Byzantine navy

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Byzantine Navy
Participant in the Justinianic Wars, the
Byzantine–Arab Wars, the Byzantine–Bulgarian
Wars, the Rus'–Byzantine Wars, the Crusades
and the Byzantine–Ottoman wars
Active 330–1453
Byzantine Emperor
(Commander-in-chief)
Leaders Megas droungarios,
Megas doux (after 11th
century)
Headquarters Constantinople
Area of Mediterranean Sea, Danube,
operations Black Sea
ca. 42,000 men in 899.[1]
Strength ca. 300 warships in 9th–10th
centuries.[2]
Part of Byzantine Empire
Originated as Roman Navy
Venice, Genoa, Pisa,
Allies Crusader states, Emirate of
Aydın
Vandals, Ostrogoths, the
Caliphate and Saracen
pirates, Slavs, Bulgarians,
Opponents Rus', Normans, Genoa,
Venice, Pisa, Crusader states,
Seljuks, Anatolian Turkish
Beyliks, Ottomans

The Byzantine navy comprised the naval forces of the Byzantine Empire. Like the empire it
served, it developed directly from its earlier imperial Roman counterpart, but in comparison
with its precursor played a far greater role in the defense and survival of the state. While the
fleets of the Roman Empire faced few great naval threats, operating as a policing force and
vastly inferior in power and prestige to the legions, the sea was vital to the very existence of
Byzantium, which several historians have called a "maritime empire".[3] Throughout its
history, the Empire had to defend a long coastline, often with little hinterland. In addition,
shipping by sea was always the quickest and cheapest way of transport, and the Empire's
major urban and commercial centers, as well as its most fertile areas, lay close to the sea.[4]
Nevertheless, the nature and limitations of the maritime technology of the age meant that the
Byzantines could not develop a true thalassocracy. Combined with the traditional
predominance of the great Anatolian land-holders in the higher military and civil offices, this
meant that the navy, even at its height, was still regarded largely as an adjunct to the land
forces, a fact clearly illustrated by the relatively lowly positions its admirals held in the
imperial hierarchy.[5]
With the Muslim conquests from the 7th century onwards, the Mediterranean Sea ceased
being a "Roman lake" and became a battleground between Byzantines and Arabs. Not only
were the Byzantine fleets critical in the defense of the Empire's far-flung possessions around
the Mediterranean basin, but they also played a major role in the defense of the imperial
capital of Constantinople from seaborne attacks. Through the use of "Greek fire", the
Byzantine navy's best-known and feared secret weapon, Constantinople was saved from
several sieges and numerous naval engagements were won for the Byzantines. Thus, by the
early 9th century, the Byzantine navy, a well-organized and maintained force, was again the
dominant maritime power in the Mediterranean. The antagonism with the Muslim navies
continued until the 11th century, during which the navy, like the Empire itself, began to
decline.

From that point on, the Byzantines were forced more and more to rely on the navies of allied
Italian city-states like Venice and Genoa, with disastrous effects on their economy and
sovereignty. Recovery under the Komnenians was followed by another period of decline,
which culminated in the disastrous dissolution of the Empire by the Fourth Crusade in 1204.
After the Empire was restored in 1261, several emperors of the Palaiologan dynasty tried to
revive the navy, but their efforts had only a temporary effect. By the mid-14th century, the
Byzantine fleet, which once could field hundreds of warships, was limited to a few dozen at
best.[6] The diminished navy however continued to be active until the fall of the Byzantine
Empire to the Ottomans in 1453.

Contents
[hide]
 1 History
o 1.1 Early period
 1.1.1 Civil wars and barbarian invasions: the 4th and 5th centuries
 1.1.2 The 6th century – Justinian restores Roman control over the
Mediterranean
o 1.2 The struggle against the Arabs
 1.2.1 The emergence of the Arab naval threat
 1.2.2 The Byzantine counter-offensive
 1.2.3 Renewed Muslim ascendancy
o 1.3 The "Byzantine Reconquest"
 1.3.1 The reign of Basil I
 1.3.2 Arab raids during the reign of Leo VI
 1.3.3 The recovery of Crete and the Levant
o 1.4 Komnenian period
 1.4.1 Decline during the 11th century
 1.4.2 Attempts at recovery under Alexios I and John II
 1.4.3 The naval expeditions of Manuel I
o 1.5 Decline
 1.5.1 The Angeloi dynasty
 1.5.2 Nicaea and the Palaiologan period
 2 Organization
o 2.1 Early period (4th – mid-7th centuries)
o 2.2 Middle period (late 7th century – 1070s)
 2.2.1 The naval themes
  2.2.2 Manpower and size
 2.2.3 Rank structure
o 2.3 Late period (1080s – 1453)
 2.3.1 The reforms of the Komnenoi
 2.3.2 The navy of Michael VIII Palaiologos
 3 Ships
 4 Tactics and weapons
o 4.1 Naval tactics
o 4.2 Armament
o 4.3 Greek fire
 5 Citations

 6 Sources and bibliography

[edit] History
[edit] Early period

[edit] Civil wars and barbarian invasions: the 4th and 5th centuries

By the late 5th century, the Western Mediterranean had fallen in the hands of barbarian
kingdoms. The conquests of Justinian I restored Roman control over the entire sea, which
would last until the Muslim conquests in the latter half of the 7th century.

The Byzantine navy, like the East Roman or Byzantine Empire itself, was a continuation of
the Roman Empire and its institutions. After the Battle of Actium in 31 BC, and in the absence
of any external threat, the Roman navy in the Mediterranean performed mostly policing and
escort duties. The Roman fleets were therefore composed of relatively small vessels, best
suited to these tasks. Massive sea battles, like those fought in the Punic Wars, no longer
occurred. By the early 4th century, the permanent Roman fleets had dwindled, so that when
the fleets of the rival emperors Constantine the Great and Licinius clashed in 324 AD,[7] they
were composed to a great extent of newly-built or commandeered ships from the port cities of
the Eastern Mediterranean.[8] The civil wars of the 4th and early 5th centuries did however see
a revival of naval activity, with fleets mostly employed to transport armies, such as in 350,
when Constantius II sailed against the usurper Magnentius, or in Stilicho's wars.[9]
Considerable naval forces continued to be employed in the Western Mediterranean throughout
the first quarter of the fifth century, especially from North Africa, but Rome's mastery of the
Mediterranean was soon challenged, when Africa was overrun by the Vandals over a period of
fifteen years.[10]

The new Vandalic Kingdom of Carthage, under the capable king Geiseric, immediately
launched raids against the coasts of Italy and Greece, even sacking and plundering Rome in
455.[11] The Vandal raids continued over the next two decades, despite repeated Roman
attempts to defeat them.[11] The Western Empire was impotent, its navy having dwindled to
almost nothing,[12] but the eastern emperors could still call upon the resources and naval
expertise of the Eastern Mediterranean. A first Eastern expedition in 448 however went no
further than Sicily, and in 460, the Vandals attacked and destroyed a Western Roman invasion
fleet at Cartagena in Spain.[11] Finally, in 468, a huge expedition was assembled under
Basiliscus, reputedly numbering 1,113 ships and 100,000 men, but it failed disastrously.
About 600 ships were lost, and the financial cost of 130,000 pounds of gold and 700 pounds
of silver nearly bankrupted the Empire.[13] This forced the Empire to come to terms with
Geiseric, signing a peace treaty. After Geiseric's death in 477 however, the Vandal threat
receded.[14]

[edit] The 6th century – Justinian restores Roman control over the Mediterranean

In 508, as antagonism with the Ostrogothic Kingdom of Theodoric flared up, the Emperor
Anastasius I (491–518) sent a fleet of 100 warships against the coasts of Italy.[15] In 513, the
magister militum per Thracias, Vitalian, revolted against Emperor Anastasius I. The rebels
assembled a fleet of some 200 ships, but after a few successes, they were destroyed by
admiral Marinus, who employed an incendiary substance (possibly an early form of Greek
fire) to defeat them.[16]

