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684).
While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits.
Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed,
either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units must first
secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation
proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which
expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the
control of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened
or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS
2d. 241).
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Otilia STA. ANA vs Spouses Leon and Aurora CARPO
G.R. No. 164340 / 572 SCRA 463
November 28, 2008
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- Respondent Leon and his brother are registered co-owners of a parcel of land
located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna (Santa Rosa Estate Subdivision), with an area of 91.337k
sq. meters.
- 3.5 hectares of the aforementioned land was pertained to Leon and his wife, co-
respondent Aurora, and was devoted to rice and corn production. It was tenanted
by one Domingo Pastolero, husband of Adoracion.
- When Domingo passed, his wife and son, Eplidio, assumed tenancy rights.
- On December 29, 1983, Adoracion executed a notarized Pinanumpang Salaysay,
with Leon’s conformity and for a consideration of P72.5k, wherein Adoracion
transferred to herein petitioner Otillia her tenancy rights. Petitioner (together with
her husband, Marciano) became the new tenant of the land.
- After some time, and when the tenancy relationship between respondents and
petitioner went sour, respondents filed a complaint for ejectment due to non-
payment of lease rentals, where they alleged that:
o It was agreed upon that existing rentals would be increased from 36 to
45 cavans.
o If respondents wanted to reposses the property, they had to pay back
the petitioner P72.5k.
o Despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to pay actual rentals from
July 1985 to September 1989.
o The land had been declared suitable for commercial and industrial
purposes, as per Zoning Ordinance of 1981 of the Municipality of Sta.
Rosa.
- Petitioners, in their answer, argued that:
o The existing rental was fixed at 36 cavans of palay, once or twice a year,
depending on availability of irrigation water.
o There was no agreement as to the future surrender of land in favor of
respondents.
o They sent verbal and written notices to respondents, advising them to
accept rental payments.
o When respondents refused to accept rental payments, they were
compelled to sell the harvest and deposit the proceeds thereof to
Universal Savings Bank, in the name of respondents.
o They are farmer-beneficiaries of the land pursuant to P.D. 27, and
wanted the courts to declare Marciano as full owner of the same.
PARAD: Ruling in favor of RESPONDENTS.
- Petitioners deliberately defaulted in the payment of their rentals, when PARAD
found an account under petitioner’s and her husband’s names with Republic
Planters Bank, in which the rentals were deposited.
- It was only during the hearing that the amount of P40k was deposited with Universal
Savings Bank for unpaid rentals.
DARAB: PARAD decision SET ASIDE.
- For a valid ouster of a farmer-tenant, the willful and deliberate intent not to pay
lease rentals must be present and/or ascertained.
- DARAB concluded that it petitioners cannot have deliberately failed nor refused to
pay their lease rentals when respondents “turned a deaf ear” to the notices sent to
them.
CA: PARAD decision AFFIRMED.
- Petitioner’s failure to pay was tainted with bad faith and deliberate intent. Hence,
they did not legally comply with their duties as tenants.
- Subject land was not covered by P.D. 27, R.A. No. 6657, and E.O. No. 228, since the
same land had become a residential, commercial, and industrial land.
o The vicinity map of the land shows that it is almost beside Nissan Motors
Technopark, and surrounded by the South Expressway, and several other
companies such as Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., and Toyota
Motors.
o As such, it became exempt from the aforementioned statutes.
ISSUES:
- Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the subject land had already become
residential, commercial, and/or industrial, and thus excluded from coverage of
agrarian reform laws.
- Whether or not petitioner, as agricultural tenant, failed to pay her lease rentals
on time.
o Her husband died during the pendency of the case.
SC: CA decision REVERSED. DARAB decision REINSTATED.
- The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes courts from resolving a controversy
over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged in an administrative body of special
competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the DAR, specifically
the DARAB and PARAD. Issues of retention and non-coverage of a land under
agrarian reform, are within the domain of the DAR Secretary, since they are Agrarian
Law Implementation (ALI) cases.
o Initially, the case was filed over the issue of non-payment of lease
rentals, which is an agrarian dispute cognizable by the PARAD and
DARAB.
o However, it was wrong for the DARAB to decide on the issue of retention
and non-coverage of land, an issue which it had no jurisdiction over.
o The CA also prematurely ruled on the same issue, since the DARAB and
PARAD had no jurisdiction to rule upon it.
o The SC refrained from ruling on the same issue.
- The burden of proof to show existence of a lawful cause for ejectment of an
agricultural lessee rests upon respondents as agricultural lessors.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
o Petitioners FAILED to discharge such burden. The agricultural tenant’s
failure to pay lease rentals was not proven to be willful and deliberate.
o Mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholder’s share does not
necessarily give the lessor a right to eject the lessee when there is lack
of deliberate intent on the part of the tenant-lessee to pay.
o Deliberate – characterized by, or results from slow, careful, thorough
calculation and consideration of effects and consequences.
o Willful – one governed by will without yielding to reason or without
regard to reason.
o The DARAB was correct in ruling that it was not the fault of petitioner,
and that there was good faith upon petitioners when respondents
refused to accept payment.
 Marciano wrote Leon two letters informing him of the
availability of lease rentals.
 DAR intervention and mediation was sought by Marciano, but
respondents failed to attend.
Ferdinand and Renato DELA CRUZ vs Amelia QUIAZON
G.R. No. 171961 / 572 SCRA 681
November 28, 2008
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- The mother of respondent, Estela, was the registered owner of a parcel of land
situated in Sto. Domingo II, Capas, Tarlac.
- Said property was brought under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant
to P.D. No. 27. Tenant-farmer Feliciano dela Cruz was issued a CLT over a 3.72-
hectare portion of the property.
- On March 1992, the heirs of Estela, including respondent, soon executed a Deed of
Executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Admission and Partition with Waiver, adjudicating
among themselves all properties left by both of their parents, except the subject
aforementioned property, which was adjudicated solely in favor of respondent.
- Respondent then filed a complaint with the Provincial Adjudication Board of the
DAR, against petitioner Ferdinand, alleging that:
o Ferdinand entered into a leasehold contract with respondent, wherein
he bound himself to deliver 28 cavans of palay as rental.
o Petitioner failed to deliver the same since he already abandoned the
landholding when he already migrated to the USA.
- Respondent amended the complaint to implead Renato, and further alleged that:
o Petitioners were already immigrants to the USA, and that Renato, the
actual tiller of the land, was a usurper since his possession was without
the consent of the landowner.
- In his Answer, petitioner alleged that:
o The execution of the leasehold contract was erroneous considering that
a CLT had already been issued in favor of his father, Feliciano.
o By virtue of the same, they became owners of the landholding, without
obligation to pay rentals to respondent, but only to pay amortizations to
Land Bank.
o They had already paid rentals until 1992, which should be considered as
advance payments for the land.
- After the case was filed, petitioners began paying amortizations to the Land Bank of
the Philippines.
DAR Provincial Adjudication Board: Complaint DISMISSED.
- Provincial Adjudicator Bello dismissed the complaint based on his finding that the
landholding had not been abandoned, considering that Renato, a member of
Feliciano’s immediate family, was in actual and physical possession thereof
- He also directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office to determine whether
amortizations had been fully paid and, if so, to issue an Emancipation Patent.
- During appeal, respondent executed a Deed of Conveyance and Waive of her rights
over the subject property in favor of her siblings.
- Unknown to petitioners, respondent and her siblings filed an Application of
Retention before the DAR Regional Office. Said application was granted, where it
was ordered that:
o The land was to be divided among the heirs.
o The leaseholders (petitioners) maintain a peaceful landholding of the
property.
o The landowners-applicant (heirs of Estela) cause segregation of the
retained area.
- The heirs of Feliciano prayed for the setting aside of said order. Said ‘appeal’ was
dismissed by DAR Secretary Garliao.
DARAB: Respondent’s appeal DISMISSED (1st decision).
- Respondent then filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment, claiming that she just
arrived from the USA, and that she found out about the DARAB decision late.
DARAB: Petition for Relief from Judgment GRANTED. Previous decision REVERSED (2nd
decision).
- This time, the DARAB found for respondent, finding that petitioners indeed had
abandoned the subject landholding.
CA: Petitioner’s appeal DENIED.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners had abandoned the landholding.
- Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the DARAB decision.
o Petitioners assert that they have not abandoned the landholding since
Renato still cultivated the land.
SC: CA decision REVERSED. DARAB’s 1st decision REINSTATED.
- Abandonment requires:
o A clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim, or to desert
a right or property.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
o An external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect.
 The intention to abandon implies a departure, with the
avowed intent of never returning, resuming, or claiming the
rights and the interests that have been abandoned.
- Petitioners did not abandon the subject landholding, as in fact they have
continuously cultivated the property.
o The immigration of the original farmer-beneficiary did not necessarily
result in the abandonment of the landholding, considering that one of
his sons (namely Renato) continued cultivating the land.
o Personal cultivation, as required by law, includes the cultivation of the
land by the tenant himself, or with the aid of the immediate farm
household, which refers to members of the family of the tenant, and
other persons dependent upon him for support, and who usually help
him in the agricultural activities.
- The DARAB erred in a number of events.
o It erred in granting the petition for relief from judgment when
respondent was negligent in filing her motion for reconsideration or
appeal to the CA.
o She cannot claim that she was belatedly informed of the 1st DARAB
decision when a helper handed her the same.
Quismundo vs CA
FACTS:
 On feb 19, 1988, felicisimo ocampo, catalino ocampo, pedro marquez, romeo
enriquez and herminio yuson, tenatnts of nina quismuno filed a complaint with the
trail court praying that their relationship with petitioner be changed from share
tenancy to a leasehold system, pursuant to section 4 of republic act no. 3844, their
request therefore having been denied by Quismundo.
 On March 2, 1988 ocampo, et. Al filed a motion for the issuance of an order
authorizing the supervision of the deputy sheriff of the court of the harvesting and
liquidation of the 19871988 sugarcane crops, motion was granted by the trial court
in an order dated March 3, 1988.
 On March 16, 1988, Quismundo filed a Motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
cause of action, trial couyrt denied the motion.
 On june 1988, Quismundo filed an MR invoking that the court lack jurisdiction over
the case.
 On November 9, 1988, While the MR is pending, ocampo then filed another motion
for the suspension of hervesting.
 On December 6,1988, Trial court granted the motion of ocampo and denied the MR
of Quismundo.
 Quismundo raised the case to CA , CA upheld the TC’s decision which stated,
“The right of the private respondents to choose leasehold tenancy is
governed by RA 3844. We find nothing in Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229 and
RA 6657 divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over the case. To be sure, RA 6657
was enacted on June 10, 1988 or later than the filing of the Complaint in AGRA Case
No. 5174 on February 13, 1988. On the other hand, sec. 27 of E.O. 229 approved on
July 22, 1987 provides that "... the provisions of RA 3844 and other agrarian laws
not inconsistent with this order shall have suppletory effect." We see no
inconsistency between RA 3844 and E.O. No. 229 with respect to the jurisdiction of
the trial court over the cause of action of the private respondent who desires to
adopt a leasehold system pursuant to RA 3844. E.O. No. 229 vests quasi-judicial
powers on the DAR to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" subject
of Proclamation No. 229.8 We hold that the right of private respondents to adopt a
leasehold system under RA 3844 is distinct and separate and not affected by the
enactment of E.O. No. 229 and, hence, may be enforced pursuant to the judicial
mechanism provided for by RA 3844.
 Quismundo’s contention is that the RTC of Angeles City has no jurisdiction to try the
said case considering that the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate agrarian cases has
already been vested to the Dept of Agrarian by EO 229.
ISSUE: W/N RTC has jurisdiction to try the said case.
RULING:
 SC found Quismundo’s petition justifiable
 SC granted petition and reversed CA’s decision
 SC also declared the lower court’s decisions dated March 3, 1988, June 2, 1988 and
December 6, 1988 as Null and Void
1) Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the mechanism for the implementation
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program instituted by Proclamation No. 131,
dated July 22, 1987, vests in the Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial
powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters. The pertinent
provision of said executive order reads as follows:
SECTION 17. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby
vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters, and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the
Department of Agriculture (DA).
The DAR shall have powers to punish for contempt and to issue
subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its order or
decisions.
The decisions of the DAR may, in proper cases, be appealed to the
Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately executory
notwithstanding such appeal.
 SC ruled that the above quoted provision should be deemed repealed.
 Upon the enactment of EO 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987, the RTC are
removed of the jurisdiction to try agrarian cases, said jurisdiction is now bestowed
to the DAR.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Rufinda vda de Tangub vs CA
FACTS:
 Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres (deceased), filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Lanao del Norte in March, 1988, "an agrarian case for damages by reason
of the unlawful dispossession, they were tenants from the landholding owned by
the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil, they also included PNB by alleging that
the bank, holder of the mortgage of the land involved, has caused the foreclosure
of the property resulting to the acquisition of the bank as the highest bidder at the
foreclosure sale
 Tangub prayed that the mortgage and transactions made in relation to such be
annulled and voided
 Complaint was dismissed in the Order dated August 24, 1988
 Tangub spouses filed a petition for certiorati with the SC, SC found no special and
important reason to take congnizaznce of the action, SC referred the case to CA
 CA dismissed petition finding that the jurisdictional question had been correctly
resolved by the trial court by ruling that agrarian cases are no longer heard by the
RTC’s by rather by DAR adjudication board, ruling was based on EO229.
