ISSUES:
Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public
concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon
their approval.
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other
date, without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of
the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette,
and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon
to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Section
14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or local, running for
any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar
as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be
expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the
ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair election practices, while
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section
66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a public appointive office
or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees
in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the
repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no
longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials
continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position.
On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains -
they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its
enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section
16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before
it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence,
should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra,
Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the
“Accountability of Public Officers:”
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those
members of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso
facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.
HELD:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject
of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient
if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing
of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful
and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough
to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require
that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of
Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda,
does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may
be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with
Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of
society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage
political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within
the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to look into
the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired
results, whether, in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a
particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions
does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from
repealing Section 67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of the
provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over
time, Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby
enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly election of truly
deserving members of Congress – is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term
and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive
officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall take effect
immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid.
In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous
publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette
or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that
the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the
exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it
transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been
shown in this case.
Umali vs Estanislao 209 SCRA 446
Facts:
Congress enacted Republic Act 7167 amending the NIRC (adjusting the basic and additional exemptions
allowable to individuals for income tax purposes to the poverty threshold level). The said Act was signed
and approved by the President on 19 December 1991 and published on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a
newspaper of general circulation. On 26 December 1991, the CIR promulgated Revenue Regulations No.
1-92 stating that the regulations shall take effect on compensation income from January 1, 1992.
Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the CIR to implement RA 7167 in regard to income
earned or received in 1991, and prohibition to enjoin the CIR from implementing the revenue regulation.
Issue:
Assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992 (15 days after its publication in “Malaya”),
whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to compensation income earned or received
during calendar year 1991.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to compensation
income earned or received during calendar year 1991. Sec. 29, par. [L], Item No. 4 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall automatically adjust not more
often than once every three years, the personal and additional exemptions taking into account, among
others, the movement in consumer price indices, levels of minimum wages, and bare subsistence levels.
The exemptions were last adjusted in 1986. The president could have adjusted it in 1989 but did not do
so. The poverty threshold level refers to the level at the time Rep. Act 7167 was enacted by Congress.
The Act is a social legislation intended to alleviate in part the present economic plight of the lower
income taxpayers.
Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions shall be available after the law shall have
become effective. These exemptions are available upon the filing of personal income tax returns, done
not later than the 15th day of April after the end of a calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, which
became effective, on 30 January 1992, the increased exemptions are literally available on or before 15
April 1992 [though not before 30 January 1992]. But these increased exemptions can be available on 15
April 1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or received during the calendar year 1991.
The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 are not available in respect of compensation
income received during the 1990 calendar year; the tax due in respect of said income had already
accrued, and been presumably paid (The law does not state retroactive application). The personal
exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available as to compensation income
received during 1992 because it would in effect postpone the availability of the increased exemptions to
1 January-15 April 1993. The implementing regulations collide with Section 3 of Rep. Act 7167 which
states that the statute "shall take effect upon its approval”. The revenue regulation should take effect on
compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1991. Since this decision is promulgated after
15 April 1992, those taxpayers who have already paid are entitled to refunds or credits.
Bara Lidasan vs Commission on Elections
November 12, 2011
21 SCRA 496 – Political Law – Effect if Title Does Not Completely Express the Subject
Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No. 4790, entitled “An Act Creating
the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan however discovered
that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA
4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law,
COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton.
Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the
law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory
several barrios from Cotabato.
ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province – Issue: Whether or not, the family home extrajudicially constituted is entitled to exemption from the
Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be execution levy issued at the instance of the offended party.
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”?

HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult
to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself
that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent
Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually
affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is
to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the
constitutionality of RA 4790.
Held: No.
Ratio: Article 243, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code provides that debts incurred before the declaration was
recorded in Registry of Property shall be exempted. However, the Supreme Court ruled that it is of no
merit that the appellant considered his unpaid indemnity due as a debt, and that, the word “debt: shall
be treated in its generic sense.

Aglipay v. Ruiz, GR No. L-45459, March 13, 1937 StatCon maxim: The context may circumscribe the meaning of a statute; it may give a word or phrase a
meaning different from its usual or ordinary signification. In such a case, the meaning dictated by the
Facts:
context prevails.
Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Phil. Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against respondent
Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of
the 33rd Intl Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invokes that such
issuance and selling, as authorized by Act 4052 by the Phil. Legislature, contemplates religious purpose –
for the benefit of a particular sect or church. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps is constitutional?

Held/Reason:

The Court said YES, the issuing and selling of commemorative stamps by the respondent does not
contemplate any favor upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only ‘to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourist’ and the government just took advantage of an event considered of
international importance, thus, not violating the Constitution on its provision on the separation of the
Church and State. Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a constitutional mandate is
not inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’.
Emphasizing that, ‘when the Filipino people ‘implored the aid of Divine Providence’, they thereby
manifested reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.’

People v. Chaves G.R. No. L-19521. October 30, 1964

Facts: Esteban Chaves has been found guilty by the CFI and CA of a violation of RA 145. He collected a
claim for Marcela Rambuyon for death benefits in the sum of $4,252 due for the demise of her son, a
USAFFE veteran. The check was cashed by Chaves and gave only P3, 202.20 to the claimant and retained
P5, 362.20 for himself. He was sentenced to indemnify the offended party the sum of P5, 362.20 and
costs. However, the indemnity has not been paid yet. So the sheriff resorted into taking a residential lot
and building of the accused. The accused claimed that it was a recorded family home extra-judicially.