CHAVEZ vs.

JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC. Then, the JBC
En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the
Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondent contends that the
phrase “ a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one
representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress”
as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives
be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.

HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of congress”
should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not both.
That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.
In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the
process. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the
two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the
entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7)
members only.
Bolos v Bolos

FACTS:

Petitioner Cynthia Bolos filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to Respondent Danilo
Bolos under Article 36 of the Family Code. After trial, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy
of said decision was received by respondent who thereafter timely filed the Notice of Appeal. The RTC
denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new
trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order declaring its decision declaring
the marriage null and void as final and executor. Then, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari
seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. He also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to
render the essential marital obligations to petitioner, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him,
the family home and their children.

The CA granted the petition. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for
reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the
marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code
took effect. Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized
before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the phrase “under the Family Code” in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such
that petitions filed after the effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the
marriage was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before
its effectivity.

iSSUE:

Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to the case at bench.

HELD:

No, it does not. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is
explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:

“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only
to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3,
1988.7The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation
that the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather than
to the word “marriages.”
ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. and OSCAR TOCMO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSE MARTILLOS, respondents.

Facts:

A complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims was filed against Roos before the NLRC. Jose
Martillos alleged that he had been hired as a driver-mechanic in 1988 but was not made to sign any
employmen contract by Roos. Roos contended that Martillos had been hired on several occasions as a
project employee and that his employment was coterminous with the duration of the projects.

The Labor artiber ruled in favor of Martillos finding that he had acquired the status of a regular employee
as he was hired as a driver with little interruption from one project to another, a task which is necessary to
the usual trade of his employer. The Labor Arbiter ordered Roos to pay Martillos the aggregate sum of
P224,647.17 representing backwages, separation pay, salary differential, holiday pay, service incentive
leave pay and 13th monh pay. Roos filed an appeal however instead of posting the required cash or
surety bond within the reglementary period. The 2nd Division of the NLRC dismissed Roos’ appeal for
lack of jurisdiction stating that the bond is an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the
employer. Roos elevated the dismissal to the CA but the resolution of the NLRC was affirmed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of the appeal bond is substantial compliance with the NLRC rules.

RULING:

NO. The NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeal. The appeal bond is not merely
procedural but jurisdictional. The Court reiterates the settled rule that an appeal from the decision of
the Labor Arbiter involving a monetary award is only deemed perfected upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond within ten (10) days from such decision. The appeal bond is not merely procedural but
jurisdictional. Without said bond, the NLRC does not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal.

The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of
an appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal may be perfected “only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.” The word “only” makes it perfectly clear that the
LAWMAKERS intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means
by which an employer’s appeal may be considered completed. The law however does not require its
outright payment, but only the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should
the appeal fail. The judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of the date it
was originally passed, since the Court’s construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that the interpreted law carried into effect.
Tan vs Sabandal B.M. No. 44 February 24, 1992

Facts: Petitioner files a motion for reconsideration after the court allows respondent to finally take oath
and practice the law profession after considering his plea for forgiveness and showing willingness to
reform along with testimonials attesting to his good moral character among which is a testimonial by the
IBP Zamboanga. Petitioners contend that such testimonial was only signed by its President, a counsel for
the in-laws of Sabandal, without the authorization of the IBP Board members. The court allowed the IBP
to manifest testimony to certify as to the good moral character of the respondent and asked for a
comment from the RTC Judge in Zamboanga. Members of the IBP manifested that they see no
impediments as to the moral character of Sabandal while the RTC Judge informed the court of the civil
case against the respondent concerning the mortgaged land which he secured for a free patent which
turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible for acquisition for a free patent. The civil case however
was settled amicably and the respondent was not charged of any crime. Subsequently, Tan already
forgave the respondent and withdrew her opposition for the taking of oath of office of the respondent
while the other 2 petitioners leave upon the court to decide.

ISSUE: WON Sabandal should be allowed to take oath of office

RULING: The court ruled that in the development of the case, they find Sabandal to have concealed the
civil case brought against him in the course of his series of petitions to be allowed to take oath together
with the testimonies attesting to his good moral character without any mention of the pending case
against him. The court finds this as manipulative and gross dishonesty on the part of the respondent.
Although there were testimonials on his good moral characters those were made without any knowledge
of the case against him. The commission of his offense itself is devoid of honesty. With the practice of law
a matter of privilege and not as a right, they find respondent unfit to be a member of the law profession
therefore it recalled the court resolution of allowing the respondent to take oath.
LEGARDA VS. CA

Facts: Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his appearance
with an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer. Yet, he failed to file the answer within the
extended period prayed for. Counsel for private respondent, New Cathay House Inc. filed an ex-parte
motion to declare petitioner in default which was granted. Then, the trial court rendered its decision in
favor of private respondent. At public auction, the sheriff sold the subject property of petitioner. After the
one year redemption period expired without the petitioner redeeming the property. the sheriff issued a
final deed of sale. Upon learning of this, petitioner prevailed upon her counsel, to seek the appropriate
relief. On November 6, 1986 said counsel filed in the CA a petition for annulment of judgment. The
documentary evidence presented by private respondent is falsified and tampered with. An amended
petition was filed by counsel for petitioner in the CA. 56y

Issue:
Whether counsel committed gross negligence.