 Rufina once again contended with the SC the trial court’s order of dismissal dated
August 26, 1988 and the decision of the CA are patently illegal and unconstitutional.
Issue: W/N RTC has jurisdiction to hear and try agrarian cases.
Ruling:
 SC dismissed petition for lack of merit and affirmed CA decision.
DAR VS CUENA III.
Private respondent Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in La Carlota City
and devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane. Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) of La Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent
Cuenca placing the above-described landholding under the compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657.
The notice also stated that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) will determine the value of
the subject land pursuant to E.O No. 405. Private respondent Cuenca filed with the RTC for
Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405.
He alleged that the implementation of CARP in his landholding is no longer with authority of
law considering that, if at all, the implementation should have commenced and should have
been completed between June 1988 to June 1992; that EO No. 405 amends, modifies and/or
repeals CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional considering that then President C.Aquino no
longer had law-making powers; that the NOTICE OF COVERAGE is a gross violation of PD 399.
Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null and void ab initio. The respondent
Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunados motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from
implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the determination of
the value of the subject land. The DAR thereafter filed before the CA a petition for certiorari
assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of Coverage, but
was mainly the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the CA ruled that the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the case. Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also
had the power to issue writs and processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties.
Issue: Whether the complaint filed by the private respondent is an agrarian reform and
within the jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court
Ruling: Yes.
A careful perusal of respondent’s Complaint shows that the principal averments and reliefs
prayed for refer -- not to the "pure question of law" spawned by the alleged unconstitutionality
of EO 405 -- but to the annulment of the DAR’s Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the main thrust of
the allegations is the propriety of the Notice of Coverage, as may be gleaned from the following
averments. We stress that the main subject matter raised by private respondent before the
trial court was not the issue of compensation (the subject matter of EO 40527). Note that no
amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the DAR. Hence, there was no occasion to
invoke the court’s function of determining just compensation.
To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage29 constitutes the first necessary step towards
the acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly then, the propriety of the Notice relates
to the implementation of the CARP, which is under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR.
Thus, the DAR could not be ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of appending
an allegedly constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.
UALAT VS JUDGE RAMOS
In this case, complainant Sabio claims that he is an agricultural lessee of an agricultural land.
Complainant Ualat, on the other hand, alleges that he is Sabios caretaker. It appears from 2
complaints Sabio filed with the DARAB a complaint for Recovery of Possession against the
landowner and Raymundo Sabio, brother of complainant Sabio.
On August 30, 1990, the landowner filed against herein complainants a case for Illegal Detainer
with respondents sala. the DARAB ruled in favor of complainant Sabio declaring that the right
of the complainant as the tenant-tiller to peaceful possession and cultivation should not be
disturbed. On November 5, 1990, however, respondent Judge rendered a decision[4] in favor of
the landowner ordering the complainants, among others, to vacate the property.
Complainants now contend that, notwithstanding knowledge of the DAR resolution, and the
fact that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR, respondent Judge, using his
power and authority, took cognizance of the case because of personal interest and motive.
They claim that during the pendency of the case, respondent Judge, thru his son and brother,
cultivated a portion of the land subject matter of the case.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Complainant Ualat, on the other hand, alleges that as the result of the unjust decision, his
residential house which is not the subject of the lease was levied upon by the sheriff, and
argued that as mere caretaker, he could not be held jointly and severally liable to pay the
obligations of Quirino Sabio as agricultural tenant.
Respondent judge denied the allegations and stated in his comments that he was without
knowledge or information about the complaint with the DAR, nor was he made aware of
the DAR resolution because nothing of this sort was stated by the parties in their pleadings, nor
were these brought out during the proceedings. Thus, on the basis of the evidence presented,
he ruled that the relationship between the landowner and herein complainants is that of civil
lease.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
Knowledge of existing agrarian legislation and prevailing jurisprudence on the subject, together
with an ordinary degree of prudence, would have prompted respondent Judge to refer the case
to the DAR for preliminary determination of the parties relationship, as required by law.
As can be readily seen from the answer filed by complainants Sabio and Ualat in the civil case,
they alleged the existence of an agrarian tenancy relationship between themselves and the
landowner. Additionally, in the proceedings before respondent judge, complainants were even
represented by a lawyer from the DAR. These matters should have been sufficient to put
respondent Judge on notice that complainants were claiming protection under our agrarian
laws. At that point, he ought to have realized that there existed a genuine issue involving
agricultural tenancy among the parties with respect to the subject property. At the very least,
as suggested by the Investigating Judge, respondent could have himself conducted a
clarificatory hearing to determine such relationship.
However, DARAB has no jurisdiction with respect to agrarian matters involving the prosecution
of all criminal offenses under RA 6657 and the determination of just compensation for
landowners (Rep. Act No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 57). Jurisdiction over said matters are lodged with
the Special Agrarian Courts (SACs). The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court maintain their
appellate jurisdiction over agrarian cases decided by DARAB. (Vda. de Tangub vs. Ca, 191 SCRA
885 (1990).
Napoleon Magno v Gonzalo Francisco and Regina Vda de Lazaro G.R. No. 168959 March 25
2010
Facts:
Petitioner is the owner of a 5.3hectare lot which is a portion of an agricultural land identified
as Lot No. 593 situated in Nueva Ecija. Petitioners lot is part of the 13 parcels of land registered
in the name of petitioner's mother, Maria Talens (Talens). Talens landholding totals 61
hectares, more or less.
Petitioner acquired the lot through a Deed of Sale executed by Talens on 28 July 1972 but the
sale was only registered on 3 September 1986 At the time of the sale, Gonzalo Francisco and
Manuel Lazaro tenanted the land and their separate areas of tillage were 2.8 and 2.5 hectares,
respectively. Petitioner entered into a written contract of agricultural leasehold with Manuel
Lazaro on 5 October 1972 and with Gonzalo Francisco on 7 August 1980. In the leasehold
contract, Manuel Lazaro was obliged to pay a lease rental of 35 cavans during the regular
season, and 20 cavans during dayatan cropping season. Gonzalo Francisco, on the other hand,
was required to pay a lease rental of 35 cavans during the regular season and 25 cavans during
the cropping season. Gonzalo Francisco and Manuel Lazaro (who was succeeded by his
surviving spouse Regina Vda. De Lazaro upon his death) complied with the conditions of the
agricultural leasehold until the regular season of April 1991 when they stopped paying rentals
despite petitioners repeated demands.
Respondents believed that they have fully paid the price of the lot under the Barangay
Committee on Land Productions (BCLP) valuation. On 10 January 1990, Gonzalo Francisco was
issued Emancipation Patent (EP) No. 416156 covering an area of 27,284 square meters. On the
same date, Manuel Lazaro was also issued EP No. 416157 covering an area of 25,803 square
meters.
On 19 May 1993, petitioner filed with PARAD of Cabanatuan City a complaint for ejectment and
collection of lease rentals against respondents. At the time of filing of the complaint,
respondent Francisco and respondent Lazaro were already in arrears of 155 cavans and 145
cavans, respectively. Ruling of DARAB: DARAB rendered a decision declaring the Deed of
Absolute Sale between petitioner and Talens as binding upon the respondents. The DARAB also
declared that the agricultural leasehold relationship between petitioner and respondents still
subsists. The DARAB ordered respondents to pay the lease rentals from April 1991 until the
proper reinstatement of the lease contracts.
Issue: Whether unregistered EPs issued to agricultural lessees which appear to be irregular
on their face can defeat the landowners rights to agricultural leasehold rentals.
Held: No.
In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Abdulwahid, the Court, quoting Centeno v. Centeno, held:
The DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation
of the agrarian reform program. The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction "to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under RA No.
6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. No. 3844 as amended by R.A. No. 6389, P.D. No. 27
and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations." Agrarian dispute as
defined in Section 3(d) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 refers "to any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee." It is undisputed that petitioner and respondents
have an established tenancy relationship, such that the complaint for collection of back rentals
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
and ejectment is classified as an agrarian dispute and under the jurisdiction of the PARAD and
thereafter by the DARAB. However, in view of the conflicting claims where petitioner asserted
ownership over the lot and respondents emphasized that the lot is subject to OLT coverage,
there is a need to ascertain if the lot is under the agrarian reform program. Since the
classification and identification of landholdings for coverage under the agrarian reform
program are Agrarian Law Implementation cases, the DAR Secretary should first resolve this
issue. Verily, there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents
in this case. An action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease rentals is clearly an agrarian
dispute, cognizable at the initial stage by the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB. But issues
with respect to the retention rights of the respondents as landowners and the
exclusion/exemption of the subject land from the coverage of agrarian reform are issues not
cognizable by the PARAD and the DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, as
aforementioned, the same are Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases. Therefore, the PARAD
of Cabanatuan City had no authority to render a decision declaring the lot under OLT coverage.
In fact, when the case was appealed, the DARAB acknowledged that it had no jurisdiction on
the OLT coverage. In an Order dated 10 October 2002, the DARAB suspended the case
proceedings until the submission of the result of the administrative determination of the lot
and thus submitted the entire records to the DAR Secretary. Respondents themselves admitted
in their Memorandum that the DAR has not submitted the result of its administrative
determination of the lot to the DARAB. It is therefore essential that the DAR Secretary should
first resolve the issue on the lots inclusion or exclusion from OLT coverage before a final
determination of this case can be had. Proof necessary for the resolution of the issues on OLT
coverage and petitioners right of retention should be introduced in the proper forum. The
Office of the DAR Secretary is in a better position to resolve these issues being the agency
lodged with such authority since it has the necessary expertise on the matter.
Jaime P. Corpin v Amor S. Vivar GR No. 137350 June 19, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Tabang, Bulacan covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-299732 issued by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Private
respondent Amor S. Vivar is in possession of said parcel of land. On March 16, 1996, petitioner
filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan a complaint for ejectment against
private respondent.
The latter refused to vacate the said lot, claiming that he is a tenant of petitioner. In his Answer
with Motion to Dismiss, private respondent averred that the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case since it involved a landlord-tenant relationship. Hence, the same
should have been filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform instead. However, since the
Answer was filed out of time, the municipal trial court issued an Order, dated October 17, 1996
declaring that the case was deemed submitted for judgment as may be warranted by the
allegations in the complaint.
Decision of MTC: Municipal Trial Court rendered a Decision ordering private respondent to
vacate the land in dispute.
Decision of the RTC: The Regional Trial Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, rendered its Decision
reversing the judgment of the municipal trial court and dismissing petitioner's complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.
Ruling of the CA: The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition
for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the MTC should gave disregarded respondent's answer for having been
filed out of time.
Held: We find that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the municipal trial court
should not have disregarded private respondents Answer but should have proceeded to
determine whether or not it had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case: It was error
for the municipal trial court to disregard the answer of respondent on the sole premise that it
was belatedly filed. The answer raised the issue of jurisdiction which the court could not just
gloss over because, if, after hearing, it turned out that it really did not have jurisdiction over
the case because it involved an agrarian dispute, then its decision excluding and ejecting
respondent from the premises would have been a complete nullity. In the case of Bayog vs.
Natino which the appellate court cited, we held that the metropolitan circuit trial court, which
dismissed defendants Answer for having been filed out of time and decided the case based on
the allegations in the complaint, should not have disregarded defendants Answer and should
have heard and received the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it had
jurisdiction over the case. The Bayog case also involved a complaint for ejectment. Defendant
therein filed his Answer beyond the reglementary period, but alleged in said pleading that the
metropolitan circuit trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because
the lot in question involved an agricultural lot owned by plaintiff and tenanted by defendant.
Defendant therein attached to his Answer the Agricultural Leasehold Contract between him
and plaintiff and the Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold issued in his favor. This Court
considered said documents as sufficient to show the municipal circuit trial courts lack of
jurisdiction over the case. In the case at bar, however, we do not find the documents submitted
by the parties as sufficient to have enabled the Regional Trial Court to thoroughly resolve the
issue of whether or not the municipal trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case. The Court notes that the following documents attached by private respondent to
the memoranda which he submitted to the Regional Trial Court were not even submitted to
the municipal trial court: (1) Letter dated March 25, 1995 written by the Junior Statistician of
the Department of Agrarian Reform in Guiguinto and Balagtas, Bulacan addressed to the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Balagtas, Bulacan;(2) Patunay dated March 24, 1997
issued The BARC Chairman of Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan; (3) Certification dated June 07, 1994
issued by the Barangay Chairman of Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan; and (4) Certification dated
February 23, 1995 issued by the Barangay Chairman of Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan. The
Regional Trial Court should not have considered the aforementioned in rendering its Decision
since said documents were only presented before it on appeal, and were not previously filed
with the municipal trial court in the original case. What were presented to the municipal trial
court were limited to the following: (1) Pagtitibay dated February 21, 1996 signed by Angel
Torres, Chairman of the BARC of Tabang; (2) Affidavit of Dr. Teodoro Placido dated April 22,
1996; (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ambrosio T. Mendoza dated April 22, 1996;and (4)
Sinumpaang Salaysay of private respondent dated April 22, 1996. Considering the foregoing, it
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing whereby both parties may present evidence
which may shed light on the issue of the municipal trial courts jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Courts finding that there exists a landlord-tenant relationship
between petitioner and respondent, which was based on the documents attached by private
respondent to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court but not presented to the municipal
trial court, must be set aside due to insufficiency of evidence.
