SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C.

LANTION, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,
respondents. 
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and overwhelming powers
of government. His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under
the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to
uphold a citizens basic due process rights, or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle
sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual
concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the
criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of
the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to
guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter
referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes
correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an
extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested
state resident in the Requesting State). 
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S.
Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to
the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest
issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said
extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United
States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two
[2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty
5 years on each count);
 C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum
Penalty 5 years on each count);
D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);
E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts;
Maximum Penalty less than one year).
(p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition
request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of
some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other matters that
needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo). 
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel,
wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U. S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that
he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested
papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the
meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the
request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of
time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999
(but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the
following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and
supporting documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this
Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance
with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the
Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the
documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents
submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under
our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary
investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely
determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty
 have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be
extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and
extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for
ample time to evaluate said documents. 
2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury
information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict
secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure orders from the
concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury
information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of
extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not
authorized by the United States District Courts. In this particular extradition request the
United States Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of the subject information. This Departments denial of your request is
consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the
Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under
P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection
with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel
herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto,
and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioners letter
dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and
from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the
United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo). 
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch
25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C.
Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his
own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining
from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in
connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the
petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from
performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as
agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00
oclock in the morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written
comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said
date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER BECAUSE:  
I.

BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE

ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I. E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND
DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE
REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN
 EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE
MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.

PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING

LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE
EXTRADITION LAW;
III.

THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON

ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION

AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed
for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing:  
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from
this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or
any person or persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE
and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public
respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of
the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed
their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent.
However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to
delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing?
An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic
(the issues of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution
would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus
allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the
proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic
due process rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement
constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict
between private respondents basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive
merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of
the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court. 
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty
which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof
defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at
the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed
on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions of the
Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual, are
abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the
authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having
equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and
identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained
of, and the time and place of the commission of these acts;  
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or
description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
pertinently provides:
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet
the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the
request together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall
immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the
sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then
is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive
authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable
location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which
extradition is requested;

4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense; 

5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the
execution of punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said
Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his
arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying
documents received in support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular
officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S.
Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the
executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that
the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting
documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary
of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the
case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P. D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition
with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the
extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.). 

The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon
as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition
on the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph
[1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil,
or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of
the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent
with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree
provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State,
represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the
reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section
10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and
immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in
criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required
15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on
the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is
requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents
itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings? 
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to
file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers,
to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not
the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the
Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to
abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request
was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24
hours later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of
Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying
documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his
Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the
request to the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign
Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to
determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply
with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner
ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the
extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an
extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private
respondent insisted on the following: (1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers;
(2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and
to present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in
abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request. 
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its
powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has,
through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own,
indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow
private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign
Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a
well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The
Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by
himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his
undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui
generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of
ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical
assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the
request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not
extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that
the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August
31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said
process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial power.  
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported
by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs.
United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory
power, is one of the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise
its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the
administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or
entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means of
accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op.
cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful
aid or tool in an administrative agencys performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.
Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the
functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial
functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The
Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions
or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for
investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented
to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there
is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.  
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition
documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the
Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers
comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an
extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to
determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The bodys
power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is
characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition
process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee
pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a
contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the
request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged
after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a
shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]).
Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a
request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained,
or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only
be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his
possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee
during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as during the
evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.  
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are
essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and
ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself,
this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process
partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make
available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza
during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been
advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-
incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-
incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only
in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal
aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality,
which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the
earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of ones
license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a
respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein
ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are
deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier
case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence,
laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a
statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such
proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from
the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If,
however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the
proceeding is civil in nature.  
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of ones property or property
right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible
deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed
second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be
returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to
a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the
evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same
result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an
information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioners reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, Petitioners
Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for petitioners conclusion that his
preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a treaty in
Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had
nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of
liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516).
Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty
commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of
crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process
protection to their respective citizens. 
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly
identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective
Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and impressed,
the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of
meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to
meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process are
interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for
progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket,
the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the
process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play"
(Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owners Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]).
It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government
(Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and
procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed.,
pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in
criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these
rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case
affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their
side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondents basic due process rights, granting him the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to
submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof.
Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant. 

These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing
administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy
restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to
public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal
prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded
from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected,
such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of
a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been
claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of
the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy
considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.  
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the
Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings.
In interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the
fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal
construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of
persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In
order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in
proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the
face of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the
time the offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the commission
of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some court or magistrate
(35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the asylum state,
and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of
the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made
before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charging instrument or papers are
mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the governor of the asylum
state to effect the extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of
the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments
accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney
is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on
demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker,
Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853).  
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive
authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and
the designation of the particular officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A
Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioners memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September
13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S.
extradition procedures and principles, which are basically governed by a combination of treaties (with
special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests
for the provisional arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice
to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request
for extradition is transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of
Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal
request has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties
provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as
extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated in
accordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective
extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the
evidence offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign
country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to
conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty
permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought
and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.) 
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having
received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having
committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting extradition
(Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international
extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a committing
magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its
determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the persons extraditability. The
court then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the
Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of
State (18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the
requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present
whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination
whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one
entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition
documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act
on the courts determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign
Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the points
earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the
preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has
taken over the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and
prosecuting the petition for extradition.  
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person
sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He
emphasizes that petitioners primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondents citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
 The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a
proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that
they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that
no right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines
Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.

(pp. 40-41, Private Respondents Memorandum.)  

In the Philippine context, this Courts ruling is invoked:

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the
individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there
be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in
keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts.
There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent
public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed
under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the
nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioners argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons
must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence
to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord.
Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent
in "ordered liberty." 
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no
extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition,
the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act
favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that
federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur
2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the
power to deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the
extradition documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the
requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for
the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will not vest
our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring
compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government
of certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official
English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that
consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his Department and those
from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be
completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a
proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be
dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is
private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without
prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On
one hand, there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative
determination which, if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The
grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section
2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition
petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional
arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant
and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with
and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of
Article III which reads:  
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines,
namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access
to official records and documents. The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to
information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official records is
likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by
law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the
premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values
of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondents letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do
not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents
requested are not of public concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction
between matters vested with public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only
becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes
the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby,
his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a
public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives
or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen has
"standing". 
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct
bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes
the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to
information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes
Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the
government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such
information may be contained in official records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from
the U. S. Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers
have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U. S. Government. Consequently, if a third
party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public
concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be
tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the
government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government
has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of
the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by
then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a
fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would
private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty?
Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due
process clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the
constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law
implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice
and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations. 
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law,
requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our
country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which
provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the doctrine of
incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative
action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public
International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize
them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper
regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation
Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a
situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
[1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law
and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation,
as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat
priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.). 
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En
contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pitted against each other. There is no
occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due
process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial
determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S.
extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the
evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request
and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the
basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing
law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee.
Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in
interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for
copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to
be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of
Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioners
revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial.
The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of
certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be
lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial.  

A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.

One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two
basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective
extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the
Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Following petitioners theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a
period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of
the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioners theory would
also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition
petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor,
notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended " Can petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and
hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be
subservient thereto? 
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273
SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315
[1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]).
In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced
(Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not
tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioners
fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested States non-performance of
its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount
consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of
Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals
(201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we
ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization
of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its
Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal
Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-Connected
Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although
summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum
requirements of due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
... [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an
employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain
instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges
preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is
by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural
requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the
constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the
employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable
opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the
 charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses.

(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process
rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property
or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign
land. The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of
private respondents liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice
outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call
for "justice outside legality," since private respondents due process rights, although not guaranteed by
statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law
of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That
would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and
government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and
wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and
academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 6/2/00 2:12 PM

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding

Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,
respondents. 
DECISION
MELO, J.:
The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and overwhelming powers
of government. His only guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under
the Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to
uphold a citizens basic due process rights, or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle
sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental writ.
The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069
"Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual
concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where the
criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of
the Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for rules to
guide the executive department and the courts in the proper implementation of said treaties.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter
referred to as the RP-US Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes
correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an
extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested
state resident in the Requesting State). 
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S.
Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to
the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest
issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said
extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United
States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):
A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two
[2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);
B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty
5 years on each count);
C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum
Penalty 5 years on each count);
D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty 5
years on each count);
E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts;
Maximum Penalty less than one year).
 (p. 14, Rollo.)
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of
attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition
request and the documents in support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of
some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other matters that
needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo). 
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel,
wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U. S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that
he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested
papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the
meantime.
Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the
request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of
time to amplify on his request.
In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated July 13, 1999
(but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the foregoing requests for the
following reasons:
1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition request and
supporting documents from the United States Government, pending evaluation by this
Department of the sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance
with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the
Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the
documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which the documents
submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence. Evidentiary requirements under
our domestic law are also set forth in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.
Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a preliminary
investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of criminal cases. We merely
determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty
have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.
It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be
extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and
extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for
ample time to evaluate said documents. 
 2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand jury
information and documents obtained through grand jury process covered by strict
secrecy rules under United States law. The United States had to secure orders from the
concerned District Courts authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury
information to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose of
extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said information is not
authorized by the United States District Courts. In this particular extradition request the
United States Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of the subject information. This Departments denial of your request is
consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the
Philippine Government must represent the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department of Justice under
P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.
3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection
with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
to which we are a party provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or
convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.
(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel
herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto,
and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioners letter
dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and
from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the
United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo). 
The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter raffled to Branch
25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided over by the Honorable Ralph C.
Lantion.
After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who appeared in his
own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum, but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day, disposing:
 WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the Secretary of
Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining
from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in
connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the
petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial court; and from
performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary injunction, as
agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on August 17, 1999 at 9:00
oclock in the morning. The respondents are, likewise, ordered to file their written
comment and/or opposition to the issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said
date.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)
Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER BECAUSE:  
I.

BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM COMMITTING THE

ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I. E., TO DESIST FROM REFUSING PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND
DOCUMENTS AND FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN
OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE
REQUEST, THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE
PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS, IN
EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN ADJUDICATION ON THE
MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.

PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING

LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE
EXTRADITION LAW;
III.
 THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION IS, ON
ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS PROTECTION

AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.
(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)
On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also issued, as prayed
for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO) providing:  
NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from
this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your agents, representatives or
any person or persons acting in your place or stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE
and DESIST from enforcing the assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public
respondent in Civil Case No. 99-94684.
GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of
the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999.
(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)
The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as directed, filed
their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are patent.
However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both parties, compel us to
delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing?
An affirmative answer would necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic
(the issues of which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution
would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24, 1999, thus
allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the extradition petition with the
proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic
due process rights at the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement
constitute a breach of the legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the
RP-US Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there any conflict
between private respondents basic due process rights and the provisions of the RP-US Extradition
Treaty?
The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into the substantive
merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which concern the proceedings in Civil
Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of
the TRO of August 17, 1999 by the trial court. 
To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US Extradition Treaty
which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into force the implementing provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof
defines extradition as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at
the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed
on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government." The portions of the
Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a charged and not convicted individual, are
abstracted as follows:
The Extradition Request
The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:
1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest issued by the
authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or some other instruments having
equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as to the name and
identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known, the acts or omissions complained
of, and the time and place of the commission of these acts;  
3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the designation or
description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the request; and
4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.
(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
pertinently provides:
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet
the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the
request together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall
immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.
The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task of evaluating the
sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then
is the coverage of this task?
In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the executive
authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:
1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity and probable
location of the person sought;
2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;
3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the offense for which
extradition is requested;

4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the offense; 

5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the
execution of punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 of said
Article, as applicable.
(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)
7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide probable cause for his
arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed there;
8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent authority; and
9. A copy of the charging document.
(Paragraph 3, ibid.)
The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the accompanying
documents received in support of the request had been certified by the principal diplomatic or consular
officer of the Requested State resident in the Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S.
Embassy; Embassy Note No. 951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).
In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the
executive authority of the Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated, or that
the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation."
The Extradition Petition
Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request and its supporting
documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he shall deliver the same to the Secretary
of Justice, who shall immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the
case (Paragraph [1], Section 5, P. D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition
with the proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the
extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.). 
The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for extradition, shall, as soon
as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective extraditee to appear and to answer the petition
on the day and hour fixed in the order. The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the
immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph
[1], Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.
The Extradition Hearing
The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding is criminal, civil,
or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9 thereof provides that in the hearing of
the extradition petition, the provisions of the Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent
with the summary nature of the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree
provides that the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State,
represent the latter throughout the proceedings.
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the extradition and giving the
reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section
10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and
immediately executory (Section 12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in
criminal cases in the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required
15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).
The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is extraditable based on
the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US
Extradition Treaty. The trial court also determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is
requested is a political one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).
With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following query presents
itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the evaluation stage of the
extradition proceedings? 
A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the Secretary of Justice is to
file the extradition petition after the request and all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers,
to assure their sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or not
the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable
under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the
Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there was failure to
abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is true that the extradition request
was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24
hours later, the Department of Justice received the request, apparently without the Department of
Foreign Affairs discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying
documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs that his
Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which reason he simply forwarded the
request to the Department of Justice, indicates the magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign
Affairs in taking lightly its responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to
determine the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they comply
with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US Extradition Treaty. Petitioner
ratiocinates in this connection that although the Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the
extradition documents, the Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an
extradition petition (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private
respondent insisted on the following: (1) the right to be furnished the request and the supporting papers;
(2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable period of time to oppose the request, and
to present evidence in support of the opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in
abeyance pending the filing of private respondent's opposition to the request. 
The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority, one abdicating its
powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of Foreign Affairs, moreover, has,
through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation that it is adopting the instant petition as its own,
indirectly conveying the message that if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow
private respondent to participate in the process of evaluation.
Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the Department of Foreign
Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and supporting documents and that it arrived at a
well-founded judgment that the request and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The
Secretary of Justice, eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by
himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA Secretary or his
undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative determination?
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class by itself. It is sui
generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is purely an exercise of
ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical
assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the
request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not
extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or that
the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal legislation (tsn, August
31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said
process may be characterized as an investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding
conducted in the exercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial power.  
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b)
determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported
by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs.
United States, 304 U.S. 1). Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory
power, is one of the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise
its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26). This power allows the
administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or
entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p. 27), or to require disclosure of information by means of
accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op.
cit., p. 64).
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence, which is a useful
aid or tool in an administrative agencys performance of its rule-making or quasi-judicial functions.
Notably, investigation is indispensable to prosecution.
In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to rule on the
functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It does not exercise judicial
functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts and making findings in respect thereto. The
Court laid down the test of determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions
or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only purpose for
investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts and circumstances presented
to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there
is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.  
The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to evaluate extradition
documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the
Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only power is to determine whether the papers
comply with the requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an
extradition petition. Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to
determine whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The bodys
power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation procedure is
characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the wheels of the extradition
process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee. This
deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee
pending the submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of urgency, a
contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending presentation of the
request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged
after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a
shorter period of 20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]).
Logically, although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a
request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be continuously detained,
or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty), for he will only
be discharged if no request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his
possible flight from the Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee
during the pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as during the
evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one.  
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is akin to an
administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of which are
essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and
ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself,
this is a "tool" for criminal law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process
partakes of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make
available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain constitutional rights that are
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza
during the oral arguments, there are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had been
advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-
incrimination (tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).
In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the right against self-
incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is ordinarily available only
in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal
aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality,
which could result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing the
earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of ones
license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.
Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth against a
respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft Law. Again, we therein
ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of property, the administrative proceedings are
deemed criminal or penal, and such forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier
case of Almeda, Sr. vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence,
laid down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding is under a
statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included in the criminal case, such
proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from
the statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If,
however, the proceeding does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the
proceeding is civil in nature.  
The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of ones property or property
right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible
deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed
second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be
returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to eventual extradition to
a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the
evaluation procedure is akin to a preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same
result the arrest and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the filing of an
information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to the deprivation of his liberty.
Petitioners reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8, Petitioners
Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority for petitioners conclusion that his
preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary investigation. The characterization of a treaty in
Wright was in reference to the applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had
nothing to do with the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.
As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding enforced by public
authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative
power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of
liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516).
Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty
commitments.
The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of
crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process
protection to their respective citizens. 
The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only worded in exactly
identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are alike in what their respective
Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which the provisions are informed and impressed,
the elasticity in their interpretation, their dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of
meeting every modern problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to
meet the exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process are
interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the capacity for
progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the confines of a legal straitjacket,
the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the due process clause "gradually ascertained by the
process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs.
New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play"
(Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owners Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 [1967]).
It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government
(Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).
Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires the intrinsic
validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or property, and
procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the
guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed.,
pp. 102-106).
True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing pervade not only in
criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-observance of these
rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case
affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the right to appear therein and present their
side and to refute the position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).
In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding, Section 3, Rule 112
of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondents basic due process rights, granting him the right to be
furnished a copy of the complaint, the affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to
submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof.
Moreover, the respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant. 

These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such as:
1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive suspension of a public servant facing
administrative charges (Section 63, Local Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy
restaurants or theaters showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to
public health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal
prosecution;
2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent is not precluded
from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to the person affected,
such as the summary distraint and levy of the property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of
a temporary appointee; and
3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them had not been
claimed.
Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the evaluation stage of
the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are quite noteworthy
considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S. Government.  
American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition which is based on the
Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and international extradition proceedings.
In interstate rendition or extradition, the governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the
fugitive to the demanding state. The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal
construction to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible of
persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am Jur 2d 754-755). In
order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition papers or the demand must be in
proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional facts essential to the extradition must appear on the
face of the papers, such as the allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the
time the offense charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the commission
of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding state before some court or magistrate
(35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are then filed with the governor of the asylum state,
and must contain such papers and documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of
the instrument charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit made
before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charging instrument or papers are
mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer jurisdiction on the governor of the asylum
state to effect the extradition (35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of
the indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other instruments
accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered to the fugitive or his attorney
is directory. However, the right being such a basic one has been held to be a right mandatory on
demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker,
Cr., 324, S.W.2d 853).  
In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation to the executive
authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the return of the alleged offender, and
the designation of the particular officer having authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A
Am Jur 2d 815).
In petitioners memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter dated September
13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, summarizing the U.S.
extradition procedures and principles, which are basically governed by a combination of treaties (with
special reference to the RP-US Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In urgent cases, requests
for the provisional arrest of an individual may be made directly by the Philippine Department of Justice
to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request
for extradition is transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.
2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to the Department of
Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a declaration confirming that a formal
request has been made, that the treaty is in full force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties
provide reciprocal legal representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as
extraditable offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated in
accordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent extradition hearing.
3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the prospective
extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold a hearing to consider the
evidence offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)
4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable to the foreign
country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over the defendant and jurisdiction to
conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty
permits extradition; and (c) there is probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought
and that he committed the offenses charged (Ibid.) 
5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability after having
received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction" with having
committed any of the crimes provided for by the governing treaty in the country requesting extradition
(Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international
extradition proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a committing
magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]
6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it incorporates its
determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies the persons extraditability. The
court then forwards this certification of extraditability to the Department of State for disposition by the
Secretary of State. The ultimate decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of
State (18 U.S.C. 3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the motives of the
requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person facing extradition may present
whatever information he deems relevant to the Secretary of State, who makes the final determination
whether to surrender an individual to the foreign government concerned.
From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins and ends with one
entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the request and the extradition
documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act
on the courts determination of extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign
Affairs which should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the points
earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department of Justice for the
preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however, the Department of Foreign
Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the request to the Department of Justice which has
taken over the task of evaluating the request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and
prosecuting the petition for extradition.  
Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should the person
sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in the evaluation stage. He
emphasizes that petitioners primary concern is the possible delay in the evaluation process.
We agree with private respondents citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:
The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state ends is a
proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional adjudication. But the
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might
fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that
they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize praiseworthy
government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre ones.
(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)
 The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine Government that
no right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of Rights of the Philippines
Constitution but of the United States as well, is sacrificed at the altar of expediency.

(pp. 40-41, Private Respondents Memorandum.)  