In 533, taking advantage of the absence of the Vandal fleet in Sardinia, an army of 15,000
under Belisarius was transported to Africa by an invasion fleet of 92 dromons and 500
transports (the entire fleet was manned by 30,000 men),[17] beginning the Vandalic War, the
first of the Wars of Reconquest of Emperor Justinian I (527–565). These were largely
amphibious operations, made possible by the control of the Mediterranean waterways, and the
fleet played a vital role in carrying supplies and reinforcements to the widely dispersed
Byzantine expeditionary forces and garrisons.[16] This fact was not lost on the Byzantines'
enemies. Already in the 520s, Theodoric had planned for a massive fleet buildup directed
against the Romans and the Vandals, but his death in 526 limited the extent of these plans.[18]
In 535, the Gothic War began by a double-pronged offensive, with a fleet again carrying
Belisarius' army to Sicily and then Italy. Roman control of the sea was of great strategic
importance, and allowed the smaller Roman army to successfully occupy the peninsula by
540.[19]
In 541 however, the new Ostrogoth king, Totila, created a fleet of 400 warships with which to
deny the seas around Italy to the Empire. Two Roman fleets were destroyed near Naples in
542,[20] and in 546, Belisarius personally commanded 200 ships against the Gothic fleet that
blockaded the mouths of the Tiber, in a failed effort to relieve Rome.[21] In 550 Totila invaded
Sicily, and in the next year, his fleet, numbering over 300 warships, captured Sardinia and
Corsica, and raided Corfu and the coast of Epirus.[22] However, a defeat at Sena Gallica
marked the beginning of the final Imperial ascendancy.[16] With the final conquest of Italy and
southern Spain under Justinian, the Mediterranean once again became a Roman lake.[16]

Despite the subsequent loss of much of Italy to the Lombards, the Empire maintained control
of the seas, as the Lombards never ventured to sea, and was thus able to maintain several
coastal strips of territory around Italy for centuries.[23] The only major naval action of the next
80 years was during the Siege of Constantinople by the Sassanid Persians and Avars/Slavs in
626. The Slavs' fleet of monoxyla was intercepted by the Byzantine fleet and destroyed,
denying the Persian army passage across the Bosporus and eventually forcing the Avars to
retreat.[24]

[edit] The struggle against the Arabs

[edit] The emergence of the Arab naval threat

For more details on this period, see Byzantium under the Heraclians.

During the 640s, the Muslim conquest of Syria and Egypt created a new threat, as the Arabs
not only conquered significant recruiting and revenue-producing areas, but, after the utility of
a strong navy was demonstrated by the short-lived Byzantine recapture of Alexandria in 644,
they took to creating a navy of their own. In this effort, the Arabs used the manpower of the
conquered Levant, which until a few years ago had provided ships and crews for the
Byzantines.[25] As a result, and because of a shared Mediterranean maritime tradition and
mutual interactions in the subsequent centuries, the Arab ships were very similar to their
Byzantine counterparts.[26] This similarity also extended to tactics and general fleet
organization, with translations of Byzantine military manuals being available to the Arab
admirals.[27]

After seizing Cyprus in 649 and raiding Rhodes, Crete and Sicily, the young Arab navy
decisively defeated the Byzantines under the personal command of Emperor Constans II
(641–668) in the Battle of the Masts of 655.[28] This catastrophic Byzantine defeat opened up
the Mediterranean to the Arabs, and began a centuries-long series of naval conflicts over the
control of the Mediterranean waterways.[29][28] From the reign of Muawiyah I (661–680), raids
intensified, as preparations were maid for a great assault on Constantinople itself. In the long
first Arab siege of Constantinople, the Byzantine fleet proved instrumental to the survival of
the Empire: through the use of its newly-developed feared secret weapon, the "Greek fire",
the Arab fleets were defeated. The Muslim advance in Asia Minor and the Aegean was halted,
and a thirty-year truce concluded soon after.[30]

In the 680s, under Justinian II (685–695 and 705–711), great care was shown to the navy,
which was strengthened by the resettlement of over 18,500 Mardaites along the southern
coasts of the Empire, where they were employed as marines and rowers.[31] Nevertheless, the
Arab naval threat intensified as they gradually took control of North Africa in the 680s and
690s.[32] The last Byzantine stronghold, Carthage, fell in 698, although a Byzantine naval
expedition managed to briefly retake it.[33] The Muslims built a new city and naval base at
Tunis, and 1,000 Coptic shipwrights were brought to construct a new fleet, which, under
Musa bin Nusair, would challenge Byzantine control of the western Mediterranean.[34] From
the early 8th century on, Muslim raids unfolded unceasingly against Byzantine holdings in the
Western Mediterranean, especially Sicily.[35] In addition, the new fleet would allow the
Muslims to complete their conquest of the Maghreb and to successfully invade and capture
most of Spain.[36]

[edit] The Byzantine counter-offensive

For more details on this period, see Byzantium under the Isaurians.

Emperor Leo III the Isaurian and his son and successor, Constantine V. Together, they
spearheaded a revival of Byzantine fortunes against the Arabs, but also caused great internal
strife because of their iconoclastic policies.

The Byzantines were unable to respond effectively to the Muslim advance in Africa, because
the two decades between 695 and 715 were a period of great domestic turmoil.[37] They did
react with raids of their own in the East, such as the one in 709 against Egypt which captured
the local admiral,[35] but they also prepared for the coming onslaught: as Caliph al-Walid I
(705–715) readied his forces for a renewed assault against Constantinople, Emperor
Anastasios II (713–715) prepared the capital, and mounted an unsuccessful preemptive strike
against the Muslim naval preparations.[37] Anastasios was soon overthrown by Theodosius III
(715–717), who in turn was replaced, just as the Muslim army was advancing through
Anatolia, by Leo III the Isaurian (717–741). It was Leo III who faced the second and last Arab
siege of Constantinople. The use of Greek fire, which devastated the Arab fleet, was again
instrumental to the Byzantine victory, while a harsh winter and Bulgar attacks further sapped
the besiegers' strength.[38]

In the aftermath of the siege, the retreating remains of the Arab fleet were decimated in a
storm, and Byzantine forces launched a counteroffensive, with a fleet sacking Laodicea and
an army driving the Arabs from Asia Minor.[39][40] For the next three decades, naval warfare
featured constant raids from both sides, with the Byzantines launching repeated attacks
against the Musilm naval bases in Syria (Latakia), and Egypt (Damietta and Tinnis).[35] In 727,
a revolt of the thematic fleets, largely motivated by resentment against the Emperor's
iconoclasm, was put down by the imperial fleet through use of Greek fire.[41] Despite the
losses this entailed, in 739, some 390 warships were reportedly sent to attack Damietta,[35] and
in 747, aided for the first time by ships from the Italian city-states, the Byzantines decisively
defeated the combined Syrian and Alexandrian fleets off Cyprus, breaking the naval power of
the Umayyad Caliphate.[35]

The Byzantines followed this up with the destruction of the North African flotillas, and
coupled their successes with severe trading limitations imposed on Muslim traders, which,
given the Empire's ability to control the waterways, strangled Muslim maritime trade.[42]
Together with the collapse of the Ummayyad state shortly thereafter and the increasing
fracturing of the Muslim world, the Byzantine navy was left as the sole organized naval force
in the Mediterranean.[35] Thus, during the latter half of the 8th century, the Byzantines enjoyed
a second period of complete naval superiority.[25] During this time, to stand watch on the
coasts of Syria, guarding against a raid by the Byzantine fleet, was deemed by the Muslims
more pious an act than a night of prayer in the Kaaba.[43]

These successes enabled Emperor Constantine V (741–775) to shift the fleet from the
Mediterranean to the Black Sea during his campaigns against the Bulgars in the 760s. In 763,
a fleet of 800 ships carrying 9,600 cavalry and some infantry sailed to Anchialus, where he
scored a significant victory, but in 766, a second fleet, allegedly of 2,600 ships, again bound
for Anchialus, sank en route.[44]

[edit] Renewed Muslim ascendancy

"During that time [...] the Muslims gained control over the whole Mediterranean.
Their power and domination over it was vast. The Christian nations could do
nothing against the Muslim fleets, anywhere in the Mediterranean. All the time, the
Muslims rode its wave for conquest."
Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, III.32[45]

This Byzantine naval predominance was to last until the early 9th century, when a succession
of disasters spelled its end and inaugurated an era that would represent the zenith of Muslim
ascendancy.[46] Already in 790, the Byzantines suffered a major defeat in the Gulf of Antalya,
and raids against Cyprus and Crete recommenced during the reign of Harun al-Rashid (786–
809).[47] Around the Mediterranean, new powers were rising, foremost amongst them the
Carolingian Empire. In 803, the Pax Nicephori recognized the de facto independence of
Byzantine Venice, which was further established by the repulsion of a Byzantine attack in
809.[48] At the same time, in Ifriqiya, the new Aghlabid dynasty was established, which
immediately engaged in raids throughout the central Mediterranean.[48]