HEIRS OF HERMAN REY SANTOS. OF SANTOS V. CA
G.R. No. 109992. March 7, 2000
Facts:
Herman Rey Santos, who is now substituted by his heirs, obtained the subject land thru a public
auction. Santos then registered the deed of sale in the register of deeds, after Garcia failed to
exercise his right of redemption.
Private respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an application for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing private respondent from
gathering the mango fruits. DARAB granted the petition.
Private respondent filed a Petition for Consignation before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan,
in an apparent attempt to redeem his land. This petition was dismissed.
Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992 a motion to intervene[5] with the
DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and interests
private respondent filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and Document,
Redemption with Damages and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos.
Adjudication Board suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio’s motion for intervention.
Intervenor Pantaleon Antonio filed with the DARAB a Motion to Withdraw Intervenor’s
deposited share.[8] The motion was granted and intervenor Pantaleon Antonio was allowed to
withdraw harvest proceeds. DARAB then recognized Pantaleon Antonio as the duly constituted
agricultural tenant of the subject land.
As appealed, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Orders of DARAB. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N PARAD has jurisdiction over the matters raised by the intervenor.
Held: No, PARAD has no jurisdiction.
Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:
- Section 1.Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or
incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. (Italics supplied)
"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP Law), as:
- (d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,
whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
- It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this
Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. Tenancy relationship is needed for DARAB
to have jurisdiction over the case.
- Court held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to
the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform; b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and c)
approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural
uses.
Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform
laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the controversy.
DEL MONTE PHILIPPINES INC. EMPLOYEES AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES COOPERATIVE
(DEARBC). Petitioner vs. JESUS SANGUNAY and SONNY LABUNOS, respondents
G.R. No. 180013 January 31, 2011
Doctrine: Under Sec. 50 of RA 6657, DARAB is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform maters and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matter
involving implementation of CARP. Hence, at first instance, only DARAB can determine and
adjudicate agrarian disputes.
Facts:
1. A 2M sq. m. landholding, covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award, was
awarded to petitioner DEARBC, an agrarian cooperative and beneficiary under the
CARP.
2. DEARBC claimed that:
a. Respondent Sangunay illegally entered a portion of its property called
“Field 34” and utilized a portion of 1.5 hectares of such property wherein
he planted corn, built a house and resided in such from 1986 to present.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
b. Respondent Labunos also illegally entered same portion and tilled 8
hectares wherein he planted trees, gmelina, mahogany andother crops
as a source of his livelihood.
c. Both respondents failed to return the lands despite demand and such
illegal occupation resulted in deprivation of use of land and damages.
3. DEARBC filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Specific Performance
with Damages with DARAB Region Office against several people, among them were
respondents.
4. The Adjudicator ruled in favor of DEARBC on the ground that respondents failed to
prove ownership of such portions of the landholding.
5. Respondents elevated the case to DARAB Central Office. They argued that:
a. Sangunay’s and Labunos’ position:
i. Land was an accrual deposit he inherited from his father in
which he had been in open, public, adverse, actual, physical
and continuous possession of land as an owner.
ii. He cultivated such land with the knowledge of DEARBC. He
presented Tax Declaration and Real Property Historical
Ownership issued by Municipal Assessor, showing that he
declared property for taxation even before DEARBC acquired
it.
iii. He was a qualified farmer-beneficiary entitling him to security
and tenure under CARP
6. DARAB dismissed DEARBC’s case for lack of jurisdiction as such issue of ownership
of subject land is a regular case which falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts
and not as an agrarian dispute.
a. The dispute does not relate to any tenurial agreement.
7. DEARBC appealed to the CA. CA dismissed the petition for procedural infirmities in
it verification, certification and attachments.
8. Hence, this petition.
9. DEARBC claims that DARAB has jurisdiction because it partakes of a boundary
dispute or an ouster of an intruder found under DARAB Rules of Procedure and AO
03.
10. Respondents argue that jurisdiction of DARAB is limited to agrarian disputes and
implementation of CARP. Issues of possession may be dealt with by DARAB only
when they relate to agrarian disputes.
Issue: W/N DARAB has jurisdiction over the case of DEARBC
Held: No! DARAB does not have jurisdiction.
1. Jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial office or government agency, is
determined by allegations and relief prayed for.
2. Under Sec. 50 of RA 6657, DARAB is vested with primary jurisdiction to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform maters and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
matter involving implementation of CARP.
3. Hence, at first instance, only DARAB can determine and adjudicate agrarian
disputes.
4. According to RA 6657, “agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise,
over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this
Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to
farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.”
5. Clearly, no agrarian dispute exists as DEARBC only prays for ejectment and does not
involve tenurial agreements. Both parties werecontending for the ownership of
parcels of land.
6. The ruling of DAR v Abdulwahidis inapplicable as the dispute involved in such case
was the “terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landlord to agra
beneficiaries.
7. DEARBC’s complaint lacks allegations to persuade Court in considering it as an
agrarian dispute.
PETITION IS DENIED.
G.R. No. 176838 June 13, 2013
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by Fritzi C. Pantoja, in her capacity as
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer, DAR-Laguna, Petitioner, vs. PARAMOUNT HOLDINGS
EQUITIES, INC., JIMMY CHUA, ROJAS CHUA, BENJAMIN SIM, SANTOS C. TAN, WILLIAM C. LEE
and STEWART C. LIM, Respondents.
Facts: The case stems from the petition4 docketed as DARAB Case No. R 0403-0009-02, filed
with the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) by the DAR through Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer (PARO) Felixberto Q. Kagahastian. The petition sought to nullify the sale to the
respondents of several parcels of land.
The PARO argued that the properties were agricultural land yet their sale was effected without
DAR Clearance as required under Republic Act No. 6657 (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
The respondents opposed the petition, contending that since the matter involves an
administrative implementation of R.A. No. 6657, the case is cognizable by the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, not the DARAB.
Issue: The main issue for the Court’s resolution is: Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction
over the dispute that seeks the nullification of the subject properties’ sale.
Ruling: The Court answers in the negative.
The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited under the law, as it was created under Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 129-A specifically to assume powers and functions with respect to the adjudication
of agrarian reform cases under E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.22 Significantly, it was
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
organized under the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The limitation on the authority
of it to mere agrarian reform matters is only consistent with the extent of DAR’s quasi-judicial
powers under R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 229, which read:
SECTION 50 [of R.A. No. 6657]. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.—The DAR is hereby vested
with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian
reform except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
SECTION 17 [of E.O. No. 229]. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR.—The DAR is hereby vested
with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, and shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform,
except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department
of Agriculture (DA).
It is understood that the aforementioned cases, complaints or petitions were filed with the
DARAB after August 29, 1987.
Matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of Republic Act No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988 and other
agrarian laws as enunciated by pertinent rules shall be the exclusive prerogative of and
cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR.
Consistent with the aforequoted legal provisions, we emphasized in Heirs of Candido Del
Rosario v. Del Rosario23 that the jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited to
cases involving agrarian disputes, including incidents arising from the implementation of
agrarian laws. Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute in this manner:
(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under
R.A. 6657 and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand
in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor
and lessee.
Specifically, the PARO’s petition failed to sufficiently allege any tenurial or agrarian relations
that affect the subject parcels of land. Although it mentioned a pending petition for coverage
filed with DAR by supposed farmers-tillers, there was neither such claim as a fact from DAR,
nor a categorical statement or allegation as to a determined tenancy relationship by the PARO
or the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.
G.R. No. 123417. June 10, 1999
JAIME MORTA, SR. and PURIFICACION PADILLA, petitioners, vs. JAIME OCCIDENTAL, ATTY.
MARIANO BARANDA, JR., and DANIEL CORRAL, respondents.
Facts: On January 10 and 21, 1994, [3] petitioners Jaime Morta, Sr. and Purificacion Padilla filed
two (2) cases [4] for damages with preliminary injunction, with the Municipal Trial Court,
Guinobatan, Albay, against respondents Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr. and
Daniel Corral, which were consolidated pursuant to Rule 31 of the Revised Rules of Court. In
the complaints, petitioners alleged that respondents through the instigation of Atty. Baranda,
gathered pilinuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their respective land, delivered the
produce to Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr., and destroyed their banana and pineapple plants. In
Civil Case No. 481, petitioners claimed damages amounting to P8,930.00, plus costs of suit; in
Civil Case No. 482, petitioners claimed P9,950.00, as damages. The court considered the cases
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure and ordered respondents to file their answer.
In their answer, respondents claimed that petitioners were not the owners of the land in
question. They alleged that the torrens titles of the land indicated a certain Gil Opiana as the
registered owner. Gil Opiana was the father of Josefina Opiana-Baraclan who inherited the lots
upon the former's death. Respondent Jaime Occidental contended that he was a bona fide
tenant of Josefina Opiana-Baraclan. Respondents stated that there was no annotation on the
titles establishing petitioners' right over the land. They denied harvesting the anahaw leaves
and coconuts, as well as delivering the produce to Atty. Baranda, Jr.
Issue: Petitioners claim that Morta is not a tenant of either Jaime Occidental or Josefina
Opiana-Baraclan, as shown by the MARO certification. They argue that the civil actions for
damages are not tenancy-related, and, hence, are properly cognizable by the trial court, not
the DARAB.
Ruling: We resolve to grant the petition.
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
[14] "Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in the
complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon a claim asserted
therein - a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the jurisdiction of
the court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the defendant in his answer or
motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely upon the defendant. [15] The complaint filed by petitioners before the Municipal Trial
Court is an action for damages for illegal gathering of anahaw leaves, pilinuts and coconuts,
and the destruction of their banana and pineapple plantations. The respondents did not
question the municipal trial court's jurisdiction in their answer. The issue of jurisdiction was
raised for the first time on appeal.
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between
the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would be essential
to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation
on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. [16] In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,
[17] we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reforms is limited to the
following:
a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;
b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and
c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.
The regional trial court ruled that the issue involved is tenancy-related that falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. It relied on the findings in DARAB Case No. 2413 that
Josefina Opiana-Baraclan appears to be the lawful owner of the land and Jaime Occidental was
her recognized tenant. However, petitioner Morta claimed that he is the owner of the land.
Thus, there is even a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land, Josefina Opiana-
Baraclan or petitioner Morta. The issue of ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it
is definitely outside its jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the DARAB regarding the
ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. The issue of ownership shall be
resolved in a separate proceeding before the appropriate trial court between the claimants
thereof.
At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the land, the case can not be
considered as tenancy-related for it still fails to comply with the other requirements. Assuming
arguendo that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan is the owner, then the case is not between the
landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental can not claim that there
is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to
comply with the above requisites, we conclude that the issue involved is not tenancy-related
cognizable by the DARAB.
Rodrigo and Ana ALMUETE vs Marcelo ANDRES and the Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 122276 / 369 SCRA 619
November 20, 2001
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- In 1957, the then National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA)
awarded petitioner Rodrigo a parcel of agricultural land located in San Vicente,
Isabela, measuring approximately 72.587 sq. meters. Since then, he has exercised
exclusive possession of the property.
- However, in 1979, an Agrarian Reform Technologist, Gragasin, filed a field
investigation and inspection report stating that:
o The whereabouts of Rodrigo was unknown, and that he had waived all
his rights as a NARRA settler due to his poor health beyond his control
and financial hardship.
o The actual occupant of the land is respondent Andres since 1967.
o Recommended that the Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) cancel the
award, and that the land be awarded instead to Andres.
- Andres filed his homestead application, and represented that Rodrigo sold the land
to one Masiglat, in consideration of a radiophono. However, Masiglat was
disqualified from acquiring the land since he was also a NARRA awardee, so he
transferred the land to Andres in exchange for one carabao and P600. The tranfers
were not covered by written contracts between parties.
MAR: Homestead application GRANTED.
- Meanwhile, Rodrigo and his daughter, Ana, continued to cultivate the land. Their
house was built thereon in 1982. From time to time, he would visit the farm to
deliver supplies and pay wags to the laborers who worked therein.
- The DAR regional director recommended the transfer of ownership of the land to
Andres. In 1988, an OCT was issued in favor of respondent.