In the Philippine context, this Courts ruling is invoked:

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the
individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not enough that there
be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means employed to pursue it be in
keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts.
There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent
public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed
under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the
nation who would deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).
There can be no dispute over petitioners argument that extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused or convicted persons
must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or fast-tracked proceedings and adherence
to fair procedures are, however, not always incompatible. They do not always clash in discord.
Summary does not mean precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent
in "ordered liberty." 
Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that point, there is no
extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may not occur. In interstate extradition,
the governor of the asylum state may not, in the absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act
favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that
federal and statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31 Am Jur
2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the requested state has the
power to deny the behest from the requesting state. Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the
extradition documents the Secretary of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the
requirements of the law and the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for
the filing of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will not vest
our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.
In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable efforts in assuring
compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it even informed the U.S. Government
of certain problems in the extradition papers (such as those that are in Spanish and without the official
English translation, and those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that
consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his Department and those
from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature of the evaluation, which cannot just be
completed in an abbreviated period of time due to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a
proceeding that urgently necessitates immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be
dispensed with?
Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of administrative action. Is
private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without
prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On
one hand, there is yet no extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative
determination which, if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The
grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The "accused" (as Section
2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat of arrest, not only after the extradition
petition is filed in court, but even during the evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional
arrest allowed under the treaty and the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant
and manifest.
Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed with
and shelved aside.
Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise invokes Section 7 of
Article III which reads:  
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the Philippines,
namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2) the corollary right of access
to official records and documents. The general right guaranteed by said provision is the right to
information on matters of public concern. In its implementation, the right of access to official records is
likewise conferred. These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by
law" (Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely on the
premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values
of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondents letter-request dated July 1, 1999 do
not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the matters contained in the documents
requested are not of public concern. On the other hand, private respondent argues that the distinction
between matters vested with public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only
becomes material when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes
the right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly affected thereby,
his right to information becomes absolute.
The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking, every act of a
public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of public concern (Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad
spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives
or simply because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the people and any citizen has
"standing". 
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said action has a direct
bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of deprivation or injury, he actually invokes
the basic right to be notified under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to
information on matters of public concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes
Section 14, particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within the control of the
government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such
information may be contained in official records, and in documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions.
In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official government action from
the U. S. Government. No official action from our country has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers
have some relation to matters of foreign relations with the U. S. Government. Consequently, if a third
party invokes this constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public
concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the balance must be
tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for the proper functioning of the
government. During the evaluation procedure, no official governmental action of our own government
has as yet been done; hence the invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of
the extradition hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government by
then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request. The extradition of a
fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.
We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant controversy: Would
private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty?
Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due
process clause in the Constitution?
First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon the
constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the Extradition Law
implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the grant of the basic rights of notice
and hearing to private respondent on foreign relations. 
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law,
requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The observance of our
country's legal duties under a treaty is also compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which
provides that "[t]he Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations." Under the doctrine of
incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land and no further legislative
action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public
International Law, 1992 ed., p. 12).
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize
them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper
regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation
Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55). In a
situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230
[1963]; In re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law
and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact that
international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation,
as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat
priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and
treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.). 
In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or national law? En
contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pitted against each other. There is no
occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty, as implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due
process rights of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the judicial
determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted to the
prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S.
extradition procedures also manifests this silence.
Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he describes the
evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the sufficiency of the extradition request
and the supporting documents.
We disagree.
In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the
basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing
law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee.
Similarly, American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in
interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even request for
copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state, and if he does, his right to
be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy surrounding the action of the Department of
Justice Panel of Attorneys. The confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioners
revelation that everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial.
The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized the disclosure of
certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential, the veil of secrecy cannot be
lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not even during trial.  

A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.

One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the conferment of the two
basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
proceedings. We have to consider similar situations in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.
Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a preliminary
investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the respondent or the prospective
extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest is even allowed by the Treaty and the
Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Following petitioners theory, because there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a
period of time, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of
the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended
except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it"? Petitioners theory would
also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition
petition has already been filed in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor,
notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended " Can petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and
hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could thus be
subservient thereto? 
The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273
SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315
[1997]; Aquinas School vs. Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]).
In essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced
(Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31 [1997]). This Court will not
tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioners
fears that the Requesting State may have valid objections to the Requested States non-performance of
its commitments under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount
consideration.
How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to the four corners of
Presidential Decree No. 1069?
Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs. Court of Appeals
(201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we
ruled that in summary proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization
of the Civil Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing its
Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971 (Providing Legal
Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may be charged for Service-Connected
Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in the Integrated National Police, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for other purposes), as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although
summary dismissals may be effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum
requirements of due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:
... [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is saying is that an
employee may be removed or dismissed even without formal investigation, in certain
instances. It is equally clear to us that an employee must be informed of the charges
preferred against him, and that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is
by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural
requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still remain consistent with the
constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the
employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable
opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the
charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defenses.

(at p. 671)
Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld the due process
rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property
or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign
land. The convergence of petitioners favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of
private respondents liberty is easily comprehensible.
We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice
outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial
pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call
for "justice outside legality," since private respondents due process rights, although not guaranteed by
statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We would not be true to the organic law
of the land if we choose strict construction over guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That
would not be in keeping with the principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.
Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of liberty and
government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger arm, lest an errant and
wayward course be laid.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers, and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
supporting evidence. The incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and
academic by this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 6/2/00 2:12 PM

MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner, vs. The HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, DAVAO ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, The HON. MINISTER, (NOW
SECRETARY) of NATURAL RESOURCES AND PHILLIP CO, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products Inc. (MIWPI, for brevity) filed this action for prohibition,
Damages and Injunction, in order to prevent the respondent Minister (now Secretary) of Natural
Resources from enforcing its Order of Execution against it, for liability arising from an alleged
encroachment of the petitioner over the timber concession of respondent DAVENCOR located in Mati,
Davao Oriental.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, , ruled in favor of the petitioner, but on appeal, was reversed by
the respondent Court of Appeals in its decision dated , which found MIWPI, as an alter ego of Milagros
Matuguina and/or Matuguina Logging enterprises (MLE, to be liable to DAVENCOR for illegal
encroachment.
The following are the antecedent facts:
On , the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forest Development issued Provisional Timber License
(PTL) No. 30, covering an area of 5,400 hectares to Ms. Milagros Matuguina who was then doing
business under the name of MLE, a sole proprietorship venture. A portion, covering 1,900 hectares, of
the said area was located within the territorial boundary of Gov. Generoso in Mati, Davao Oriental, and
adjoined the timber concession of Davao Enterprises Corporation (DAVENCOR), the private
respondent in this case.
On , petitioner Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. (MIWPI), was incorporated, having an
authorized capital stock of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00).[1] The incorporators/stockholders of
MIWPI, and their stock subscriptions were as follows:
Name No. Of Shares Subscribed Amount of Capital
Stock Subscribed
1. Henry Wee 1,160,000 1,160,000.00
2. Ma. Milagros Matuguina 400,000 400,000.00
3. Alejandro Chua Chun 200,000 200,000.00
4. Bernadita Chua 120,000 120,000.00
5. Domingo Herrera 40,000 40,000.00
6. Manuel Hernaez 40,000 40,000.00
7. Luis Valderama 40,000 40,000.00
----------------- ------------------
2,000,000 2,000,000.00
=========== ===========
Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder of MIWPI on , when the latters Board of
Directors approved by Resolution the transfer of 1,000,000 shares from Henry Wee to Milagros
Matuguina, thus giving her seventy percent (70%) stock ownership of MIWPI.
In an undated letter[2] to the Director of Forest Development (BFD) on , Milagros Matuguina requested
the Director for a change of name and transfer of management of PTL No. 30, from a single
proprietorship under her name, to that of MIWPI.
This request was favorably endorsed on [3] by the BFDs Acting Director, Jose Viado to respondent
Secretary of Natural Resources, who approved the same on .[4]
On , Milagros Matuguina and petitioner MIWPI executed a Deed of Transfer[5] transferring all of the
formers rights, interests, ownership and participation in Provincial Timber License No. 30 to the latter
for and in consideration of 148,000 shares of stocks in MIWPI.
A copy of said deed was submitted to the Director of Forest Development and Petitioner MIWPI had
since been acting as holder and licensee of PTL No. 30.
On , pending approval of the request to transfer the PTL to MIWPI, DAVENCOR, through its
Assistant General Manager, complained to the District Forester at Mati, Davao Oriental that Milagros
Matuguina/MLE had encroached into and was conducting logging operations in DAVENCORs timber
concession.
After investigation of DAVENCORs complaint, the Investigating Committee which looked into
DAVENCORs complaint submitted its report to the Director, finding that MLE had encroached on the
concession area of DAVENCOR. In line with this, the Director of Forest Development issued an
Order[6] on , finding and declaring MLE to have encroached upon, and conducted illegal logging
operations within the licensed or concession area of DAVENCOR.
MLE appealed the Order to the Ministry of Natural Resources, which appeal was docketed as MNR
CASE No. 6450. During the pendency of the appealed case with the Minister of Natural Resources,
Ma. Milagros Matuguina disposed of her shares in petitioner MIWPI, thereby ceasing to be a
stockholder of the petitioner of .[7]
On , The Minister of Natural Resources, Hon. Ernesto M. Maceda rendered his Decision,[8] affirming
the aforesaid order of the Director of Forest Development, stating thus:
DECISION
For our Resolution is the appeal by MATUGUINA LOGGING ENTERPRISES (MLR, for short) of
the Order dated of the Director of Forest Development finding and declaring MLE to have encroached
upon, and conducted illegal logging operations within the license or concession area of DAVAO
ENTERPRISES CORPORATION. The aforesaid Order dispositively states:
WHEREFORE, there being a clear and convincing proof that Matuguina Conducted illegal operation
within the licensed area of DAVENCOR, above named respondent is hereby ordered to pay to the
complainant the equivalent value in pesos of 2,352.04 cubic meters of timber based on the market price
obtaining, at the logpond of the respondent at the time of cutting, minus the cost of production, or to
restitute to the complainant equal volume of 2,352.04 cubic meters of logs owned by respondent to be
taken at respondents logpond. The respondent is hereby directed to comply with this Order within a
period of ninety (90) days from receipt of this Order and after the lapse of the said period, no
compliance has been made by the respondent, its logging operations shall ipso facto become
automatically suspended until respondent shall have complied as directed.
The Regional Director of Region II, is hereby instructed to implement this Order and to submit his
compliance report within ten (10) days after the lapse of the ninety (90) days period within which the
respondent is directed to comply with this order.
And that the dispositive portion of the said decision states;
WHEREFORE, the Order dated of the Director of Forest Development is hereby AFFIRMED.
When the Decision of the Minister of Natural Resources became final and executory, Philip Co and
DAVENCOR requested the respondent Minister on to issue immediately a writ of execution against
MLE and/or MIWPI.[9] The Order of Execution[10] was issued on by the Minister through the latters
Assistant on Legal Affairs. The said Order directed the issuance of a writ of execution, not only against
MLE, but likewise against MIWPI. The dispositive portion of the order provides:
WHEREFORE, let a Writ of Execution be issued against Matuguina Logging Enterprises and/or
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. For the satisfaction of the Decision of the Bureau of Forest
Development dated , and the Order of this office dated .
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, a writ of execution[11] dated was issued in favor of the respondent DAVENCOR, which
states:
The City/Provincial Sheriff
GREETINGS:
You are hereby directed to enforce, implement and execute the Order of Execution dated of this Office
in the above-entitled case against Matuguina Logging Enterprises and/or Matuguina Integrated Wood
Products, Inc. its officers or any person or corporation in its behalf and conformably with the Order
dated of the Director of Forest Development, stating dispositively.
xxx
You are hereby requested to submit your return to this Office within the period of sixty (60) days from
your receipt hereof as to action taken hereon.
SO ORDERED."
On February 11, 1987, MIWPI filed the instant complaint[12] for prohibition, damages and injunction,
with prayer for restraining order, which case was docketed as Civil Case No. 18,457-87 in the Regional
Trial Court Davao City, Branch 17. MIWPI stated its primary cause of action, the relevant portion of
which reads, viz.:
5. That plaintiff which has a distinct and separate personality of its own under the law, and was never a
party to the case between DAVENCOR and MLE, suddenly became a party to the case after the
decision became final and executory with the issuance of Annex B hereof for reasons known to the
defendants alone:
6. That the issuance of Annex B hereof (the order of execution) by the defendant Minister has been
made not only without or in excess of his authority but that the same was issued patently without any
factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights under the due process
clause;
7. That plaintiff, in the face of the order (Annex B) complained of, there being no appeal or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, does not have any alternative but to
ventilate the present recourse;
8. That defendant Minister is doing, threatens or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done,
some act which definitely is in violation of the plaintiffs rights respecting the subject matter of the
action, and unless said act or acts are restrained or prohibited at least during the pendency of this case,
said act or acts would probably work not only injustice to plaintiff but world tend to render the
judgment of this Honorable court ineffectual;
9. That the commission or continuance of the acts complained of during the present litigation would not
only cause great and irreparable injury, but will also work injustice to the plaintiff, and would
complicate, aggravate and multiply the issues in this case;
10. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consist in
restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the performance of acts,
either for a limited period or perpetually;
11. That great and irreparable injury would inevitably result to the plaintiff before the matter can be
heard on notice, hence, immediate issuance of a restraining order is necessary and proper;
12. That the plaintiff is willing and able to file the necessary bond executed to the defendants, in an
amount to be fixed by the Court, to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to the defendants all damages
which they may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court should finally decide that the plaintiff
was not entitled thereto.
MIWPI, likewise alleges that in wantonly and imprudently procuring the Writ of Execution against it,
which DAVENCOR and Philip Co seek to enforce a 2.5 Million Peso liability of plaintiff, the latter has
been constrained to bring the present action, thereby incurring damages in the sum of P500,000.00 in
concept of actual and compensatory damages, and P250,000.00 in attorneys fees, which amount
petitioner now seeks to recover.
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order the next day, February 12, 1987, restraining and/or
enjoining the private respondents and the Hon. Secretary of Natural Resources from enforcing,
implementing and/or carrying into effect, the decision of the respondent Secretary dated October 1,
1986, as well as the order of execution dated January 6, 1987.
On February 17, 1987, private respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss[13] alleging that the trial court had
no jurisdiction over the case under Presidential Decree No. 705, to which Motion to Dismiss, petitioner
filed an Opposition[14] dated February 1987. On March 9, 1987, the trial court issued an order[15]
denying private respondents Motion to Dismiss. Hence, private respondents filed their Answer[16]
dated March 13, 1987 and an Amended Answer[17]
In the latter pleading, private respondents raised the following special and affirmative defenses:
7. That neither Milagros Matuguina nor Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. advised defendant
Davencor of the change of name, and transfer of management of PTL No. 30. From Milagros
Matuguina to Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc., during the pendency of MNR Case No. 6540
before the Bureau of Forest Develoment and the Ministry of Natural Resources, notwithstanding that
the lawyer of matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc., who was also a stockholder thereof, had
appeared for Milagros Matuguina in said administrative case.
8. That plaintiff has acted in bad faith and is now in estoppel from questioning the Writ of Execution
issued against Milagros Matuguina (now Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc.) to satisfy the
judgment in MNR Case No. 6540.
9. This Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of this action, especially
because:
(a) The plaintiff has not exhausted administrative remedies available to it before
initiating this action;
(b) In the guise of entertaining an action for damages, this Court is being misled by the
plaintiff into deciding questions properly for the Department of Natural Resources to
decide exclusively in the lawful exercise of its regulatory jurisdiction;
(c) The plaintiff is now precluded and estopped from filing this action.
10. The plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendants and has not stated any in its complaint,
especially because:
(a) Having failed to exhaust administrative remedies, plaintiff is without a ripe cause of
action that can be pleaded before this Honorable Court;
(b) In substance, there is no justifiable question raised under the facts and circumstances
of this case.
Meanwhile, on June 2, 1987, the trial court issued an order[18] granting the petitioners prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the private respondents and the Secretary of Natural
Resources, ordering them to desist, refrain and prevent from enforcing respondent Secretarys Decision
dated October 1, 1986 as well as the writ of execution dated January 8, 1987.
On May 10, 1989, the trial court rendered its Decison[19] in favor of the petitioner, disposing of the
action as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, finding the evidence of plaintiff, Matuguina Integrated Wood