The Byzantines on the other hand were weakened by a series of catastrophic defeats against
the Bulgars, followed in 820 by the revolt of Thomas the Slav, which carried along a large
part of the Byzantine armed forces, including the thematic fleets.[49] Despite its suppression, it
severely depleted the Empire's defenses. As a result, Crete fell between 824 and 827 to a band
of Andalusian exiles. Three successive Byzantine recovery attempts failed in short order over
the next few years, and the island became a base for Muslim piratical activity in the Aegean,
radically upsetting the balance of power in the region.[50] In the Levant, under the Abbasid
Caliphate, Arab naval power was reviving,[51] and despite some successes over the Cretan
corsairs, and the razing of Damietta by a Byzantine fleet of 85 ships in 853, the Byzantines
were kept constantly engaged by the operations of the Muslim fleets.[52]

The situation was even worse in the West, where a critical blow was inflicted on the Empire in
827, as the Aghlabids began the slow conquest of Sicily, aided by the defection of the
Byzantine commander Euphemius, together with the island's thematic fleet.[51][53] In 838, the
Muslims crossed over into Italy, taking Taranto and Brindisi, followed soon by Bari. Venetian
operations against them were unsuccessful, and throughout he 840s, the Arabs were freely
raiding Italy and the Adriatic, even attacking Rome in 846.[53] Attacks by the Lombards and
Lothair I failed to dislodge the Muslims from Italy, while two large-scale Byzantine attempts
to reconquer Sicily were heavily defeated in 840 and 859.[54] By 850, the Muslim fleets,
together with large numbers of independent ghazi raiders, had emerged as the major power of
the Mediterranean, putting the Byzantines and the Christians in general on the defensive.[51][55]

The same period, when a battered Byzantium defended itself against enemies on all fronts,
also saw the emergence of a new threat from an unforeseen direction: the Rus' made their first
appearance in Byzantine history with a raid against Paphlagonia in the 830s, followed by a
major expedition in 860.[56][57]

[edit] The "Byzantine Reconquest"

For more details on this period, see Byzantium under the Macedonians.

During the course of the latter 9th and the 10th century, as the Caliphate fractured into smaller
states and Arab power became weakened, the Byzantines launched a series of successful
campaigns against them.[58] This "Byzantine Reconquest" was overseen by the able sovereigns
of the Macedonian dynasty (867–1056), and marked the high water-mark of the Byzantine
state.

[edit] The reign of Basil I

Gold solidus of Emperor Basil I the Macedonian. His patronage of the fleet resulted in several
successes and was long remembered by the sailors, forming strong ties of loyalty to the
Macedonian dynasty that were felt up until the days of his grandson, Constantine VII.[59]

The ascension of Emperor Basil I (867–886) heralded this revival, as he embarked on an

aggressive foreign policy. Continuing the policies of his predecessor, Michael III (842–867),
he showed great care to the fleet, and as a result, successive victories followed: in 867, a fleet
under the droungarios tou plōïmou Niketas Ooryphas relieved Dalmatia from Arab attacks
and reestablished Byzantine presence in the area,[60] while a few years later, he twice heavily
defeated the Cretan pirates,[61] temporarily securing the Aegean.[51] At the same time Cyprus
was temporarily recovered and Bari occupied.[62] At the same time however, the Muslim
presence in Cilicia was strengthened, and Tarsos became a major base for land and seaborne
attacks against Byzantine territory, especially under the famed emir Yazaman al-Khadim
(882–891).[63]
In the West, the Muslims continued to make steady advances. Following the fall of Enna in
855, the Byzantines were confined to the eastern shore of the island, and under increasing
pressure. A relief expedition in 868 achieved little. Syracuse was attacked again in 869, and in
870, Malta fell to the Aghlabids.[64] Muslim ships raided the Adriatic, and although they were
driven pout of Apulia, they established bases along the western Italian coast in the early 880s,
from where they would not be completely dislodged until 915.[65] In 878, Syracuse, the main
Byzantine stronghold in Sicily, was attacked again and lost, largely because the Imperial Fleet
was occupied with transporting marble for the construction of the Nea Ekklesia, Basil's new
church.[66] In 880, Ooryphas' successor, the droungarios Nasar, scored a significant victory in
a night battle over the Tunisians who were raiding the Ionian Islands. He then proceeded to
raid Sicily, carrying off much booty, before defeating another Muslim fleet off Punta Stilo,
while another Byzantine squadron scored a significant victory at Naples.[67][68] These successes
allowed a short-lived Byzantine counteroffensive to develop in the West in the 880s under
Nikephoros Phokas the Elder, during which the Byzantine foothold in Apulia and Calabria
was expanded, forming the thema of Langobardia, which would later evolve into the
Catepanate of Italy. A heavy defeat off Milazzo in 888 however signaled the virtual
disappearance of major Byzantine naval activity in the seas around Italy for the next century.
[51][69]

[edit] Arab raids during the reign of Leo VI

Despite the successes under Basil, during the reign of his successor Leo VI the Wise (886–
912), the Empire was again under serious threats. In the north, a war broke out against the
Bulgarian Tsar Simeon, and in 895, a part of the Imperial Fleet was used to ferry an army of
Magyars across the Danube to raid Bulgaria.[70] The Bulgarian war produced several costly
defeats, while at the same time the Arab naval threat reached new heights, as successive raids
devastated the shores of Byzantium's naval heartland, the Aegean Sea. In 891 or 893, the Arab
fleet sacked the island of Samos and took its stratēgos prisoner, and in 898, the eunuch
admiral Raghib carried off 3,000 Byzantine sailors of the Kibyrrhaiotai as prisoners.[71] These
losses denuded the Byzantine defenses, opening the Aegean up to raids by the Syrian fleets.[63]
The first heavy blow came in 901, when the renegade Damian of Tyre plundered Demetrias.
[71]
The greatest disaster however came in 904, when another renegade, Leo of Tripoli, raided
the Aegean and even penetrated the Dardanelles, before proceeding to sack the Empire's
second city, Thessalonica, all this while the Empire's fleet remained passive in the face of the
Arabs' superior numbers.[72] These losses were coupled with the fall of Taormina, the Empire's
last outpost in Sicily, in 902.[65] It is no surprise that a defensive and cautious mindset is
advocated by the contemporary Naumachica of Emperor Leo.[51]

The most distinguished Byzantine admiral of the period was Himerios, the logothetēs tou
dromou. Appointed admiral in 904, he was unable to prevent the sack of Thessalonica, but he
scored a first victory in 906, and in 910, he led a successful attack on Laodicea.[73] The city
was sacked and its hinterland plundered and ravaged without the loss of any ships.[74] A year
later, however, a huge expedition under Himerios against the Emirate of Crete, comprising a
fleet of 112 dromons and 75 pamphyloi with 43,000 men, failed,[75] followed by a catastrophic
defeat at the hands of Leo of Tripoli off Chios, as the fleet returned to Constantinople.[76]

The tide began to turn again after 920. Coincidentally or not, the same year witnessed the
ascension of an admiral, Romanus Lecapenus (920–944), to the Imperial throne, for the
second (after Tiberius Apsimarus) and last time in the Empire's history. Finally, in 923, the
decisive defeat of Leo of Tripoli off Lemnos, coupled with the death of Damian during a siege
of a Byzantine fortress in the next year, marked the beginning of the Byzantine resurgence.[77]

[edit] The recovery of Crete and the Levant

In 961, Nikephoros Phokas led a huge amphibious operation which recovered Crete for the
Empire, thus securing the safety of the Aegean Sea from the Muslim pirate threat.