- Shortly thereafter, Andres, accompanied by 10 other persons armed with bolos,
entered the property, claiming exclusive right of ownership and possession. They
felled narra trees and converted the same to lumber, and destroyed the mongos
planted by petitioners. Andres gained control of approximately half of the property.
- When he complained to the DAR, it was only then that he learned of the cancellation
of his award in favor of Andres. They then filed an action for reconveyance and
recovery of possession with the TC.
RTC – Isabela: Decision in favor of PETITIONERS.
- The RTC found that Andres did not acquire any right over the property which he
bought from Masiglat since the latter never acquired ownership from Rodrigo.
- Andres could not present any valid document to prove his acquisition of the land.
- It was found that Rodrigo never abandoned the same.
- Gragasin made false assertions, misleading the Regional Director into cancelling
Rodrigo’s award.
- Andres failed to appeal, rendering the RTC decision final and executory.
- A writ of execution was issued, but Andres filed a motion to quash the same. The
RTC did not act on it since it had no more jurisdiction over the case.
CA: RTC decision declared NULL AND VOID.
- Respondent argued that since the property as agricultural land covered by a
homestead patent, exclusive jurisdiction was with the DARAB and not with the
regular courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
SC: CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
- The action filed by petitioners was for recovery of possession and reconveyance of
title, in which the issue to be resolved was who between the parties had better right
to the property. It was a controversy relating to ownership of the land, which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
o Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
fixing, negotiating, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
o It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired
under R.A. 6657 and other terms and condition of transfer of ownership
from landowners to farmworkers.
o The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited to cases involving tenancy
relationship, which has the following indispensable elements:
 The parties are the landowner ad tenant.
 The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land.
 There is consent between the parties.
 The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production.
 There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant.
 The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant.
- The CA gravely erred when it granted the petition for certiorari and held that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.
o The action filed was cognizable by regular courts.
o While the caption of the complaint includes ejectment, it is the
allegations therein that determine the nature of the action.
 Petitioners prayed for the cancellation of the OCT in the name
of respondent, and that petitioners instead be declared
absolute owners of the land.
- The CA also gravely erred when it gave due course to the special civil action for
certiorari.
o Certiorari is a remedy of last recourse, when there is no plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy.
o It cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. Herein
respondent lost that remedy by his failure to appeal.
Machete vs CA
Issue: W/N RTC’s are vested with jurisdiction over cases for collection of back rentals
from leasehold tenants?
FACTS:
 Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages before
the RTC of Tagbilaran City against Lope Machete et, al.
 The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold agreement with
respect to Villalon’s landholdings at Carmen, Bohol, they agreed that Machete, et al
were to pay Villalon a certain percent of the harvest.
 Despite demands made by Villalon, Machete, Et al, with no valid reason failed to pay
their respective rentals.
 Machete et al moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jursudiction
of the TC over the subject matter, they also contented that the case is connected
with the agrarian relations, which falls squarely to the jurisdiction of DAR in excerise
of its quasi judicial powers under therevised riled of the DARAB.
 On August 22, 1989, TC granted the motion to dismiss and denied the MR
 Villalon seeked for the annulment of the orders before CA which then reversed the
TC decision and directing TC to assume jurisdiction of the case, CA also rejected
Machete’s MR.
RULING:
 SC reversed CA’s decision
 SC reinstanted RTC decision dated August 22 and September 28
 SC stated that the case which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of
petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private
respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial
court to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
 SC also stated that CA made an error by directing TC to assume jurisdiction over the
case, he resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a
better position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency
presumably possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. Further, the
proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by the
technical rules of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes
and other issues will be adjudicated in a just, expeditious and inexpensive
proceeding
Hon. Antonio M. Nuesa v CA GR No. 132048 March 6, 2002
Facts: On May 25, 1972, then Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued an Order of Award in favor
of Jose Verdillo over two (2) parcels of agricultural land, Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista
Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, covering 14,496 and 19,808 square meters, respectively, under
the following conditions: That within a period of six (6) months from receipt of a copy, the
awardee(s) shall personally cultivate xxx or otherwise develop at least one-fourth of the area
xxx or occupy and construct his/her house in case of residential lot and pay at least the first
installment xxx; failure on his/her part to comply with this requirement shall be sufficient cause
for cancellation of this order and for allocation xxx in favor of any qualified xxx applicant; and
that in no case shall an agreement to sell or deed of sale, as the case may be, issued in favor of
the awardee(s) covering the lots without a certification issued by the Land Reform Project Team
Leader of Land Settlement Superintendent that the awardee(s) has/have developed or devoted
to some productive enterprise at least one-half of the area thereof, or constructed his/her/their
house therein in case of residential land On August 26, 1993, or after twenty-one years, private
respondent filed an application with the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform
for the purchase of said lots claiming that he had complied with the conditions set forth in the
Order. Restituto Rivera, herein petitioner, filed a letter of protest against private respondent
claiming that contrary to the manifestation of private respondent, it is petitioner who had been
in possession of the land and had been cultivating the same. Petitioner had filed his own
application for said parcels in opposition to that of private respondent. On December 27, 1993,
a representative of the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office undertook an
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
investigation to look into the conflicting claims of the petitioner and the private respondent.
Based on said investigation, it was found that: xxx the subject lots were previously tenanted by
other persons namely, Agapito Garcia and Pablo Garcia for almost sixteen years prior to the
entry of Restituto Rivera in 1972 for Lot 1904 and in 1986 for Lot 1932. Restituto Rivera at the
time of investigation is still in possession/cultivation of the lots in question. These facts have
never been refuted by Jose Verdillo who further testified that Restituto Rivera used to pay
annual rental of 25 cavans for Lot 1932 and 15 cavans of palay for Lot 1904. In the investigation,
it was undoubtedly established that Lots 1932 and 1904, Psd-52045, were in
possession/cultivation of tenants or other persons exclusive of Jose Verdillo. It is crystal clear
that Jose Verdillo has culpably violated the terms and conditions of the Order of Award issued
in his favor for lots covered thereby. Petitioner, the Regional Director of DAR, Antonio M.
Nuesa, promulgated an Order cancelling the order of award in favor or Jose Verdillo. The
DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, however, chose to resolve the case on the merits and
promulgated a Decision reversing the Order of the Regional Director.
Issue: Whether or not the Board (DARAB) acted in grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack or excess of its jurisdiction.
Held: P.D. 946 provides that matters involving the administrative implementation of the
transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27 and amendatory and related
decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall be exclusively cognizable by the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, including: xxx (5) issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of
land transfer in cases outside the purview of P.D. No. 816. The revocation by the Regional
Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award by the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the
administrative functions of the DAR. The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of
adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the
case, then overturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding the case on the
merits without affording the petitioner opportunity to present his case. As held by this Court in
Centeno vs. Centeno, the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of the agrarian reform program. The DARAB has primary, original
and appellate jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended
by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
Under Section 3(d) of R.A. 6657 (CARP Law), agrarian dispute is defined to include (d) ...any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. In the case at bar,
petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy between them within the ambit of the
abovecited provision. Consequently, the DARAB had no jurisdiction over the controversy and
should not have taken cognizance of private respondents petition in the first place. Note that
Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990, governs the distribution and titling of lots in landed
estates administered by the DAR. This Order explicitly provides that since land has a social
function, there is a concomitant social responsibility in its ownership and should, therefore, be
distributed to the actual occupant/tillers thereof. In the investigation on December 27, 1993,
conducted by the Regional Officer of DAR, it was established that the subject lots were in the
possession and cultivation of persons other than the awardee Verdillo. Clearly, this constituted
a violation of the terms of the Order of Award issued in favor of private respondent as an
awardee, aside from contravening the underlying principles of agrarian reform as a social
justice measure. Given these circumstances, we find petitioner Restituto Riveras plea to
overturn the ruling of the Court of Appeals meritorious. While it bears emphasizing that
findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts, care
should be taken that administrative actions are not done without due regard to the
jurisdictional boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. In this case, respondent
DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had overstepped their legal boundaries in
taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera and private respondent
Verdillo as to who should be awarded Lots 1932 and 1904 of the Buenavista Estate. Respondent
appellate court erred in sustaining DARABs unjustified action taken with grave abuse of
discretion resulting in lack or excess of its jurisdiction.
PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK vs COURT OF APPEALS, DAR Secretary, DARAB – Davao City, and
Land Bank of the Philippines
G.R. No. 132767 / 322 SCRA 139
January 18, 2000
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- Petitioner owns 4 parcels of land in Tagum, Davao. The same were taken by the DAR
for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to R.A. No. 6657.
- Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by respondent LBP and DARAB –
Davao, petitioner filed a petition for a determination of just compensation for its
property with the RTC-Davao.
RTC-Davao: Petition DISMISSED.
- The court dismissed the petition (actually an appeal from the DARAB decision
determining the valuation of the land) for being filed out of time.
o Section 51 of R.A. No. 6657 states that:
 Any case or controversy before the DAR shall be decided
within 30 days after it is submitted for resolution. Only one
Motion for Reconsideration shall be allowed. Any order,
ruling, or decision shall be final after the lapse of 15 days from
receipt of a copy thereof.
CA: RTC decision AFFIRMED.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
- The CA ruled that jurisdiction over land valuation cases belongs to the DARAB, as
provided for in Rule II of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure.
ISSUE: Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over actions for fixing just compensation.
SC: CA decision AFFIRMED.
- R.A. No. 6657 provides:
o Sec. 50. Quasi-Judicial Power of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA)
and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR);
o Sec. 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination
of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act. The
Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their
special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for
decision.
- There is nothing in contradictory between:
o The provision of Sec. 50 granting the DAR primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate “agrarian reform matters” and exclusive
original jurisdiction over “all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform”, including determination of just compensation, and;
o Sec. 57 granting RTCs “original and exclusive jurisdiction” over all
petitions for determination of just compensation to landowner and
prosecutions of criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657.
o Sec. 50 refers to administrative proceedings, while Sec. 57 refers to
judicial proceedings.
- Under R.A. No. 6657, the Land Bank is charged with the preliminary determination
of value of lands under the land reform program, and the compensation to be paid.
o In the event the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative
proceeding is held by the PARAD (provincial), RARAD (regional), or the
DARAB (central) adjudicator, as the case may be.
- To implement Sec. 50, Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure states:
o Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation. - The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and
preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not
be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional
Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one
motion for reconsideration.
 This rule is an acknowledgment by the DARAB that the power
to decide just compensation cases is vested in the courts, but
the primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an
administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner
the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands, but
such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.
- As the petition in the RTC was filed out of time, the trial court correctly dismissed
the case and the CA correctly affirmed the order.
LBP v. Suntay
FACTS: Federico Suntay (married to Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay), herein respondent,
represented by his assignee, Josefina Lubrica, is the registered owner of a parcel of land
hectares in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro.
In 1972, the DAR, pursuant to PD 27 expropriated 948.1911 hectares of respondent's property.
The portion expropriated consisted mostly of lowland and non-irrigated riceland. LBP and the
DAR fixed the value of the expropriated land at P4,251,141.68 or P4,497.50 per hectare.
Respondent rejected petitioner's valuation as being unconscionably low and tantamount to
taking his property without due process. He then filed with the Office of the Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (RARAD), Region IV, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), a petition for the determination of just compensation against petitioner and the DAR.
On January 24, 2001, after conducting summary administrative proceedings, the RARAD
rendered a Decision fixing the just compensation for the expropriated land at P157,541,951.30
and directing petitioner to pay respondent the said amount.
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court, a Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation against respondent and the
RARAD and prayed that the just compensation for respondent's expropriated land be fixed at
P4,251,141.67 only.
ISSUE: whether the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank's petition for the determination of
just compensation
HELD: YES.
The Land Bank is charged with the responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under
land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking under the voluntary offer to sell
or compulsory acquisition arrangement. The DAR, relying on the Land Bank's determination of
the land valuation and compensation, then makes an offer through a notice sent to the
landowner. If the landowner accepts the offer, the Land Bank shall pay him the purchase price
of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of
title in favor of the government. In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto,
the DAR adjudicator conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the
compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the Land Bank and other interested
parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with
the Decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation. In determining just compensation,
the RTC is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.
It is clear that the RTC treated the petition for the determination of just compensation as an
appeal from the RARAD Decision in DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00. In dismissing the petition
for being filed out of time, the RTC relied on Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB New Rules of
Procedure which provides:
Section 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just
Compensation. – The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary
determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the
Board [Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)] but shall be
brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled
to only one motion for reconsideration.
The RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank's petition. It bears stressing that the petition is not
an appeal from the RARAD final Decision but an original action for the determination of the
just compensation for respondent's expropriated property, over which the RTC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction. This is clear from Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657 which provides:
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts [the designated
Regional Trial Courts] shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of
all criminal offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings
before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special
jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
Section 50 must be construed in harmony with Section 57 by considering cases involving the
determination of just compensation and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as
excepted from the plenitude of power conferred upon the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for
this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over
cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases. Valuation of property in eminent domain is
essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies.