Products, Inc. sufficient to sustain a preponderance of evidence, showing that the order of execution
dated January 6, 1987, issued by the Minister of Natural Resources, through Alexander C. Castro,
Assistant Minister for Legal Affairs, included therein, plaintiff Matuguina Integrated Wood Products,
Inc., despite non-inclusion of plaintiff in the decision of the then Minister of Natural Resources, dated
October 1, 1986, already final and executory before the issuance of the order and execution, said order
or execution is hereby declared null and void and without any legal effect.
As a consequence thereof, the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this court, dated June 2, 1987 is
hereby made permanent.
Moreover, as a result of the filing of this case, defendant Philip Co and Davencor Corporation, are
ordered to jointly and severally pay the amount of P100,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages,
along with another amount of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs of this action, in favor of plaintiff
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc.
SO ORDERED.
Private respondents appealed the trial courts decision on May 19, 1989. Their notice of appeal was
approved by the trial court. The appealed case was docketed with respondent Honorable Court of
Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 19887.
On February 25, 1991, the respondent Court rendered its Decision,[20] reversing the lower courts
pronouncement. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is reversed and set aside and the
Order of Execution issued by the Minister of Natural Resources dated January 6, 1987 is affirmed.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
In due time, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.[21] Private respondents filed their
opposition[22] to the same on April 2, 1991. In a Resolution[23] dated April 12, 1991, the motion was
denied by the respondent Court.
Not content with the courts pronouncement, petitioner is now before us on a Petition for Review on
Certiorari,[24] alleging that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
questioned decision and its companion resolution, denying the motion for reconsideration.
The reasons relied upon by the Petitioner in filing its petition are hereby restated:
I
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT WAS MADE LIABLE BY
RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN HIS ORDER OF EXECUTION
DATED 06 JANUARY 1987 (EXHIBIT B OF ATTACHMENT O) ISSUED IN MNR CASE NO.
6540 DESPITE THE FACT THAT PETITIONER WAS NEVER A PARTY NOR A PARTICIPANT
IN THE SAID CASE: IN FACT, PETITIONER NEVER HAD NOTICE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN
MNR CASE NO. 6540.
II
THE FAILURE TO AFFORD PETITIONER THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL (MNR CASE NO. 6540) COULD NOT HAVE BEEN CURED BY
THE INSTITUTION OF THE ACTION FOR PROHIBITION IN THE TRIAL COURT BECAUSE
SAID COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE WHETHER PETITIONER WAS
GUILTY OF ENCROACHMENT ON PRIVATE RESPONDENT DAVENCORS TIMBER
CONCESSION; FURTHERMORE, THE QUESTION ON WHETHER PETITIONER WAS
GUILTY OF ENCROACHMENT WAS NEVER PUT IN ISSUE IN THE CASE BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT.
III
THE LIABILITY OF MILAGROS/MLE AS FOUND BY RESPONDENT SECRETARY IN ITS
DECISION DATED 01 OCTOBER 1986 (EXHIBIT A OF THE ATTACHMENT 0) CANNOT BE
IMPUTED AGAINST PETITIONER SINCE THE LATTER IS A CORPORATION HAVING A
PERSONALITY SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM MILAGROS/MLE.
IV
PETITIONER CANNOT BE MADE LIABLE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS UNDER THE
DEED OF TRANSFER DATED 18 JULY 1975 (EXHIBIT 3 OF ATTACHMENT P) AND
SECTION 61 OF THE REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (P.D. 705, AS
AMENDED):
A. THE ALLEGED TRANSFER OF PTL NO. 30 FROM MILAGROS/MLE TO
PETITIONER NEVER BECAME BINDING AND EFFECTIVE SINCE PTL NO. 30
REMAINED IN THE NAME OF MILAGROS/MLE UNTIL ITS EXPIRATION ON
30 JUNE 1977: THIS IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT SAID TRANSFER WAS
NEVER APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF NATURAL RESOURCES.
B. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS AN EFFECTIVE TRANSFER OF
PTL NO. 30 FROM MILAGROS/MLE TO PETITIONER, THE TRANSFER COULD
NOT MAKE PETITIONER LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED ENCROACHMENT OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT DAVENCORS TIMBER CONCESSION, SINCE:
1. SAID TRANSFER WAS EXECUTED PRIOR TO THE COMMISSION OF
THE ALLEGED ENCROACHMENT AND THE FILING OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT FOR ENCROACHMENT DATED 28
JULY 1975; THUS, PETITIONER CANNOT BE MADE LIABLE FOR
OBLIGATONS OF MILAGROS/MLE WHICH WERE INCURRED AFTER
DATE OF THE SAID TRANSFER.
2. SAID TRANSFER COVERED ONLY FORESTRY CHARGES AND
OTHER GOVERNMENT FEES, AND DID NOT INCLUDE THE PERSONAL
LIABILITY OF MILAGROS/MLE THAT AROSE FROM THE
ENCROACHMENT OF THE TIMBER CONCESSION OF RESPONDENT
DAVENCOR.[25]
Private Respondent DAVENCOR and the public respondent Hon. Minister (now Secretary) of Natural
Resources filed separate Comments[26] on September 5, 1991 and June 8, 1992 respectively.
The essential issues of the present controversy boil down to the following:
Was the Petitioner denied due process when it was adjudged liable with MLE for encroaching upon the
timber concession of DAVENCOR in the respondent Minister's order of Execution?
Is the petitioner a transferee of MLE's interest, as to make it liable for the latters illegal logging
operations in DAVENCORs timber concession, or more specifically, is it possible to pierce the veil of
MIWPIs corporate existence, making it a mere conduit or successor of MLE?
Generally accepted is the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner
an execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have his day in court.
In Lorenzo vs. Cayetano, 78 SCRA 485 [1987], this Court held that only real parties in interest in an
action are bound by judgment therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant
thereto.[27]
Indeed a judgment cannot bind persons who are not parties to the action.[28] It is elementary that
strangers to a case are not bound by the judgment rendered by the court and such judgment is not
available as an adjudication either against or in favor of such other person. A decision of a court will
not operate to divest the rights of a person who has not and has never been a party to a litigation, either
as plaintiff or as defendant. Execution of a judgment can only be issued against one who is a party to
the action, and not against one who, not being a party in the action has not yet had his day in court.[29]
The writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, as it may not vary the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce.[30] Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment which
sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life and
exceeds it, it has pro tanto no validity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional
provision against depriving a person of his property without due process of law.[31]
The writ of execution issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources on January 8, 1987 clearly varies
the term of his Decision of October 1, 1986, inasmuch as the Writ includes the MIWPI as party liable
whereas the Decision only mentions Milagros Matuguina/MLE.
There is no basis for the issuance of the Order of Execution against the petitioner. The same was issued
without giving the petitioner an opportunity to defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for
the issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not appear that petitioner was at all
furnished with a copy of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Execution of the Honorable Secretarys
decision against it. Petitioner was suddenly made liable upon the order of execution by the respondent
Secretarys expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the same, apparently on the basis
merely of DAVENCORs letter requesting for the Order, and without hearing or impleading MIWPI.
Until the issuance of the Order of execution, petitioner was not included or mentioned in the
proceedings as having any participation in the encroachment in DAVENCORs timber concession. This
action of the respondent Secretary disregards the most basic tenets of due process and elementary
fairness.
The liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in administrative proceedings does not empower
the presiding officer to make conclusions of fact before hearing all the parties concerned.[32] In Police
Commission vs. Hon Judge Lood,[33] we held that the formalities usually attendant in court hearings
need not be present in an administrative investigation, provided that the parties are heard and given the
opportunity to adduce their evidence. The right to notice and hearing is essential to due process and its
non-observance will, as a rule, invalidate the administrative proceedings.
As observed by the appellate court, to wit:
the appellant should have filed a Motion with the Minister with Notice to the appellee to include the
latter as party liable for the judgment in order to afford the appellee an opportunity to be heard on its
liability for the judgment rendered against Ma. Milagros Matuguina doing business under the name
Matuguina Logging Enterprises.[34]
Continuing, the said court stated further that:
Nevertheless, the failure to comply with the procedure in order to satisfy the requirements of due
process was cured by the present action for prohibition where the liability of appellee has been
ventilated.
We do not agree. Essentially, Prohibition is a remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards or
persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by
law[35] As we held in Mafinco Trading Corporation vs. Ople, et al,[36] in a certiorari or prohibition
case, only issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board and offices involved may be resolved
on the basis of undisputed facts.
The issue of whether or not petitioner is an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, is one of fact, and
which should have been threshed out in the administrative proceedings, and not in the prohibition
proceedings in the trial court, where it is precisely the failure of the respondent Minister of Natural
Resources to proceed as mandated by law in the execution of its order which is under scrutiny.
Assuming, arguendo, that prohibition is the proper remedy for determining the propriety of piercing the
separate personality of petitioner with its stockholders, the evidence presented at said trial does not
warrant such action.
It is settled that a corporation is clothed with a personality separate and distinct from that of persons
composing it. It may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be
held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.
Conversely, a stockholder cannot be made to answer for any of its financial obligations even if he
should be its president.[37] But when the juridical personality of the corporation is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or defend crime, the corporation shall be considered as
a mere association of persons (Koppel, Inc. vs. Yatco, 77 Phil 496, Palay, Inc. vs. Clave, G.R. No.
56076, September 21, 1983, 124 SCRA 638), and its responsible officers and/or stockholders shall be
individually liable (Namarco vs. Associated Finance Co., Inc., G.R. No. L- 20886, April 27, 1967, 19
SCRA 962). For the same reasons, a corporation shall be liable for the obligations of a stockholder
(Palacio vs. Fely Transportation Co., G.R. No. L-15121, August 31, 1963, 5 SCRA 1011), or a
corporation and its successor-in-interest shall be considered as one and the liability of the former attach
to the latter.[38]
But for the separate juridical personality of a corporation to be disregarded, the wrongdoing must be
clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.[39]
In the case at bar, there is, insufficient basis for the appellate courts ruling that MIWPI is the same as
Matuguina. The trial courts observation is enlightening.
Despite apparently opposing evidence of both parties, the Court gathered and finds, that defendants
attempt to pierce the veil of corporate personality of plaintiff corporation, as to consider plaintiff
corporations merely an adjunct or alter ego of Maria Milagros Matuguina Logging Enterprises, to
justify defendants claim against plaintiff corporation, suffers heavily from insufficiency of evidence.
It is the vehement contention of defendants, to bolster its claim, that plaintiff corporation is the alter
ego of Maria Milagros Matuguina Logging Enterprises, because when Milagros Matuguina became the
Chairman of the Board of Directors of plaintiff corporation, she requested for the change of name and
transfer of management of PTL No. 30, from her single proprietorship, to plaintiff corporation.
Secondly, when Milagros Matuguina executed the deed of transfer, transferring her forest concession
under PTL No, 30, together with all the structures and improvements therein, to plaintiff corporation,
for a consideration of P14,800.00 representing 148,000 shares of stocks of plaintiff corporation actually
all existing shares of stocks of Milagros Matuguina, in plaintiff corporation represents 77.4% therein;
suffice to say that plaintiff corporation practically became an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina.
Defendants arguments on this peripheral aspect of corporate existence, do not at all indicate that such a
legal fiction, was granted.
In the first place the alleged control of plaintiff corporation was not evident in any particular corporate
acts of plaintiff corporation, wherein Maria Milagros Matuguina Logging Enterprises using plaintiff