In 942, Emperor Romanos I sent a squadron which destroyed a fleet of Muslim corsairs from
Fraxinetum with Greek fire.[78] The Empire's might was growing, and in 949, Constantine VII
(945–959) launched an expedition of about 100 Byzantine ships carrying 4,100 men against
the Emirate of Crete, which ended in disaster due to the incompetence of its commander,
Constantine Gongyles.[79][80] A renewed offensive in Italy in 951–952 was defeated by the
Aghlabids, but another expedition in 956 and the loss of an Tunisian fleet in a storm in 958
temporarily stabilized the situation in the peninsula.[78] Following a revolt by the island's
Greeks, in 963–965 a Byzantine expeditionary force recovered Taormina,[81] but a heavy
Byzantine defeat by the Fatimids at the Straits of Messina in 965 resulted in the end of
significant naval activity.[82] The seas of Italy were left to the local Byzantine forces and the
various local states until after 1025, when Byzantium again actively intervened in southern
Italy and Sicily.[83][82]

In 956, the stratēgos Basil Hexamilites inflicted a crushing defeat on the Tarsos fleet, opening
the way for another grand expedition to recover Crete.[78] In 960, Nikephoros Phokas set out
with a fleet of 100 dromons, 200 chelandia, and 308 transports carrying, together with their
crews, a force of 77,000 men to subdue the island.[84] The conquest of Crete removed the
direct threat to the Aegean, Byzantium's naval heartland, while the subsequent advance by
Phokas led to the recovery of Cilicia (in 963), Cyprus (in 968),[85] and the northern Syrian
coast (in 969).[86] These conquests removed the threat of the once mighty Muslim Syrian
fleets, effectively re-establishing Byzantine dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean.[82] A few
raids and naval clashes occurred as antagonism with the Fatimids mounted in the late 990s,
but as peaceful relations were restored, the Eastern Mediterranean remained relatively calm
for several decades to come.[87]

During the same period, the Byzantine fleet was active in the Black Sea: a Rus' fleet that was
threatening Constantinople in 941 was destroyed by a hastily assembled fleet of 15 old ships
equipped with Greek fire, and the navy played an important role in the Rus'–Byzantine War of
968–971, when John I Tzimiskes (969–976) sent 300 ships to blockade the Kievan Rus from
the Danube.[88]

[edit] Komnenian period

 For more details on this period, see Byzantium under the Komnenoi.

[edit] Decline during the 11th century

"Strive at all time to have the fleet in top condition and to have it not want for
anything. For the fleet is the glory of Rhōmania. [...] The droungarios and
prōtonotarios of the fleet should [...] investigate with rigor the slightest thing
which is done to the fleet. For when the fleet is reduced to nothingness, you shall
be overthrown and fall."
Admonitions to the Emperor
Strategikon of Kekaumenos, Ch. 87

Throughout most of the 11th century, the Byzantine navy faced few challenges. The Muslim
threat had receded, as their navies declined and relations between the Fatimids especially and
the Empire were largely peaceful: the last Arab raid against imperial territory was recorded in
1035 in the Cyclades, and was defeated in the next year.[89] Another Rus' attack in 1043 was
beaten back with ease, and with the exception of a short-lived attempt to recover Sicily under
George Maniakes, no major naval expeditions were undertaken either. Inevitably, this long
period of peace and prosperity led to complacency and neglect of the military: already under
Basil II (976–1025) the defense of the Adriatic was entrusted to the Venetians, and under
Constantine IX (1042–1055), both army and navy were reduced, as military service was
increasingly commuted in favor of cash payments, and the dependency upon foreign
mercenaries increased.[90][91] The large thematic fleets declined, and were replaced by small
squadrons subject to the local military commanders, geared more towards the suppression of
piracy than towards confronting a major maritime foe.[92]

By the last quarter of the 11th century, the Byzantine navy was thus a shadow of its former
self, having declined through neglect, the incompetence of its officers, and lack of funds.[93]
Kekaumenos, writing in ca. 1078, laments that "on the pretext of reasonable patrols, [the
Byzantine ships] are doing nothing else but ferrying wheat, barley, pulse, cheese, wine, meat,
olive oil, a great deal of money, and anything else" from the islands and coasts of the Aegean,
while they "flee [the enemy] before they have even caught sight of them, and thus become an
embarrassment to the Romans."[94] By the time Kekaumenos wrote, new and powerful
adversaries had risen. In the West, the Norman Kingdom of Sicily, which had expelled the
Byzantines from Southern Italy, and had conquered Sicily,[95] was now casting its eye on the
Byzantine Adriatic coasts and beyond. In the East, the disastrous Battle of Manzikert in 1071
had resulted in the loss of Asia Minor, the Empire's military and financial heartland, to the
Seljuk Turks. By 1081, they had established their capital at Nicaea, barely a hundred miles
south of Constantinople.[96]

[edit] Attempts at recovery under Alexios I and John II

At this point, the sorry state of the Byzantine fleet had dire consequences. The Norman
invasion could not be forestalled, and their army seized Corfu, landed unopposed in Epirus
and laid siege to Dyrrhachium,[97] starting a decade of war which consumed the scant
resources of the embattled Empire.[98] The new emperor, Alexios I Komnenos (1081–1118),
was forced to call upon the assistance of the Venetian fleet against the Normans. In exchange
for their help, in 1082, he granted them major trading concessions. This treaty, and subsequent
extensions of these privileges, practically rendered the Byzantines hostage to the Venetians
(and later also the Genoese and the Pisans): "Byzantium's lack of a navy [...] meant that
Venice could regularly extort economic privileges, determine whether invaders [...] entered
the Empire, and parry any Byzantine attempts to restrict Venetian commercial or naval
activity."[98] In the clashes with the Normans through the 1080s, the only effective Byzantine
naval force was a squadron, commanded and possibly also maintained by Michael Maurex, a
veteran naval commander of previous decades. Together with the Venetians, he initially
prevailed over the Norman fleet, but was then defeated off Corfu in 1084.[99]

Alexios inevitably realized the importance of having his own fleet, and despite his
preoccupation with land operations, he took steps to re-establish the navy's strength. His
efforts bore some success, especially in countering the attempts by Turkish emirs like Tzachas
of Smyrna to launch fleets in the Aegean.[100] The fleet under John Doukas was subsequently
used to suppress revolts in Crete and Cyprus,[101] and with the aid of the Crusaders, Alexios
was able to regain the coasts of Western Anatolia and expand his influence eastwards: in 1104,
a Byzantine squadron of 10 ships captured Laodicea and other coastal towns as far as Tripoli.
[102]
By 1118 Alexios was able to pass on a small navy to his successor, John II Komnenos
(1118–1143).[103] Like his father, John II concentrated on the army and regular land-based
campaigns, but he took care to maintain the navy's strength and provisioning system.[104] This
did not avert an embarrassment when in 1122, John refused to renew the trading privileges
that Alexios had granted to the Venetians in; after they had plundered several Byzantine
islands in retaliation, and with the Byzantine fleet unable to confront them, John was forced to
renew the treaty in 1125.[103] Evidently the Byzantine navy at this point was not sufficiently
powerful for John to successfully confront Venice, especially as there were other pressing
demands on the Empire's resources. Not long after this incident however, John II, under the
advice of his finance minister, John of Poutze, is reported to have cut funding to the fleet and
transferred it to the army, equipping ships on an ad hoc basis only.[105][103]

[edit] The naval expeditions of Manuel I

The navy enjoyed a major comeback after 1143 under the ambitious emperor Manuel I
Komnenos (1143–1180), who used it extensively as a powerful tool of foreign policy in his
relations with the Latin and Muslim states of the Eastern Mediterranean.[106] As late as 1147,
the fleet of Roger II of Sicily under George of Antioch was able to raid Corfu, the Ionian
islands and into the Aegean almost unopposed.[107] In the next year, with Venetian aid, an army
accompanied by a very large fleet (allegedly 500 warships and 1,000 transports) was sent to
recapture Corfu and the Ionian Islands from the Normans. In retaliation, a Norman fleet of 40
ships reached Constantinople itself, demonstrating in the Bosporus off the Great Palace and
raiding its suburbs.[108][109] On its return voyage however it was attacked and destroyed by a
Byzantine or Venetian fleet.[109]

In 1155, a Byzantine squadron of 10 ships in support of Norman rebel Robert III of Loritello
landed at Ancona, launching the last Byzantine bid to regain Southern Italy. Despite initial
successes and reinforcements under megas doux Alexios Komnenos Bryennios, the expedition
was ultimately defeated in 1156, and 4 Byzantine ships were captured.[110] By 1169, the efforts
of Manuel had evidently borne fruit, as a large and purely Byzantine fleet of about 150
galleys, 20 large transports and 60 horse transports under megas doux Andronikos
Kontostephanos was sent to invade Egypt in cooperation with the ruler of the Crusader
Kingdom of Jerusalem.[111][112] The invasion failed however, and the Byzantines lost half
(about 100 ships) in a storm on the way back.[113]

Following the Empire-wide seizure and imprisonment of all Venetians in March 1171, the
Byzantine fleet was strong enough to deter an outright attack by the Venetians, who settled for
negotiations. Manuel sent a fleet under Kontostephanos to confront them and employed
delaying tactics, until, weakened by disease, the Venetians began to withdraw, pursued by
Kontostephanos' fleet.[114][115] It was a remarkable reversal of fortunes, compared with the
humiliation of 1125. In 1176, another fleet of 150 ships under Kontostephanos, destined for
Egypt, returned home after appearing off Acre due to the refusal of Count Philip of Flanders
and many important nobles of the Kingdom of Jerusalem to help.[116] However, by the end of
Manuel's reign, the strains of constant warfare on all fronts and the Emperor's various
grandiose projects had become evident: the historian Nicetas Choniates attributes the rise of
piracy to the diversion of the funds, provided by the Aegean islands for the maintenance of the
fleet, to cover the various other needs of the imperial treasury.[117]

[edit] Decline

[edit] The Angeloi dynasty

For more details on this period, see Byzantium under the Angeloi.