LBP v. Martinez
FACTS: After compulsory acquisition by the DAR of respondent Martinez’s 62.5369-hectare
land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres, Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) offered ₱1,955,485.60 as just compensation. Convinced that the proffered amount was
unjust and confiscatory, respondent rejected it. DARAB conducted summary administrative
proceedings for the preliminary determination of just compensation.
PARAD Sorita, finding some marked inconsistencies in the figures and factors made as bases by
LBP in its computation and ordered the DAR to pay Php12,179,492.50 instead. A petition for
the fixing of just compensation docketed as Agrarian Case No. 696 was then filed by LBP’s
counsel before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC), the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon,
Branch 82. After filing her answer to the said petition, respondent, contending that the orders,
rulings and decisions of the DARAB become final after the lapse of 15 days from their receipt,
moved for the dismissal of the petition for being filed out of time. Petitioner opposed the
motion.
ISSUE: whether or not petitioner could file its appeal solely through its legal department
HELD: NO.
The Court reiterates its ruling in this case that the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision on
land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules.
The petition for the fixing of just compensation should therefore, following the law and settled
jurisprudence, be filed with the SAC within the said period.
Formerly, the court ruled that the trial court correctly dismissed the petition for the fixing of
just compensation because it was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in the DARAB Rules.
This ruling, however, as correctly pointed out by petitioner, runs counter to the Court’s recent
decision in Suntay [the motions for reconsideration in Suntay were denied with finality in the
January 30, 2008 Resolution of the Court, in which the Court ruled that the trial court erred in
dismissing the petition for determination of just compensation on the ground that it was filed
out of time. The Court in that case stressed that the petition was not an appeal from the
adjudicator’s final decision but an original action for the determination of just compensation.
We, however, promulgated our decision in this case ahead of Suntay. To reiterate, this case
was decided on August 14, 2007, while Suntay was decided two months later, or on October
11, 2007. Suntay should have then remained consistent with our ruling, and with the doctrines
enunciated in Philippine Veterans Bank and in Lubrica, especially considering that Lubrica was
the representative of Suntay in the Suntay case.
The Court notes that the Suntay ruling is based on Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals, decided in 1996 also through the pen of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza. In that case, the
Court emphasized that the jurisdiction of the SAC is original and exclusive, not appellate.
Republic, however, was decided at a time when Rule XIII, Section 11 was not yet present in the
DARAB Rules. Further, Republic did not discuss whether the petition filed therein for the fixing
of just compensation was filed out of time or not. The Court merely decided the issue of
whether cases involving just compensation should first be appealed to the DARAB before the
landowner can resort to the SAC under Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657.
To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the guidance of
the bench and the bar, that the better rule is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated
in Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case. Thus, while a petition for the fixing
of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator’s
decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the
DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator’s decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity.
Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade
after the land valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in
a state of uncertainty as to the true value of his property.
Ros, et al. vs DAR, et al.
G.R. No. 132477, August 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land. By virtue of a Municipal
Ordinance, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands. As part of their preparation for the
development of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners secured all the necessary
permits and appropriate government certifications.
However, the DAR disallowed the conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and directed
the petitioners to cease and desist from further developments on the land.
Petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for Injunction with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. However, the RTC, ruling that it is the
DAR which has jurisdiction, dismissed the complaint.
When the case was brought to the SC, it was referred to the CA. However, the CA affirmed the
dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DAR has the primary jurisdiction over the case.
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go through the
process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR.
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to “approve or disapprove applications
for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses,”
pursuant to Section 4(i) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.
Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize under certain conditions, the reclassification or
conversion of agricultural lands.
It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the complaint for
injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate courts under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a
controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative body of
special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB).
2. Whether or not the RTC can issue a writ of injunction against the DAR.
Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. – No injunction,
restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their
implementation of the program.
NOTE: Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, where it was held that reclassification of land does not
suffice
In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The subject landholding was merely
reclassified. Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing the
current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the Department
of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural
lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as
embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use
conversion. Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically
allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He has to
undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other
purposes.
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA), vs. THE SECRETARY
OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 183409
June 18, 2010
FACTS:
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97,3 entitled
"Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
Agricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use
conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial
arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands
reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.
Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 01-99,
entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-
agricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion. Its
coverage includes the following agricultural lands, to wit: (1) those to be converted to
residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those
to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─
the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously
authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02,
entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO
No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The
aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-
agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.
To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development,
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which
temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications.
By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects,
which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems
to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole
nation.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT HAVE BEEN
RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON-
AGRICULTURAL USES.
HELD:
Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" have been included in the
definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted
within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A,
which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that
includes the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion. Further,
the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the
category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses
and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as
provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.
More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which Opinion has been
recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified that after the effectivity of Republic
Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been given the authority to approve land conversion.
Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the authority to include in the definition of
agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use conversion.
It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion that
agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
agricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion before they can be used for the
purpose to which they are intended.
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR’s conversion authority can only be
exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988. The said date served
as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or rezoning of agricultural lands that no
longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority. Thereafter, reclassification of
agricultural lands is already subject to DAR’s conversion authority. Reclassification alone will
not suffice to use the agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the
current use of reclassified agricultural lands.It bears stressing that the act of reclassifying
agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be
utilized for non-agricultural uses and does not automatically convert agricultural lands to non-
agricultural uses or for other purposes.
Fortich vs. Corona
G.R. No. 131457 | August 19, 1999 | Ynares-Santiago, J.
Petitioners: Carlos Fortich (Governor of Bukidnon), Rey Baula (Mayor of Sumilao, Bukidnon),
NQSR Management and Development Corporation
Respondents: Deputy Executive Secretary Renato Corona, Agrarian Reform Secretary Ernesto
Garilao
Facts:
On October 1997, alleged farmer-beneficiaries commenced a hunger strike in front of the
Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City. They protested the decision of the
Office of the President (OP) dated March 29, 1996 which approved the conversion of a 144-
hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This decision already
became final and executory.
The land is located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by NQSRMDC (Norberto
Quisumbing Sr. Management and Development Corp). It was leased as a pineapple plantation
to Del Monte.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon became interested in the property, and enacted
an ordinance converting the said land to industrial/institutional with a view to attract investors
in order to achieve economic vitality.
Apparently, land conversion issues need to go through the Department of Agrarian Reform.
The DAR rejected the land conversion and instead opted to put the same under CARP and
ordered the distribution of the property to the farmers.
The case reached the Office of the President (OP). The OP rendered a decision reversing the
DAR and converting the land to agro-indusrial area, which became the subject of the strike of
the farmers.
The hunger strike was dramatic and well-publicized which commanded nationwide attention
that even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried to intervene for their “cause”.
These events led the OP, through then Deputy Exec. Sec. Corona, to issue the so-called “Win-
Win” Resolution, substantially modifying its earlier Decision (see decision dated March 29,
1996) after it had already become final and executory.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
It modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of
forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be
distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
The Supreme Court, in their decision dated April 24, 1998, ruled for Fortich and company and
declared that the “Win-Win” Resolution is VOID and of no legal effect considering that the
March 29, 1996 resolution of the OP already became final and executory.
Aggrieved, respondents Corona and Garilao filed [separate] motions for reconsideration for the
said ruling (separate MRs were filed but was resolved by the Court through one resolution).
The Court, in their Resolution dated Nov. 17, 1998, voted TWO-TWO on the separate MRs filed
by Corona and Garilao assailing the April 24, 1998 Decision.
Hence, the instant motion. The respondents pray that this case be referred to the Court en
banc. They contend that inasmuch as their earlier motions for reconsideration (of the Decision
dated April 24, 1998) were resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a
decision, i.e., three, was not met. Consequently, the case should be referred to and be decided
by this Court en banc, relying on the following constitutional provision:
o Art. 8, Sec. 4 (3) - Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least
three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided
en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision
rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en
banc.
Issue/Held: Whether or not the aforementioned resolution of the Court (the resolution
addressing the MR, wherein the justices voted 2-2) should be referred to the Court en banc.
Held: NO.
Ratio:
• A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the
intention of the framers to draw a distinction between CASES and MATTERS.
o CASES are “decided”.
o MATTERS, which include motions, are “resolved”.
• Otherwise put, the word “decided” must refer to “cases”; while the word “resolved”
must refer to “matters”, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis.
o This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section
4(3), but also of the other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear.
• With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred
to the Court en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained.
• Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes
is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence
of the aforequoted provision speaks only of “case” and not “matter”.
• The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the
disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only
way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc.
o On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing
party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion
because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision
which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary
vote for its reconsideration.
• Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The
assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the
ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
• Respondents further argue that the issues submitted in their separate motions for
reconsideration are of first impression. They are arguing that the local government unit
concerned still needs to obtain the approval of DAR when converting land. However, this was
rebutted in the resolution dated November 17, wherein it was expressed that:
o “Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no
extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc. In the case of Province of
Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we held that local government units need
not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use.”
o The Court voted unanimously in that case, hence, the argument of the petitioners
that their MRs are motions involving first impression is flawed.
• Moreover, a second motion for reconsideration is generally prohibited, unless there
is a showing of extraordinary persuasive reasons and a leave of court is filed. In this case, there
was none.
• Remember that the Court, in its Decision, upheld the March 29, 1996 ruling of the
OP because it was already final and executory thus the Win-Win resolution cannot be
implemented anymore? Well, because of this, there was a litany of protestations on the part
of respondents and intervenors including entreaties for a liberal interpretation of the rules.
The sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching effects, the case was
“disposed of on a mere technicality”.
o The Court however said that it was not a “mere technicality” because the finality of
the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land in dispute
on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand
to be benefited by the development of the property.
• Lastly, the Court determines whether or not the farmer-intervenors have standing
to intervene in this case. The Court said there was none, because the source of their “standing
to file” is the “Win-Win Resolution”
o Why was there no standing on the part of the farmer-intervenors who derived their
rights from the Win-Win resolution? The issuance of the Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) to them does not grant them the requisite standing in view of the nullity of the “Win-
Win” Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void.
Reynaldo CHUA, doing business under the name & style Prime Mover Construction
Development vs The COURT OF APPEALS, Social Security System, Andres Paguio, et al.
G.R. No. 125837 / 440 SCRA 121
October 6, 2004
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Facts:
- On August 1985, private respondents filed a Petition with the Social Security
Commission for SSS coverage and contributions against herein petitioner Chua,
claiming that:
o They were regular employees of Chua;
o They were assigned by him in various construction projects continuously;
o They were dismissed without justifiable grounds and without notice to
them;
o Chua did not report them to the SSS for compulsory coverage.
- Petitioner Chua filed his Answer, averring:
o That private respondents had no cause of action against him;
o That assuming they had any, they were barred by prescription and
laches;
o That private respondents were not regular employees, but merely
project employees whose work had been fixed for a specific project.
Hence, they were not entitled to coverage under the Social Security Act.
- The SSS filed a Petition in Intervention, alleging that it has an interest in the petition
filed by private respondents. It stated that it is a mandatory obligation of every
employer to report its employees to the SSS for coverage and to remit the required
contribution, including penalties for late premium remittances.
SSC: Order in favor of RESPONDENTS.
- The SSC declared private respondents to be regular employees of petitioner, and
ordered the payment of the unpaid SSS contributions plus penalties.
CA: SSC order AFFIRMED.
Issue: Whether or not private respondents were regular employees of petitioner, and
therefore should be included in the SSS coverage.
SC: Petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
- It is clear that private respondents are employees of petitioner, the latter having
control over the results of the work done, as well as the means and methods by
which the same were accomplished.
o Petitioner himself admitted that they worked in his construction
projects, although the period of their employment was co-terminus with
their phase of work.
o The existence of an employer-employee relationship between the
parties can be determined by the application of the control test. The
essential requisites of an employer-employee relationship are as follows:
 Selection and Engagement of the Employee;
 Payment of Wages;
 Power of Dismissal;
 Power of Control, with regard to the means and methods by
which the work is to be accomplished (this is the most
determinative factor).
o Despite petitioner’s contentions, the CA correctly held that private
respondents were regular employees.
 They were employed as masons, carpenters, and fine graders
in petitioner’s various construction projects.
 The work they performed were necessary and desirable to
petitioner’s business, which usually involves the construction
of roads and bridges.
 Moreover, employment ceases to be co-terminus with
various projects when the employee is continuously rehired
due to the demands of the employer’s business, and re-
engaged for many more projects without interruption.
- Regardless of the nature of their employment, whether it is regular or project,
private respondents are subject of the compulsory coverage under the SSS Law,
their employment not falling under the exceptions provided for by law (Sec. 8.j).
- Private respondents’ right to file their claim had not yet prescribed at the time of
filing, considering that a mere 8 years had passed from the time delinquency was
discovered, or the proper assessment was made.
o Under R.A. 1161, as amended, the prescriptive period is 20 years.
- The principle of ‘laches’ does not apply to private respondents.
o The principle ordains that failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained amount of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence
could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
o In the instant case, there was no proof that private respondents failed or
neglected to assert their right.