corporation, executed acts or powers directly involving plaintiff corporation.
Neither was there any evidence of defendants, that Maria Milagros Matuguina Logging Enterprises,
using the facilities and resources of plaintiff corporation, involved itself in transaction using both single
proprietorship and plaintiff corporation in such particular line of business undertakings.
As stated by this court in resolving plaintiffs prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
said:
There is actually, no evidence presented by defendant, showing that sometime on March 15, 1986, to
January 1987, during which period, the subject decision of Hon. Secretary of Natural Resources and
corresponding writ of execution, Maria Milagros Matuguina was a stockholder of plaintiff corporation
in such amount or was she an officer of plaintiff corporation in whatever capacity.
The above circumstances is relevant and significant to assume any such justification of including
plaintiff corporation in the subject writ of execution, otherwise as maintained by defendants, what
matters most was the control of Milagros Matuguina Logging Enterprises of plaintiff corporation in
1974 and 1975, when the administrative case was pending, this circumstance alone without formally
including plaintiff corporation in said case, will not create any valid and sufficient justification for
plaintiff corporation, to have been supposedly included in the suit against defendants and Maria
Milagros Matuguina Logging Enterprises, in the administrative case.
Yet, granting as claimed by defendants, that in 1974 or in 1975, Maria Milagros Matuguina became the
controlling stockholder of plaintiff corporation, on account of the change of name and transfer of
management of PTL No. 30, this circumstance, we repeat, does not of itself prove that plaintiff
corporation was the alter ego of Maria Milagros Matuguina Logging Enterprise, as enunciated in
various decisions of this Court, to wit:
It is important to bear in mind that mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of
all or nearly all of the capital stocks of the corporation, is not itself a sufficient warrant for disregarding
the fiction of separate personality. (Liddel and Co. vs. Collector of Internal revenue, G.R. No. 9687,
June 30, 1961).
It is recognized as lawful to obtain a corporation charter, even with a single substantial stockholder, to
engage in specific activity and such activity may co-exist with other private activities of the
stockholders.
If the corporation is substantial one, conducted lawfully; without fraud on another, its separate identity
is to be respected.[40]
In this jurisdiction, it is a settled rule that conclusions and findings of fact by trial court are entitled to
great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the
trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying in the case.[41]
It is likewise improper to state that the MIWPI is the privy or the successor-in-interest of MLE, as the
liability for the encroachment over DAVENCORs timber concession is concerned, by reason of the
transfer of interest in PTL No. 30 from MLE to MIWPI.
First at all, it does not appear indubitable that the said transfer ever became effective, since PTL No. 30
remained in the name of Milagros Matuguina/MLE until it expired on June 30, 1977.[42]
More importantly, even if it is deemed that there was a valid change of name and transfer of interest in
the PTL No. 30, this only signifies a transfer of authority, from MLE to MIWPI, to conduct logging
operations in the area covered by PTL No. 30. It does not show indubitable proof that MIWPI was a
mere conduit or successor of Milagros Matuguina/MLE, as far the latters liability for the encroachment
upon DAVENCORs concession is concerned. This is the only conclusion which we can discern from
the language of Section 61 of P.D. 705,[43] and the letters of the Acting Minister of Natural Resources
to Milagros Matuguina/MLE and to MIWPI, on September 16, 1975.[44] In Soriano vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court stated in clear language, that-
It is the general rule that the protective mantle of a corporations separate and distinct personality could
only be pierced and liability attached directly to its officers and/or members stockholders, when the
same is used for fraudulent, unfair, or illegal purpose. In the case at bar, there is no showing that the
Association entered into the transaction with the private respondent for the purpose of defrauding the
latter of his goods or the payment thereof. xxx. Therefore, the general rule on corporate liability, not
the exception, should be applied in resolving this case. (G.R. No. 49834, June 22, 1989)
The respondents cite Section 61 of P.D. 705 to establish MIWPIs succession to the liability of Milagros
Matuguina/MLE:
SEC. 61. Transfer. Unless authorized by the Department Head, no licensee, lessee, or permittee may
transfer, exchange, sell, or convey his license agreement, license, lease or permit, or any of his rights or
interest therein, or any of his assets used in connection therewith.
The licensee, lessee, or permittee shall be allowed to transfer or convey his license agreement, license,
lease, or permit only if he has not violated any forestry law, rule or regulation; has been faithfully
complying with the terms and conditions of the license agreement, license, lease or permit; the
transferee has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to hold a license agreement,
license, lease or permit; there is no evidence that such transfer or conveyance is being made for
purposes of speculation; and the transferee shall assume all the obligations of the transferor.
The transferor shall forever be barred from acquiring another license agreement, license, lease or
permit.
Even if it is mandated in the abovestated provision that the transferee shall assume all the obligations of
the transferor this does not mean that all obligations are assumed, indiscriminately.
Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and intent of the legislature that is important.
When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to
absurdity, it should be construed according to the spirit and reason, disregarding if necessary the letter
of the law.[45]
In construing statutes, the terms used therein are generally to be given their ordinary meaning, that is,
such meaning which is ascribed to them when they are commonly used, to the end that absurdity in the
law must be avoided.[46] The term obligations as used in the final clause of the second paragraph of
Section 61 of P.D. 705 is construed to mean those obligations incurred by the transferor in the ordinary
course of business. It cannot be construed to mean those obligations or liabilities incurred by the
transferor as a result of transgressions of the law, as these are personal obligations of the transferor, and
could not have been included in the term obligations absent any modifying provision to that effect.
In the September 16, 1975 letters of Acting Director of the Bureau of Forest Development to Milagros
Matuguina and MIWPI informing them of the approval of Matuguina's request for the change of name
and transfer of management of PTL No. 30, the following statements were made by the Acting
Director:
"In view hereof, (Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc.) shall assume the responsibility of paying
whatever pending liabilities and/or accounts remaining unsettled, if any, by the former licensee,
Milagros Matuguina, with the government." (Emphasis ours)[47]
Accordingly, the letter's language implies that the obligations which MIWPI are to assume as transferee
of Milagros Matuguina/MLE are those obligations in favor of the government only, and not to any
other entity. Thus this would include Forestry Charges, Taxes, Fees, and similar accountabilities.
In sum, the Court makes the following pronouncements:
(a) The respondent Honorable Minister of Natural Resources gravely abuse its discretion when it issued
its Order of Execution on January 6, 1987, including therein as one of the parties liable the petitioner
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc., which was never a party to the assailed proceeding
resulting in the issuance of such Order and, without affording the same an opportunity to be heard
before it was adjudged liable.
(b) The petitioner is a corporate entity separate and distinct from Milagros Matuguina/Matuguina
Logging Enterprises, there being no clear basis for considering it as a mere conduit or alter ego of
Matuguina/MLE, and therefore, cannot be made liable for the obligations of the same for encroachment
over the timber concession of private respondent DAVENCOR.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the Decision dated
February 25, 1991 is SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED,
and correspondingly, Order of Execution of the respondent Secretary of Natural Resources is declared
Null and Void and without effect.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PEDRO S. ESPINA,
CRISTETA REYES, JOHNY SANTOS, ANTONIO ALEGRO, ROGELIO MENGUIN, PETE
ALVERIO, ROGEN DOCTORA and JANE GO, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review with an urgent prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order which seeks to: (a) annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 31733 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Pedro S. Espina et al.", insofar as it
denied the People's prayer to inhibit respondent Judge Pedro S. Espina of the from hearing Criminal
Cases No. 93-01-38 & 9301-39, respectively, entitled "People of the vs. Cristeta Reyes, et al." and
"People of the vs. Jane C. Go"; and b) enjoin respondent judge from conducting further proceedings in
the aforesaid criminal cases.
Acting on the said petition, the Court on April 3, 1995 resolved to require respondents all of whom are
the accused in the aforesaid criminal cases, to comment thereon within 10 days from notice, to issue the
temporary restraining order prayed for, and to enjoin respondent judge from taking further action in
Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 & 93-01-39 until further orders from the Court.
It appearing that private respondents Cristeta Reyes & Rogen Doctora, Johny Santos & Antonio Alegro
& Jane C. Go failed to file their respective comments within the period which expired on April 17,
1995 and April 18, 1995, respectively, the Court on June 26, 1995 resolved to require said private
respondents to show cause why they should not be disciplinary dealt with for such failure, and to file
the required comments, both within ten (10) days from notice.
As to respondents Johny Santos & Antonio Alegro (prisoners at the Tacloban City Jail), copies of the
resolution requiring them to file comment were returned unserved with the postmaster's notation
"unknown in said address". The Court, on directed the Solicitor General to serve the same on said
respondents and to inform the Court of such service, both within ten (10) days from notice.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Compliance stating that the required copies were sent to
private respondents Santos & Alegro through ordinary mail on .
To date, all the respondents have not yet filed their comments, for verily, delay in the submission of the
same would appear to benefit respondents, and sanction against them may not really amount to much,
considering that most of them are under detention. Thus, so as not to unduly delay the disposition of
Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39, we now resolve to dispense with respondent's comments
and to proceed with the disposition of the petition.
One of the essential requirements of procedural due process in a judicial proceeding is that there must
be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it.
Thus, every litigant, including the State, is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge which
was explained in Javier vs. Commission of Elections (144 SCRA 194 [1986]), in the following words:
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must
not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their
rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge,
otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will
not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the
justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a
formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the
parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denoucement according to a prepared script.
There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The Judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
In the case at bar, Judge Pedro Espina, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, can not be
considered to adequately possess such cold neutrality of an impartial judge as to fairly assess both the
evidence to be adduced by the prosecution and the defense in view of his previous decision in Special
Civil Action No. 92-11-219 wherein he enjoined the preliminary investigation at the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office level against herein respondent Jane Go, the principal accused in the killing of her
husband Dominador Go.
Judge Espina's decision in favor of respondent Jane Go serves as sufficient and reasonable basis for the
prosecution to seriously doubt his impartiality in handling the criminal cases. Verily, it would have
been more prudent for Judge Espina to have voluntarily inhibited himself from hearing the criminal
cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 31733 is hereby SET ASIDE and The Honorable Pedro Espina, Presiding Judge of Branch 7 of the
Regional Trial Court of the 8th Judicial Region stationed in Tacloban is hereby declared disqualified
from taking cognizance of Criminal Cases No. 93-01-38 and 93-01-39. It is further ordered that these
criminal cases be re-raffled to another branch of the .
SO ORDERED.