The Fall of Constantinople to the Fourth Crusade marked the triumph of the Latin West, and
especially the Venetian maritime power, over the enfeebled Byzantine Empire.

After the death of Manuel I and the subsequent demise of the Komnenian dynasty in 1185, the
navy deteriorated swiftly and hopelessly. The maintenance of galleys and the upkeep of
proficient crews was very expensive, and neglect could lead to a rapid deterioration of the
fleet. Already in 1182 the Byzantines had to pay Venetian mercenaries to crew some of their
galleys,[118] but in the the 1180s, as the Komnenian establishment still remained, expeditions of
70–100 ships are still recorded in contemporary sources.[119]

Thus, in 1185, Emperor Andronikos I (1183–1185) could still gather 100 warships to resist
and later defeat a Norman fleet in the Sea of Marmara.[120] However, the subsequent peace
treaty included a clause which required Sicily to furnish a fleet for the Empire. Together with
a similar agreement made by Isaac II Angelos (1185–1195 and 1203–1204) with Venice the
next year, in which the Republic would provide 40–100 galleys at six months' notice in
exchange for favorable trading concessions, it is a telling indication that the Byzantine
government was aware of the inadequacy of its own naval establishment.[118] In 1186, with his
brother Alexios III (1195–1203) being held captive in Acre, Isaac II sent 80 galleys to liberate
him, but the fleet was destroyed off Cyprus by the Norman pirate Margaritus of Brindisi.
Later in the same year, another Byzantine fleet of 70 ships was sent by Isaac II to recapture
Cyprus from Isaac Komnenos, but it was also defeated by Margaritus.[121] In an attempt to
regain some lost territories in the Holy Land, in 1189 the Byzantine Emperor agreed to send
100 galleys to aid Saladin in capturing Antioch.[122]

The decline accelerated during the 1190s: according to Choniates, the then megas doux,
Michael Stryphnos, sold off the equipment of the warships for his own profit,[118] so that by
1196, there were only about 30 galleys left.[6] The Byzantines were thus helpless as Genoese
and Venetians operated freely in the Aegean during the latter 1190s, raiding at will and
imposing their terms on the Empire.[123] During this period, the Byzantines came to rely on
hiring Western privateers to fight for them.[111] By the time the Fourth Crusade arrived at
Constantinople in 1203, there were only 20 ships left, so decayed that during the siege, 17
were employed, without success, used as fireships against the Venetian fleet.[6]

[edit] Nicaea and the Palaiologan period

For more details on this period, see Byzantium under the Palaiologoi.

After the Fourth Crusade, the Nicaean Emperors initially pursued a policy of consolidation.
Naval operations were limited, but in 1225, the Nicaean fleet was able to occupy the islands
of Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and Icaria. Only after the recapture of Constantinople in 1261 was
the Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos (1259–1282) able to focus his attention on the fleet. In
the early 1260s, the Byzantine navy was still weak, as evidenced by the defeat of a combined
Byzantine-Genoese fleet of 48 ships by a much smaller Venetian fleet in 1263.[124] By 1270
however, Michael's efforts produced a strong navy of 80 ships, with several Latin privateers
sailing under imperial colors. In the same year, a fleet of 24 galleys besieged the town of
Oreos in Negroponte (Euboea), and defeated a Latin fleet of 20 galleys.[125] This marked the
first successful independent Byzantine naval operation and the beginning of an organized
naval campaign in the Aegean, that would continue throughout the 1270s and would result in
the recapture, albeit briefly, of many islands from the Latins.[126]

This revival did not last long. Michael's successor Andronikos II Palaiologos (1282–1328)
wrongly assumed that by relying on the naval strength of his Genoese allies he could
completely do without the maintenance of a fleet, with its particularly heavy expenditure. He
therefore disbanded the navy, and instead hired 50–60 Genoese galleys in 1291. Andronikos'
cutbacks of military expenditures were extended to the army as well, and had severe effects:
during his long reign, the Turks gradually took permanent possession of the Aegean coasts of
Anatolia, with the Empire unable to reverse the situation. In ca. 1320, the Emperor belatedly
tried to rebuild the navy by constructing 20 ships, but this effort came to naught.[6] His
grandson and heir Andronikos III Palaiologos (1328–1341) actively tried to rebuild the navy's
strength, personally leading it in expeditions against Latin holdings in the Aegean, but his
policies failed to stem the overall decline. After his reign, the highest number of warships ever
mentioned to be in the Byzantine navy rarely exceeded ten, but with impressment of merchant
vessels, fleets of 100–200 ships could still occasionally be assembled.[6]

The navy was very active during the civil war of 1341–1347, in which its commander, the
megas doux Alexios Apokaukos, played a prominent role. Following the civil war, Emperor
John VI Kantakouzenos (1347–1354) tried to restore the navy and merchant fleet, as a means
of both reducing the Empire's dependency on the Genoese colony of Galata, and of securing
the control of the Dardanelles against passage by the Turks. To that end, he enlisted the aid of
the Venetians, but in March 1349, his newly-built fleet of 9 fair-sized and about 100 smaller
ships was caught in a storm off the southern shore of Constantinople. The inexperienced
crews panicked, and the ships were either sunk or captured by the Genoese.[127] In 1351,
Kantakouzenos participated with only 12 ships in the war of Venice and Aragon against
Genoa, but was soon forced to sign an unfavorable peace.[128]

Kantakouzenos was the last emperor who had the means to try and restore the navy, as the
Empire, weakened by civil wars and territorial loss, went into terminal decline. During the
brief usurpation of John VII in 1390, Manuel II (1391–1425) was able to gather only 5 galleys
and 4 smaller vessels (including some from the Knights of Rhodes) to recapture
Constantinople and rescue his father John V.[129] Six years later, Manuel promised to arm 10
ships to assist the Crusade of Nicopolis;[130] twenty years later, he personally commanded 4
galleys and 2 other vessels carrying some infantry and cavalry, and saved the island of Thasos
from an invasion.[131] Likewise, in 1421, 10 Byzantine warships were engaged in support of
the Ottoman pretender Mustafa against Sultan Murad II.[130]

The last recorded Byzantine naval victory occurred in 1427 in a battle off the Echinades
Islands, when the Emperor John VIII Palaiologos (1425–1448) defeated the superior fleet of
Carlo I Tocco, Count of Cephalonia and Despot of Epirus, forcing him to relinquish all his
holdings in the Morea to the Byzantines.[132] The last appearance of the Byzantine navy was in
the final Ottoman siege of 1453, when a fleet of 10 Byzantine and 16 foreign ships defended
Constantinople against the Ottoman fleet.[133] During the siege, on 20 April 1453, the last
naval engagement in Byzantine history took place, when three Genoese galleys escorting a
Byzantine transport fought their way through the huge Ottoman blockade fleet and into the
Golden Horn.[134]

[edit] Organization
[edit] Early period (4th – mid-7th centuries)

Under Emperor Diocletian, the navy's strength reportedly increased from 46,000 men to
64,000 men,[135] a figure that represents the numerical peak of the late Roman navy. By the 4th
century, the large, permanent fleets of the early Empire had been progressively broken up in
smaller squadrons. During the 4th and 5th centuries, the situation regarding the structure of
the navy is somewhat unclear. The Danube Fleet (Classis Histrica) with its attendant
legionary flotillas is still well attested in the Notitia Dignitatum, and its increased activity is
commented upon by Vegetius.[136] In the West, several fluvial fleets are mentioned, but the old
standing praetorian fleets had all but vanished,[137] and even the remaining western provincial
fleets appear to have been seriously understrength and incapable of countering any significant
barbarian attack.[138] In the East, the Syrian and Alexandrian fleets are known from legal
sources to have remained in existence in ca. 400 AD,[139] while a fleet is known to have been
stationed at Constantinople itself, perhaps created out of the remnants of the praetorian fleets.
[8]
Its size however is unknown, and it does not appear in the Notitia.[140]

During the 5th century, for operations in the Mediterranean, fleets appear to have been
assembled on an ad hoc basis and then disbanded.[16] The first permanent Byzantine fleet can
be traced to the revolt of Vitalian in 513–515, when Anastasius I created a fleet to counter the
rebels' own.[16] This fleet was retained, and under Justinian I and his successors it developed
again into a professional and well-maintained force.[25] Due to the absence of any naval threat
however, the fleet of the late 6th century was relatively small, with several small flotillas in
the Danube and two main fleets maintained at Ravenna and Constantinople.[141] Additional
flotillas must have been stationed at the other great maritime and commercial centers of the
Empire: at Alexandria, providing the escort to the annual grain fleet to Constantinople, and at
Carthage, controlling the western Mediterranean.[142] Not only did the fleet profit from the
long-established naval tradition and infrastructure of those areas, but also, in the event of a
naval expedition, a large fleet could be quickly and inexpensively assembled by impressing
the numerous merchant vessels.[143]

[edit] Middle period (late 7th century – 1070s)

[edit] The naval themes

The Byzantine Empire in 717. The scattered and isolated imperial possessions around the
Mediterranean were defended and reinforced by the Byzantine fleets.