Social Security System (SSS) vs Rosanna Aguas, et al.
G.R No. 165546 / 483 SCRA 383
February 27, 2006
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Facts:
- Pablo Aguas, a member of the SSS and a pensioner, died on December 1996. He was
survived by herein respondents, who filed a claim for death benefits. The claim for
monthly pension was settled on February 1997.
- Shortly after, on April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter from one Leticia Aguas-
Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting respondent’s claim for death benefits, where
she alleged the following:
o Rosanna abandoned the family home more than 6 years before;
o Rosanna lived with another man on whom she had been dependent for
support;
o Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna, but the latter had several with
a certain Romeo dela Pena.
 Enclosed was notarized copy of the original birth certificate
of one Jefren dela Pena, showing that he was born on
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
November 1996, and that the parents were Rosanna
Hernandez and Romeo dela Pena, and that both ‘parents’
were married on November 1, 1990.
- SSS then suspended payments of Rosanna’s monthly pensions, and conducted an
investigation to verify Leticia’s allegations.
- Upon investigation, the SSS found:
o Rosanna had no children with Pablo;
o Jeylnn and Jefren were Rosanna’s children with Romeo;
o Rosanna left Pablo 6 years before his death, and lived with Romeo while
she was pregnant with Jeylnn;
o Pablo was not capable of having a child since he was under treatment
(infertile).
- SSS denied respondent’s request to resume payment of pensions, and advised the
same to refund within 30 days P10, 350.00, the amount released to her as pensions.
- Respondents filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC) a claim/petition for
Restoration/Payment of Pensions, where they presented photocopies of:
o Pablo and Rosanna’s marriage certificate;
o Janet’s certificate of live birth;
o Jeylnn’s certificate of live birth;
o Pablo’s death certificate.
- Respondents claimed that Jeylnn was the legitimate child of Pablo, and asserted that
Rosanna never left Pablo, and that they lived as husband and wife under one roof.
- The SSS also secured confirmation reports from civil registers confirming
respondents’ allegations.
- Among the testimonies presented, it was found that Jeylnn was the legitimate child
of Rosanna and Pablo, and that Janet was merely adopted. Jefren’s parentage was
never cleared.
SSC: Petition DENIED.
- The SSS denied respondents’ claims and demanded a refund of the pensions
previously paid out to Rosanna.
- It ruled that Rosanna was no longer a qualified beneficiary since she contracted
marriage with Romeo during the subsistence of her marriage to Pablo.
CA: SSC Order REVERSED.
- The CA relied on the birth certificates of Janet and Jeylnn showing that they were
children of Pablo, and the same were binding upon the parties, including the SSS.
- The CA also found no evidence showing that Rosanna ceased to receive support
from Pablo before his death.
- The CA also ruled that the alleged affair with Romeo dela Pena was not properly
proven. And even if Rosanna was married to him, it would have been a void
marriage.
Issue: Whether or not respondents are entitled to SSS pensions.
SC: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. CA Decision AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
- Only Jeylnn Aguas is declared ENTITLED to benefits accruing from Pablo’s death.
o The following were defined under Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 735:
 Death Benefits (Sec. 13) – Upon death of the covered
employee, his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled to basic
monthly pension, and his dependents to the dependent’s
pension.
 Dependent (Sec. 8.e) – The legitimate, legitimated, or legally
adopted child who is unmarried, not gainfully employed, and
not over 21 years of age, provided that he is congenitally
incapacitated and incapable of self-support physically or
mentally; the legitimate spouse dependent for support upon
the employee; and the legitimate parents wholly dependent
upon the covered employee for regular support.
 Beneficiaries (Sec. 8.k) – The dependent spouse until he/she
remarries, and the dependent children, who shall be the
primary beneficiaries.
o Whoever claims entitlement to such benefits should establish his or her
right by substantial evidence. As per the records, only Jeylnn sufficiently
established her right to a monthly pension.
 She submitted a photocopy of her birth certificate bearing the
signature of Pablo. The same was authenticated by the Civil
Registry, that she was born on October 1991. A birth
certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of
paternity.
 Given that the records show that Rosanna and Pablo were
married in 197, and that their marriage subsisted until Pablo’s
death in 1996, it was evident that Jeylnn was born during the
marriage.
 Leticia cannot impugn the legitimacy of Jeylnn since that right
is strictly personal to the husband, and in some exceptional
cases, the heirs.
 The presumption of legitimacy cannot extend to Janet since
her date of birth was not substantially proven. She, therefore,
cannot claim for benefits.
 The birth certificate she submitted was not
verified in any way by the civil register. It is a mere
photocopy which was not confirmed by the civil
register.
 Moreover, the witnesses were unanimous in
saying that Janet was not the real child since her
adoption by Rosanna and Pablo did not undergo
any legal proceedings.
 Rosana also cannot claim for benefits.
 For the spouse to qualify as primary beneficiary,
she must prove the following:
o She is the legitimate spouse; and
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
o She is dependent upon the member
for support.
 Rosanna’s presentation of a verified marriage
certificate merely established the fact that she
was the legitimate spouse of Pablo, but it did not
establish her dependency on him.
 A wife who is already separated de facto from her
husband cannot be said to be dependent for
support upon the husband, unless otherwise
proven.
Dycaico v. SSS
G.R. No. 161357
November 30, 2005
Facts:
Bonifacio Dycaico became a member of the SSS on January 24, 1980, and he named herein
petitioner Elena Dycaico and their eight children as his beneficiaries. At the time, Bonifacio and
Elena lived together with the benefit of marriage. In June 1989, Bonifacio was considered
retired and began to receive his monthly pension from SSS, and continued to receive the same
until his deal on June 19, 1997. A few months prior to his death, Bonifacio married the
petitioner on January 6, 1997.
Petitioner Elena filed an application for survivor’s pension, which was denied under Section 12-
B(d) of RA 8282 or the Social Security law. This was because the primary beneficiaries as of the
date of the retirement of the pensioner should be the ones entitled to receive the monthly
pension. The fact that they had not been married at the time Bonifacio’s retirement meant that
she could not be a primary beneficiary.
Elena filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC) a petition that alleged that the denial of
her survivors’ pension was unjustified, and that Bonifacio had designated her and their children
as primary beneficiaries in his SSS Form RS-1. There was also no indication that only legitimate
family members could be made beneficiaries, and that the SSS was bound to respect the
designation.
The SSC affirmed the denial of the claim, however. The SSC ruled that entitlement to the
survivor’s pension in one’s capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of the
relationship with and dependency for support upon the deceased SSS member during their
lifetime.
CA: The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner Elena’s petition, declaring that as the common-
law wife of Bonifacio at the time of his retirement, the designation done by the latter was void.
Furthermore, none of their illegitimate children could qualify as primary beneficiaries, as all of
them had reached the age of twenty-one (21) years old.
Issues: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the SSC wherein
legitimacy of relationship is necessary in order for one to avail of the survivors’ pension as
the primary beneficiary.
Held: Yes, the Court of Appeals erred.
The outright disqualification of Elena without her having had been given the opportunity to
prove the fact that she was Bonifacio’s bona fide legal spouse is untenable. Retirement benefits
are property interest of a retiree, and these employees have vested rights in the pension they
are to receive. Thus, the dependent spouse of such employees are entitled to their survivorship
pension under RA 8282.
Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 is VOID, violating the due process clause by depriving those surviving
spouses of retired SSS members who contracted their marriages after the retirement of the
later. These is clear and outright confiscation of benefits due to the same and they are deprived
of their opportunity to be heard.
GSIS v. Zarate
G.R. No. 170847
August 3, 2010
Facts:
The deceased Henry Zarate was a Senior Fire Officer who died in a vehicular accident while on
off-duty status. His wife, Felicitas filed a claim for death benefits wit hthe GSIS under PD 626,
which was denied due to the fact that Henry had died from a cause that did not arise out of nor
was in the course of his employment.
Felicitas appealed the ruling to the ECC, which was dismissed. The ECC affirmed the findings
that Henry’s death was not work-related and thus, not compensable. Henry had gone to La
Union to visit his mother, and thus, was not in the actual performance of his duty as a fireman.
CA: The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the ECC. The court found that that there was
reasonable work connection in Henry’s death and that the policy of the late extends state
insurance benefits to as many qualified employees as possible.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in granting the claim for death
benefits of respondent Zarate under PD 626, despite the fact that the cause of Henry Zarate’s
death did not arise out of or in the course of employment.
Held: No, it did not.
It is not disputed that Henry visited his mother because of her illness, and that he had asked his
superior’s permission to do the same. However, this leave was granted on the condition that
he returned the next day. The grant of death benefits is reasonable, due to the fact that he had
died on his way back to his work station, in compliance with the timeline his superior gave him.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Henry should already be deemed en route to the performance of his duty when his accidental
death occurred. He was on his way back to Manila in order to be on time and be ready for work
the next day as Senior Fire Officer of the Pinagkaisahan Fire Substation in Cubao. He was
traveling with his superiors’ permission and was complying with the condition that he return
the next day. Under these facts, Henry was in the course of complying with his superiors order
when he met his fatal accident.
Gatus v. SSS
G.R. No. 174725
January 26, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Gatus worked at the Central Azucarera de Tarlac and was a covered member of the
SSS. He optionally retired from the same upon reaching 30 years of service on January 2002 at
the age of 62 years old. Over the course of his retirement, he had been certified fit to work in
1975. In 1995, however, he had been diagnosed with Coronary Artery Disease (CAD), and his
medical records showed him to be hypertensive for 10 years and a smoker.
On account of his CAD, he was given permanent partial disability benefits. In 2002, he became
a retired pensioner. In 2003, however, an SSS audit revealed the need to recover the EC benefits
already paid to Gatus due to his CAD being attributed to his chronic smoking and not his work.
He was notified of the same.
Gatus assailed the decision, but the SSS denied the same, and subsequently denied his motion
for reconsideration. He elevated the matter to the ECC, which held that though CAD was an
occupational disease under Annex A of the Implementing Rules on Employees’ Compensation,
there was nothing on record to establish the presence of the qualifying circumstances for
responsibility. Gatus had failed to prove that the conditions at his former workplace and the
nature of his previous employment increased the risk of contract his CAD. Thus, his appeal was
denied.
CA: The Court of Appeals held that Gatus was not entitled to compensation benefits under PD
626, affirming the ECC. It found that the petitioner, a chronic smoker and hypertensive for 10
years, could have contracted the CAD due to his habits.
Issues: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Gatus was not entitled to compensation
benefits despite the presence of an occupational disease (CAD).
Held: No, the CA did not err.
The burden of proof was on Gatus to show that his CAD was occupational by proving any of
the following conditions:
(a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment there must be
proof that an acute exacerbation clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the
nature of his work.
(b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must
be followed within twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute
causal relationship.
(c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain at work
showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such
symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship
Gatus failed to submit substantial evidence, as required under PD 626, that might have shown
he was entitled to the benefits he applied for.
Republic v. Asiapro Cooperative
FACTS: Respondent Asiapro, as a cooperative, is composed of owners-members. Under its by-
laws, owners-members are of two categories, to wit: (1) regular member, who is entitled to all
the rights and privileges of membership; and (2) associate member, who has no right to vote
and be voted upon and shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges provided in its by-
laws. Its primary objectives are to provide savings and credit facilities and to develop other
livelihood services for its owners-members. In the discharge of the aforesaid primary
objectives, respondent cooperative entered into several Service Contracts with Stanfilco - a
division of DOLE Philippines, Inc. The owners-members do not receive compensation or wages
from the respondent cooperative. Instead, they receive a share in the service surplus which the
respondent cooperative earns from different areas of trade it engages in, such as the income
derived from the said Service Contracts with Stanfilco. The owners-members get their income
from the service surplus generated by the quality and amount of services they rendered, which
is determined by the Board of Directors of the respondent cooperative.
In September 2006, petitioner SSS sent a letter to the respondent cooperative, addressed to its
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and General Manager Leo G. Parma, informing the latter that
based on the Service Contracts it executed with Stanfilco, respondent cooperative is actually a
manpower contractor supplying employees to Stanfilco and for that reason, it is an employer
of its owners-members working with Stanfilco. Thus, respondent cooperative should register
itself with petitioner SSS as an employer and make the corresponding report and remittance of
premium contributions in accordance with the Social Security Law of 1997.
Petitioners claim that SSC has jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it by
petitioner SSS as it involved an issue of whether or not a worker is entitled to compulsory
coverage under the SSS Law. Petitioners contend that there is an employer-employee
relationship between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members. The respondent
cooperative is the employer of its owners-members considering that it undertook to provide
services to Stanfilco, the performance of which is under the full and sole control of the
respondent cooperative.
Respondent cooperative alleges that its owners-members own the cooperative, thus, no
employer-employee relationship can arise between them. The persons of the employer and
the employee are merged in the owners-members themselves. Likewise, respondent
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
cooperatives owners-members even requested the respondent cooperative to register them
with the petitioner SSS as self-employed individuals. Hence, petitioner SSC has no jurisdiction
over the petition-complaint filed before it by petitioner SSS.