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:
The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as a result of
supervening events it has become moot and academic. It is not as simple as that. Several lives have
been lost in connection with this case, including that of the petitioner himself. The private respondent is
now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has been defiled and the popular will scorned through a
confabulation of those in authority. This Court cannot keep silent in the face of these terrible facts. The
motion is denied.
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the
May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the
advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve
of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the
petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. The incident naturally heightened
tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it
intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the
ruling party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true
to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the
petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His
complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division
of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void
because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the
Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was
gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious
manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the killing, which
flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently believed they were above the
law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors that strengthened the cause of the Opposition
in the February revolution that toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present government under
President Corazon C. Aquino.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the
petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a
convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues involved that must be
resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important
purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect
condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the
government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not
always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and
decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute
has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act
then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as
a restraint upon the future.
It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press that elections during the
period of the Marcos dictatorship were in the main a desecration of the right of suffrage. Vote-buying,
intimidation and violence, illegal listing of voters, falsified returns, and other elections anomalies
misrepresented and vitiated the popular will and led to the induction in office of persons who did not
enjoy the confidence of the sovereign electorate. Genuine elections were a rarity. The price at times
was human lives. The rule was chicanery and irregularity, and on all levels of the polls, from the
barangay to the presidential. This included the rigged plebiscites and referenda that also elicited the
derision and provoked the resentments of the people.
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness of elections in other
provinces dominated by the KBL. Terrorism was a special feature, as demonstrated by the killings
previously mentioned, which victimized no less than one of the main protagonists and implicated his
rival as a principal perpetrator. Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their
supporters were gripped with fear of violence at the hands of the party in power.
What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the
Commission on Elections toward the anomalies being committed. It is a matter of record that the
petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All the electoral body did was refer
the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its constitutional role as
the guardian of free, orderly and honest elections. A more assertive stance could have averted the
Sibalom election eve massacre and saved the lives of the nine victims of the tragedy.
Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its transparent bias in
favor of the administration. This prejudice left many opposition candidates without recourse except
only to this Court.
Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns, the
petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival, the
private respondent herein. 1 Specifically, the petitioner charged that the elections were marred
by "massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of
election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated
by the armed men of respondent Pacificador." 2 Particular mention was made of the
municipalities of Caluya, Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and also of San Remigio, where
the petitioner claimed the election returns were not placed in the ballot boxes but merely
wrapped in cement bags or Manila paper.
On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board
of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning
candidate until further orders.3 On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the board to
immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case
before the Commission.4 On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board
of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day
period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. 5 Finally, on July 23, 1984, the
Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia
proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of Antique. 6
This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners Jaime Opinion and
Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former law
partner of private respondent Pacificador, Opinion had refused.7
The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision.
The core question in this case is one of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the
private respondent the winner in the election?
The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all
member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.
Section 3 provides:
The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be
heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa,
which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases
shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision.
While both invoking the above provisions, the petitioner and the respondents have arrived at opposite
conclusions. The records are voluminous and some of the pleadings are exhaustive and in part even
erudite. And well they might be, for the noble profession of the law-despite all the canards that have
been flung against it-exerts all efforts and considers all possible viewpoints in its earnest search of the
truth.
The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all
contests involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections en banc. This is as it should be, he says, to insure a more careful decision,
considering the importance of the offices involved. The respondents, for their part, argue that only
contests need to be heard and decided en banc and all other cases can be-in fact, should be-filed with
and decided only by any of the three divisions.
The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible distinction between the
terms "contests" and "cases" to prove his point. 8 Simply put, his contention is that the pre-
proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a
contest at that time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission
on Elections, consonant with Section 3. The issue was at this stage still administrative and so
was resoluble by the Commission under its power to administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections,9 not its authority as sole judge of the election contest.
A contest, according to him, should involve a contention between the parties for the same office "in
which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder but also to have himself inducted into the
office." 10 No proclamation had as yet been made when the petition was filed and later
decided. Hence, since neither the petitioner nor the private respondent had at that time
assumed office, there was no Member of the Batasang Pambansa from Antique whose
election, returns or qualifications could be examined by the Commission on Elections en
banc.
In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding election cases,
according to this theory, the Constitution was laying down the general rule. The exception was the
election contest involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided
en banc. 11 The en banc requirement would apply only from the time a candidate for the
Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was only then that a contest could be
permitted under the law. All matters arising before such time were, necessarily, subject to
decision only by division of the Commission as these would come under the general heading
of "election cases."
As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections into two, viz.: (1) over matters arising before the proclamation, which should
be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its administrative power; and (2) over matters
arising after the proclamation, which could be heard and decided only en banc in the exercise of its
judicial power. Stated otherwise, the Commission as a whole could not act as sole judge as long as one
of its divisions was hearing a pre-proclamation matter affecting the candidates for the Batasang
Pambansa because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still another way, the Commission en banc
could not do what one of its divisions was competent to do, i.e., decide a pre-proclamation controversy.
Moreover, a mere division of the Commission on Elections could hear and decide, save only those
involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa, all cases
involving elective provincial and city officials from start to finish, including pre-proclamation
controversies and up to the election protest. In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and then
judicial powers. But in the case of the Commission en banc, its jurisdiction would begin only after the
proclamation was made and a contest was filed and not at any time and on any matter before that, and
always in the exercise only of judicial power.
This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the whole, granting to the
division while denying to the banc. We do not think this was the intention of the Constitution. The
framers could not have intended such an irrational rule.
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial
and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from
beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of
the winners.
It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now called "pre-
proclamation controversies" is a relatively recent innovation in our laws, having been introduced only
in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code. Section 175 thereof
provided:
Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The Commission shall be the sole judge
of all pre-proclamation controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final
and executory. It may, motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing
order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any proclamation, if one
has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.
Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns and qualifications of public officers
came under the complete jurisdiction of the competent court or tribunal from beginning to end and in
the exercise of judicial power only. It therefore could not have been the intention of the framers in
1935, when the Commonwealth Charter was adopted, and even in 1973, when the past Constitution
was imposed, to divide the electoral process into the pre-proclamation stage and the post-proclamation
stage and to provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage, considering the first administrative and
the second judicial.
Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C. Section 2(2) was
incorporated in the 1973 Constitution did not follow the strict definition of a contention between the
parties for the same office. Under the Election Code of 1971, which presumably was taken into
consideration when the 1973 Constitution was being drafted, election contests included the quo
warranto petition that could be filed by any voter on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the
contestee although such voter was himself not claiming the office involved. 12
The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the
widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be
interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as referring
to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation
of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to stress, the
term should be given a consistent meaning and understood in the same sense under both Section 2(2)
and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that
"election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns
and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of
canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns and "qualifications" to matters that could be
raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or
ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they applied
to the members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973
Constitution, could be heard and decided by it only en banc.
We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and decided by the
Commission on Elections, only by division as a general rule except where the case was a "contest"
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving
members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the
most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the
Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late
already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many
unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat
of the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory would make this gambit possible for the
pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three
members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the
Commission en banc.
After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able to rectify in time the
proclamation summarily and not very judiciously made by the division. While in the end the protestant
might be sustained, he might find himself with only a Phyrric victory because the term of his office
would have already expired.
It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre- proclamation question upon the
division, the Constitution did not intend to prevent the Commission en banc from exercising the power
directly, on the theory that the greater power embraces the lesser. It could if it wanted to but then it
could also allow the division to act for it. That argument would militate against the purpose of the
provision, which precisely limited all questions affecting the election contest, as distinguished from
election cases in general, to the jurisdiction of the Commission en banc as sole judge thereof. "Sole
judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also and even the division of the Commission A
decision made on the contest by less than the Commission en banc would not meet the exacting
standard of care and deliberation ordained by the Constitution
Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation controversies in Section
175, supra, the law was obviously referring to the body sitting en banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation
controversies involved in Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections, 13 where the said provision was
applied, were heard and decided en banc.
Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier attention by the
respondent Commission on Elections is due process of law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair
play which is the hallmark of the free society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit
himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the private respondent, he obstinately
insisted on participating in the case, denying he was biased. 14
Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at the time, and
the particular relationship between Commissioner Opinion and MP Pacificador, one could not be at
least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of the body would be adverse to the petitioner. As in
fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the
case to another division cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter
belied his wounded protestations of innocence and proved the motives of the Second Division when it
rendered its decision.
This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the
indispensable imperative of due process. 15 To bolster that requirement, we have held that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance
to the parties that his decision will be just.16 The litigants are entitled to no less than that.
They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give
them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must
believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice
Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a
formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the
parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script.
There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the
prejudice of a just decision. Where this is probable or even only posssible, due process demands that
the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must be above
suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should have recognized his duty and abided by this
well-known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the Second Division of the
necessary vote for the questioned decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the proceeding null and
void. 17
Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken place, not the least significant
of which was the February revolution of "people power" that dislodged the past regime and ended well
nigh twenty years of travail for this captive nation. The petitioner is gone, felled by a hail of bullets
sprayed with deadly purpose by assassins whose motive is yet to be disclosed. The private respondent
has disappeared with the "pomp of power" he had before enjoyed. Even the Batasang Pambansa itself
has been abolished, "an iniquitous vestige of the previous regime" discontinued by the Freedom
Constitution. It is so easy now, as has been suggested not without reason, to send the rec•rds of this
case to the archives and say the case is finished and the book is closed.
But not yet.
Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in the vigor of his
youth because he dared to speak against tyranny. Where many kept a meekly silence for fear of
retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned in hopes of safety and even reward, he chose to fight.
He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His
was a singular and all-exacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country. And though he fought
not in the barricades of war amid the sound and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier nonetheless,
fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the enemies of his race, unfortunately of his race
too, who would impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark enslavement. He did not see the
breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a very real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer
because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, "swifter than eagles and stronger than lions."
A year ago this Court received a letter which began: "I am the sister of the late Justice Calixto Zaldivar.
I am the mother of Rhium Z. Sanchez, the grandmother of Plaridel Sanchez IV and Aldrich Sanchez,
the aunt of Mamerta Zaldivar. I lost all four of them in the election eve ambush in Antique last year."
She pleaded, as so did hundreds of others of her provincemates in separate signed petitions sent us, for
the early resolution of that horrible crime, saying: "I am 82 years old now. I am sick. May I convey to
you my prayer in church and my plea to you, 'Before I die, I would like to see justice to my son and
grandsons.' May I also add that the people of Antique have not stopped praying that the true winner of
the last elections will be decided upon by the Supreme Court soon."
That was a year ago and since then a new government has taken over in the wake of the February
revolution. The despot has escaped, and with him, let us pray, all the oppressions and repressions of the
past have also been banished forever. A new spirit is now upon our land. A new vision limns the
horizon. Now we can look forward with new hope that under the Constitution of the future every
Filipino shall be truly sovereign in his own country, able to express his will through the pristine ballow
with only his conscience as his counsel.
This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It can and will be won if we are
able at last, after our long ordeal, to say never again to tyranny. If we can do this with courage and
conviction, then and only then, and not until then, can we truly say that the case is finished and the
book is closed.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events
that have legally rendered it moot and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision
of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.
Fernan and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I concur and reserve the filing of a separate concurrence.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring in the result:
I concur in the result. The questioned Decision of the Second Division of the COMELEC, dated July
23, 1984, proclaiming private respondent, Arturo F. Pacificador, as the duly elected Assemblyman of
the province of Antique, should be set aside for the legal reason that all election contests, without any
distinction as to cases or contests, involving members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa fall under the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution.
FELICIANO, J., concurring in the result:
I agree with the result reached, that is, although this petition has become moot and academic, the
decision, dated 23 July 1984, of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections which had
proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador as the duly elected Assemblyman of the Province of Antique must be
set aside or, more accurately, must be disregarded as bereft of any effect in law. I reach this result on
the same single, precisely drawn, ground relied upon by Melencio-Herrera, J.: that all election contests
involving members of the former Batasan Pambansa must be decided by the Commission on Elections
en banc under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution. These Sections do not
distinguish between "pre-proclamation" and "post-proclamation" contests nor between "cases" and
"contests."