In response to the Arab conquests during the 7th century, the whole administrative and
military system of the Empire was reformed, and the thematic system established. According
to this, the Empire was divided into several themata, which were regional civil and military
administrations. Under the command of a stratēgos, each thema maintained its own, locally
levied forces. Following a series of revolts by thematic forces, under Constantine V the larger
early themes were progressively broken up, while a central imperial army was created,
stationed at or near Constantinople, serving as a central reserve that henceforth formed the
core of campaigning armies.[144]

A similar process was followed in the fleet, which was organized along similar lines. In the
660s, Constans II established the corps of the Karabisianoi (Greek: Καραβισιάνοι, "the Ships'
Men"),[145] possibly from the remainders of the old quaestura exercitus[146] or the Army of the
Illyricum.[147] It was headed by a stratēgos, and included the southern coast of Asia Minor
from Miletus to Seleucia in Cilicia, the Aegean islands and the imperial holdings in southern
Greece. Its headquarters was initially at Samos, with a subordinate command under a
droungarios at Cibyrra in Pamphylia. As its name suggests, it comprised most of the Empire's
standing navy, and faced the principal maritime threat, the Arab fleets of Egypt and Syria.[82]
[146]

During the course of the middle Byzantine period, the large original themes were subdivided
into smaller ones, and new ones were created by conquest in the 9th and 10th centuries.
Although most themes that had a shoreline maintained some ships, the principal naval themes
(θέματα ναυτικᾶ) in the 8th–10th centuries were four:

 the Theme of the Cibyrrhaeots or Kibyrrhaiotai (θέμα Κιβυρραιωτῶν). It was

created from the Karabisianoi fleet, and assigned the administration and defense of the
southern coasts of Asia Minor.[148] The exact date of its creation is unclear, with
estimates ranging from ca. 690,[148] to after ca. 720.[149] The seat of its stratēgos initially
at Cibyrra and later at Attaleia.[150] Being located closest to the Muslim Levant, it
remained the Empire's principal naval fleet.[82]
  the Theme of the Aegean (θέμα Αἰγαίου). It was separated from the Cibyrrhaeots in
843, probably as a response to the new threat from the Muslim emirate of Crete, and
included the Aegean islands except for the Dodecanese.[52][151]
 the Theme of Samos (θέμα Σάμου), separated from the Theme of the Aegean Sea ca.
882.[151] It included the Ionian coast, with capital at Smyrna.
 the Theme of Hellas (θέμα Ἑλλάδος), founded in ca. 686–689 by Justinian II,
encompassing the imperial possessions of southern Greece with capital at Corinth.
Justinian settled 6,500 Mardaites there, who provided oarsmen and garrisons.[145]
While not exclusively a naval theme, it maintained its own fleet. It was split in 809
into the Theme of the Peloponnese and the new Theme of Hellas, covering Central
Greece and Thessaly, which also retained smaller fleets.[152][153]

In addition, the central Imperial Fleet (βασιλικόν πλώιμον, basilikon plōimon) at

Constantinople was expanded, and played a major role, especially in the repulsion of the Arab
sieges of Constantinople.[146] Because of its location, it was also known as the fleet of the
Stenon, from the Straits of the Dardanelles.[154] Unlike the earlier Roman navy, where the
provincial fleets were decidedly inferior in numbers and included only lighter vessels than the
central fleets, the Byzantine thematic fleets were formidable formations in their own right.[155]

Other themata with a significant naval force were:

 the Theme of Sicily (θέμα Σικελίας), responsible for Sicily and the imperial
possessions in southwestern Italy (Calabria). Once the bastion of Byzantine naval
strength in the West, by the late 9th century it had greatly diminished in strength, and
disappeared after the final loss of Taormina in 902.[82]
 the Theme of Ravenna, in essence the Exarchate of Ravenna, until its fall in 751.
 the Theme of Cephallonia (θέμα Κεφαλληνίας), controlling the Ionian Islands,
promoted from an archontate in 809.[152] The new imperial possessions in Apulia were
added to it in the 870s, before they were made into a separate thema (that of
Langobardia) in about 910.[156]
 the Theme of Paphlagonia (θέμα Παφλαγονίας) and the Theme of Chaldia (θέμα
Χαλδίας), split off from the Armeniac Theme in ca. 819 by emperor Leo V and
provided with their own naval squadrons, possibly as a defense against Rus' raids.[157]

[edit] Manpower and size

Just as with its land counterpart, the exact size of the Byzantine navy and its units is a matter
of considerable debate, due to the scantness and ambiguous nature of the primary sources.
One exception are the numbers for the late 9th and early 10th century, for which we possess a
more detailed breakdown, dated to the Cretan expedition of 911. These lists reveal that during
the reign of Leo VI the Wise, the navy reached 34,200 oarsmen and perhaps as many as 8,000
marines.[1] The central Imperial Fleet totaled some 19,600 oarsmen and 4,000 marines under
the command of the droungarios of the basilikon plōimon. These four thousand marines were
professional soldiers, recruited by Basil I in the 870s, and greatly strengthened the Imperial
Fleet. Whereas previously the fleet had depended on thematic and tagmatic soldiers for its
marines, the new force provided a more reliable, better trained and immediately available
force at the Emperor's disposal.[61] Indeed, the marines of the Imperial Fleet were considered
to belong to the imperial tagmata, and organized along similar lines.[158] The Aegean Themal
Fleet numbered 2,610 oarsmen and 400 marines, the Cibyrrhaeotic Fleet stood at 5,710
oarsmen and 1,000 marines, the Samian Fleet at 3,980 oarsmen and 600 marines, and finally,
the Theme of Hellas furnished 2,300 oarsmen with a portion of its 2,000 thematic soldiers
doubling as marines.[1]

The following table contains approximate estimates of the number of oarsmen over the entire
history of the Byzantine navy:

Year 300 457 518 540 775 842 959 1025 1321

Rower 32,000[15 32,000[15 30,000[16 30,000[16 18,500[16 14,600[16 34,200[16 34,200[16 3,080[163
9] 9] 0] 0] 1] 2] 2] 2] ]
s

Contrary to popular perception, galley slaves were not used as oarsmen neither by the
Byzantines and the Arabs, nor by their Roman and Greek predecessors.[164] Throughout the
existence of the Empire, Byzantine crews consisted of mostly lower-class freeborn men, who
were professional soldiers, legally obliged to perform military service (strateia) in return for
pay or land estates. In the first half of the 10th century, the latter were calculated in the value
of 2-3 lb of gold for sailors and marines.[165]

As far as ships are concerned, according to numbers provided by Constantine

Porphyrogenitus, in 949 the Imperial Fleet alone mustered 100, 150 or 250 ships (the numbers
depend on the interpretation of the Greek text).[166] Accepting a number of 150, historian
Warren Treadgold extrapolates a total, including the four naval themes, of ca. 240 warships, a
number which was increased to 307 for the Cretan expedition of 960–961. The latter number
probably represents the approximate standing strength of the entire Byzantine navy (including
the smaller flotillas) in the 9th and 10th centuries.[2]