ISSUE: whether the social security commission has jurisdiction
HELD: Yes. since the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the respondent
cooperative and its owners-members was put in issue and considering that the compulsory
coverage of the SSS Law is predicated on the existence of such relationship, it behooves the
petitioner SSC to determine if there is really an employer-employee relationship that exists
between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members.
The question on the existence of an employer-employee relationship is not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Article 217 of the Labor Code
enumerating the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC provides that:
ART. 217. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS AND THE COMMISSION. - (a) x x x.
xxxx
6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity
benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons
in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
Hence, the question on the existence of an employer-employee relationship for the purpose of
determining the coverage of the Social Security System is explicitly excluded from the
jurisdiction of the NLRC and falls within the jurisdiction of the SSC which is primarily charged
with the duty of settling disputes arising under the Social Security Law of 1997.
In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are
considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers; (2) the payment of wages by
whatever means; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the worker's conduct,
with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. The most important element is
the employer's control of the employee's conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be
done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish. All the aforesaid elements are
present in this case.
It is true that the Service Contracts executed between the respondent cooperative and Stanfilco
expressly provide that there shall be no employer-employee relationship between the
respondent cooperative and its owners-members. This Court, however, cannot give the said
provision force and effect.
First. It is expressly provided in the Service Contracts that it is the respondent cooperative
which has the exclusive discretion in the selection and engagement of the owners-members as
well as its team leaders who will be assigned at Stanfilco.
Second. Wages are defined as remuneration or earnings, however designated, capable of
being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained, on a time, task, piece or
commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer
to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of employment for work done or to be
done, or for service rendered or to be rendered. In this case, the weekly stipends or the so-
called shares in the service surplus given by the respondent cooperative to its owners-members
were in reality wages, as the same were equivalent to an amount not lower than that
prescribed by existing labor laws, rules and regulations, including the wage order applicable to
the area and industry; or the same shall not be lower than the prevailing rates of wages. It
cannot be doubted then that those stipends or shares in the service surplus are indeed wages,
because these are given to the owners-members as compensation in rendering services to
respondent cooperatives client, Stanfilco.
Third. It is also stated in the above-mentioned Service Contracts that it is the respondent
cooperative which has the power to investigate, discipline and remove the owners-members
and its team leaders who were rendering services at Stanfilco.
Fourth. As earlier opined, of the four elements of the employer-employee relationship, the
control test is the most important. In the case at bar, it is the respondent cooperative which
has the sole control over the manner and means of performing the services under the Service
Contracts with Stanfilco as well as the means and methods of work. Also, the respondent
cooperative is solely and entirely responsible for its owners-members, team leaders and other
representatives at Stanfilco. All these clearly prove that, indeed, there is an employer-
employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members.
Bunao vs. SSS
FACTS: Artus E. Bunao (Artus), husband of petitioner, was employed by Ocean Tanker
Corporation as an acting Second Marine Engineer on board the vessels M/T Palawan, M/T
Guimaras and M/T Buenavista from 20 July 1995 until 06 August 1999. Per Job Description from
Ocean Tanker Corporation, Artus was tasked with the duties enumerated hereunder:
1. Plans and implements proper operation, maintenance and repairs of all deck and engine
room machinery and equipment subject to the approval of the Chief Engineer.
2. Conducts routine check-up of all engine room machinery and advises Chief Engineer
regarding malfunctions and operational defects particularly with regard to critical vessel
operations relating to safety or pollution as detailed in the Shipboard Management Manual and
recommends subsequent repairs needed.
3. Accomplishes monthly reports on all engine operational performance, maintenance and
repairs conducted on all machinery.
4. Conducts meetings and submits confidential and other written reports upon the discretion
of the Chief Engineer.
5. Keeps log of performance of other machinery and conscientiously maintains onboard
engine room maintenance and operational records and furnishes same to Chief Engineer for
inclusion in vessel machinery records and reports.
6. Ensures the upkeep and maintenance of the Engine Room by arranging, monitoring and
controlling day to day engine room maintenance activities in coordination with Chief Engineer.
7. Ensures the smooth operation of the vessel main and auxiliary machinery.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
8. Transfers and/or fills up fuel oil and lube oil settling and dry tanks, if necessary.
9. Sees to it that work is carried out safely and efficiently, and in accordance with good
engineering and work practices at all times.
10. Assumes engineering watch in port or underway.
11. Acts as the Chief Engineer in his absence.
12. Performs other duties as may be assigned.
On 23 September 1999, Artus was rushed to the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo, Manila,
because of body weakness. The diagnostic procedures revealed an impression of Renal Cell
Cancer with Liver Metastasis. He was later discharged.
On 15 October 1999, the occurrence of Artuss sickness was reported to the Social Security
System. On 14 November 1999, Artus was again admitted at the same hospital due to loose
bowel movement and body weakness. He was discharged after two days.
Artus died on 29 November 1999. According to the certificate of death, the cause of death was
Hepatic Encephalopathy, Renal Cell Cancer.
Petitioner filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626, as amended, before the SSS. The SSS,
however, denied the claim on the ground that her husband’s ailment, which caused his death,
is not included in the list of occupational diseases, and that the same has no causal relationship
with the nature of her husband’s work.
The Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), upon appeal, affirmed the SSS decision.
Petitioner maintains that that the risk of contracting the fatal ailment that resulted in Artuss
death was increased by the working environs to which the latter was exposed as 2nd Marine
Engineer in Ocean Tanker Corporation from 20 July 1995 to 06 August 1999. She concluded that
the renal cell cancer which caused Artuss demise developed and was brought largely by the
conditions present in the nature of his job.
The SSS, on the other hand, mainly argues that Artuss ailment is not included in the list of
occupational diseases and that petitioner failed to submit proof that would constitute a
reasonable basis for concluding either that the condition of Artuss employment and nature of
work caused the disease or that such working conditions aggravated the risk of contracting the
same.
ISSUE: whether petitioner is entitled to compensation benefits under PD 626
HELD: NO. For the beneficiaries of an employee to be entitled to death benefits under the
system, the cause of death of the employee must be a sickness listed as an occupational disease
by ECC; or any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting
the same is increased by the working conditions.
There is no dispute that renal cell cancer is not listed as an occupational disease under Annex
A of the Rules on Employees Compensation. As such, petitioner has the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence, the causal relationship between her husband's illness and his working
conditions.
Petitioner alleged that in the performance of her husband's duties as 2nd Marine Engineer, the
latter was exposed to leaded petrol and petroleum products that contain various chemicals like
hydrogen, benzene and lead which are health hazards because of their carcinogenicity. She
claims that most of these chemicals precipitate kidney disease, kidney cancer and liver cancer.
Unfortunately, such bare allegations and vague excerpts on cancer do not constitute such
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion that there
is indeed a causal relationship between the illness of the deceased and his working conditions.
Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions.
There is no showing that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the
condition. Petitioner did not present medical history, records or physician's report in order to
substantiate her claim that the working conditions on board the vessels M/T Palawan, M/T
Guimaras and M/T Buenavista increased the risk of contracting renal cell cancer.
Certainly, cancer is a disease that strikes people in general. The nature of a person's
employment appears to have no relevance. Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly
paid executive or one who works on land, in water, or in the deep bowels of the earth. It makes
no difference whether the victim is employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a
blue collar worker, a housekeeper, an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.
GSIS v. Angel
G.R. No. 166863
FACTS:
On 3 March 1998, Sgt. Angel was invited from his post by a certain Capt. Fabie M. Lamerez to
shed light on his alleged involvement in a "pilferage/gunrunning" case being investigated by
the Philippine Army. He was placed inside a detention cell to await further investigation. The
following day, the lifeless body of Sgt. Angel was found hanging inside his cell with an electric
cord tied around his neck. Respondent, the wife of the late Sgt. Angel, filed a complaint before
the PNP Criminal Investigation Command, alleging that her husband was murdered.
On 8 April 1998, upon investigation, The Provost Marshal concluded that foul play may have
been committed against Sgt. Angel and recommended that the case be tried by a court martial.
On 25 April 1998, the Inspector General, upon referral of the case, held that there is no
evidence suggesting foul play. It could have triggered a mental block that caused him to hang
himself. On 3 December 1999, Judge Advocate General Honorio Capulong in his report
recommended that Sgt. Angel be declared to have died in line of duty.
By reason thereof, respondent, as widow of Sgt. Angel, filed a claim for death benefits with the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended.
On 29 September 1999, the GSIS denied the respondent’s claim on the ground that Sgt. Angel’s
death did not arise out of and in the course of employment.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
ECC Ruled in favour of GSIS - the deceased was not performing his official duties at the time of
the incident.
CA: REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the GSIS ORDERED to pay the death benefits due the
petitioner as widow of Sgt. Angel
The soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject
to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of
his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days a week, except, of course, when he is on
vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is
shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going
on an approved vacation leave.
ISSUE: WON the declaration by the Philippine Army that the death of Sgt. Angel was "in line
of duty status" confers compensability under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626
otherwise known as "Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund.
SC:
Pertinent jurisprudence outline that the injury must be the result of an employment accident
satisfying all of the following: 1) the employee must have been injured at the place where his
work requires him to be; 2) the employee must have been performing his official functions; and
3) if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the
employer.
It is important to note, however, that the requirement that the injury must arise out of and in
the course of employment proceeds from the limiting premise that the injury must be the result
of an accident.
An accident is an event which happens without any human agency or, if happening through
human agency, an event which, under the circumstances, is unusual to and not expected by
the person to whom it happens. It has also been defined as an injury which happens by reason
of some violence or casualty to the insured without his design, consent, or voluntary
cooperation.
Art. 172. Limitation of liability – The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for compensation to
the employee or his dependents, except when the disability or death was occasioned by the
employee’s intoxication, willful intention to injure or kill himself or another, notorious
negligence or otherwise provided under this title.
With the law upon the facts, we conclude that the death of Sgt. Angel did not result from an
accident which is compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626. It was on the contrary
occasioned by an intentional or designed act which removes the resulting death from the
coverage of the State Insurance Fund.
Clearly the deceased was not performing his official duties at the time of the incident. On the
contrary, he was being investigated regarding his alleged involvement on a
pilferage/gunrunning case when he was found dead in his cell, an activity which is foreign and
unrelated to his employment as a soldier. Thus, the protective mantle of the law cannot be
extended to him as the documents appear bereft of any showing to justify causal connection
between his death and his employment.
Death in line of duty is not equivalent to a finding that the death resulted from an accident and
was not occasioned by the sergeant’s willful intention to kill himself. It is not enough, as
erroneously pointed out by the Court of Appeals, that there is evidence to support the
conclusion that the sergeant died while in the performance of his duties since he was not
arrested but was merely invited to shed light on the investigation which was "part of official
duties to cooperate with the inquiry being conducted by the Philippine Army." There must be
evidence that the sergeant did not take his own life considering the fact that he was "found
hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck."
From what is extant in the records, though, we rule in favor of the positive finding that there is
no evidence of foul play over the inference that foul play may have been committed. The
circumstances of Sgt. Angel’s death – his lifeless body was found hanging inside his cell with an
electric cord tied around his neck − taken together with the unrebutted finding that there is no
evidence of foul play – negate respondent’s claim of murder of her husband and of
compensability of such death. It was not accidental death that is covered by Presidential Decree
No. 626.
GSIS v. Manuel Besitan
G.R. No. 178901
FACTS:
Respondent Besitan was employed by the Central Bank of the Philippines (now Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas) on January 21, 1976 as a Bank Examiner.7 Subsequently, he was promoted as Bank
Officer II and eventually as Bank Officer III.
In October 2005, Besitan was diagnosed with End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic
Glomerulonephritis and thus, had to undergo a kidney transplant at the National Kidney and
Transplant Institute (NKTI), for which he incurred medical expenses amounting to ₱817,455.40.
Believing that his working condition increased his risk of contracting the disease, Besitan filed
with the GSIS a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626,11 as
amended. The GSIS, however, denied the claim. The GSIS Decision was affirmed by the
Employees Compensation Commission but reversed by the Court of Appeals.
GSIS contends that Besitan’s ailment, Glomerulonephritis, is not an occupational disease;
hence, it is incumbent upon him to prove that the risk of contracting the said disease was
increased by his employment and working condition. And since he failed to show that there is
a causal relationship between his employment and his ailment, he cannot claim compensation
benefits under PD No. 626, as amended.
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
Besitan admits that his ailment is not listed as an occupational disease under PD No. 626, as
amended. He, however, insists that he was able to prove by substantial evidence that the risk
of contracting the disease was increased by his working condition. He maintains that in claiming
compensation benefits, certainty is not required, only probability. He points out that he was in
good health when he was employed by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas in 1976 and that it was
only in 2004 that he contracted his kidney ailment.