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I concur and reserve the filing of a separate concurrence.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring in the result:
I concur in the result. The questioned Decision of the Second Division of the COMELEC, dated July
23, 1984, proclaiming private respondent, Arturo F. Pacificador, as the duly elected Assemblyman of
the province of Antique, should be set aside for the legal reason that all election contests, without any
distinction as to cases or contests, involving members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa fall under the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc pursuant to Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution.
FELICIANO, J., concurring in the result:
I agree with the result reached, that is, although this petition has become moot and academic, the
decision, dated 23 July 1984, of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections which had
proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador as the duly elected Assemblyman of the Province of Antique must be
set aside or, more accurately, must be disregarded as bereft of any effect in law. I reach this result on
the same single, precisely drawn, ground relied upon by Melencio-Herrera, J.: that all election contests
involving members of the former Batasan Pambansa must be decided by the Commission on Elections
en banc under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution. These Sections do not
distinguish between "pre-proclamation" and "post-proclamation" contests nor between "cases" and
"contests."
Footnotes

PEDRO M. AZUL, doing business under the names and styles of JERLYN TRADING &
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES & BERLYN SERVICE CENTER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE P. CASTRO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch IX at Quezon City, and ROSALINDA P. TECSON, respondents.
Edmundo A. Baculi for petitioner.
Benjamin Grecin for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner raises due process questions in this petition for certiorari contending that the respondent
court gravely abused its discretion-(l) when it denied a motion to lift an order of default issued seven
(7) days before the petitioner received the order to file responsive pleading; (2) when it denied a motion
for new trial or reconsideration on the ground that it was pro-forma; (3) when it rendered a decision,
not supported by the facts and the law, granting a total amount of P1,187,615.69 covering the principal
and damages in a connection case for only P250,092.55; (4) when it issued orders denying an extension
of time to file the record on appeal and dismissing the appeal; and (5) when it issued a writ of
preliminary attachment on a bond of P250,000.00 with no basis for the allegation that he is about to
remove or dispose of his properties to further defraud his creditors.
On March 14, 1979, respondent Rosalinda Tecson filed a complaint for collection of the sum of
P250,092.55 with interests. Tecson also prayed for P100,000.00 actual and compensatory damages,
P500,000.00 moral damages, exemplary damages as may be proved during the trial, twenty five percent
(25%) attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs. The complaint alleged that Tecson, on various
occasions, loaned a total of P391,822.78 to Azul to finance the latter's deliveries of supplies and
construction materials to the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As inducement for the loans in addition
to her share of the profits, the private respondent alleged that she was authorized to collect the checks
due to Azul from the AFP Finance Center. However, Tecson was able to collect only P141,730.23 thus
leaving a balance of P250,092.55, subject matter of the suit filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal at Quezon City, then presided by Judge Ulpiano Sarmiento.
The copy of the complaint was received by petitioner Azul on March 27, 1979. On April 10, 1979, the
petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for extension of time to file a responsive pleading. He asked
for fifteen (15) days from April 11, 1979.
Judge Sarmiento having retired, Judge Lino Anover took over the sala temporarily and gave Azul only
five (5) days from April 11, 1979 within which to file his responsive pleading.
Unfortunately, the petitioner received this order dated April 11, 1979 to declare the petitioner in default
since the extended period had expired.
On April 18, 1979, respondent Judge Jose Castro over the sala vacated by Judge Sarmiento. Among his
acts on that first day in office was an order declaring Azul in default and directing the presentation of
evidence ex-parte before the branch clerk of court "at such time and date convenient to both."
The reception of evidence was conducted by the court's commissioner on April 19, 1979. On April 27,
1979, the respondent court rendered the questioned decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff as
follows:
a. The sum of P250,092.55 the principal obligation, with interest thereon at the legal rate
from the date of filing of the complaint on March 14, 1979 until fully paid;
b. the sum of P100,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages in both causes of action;
c. the sum of P350,000.00 as moral damages in both causes of action;
d. the sum of P150,000.00 as exemplary damages in both causes of action;
e. the sum equivalent to 25% percent of the total claims involved in all the causes of
action in the complaint as attorney's fees;
f. to pay the expenses of litigation and costs of suit.
On May 2, 1979, petitioner Azul, as yet unaware of the decision, filed a motion to lift the order of
default. Together with the motion, he also filed his answer.
On May 7, 1979, the decision adverse to the petitioner was received by his counsel.
On June 6, 1979, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial.
On July 20, 1979, the court issued an order denying the motion to lift the order of default followed by
another order on July 24, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration or new trial.
On August 1, 1979, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond, and a motion for extension of
time to file his record on appeal.
On August 3, 1979, the respondent court denied the motion for extension of time to file record on
appeal stating that the motion was filed late. The petitioner asked that this denial be reconsidered
because the decision was actually received on May 7, 1979. The petitioner explained that the date
"May 5, 1979" given as the date of receipt was a clerical error and, therefore, the motion for extension
of time to file record on appeal was filed within the reglementary period.
On August 7, 1979, the court reconsidered its earlier denial and stated, "while the instant motion is not
sufficiently meritorious, if only to give the defendant a final chance to ventilate his case on appeal and
in the interest of justice, said defendant is given ten (10) days from receipt of this order within which to
file his record on appeal.
The petitioner filed his record on appeal on August 21, 1979. The court approved it on August 27,
1979. However, acting on an August 30, 1979 opposition filed by respondent Tecson, the court on
August 31, 1979 issued an order setting aside its August 27, 1979 order approving the record on appeal.
On September 11, 1979 the respondent court issued the order dismissing the appeal.
We agree with the petitioner that he was denied due process. The constitutional provision on due
process commands all who wield public authority, but most peremptorily courts of justice, to strictly
maintain standards of fundamental fairness and to insure that procedural safeguards essential to a fair
trial are observed at all stages of a proceeding.
From the earliest inception of constitutional government in our country, the concepts of notice and
hearing have been fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without
the right to notice and to be heard. The emphasis on substantive due process and other recent
ramifications of the due process clause sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due
process was initially concerned with fair procedure. Every law student early learns in law school the
definition submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat.
518) that due process is the equivalent of law of the land which means "the general law; a law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial ... that
every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general
rules which govern society."
A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment only after a lawful hearing by a coldly
neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of procedural due process.
We had occasion to emphasize in Santiago v. Santos (63 SCRA 392), which, unlike the case before us
now, was only a summary action for ejectment that:
In an adversary proceeding, fairness and prudence dictate that a judgment, based only on
plaintiff's evidence adduced ex parte and rendered without hearing defendant's evidence,
should be avoided as much as possible. In order that bias may not be imputed to the
judge, he should have the patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a
chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proofs might not be
adequate to overthrow the case for the plaintiff. A display of petulance and impatience in
the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold
neutrality of an impartial judge".
It is true that a party should be vigilant of his rights. It may be argued that when the petitioner's counsel
asked for a fifteen (I 5) day extension from April 11, 1979 to file his answer, it was imprudent and
neglectful for bum to assume that said first extension would be granted. However, the records show
that Atty. Fernando P. Camaya personally went to the session hall of the court with his motion for
postponement only- to: be informed that Presiding Judge Ulpiano Sarmiento had just retired but that his
motion would be considered "submitted for resolution." Since the sala was vacant and pairing judges in
Quezon City are literally swamped with their own heavy loads of cases, counsel may be excused for
assuming that, at the very least, lie had the requested fifteen (15) days to file his responsive pleading.
It is likewise inexplicable why Judge Lino Anover, who had not permanently taken over the sala
vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly rule that only a five-day extension, would be allowed.
And to compound the petitioners problems, the order was sent by mail and received only twelve (12)
day later or after the five-day period. Before the much publicized Project Mercury of the Bureau of
Posts, a court should have known that court orders requiring acts to be done in a matter of days should
not be sent by mail. Meanwhile, the petitioner was declared in default. The motion to declare defendant
in default is dated April 17, 1979. No copy was furnished the petitioner. It was acted upon on April 18,
1979, the very first day in office of the respondent judge in Quezon City.
Jurisprudence on default judgments is clear and abundant. Our ruling in Amante v. Sunga (64 SCRA
192) is appropriate:
In the attendant circumstances, We cannot perceive how the interest of justice was
served and promoted by the precipitate action of the trial court. A default judgment does
not pretend to be based on the merits of the controversy. Its existence is justified by
expediency. It may, however, amount to a positive and considerable injustice to the
defendant. The possibility of such serious consequences necessarily requires a careful
examination of the circumstances under which a default order was issued. And when no
real injury would result to the interests of the plaintiff by the reopening of the case, the
only objection to such action would, therefore, be solely on a technicality. On such an
infirm foundation, it would be a grievous error to sacrifice the substantial rights of a
litigant. For the rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective in
assisting the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
cases.
Shortly afterwards, the often cited case of Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete (66 SCRA 425) reiterated the same
principle:
After careful scrutiny of all the above-related proceedings in the court below and mature
deliberation, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that petitioners should be granted
relief, if only to stress emphatically once more that the rules of procedure may not be
misused and abused as instruments for the denial of substantial justice. A review of the
record of this case immediately discloses that here is another demonstrative instance of
how some members of the bar, availing of their proficiency in invoking the letter of the
rules without regard to their real spirit and intent, succeed in inducing courts to act
 contrary to the dictates of justice and equity, and, in some instances, to wittingly or
unwittingly abet unfair advantage by ironically camouflaging their actuations as earnest
efforts to satisfy the public clamor for speedy disposition of litigations, forgetting an the
while that the plain injunction of Section 2 of Rule 1 is that the "rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining" not only
'speedy' but more imperatively, "just . . . and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding." We cannot simply pass over the impression that the procedural
maneuvers and tactics revealed in the records of the case at bar were deliberately
planned with the calculated end in view of depriving petitioners and their co-defendants
below of every opportunity to properly defend themselves against a claim of more than
substantial character, considering the millions of pesos worth of properties involved as
found by respondent judge himself in the impugned decision, a claim that appears, in the
light of the allegations of the answer and the documents already brought to the attention
of the court at the pre-trial, to be rather dubious. What is most regrettable is that
apparently, all of these alarming circumstances have escaped respondent judge who did
not seem to have hesitated in acting favorably on the motions of the plaintiff conducive
to the deplorable objective just mentioned, and which motions, at the very least,
appeared to be of highly controversial merit, considering that their obvious tendency and
immediate result would be to convert the proceedings into a one-sided affair, a situation
that should be readily condemnable and intolerable to any court of justice.
The defendant's failure to answer on time was excusable. Moreover, the lower court was presented with
defenses which, on their face, appeared to warrant a setting aside of the default order and a full-fledged
hearing where both parties could present their respective evidences. The petitioner stated:
11. That defendant has good and valid defenses consisting of:
a) I did not borrow the huge sum of THREE HUNDRED NINETY ONE
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY TWO PESOS & 781100
(P391,822.78) from plaintiff Rosalinda Tecson;
b) I did not issue to Rosalinda Tecson the receipt mentioned in par. 8 of
her complaint;
c) That the same receipts mentioned in par. 8 of her complaint did not
state that sums of money stated on the face of these receipts were received
as loan, in fact it does not appear on the face of the receipts for what
purpose the said money were allegedly received;
d) That the checks she mentioned in par. 8 were issued by her and
encashed by her which is very unnatural for a person who is lending
money to another;
e) That there is pending between Rosalinda Tecson and myself Civil Case
No. 113565 of the Court of First Instance of Manila entitled "RIZAL
 COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION versus PEDRO M.
AZUL, ROSALINDA P. TECSON and PURITA DE CASTRO," where
the said amount of THREE HUNDRED NINETY ONE THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY TWO PESOS & 78/100 (P391,822.78)
and in addition the same amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY ONE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS & 20/100
(P141,730.20) mentioned in pars. 8 and 9 of plaintiff's complaint are the
subject matter of compulsory cross- claim between the said parties;
f) Plaintiff was never authorized to withdraw, collect and receive the
checks whose face value amounted to ONE HUNDRED FORTY ONE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS & 20/100 (P
141,730.20) mentioned in par. 9 of her complaint;
g) Plaintiff was never authorized to endorse and encash the checks
mentioned in par. 9 of her complaint;
h) Plaintiff up to this time was not able to show any authority authorizing
her to withdraw, receive and endorse checks intended for me;
i) The estafa case, I.S. 78-20883, I filed against plaintiff before the City
Fiscal's Office of Quezon City is valid and fully supported by a document
and in fact, it was filed with and was endorsed by the authorities at Camp
Crame after an investigation was conducted, wherein plaintiff Rosalinda
Tecson was given the opportunity to present evidence;
j) That I filed the said estafa case in the exercise of my right and within
legal bounds;
12. That, if given the opportunity to present my evidence before this Court, I would be
able to prove my defendant and support them with sufficient documentary and oral
evidence; that I need only about three (3) hours to present my evidence in support of
these defenses;
13. Attached to this motion is an affidavit of merits as required by the Rules of Court.
The private respondent contends that the default judgment has become final and executory and may no
longer be set aside. As in the Lim Tanhu case, we cannot simply pass over the impression that the
procedural maneuvers and tactics revealed in the records of the case at bar were deliberately planned
with the calculated end in view of depriving petitioners of an opportunity to defend themselves, not
only against the claim of P250,092.55 but damages and attorney's fees quadruple that amount and of
the right to elevate the decision to a higher court.
The petitioner cryptically refers to an "unseen hand" orchestrating proceedings. His counsel, Atty.
Camaya, went to court with a motion for extension of time to file answer. Instead of being informed
that even with the retirement of the presiding judge, he had only five (5) days to answer, he was told to
file the motion and consider it submitted. The order granting five days extension was mailed with the
near certain knowledge he would not get it on time and after petitioner's being knocked out by an order
declaring him in default, there was the well-founded "hope that procedural mistakes along the way will
bury forever the presence of an irregularity."
The fears of the petitioner turned out to be justified, His counsel fell into some procedural lapses as the
respondent's counsel ably blocked every attempt to set aside the default judgment and keep it from
becoming final.
Not only was the petitioner not furnished a copy of the motion to declare him in default but no time and
date of hearing were fixed. The motion is dated April 17, 1979. It was granted on April 18, 1979. On
April 19, 1979, evidence was presented ex-parte before the branch clerk of court. About one week
later, the decision was rendered. In addition to the principal claim of P250,092.55, the court awarded
interest at the legal rate until paid, P600,000.00 in damages, and P237,523.14 attorney's fees for
counsel whose most difficult work up to that point was preparing the complaint and the motion to
declare the defendant in default and presenting evidence ex-parte before the branch clerk of court.
The July 24, 1979 order of the lower court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration or new
trial on the ground that it is "pro forma". Even a cursory appraisal of the motion will indicate that it is
far from pro forma. The motion discusses in seven (7) typewritten legal size pages why the defendant's
failure to file responsive pleading should be excused on grounds of excusable mistake and negligence
and why the default judgment should be deemed null and void. The lower court which had just awarded
extravagantly liberal damages in a default judgment should have given better reasons for rejecting the
motion instead of relying on the conventional finding of a "pro forma" presentation.
On August 1, 1979, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file
record on appeal. The lower court denied the motion for extension of time to file record on appeal on
August 3, 1979 on the ground that it was filed two days late. Upon a motion for reconsideration
explaining a typographical error which mistakenly indicated that a decision actually received on May 7
was received on May 5, the court granted ten (10) days extension to file the record on appeal only to
reverse itself when on September 11, 1979, it granted the respondent's motion to dismiss appeal.
The private respondent capitalizes on procedural errors allegedly committed by the petitioner's counsel
after he failed to file his answers within the given five-day period. Counsel has explained the delays but
without going into the merits of the explanations, we find the delays insufficient reason to warrant our
countenancing the denial in this case and the disregard of our many admonitions for courts to be wary
and reluctant in deciding cases through default judgments.
The petitioner alleges that the decision awarding P1,187,615.69 to the private respondent is not
supported by the facts elicited during the hearing ex-parte before the branch clerk of court. The merits
of the collection case should be determined after both petitioner and respondent are afforded full
opportunity to present their respective evidences.
The petitioner's mention of an "unseen hand" orchestrating the proceedings in this case should also be
referred to the office of the Court Administrator for investigation and appropriate action.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court's order dated
March 19, 1979 issuing a writ of preliminary attachment, the order dated April 18, 1979, declaring the
petitioner in default, the decision dated April 27, 1979, the order dated July 20, 1979 denying the
motion to lift the order of default, the order dated July 24, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration
or new trial, the order dated Septemeber 11, 1979 dismissing the appeal, and the order dated October
29, 1979 issuing a writ of execution to enforce the court's judgment are SET ASIDE as NULL and
VOID. The appropriate branch of the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City is ordered to ADMIT the
ANSWER filed by the petitioner and CONDUCT trial on the merits. The Acting Court Administrator is
ordered to conduct and INVESTIGATION as abovestated.
SO ORDERED.