[edit] Rank structure

Although naval themes were organized much the same way as their land counterparts, there is
some confusion in the Byzantine sources as to the exact rank structure.[167] The general term
for admiral was stratēgos, the same term used for the generals that governed the land themata.
Under the stratēgos were two to three tourmarchai (effectively "Vice Admirals"), in turn
overseeing a number of drungarioi (corresponding to "Rear Admirals").[168] Until the mid-9th
century, the governors of the themes of the Aegean and Samos are also recorded as
droungarioi, since their commands were split off from the original thema of the Cibyrrhaeots,
but they were then raised to the rank of stratēgos.[168] The commander of the Imperial Fleet
however remained known as the droungarios tou basilikou plōimou (later with the prefix
megas, "grand").[169] His title is still found in the Komnenian era, albeit as commander of the
imperial escort squadron, and survived until the Palaiologan era, being listed in the 14th-
century Book of Offices of Pseudo-Codinus.[170] The office of a deputy called topotērētēs is
also mentioned for the Imperial Fleet, but his role is unclear from the sources. He may have
held a post similar to that of a Port Admiral.[171]

Since the admirals also doubled as governors of their themes, they were assisted by the
prōtonotarios, who headed the civilian administration of the theme. Further staff officers were
the chartoularios in charge of the fleet administration, the prōtomandatōr ("head
messenger"), who acted as chief of staff, and a number of staff komētes ("counts"), including a
komēs tēs hetaireias, who commanded the bodyguard of the droungarios.[158] Squadrons of
three or five ships were commanded by a komēs or droungarokomēs, and each ship's captain
was called kentarchos ("centurion"), although literary sources also used more archaic terms
like nauarchos or even triērarchos.[172]

Each ship's crew, depending on its size, was composed of one to three ousiai (ούσίαι, sing.
ούσία) of ca. 110 men each. Under the captain, there was the bandophoros ("banner bearer"),
who acted as executive officer, two helmsmen called prōtokaraboi ("heads of the ship"),
sometimes also referred to archaically as kybernētes, and a bow officer, the prōreus.[173] In
actual terms, there would have been several of each kind upon each ship, working in shifts.[174]
Most of these rose from the ranks, and there are references in the De Administrando Imperio
to first oarsmen (prōtelatai) who rose to become prōtokaraboi in the imperial barges, and
later assumed higher offices, with emperor Romanos Lekapenos the most notable amongst
them.[175] There were also a number of specialists on board, such as the two bow oarsmen and
the siphōnatores, who worked the siphons used for discharging the Greek fire.[173] A
boukinatōr ("trumpeter") is also recorded in the sources,[176] who conveyed orders to the
rowers (kōpēlatai or elatai).[177] Since the marine infantry were organized as regular army
units,[177] their ranks followed those of the army.

[edit] Late period (1080s – 1453)

[edit] The reforms of the Komnenoi

After the decline of the navy in the 11th century, Alexios I rebuilt it on different lines. Since
the thematic fleets vanished, their remnants were amalgamated into a unified imperial fleet,
under the new office of the megas doux.[104] The megas droungarios of the fleet, once the
overall naval commander, was subordinated to him, acting now as his principal aide.[178] The
megas doux was also appointed as overall governor of southern Greece, the old themata of
Hellas and the Peloponnese, which were divided into districts (oria) that supplied the fleet.[179]
Under John II, the Aegean islands also became responsible for the maintenance, crewing and
provision of warships, and contemporary sources took pride in the fact that the great fleets of
Manuel's reign were crewed by "native Romans", although use was made of mercenaries and
allied squadrons.[180]

[edit] The navy of Michael VIII Palaiologos

With the decline of the Byzantine fleet in the latter 12th century, the Empire increasingly
relied on the fleets of Venice and Genoa. Alongside the mistrusted Italian city-states, with
whom alliances shifted regularly, mercenaries were increasingly employed in the last
centuries of the Empire, often rewarded for their services with fiefs. Most of these
mercenaries, like Giovanni de lo Cavo (lord of Anafi and Rhodes), Andrea Moresco
(successor of de lo Cavo in Rhodes) and Benedetto Zaccaria (lord of Phocaea), were Genoese,
to whom the Byzantines were often allied. Under Michael VIII, for the first time a foreigner,
the Italian privateer Licario, became megas doux and was given Euboea as a fief.[181] In about
the same time, another high rank, that of amiralios (ἀμιράλιος or ἀμιράλης) was introduced,
being third in the hierarchy after the megas doux and the megas droungarios.[182]

At the same time, after regaining Constantinople in 1261, Michael VIII sought to lessen this
dependence on foreigners and initiated a great effort to rebuild a "national" navy, forming a
number of new corps to this purpose: the Gasmouloi (Γασμοῦλοι), who were men of mixed
Greek-Latin descent living around the capital; and colonists from Laconia, called Lakōnes
(Λάκωνες, "Laconians") or Tzakōnes (Τζάκωνες), were used as marines, forming the bulk of
Byzantine naval manpower in the 1260s and 1270s.[183] Michael also set the rowers, called
Prosalentai or Prosēlontes, apart as a separate corps.[184] All these groups received small
grants of land to cultivate in exchange for their service, and were settled together in small
colonies.[185] The Prosalentai were settled near the sea throughout the northern Aegean,[186]
while the Gasmouloi and Tzakōnes were settled mostly around Constantinople and in Thrace.
These corps remained extant, albeit in a diminished form, in the last centuries of the Empire
(the last mention of the Prosalentai is in 1361, and of the Gasmouloi as late as 1422).[6]

[edit] Ships
For more details on this topic, see Dromon.

Reconstruction of an early 10th century Byzantine bireme dromon by John H. Pryor, based on
references in the Tactica of Emperor Leo VI the Wise. Notice the lateen sails, the fore- and
mid-castles, and the Greek fire siphon in the prow. The above-water spur is evident in the
bow, while the captain's tent and the two steering oars are located at stern.

The main warship of the Byzantine navy until the 12th century was the dromon (δρόμων) and
its derivatives. An evolution of the light liburnian galleys of the imperial Roman fleets, the
term first appeared in the late 5th century, and was commonly used for a specific kind of war
galleys in the 6th.[187] The term dromōn itself comes from the Greek root δρομ-(άω), "to run",
meaning thus "runner", and 6th-century authors like Procopius are explicit in their references
to the speed of these vessels.[188] During the next few centuries, as the naval struggle with the
Arabs intensified, heavier versions with two or possibly even three banks of oars evolved.[189]
Eventually, the term was used in the general sense of "warship", and was often used
interchangeably with another Byzantine term for a large warship, chelandion (Greek:
χελάνδιον, from the Greek word kelēs, "courser"), which first appeared during the 8th century.
[190]

The appearance and evolution of medieval warships is a matter of debate and conjecture: until
recently, no remains of an oared warship form either ancient or early medieval times had been
found and information had to be gauged from literary evidence, crude artistic depictions and
the remains of a few merchant vessels. Only in 2005–2006 did archaeological digs for the
Marmaray project in the location of the Harbor of Theodosius (modern Yenikapi) uncover the
remains of over 20 Byzantine ships from the 6th to 10th centuries, including galleys.[191]

The accepted view is that the main developments which differentiated the early dromons from
the liburnians, and that henceforth characterized Mediterranean vessels, were the adoption of
a full deck (katastrōma), the abandonment of the rams on the bow in favor of an above-water
spur, and the introduction of lateen sails.[192] The dromons that Procopius describes were
single-banked ships of probably 50 oars, arranged with 25 oars on each side.[193] Again unlike
ancient Greek and Hellenistic vessels, which used an outrigger, these extended directly from
the hull.[194] In the later bireme dromons of the 9th and 10th centuries, the two oar banks
(elasiai) were divided by the deck, with the first oar bank was situated below, and the second
oar bank situated above, its rowers expected to fight alongside the marines in boarding
operations.[195]

Overall length must have been about 32 meters.[196] Although most contemporary vessels had a
single mast (histos or katartion), the larger bireme dromons at least must have had two to be
able to maneuver.[197] The ship was steered by means of two steering oars at stern (prymnē),
which also housed a tent (skēnē) that covered the captain's berth (krab(b)at(t)os).[198] The prow
(prōra) featured an elevated forecastle (pseudopation), below which the siphon for the
discharge of Greek fire projected,[199] although secondary siphons could also be carried
amidships on either side.[200] A pavesade (kastellōma), on which marines could hang their
shields, ran around the sides of the ship, providing protection to the deck crew.[201] Larger
ships also had wooden castles (xylokastra) on either side between the masts, similar to those
attested for the Roman liburnians, providing archers with elevated firing platforms.[202] The
bow spur (peronion) was intended to ride over an enemy ship's oars, breaking them and
rendering it helpless against missile fire and boarding actions.[203]