ISSUE: Whether Besitan is entitled to compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as amended
HELD:
Section 1, Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation provides that for the
sickness or resulting disability or death to be compensable, the claimant must prove either:
A. that the employee's sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed under
Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation, or
B. That the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working conditions.
Under the increased risk theory, there must be a reasonable proof that the employee’s working
condition increased his risk of contracting the disease, or that there is a connection between
his work and the cause of the disease. Only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct
causal relation, however, is required to establish compensability of a non-occupational disease.
Probability, and not certainty, is the yardstick in compensation proceedings; thus, any doubt
should be interpreted in favor of the employees for whom social legislations, like PD No. 626,
were enacted.
Moreover, direct and clear evidence, is not necessary to prove a claim. Strict rules of evidence
do not apply as PD No. 626 only requires substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
In this case, since Besitan’s ailment, End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic
Glomerulonephritis is not among those listed under Annex "A," of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation, he needs to show by substantial evidence that his risk of
contracting the disease was increased by his working condition.
After a careful study of the instant case, we find that Besitan has sufficiently proved that his
working condition increased his risk of contracting Glomerulonephritis, which according to GSIS
may be caused by bacterial, viral, and parasitic infection (i.e. Typhoid fever, Syphilis,
Leptospirosis, Toxoplasmosis, Varicella, Mumps, Measles, Schistosomiasis, Hepatitis B and C
infection, etc.).
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City Branch, petitioner, vs. MILAGROS O.
MONTESCLAROS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 146494. July 14, 2004]
Facts:
Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas Montesclaros (Nicolas) married Milagros Orbiso (Milagros)
on 10 July 1983. Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he married Milagros who was then
43 years old.
On 4 January 1985, Nicolas filed with the GSIS an application for retirement benefits effective
18 February 1985 under PD 1146 or the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977.
In his retirement application, Nicolas designated his wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary.
Nicolas' last day of actual service was on 17 February 1985.
On 31 January 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas application for retirement effective 17 February
1984, granting a lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and a monthly annuity
thereafter.
Nicolas died on 22 April 1992. Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under
PD 1146. On 8 June 1992, GSIS denied the claim because under Section 18 of PD 1146, the
surviving spouse has no right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the
marriage with the pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
retirement on 17 February 1984.
On 2 October 1992, Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for declaratory relief
questioning the validity of Section 18 of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship
pension.
Issue: Whether or not Section 18 of PD 1146 is valid insofar as it prohibits the dependent
spouse from receiving survivorship pension if such dependent spouse married the pensioner
within three years before the pensioner qualified for the pension.
Held: INVALID.
The proviso which was the sole basis for the rejection by GSIS of Milagros claim, is
unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause. The proviso is also discriminatory
and denies equal protection of the law.
Retirement Benefits as Property Interest
Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the government employee to pay monthly
contributions. PD 1146 mandates the government to include in its annual appropriation the
necessary amounts for its share of the contributions. It is compulsory on the government
employer to take off and withhold from the employees monthly salaries their contributions and
to remit the same to GSIS. The government employer must also remit its corresponding share
to GSIS. Considering the mandatory salary deductions from the government employee, the
government pensions do not constitute mere gratuity but form part of compensation.
In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that
employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the
terms of employment. The reason for providing retirement benefits is to compensate service
to the government. Retirement benefits to government employees are part of emolument to
encourage and retain qualified employees in the government service. Retirement benefits to
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
government employees reward them for giving the best years of their lives in the service of
their country.
Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested
right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause. Retirees enjoy a protected
property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.
Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under
the terms of the public employees pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his
pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.
In addition to retirement and disability benefits, PD 1146 also provides for benefits to survivors
of deceased government employees and pensioners. Under PD 1146, the dependent spouse is
one of the beneficiaries of survivorship benefits. A widows right to receive pension following
the demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual compensation.
Denial of Due Process
The proviso is contrary to Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws. The proviso is unduly oppressive in outrightly
denying a dependent spouses claim for survivorship pension if the dependent spouse
contracted marriage to the pensioner within the three-year prohibited period. There is outright
confiscation of benefits due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving spouse an
opportunity to be heard. The proviso undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure
comprehensive and integrated social security and insurance benefits to government employees
and their dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death, and retirement of the
government employees.
PD 1146 has the following purposes:
a. to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System;
b. to guarantee to the government employee all the benefits due him; and
c. to expand, increase, and improve the social security and insurance benefits made available
to him and his dependents such as:
increasing pension benefits
expanding disability benefits
introducing survivorship benefits
introducing sickness income benefits
extending compulsory membership to all government employees irrespective of status.
The law extends survivorship benefits to the surviving and qualified beneficiaries of the
deceased member or pensioner to cushion the beneficiaries against the adverse economic
effects resulting from the death of the wage earner or pensioner.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The surviving spouse of a government employee is entitled to receive survivors benefits under
a pension system. However, statutes sometimes require that the spouse should have married
the employee for a certain period before the employees death to prevent sham marriages
contracted for monetary gain.
A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the
equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1)
it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of
the same class. Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class
provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class from another.
The proviso in question does not satisfy these requirements. The proviso discriminates against
the dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the pensioner within three years before the
pensioner qualified for the pension. Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married
the pensioner more than three years before the pensioners death, the dependent spouse
would still not receive survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before
the pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the prohibition is vague. There is no
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose intended. The law itself
does not provide any reason or purpose for such a prohibition. If the purpose of the proviso is
to prevent deathbed marriages, then we do not see why the proviso reckons the three-year
prohibition from the date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the
pensioner died. The classification does not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the
classification lumps all those marriages contracted within three years before the pensioner
qualified for pension as having been contracted primarily for financial convenience to avail of
pension benefits.
Indeed, the classification is discriminatory and arbitrary. This is probably the reason Congress
deleted the proviso in Republic Act No. 8291 (RA 8291), otherwise known as the Government
Service Insurance Act of 1997, the law revising the old charter of GSIS (PD 1146). Under the
implementing rules of RA 8291, the surviving spouse who married the member immediately
before the members death is still qualified to receive survivorship pension unless the GSIS
proves that the surviving spouse contracted the marriage solely to receive the benefit.
Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that marriages contracted within three years
before retirement or death of a member are sham marriages contracted to avail of survivorship
benefits. The present GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship pension of the
surviving spouse who contracted marriage to a GSIS member within three years before the
members retirement or death. The law acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse
contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship benefits is a matter of evidence. The
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello
law no longer prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly prejudices the legitimate
surviving spouse and defeats the purpose for which Congress enacted the social legislation.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, vs JEAN E. RAOET,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 157038 December 23, 2009
Facts:
The respondents husband, Francisco M. Raoet entered government service on July 16, 1974 as
an Engineer Trainee at the National Irrigation Administration (NIA). On July 5, 1978, he was
appointed as Junior Civil Engineer, and on April 22, 1981, he rose to the rank of Irrigation
Engineer B. On August 1, 1998, he was promoted to the position of Engineer A the position he
held until his death on May 5, 2001. As Engineer A, Francisco supervised the implementation
of construction activities of Lateral E and E-1. He was also tasked to review and check the
structural plan and the facilities.
In 2000, Francisco was diagnosed with Hypertension, Severe, Stage III, Coronary Artery Disease,
and he was confined at the Region I Medical Center from July 16 to July 25, 2000. As the GSIS
considered this a work-related condition, Francisco was awarded 30 days Temporary Total
Disability benefits, plus reimbursement of medical expenses incurred during treatment.
On May 5, 2001, Francisco was rushed to the Dr. Marcelo M. Chan Memorial Hospital because
he was vomiting blood. He was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital.
The respondent, as widow, filed with the GSIS on May 24, 2001 a claim for income benefits
accruing from the death of her husband, pursuant to PD 626. On August 31, 2001, the GSIS
denied the claim on the ground that the respondent did not submit any supporting documents
to show that Franciscos death was due to peptic ulcer.
On appeal, the ECC affirmed the findings of the GSIS in its decision of July 24, 2002. According
to the ECC, it could not determine if Franciscos death was compensable due to the absence of
documents supporting the respondents claim. Since Francisco had no prior history of
consultation relating to peptic ulcer and no autopsy was performed to ascertain the cause of
his death, the ECC could not conclude that Bleeding Peptic Ulcer Disease was the reason for his
demise.
Issue: Did Franciscos occupation involve prolonged emotional or physical stress to make his
death due to peptic ulcer compensable?
Held: YES.
Based on the GSIS own records, Francisco was diagnosed with Hypertension, Severe, Stage III,
Coronary Artery Disease, and confined at the Region I Medical Center in July 2000. The GSIS
found this ailment work-connected and awarded Francisco 30 days Temporary Total Disability
benefits. This finding assumes importance in the present case because the established
underlying causes of the combination of these diseases are, among others, the stressful nature
and pressures inherent in an occupation. This was what the GSIS acknowledged in recognizing
Franciscos total temporary disability.
Francisco worked as Engineer A with the NIA, a job with enormous responsibilities. He had to
supervise the construction activities of Lateral E and E-1, and review the structural plan and
facilities. The stresses these responsibilities carried did not abate for Francisco when he
returned from his Temporary Total Disability; he occupied the same position without change
of responsibilities until his death on May 5, 2001. Thus, Francisco had continuous exposure to
prolonged emotional stress that would qualify his peptic ulcer a stress-driven ailment as a
compensable cause of death.
In arriving at this conclusion, we stress that in determining the compensability of an illness, we
do not require that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development, or
acceleration of a claimants illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that
his employment contributed, even if only in a small degree, to the development of the disease.
It is well-settled that the degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial
evidence, which means, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. What the law requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a
direct causal relation. It is enough that the hypothesis on which the workmans claim is based is
probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some
basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.
It is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or
acceleration of a claimants illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that
his employment contributed, even if to a small degree, to the development of the disease.
In this case, the chain of causation that led to the peptic ulcer is too obvious to be disregarded.
The pressures of Franciscos work constant, continuing and consistent at his level of
responsibility inevitably manifested their physical effects on Franciscos health and body; the
initial and most obvious were the hypertension and coronary artery disease that the GSIS itself
recognized. Less obvious, but nevertheless arising from the same pressures and stresses, were
the silent killers, like peptic ulcer, that might not have attracted Franciscos attention to the
point of driving him to seek immediate and active medical intervention. Ultimately, when the
ulcer-producing stresses did not end, his ulcer bled profusely, affecting his heart and causing
its arrest. In this manner, Francisco died. That his widow should now be granted benefits for
Franciscos death is a conclusion we cannot avoid and is, in fact, one that we should gladly make
as a matter of law and social justice.
[G.R. No. 141707. May 7, 2002] CAYO G. GAMOGAMO, petitioner, vs. PNOC SHIPPING AND
TRANSPORT CORP., respondent.
FACTS: Herein petitioner was first employed for fourteen years with Department of Health after
his resignation on November 2 1977. After which he was hired as company dentist by Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation (LUSTEVECO), a private domestic corporation which was subsequently
taken over by herein respondent PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation. Petitioner was
AGRARIAN REFORM AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION (SECTION 2B, 1ST SEMESTER, AY 2017-2018)
Atty. Ma. Patricia P. Ruallo-Bello

among those who opted to be absorbed by the Respondent and continued to work as company
dentist.
Respondent implemented a Manpower Reduction Program, wherein retrenched employees
shall receive a two-month pay for every year of service. Petitioner resigned from PNOC upon
reaching 60 years old wherein he received a retirement pay equivalent to one month pay for
every year of service and other benefits. Later, the president of said company was replaced by
Dr. Nemesio E. Prudente who implemented significant cost-saving measures and later two
employees were retrenched and were paid a 2-month separation pay for every year of service
under Respondents Manpower Reduction Program. Due to this, petitioner filed a complaint at
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for the full payment of his retirement benefits
wherein he argued that his service with the DOH should have been included in the computation
of his years of service. The Labor Arbiters dismissed his complaint however, NLRC reversed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondent dismayed, filed with the Court of Appeals a special
civil action for certiorari, and was granted. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s years of service with the DOH must be considered as
creditable service for the purpose of computing his retirement pay.

HELD: No.
The Supreme Court did not uphold petitioners contention that his fourteen years of service
with the DOH should be considered because his last two employers were government-owned
and controlled corporations, and fall under the Civil Service Law. Article IX(B), Section 2
paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution states that--
“Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters.
It is not at all disputed that while Respondent and LUSTEVECO are government-owned and
controlled corporations, they have no original charters; hence they are not under the Civil
Service Law. In addition, petitioner also signed and delivered to Respondent a Release and
Undertaking wherein he waives all actions, causes of actions, debts, dues, monies and accounts
in connection with his employment with Respondent. This quitclaim releases Respondent from
any other obligation in favor of petitioner. While quitclaims executed by employees are
commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy and are ineffective to bar claims for the
full measure of the employee’s legal rights, there are legitimate waivers that represent a
voluntary and reasonable settlement of laborers claims which should be respected by the
courts as the law between the parties.