Held/Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner's counsel is a well-known practicing lawyer and dean of a law school. It is to be expected
that he would extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to the petitioner. Unfortunately, counsel
appears to have abandoned the cause of petitioner. A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of
his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except
in accordance with the law. He should present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in
support of his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his
duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the
judge or the general public.

RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD

G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

FACTS:
Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged lack
of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and prohibition. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections.However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC.

HELD: Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
— that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. As noted by various authorities,
the practice of law is not limited to court appearances. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more
legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. By no means
will most of this work involve litigation. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full
range of traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation.

METROBANK VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 86100-03 [1990]

FACTS:
Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari as CA affirms the decision of the
trial court expressing its view that petitioner should pay the charging lien on the civil case
filed against them which result into a dismissal. Based upon subsequent dismissal of the
said case, private respondents filed a motion to fix its attorney’s fees based on quantum
meruit, resulting to an exchange between the parties. Petitioners aver that they have paid
services of its lawyers in full but the latter contends that partial amounts forwarded to them
did not consist of payment. To avoid adverse confrontation, petitioners offered to pay
P600,000 in which case respondents refused. Both trial court and appellate court
commanded petitioner to pay the amount of P936,000 based on the charging liens of the
dismissed civil case against them.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien to
satisfy attorney’s fees;
(2) Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien;
(3) Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual
and current market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.
HELD:
Court holds that respondent cannot charge a lien due to the dismissal of the civil case. Such
enforceability is only applicable to money claims and only to dismissed judgments if there is
an applicable law or pre-existing agreement between the parties (7A CJS 756). In addition,
the fixing of attorney’s fees are determined in a separate civl action. Accordingly, in fixing
compensation based on quantum meruit, three conditions are to be considered: (1) the
importance of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered,
and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer.
Likewise, the Court reiterates the legal profession’s manifest mandate for public service
instead of capital gain. Its aim is to uphold public interest and not profiteering.
Court grants petition on a review for certiorari and reverses the decision of inferior courts.
Appropriate proceedings may be commenced by respondent to establish attorney’s fees.

In Re INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE

PHILIPPINES [49 SCRA 22, January 9, 1973]
FACTS:
[T]he Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the “earnest recommendation” — on the
basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 of the Court, and
“consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission’s] Board of Consultants, as
well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar” — that “(the) Honorable
(Supreme) Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption
and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule.” The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the
Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible
and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations.

ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

HELD:
YES. On all issues.

RATIO:
[T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article
VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, “to promulgate rules concerning x x x the admission to the practice of
law.”

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
“perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable,” within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, ordained
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines effective January 16, 1973.

In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 568 (AC 1928)

FACTS:
Atty. Marcial Edillon was dibarred due to non-payment of his IBP dues, hence the petitioner on this case.
He claimed that the provisions of Sec. 10 of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court is unconstitutional as he is
being compelled, as a precondition in maintaining his good standing as a lawyer, to pay and settle his
dues to the IBP. Petitioner stubbornly insisted his take and refused to admit full competence of the court
in this matter. But after some time in realization, his recalcitrance and defiance were gone in his
subsequent communication with the court. He appealed that his health, advanced age, and concern to his
former clients’ welfare be considered in his prayer so that he can again practice law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Edillon should be reinstated as member of the bar.

HELD:
YES. Admission to the bar is a privilege burdened with condition. Failure to abide entails loss of such
privilege. Considered in addition was the two (2) years Atty. Edillon was barred to practice law, and the
dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban that “the power to discipline, especially if amounting
to disbarment, should be exercised in a preservative and not on the vindictive principle”. After contrition
on the part of the petitioner, the court finds reinstatement in order.
Cruz vs. Mina

Facts:

Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law
student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer
may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. However, in an Order dated
February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the
ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the
Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down
in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

Issue:

whether or not petitioner may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant

Ruling:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of
an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.

[A.M. No. P-220. December 20, 1978.]

JULIO ZETA, complainant, vs. FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.

FACTS

Apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior permission
of his superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, respondent court
interpreter also falsified his time records by making it appear therein that he was
present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in the municipal court
appearing as counsel, without being a member of the bar, which furthermore,
constitutes illegal practice of law. The investigating judge recommended the
reprimand of respondent. The Supreme Court dismissed the respondent from his
position as court interpreter.

ISSUE: Whether or not THE RESPONDENT AS COURT INTERPRETER ALLOWED TO

PRACTICE LAW?
HELD: NO.
Only members of the bar are allowed to practice law. The fact that respondent
court interpreter appeared a number of times as counsel indicates that he was
doing it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than pure love
of justice; and his appearance as counsel, without being a member of the Bar.
The appearance as counsel in various municipal courts by a court interpreter, without
prior permission of his superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, and
the falsification of his daily time record to make it appear therein that he was present
in his office when in fact he was not, are grave offenses which warrant his separation
from the service. Respondent is dismissed from his position as interpreter in the Court
of First Instance with prejudice to reemployment in the judicial branch of the
government.