By the 10th century, there were two main classes of two-banked ("bireme") warships of the
dromon type: the chelandion ousiakon (χελάνδιον οὑσιακόν), so named because it was
manned by an ousia of 108 men and the chelandion pamphylon (χελάνδιον πάμφυλον),
which was crewed with up to 120–160 men and probably originated as a transport ship.[204]
The vessels with larger crews of up to 230 rowers and 70 marines attested for the Cretan
expeditions of 911 and 949 probably refer to supernumerary crews being carried aboard,
rather than larger vessels.[205] A smaller, single-bank ship, the monērēs (μονήρης, "single-
banked") or galea (γαλέα, from which the term "galley" derives), with ca. 60 men as crew,
was used for scouting missions but also in the wings of the battle line.[206] Three-banked
("trireme") dromons are described in a 9th century work dedicated to the parakoimōmenos
Basil Lekapenos. However this treatise, which survives only in fragments, draws heavily upon
references on the appearance and construction of a Classical trireme, and must therefore be
used with care when trying to apply it to the warships of the middle Byzantine period.[207][208]

For cargo transport, the Byzantines usually commandeered ordinary merchantmen as transport
ships (phortēgoi) or supply ships (skeuophora). These appear to have been mostly sailing
vessels, rather than oared.[209] The Byzantines and Arabs also employed horse-transports
(hippagōga), which were either sailing ships or galleys, the latter certainly modified to
accommodate the horses.[210] Given that the chelandia appear originally to have been oared
horse-transports, this would imply differences in construction between the dromōn proper,
which was developed exclusively as a war galley, and the chelandion, terms which otherwise
are often used indiscriminately in literary sources.[211]
[edit] Tactics and weapons
[edit] Naval tactics

As with the land army, the Byzantines took care to codify, preserve and pass on the past
lessons of sea warfare through the use of military manuals. The main surviving texts are the
chapters on sea combat (peri naumachias) in the Tactica of Leo the Wise and Nikephoros
Ouranos (both drawing extensively from the 6th century Naumachiai of Syrianos Magistros
and other earlier works),[207] and are complemented by relevant passages in the De
administrando imperio of Constantine Porphyrogenitus and other works by Byzantine and
Arab writers.[27]

The manuals emphasized the training and welfare of the crews, the acquisition of accurate
intelligence, and the maintenance of a disciplined and well-ordered formation. Advice is
provided on drawing up a battle plan, but they also emphasized the need for initiative and
improvisation on the part of the admiral during the actual battle. A system of transmitting
orders from ship to ship through signal flags and lanterns is also prescribed.[27] Importance is
also laid on matching one's forces and tactics to the prospective enemy: Leo VI contrasts the
Arabs with their heavy and slow ships, to the small and fast craft of the Slavs and Rus'.[212]

Indeed, because medieval Mediterranean naval warfare, following the abandonment of the
ram, depended on a constant barrage of missiles and boarding actions,[213] the main task for
fleet commanders was to keep their formations well ordered. Conversely, tactical maneuvers
attempted to disrupt the enemy formation,[214] including the use of various stratagems, such as
dividing one's force and carrying out flanking maneuvers, feigning retreat or hiding a reserve
in ambush.[215] Indeed, Leo VI advocates the use of stratagems and advises against direct open
confrontation.[216] Fleets that failed to keep an ordered formation usually avoided battle.[214]

According to Leo VI, a crescent formation seems to have been the norm, with the flagship in
the center and the heavier ships at the horns of the formation, in order to turn the enemy's
flanks.[217] A range of variants and other tactics and counter-tactics was available, depending
on the circumstance.[27] Once the fleets were close enough, exchanges of missiles began, while
the final outcome was determined by boarding actions: the ships grappled each other, and the
marines, to whom the rowers of the ship's upper bank were added, engaged in hand-to-hand
combat.[218]

It must be noted that the nature of the galley navies imposed many limitations on their
operational capabilities. Galleys did not handle well in rough waters and could be swamped,
which would be catastrophic in the open sea. Indeed, history is replete with instances were
galley fleets were sunk by bad weather.[219] The sailing season was therefore usually restricted
from mid-spring to September.[220] The galleys' maintainable cruising speed, even when using
their sails, was limited,[221] as were the amount of supplies and water it could carry, the latter
especially critical in the hot Mediterranean summers.[222] All this meant that fleets composed
of galleys were confined to coastal routes,[219] and had to make frequent landfall to replenish
their supplies and rest their crews.[223] It is for these reasons that Nikephoros Ouranos
emphasizes the need to have available "men with accurate experience of the sea [...], which
winds cause it to swell and which blow from the land, and who know the hidden rocks in the
sea, the places that have no depth, the land along which one sails and the islands adjacent to it,
the harbours and their distance from each other."[224]
[edit] Armament

Greek fire grenades and caltrops from Crete, dated to the 10th and 12th centuries.

Unlike the warships of Antiquity, Byzantine and Arab ships did not feature rams, and the
primary means of ship-to-ship combat were boarding actions and missile fire, as well as the
use of inflammable materials such as Greek fire.[155] Despite the fearsome reputation of the
latter though, it was effective only under certain circumstances, and not the decisive anti-ship
weapon that the ram had been in the hands of experienced crews.[225]

Like their Roman predecessors, Byzantine and Muslim ships were equipped with small
catapults (mangana) and ballistae (toxoballistrai) that launched stones, arrows, javelins, pots
of Greek fire or other incendiary liquids, caltrops (triboloi) and even containers full of
asbestos or, as Emperor Leo VI somewhat implausibly suggests, scorpions and snakes.[226]
Marines were heavily armored (Leo refers to them as "cataphracts") and armed with close-
combat arms such as lances and swords, while the sailors fought with bows and crossbows.[227]
The importance and volume of missile fire during sea combat can be gauged from the fleet
manifests for the Cretan expeditions of the 10th century, which mention 10,000 caltrops, 50
bows and 10,000 arrows, 20 hand-carried ballistrai with 200 bolts called myai ("flies") and
100 javelins per dromon.[228] Cannons were rarely used by the Byzantines, who only had a few
pieces for the defense of the land walls of Constantinople. Unlike the Venetians and Genoese,
there is no indication that any were ever mounted on ships.[229]

[edit] Greek fire

For more details on this topic, see Greek fire.

As he [the Emperor] knew that the Pisans were skilled in sea warfare and dreaded a
battle with them, on the prow of each ship he had a head fixed of a lion or other
land-animal, made in brass or iron with the mouth open and then gilded over, so
that their mere aspect was terrifying. And the fire which was to be directed against
the enemy through tubes he made to pass through the mouths of the beasts, so that
it seemed as if the lions and the other similar monsters were vomiting the fire."
 From the Alexiad of Anna Comnena, XI.10[230]

The term "Greek fire" was given to the concoction by the Latins (Western Europeans), as they
viewed the Byzantines simply as Greeks. The native Greek name was "liquid fire" (ὑγρόν
πῦρ). Although the use of incendiary chemicals by the Byzantines has been attested since the
early 6th century, the actual substance known as Greek fire is believed to have been created in
673 and attributed to an engineer from Syria, named Kallinikos. The most common method of
deployment was to emit the formula through a large bronze tube (siphōn) onto enemy ships.
[155]
Usually the mixture would be stored in heated, pressurized barrels and projected through
the tube by some sort of pump while the operators were sheltered behind large iron shields.
Alternatively, it could be launched by catapults. A portable version (cheirosiphōn) also
existed, reputedly invented by Leo VI, making it the direct analogue to a modern
flamethrower.[231]

The means of its production was kept a state secret, and its components are only roughly
guessed or described through secondary sources like Anna Comnena, so that its exact
composition remains unknown to this day. In its effect, the Greek fire must have been rather
similar to napalm.[155] Burning fiercely, it could stay ablaze even underwater for a short period.
Despite the somewhat exaggerated accounts of Byzantine writers, it was by no means a
"wonder weapon", and could not avert some serious defeats.[232] Certainly, in favourable
circumstances and against an unprepared enemy, its great destructive ability and
psychological impact could prove decisive, as displayed against the Rus'. Greek fire was
rarely used on land, the last time being the final siege of Constantinople in 1453. The Arabs
eventually also fielded their own "liquid fire" after 835, but it is unknown if they used the
Byzantine formula, possibly obtained through espionage or through the defection of stratēgos
Euphemios in 827, or whether they independently created a version of their own.[155]

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227. ^ Leo VI the Wise, Tactica, XIX.13
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824), Athens 1984, p. 64

[edit] Sources and bibliography

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Navy of the Byzantine Empire

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